Byzantine Army

This paper looks at the place of the sixth-century Byzantine general Narses (c. 480–573) in the history of Byzantine gender. Certainly, it has always been important for ancient and modern historians to emphasise Narses’ eunuchism. Indeed, for many modern scholars, Narses’ identity as a castrate has been more important for study than his military deeds and political achievements that proved ephemeral. For some, the presence of a eunuch in such an essential military role indicates a turning away from codes of generalship based on traditional martial courage and manliness. This paper questions such a view, suggesting that Byzantium had a much more flexible notion of eunuchs’ gender status than some recent scholarship allows. Indeed, it suggests that Narses fits into a continuing hegemony of traditional masculine values based on the supremacy of Byzantine men’s martial virtues.

Selon une idée largement répandue, l’Homme ne fut en mesure de tirer pleinement profit du cheval qu’à partir du Moyen Age en raison de l’apparition d’avancées techniques majeures à cette période de l’histoire. A en croire la liste des accessoires hippiques supposés médiévaux, l’Antiquité n’a quasiment rien produit et le rôle du cheval n’était que secondaire. Pourtant, dès l’Antiquité tardive, la place de cet animal gagne considérablement en importance dans la cavalerie et la production hippiatrique qui connaît un essor sans précédent vient confirmer ce nouveau rôle. Or, sans la mise en place de certains accessoires hippiques, tels les étriers, la force animale ne pouvait pas être utilisée au mieux.
La question de l’époque à laquelle sont apparus les étriers est donc fondamentale pour mieux comprendre et apprécier à leur juste valeur certains changements intervenus dans l’Antiquité tardive. Aussi, à la lumière de découvertes archéologiques récentes et à l’aide de l’étude des termes utilisés en grec pour désigner l’étrier, nous remettons en question la date de son apparition et, par conséquent, l’origine de son introduction dans la cavalerie protobyzantine. Le but final de cette contribution est de redéfinir la place du cheval aux IVe-VIe siècles, place prédominante liée très étroitement à l’utilisation d’accessoires hippiques majeurs tels que les étriers.

"Ces Actes des Journées d’étude internationales (Strasbourg, 6-7 novembre 2009) sont l’aboutissement d’un programme de recherche (2007-2009), mené au sein de l’UMR 7044 (Étude des civilisations de l’Antiquité : de la Préhistoire à Byzance), sur la place du cheval dans l’empire byzantin. Les 14 contributions qu’ils réunissent sont consacrées au cheval de guerre et de loisir dans l’Antiquité et au Moyen Âge.

L’ouvrage est divisé en trois sections. Dans la première, les contributeurs analysent la naissance du corps de cavalerie dans l’armée romaine et ses emplois. Sont également étudiés les différences régionales du pourtour méditerranéen dans l’élevage du cheval, les prix pratiqués ou encore les connaissances hippologiques des Anciens. Les travaux qui composent la deuxième partie proposent des synthèses sur le cheval médiéval, byzantin et occidental. Ils abordent le sujet à travers les textes, les sources archéologiques, les représentations et les us et coutumes des civilisations étudiées. Enfin, la dernière partie s’intéresse aux instruments hippiques, aux armes et à l’hippiatrie. Y sont ainsi réexaminées les innovations, adoptions et adaptations, dans l’Antiquité tardive, des pièces de l’équipement équin essentielles pour le combat, telles que l’étrier et le mors. Les armes des cavaliers sont réévaluées, ainsi que les changements dans leurs techniques de combat suite à la diffusion de l’étrier. On trouvera aussi l’analyse du vocabulaire employé pour l’anatomie du cheval dans la littérature hippiatrique grecque, qui connaît à cette période un essor sans précédent, lié au développement de la cavalerie romaine et protobyzantine."

In the twilight of the Western Roman Empire in the 5th–6th centuries, the elite of the field armies was the heavy armoured cavalry – the cataphracts, clad in lamellar, scale, mail and padded fabric armour. After the fall of the West, the Greek-speaking Eastern or Byzantine Empire survived for nearly a thousand years, and cavalry remained predominant in its armies, with the heaviest armoured regiments continuing to provide the ultimate shock-force in battle.
Accounts from Muslim chroniclers show that the ironclad cataphract on his armoured horse was an awe-inspiring enemy: '...they advanced against you, iron-covered – one would have said that they advanced on horses which seemed to have no legs'. This new study, replete with stunning full-colour illustrations of the various units, offers an engaging insight into the fearsome heavy cavalry units that battled against the enemies of Rome's Eastern Empire.

