Contingent a Priori

Given the current “definition” of the term 'meter' a simple argument appears to show that some scientists could come to know the speed of light a priori. I argue that coming to know that a proposition is true does not always put one in epistemic contact with the fact that makes that proposition true. The former may be trivial and a priori, though the latter may be substantial and a posteriori.

Neste trabalho consideraremos se o racionalismo é compatível com a existência do conhecimento a priori de verdades contingentes e se de fato pode haver tal conhecimento. Para tanto avaliaremos uma série de argumentos que compuseram a discussão desse tema nas últimas
décadas — como os argumentos de Kripke (2012), Hawthorne (2002) e Turri (2011). Concluiremos que o racionalismo é compatível com a existência do conhecimento a priori de verdades contingentes e que de fato pode haver tal conhecimento.

I present several arguments which together or separately, and among other things, provide what I take to be a definitive argument against the use of so-called sex-neutral masculine language. The main title presents, in elevated language, a simple (perverse) idea --some might say small, and I am happy to agree-- that is the essential keystone of masculine language and the essential reason behind its current remise-en-question. The subtitle plays on deep structure to convey the idea that this paper has both semantic interests and deontic concerns. In the sense of any paper with an 'ought' in it, it is, among other things, an advocacy paper.
Part I: Double Standards and the Contingent A Priori focuses on the use of the word 'man'. Part II: The Masculine Language Loop examines how the pernicious a priori --the masculine language virus-- infects our pronominal system, and our attitudes.

This document consists of 18 entries from my Workbooks of the past two decades which were selected to shed light on the philosophical background and status of the key concept of the version of critical-theoretical cognitive sociology I have been promoting for a number of decades – the concept of the cognitive order. The content is organized in four sections. (i) The opening section on the one hand establishes the concept‘s relation to Kant’s ‘transcendental ideas of reason’, but on the other shows that it owes much to the post-Hegelian detranscendentalization or relativization of Kant’s a priori or transcendentalism, with the implication that it concerns the conditions and emphatically not the foundations of the sociocultural form of life. The detranscendentalization process is considered in some detail, both generally and in relation to cognitive sociology. (ii) The second section explores in more specific terms the contributions of a number of key American and European philosophers to the detranscendentalization process, including Charles S. Peirce, C.I. Lewis, Wilfrid Sellars, Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom. The interesting insight arising is that the convergence between the European concern with a prioricity and the American concern with analyticity facilitates the characterization and understanding of the concept of the cognitive order. (iii) The third section shows that the transcendental, a priori or formal analytical nature of the cognitive order as a set of concepts and principles functioning as preceding conditions is mind-dependent in the sense of being the outcome of human creative activity and self-understanding. The creation and use of these concepts and principles by subjects or actors in the course of their social-ontological construction of their world is clarified in terms of conceptual realism. This constructive moment is then located in the context of the historical generation and evolutionary stabilization of the cognitive order. (iv) The final concluding section first gives a summary statement on the cognitive sociological concept of the cognitive order and, second, provides a clarification of its place and role in social scientific reasoning.

In Naming And Necessity, Saul Kripke suggests that there may be contingent propositions which are knowable a priori (by creatures like us), and that there may be necessary propositions which are knowable only a posteriori (by creatures like us). As an example of a contingent proposition which is knowable a priori (by creatures like us) Kripke offers: the proposition which is the content of the sentence The length of stick S at to is one metre, where stick S is the standard metre, and to is the time at which the reference of the expression "one metre" is fixed for one via reference to (the length of) S. And, as an example of a necessary proposition which is knowable only a posteriori (by creatures like us) Kripke suggests: the proposition which is the content of the sentence Hesperus is Phosphorus.

In Frege’s Puzzle, Nathan Salmon argues that, although the general claims which Kripke makes are correct, the examples which he gives do not carry conviction. On the one hand, Salmon argues that, although there are necessary propositions which are knowable only a posteriori (by creatures like us), the sentence Hesperus is Phosphorus actually has as its content a necessary proposition which is knowable a priori (by creatures like us). And, on the other hand, Salmon argues that although there are contingent propositions which are knowable a priori (by creatures like us), the sentence The length of stick S at to is one metre actually has as its content a contingent proposition which is only knowable a posteriori (by creatures like us).

