The Effect of Institutional Arrangements on Political Advocacy
by Swedish and American Nonprofits
Richard Hoefer
Abstract
Using survey data from Swedish and American human service interest groups, this
paper explores the impacts of institutional arrangements on advocacy organizations.
These two countries were chosen to exemplify corporatist and pluralistic systems.
Results indicate that these different systems of interest group and government
relations have significant impacts on how advocacy organizations are structured and
operate. As predicted by corporatist and pluralist theory, Swedish groups are different
than American groups in many ways relating to their "demographic" attributes, their
organizational environment and their relationship with government. In addition, the
different institutional arrangements have an impact on what activities Swedish and
American groups use to influence policy and the self-perceived effectiveness of those
efforts, although not always in the ways expected.
Implications for future research and theory-building are also discussed.
Introduction
One common way to conduct comparative research is to find two cases which are
widely divergent on an important variable in order to highlight expected differences.
If hypotheses derived from theory hold up in such research, the theory appears sound
and can be applied to more ambiguous situations. This paper uses the theories of
corporatism and pluralism as exemplified by Sweden and the United States to explore
how institutional arrangements affect political advocacy by nonprofit organizations.
The results show that these different systems affect many aspects of the way that
advocacy organizations are structured and operate.
The paper is divided into several sections. The introduction describes Swedish
corporatism and American pluralism and discusses the current situation for voluntary
sector advocacy organizations. The paper next details the research methods and
general research questions addressed. The third section presents results for human
service interest groups in both countries. A final section discusses the results and
draws some conclusions about what has been found through this study.
Corporatism and Pluralism
Swedish Corporatism
There is an extensive literature about corporatism in general and Sweden in particular.
Most authors promote the view that Sweden is a good example of the phenomenon
(Grant, 1985; Lehmbruch, 1984; Schmidt, 1982; Schmitter, 1981; Strich, 1974).
Peterson (1977: 59), for example, states: "Corporate structures are particularly well
developed in Sweden and their effect on interest group politics is probably more
apparent there than in other political systems."
Although the term "corporatism" takes on many meanings in the literature, in the
Swedish context we can use Micheletti's formulation:
A minimal definition of corporatism is an integral relationship for decision-making
and implementation between the state and encompassing interest organizations.
Encompassing interest organizations represent the greater part of the collectivity
which they can organize as members. For Sweden, the distinguishing characteristic of
corporatism is the incorporation of antagonistic, encompassing interests in state
policymaking" (1991:149).
Swedish corporatism is broad in scope and has not changed much in recent years. It
has withstood attack from conservative political parties when they controlled
parliament in recent years (Bergström, 1991; Hoefer, 1996; Hoefer, 1994; Micheletti,
1991; Rothstein, 1988). While some literature suggests that Sweden is becoming less
corporatist (Bergström, 1991; Cawson, 1982, Micheletti, 1991; Peterson & Walker,
1991; Rothstein, 1988), the most recent empirical evidence indicates little change
occurring since the mid-1980s (Hoefer, 1996). Organizations, in this system, continue
to have official and relatively easy access to decisionmakers (Anton, 1980; Heclo and
Madsen, 1987).
Voluntary sector organizations in Sweden are without question part of the corporatist
structure. Lundström (1996:139) describes current relations between the voluntary and
state sector in terms of "close cooperation and integrative processes" (emphasis in
original). In a historical process that accelerated after World War II, the Swedish
government took over many voluntary services and made them a part of the welfare
state. The voluntary organizations did not oppose this shift in responsibility.
(Lundström, 1996). According to Lundström,
Older organizations survived through strategies that include the establishing and
developing of activities within certain niches of the field. In addition, more or less
new types of organizations were able to establish themselves. These interest
organizations and self-help groups often have adopted an ideology related to the labor
movement and popular mass movement traditions that were established at the turn of
the century (1996:139).
There are three primary corporatist structures in Swedish policy-making. The first are
Royal Commissions (utredningar) which the government sets up and funds to study a
particular delimited area and to propose legislation. Representatives of interest groups
are appointed by the government to be voting members of the commissions.