In this paper I will address the labarum, a war standard introduced by Constantine the Great, and the problem of the Christianization of the Roman military signs between Constantine’s reign (306-377 AD) and the Theodosian period (379-457). Many scholars have referred to the labarum, but usually indirectly when discussing Constantine’s conversion. There are several open questions and gaps in our knowledge regarding this emblem, and I will attempt to answer some of them. First, this paper refers briefly to the precedents of military and religious standards in Antiquity and Pagan Rome. Then, it explores the origins, form, function and meaning of the labarum under Constantine and his successors through the literary and iconographic sources. The labarum started as symbol of victory granted by an ambiguous “supreme divinity”, and towards the last decades of Constantine’s reign the interpretation of it as a Christian apotropaic sign became dominant. Constantine’s successors used the labarum as a declaration of continuity, and the standards caused controversy under Julian the Apostate. Finally, this paper addresses the transformation of the standard under the house of Theodosius. I argue that in this period the cross surpassed the Chi-Rho symbol and the labarum-cross became the main banner of the Christian Roman Empire.

http://doi.org/10.18573/jlarc.117

It’s widely accepted that the number of eight thousand Byzantine
soldiers slaughtered at the battle of the Scultenna river (643), reported by Paul the Deacon, using as his source the Origo Gentis Langobardorum, has been greatly exaggerated, mainly to glorify the winner of the fight, the Lombard king Rothari, and as a mere indication of his apparently overwhelming victory. However, this number also represents the only numerical indication from direct sources about the army of Ravenna between 6th and 8th century (the only other number for an Imperial army of the period in Italy, though not the army of Ravenna, is given for the battle of Forino, fought in the year 663). Moreover, historians tended to
disregard this number only on the basis of caution and by considering that armies of the same period usually couldn’t even reach such numbers (a not surely verifiable notion, at times even contradicted by period sources). The aim of this article is to analyze more precisely and in dept why the number of eight thousand fallen soldiers given by the Origo and Paul the Deacon is indeed exaggerated, and also to give a plausible estimate of the actual forces under the direct command of the Exarch at the battle of the Scultenna river, particularly the troops stationed in Ravenna, using a comparative approach between written sources between the 6th and 8th century, by using modern studies and estimates of the strength of the
Byzantine army and by considering the available epigraphic evidences linked to the Imperial forces in Italy.

This dissertation argues that martial virtues and images of the soldier’s life represented an essential aspect of early Byzantine masculine ideology. It contends that in many of the visual and literary sources from the fourth to the seventh centuries CE, conceptualisations of the soldier’s life and the ideal manly life were often the same. By taking this stance, the dissertation challenges the view found in many recent studies on Late Roman masculinity that a Christian ideal of manliness based on extreme ascetic virtues and pacifism had superseded militarism and courage as the dominant component of hegemonic masculine ideology.

The heavy armoured cavalry of the Roman World carried on its own progress within the byzantine army. Throughout the sixth to the eleventh centuries, the byzantine katáphraktos supposed the hightest development of this kind of cavalryman inside a military tradition that was a direct heir and continuer of the evolution of roman warfare. After temporarily yield their own leadership to the horse-archers (hippotoxótai) as main axis of byzantine cavalry, katáphraktoi entered in the final phase of their development as backbone of any byzantine cavalry army, conditioning its strategy at all. Along this pages we will treat an approach to the heavy armoured byzantine cavalry until its disappearance in the late eleventh century, as a colophon and last chapter of the progress of roman (and then byzantine) cataphractus / katáphraktos.

Recent studies on the political and military history in the reign of Leo VI (r. 886–912) tend to emphasise his role as a central authoritative figure. However, close scrutiny on the emperor’s military treatise called the Taktika and collation with the actual situation offers a different picture on his view concerning the warfare in the eastern frontier. In chapter XVIII of the Taktika on the manoeuvres against the raiding Arabs, Leo emphasises the importance of autonomous regional defence undertaken by local forces. When understood collectively with other sources, this can be an attestation of Leo’s willingness to delegate power to potentates in order to resist the incessant raids more effectively, despite the possible centrifugal effects. This sort of interaction between the central government and the frontier can be comprehended a the broader context of the long-term continuity of the Byzantine flexible frontier policy from the ninth to the eleventh centuries.

