European Defence Technological and Industrial Base

The question of a defence White Book at European level has been under discussion for some time. Many voices, particularly in the European Parliament, are pushing for such an initiative, while others consider that it is not only unnecessary, but could even dangerously divide Europeans.
Concretely, the question cannot be tackled separately from that of defence planning and processes which underpin the development of military capabilities, as White Books are often the starting point for these.
Within the European Union, however, there is not just one, but three types defence planning: the national planning of each of the Member States; planning within the framework of NATO (the NATO Defence Planning Process) and, finally, the European Union’s planning, which has developed in stages since the Helsinki summit of 1999 and comprises many elements. Its best-known component - but by no means not the only one - is the capability development plan established by the European Defence Agency.
How do all these different planning systems coexist? What are their strengths and weaknesses? Answering these preliminary questions is essential in mapping the path to a White Book. This is what this study sets out to do.

Since 2016, efforts to increase cooperation in the EU’s security and defence policy have accelerated. New initiatives have been undertaken in the military, industrial and civilian dimensions under the label of a European Defence Union. So far, nothing indicates that the enhanced cooperation of the EU member states will lead to an integration of their defence policies or to building an alternative to NATO. The new EU instruments, even if they are actively used by the member states, will to only a small extent increase European military capabilities, lead to innovation in the European defence industry or improve the capacity of the military and civilian crisis management missions. This report presents and analyses the EU’s instruments, as well as the opportunities and challenges they present to those EU member states that form NATO’s eastern flank at the same time.

There is an increasing demand for the EU to become a ‘Security Provider’. This demand comes from Europe’s best ally, namely the U.S., but also from Member States themselves. For the first time ever the defence solidarity clause of article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union was invoked in November 2015. Ultimately the demand to put ‘more defence in the Union’ comes from European citizens who wonder why Europe does not protect them in the current turmoil. From the answer to this question depends not only Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’, but possibly the future of the whole European project.
Several steps have already been initiated to answer the call for more defence in Europe. Since the beginning of his mandate, President Juncker has declared defence a ‘priority’, called for the implementation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and reiterated the long term vision of a ’European army’. In June 2016, a ‘global strategy’ will be issued and a Commission Defence Action Plan should follow by the end of 2016. A ‘Pilot Project’, adopted by the European Parliament in autumn 2014, has been launched and should open the path to a ‘Preparatory Action on Defence Research’ that may be voted in 2016 for the 2017- 2020 budgets.

A natural underpinning of those efforts should be the undertaking of a full-fledged Union programme in defence research. The size, the shape and the steps to be taken towards setting it up are the subject of the present report.

One year after the British vote on Brexit, the Member States of the European Union seem to be on the verge of waking the 'Sleeping Beauty' of European defence: permanent structured cooperation (PESCO). Do they have the same understanding of its intended goals and of the ways forward or means of achieving them, or are they simply motivated by the desire not to end up on the edges of the sort of Eurogroup for defence that is being set up? What are the specific areas of agreement and disagreement between the groups taking shape in the European Council? Have any debates intentionally or unintentionally been glossed over and, if so, which ones? Lastly, what are the desirable scenarios for the months and years to come? Is there still time to change things or has the die been cast? The purpose of this study is to answer those questions.

Un an après le vote britannique sur le Brexit, les États membres de l'Union européenne semblent sur le point de réveiller la « belle au bois dormant » de la défense européenne: la coopération structurée permanente, plus connue sous son acronyme anglais de PESCO. Ont-ils bien la même compréhension de l'objectif qu'il s'agit d'atteindre et les voies et moyens pour y parvenir, ou sont-ils seulement animés par la volonté de ne pas rester à la périphérie d'une sorte d'eurogroupe de défense en train de se constituer ? Quels sont, de façon précise, les principaux points d'accord et de désaccord entre les différents groupes qui se dessinent au sein du Conseil européen ? Des débats ont-ils été passés sous silence, volontairement ou involontairement, et si oui lesquels ? Enfin, quels sont les scénarios souhaitables pour les mois et les années à venir ? Est-il encore temps de changer les choses ou bien les dés ont-ils déjà été lancés? La présente étude ambitionne de répondre à ces questions.

