Carbon Trading

Carbon trading, as a market-based climate policy that allows polluters to comply with emissions reductions commitments with tradable pollution rights, is presented by its proponents as the most cost-efficient alternative for climate change mitigation, while critics counter that the cost-efficiency argument ignores the harms that result from commodifying carbon. This thesis contributes to this debate, which is fundamental for the future of environmental policies, by exposing the social costs of carbon trading and making the case against its inclusion in the climate policy-mix. The argument developed here draws from theoretical contributions on the social costs of private activities and on value conflicts, as well as critical perspectives on the neoliberalization of nature and the limits of the market.
Emissions trading was firstly proposed as an alternative to efficiency-maximizing or pigouvian environmental taxation. Based on the property rights approach to social costs, emissions trading would allow regulators to escape the impossible task of calculating the optimal level of pollution and offer instead a cost-efficient way to achieve an exogenously determined level of pollution. This theoretical shift would allow economics to be centred on discussing the best means to achieve given ends and relived it of discussing ends. The ends-means dichotomy, however, does not hold outside textbook economics, as well as the description of emissions trading as a simple and efficient alternative to direct regulation. As the US experience with emissions trading shows, creating markets for tradable pollution rights requires government investment in a regulatory apparatus that is no less complex than what is required for direct regulation or taxation. This experience also illustrates how the purported efficiency of emissions trading systems is a flip side of their weak environmental performance and their disregard for social justice and democratic participation.
Carbon trading schemes created under the Kyoto Protocol raise additional problems. Compared to “cap and trade” schemes based on a single pollutant and a restricted number of sources, schemes like the EU Emissions Trading System are more complex and require further government intervention. Furthermore, flexibility instruments like the Clean Development Mechanism allow industrialized countries to pollute beyond their emissions commitments and raise issues with the disputable integrity of methodologies that account for emissions reductions from offset projects relative to an arbitrary baseline. The dismal performance of these schemes is illustrated by their inability to provide an incentive to decarbonization, while distributing rents to polluters and creating new sources of corruption.
These issues are not reducible to discussions on accounting procedures and other technicalities. Opening the “black box” of carbon quantification and commensuration reveals that its calculations sideline relevant uncertainties and assume a degree of accuracy that scientific knowledge and technology cannot deliver in the present. Yet, since accounting for emissions increases or reductions requires political decisions on what is to be accounted for, what is the relevant metric and what is an acceptable degree of uncertainty, further scientific and technological developments are not enough to make it possible to produce the unambiguous numbers that carbon trading requires.
Going further on the discussion of the implications of carbon commensuration and abstraction, this thesis presents an argument against the inclusion of carbon trading in the climate policy-mix based on four normative critiques. With the support of critical literature, it is argued that carbon trading is ineffective, undemocratic, unjust and unethical and that, for these reasons, it can only be considered as a cost-effective policy when its social costs are ignored. An argument against carbon trading reformism is then presented by illustrating how trying to mitigate the negative effects of carbon markets by imposing restrictions on trading leads to the erosion of these markets. A better alternative is claimed to be supporting climate policies that foster a plurality of values and deliver social benefits.
The thesis concludes by advocating a shift in the climate policy debate to a discussion on the values that are fostered or hindered by each policy. A general framework is proposed that respects value pluralism and acknowledges conflicts between incommensurable values, which is not compatible with market-based policies.

Carbon pricing has come to dominate the white environmental and climate movements as well as the debate on how to curb climate change. It is with grave concern that the Indigenous Environmental Network and the Climate Justice Alliance have come together to produce this series of publications on carbon pricing in response to the promotion of false solutions that continue to concentrate power, imprison communities, and solely focuses on carbon emissions and not root causes. Although the publication is aimed primarily at a North American audience, we hope that it can also be a useful tool for communities elsewhere who are impacted by – and are resisting – carbon pricing and all of its synonyms as a master strategy for tackling global warming. Highlighting how carbon pricing mechanisms obscure the root causes of climate change, divide communities and organizations, and furthers the impacts of climate change to all, we have included a wide variety of international examples of and perspectives on carbon pricing, while keeping in mind that domestic US climate politics have important international consequences.