This PhD dissertation is accessible via the link below.

ABSTRACT

There are arguably two ways of understanding the fundamental processes of military history. One emphasizes unchanging principles in warfare and that conduct of war is largely dictated by the physical realities. The other claims that the ways of war are more-or-less cultural constructs. I approach this “military culture debate” by analysing the land and naval warfare in the area that surrounded the Aegean Sea, which had belonged to the Byzantine empire in the late twelfth century. The period discussed extends from the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) to the early 1420s.

The region and era in question are suitable for testing different understandings of military history. It is a geographical and geopolitical region where two major groups of conquerors arrived in the thirteenth century. The Catholic Christian Latins represent the western European ways of war of the time and the military traditions of the Muslim Turks originated from the steppe and from the east. Both settled in the region and founded realms. Therefore, they had to adjust themselves to the environment. Similarly, local Orthodox Christian, mostly Byzantine, rulers had to adapt to the situation.

I compare the composition of armed forces and willingness to engage in battles of the above-mentioned three groups fighting in the region. My study analyses what influence their cultural background had on their conduct in these matters. I provide new information about the warfare of the study era and increase our understanding of why the Ottoman Turks were able to conquer most of the region.

I found that the “culturalist” understanding of military history usually had the best explanatory potential in the scope of my research. The belligerents tried to construct their armed forces and fight their wars in a manner guided by their cultural background. To a certain extent they had to adapt to the local conditions, but in the issues dealt with here it was mainly a question of adapting to the social structures and the adversaries, rather than to the climate and geography of the region. The armies shared a growing number of similarities as time went by, but the influx of troops from outside the region and religious doctrines contributed to differences in the composition of armed forces and thus how wars were waged.

The Ottomans apparently made the best use of the military potential of regions they controlled. This was probably one of the key reasons why they prevailed in the study area. For cultural reasons, the Christian powers tended to neglect the use of certain groups of people in the military. Thus their forces were more often supplemented with mercenaries and allies whose reliability was uncertain and this had adverse consequences, particularly for Byzantium.

As regards engaging in battles, an important issue was how reliable the people living in fortified towns were perceived to be, which influenced how necessary it was to fight in the open. Transporting of siege-equipment, on the other hand, hampered the possibility of  avoiding battles. The Latins showed more battle-willingness in their warfare than the other belligerents in the conflicts of the region. There were cultural reasons behind this. It should nevertheless be noted that there was variation in the battle-willingness of the Byzantines depending on commanders, circumstance, period, and adversary. Much of the Turkish and steppe nomad warfare consisted of raids in which battles were usually avoided. However, battle-willingness was more apparent in the conflicts of the great Muslim dynasties, and when the Muslim leaders faced one another, or when they repulsed invasions of Christian powers in their own regions. This battle-willingness of the Turks could come as surprise to the latter.

In academia.edu you can read the introduction and content. The full work is in the address: https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/335952?fbclid=IwAR2fdr-1l31x5qX2exQLkuHGMRLUqe8mHxNQUe_VFEoHcg7NvygTINZ-1rM

ABSTRACT: The continued use of Latin as the official Heeressprache of the East Roman Empire up to the 630s supplies the context for an examination of a text virtually unknown to classical scholarship. Mediceo-Laurentianus graecus LV-4 contains an anonymous and mutilated Greek military treatise, published by Karl Müller in 1880 and subsequently styled De Militari Scientia. Its character, date and textual affinities are briefly considered, concluding that it is an informal epitome or ‘working copy’ of Maurice’s Strategicon (ca. 590s), possibly compiled ca. 630s–640s as an aide-mémoire for a senior officer. This treatise is a unique witness to two loanwords from Latin – παλμάριον (palmarium) and ῥέκαλα (*recala), neither previously documented in lexica, and the latter not directly attested in Latin. The author’s usage of the construction ῥέκαλα δίδωμι  ῥέκαλα ποιέω, with the sense ‘to make a withdrawal’, now permits recognition of the corresponding expression recala facio in the highly corrupted text of a Latin speech preserved in the Strategicon.