Recent cuts in EU member states’ defence budgets
make it impossible to maintain adequate military
capabilities at the national level. Only a greater
European integration of the national armed forces
can keep them effective and efficient. Some steps
forward in this direction are possible, although
difficult, on several levels: the implementation of the
pooling and sharing approach on the military level;
the establishment of the permanent structured
cooperation on the institutional level; the definition of
a European roadmap for dual-use technologies on
the technological level; the launch of European
procurement programmes co-financed by the EU on
the industrial level. All these steps forward are linked
to a urgent and basic political choice between two
alternatives: more Europe in defence policy, or the
complete inability of European countries to conduct
such a policy.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Defence Agency (EDA) are two defence organizations having as their major “product” the collective effort in the defence sector.
Since 1949 when NATO was established, events of great significance like the fall of Berlin wall and the 9/11 terrorist attacks caused changes to the global environment and brought up identity and adaptation problems for both organizations. In addition, human poverty and climate change are new potential hazards of humanitarian crisis. As a result both NATO and EDA shifted their orientation more towards safety and security against threats than defence against an opponent.
Moreover, due to the current economic crisis fiscal constraints are imposed on the member-states of the two organizations making the sufficient funding of defence needs difficult. This converted NATO’s and EDA’s strategic planning concept into a defence capabilities-based approach and initiated structural and functional transformation procedures.
Aiming to achieve economies of scale to defence expenditures of their member-states, NATO and EDA established cost-reduction mechanisms: Smart Defence for NATO and Pooling and Sharing for EDA. These projects enhance cooperation among the participants concerning defence industry and military procurements. They also support the development of capabilities of their member-states and the exploitation of existing military capabilities and resources in a collective manner.
The dissertation, using the strategic management theoretical framework, attempts to define the identity, the history the vision and mission and the strategic planning procedure of NATO and EDA. The study concludes that the strategic planning of both organizations has been profoundly affected by the economic crisis and suggests the prerequisites that make Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing mechanisms beneficial to the member-states. Finally, there is a specific reference to the potential of the Hellenic military and defence sector.

Key words: NATO, EDA, strategic planning, military capability, Smart Defence, Pooling and Sharing.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) has been critical for the shaping of EU armaments policy and, consequently, for the agenda of military research and development (R&D) at the Brussels level. As the Commission initiative on defense research falls directly into the remit of the Agency, the literature has noted the existence of rivalry between the two institutions. This conclusion is also compatible with a reading of the two institutions that emphasizes their different institutional form-supranational versus intergovernmental. Utilizing a historical materialist approach, the chapter attempts-against this consensus over inter-institutional rivalry-to highlight the inner unity of purpose that unites dialectically the EDA and the Commission as far as defense research is concerned. It does so by documenting the record of EDA in the realm of R&D and by integrating this record and the Commission initiative into a single conceptual scheme, emphasizing the unifying role of the goal of supporting the competitive position of the European arms industry. 14.1 Introduction The European Defence Agency (EDA) has been critical for the shaping of EU armaments policy and, specifically, for the agenda of military research and development (R&D) at the Brussels level. As the European Commission initiative on military R&D falls directly into the remit of the Agency, the literature has noted the existence of rivalry between the two institutions (Fiott 2015). This conclusion is also compatible with a reading of the two institutions that emphasizes their different institutional form-supranational versus intergovernmental. Utilizing a historical materialist approach, the chapter attempts-against this consensus on inter-institutional rivalry-to highlight the inner unity of purpose that connects dialectically the EDA and the I. Oikonomou (*)

The European Global Strategy that was launched in 2016 was the catalyst for a concatenation of initiatives, strategic and operational, aiming at augmenting the European Security and Defence Policy up to a level at which the EU could deliver effective security to its citizens and in its surrounding vicinity. Concomitantly, the EU and NATO operational cooperation agreed in July 2016 offered an unprecedented framework for cooperation between the two organizations further empowering their objectives towards making European Security and Defence more relevant to respond against challenges and threats on the ground. This article advocates that despite the dramatic progress that has taken place in recent years, it remains to be seen whether the EU will reach the level of a Security and Defence Union without reducing its inclusive character.