Membership is a highly prized commodity for groups because the basic thrust of
policy proposals is shaped here. Groups which are not designated to be members are
often allowed to appoint non-voting "experts" to participate in the process. The most
similar mechanism in the USA is the use of Presidential commissions, although the
Swedish Royal commissions are a much more important and institutionalized part of
the legislative process.
The second corporatist structure is the invitation to comment on commission
proposals for new policy (the "remiss" system). Open to any group or individual in
Sweden, these comments in favor of or against the commission's ideas must be
considered by the government and carry substantial weight. In fact, Elvander (1969:
255) found that groups rank the remiss process higher, on average, than being
commission members in terms of getting their views across to government. The
closest American equivalent is the process of commenting on proposed regulations by
government agencies.
The last major corporatist structure is the use of interest group representatives on "layperson councils" (lekmannastyrelser). These councils are charged with overseeing the
implementation of laws and regulations and thus have an important role in day-to-day
government operations. They are more powerful than the citizen advisory boards
sometimes seen in the United States.
There are currently pressures on the social welfare voluntary sector to change its role
in Swedish society. The changes would entail "partly shifting the emphasis of
voluntary efforts from being schools for democracy and informers of the people in
favor of efforts concerning the production of welfare" (Lundström, 1996:140). These
changes will be resisted, according to Lundström, because of the organizations'
"grounding in the Swedish tradition of popular mass movements, where basic
democracy, member power and, not least, the organization of interest groups are
ideals upheld by many" (1996:141).
Helping keep corporatism alive are incentives for established organizations to
maintain the current system. Heisler and Kvavik (1974), for example, describe a
process of co-optation whereby groups are offered representation in policy-making
circles in exchange for supporting the resulting policies, even if the policy is not
exactly (or even very close to) what the group desired. In this model, corporatism is
fueled by the wishes of the groups to maintain their position within policy-making
circles.
While Heisler and Kvavik show why groups wish to maintain the current system,
Peterson (1977) stresses the advantages of corporatism to the government. First, the
government is able to mold the corporatist environment and governmental structures
to improve its bargaining position vis-a-vis interest groups. The government can do
this by being willing and able to deny membership on corporatist policy-making
bodies to interest groups which do not "act responsibly." Second, Swedish
corporatism allows the government to hear a wide range of opinions and uphold the
societal injunction to include, in some way, all substantively important interest groups
in decision-making relating to a policy area (Peterson, 1977) (for a longer discussion
of corporatism in social welfare policymaking in Sweden see Hoefer, 1996 and
Hoefer, 1994).
If Lundström is correct, the importance of advocacy efforts in Sweden will continue to
overshadow service provision among voluntary organizations in the social welfare
sector and the corporatist pattern will endure. This is in line with Heclo and Madsen's
conclusion about Swedish policymaking:
There is simply no alternative mechanism to commission work, no alternative
structures of corporate representation, no alternative processes for getting heard and
getting along in public life (1987:22).
American Pluralism
One of the important functions of nonprofit organizations in the United States has
traditionally been advocacy, particularly for increased government funding for
services to individuals, although service provision and other roles are also important
(Kramer, 1981). In this paper, we focus on the type of American nonprofit advocacy
organizations often referred to as interest groups. Interest groups in America have
been defined as "any group that is based on one or more shared attitudes and makes
certain claims upon other groups or organizations in society (Truman, 1971:33). In
order to do this, they "focus mainly on the lawmaking phase of the governmental
process" (Hrebenar, 1997:10).
Both the positive and the negative aspects of American interest groups are detailed in
the voluminous literature on these organizations. While there is controversy about
many elements of interest groups, it is clear that groups are not written into the
American constitution, nor are there such well developed official pathways to policymaking power for them in the United States as there are in Sweden. Interest groups in
America are important in the policy-making process but their place is outside the
formal limits of the Constitution. They have a place in the process only to the extent
that other actors allow them to have a place.
In order to be included in the process, interest groups in the United States usually
bring with them key resources which they share with decision-makers. These key
resources are funds, information and loyal members.