KEYWORDS: Maurice’s Strategikon / Strategicon, Müller Fragment, De Militari Scientia, Late Roman army, Latin Language, Vulgar Latin

L'article parle de la guerre entre l'Empire Byzantin et le Khaganate Avar (580-626) recommencée après l'institution de la domination avare sur le territoire d'Alföld dans le cadre de l'analyse de la situation internationale. Les sources principales de l'article pour les évènements de l'époque de Tiberius et de Maurice (578-602) sont Menander le Protecteur et Theophylacte Simocatta. Comme l'a dit l'auteur en s'appuyant sur l'opinion de Thérese Olajosh, Theophylacte Simocatta avait utilisé les Commentaires perdus d'un officier de l'armée byzantine proche au général Priscus ainsi que le journal militaire de l'armée de Danoube dans son récit sur la guerre avare. Les paraphrases de l' "Histoire" de Jean d'Epiphanie proposées par Theophylacte pour raconter une histoire de la guerre perse n'étaient pas examinées dans cet article. Pour la guerre mondiale du VIIe siècle (602-628), l'auteur a utilisé les "Chronographie" de Théophane, la Chronique Pascale, le Bréviaire du patriarche Nicéphore, les "Miracles de Saint Demetrios", la poésie de Georges Pisidas ainsi que les sources armeniennes et georgiennes : "Histoire d'Héraclius" de Sébéos, "Histoire de l'Aghbanie" de Movsès Kaghankatvazi, le " Kartlis Tskhovreba", les sources iraniennes : le "Khwadayènamag" dans la version poétique de Ferdowsi (le "Shâhnâmeh") et dans la version arabe de Tabarî (l' "Histoire des prophètes et des rois"). La Conclusion principale de l'article affirme que le caractère destructif du Khaganate Avar était un obstacle pour la réalisation du projet du roi Khosro II Parviz de prendre Constantinople en 626.

This paper examines the number, sources, etymology and chronology of Germanic loanwords in Roman military vocabulary with a view to establishing what these lexical influences can reveal about intercultural contact in this sphere during Late Antiquity. While loanwords have long been recognised as a fertile source of cultural information, the purpose here is to chart the linguistic impact of Germani within one particular Roman institution. Most of the linguistic borrowings examined occurred originally in Vulgar Latin, or specifically its lexical subset “sermo castrensis”, the sociolect of Roman soldiers, but they are often documented primarily or solely as transliterations or secondary loans into Greek. Specimens are categorised according to the dynamics of loanword traffic: 1. borrowed names for borrowed things (tufa/toupha,-ion, carrago, armilaus(i)a/armilausion); 2. nominal borrowings (framea, *fulcum/phoulkon); 3. uncertain loan-object or nominal borrowing (bandum/bandon, punga/poungion, phlaskion); 4. uncertain Germanic derivation (burgus, barritus, *cautia, hornatores, touldos,-on, caput porci(num)); 5. demonstrably erroneous Germanic derivation (drungus/droungos, chouzion, sculca/skoulka). Concluding remarks attempt a periodization and consider the overall character and motivation of these loanwords as ingredients of the institutional Mischkultur of the Late Roman army.

ABSTRACT: Following a preliminary survey of what is known (or believed) about equites stablesiani, a class of late Roman cavalry unit, this paper introduces two previously unexamined sources: first, a letter of Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrrhus, dated 432-3, of which the historical context, textual transmission and editorial history require clarification; second, a letter written by Emperor Justin I to Hypatius, magister militum per Orientem, in 520, as preserved in the Acta of the Fifth Ecumenical Council (553). Despite problems of transmission and/or translation, these two texts contain valuable information about the late Roman army in Oriens. In particular, they both locate personnel of the same unit, equites tertii stablesiani, at Cyrrhus in Euphratensia. The implication that Cyrrhus was the regular station of this regiment during the fifth and early sixth centuries is consistent with other evidence for the dispersal and localisation of “mobile” units of comitatenses in urban garrisons during this period, in contrast to the conventional view that comitatenses lacked permanent stations and led a peripatetic existence of temporary billets and encampments.