The article aims at showing the relevance of understanding the transformations of class composition for strengthening the connection between degrowth and environmental justice (EJ). In particular, I suggest the heterodox line of Autonomist Marxism as enabling factor of such connection. From an ecological perspective, the changing components of the working-class can be grasped by assessing the historical development of the value-nature nexus, and speci fically of labour's role within it. In fact, capitalism does not have but rather is an ecological regime. Value creation occurs not upon nature, but through it – that is, within socio-natural relations emerging from the articulation of capital, power and the environment. My basic argument is that in contemporary capitalism conditions of existence and reproduction of society have become key drivers for surplus value production – most notably in carbon trading. Hence, EJ resistances are instances of class struggle and degrowth theoretical elaboration would bene fit from incorporating such class-character. In this unprecedented situation, the task of the critique of political economy is not only that of unmasking ruling class' attempts to naturalize capitalism. It also requires resisting to elites' endeavours to directly capitalize nature.

Nearly half of Britain’s carbon dioxide emissions result from the activity of households, both within the home and from personal transport. This research examines how the carbon dioxide emissions of households can be reduced, particularly through the calculation of carbon footprints and testing the public’s reaction to the concept of personal carbon allowances (PCAs). Two data collection stages were used - a postal survey providing quantitative data, followed by semi-structured interviews producing mainly qualitative data. The research was carried out in a largely rural district which is run by a council noted for its work on sustainable energy, Newark and Sherwood. The survey looked at PCAs as well as a variety of contemporary issues that might influence household footprints such as energy efficiency grants and information, as well as relationships with gas and electricity suppliers. Each interview involved the calculation of a household carbon footprint, the identification of measures to reduce it, and the gathering of attitudes about personal carbon allowances, in order to identify challenges and opportunities with respect to reducing household carbon emissions. Support for PCAs was higher than anticipated, and tended to be associated with those who were prepared to use public transport or cycle more, or were supportive of renewable energy in homes. Interviewees had much to say about individual carbon reducing measures. Opposition was associated with those who envisaged that they would be unlikely to sell carbon units. Regarding personal transport, long commutes were common, and the cost of public transport was of concern. Specific findings were made about domestic heating, insulation, lighting, refrigeration, water use, commuting, public transport, and rail as an alternative to short-haul flights. There was more interest in monetary savings than carbon savings. Recommendations about policy and regarding further research are made.

As environmental degradation becomes a rising concern, this article argues that the development of international law on climate change expresses the deep social contradictions between accumulation and reproduction under capitalism. These contradictions are translated into the creation of a form of public property over the right to emit greenhouse gases (and not the ‘privatisation’ of the atmosphere). This public property is unequally distributed amongst states in an imperialist manner. The distribution of these rights at the domestic level amount to the distribution of rights to the climate rent. Contrary to popular accounts of the ‘commodification’ of nature, I argue that emission rights are not ‘commodities’, and emissions trading and carbon markets are not ‘accumulation strategies’. These are merely depoliticised forms in which the climate rent is extracted and circulates to preclude political debates about the goals of production.

In this article, we analyse the dynamic connections constituted by the global commodity chains of carbon markets, which offer profit, marketing and legitimacy-providing opportunities for both Northern and Southern corporations. Specifically, we contrast EDF Energy's green CSR and marketing discourse with the social, economic and environmental realities on the ground near the factory of Gujarat Fluorochemicals Limited (GFL), which operates one of the biggest clean development mechanism (CDM) projects in India. Based on historical documents, secondary datasets, companies’ websites and their financial information, primary ethnographic and interview data, our analysis makes a direct link – enabled by global carbon markets – between the green claims made by EDF Energy, one of the biggest energy companies in the UK, and the dirty reality of GFL's operations in India. In this historical case, we put into doubt the green CSR claims made by EDF Energy, questioning the discourse of sustainable development and improvement in people's lives that surround global carbon markets and specifically the CDM.