Funds are important to elected officials as it is very expensive to run for office.
Campaign contributions from groups are usually welcome and are considered
important in gaining access to these officials after the election is won. While perhaps
commonly believed by the public, there is no scholarly evidence that legislative votes
are "purchased" with campaign funding.
Information is also an important resource for interest groups. Policy-makers want
information (either to support a position already held or to aid in taking a position)
and an interest group with the appropriate data is in a strong position to influence a
decision-maker, either in the legislature or in the bureaucracy.
Loyal members allow interest group leaders to use a variety of tactics. Instead of (or
in addition to) presenting information directly to policy-makers, for example, a group
could mail the same information to its members and have them contact their own
legislators or the proper executive office. Loyal members are also more easily
"delivered" as votes to elected officials.
The doctrine of pluralism indicates that there are many groups in the American
policy-making process, all working to have their ideas adopted by elected officials.
Decision-makers respond to what they see before them and maintain order between
the contending groups. All groups thus have some chance of having their ideas
adopted and their interests satisfied although groups with more money, information
and/or members have better chances.
This concept of a pluralistic political system is not shared by all observers of the
American scene, many of whom argue that policies in America are generally made in
favor of the wealthy and well-connected. Advocates of this "elite" view maintain that
the most important issues are not up to a decision by elected officials. Only a few
groups can ever hope to be influential and these are agents of the upper classes.
Whichever is the "truth" about pluralism and elitism at the very highest levels of
decision-making, decisions made by Congress and state legislatures, the President,
governors and other actors contacted by interest groups are important to many
American citizens, especially those receiving benefits from human service programs.
Funding can be increased or cut. Benefits can be changed from in-kind to cash.
Eligibility can be broadened or narrowed. Tax laws can be altered to include program
benefits or exclude them. Thus, the ultimate truth of policy-making in the United
States is that elected officials make important choices and interest groups often
influence the final outcomes of those choices.
Researchers note several recent changes in the American interest group system.
Perhaps the most important is that the number of groups has grown tremendously in
recent years (Loomis and Ciglar, 1995; Hrebenar, 1997; Petracca, 1992; Walker,
1983). Within this tremendous increase has also been a shift in the types of groups,
with a particular increase in the number of groups representing "the public interest" or
interests of persons who have heretofore been more-or-less excluded from the
political process (Loomis and Ciglar, 1995; Hrebenar, 1997; Petracca, 1992; Walker,
1983).
No one knows precisely how many interest groups there are in the United States at the
local, state and national levels. In 1996, however, it was estimated that there were
over 22,000 interest groups at the national level (Hrebenar, 1997). Of these, about
1,900 were classified as being active in social welfare issues, up from nearly 1,000 in
1980 (Hrebenar, 1997: 15).
A second major shift affecting the operations of human service advocacy
organizations is that the technology available to groups has changed. Computers allow
more targeted communication to organizational members and decision-makers. Onceesoteric communication mechanisms such as fax machines, cellular phones and
electronic communication make possible enhanced grass-roots strategies and speedier
responses to legislative events (Loomis and Ciglar, 1995; Hrebenar, 1997; Petracca,
1992).
The end result of these (and other) changes is that "while the proliferation of interest
groups has resulted in increased representation, it has also resulted in decreased
accountability and responsibility" (Hrebenar, 1997: 334). Wilson argues that the
American system is a reflection of political culture.
In its interest group system, the United States reflects a balance that might be said to
be true of its political system more broadly: emphasis is placed more on
representation and less on effective governance. No interest group system exceeds the
capacity of the American one to represent effectively a wide diversity of views.In
contrast, the opportunities for producing better governance or improved growth
through the sort of partnership between government and economic interests found in
Japan or Sweden are absent in the United States (1992:95).
Having examined the role of nonprofit advocacy organizations under Swedish
corporatism and American pluralism, we now turn to discussing the methods of the
current study and specify the research questions addressed.
