Camp David

El artículo plantea que para lograr una verdadera paz en el conflicto palestino-israelí se deben negociar cuatro escenarios fundamentales: la cuestión del Estado palestino, el problema de la ciudad de Jerusalén, los refugiados palestinos y las colonias judías. El artículo hace un recorrido histórico del surgimiento de dichos problemas, para luego hacer un recuento de Camp David II, del año 2000, la última cumbre en donde se intentó negociar estos problemas y, finalmente, sugerir por qué estos problemas son tan importantes.

The article proposes that, to accomplish true peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, four fundamental issues must be the subject of negotiations: the question of the Palestinian State, the issue of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees and the Jewish colonies. This article does a historic exploration of the apparition of said questions, to then recount the events of Camp David II, the year 2000, the last summit where an attempt was made to negotiate on these problems and, finally, suggest why these issues are so important.

In this essay, I will analyse the use of power in third party mediation, and argue that when a mediator is able to wield such power, the success of the mediation will depend on the use of such leverage and the creation of coalitions with either or one of the sides of the negotitations. I will look at the Camp David negotiations in 1978 as well as in 2000 as case studies.

Cet article tente d’expliciter pourquoi le processus de paix israélo-palestinien s’est effondré au cours du deuxième semestre 2000.
L’approche méthodologique procède d’une double démarche. D’une part, classiquement, elle procède à un examen interne et externe rigoureux des sources disponibles, afin de trancher entre les différentes contradictions factuelles.
D’autre part, elle dresse une typologie des principales approches interprétatives afin de refléter la dimension politique sous-jacente d’un véritable «!combat de mémoires!», tant l’historiographie de ces événements est marquée, encore plus que de coutume, du sceau des préférences politiques et personnelles.

This article tries to explain why the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process collapsed in the second semester of 2000. The methodological approach follows a double path. On a first level, there is a classical internal and external assessment of the available material in order to stress the main empirical contradictions.
On second level, the author suggests a typology of the main approaches of interpretation in order to underline the underlying political dimension of this apparent “fight of memories”, as
the historiography of those events is more than usual influenced by political and personal preferences.

De Camp David akkoorden en het vredesverdrag tussen Egypte en Israël, dat daaruit vloeide, waren een product van de machtsverhoudingen die in de jaren zestig en zeventig van vorige eeuw in het Midden-Oosten heersten. Deze machtsverhoudingen kenden een serieuze verschuiving met de komst van Anwar al-Sādāt de president van Egypte toen. De relaties tussen de staten van de regio werden herzien en de geopolitieke kaart van het Midden-Oosten en zijn grenzen werden opnieuw hertekend.
Ik koos om de rol en visie van Anwar al-Sādāt in de totstandkoming van de Camp David akkoorden te bestuderen, omdat hij volgens mijn analyse de schakelfiguur was. Had zijn voorganger JamālʼAbd al-Nāṣir nog langer geleefd, dan hadden wij vandaag hoogstwaarschijnlijk een andere geopolitieke situatie in het Midden-Oosten.

Blog News

Why Avi Gabbay?

Iran

Congratulations – Israel Champion of Europe!

Royal Visit

Shabtai Shavit

Aharon Barak

Living in Denial

Haredi People on Flights – A Proposal

Did You Know?

Basic Law: Israel - The Nation State of the Jewish People

Israel Passes Law to Ban Groups Critical of Israeli Policies from Schools

Legal Advisors Bill

1982 Lebanon War

Camp David

Post Abu-Mazen

Facebook

Exercise in Logic

My New Article - "Taking North American White Supremacist Groups Seriously: The Scope and the Challenge of Hate Speech on the Internet”, International Journal of Crime, Justice, and Social Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2018): 38-57.

Cambridge University Press

Gem of the Month – Berkeley
Gem of the Month - Guy's Bar Mitzvah
Gem of the Month - Kinneret
Gem of the Month - Golan Heights
Gem of the Month - Tel Aviv
Gem of the Month - Jerusalem
Gem of the Month - Herzliya
Gem of the Month - Mondeal

Frustration
Surreal
Ariel

Movie - The Olive Tree (Spain, 2016)
Monthly Poems
Light Side - The Most UNEXPECTED Auditions EVER!

Over the past few years, I have been researching the failed peace process between Israel and the PLO, from Oslo 1993 until the present. I have examined how the conditions of peace were advanced and promoted via third-party mediation. This research is important, as the Americans continue to fail in their mediation attempts. Indeed, the Oslo channel was opened at a time when formal, non-secretive negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians were stalled in Washington DC. To date, despite considerable political, economic and diplomatic investments in the peace process, the United States has been unable to bring the Israelis and the Palestinians to sign a comprehensive peace pact and to settle their bloody conflict. While some progress has been made, peace is still a distant prospect.
The goal of the Kurtzer interview is to unearth the historical processes constituting the peace process from an American perspective. Evidence from people who were part of the process can help identify the factors that move history forward. The interviews I conducted with Kurtzer and some thirty other people reveal that there is not one history, but many histories. People who were in the same room perceive the same situation in different ways. A classic Rashomon.
The Kurtzer interview begins with Oslo 1993. The Intifada, which erupted in 1987, constituted a threat to Arafat’s leadership.  He was surprised by the scale of the uprising, which brought thousands of protesters to the streets to fight against the Israeli occupation. The rise of Hamas further threatened his position in Gaza and the West Bank. Arafat was anxious to do something which would bring him to the center of attention. Moreover, his alliance with the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War undermined his position in the moderate Arab world. Arafat needed to reinforce his leadership among the Palestinian people.

In memory of Gad Yaakobi
This article examines the major developments that have taken place since the signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993. It analyzes the major mistakes made along the way by both sides, showing that brinkmanship is a very dangerous policy when one or both sides are willing to pay a high price in blood. Finally, it offers a blueprint for breaking the deadlock roughly based on the Clinton parameters of 2001 and the subsequent Israeli-Palestinian Geneva Accords.
Keywords: Israel, Palestine, peace, security, Oslo process, Camp David