The concept of Payments for Ecosystem or Environmental Services (PES) has attracted growing attention in both academic and policy circles. The main premise of this approach is appealing: land users, who tend to be poorly, if at all, motivated to protect nature on their land, may be encouraged to do so through direct payments from ecosystem service buyers. The theoretical underpinnings of PES emanate from a Coasean externality framework, which holds that - under certain circumstances - private negotiations through the market can lead to socially optimal situations. The presumed superiority of PES over other conservation mechanisms is, however, not unequivocal. From an institutional ecological economics and political economy perspective and through a variety of theoretical and empirical chapters this Ph.D. discusses the potential and limitations of the so-called Coasean or market-based PES approach. The central argument throughout this Ph.D. is that one of the reasons for the poor performance of the dominant market-based PES approach is that it tends to overlook a broad range of important social, cultural, and economic dynamics that relate to effective environmental governance.

Carbon pricing is widely recognized as an effective policy instrument for climate change mitigation. Carbon pricing have been imposed in 39 developed countries and eight middle-income countries. Eight more middle-income countries are considering its implementation. As experiences from industrialized countries may not be relevant to developing countries, this literature review fills a knowledge gap by collating the impacts of carbon pricing in developing economies to facilitate cross-learning. Some developing countries still have distortionary subsidies in place, while others are going through environmental fiscal reforms to nudge their societies and economies towards greenhouse gases emission reduction. Various studies demonstrated that safeguards introduced with carbon pricing could help firms to transition while maintaining the motivation to innovate to stay competitive. At the household level, given different energy consumption patterns, carbon pricing in developing economies is not necessarily regressive, especially for rural population. Aggregate impacts to employment rate and gross domestic product change over time as the economy restructures towards decarbonization. A well-designed carbon pricing policy package with revenue recycling mechanisms tailored to the socioeconomic circumstances of the country could achieve multiple dividends of economic growth, increased employment, improved equality, national debt reduction or accomplishment of other sustainable development goals.

The rise of populism across Europe and the US – first in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and then in the shape of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and the Brexit vote in 2016 – are indicative of a seismic shift in the terrain of economic ideas in public discourse. Settled liberal norms concerning ever-increasing international market expansion, and the political integration required to sustain it, have been decisively upset by political forces that, whilst once on the fringes, now dominate economic debate. How might we make sense of this ideological breakdown and what might we hope for next?
This book turns to the work of Karl Polanyi for answers, developing the expansive, historicised approach to political economy that Polanyi pioneered. Holmes provides a wide-ranging history of economic ideas read in terms of a series of hopeful theoretical visions of order, in which political, social and ecological contradictions could be transcended in one way or another. Through this, the book demonstrates that the failing utopian visions of pre-2008 economic orthodoxy, which have formed the backdrop to the rise of populism today, are only the latest in a series that stretches across economic thought in Western modernity as a whole.
This book will interest students and scholars of international political economy, political science, sociology, anthropology, law and history.

Forests and carbon sequestration have become fundamental themes in climate change mitigation. The idea of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) has generated significant interest in forest governance from United Nations (UN) climate strategies over the past decade. REDD+ was initially hailed as a smart and cost-effective way to mitigate climate change. As it is rolling out, ambiguities and controversies are increasingly surfacing to the stakeholders at different levels. Examining the forest governance of Nepal in detail, this research examines how relationships between national and local forest actors have changed, and how REDD+ discourses have evolved among them at the interface between global interests in carbon commodification on one hand, and local realities of community forestry on the other hand. To better understand these competing positions, the study uses a post-structural political ecology perspective with elements of discourse analysis. Using data from interviews with policy actors and members of three local community forest user groups, focus group discussions, policy event observations, and document reviews, this paper highlights how global forest carbon commodification has been affecting community forestry governance. It also illustrates different storylines that actors employ to influence policy discourse and REDD+ debates, indicating a considerable range of problem definitions and policy solutions of climate change among the actors. The analysis highlights the connection between power relationships and the evolution of discourses surrounding REDD+, and how an external discourse can reinforce or challenge local governance and the centralization of forest authority. As such, the research also offers a new application of discursive storylines to climate change discourse analysis across national and local scales. The findings emphasize the importance of a more open and transparent dialogue across Nepal's forest governance and management levels to ensure actual benefits for healthy forests, strong communities, and effective climate change mitigation. Nepal's findings also suggest highly relevant lessons to other developing countries with significant community forest governance, and a strong planned focus on REDD+.