Methods
This research project employed surveys of human service interest groups in Sweden
and the United States. The questionnaires were as identical to each other as possible
while reflecting differences in political institutions. The surveys were completed in
1994 by 61 Swedish organizations and 127 American organizations,. This represents a
60% return rate for the Swedish survey and a 40% rate for the American survey.
For Sweden, the primary way that organizations were selected for inclusion in the
research was if they had used the remiss system to comment on government human
services policy proposals during the 1980s. This list was augmented by selecting a
few additional groups listed in the Stockholm phone book under any one of many
different headings reflecting advocacy-oriented organizations. American
organizations were included if they were listed in the1992 Washington Information
Directory (a list of thousands of interest groups) as being active in social welfare
policy and if the group confirmed that it lobbied the executive branch as well as the
legislative branch.
For both countries, a typical mail survey process was used in this research: an initial
mailing to all groups, a postcard "Thank you"/reminder ten days later, and a second
full mailing to all non-respondents two weeks later (Fowler, 1988).
This research is unique in having identical survey information on a broad range of
issues regarding advocacy organizations active in social welfare issues from Sweden
and the United States. The American survey is similar to that used by Walker (1983);
it was adapted to fit the Swedish situation by the author. Before being used in
Sweden, however, three Swedish political scientists read it and suggested various
improvements.
Research Question
This paper is a first look at the data collected by these surveys. The overarching
question we address is: "Do the structures of corporatism and pluralism affect the
demographics, environment, activities and effectiveness of human service advocacy
groups?"
Results
This section is divided into four areas, focusing on the topics of respondent
demographics, group environment, group advocacy activities and self-reported group
advocacy effectiveness. Each subsection begins with a description of several
hypotheses about the ways that corporatism and pluralism should be reflected in the
data. Results are then shown to either support or reject the hypotheses.
Respondent Demographics
Given the nature of a corporatist system in which "encompassing organizations" are
granted access to the policymaking processes and the length of time that Sweden's
system has been corporatist, we believe that there is a strong incentive for interests to
have organized quite a while ago and to have maintained an all-encompassing
organization. Groups active in policymaking generally derive their legitimacy from
representing (and, in some ways, controlling) citizens who are members.
Representation requires members; control is aided by an organization that is not
merely a national group, but one that has local sub-units.
A pluralist system, however, should look different. Groups have little incentive to be
all-encompassing; groups are more likely to try to exploit narrow niches in the policy
space (Browne, 1991). This would lead to a number of small organizations, both in
terms of staff and membership (if any; organizations may not have any members).
Those organizations that are membership groups have little incentive to establish
local or state chapters that might compete for contributions of scarce money and time.
When describing Swedish groups, then, we should expect that they will be older (on
average) than US groups, more "member-oriented" and structured with more subunits.
We also suspect that the American system will be more dynamic, with larger increases
in staff size and membership in recent years.
Table 1 shows data that support these generalizations. The median age for Swedish
groups is over twice that of American groups (52.0 years compared to 23.5 years). All
of the Swedish groups have members compared to only 74% of US organizations.
More of the Swedish organizations have subunits and their median staff size is larger
than the median staff size of American groups. (American organizations do have a
larger mean staff size, but this is due to two organizations with extremely large
staffs.)
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the sample
Sweden
USA
(n = 61)
(n = 127)
52.0 years
23.5 years
.000 A
Have Members?
100%
74%
N/A
Mean Number
96,276
616,001
.079 B
Mean Number Organizational
Members
4,761
10,709
.103 B
% Groups with an Increase in
Membership Size in Last 5 years
38%
54%
.000 A
Have Subunits?
82%
52%
.000 A
Median Staff Size
16 FTEs
11.5 FTEs
N/A
Mean Staff Size
49 FTEs
64 FTEs
.035 B
25%
49%
.000 A
Demographic Category
Median Age
P value
Individual Members
% Groups with an Increase in Staff
Size in Last 5 years
Notes: A - statistical test is a chi-square test.
B - statistical test is an Eta test.
Complete information on the distributions used to calculate the statistics are available
from the author.