KEYWORDS: Late Roman army, Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Oriens, Justin I, military chaplains

The soldier, both as an individual and as a member of a particular group, and the army, as one of the most essential components of maintaining the integrity of the Byzantine Empire - to the extent that this was possible at times - and of carrying out its foreign policy, are subject to very frequent references by historiographers. They are also quite often referred to in panegyrics, while they are present also in letters composed by scholars. Particularly useful, however, in providing information about and explaining the attitude of the Byzantine army, are the military treatises (the Tactica), the texts that give instructions to the general regarding the taking advantage of his army. 
Violence in war emanated from two factors. The first was the orders given by the head of the army, aiming at the defeat of the enemy by the employment of several means: slaughter, captivity, destruction of crop, pillaging or exemplary punishment that could demoralize the opponent. The second factor was the personality of the soldier and his psychological status during the battle. 
The conduct of the soldiers will be discussed through the presentation of relevant examples in order to clarify the methods of and the reasons for the use of violence by the Byzantine army.

Abstract – The present study compares and takes an in-depth look at archaeological, written and iconographical evidences of the Eastern Roman equestrian military equipment during 6th - 7th centuries, between the reigns of the emperors Justinian and Heraclius.
The evidences for Eastern Roman equestrian military equipment are compared with sources from territory and cultures outside the empire (e.g. the Sasanians and the Àvars), with the aim to look for any external influence.
Also, some major issues related to the subject are analyzed, such as: the production of the equestrian military equipment, which seems to be unrelated with the imperial fabricae of military gear; how widespread was the actual use of horse armours in the Eastern Roman army between 6th and 7th century, since apparently there are huge discrepancies between military manuals prescriptions, iconographical sources and archaeological evidence; how widespread actually was
the use of the newly introduced stirrups, which are for the first time mentioned in the Strategikon by emperor Maurice Tiberius; the possibility of the usage of at least two different types of saddle in the
Eastern Roman army of the period.

Dymydyuk D.Blade weapons in the medieval Armenian chronicles of the Bagratid era (end of 9th – middle of 11th centuries): the problem of terminology, History and culture. Journal of Armenian studies, Yerevan 2019, Vol. 2, p. 33-48.

Դիմիդյուկ Դ. Սառը զենքերը Բագրատունյաց դարաշրջանի ժամանակագրություններում (IX դ. վերջ-XI դ.). հարցի տերմինաբանությունը, Պատմություն եվ մշակույթ. Հայագիտական հանդես, Երեվան 2019, №2, 33-48.

В статье рассматривается терминология холодного оружия, а именно проблема значения и использования слов “սուր” (сур), “սուսեր” (сусер) “թուր” (тур)”, “վաղակ” (вагхак), а также “պողովատ” (погховат) в средневековых армянских хрониках времен Багратидов (конец IX – середина XI вв.) и смежных эпох. Анализируется различия между упомянутыми терминами, закономерности их использования в хрониках, а также характеристика описываемого оружия.
Обращено внимание на то, что в средневековых армянских летописях существует полный хаос относительно использования тех или других военных терминов, потому что в большинстве случаев выбор термина зависел от стиля хрониста, его языковых предпочтений и других причин, из-за чего невозможно точно идентифицировать значение тех или иных терминов.
Предполагаем, что в эпоху Багратидов слово “սուր” (сур), скорее всего, означало простой обоюдоострый меч и вместе со словом “սուսեր” (сусер) чаще всего использовалось в хрониках, в то время как термин “թուր” (тур) использовался крайне редко.
Чтобы уточнить информацию о том, как выглядел тот или иной меч, летописцы могли использовать дополнительные слова, как “երկսայր” (ерксайр – обоюдоострый) или “միասեռ” (миасер – однолезвийный). Заметим, что в хрониках отсутствовала информация, которая бы указывала на кривизну лезвия меча.

Ключевые слова: меч, палаш, сабля, սուր, սուսեր, թուր, Багратидская Армения, оружие.

The article discusses terminology of blade weapons, namely the problem of the meaning and using the words “սուր” (sur), “սուսեր” (suser), “թուր” (tur), “վաղակ” (vaghak) and “պողովատ” (poghovat) in the medieval Armenian chronicles of the Bagratid era (late 9th – middle of 11th c.) and adjacent periods. The differences between the mentioned terms, dependences of their use in the chronicles, and the physical characteristics of the described weapons were analyzed.
Attention was drawn to the fact that in the medieval Armenian chronicles there was complete chaos regarding the using of military terms, because in most cases the choice of the term depended on the style of the chronicler, his language preferences and other reasons. Therefore, it is impossible to determine the accurate meaning of these terms.
We can assume that in the Bagratid era, the word “սուր” (sur) probably meant a simple double-edged sword, and together with the word “սուսեր” (suser) they were the most popular in medieval Armenian chronicles, while the word “թուր” (tur) was used rarely. In order to clarify the information about on what the swords looked like, chroniclers could use additional words like “երկսայր” (yerksayr – double-edged) or “միասեռ” (miaser – single-edged). Please note, that in those times chronicles did not contain any information which would indicate the curvature of the blades.