This paper reviews the progress of carbon trading in China and examines the involvement of the state and financial sectors. China witnessed proliferation of domestic carbon markets before attempting to institutionalize the carbon trading regime. Direct and strong government intervention is a key feature of this process. The domestic carbon markets are primarily created, shaped and operated by the central and local governments supported by a cohort of macro-economic planners, local economic agencies, state-owned financial institutions, and business organizations with government backing. Key market players are institutionally dependent on the state – much more so than in capitalist economies. Private investments have not been adequately and effectively mobilized due to unfavourable economic, regulatory, and policy conditions. Non-state financial actors are not an active and influential player. This indicates a hierarchical relationship between the state and finance and a clear asymmetry of power in the organization of China’s carbon markets. These observations constitute a notable difference to the international carbon markets which are subject to the strong influence of private finance. China has put the market-based policy instrument of carbon trading under a substantial concentration of state power. The findings have important implications for understanding the rise of carbon markets in non-traditional capitalist economies.

In this work, a solid-state high performance supercapacitor is fabricated based on a ternary polyaniline@Fe3O4@carbon fibers nanocomposite. To prepare the polyaniline@Fe3O4@carbon fibers electrodes, a two-step method including electrophoretic deposition of Fe3O4 nanoparticles on carbon fibres followed by an in situ polymerization process of polyaniline is utilized. The results show that the polyaniline@Fe3O4@carbon fibers nanocomposite with a layer by layer microstructure is successfully formed. The fabricated nanocomposite represents a specific surface area of 3.12 m2 g−1. The electrochemical measurements in a three-electrode configuration reveals a high specific capacitance of 245.5 F g−1 at 0.5 A g−1 and an excellent cycle stability (82.44% after 1000 cycle) of the polyaniline@Fe3O4@carbon fibers electrode. The as-fabricated solid-state supercapacitor based on the polyaniline@Fe3O4@carbon fiber nanocomposite cloth with a surface area of 25 cm2 powers up a blue light-emitting diode for 4 min and delivers a high energy density of 78.6 Wh.kg−1 at a power density of 1047.5 W kg−1.

The difficulties of organizing emissions trading in line with the principles of economics have led economic sociologists to interrogate the significance of political compromises and technical conditions to the performance of markets. This article argues that sociological studies of ‘techno-politics’ should be complemented with a geographical perspective concerned with how such market experiments are territorialized in relation to wider socio-technically distributed practices. Focusing on the setup of a regionally concentrated and integrated European market for carbon, it investigates a particular compromise made between climate and energy policies in the post-2012 trading rules for the electricity sector: a nexus created between the risks of energy insecurity, competitive disadvantage, and ‘carbon leakage’. The resistance of EU border states to carbon pricing has enabled ‘carbon leakage’ to be re-conceptualized as a threat of transferring electricity generation to non-market suppliers, which reinforces state-centred strategies of carbon-intensive production. This case evidences three fundamentally spatial predicaments of technopolitics, contributing to geographical studies of marketization. Firstly, the politics of allocating emissions allowances is exacerbated by the territorial premises of the market that bring neoliberal forms of governing climate change into conflict with state sovereignty claims. Secondly, the technical aspects of calculating carbon exchange cannot be dissociated from other transboundary modes of circulation in the market region, such as electricity transmission networks. Thirdly, experiments with carbon marketization can have spatially differentiated effects, challenging the enclosure of market territory and creating a contentious ‘frontier region’ with distinct trading rules on the borders of the market.

China has introduced several pilot emission trading schemes to build the basis for a national scheme. The potential scale of this initiative raises prospects for a regional carbon trading network as a way to further engage other major Asian economies. However, the Chinese carbon markets rest upon a unique political-economic context and institutional environment that are likely to limit their development and viability. This article offers an overview of such structural economic and political constraints. Four main challenges are identified, namely, inadequate domestic demand, limited financial involvement, incomplete regulatory infrastructure, and excessive government intervention. The first two challenges concern economic dimensions and may be partially addressed by the incentives created by the newly introduced emission trading schemes. The other two are more deeply entrenched in the dominant political system and governing practice. They require fundamental changes to the ways in which the state and the market interact. The success of China’s carbon market reform depends crucially on the ability of the ongoing efforts to transform the distorted state-market relationship.