The data also indicate that the American system has seen a greater percentage of
groups increasing their membership and their staff size in the recent past compared to
the Swedish groups. This dynamism may be related to the fact that the Swedish
interest group system is already very crowded and the groups have already done a
good job of having nearly all willing persons join the organizations they are eligible
for.
Group Environment
One of the key components of an interest group's existence is the type of environment
within which it operates. We expect that a group in a corporatist environment has a
secure niche, that competition with other groups for members and resources is limited
and that conflict is limited, as actors in the political system attempt to accommodate
their needs with the needs of all. In addition, because corporatism includes groups in
the decisionmaking process no matter which political party is in power, we should see
little change in group-government relations after a shift in control of parliament.
A different picture emerges for a pluralist system. The image that emerges is that of a
very competitive situation, where actors seek to gain as many spoils from the system
as they can. New groups begin, hoping to draw members and resources away from
established groups by offering a different array of benefits and by claiming to
advocate more effectively. Also, because interest groups tend to be linked with one
political party or another (Peterson and Walker, 1991), their access will vary
according to which one is in control.
The data indicate that these hypotheses are correct. When asked how much
competition groups encounter in obtaining members and other resources, US groups
indicate that they are in a much more competitive environment than are Swedish
groups (chi-square of 18.815, p = .000). Nearly one-third of American groups (32%)
say that they are in continuous competition compared to just one-fifth of Swedish
groups(20%). Over half of Swedish groups (54%) say that they have little
competition; only one-fourth (23%) of American groups respond this way. All other
groups indicate that they have some competition. (46% of American groups and 26%
of Swedish groups). Table 2 examines the level of conflict in the environment
perceived by group leaders.
Table 2: Elements of the Environment
Sweden
USA
P value
(n = 61)
(n = 127)
Intense conflict exists
2.33
3.04
.002
Elected officials oppose group
2.82
3.53
.001
Other groups oppose group
2.75
3.51
.001
Government agencies oppose group
2.20
2.65
.022
NOTE: Degree of agreement is measured on a Likert type scale with 1 being "not at
all a good description of our group's situation" to 5 being "a very good description of
our group's situation." P-value is derived from a T-test.
For each of the four questions indicating the perceived level of conflict and potential
sources for conflict, American groups report more conflict in their environment than
do their Swedish counterparts. American group leaders are more likely to believe that
intense conflict exists regarding the issues of importance to their group. They are also
more likely to believe that elected officials, other groups and government agencies
oppose them than are Swedish leaders.
As predicted, group-government relations are different in Sweden and the US. Almost
all (95%) Swedish groups say that they are contacted by government agencies on a
regular basis, compared to about three-fourths (72%) of American groups (chi-square
= 14.143, p = .000). Groups report similar levels of cooperation from the agency they
have the most contact with (54% of Swedish groups say that that agency "normally
cooperates" compared to 62% of American groups), but this may be an artifact of
having Democrats in power during the time of the survey. American groups indicate
that cooperation is dependent on which party is in power; Swedish groups do not.
When asked how cooperation was affected by the most recent shift in control of the
Administration (from Republican George Bush to Democratic Bill Clinton in the USA
and from Social Democrats to a conservative coalition in Sweden), two-thirds of
American human service interest groups (66%) found an increase in cooperation.
Only one-fourth of Swedish groups reported an increase in cooperation. Over half of
Swedish groups (53%) , on the other hand, said there was no change in levels of
cooperation, compared to one-fourth (24%) of US groups. One-fifth (20%) of
Swedish groups did report less cooperation as the liberal party lost power. Only 10%
of American groups indicated that cooperation was less under the Democrats than the
Republicans (chi-square 34.401, p < .000).
The information in this section points to clear differences in how interest groups see
their environment and the ways that they are connected to government agencies. As
predicted, Swedish groups feel less competition and less conflict than do American
groups. Swedish organizations have greater continuity in their relationships with
government agencies than do American groups, even after significant political
changes occur.
Group Advocacy Activities
With every issue they confront, interest groups are faced with the decision of how to
respond to affect the situation. There are many constraints on their possible reactions.
