Barbary Wars

1. I never see a map but I'm away --
2. The gate to Barbary --
3. The factory of strange odors --
4. Mid pleasures and palaces --
5. Carthago Deleta Est --
6. Ashes of empire --
7. To Kairouan the holy --
8. Troglodytes and lotus-easters --
9. Across the shats to the sandy sea --
10. The conquest of the sahara --
11. The last home of mystery --
12. Down to the land of the Mozabites --
13. Biskra, demi-mondaine of the desert --
14. Frontiers of Rome --
15. The Grand Kabylia --
16. The capital of the corsairs --
17. Following the pirate coast --
18. The foreign legion --
19. The struggle for power in the farthest west --
20. From a Fasi housetop --
21. In the shadow of the Sherrefian umbrella --
22. South to the forbidden Sus.

Slaves in Algiers: the United States of America's Prisoners in Algiers 1785-1797

Throughout the 15 century and 18 centuries the Mediterranean witnessed a vicious conflict between the North African States and the European powers. The North African States and the Europeans captured each other's ships and enslaved the crews aboard. Therefore, the European powers mollified the North African States with annual tribute so they leave their ships pass in peace. In late 18 century the United States of America got independence and resumed its trade in the Mediterranean. Consequently, the American vessels became a target for the North African corsairs, specially Algerians corsairs because there were not any kind of treaties between the U.S. and the North Africans. In 1785 the Algerian corsairs seized two American ships and captured the crewmen. Once again in 1793 the Algerian managed to abduct 10 trade ships and captured 120 men. More than 10 years the American tread ships suffered from the North African corsairs. Meanwhile, the  American captives suffered 10 year enslavement in Algiers and the U.S. government lacked a solution for the problem. This situation raise a public criticism for the government and generated a public respond. This research aims to shed a light on the American captives experience in Algiers on a personal level and at the same time this research try to understand the American public respond to the captives issue.

William Eaton was an American soldier, diplomat, and adventurer who came to Egypt in 1804 with the blessing of President Thomas Jefferson. Accompanying Eaton as he disembarked from the ship Argus in Alexandria Bay were Lieutenant Presley Neville O’Bannon and a detachment of U. S. Marines. Their task was to find the Libyan exile Hamet Karamanli, cross the Northern Coast of the Libyan Desert, attack Derna, and set Karamanli on the throne of Tripoli. This was a formidable undertaking. Eaton landed in Alexandria. He raced to Cairo. He returned to Alexandria. He set off for the Fayoum. He returned to Alexandria. Where the British agents in Egypt were most cooperative, the French agent, Mr. Drovetti, was extremely uncooperative. Finally, with Karamanli at their side, the Americans set off across the Northern Coast. A journey of under 20 days turned into a nightmare of over 50 days. The land was inhospitable. There was Christian-Muslim tension. Eaton and Karamanli constantly fought for control of the caravan. The Arabs were continuously revolting. In this paper we will retrace Eaton’s steps and try to figure out his location as events unfolded.
It was first presented as William Eaton: A Forgotten American Voice at an ASTENE (Association for the Study of Travel in Egypt and the Near East) conference in Newnham College, Cambridge University (England) on July 15-18, 1999. The next year it appeared in Janet Starkey and Okasha El-Daly’s publication Travellers in the Deserts of the Orient published by ASTENE in 2000. In 2004, I was consulted for the Indigo Films presentation for the History Channel. The results appeared as the Battle of Tripoli. Sunday, September 19, 2004. Finally, much revised, it became a chapter in my book Americans in Egypt: 1770-1915.

Abstract

The North African Barbary States (Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli) and the United States of America maintained various relations in the Early Modern Times. After the War of Independence the relations became rather problematic between the two cultures. In the American mind, relations with the Barbary States have been generally associated with issues of commerce, piracy, captivity, tribute and war. The American merchants and sailors were captured several times by muslim corsairs after the Revolutionary War. The confederation, however, was powerless in foreign matters and there was a need to centralize the government. At the same time, in the early 1800s several sea narratives and captivity narratives were published about the Americans. This had an important impact on American literature. Furthermore, the first foreign war of the United States was against Tripoli between 1801–1805. Historians connect this war with the birth of the US Navy and Marine Corps. After the Tripolitan War, the Americans citizens met an illustrious muslim diplomata as well. Sidi Soliman Mellimelli, the Tunisian envoy was the first Muslim ambassador in the USA between 1805 and 1806.