One of the biggest unsolved crisis today is of the changing climate due to the continuous (and rising) anthropogenic input of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Efforts to mitigate this climate change by various governmental movements and policies around the world and within a country, state, or city do not seem to be able to counteract the problem. Mumbai local government up till now has focused on cleaning of wastes and sewages with few policy enforcements on vehicular air pollution.

Mechanisms such as Kyoto and the EU ETS though manage Emission Trading between companies; their focus only is limited to the upstream users leaving a policy gap on individual emission. The current untried proposal by UK research teams of Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) of managing one’s carbon footprint is being studied upon. PCT overcomes the economical drawbacks of adapting to a lower carbon economy by inducing a behavioural change in energy usage. Thus the question comes: Can PCT be an effective solution in reducing Greenhouse Gas emission in Mumbai?

The effectiveness has been assessed by taking in considering the adaptability of PCT to Mumbai’s economic structure and its acceptability. For research purpose, 5 Income Groups were formed (with Group 5 earning the highest). Survey was then taken to see CO2e (Carbon Dioxide equivalent) emission of 100 families in Mumbai from different Income Groups and their response to the scheme.

It was noted that there was a trend in the Income Group and their emission level. Considering the theoretical literature and discussion of working of PCT in Mumbai, a conclusion was drawn about the scheme that it will be an effective solution to the emission problem in Mumbai. This research was evaluated for effectiveness and hurdles taking in account the unexplored parameters and assumptions.

Two global initiatives, the Genographic Project and the Carbon Lottery, share an ambition to make abstract, global processes—human evolution and climate change—comprehensible and engaging to non-specialists. Despite their differences, they both do so by means of self-objectifications that scale up the selves of participants and scale down complex, spatio-temporal models of human-world relations. Based on the author's auto-ethnographic experience as a participant in both initiatives, it is argued that carbon calculators and personalised genomics involves a pragmatics of scale that evaluates and compares users on the basis of their relative expression of, or deviation from, a standard. Furthermore, this is not based on actual resources that participants do or do not possess, but on forms of capitalist exchange that underwrite carbon trading and population genomics, as experts and corporations make fungible intellectual property derived from purportedly rare DNA and sustainable practices, which are typically indigenous and non-western. In fact, for users of these initiatives, the global inequalities that make possible transactions in carbon offsets and genetic ancestry are obscured from view. As a result, though initiatives like the Genographic Project and Carbon Lottery may provide comprehensible self-objectifications, they potentially make the world more unequal in the process. Introduction Evolution and climate change remain very controversial ways of thinking about how people relate to the world, despite widespread acceptance of these models within the biological and Earth sciences, respectively. It may be that the findings of climatology and evolutionary biology are difficult to accept because they defy the appeal of naive empiricism. Climate and evolution are general patterns that gradually develop over long periods of time and, for this reason, cannot be directly observed as such. One cannot perceive trends in global climate by documenting the current weather in a single location, anymore than one can perceive evolutionary processes by studying a single organism in isolation. Because climate and evolution are complex, long-term spatio-temporal processes they can seem abstract and impersonal when compared to everyday experience on a human scale (Aubrey, 2009; Irvine, 2014).

[Free copy until 21 Apr 2017 available from https://authors.elsevier.com/a/1UeNy15eieoVjn]
China has developed its own domestic carbon markets by setting up emission trading schemes. This study addresses concerns about the functioning of these schemes and the financial performance of the Chinese carbon market. It aims to assess an actual outcome of this policy intervention, i.e. trading records, which were used in our analysis to examine a key financial property of the allowance-based market in Shenzhen. In a mature market, assets that incur higher risks are likely to yield higher returns, i.e. a positive relationship. To examine this property, we solicited historical data on the price and trading volume of emission allowances. We statistically estimated the degree of volatility in the Shenzhen market and its relationship with expected return premium. We found that the rate of return was negatively associated with expected risk. This stands at odds with the usual expectation in the financial market and the prediction of asset pricing theory. Also, kurtosis in trading volume was excessively high and its fluctuations were highly concentrated. We discuss these findings in terms of market liquidity and information uncertainties, and offer some policy recommendations. More regulatory attention and economic fixes are needed to improve market efficiency and eliminate sources of market distortions.