Perhaps the most important one is that group leaders must choose tactics that will
maintain and perhaps enhance the flow of resources to the organization.
We expect Swedish corporatism to foster a particular set of tactics because of its
emphasis on close working relationships between government and groups, reaching
consensus before making proposals public, the parliamentary system of government
and of working through the particular Swedish corporatist institutions such as Royal
Commissions and the remiss process.
Elements of the pluralistic American system that might lead to a different set of tactics
being used include the emphasis on the power of individual legislators, the need to
remain officially nonpartisan in order to protect a group's nonprofit status and the
importance of litigation for creating legal precedents.
Table 3 indicates the perceived importance of nine tactics that could be used to affect
policy. Two of the tactics, "Work on remiss submissions" and "Work on Royal
Commissions," are applicable only in Sweden. The other tactics can be employed in
both countries.
Table 3: Activities used to affect policy decisions
Sweden
USA
P value
(n = 61)
(n = 127)
Work on remiss submissions
5.14
n/a
n/a
Affect public opinion through the mass media
4.82
4.18
.005
Work to affect Royal Commissions
4.62
n/a
n/a
Work with bureaucracy
4.58
4.94
.11
Work with legislators and their staff
4.29
5.17
.000
Develop a policy consensus among experts
3.36
4.01
.010
Litigate in court
2.70
2.20
.051
Protest and demonstrate
2.31
1.66
.001
Elect a particular party to office
1.44
1.56
.544
NOTE: Importance of tactic is measured on a Likert type scale with 0 being "tactic is
not used" to 6, "one of the most important tactics." P-value is derived from a T-test.
As before, there are significant differences in group responses to this set of questions.
Swedish organizations believe that "affecting public opinion through the use of the
mass media," "litigating in court," and "using protests and demonstrations" are all
significantly more important ways of influencing policy decisions than do American
groups. American groups, on the other hand, are significantly more likely to believe
that "working with legislators and their staffs," and "developing a policy consensus
among experts" are more useful. Americans also favor "working with the
bureaucracy," and "working to elect a particular party" but not at a statistically
significant level.
Only one of these differences was in the expected direction. Working with legislators
and their staffs is more important in the American system due to single member
districts and relatively weak political parties. The Swedish parliamentary system, with
strong party allegiance, works against emphasizing lobbying individual
representatives.
Most of the differences are at least somewhat surprising. Swedish groups put much
stock in using the mass media to affect public opinion, a tactic that does not seem to
be a very "corporatist" way to influence policymaking. Perhaps the explanation is that
interest groups seek to influence the public as a way of "controlling" them into
accepting a policy measure already agreed upon by groups and the government.
It is also surprising that Swedish groups believe that litigating in court is more
important than American groups do. America is a much more litigious society than is
Sweden and it seems that Congress and the President are relieved when the courts take
on some of the more divisive policy issues.
Finally, two tactics relate to consensus building and formal conflict. One would
expect that corporatist Sweden would be the country where building a consensus
among experts and de-emphasizing protests would be more highly prized, compared
to a fractious, pluralist USA. The opposite is the case however. Consensus building is
esteemed more highly and protests are valued less in America than in Sweden.
Advocacy Effectiveness
The end result of any interest group action, organizational leaders and members hope,
is policy that is in line with the group's position. While interest group effectiveness is
difficult to measure, there have been some efforts (for more detail on this topic, see
Hoefer, 1994). The approach used in this research is self-reported effectiveness.
Despite its apparent shortcomings in terms of objectivity it has the benefits of being
easily obtained and a good starting point for comparisons. It also allows people with
much insight and little reason to exaggerate on an anonymous survey to provide their
input.
Given the literature on corporatism, we might expect groups to be frequently
successful in their advocacy efforts. Their positions are arrived at after considerable
internal debate and are supposed to take into account the other interests represented in
policy-making. This type of situation brings forth an image of self-effacing efficacy.
Leaders would ask only for what is reasonable to begin with and thus would increase
the chances of getting it.
American pluralism, on the other hand, is extremely conflictual and, with the number
of groups growing quickly, we expect American groups to be less successful, on
average, than are Swedish organizations.
