When economist Hernando de Soto published The Mystery of Capital in 2000, its author made (on page 221) a single seemingly insubstantial reference to philosopher John Searle[s The Construction of Social Reality, which had appeared in... more
When economist Hernando de Soto published The Mystery of Capital in 2000, its author made (on page 221) a single seemingly insubstantial reference to philosopher John Searle[s The Construction of Social Reality, which had appeared in 1995. Nobody need have paid attention to this fleeting citation, particularly because the other philosophers refere nced in support of de Soto's claims -- Popper, Dennett, Foucault, Derrida -- constitute quite a philosophical hodgepodge. It required a catalyst at the time who worked on ...
This paper aims to contribute to the study of document, not as a phenomenon regulated by the law, but as a general concept of the philosophy of law. Documents, indeed, play a key-role in establishing institutional and legal practices,... more
This paper aims to contribute to the study of document, not as a phenomenon regulated by the law, but as a general concept of the philosophy of law. Documents, indeed, play a key-role in establishing institutional and legal practices, which is independent of legal acts. First of all, I try to identify some constitutive elements of documental phenomena; then, I try to highlight the way in which documents can be used in order to construe social and legal reality; finally, I distinguish two types of constitutive role played by documents. In this analysis the theory of “documentalityµ proposed by Maurizio Ferraris is critically assessed: although some of the theses of documentality therein proposed are not entirely acceptable, they contain some useful intuitions.
Il diritto è visto spesso come un linguaggio e la cosiddetta realtà giuridica può essere vista (anche) come il prodotto di atti di lin- guaggio (regolati dal diritto) mediante i quali è possibile costitui- re, modificare, estinguere... more
Il diritto è visto spesso come un linguaggio e la cosiddetta realtà giuridica può essere vista (anche) come il prodotto di atti di lin- guaggio (regolati dal diritto) mediante i quali è possibile costitui- re, modificare, estinguere posizioni giuridiche. Ciò è così vero che la teoria degli atti linguistici è diventata fecondo riferimento per la filosofia del diritto. Ma, nella quotidiana esperienza che si ha degli atti giuridici, essi solo raramente si presentano come mere enuncia- zioni orali, mostrandosi piuttosto con la veste del documento: leg- gi, sentenze, contratti, multe, licenze, titoli di viaggio, bollette. Che ruolo gioca il documento nella costruzione della realtà giuridica? È un mero rivestimento dell’atto giuridico o ha una sua propria e autonoma forza costitutiva? Il volume tenta di rispondere a queste domande, nella prospettiva di considerare il documento non come mero fenomeno regolato dal diritto, ma come vera e propria cate- goria generale del diritto.
When economist Hernando de Soto published The Mystery of Capital in 2000, its author made (on page 221) a single seemingly insubstantial reference to philosopher John Searle's The Construction of Social Reality, which had appeared in... more
When economist Hernando de Soto published The Mystery of Capital in 2000, its author made (on page 221) a single seemingly insubstantial reference to philosopher John Searle's The Construction of Social Reality, which had appeared in 1995. Nobody need have paid attention to this fleeting citation, particularly because the other philosophers referenced in support of de Soto's claims���Popper, Dennett, Foucault, Derrida���constitute quite a philosophical hodgepodge. It required a catalyst at the time who worked on ...
This paper introduces an ongoing research that seeks some sort of combination between the Organizational Engineering (OE) approach and the Theory of Document Acts (D-Acts). The motivation for such research is the possibility of... more
This paper introduces an ongoing research that seeks some sort of combination between the Organizational Engineering (OE) approach and the Theory of Document Acts (D-Acts). The motivation for such research is the possibility of improvements in DEMO Method from the application of some tenets formulated in D-Acts ontology. Even though DEMO is already a consolidate method, we believe that it can benefit from the way in which D-Acts ontology deal with documents, considering them social entities able to create rights and obligations. In order to reach our goals, we first present a brief background about DEMO and D-acts; to then model some uses cases using DEMO. Finally, we apply the logical framework of D-acts ontology on the aforementioned use cases. We conclude that there is some overlapping between the two approaches, but also that is possible to glimpse gains with our attempt in future.
Consider a game of blind chess between two chess masters that is recorded in some standard chess notation. The recording is a representation of the game. But what is the game itself? This question is, we believe, central to the entire... more
Consider a game of blind chess between two chess masters that is recorded in some standard chess notation. The recording is a representation of the game. But what is the game itself? This question is, we believe, central to the entire domain of social ontology. We argue that the recorded game is a special sort of quasi-abstract pattern, something that is: (i) like abstract entities such as numbers or forms, in that it is both nonphysical and nonpsychological; but at the same time, (ii) through its association with specific players and a specific occasion, tied to time and history. We discover other abstract patterns of this sort especially in the domains of law and commerce. This essay draws on the work in social ontology, we of Hernando de Soto and of John Searle to develop an ontology of the social world based on an analysis of the peculiar interdependence between quasi-abstract patterns and their representations in documents of different sorts.