Résumé
Au printemps de 1805, la frégate Constitution a capturé trois navires de Régence de Tunis parce que selon le point de vue des Américans, elles avaient violé le blocus maritime de Tripoli. Le malentendu a menacé de rupture, peut-être d’une „autre guerre barbaresque” entre les deux Etats en août 1805. L'analyse de ces événements a été indûment reléguée derrière la description des événements de la guerre de Tripoli dans l’historiographie américaine. Cette étude tente principalement de compenser cette lacune. Cependant, la présente étude est considéré comme traditionnelle, à certains égards, car elle décrit en majeure partie les antécédents, l’évolution et la résolution du désaccord tuniso-américain du point de vue des sources et de la littérature américaine. La crise entre les États-Unis et la Régence de Tunis a été résolue finalement par consensus, en conséquence duquel Sidi Soliman Mellimelli pouvait commencer sa mission diplomatique aux États-Unis le 5 septembre 1805.

In 2004, the Smithsonian debuted "The Price of Freedom: Americans at War," a permanent exhibition at the National Museum of American History in Washington DC. The exhibit occasioned strong criticism for its privatization of public memory and glorification of militarism. What has gone unexamined, however, is the curious absence of the 1801–1805 War with Tripoli from the exhibit. This war has long been invoked as an important lesson in US exceptionalism. The assault and short occupation of the coastal town of Derna by US-led forces in 1805 holds particular significance and commemorations of the battle during the twentieth century were important in the formation of attitudes that informed US approaches to empire before, during, and after the Cold War.

Refusing to compromise America’s liberty and freedom overseas, the Barbary Wars of 1801 to 1815 were a series of decisive military conflicts against these pirates, which thrust a young America onto the world stage. These early conflicts of the United States continue to influence America’s actions today, protecting American interests around the world in defense of freedom of the seas, through either conflict or compromise.

Riffing off of George Fletcher's theory of Romanticism and war, the article reviews Fletcher's arguments, which received derisive reviews during the War against Iraq in 2003. The article takes Fletcher's approach seriously in considering the problem of war as a Romantic impulse, and the difficulties caused by that understanding. The article then derives arguments on the limits of the laws of war to apply to military actions against terrorism. The article considers the nature of collective guilt as a mitigating element in the crimes of one individual, and it considers the nature of non-state enemies in war. This last point is illustrated through detailed contrast between the U.S. experiences in the Barbary Wars and the Punitive Expedition to Mexico.

يهدف هذا البحث الى دراسة علاقة الولايات المتحدة الامريكية مع منطقة شمال افريقيا خلال الفتر الممتدة من عام 1783 الى عام 1800 و التي تسمى بفترة حروب البربر نسبة الى السكان الاصليين لمنطقة شمال افريقيا. خلال هذه الفترة ابحرت العديد من السفن التجارية الأمريكية من موانئها الى موانئي دول أوروبا و بالأخص المطلة على البحر الأبيض المتوسط مثل نيس و تولون و جزر الكناري لكنها واجهت هجمات متكررة من قبل قراصنة شمال افريقيا. حيث كان قراصنة دول شمال افريقيا و هم من المغرب و الجزائر و تونس و طرابلس يأسرون السفن الأميركة و يحتجزون البحارة كرهائن و يطالبوا بفدية لفك اسرهم او دفع مبالغ مالية سنوية حتى تتمكن السفن الامريكية من الابحار بأمان. استمر قراصنة شمال افريقيا بمهاجمة السفن الامريكية كون ان حكومة الولايات  لا تملك القوة العسكرية  لحامية سفنها ولا القدرة الاقتصادية لافتداء الاسرى او دفع اتاوات للقراصنة. ان علاقة الولايات المتحدة مع دول شمال افريقيا أدت الى تحديات الدبلوماسية و العسكرية و الاقتصادية. ان هذه البحث يسلط الضوء بعمق على تداعيات علاقة الولايات المتحدة الامريكية مع منطقة شمال افريقيا و يبين تعقيدات هذه التجربة التي امتد تأثيرها الى عدة مستويات. بحيث أثرت هذه التجربة على السياسة الداخلية و وسعت الخلاف بين الاحزاب الأمريكية و عقد العلاقات الدبلوماسية بين أمريكا و دول أوربا و خلقت علاقة عدم الثقة بين الحكومة الأميركة و الشعب الأمريكي.