Through the use of assisted reproductive technologies multiple children are born, adding to worldwide carbon emissions. Evaluating the ethics of offering reproductive services against its overall harm to the environment makes unregulated ARTs unjustified, yet the ART business can move towards sustainability as a part of the larger environmental movement. In the medical industry this can be accomplished through the established discipline of environmental bioethics and the nascent field of green bioethics.  When green bioethics is integrated into the assisted reproductive technology industry, climate change can be mitigated and the conversation about consumption can become a public discourse.

Although the impact of naturally made children on the environment is undeniable, I will focus on the assisted reproductive technologies industry as an anthropogenic source of carbon emissions which lead to climate change. The ART industry is an often-overlooked source of environmental degradation and decidedly different from natural reproduction as fertility centers provide a service for a fee and therefore can be subject to economic, policy and bioethical scrutiny.

In this article I will provide a brief background on the current state of human-driven climate change before suggesting two conservationist strategies that can be employed in the ART business. First, endorsing a carbon capping program that limits the carbon emissions of ART businesses will be proposed. Second, I will recommend that policymakers eliminate funded ARTs for those who are not biologically infertile. I will conclude the article by urging policymakers and all those concerned with climate change to consider the effects of the reproductive technologies industry in light of climate change and move towards sustainability.

Il paper proposto si compone di due sezioni fortemente interrelate. Nella prima, la contestualizzazione storica e la descrizione analitica del merca- to globale delle emissioni di CO2 vengono articolate sullo sfondo di una duplice ipotesi interpretativa: a) il processo di progressiva mercatizazzione del mutamento climatico si produce parallelamente all’emergere di una nuo- 􏰀􏰁􏰂 􏰃􏰄􏰅􏰁􏰆􏰇􏰈􏰉􏰂 􏰅􏰇􏰂 􏰊􏰋􏰄􏰅􏰌􏰍􏰇􏰄􏰎􏰏􏰂 􏰅􏰏􏰆􏰂 􏰀􏰁􏰆􏰄􏰋􏰏􏰂 􏰐􏰑􏰒􏰏􏰂 􏰊􏰄􏰓􏰓􏰇􏰁􏰃􏰄􏰂 􏰔􏰏􏰎􏰏􏰋􏰇􏰑􏰁􏰃􏰏􏰎􏰈􏰏􏰂 􏰅􏰏􏰕􏰎􏰋􏰏􏰂 ‘capitalismo cognitivo’); b) i processi di governance dei contemporanei cir- 􏰑􏰌􏰇􏰈􏰇􏰂􏰅􏰇􏰂􏰀􏰁􏰆􏰄􏰋􏰇􏰍􏰍􏰁􏰍􏰇􏰄􏰎􏰏􏰂􏰈􏰏􏰎􏰅􏰄􏰎􏰄􏰂􏰁􏰂􏰓􏰇􏰈􏰌􏰁􏰋􏰓􏰇􏰂􏰁􏰆􏰆􏰖􏰇􏰎􏰈􏰏􏰋􏰎􏰄􏰂􏰅􏰏􏰆􏰆􏰁􏰂􏰓􏰗􏰏􏰋􏰁􏰂􏰕􏰎􏰁􏰎􏰍􏰇􏰁􏰋􏰇􏰁􏰂􏰏􏰂 pongono una costitutiva e reiterata incertezza/instabilità come condizione ineludibile della propria riproduzione.
􏰘􏰏􏰆􏰆􏰁􏰂􏰓􏰏􏰑􏰄􏰎􏰅􏰁􏰂􏰊􏰁􏰋􏰈􏰏􏰂􏰅􏰏􏰆􏰂􏰊􏰁􏰊􏰏􏰋􏰂􏰈􏰁􏰆􏰏􏰂􏰇􏰊􏰄􏰈􏰏􏰓􏰇􏰂􏰅􏰇􏰂􏰆􏰁􏰀􏰄􏰋􏰄􏰂􏰀􏰇􏰏􏰎􏰏􏰂􏰃􏰏􏰓􏰓􏰁􏰂􏰁􏰂􏰀􏰏􏰋􏰇􏰕􏰑􏰁􏰂 􏰑􏰄􏰎􏰂􏰓􏰊􏰏􏰑􏰇􏰕􏰑􏰄􏰂􏰋􏰇􏰗􏰏􏰋􏰇􏰃􏰏􏰎􏰈􏰄􏰂􏰁􏰆􏰂􏰙􏰋􏰄􏰈􏰄􏰑􏰄􏰆􏰆􏰄􏰂􏰅􏰇􏰂􏰚􏰛􏰄􏰈􏰄􏰜􏰂􏰏􏰅􏰂􏰇􏰎􏰂􏰊􏰁􏰋􏰈􏰇􏰑􏰄􏰆􏰁􏰋􏰏􏰂􏰁􏰆􏰆􏰏􏰂􏰃􏰏􏰋- ci-carbonio da esso istituite.
In ultima istanza, il paper proposto si pone come obiettivo la dimostra- zione che il valore prodotto all’interno del mercato globale delle emissioni di CO2 dipende esclusivamente dall’adesione arbitraria degli attori sociali al carbon trading dogma, cioè l’asserzione empiricamente indimostrata ed in- 􏰅􏰇􏰃􏰄􏰓􏰈􏰋􏰁􏰝􏰇􏰆􏰏􏰂􏰑􏰒􏰏􏰂􏰓􏰄􏰆􏰄􏰂􏰔􏰆􏰇􏰂􏰁􏰔􏰏􏰎􏰈􏰇􏰂􏰅􏰇􏰂􏰃􏰏􏰋􏰑􏰁􏰈􏰄􏰂􏰊􏰄􏰓􏰓􏰁􏰎􏰄􏰂􏰏􏰗􏰕􏰑􏰇􏰏􏰎􏰈􏰏􏰃􏰏􏰎􏰈􏰏􏰂􏰋􏰇􏰓􏰄􏰆􏰀􏰏􏰋􏰏􏰂 le criticità legate al cambiamento climatico.
Parole chiave􏰞􏰂􏰃􏰏􏰋􏰑􏰁􏰈􏰇􏰂􏰅􏰏􏰆􏰆􏰏􏰂􏰏􏰃􏰇􏰓􏰓􏰇􏰄􏰎􏰇􏰂􏰅􏰇􏰂􏰔􏰁􏰓􏰂􏰓􏰏􏰋􏰋􏰁􏰟􏰂􏰃􏰏􏰋􏰑􏰇􏰠􏰑􏰁􏰋􏰝􏰄􏰎􏰇􏰄􏰟􏰂􏰕- nanziarizzazione; capitalismo cognitivo; carbon trading dogma; astrazione di secondo grado