Keywords: sword, broadsword, palash, saber, սուր, սուսեր, թուր, Bagratid Armenia, weapons.

Հոդվածում քննվում են Բագրատունյաց Հայաստանում  (IX դ. վերջ–XI դ.) ստեղծված “Ժամանակագրություններ”-ի տվյալները, որոնք վերաբերում են սառը զենքերի տեսակներին: Խոսքը, մասնավորապես, վերաբերում է “սուր”, “սուսեր”, “թուր”, “վաղակ”, ինչպես նաև “պողովատ” բառերի կիրառությանը և նշանակությանը: Վերլուծվել են վերոնշյալ տերմինների միջև առկա տարբերությունները, “Ժամանակագրություններ”-ում նրանց կիրառության օրինաչափությունները: Բնականաբար, տրվել է դրանց ընդհանուր բնութագիրը:
Պետք է նշել, որ հայ միջնադարյան տարեգրքերում զենքերի հիշատակությունները խիստ անկանոն են: Շատ հաճախ տերմինի ընտրությունը կախված էր տարեգրի ոճից, նախընտրությունից և այլն: Նման հանգամանքը թույլ չի տալիս հստակ որոշել տերմինների նշանակությունը և նույնականությունը:
Պետք է ասել, որ Բագրատունյաց շրջանում “սուր” բառը հիմնականում կիրառվել է երկսայր զենքերի վերաբերյալ: “Սուր” և “սուսեր” բառերը ավելի շատ են օգտագործվել տարեգիրների կողմից: Մինչդեռ “թուր” բառը հազվադեպ է հանդիպում: Տարեգիրները զենքի տեսքն առավել մանրամասն նկարագրելու համար երբեմն օգտագործել են “երկսայր” (երկու կողմից սուր) և “միասեռ” (մեկ կողմից սուր) հավելյալ բառերը: Պետք է նկատել նաև, որ տարեգրքերում բացակայել են շեղբի կորության մասին տվյալներ:

Բանալի բառեր. սուր, թրադաշույն, սվին, սուսեր, թուր, Բագրատունյաց Հայաստան, զենք:

Die vorliegende Untersuchung über die politische und ideologische Wahrnehmung von Krieg und Frieden in Byzanz in der Zeit vor den Kreuzzügen analysiert das stets aktuelle Problem Krieg aus der Sicht der Gesellschaft einer mittelalterlichen Großmacht. Ziel der Untersuchung ist es, das System von Ideen und Vorstellungen zu zeigen, welches die Wahmehmung von Krieg und Frieden in der byzantinischen Elite und, soweit dies die Quellenlage erlaubt, in allen Gesellschaftsschichten gestaltete.

Im ersten Teil wird das byzantinische Militärwesen aus einem reichsideologischen Blickwinkel betrachtet und analysiert. Die Untersuchung konzentriert sich auf die ideologisch-politische Bedeutung der Entstehung und Entwicklung der so genannten Themenordnung sowie des schrittweisen Überganges vom Themenheer in ein professionelles Heer bis in das 10. Jahrhundert. Im zweiten Teil werden die Überlegungen bzw. die theoretischen Äußerungen der Byzantiner zum Thema Krieg und Frieden, ausgehend von ihren politischen und religiösen Ideen und in Zusammenhang mit ihrer friedlichen (Diplomatie) und militärischen Außenpolitik interpretiert und analysiert.
Die traditionelle Ansicht, dass der Krieg aus der ideologisch-politischen Sicht der Byzantiner als ultima ratio betrachtet wurde, wird in dieser Untersuchung in Frage gestellt. Das byzantinische Konzept der Rechtfertigung des Krieges wird im Rahmen der Frage nach einer differenzierten Wahrnehmung des Friedens neu betrachtet und interpretiert. In diesem Zusammenhang werden die Wechselbeziehung zwischen Krieg und Religion und die Frage nach einem etablierten Konzept des sog. heiligen Krieges in Byzanz zu dieser Zeit im Hinblick auf die ideologische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam kritisch untersucht.