The United States of America and the Corsairs Activity in the Mediterranean 1783-1800.
This paper focuses on the United States engagement the with Barbary states in North Africa between the years 1783 and 1800. The Primary focus of this study is to examine the challenges the US government faced dealing with the Barbary states governments. During this period, numerous American vessels traded with Europe’s ports in the Mediterranean and large part of the American economy dependent on foreign trade. The American vessels were protected by the British fleet because they belong to the British colonies. Consequentially, in 1776 the American colonies declared independence and fought the British for a seven years and in 1783 they became a sovereign nation. The security that the British navy provided stopped. Therefore, various American vessels were attacked, harassed or captured by –Barbary states- Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian and Tripolian corsairs. They seized the vessels, captured the goods, asked for ransom, and kept the sailors as captives or slaves. Most of the European nations pay taxes to the Barbary states to have safe passage through the Mediterranean but the American could not stop the corsairs threats for many reasons. The United States was vulnerable nation it has weak federal government which lacked the ability to function due to the disagreement in regard the confederation. They even could not raise national taxes and they don’t not have a navy to protect its commerce which dependent on foreign trade. Under these circumstances, the U.S government faced complex and sever challenges. On the government level, the U.S lacked strong central government so all solutions to prevents  Barbary corsairs such as paying tributes or building a navy became a subject of dispute among the states and political parties. Many politicians thought of these solutions as a way to restrain the local government  and a privilege for the federal government to expand its power. In addition, The U.S suffered tremendously on the international level. They could not create sound relationships and their alliances were tenuous to face the Barbary stats.

Little has been written about Commodore James Barron (1768-1851) of the United States Navy.  Existing scholarship on Barron fixates on two events: Barron’s five-year suspension from the service for failing to prepare his ship for battle during the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair in 1807 and his killing of Commodore Stephen Decatur, Jr. in an 1820 duel over fallout from that suspension.  This overlooks decades of invention in which Commodore Barron worked to influence the early development of the Navy despite his lackluster combat record.

The son of a prominent officer in Virginia’s Revolutionary War Navy, Barron was commissioned as a lieutenant aboard the frigate United States in 1798.  His service and early command experience during the Quasi-War with France and the First Barbary War was characterized by routine patrol and convoy escort duties.  Barron was involved in the development of one of the Navy’s first signal books, designed and oversaw the installation of a ventilator for use aboard Navy ships, designed a steam-powered ram for harbor and river defense, and helped revitalize naval education shortly before the establishment of the U.S. Naval Academy.

Through an in-depth examination of fifteen boxes of James Barron Papers and other related documents, this thesis will bring the innovations of Commodore James Barron into well-deserved light.

A brief overview of Algiers and Tunis as an Ottoman Regencies and autonomous city-states. There is also a article on the Dey of Algiers. These articles were published in Spencer C. Tucker ed. The Encyclopedia of the Wars of the Early American Republic, 1783-1812: a political, social, and military history. Santa Barbara (Calif.): ABC-CLIO, 2014.

This study deals with early American narratives about North African captivity. The focus is put on two widely differing narratives that were written about the same event (the capture of the USS Philadelphia in 1803), one by an officer, the other by a regular sailor. The aim of this study is to show how class, monetary considerations and literary ambitions influenced the seemingly factual retellings of those events.