In this paper, I propose to argue: (i) that if Salmon's case against Kripke's examples is good, then it can be extended to show that there are no examples of the contingent a priori; and (ii) that if Salmon were to grant that Kripke's examples are good, while maintaining the rest of his views, then he would very likely be committed to the conclusion that all singular propositions -- or, at least, all suitably existentially
circumscribed singular propositions -- can be known a priori. I shall conclude with some suggestions about how Salmon's views ought to be amended.

We discuss the view, accepted by many rational intuition theorists, that rational intuitions involve appearances of necessity. The fact that we can have rational intuitions of contingent propositions casts a doubt on the adequacy of this view. This fact can be accommodated by a fallibilist theory of rational intuitions, provided one accepts that these intuitions generate ineliminable modal illusions. Drawing on two-dimensional explanations of the contingent a priori, we defend an alternative view according to which the appearances involved in rational intuitions are not appearances of necessity but rather an expression of their a priori status.

Arthur Pap worked in analytic philosophy while maintaining a strong
Kantian or neo-Kantian element throughout his career, stemming from his studying with Ernst Cassirer. I present these elements in the different periods of Pap’s works, showing him to be a consistent critic of logical empiricism, which Pap shows to be incapable of superseding the Kantian framework. Nevertheless, Pap’s work is definitely analytic philosophy, both in terms of the content and the style. According to Pap, the central topics of analytic philosophy concern meaning, modality, and analysis. Pap was also influenced by pragmatism, especially in his dissertation, although he does not fully embrace it in either its classical or its Quinean form.

Inspired by Kripke's distinction between the concepts of analyticity and apriority though the auxiliary concept of necessity, the central thesis of the present paper is that there are more kinds of political attitudes than expected; the lack of some of these in the political spectrum comes from a deep confusion between the concepts of right and conservatism. Furthermore, the separation between two kinds of order-economical and moral, will justify the more original attitudes of 'left conservatism' and 'right progressivism' whilst accounting for the more ambiguous notions of political centers and extremes. Finally, a comparison between political values and logical values-truth and falsity, will allow an explanation of the ambivalent attitudes 'left and right at once' and 'neither left nor right' either as cases of conceptual confusions or as a collapse of the political discourse into 'extreme center'.

Inspirada pela distinção que, através do conceito auxiliar de necessidade, Kripke estabelece entre os conceitos de analiticidade e a aprioridade, a tese central do presente artigo é a de que há mais tipos de atitudes políticas do que se costuma admitir. A falta de algumas dessas atitudes no espectro político vem de uma confusão profunda entre os conceitos de direita e de conservadorismo. Além disso, a separação entre os tipos de ordem econômica e moral, justificará as atitudes mais originais de 'conservadorismo de esquerda' e de 'progressismo de direita' ao mesmo tempo que explicará as noções ambíguas de centros e extremos políticos. Em conclusão, uma comparação entre valores políticos e valores lógicos (verdade e falsidade), permitirá uma explicação das atitudes ambivalentes 'esquerda e direita' e 'nem esquerda nem direita', seja como casos de confusões conceituais, seja como um colapso do discurso político no 'extremo-centro'.

Palavras-chave: Conservadorismo. Direita. Esquerda. Extremo-centro. Ordem.

In section 2, I present the main points of Kripke's theory of contingent a priori statements used to criticise Wittgenstein's claim about the standard meter in Philosophical Investigations §50, stressing that his theory is at odds with our practice of measuring things. In section 3, I hold that Wittgenstein's claim is based on two premises: (1) for all x, if x has a length in the metric system, then it is possible to compare x to S (the standard meter); (2) it is not possible to compare S to S. In section 4, I criticise the idea that the standard meter is an abstract entity. In section 5, I deal with an apparent counterexample of my interpretation. In section 6, I deal with an objection that Wittgenstein's argument is based on the confusion between metaphysical and epistemological questions. Finally, in section 7, I deal with the objection that my interpretation is based on a substantial conception of nonsense heavily criticised by the so-called resolute readers of Wittgenstein's work.