Considerable efforts are being organized to build a functioning carbon market in China. This paper presents an overview of the development of the Chinese carbon market and offers an industry perspective on the domestic regulatory and investment environments. It is based on a review of relevant publications and interviews with Beijing-based finance executives. We found that few financial institutions with the expertise required have been brought into the process of institutional development. Corporate demand for advanced financial services linked to emission trading is weak. Current regulations permit limited trading options, significantly reducing investment opportunities. The market scale is too small to attract investors and financial service providers. Consequently, the Chinese carbon market remains illiquid. Domestic financial institutions have not assumed a critical role in market development. It is suggested that policy-makers minimize administrative intervention in the market, but a modest degree of direct administrative control is still considered to be instrumental.

Offsetting is widely embraced as a market-based solution to global warming. Governments, universities, and businesses of all sorts have pledged to achieve “net zero” greenhouse gas emissions partly or entirely through offsetting projects, many of which rely on so-called nature-based solutions (NBSs). Offsets are meant to compensate for damage caused by emissions from one place by absorbing or preventing the release of an equivalent amount somewhere else. At best, offsetting results in no change in total emissions, but as theory predicts and experience shows, that best result is rarely attainable. Meanwhile, both land-based and industrial offsets legitimize continued emissions. There is active debate in Paris-pact talks and in climate politics more broadly over how much fossil-fuel industries and industrial countries will be allowed to delay real climate action by representing offsets as if they were emissions reductions. The American Association of Geographers should not contribute to this illusion by endorsing offsetting. Instead we should take steps to reduce our own emissions and speak out clearly when our work has bearing on policy decisions and public perceptions about the climate crisis.