This chapter examines the place of soldiers in the society, economy and culture of civilian communities during the Middle Byzantine period, and the implications for the ‘militarisation’ of social relationships. It explores how the localisation and integration of provincial soldiers in towns and villages of Anatolia from the mid-seventh century, through kinship, personal associations, landownership/-holding and communal tax liabilities, affected the dynamics of soldier–civilian interactions and socio-cultural homogeneity. While legal distinctions between soldier and civilian remained clearly demarcated, insofar as military status accorded judicial privileges and fiscal immunities upon a soldier’s person, family and household, the intricacies of the Byzantine military-fiscal apparatus created significant ambiguities. In particular, the rootedness of soldiers’ in village communities, together with soldiers’ partial dependence on private or familial resources to fulfil their military service, created circumstances in which military-fiscal obligations could be transferred directly and personally onto civilian neighbours. Correspondingly, the very presence of soldiers in rural society, and especially the vulnerability of poorer soldiers to exploitation or coercion by provincial elites, could draw soldiers away from official duties and shape local power relationships.

En dépit des difficultés à estimer les effectifs de l'armée byzantine, quelques conclusions raisonnablement sûres peuvent être dégagées pour les Xe-XIIe s. Le contingent de base, le tagma, comprend le plus souvent moins de mille hommes, même si le corps des Varanges a compté un temps six mille fantassins. À défaut de déterminer les effectifs globaux de l'armée, on peut montrer que, en laissant de côté les alliés étrangers, les armées de campagne étaient le plus souvent limitées, pour des raisons tactiques et logistiques, à quinze ou vingt mille combattants, ce nombre n'étant dépassé que dans les circonstances exceptionnelles.

This study of the status and peace-time functions of Byzantine soldiers (300-1200) examines diverse interactions between military personnel and civilian society. Acknowledging various categories and shifting contemporary definitions of “soldier”, a survey of socio-cultural backgrounds, modes of recruitment, terms of service and institutional environments distinguishes differences in rates and methods of remuneration, fiscal-legal privileges, socio-economic standing and professional identities. The vexed question of military landholdings becomes of pivotal significance for locating soldiers in agrarian society. Official spheres of military-civilian relations include policing and internal security, enforcement of religious policies, interventions in imperial politics and regional economic impact. Broader consideration of military sociology explores how the presence and behaviour of soldiers, on and off duty, affected the socio-economic patterns, cultural complexion and power relationships of urban and rural communities, and reflected soldiers’ varying levels of integration into civilian society, through origin, kinship, property and culture, mirroring longer-term changes in the composition of Byzantine armies.

This article aims to cast more light on the relatively under-researched subject of warfare in late Byzantine and Frankish Greece by analysing the descriptions of military operations between the Byzantine Empire and the Crusader Principality of Achaia in Morea (the Peloponnese) in 1264, especially the battle of Makry-Plagi. Moreover, it will demonstrate that, although relations between the Latins, Byzantines, and even the Turks were generally hostile at this time,  these groups could co-operate to a surprising extent, and even showed a readiness for peaceful co-existence.

Comnènes L'Orient néo-romain intégré (1159-1183) L'empire de Constantinople, celui que la langue courante de l'époque appelait la Romanie et la langue moderne Byzance, donnait une définition de lui-même, au moins jusqu'au XIII e siècle. Il était l'Empire romain, le premier si ce n'est seul Etat du monde au plein sens du terme, Res publica en latin puis politeia en grec. Il reposait sur un triptyque institutionnel. En premier lieu l'empereur, représentant de Dieu sur terre, loi vivante et juge suprême assurait la direction du monde y compris par l'usage légitime de la force armée. A la fois au-dessus à côté et en-dessous de lui, se trouvait l'Eglise, responsable, à travers ses institutions du salut des hommes, empereurs inclus. Enfin, sous ces deux structures, se trouvait l'institution assurant le fonctionnement effectif de l'Etat, son système fiscal, central dans la vie matérielle de l'Empire, le dèmosion. Pendant les deux siècles des Croisades, la présence en Orient de rivaux politiques et idéologiques, les Francs, fidèles de l'Eglise latine, fut un défi lancé aux capacités d'intégration et de direction de Constantinople sur un espace où elle avait exercé, si ce n'est le monopole du pouvoir politique suite aux invasions arabes et turques, du moins le monopole du pouvoir politique Chrétien.