We note some similarities between Swedish and American groups in terms of how
much of their time they spend on trying to influence policy (as opposed to providing
member benefits, finding funding for the organization, and so on). Swedish groups
report using 40% of the group's time in that way compared to US groups spending
31% in trying to affect policy.
The same percentage of groups in both countries reported that they were making more
policy-change efforts compared to five years previously (49%). Similar amounts were
reporting making the same number of efforts (46% in Sweden, 44% in the US) and
fewer efforts (5% in Sweden, 7% in the US).
Surprisingly, though, Swedish leaders report lower levels of political efficacy than do
their American counterparts. Swedes say that they are effective in just 26% of their
efforts, whereas Americans say that they are effective 53% of the time (t = 7.178, p <
.000).
Discussion and Conclusions
The question this paper addresses, "Are nonprofit advocacy groups affected by
institutional arrangements?" can be answered with a simple and emphatic "Yes." As
predicted by theory, Swedish groups are different than American groups in terms of
demographic characteristics and perceptions of their environment. Specific variables
showing a significant difference are age, level of centralization and level of
"dynamism" (as shown by lower rates of growth in staff and membership in the five
years prior to the survey). Swedish group leaders feel that their environment is less
conflictual than do American group leaders. Swedish groups' relationship with
government is also significantly less constrained by which party is in power.
The different institutional arrangements have an impact on what activities Swedish
and American groups undertake to influence policy, although not always in the ways
expected. Corporatism and pluralism have an impact on the self-perceived
effectiveness of those advocacy efforts, with American leaders saying that they are
more effective than do Swedish leaders.
Most, though not all, of these results are in line with predictions based on a detailed
examination of corporatist and pluralist theory. There are several implications of these
findings for researchers of advocacy organizations. First, they show the need to
understand the context within which interest groups operate in order to understand
their actions. Ignoring the larger context is easy enough to do: anyone can collect
similar data from different countries. Doing only this may, however, lead to
"mindless" research. Comparative research is much more valuable when it has a
conceptual grounding.
Second, the particular concepts chosen here, corporatism and pluralism, are shown to
have considerable utility in pointing to potential differences in the world of human
service advocacy organizations. An ongoing problem with much of the literature on
corporatism and pluralism is that testable propositions are not derived and empirical
research is not conducted to show whether these concepts are useful (for an exception
to this generalization, see Hoefer, 1996 and Hoefer, 1994). As Williamson (1989:184)
states, regarding corporatist writings: "the empirical findings, and more importantly,
the theoretical and conceptual questions and leads that these can provide, are
relatively thin on the ground". This research adds to the current "thin" layer and points
the way for other researchers to follow.
Third, despite the successful interpretations of theory, not all of our hypotheses were
supported. Whether this requires altering the theory or improving the interpretation is
not yet clear. It is clear, however, that more research would be helpful to address these
issues.
There are certainly limitations to this study as a test of the effects of corporatism and
pluralism on interest group advocacy. The primary one is that we equate corporatism
with Sweden and pluralism with the United States. While the literature agrees that
these countries are good examples of these approaches to interest group and
government relations, there are other countries that could have been chosen to
represent the concepts. Additional research should be conducted to extract what is
inherent to corporatism and pluralism, and what is unique to Sweden and the United
States.
Another limitation is the way that some concepts were operationalized. The
questionnaire was originally designed for use in the United States and, though adapted
for the Swedish situation, may contain hidden pluralist biases that skew the results.
The type of Third Sector organization studied here, interest groups, is a very
specialized type of organization, devoting a considerable amount of the organization's
time to advocacy. There are many other organizations that conduct advocacy efforts,
though not at such a high priority level. The answers those bodies would provide may
or may not be similar to the respondents chosen for this research.
Despite these limitations, the research results described here are among the few
available that compare nonprofit advocacy groups in different countries in a way that
also tests theory. As such, it may lead to additional, and more complete efforts.
Particularly useful would be to use additional countries that have corporatist and
pluralist systems and to use a wider variety of nonprofit groups.
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