Everett interpretation

October 30, 2016, the web site for the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies published an article, "Breaking into the Simulated Universe" by Eliott Edge. An attempt to argue against the idea of escaping out of the universe, if it is a simulation, as some Silicon Valley billionaires are rumored to be considering. In this paper, I will reveal why Edge is completely and totally wrong, although he has made an impressive, credible, cohesive and cogent attempt to present a convincing proposition. However, the simulation hypothesis, upon close analysis, is indefensible by anyone because it is based 100% on assumptions, both hidden and otherwise, which in most cases are demonstrably wrong.

A model for measurement in collapse-free nonrelativistic fermionic quantum field theory is presented. In addition to local propagation and effectively-local interactions, the model incorporates explicit representations of localized observers, thus extending an earlier model of entanglement generation in Everett quantum field theory [M. A. Rubin, Found. Phys. 32, 1495-1523 (2002)]. Transformations of the field operators from the Heisenberg picture to the Deutsch-Hayden picture, involving fictitious auxiliary fields, establish the locality of the model. The model is applied to manifestly-local calculations of the results of measurements, using a type of sudden approximation and in the limit of massive systems in narrow-wavepacket states. Detection of the presence of a spin-1/2 system in a given spin state by a freely-moving two-state observer illustrates the features of the model and the nonperturbative computational methodology. With the help of perturbation theory the model is appli...

The so-called Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics has been extant now for nearly sixty years, beginning as H. Everett III’s doctoral dissertation in 1957 [?], with further contributions by B. DeWitt and N. Graham in their 1973 book, The Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics [?]. The Everett approach takes quantum mechanics both realistically and as a stand-alone, autonomous theory of the world, not in need of a separate theory of measurement to bridge the apparent gap between the deterministic evolution of the wave-function in a highly abstract, probabilistic space and empirically observable statistics in the laboratory. Instead, Everett proposed that all of the apparently contradictory macroscopic results assigned some finite probability by the theory are equally real, coexisting in distinct sets of relative states. DeWitt and others later identified these clusters of mutually consistent relative states with distinct and co-existing worlds or branches of the w...

The status and justification of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis (QEH) in Bohmian mechanics is "a rather delicate matter". In this paper, I present a new analysis of this hypothesis. It is argued that the QEH should be regarded not as a mere initial condition but more appropriately as one part of the law of motion. Moreover, it is more reasonable and simpler to assume that the QEH holds true consistently at all time. The resulting theory is a many-worlds theory of random discontinuous motion of particles in three-dimensional space. This new theory agrees with experiments, and it is arguably the simplest realist version of quantum mechanics.

The article is a critical review of two methodological approaches presented in David Chalmers’ book Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. The first one is a problem of possible applications of quantum mechanics in the search for consciousness; the second one is its reversal, i.e. problem of possible applications of the research on consciousness in the study of quantum mechanics. Author presents shortly the history of the connection between mind and quantum mechanics, then describes Chalmers’ views on the subject and finally proposes a criticism of them. The issues under discussion are relatively fresh, quantum mechanics theory is approximately 100 years old, and modern, interdisciplinary approach to consciousness is almost equally new. The idea of their connection appeared around the time of the first formulation of quantum physics. Today, many philosophers, Chalmers included, are enthusiastic about the potential of quantum mechanics to face the “hard problem of consciousness”; all the more so because they are convinced of the major role that consciousness plays in quantum physics.

THE EXPLORATION OF TIME TRAVEL TO THE PAST AS A MEANS OF PRESERVING A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF THE HUMAN POPULATION IN THE FACE OF EXTINCTION LEVEL TERRESTRIAL THREATS. Prepared for review for the Lifeboat Foundation, the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs, the Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Space Nation Asgardia

It has been argued that the transition from classical to quantum mechanics is an example of a Kuhnian scientific revolution, in which there is a shift from the simple, intuitive, straightforward classical paradigm, to the quantum, convoluted, counterintuitive, amazing new quantum paradigm. In this paper, after having clarified what these quantum paradigms are supposed to be, I analyze whether they constitute a radical departure from the classical paradigm. Contrary to what is commonly maintained, I argue that, in addition to radical quantum paradigms, there are also legitimate ways of understanding the quantum world that do not require any substantial change to the classical paradigm

A complete reappraisal of the philosophical meaning of Everett's interpretation of
quantum mechanics is carried out, by analysing carefully the role of the concept of "observer" in physics. It is shown that Everett's interpretation is the limiting case of a series of conceptions of the measurement problem which leave less and less of the observer out of the quantum description of the measuring interaction. This limiting case, however, should not be considered as one wherein nothing is left outside the description. Something is still needed besides this description: pure cognitive capacity, the subject, or, in a very abstract sense: "mind". The set of branches which arise, according to Everett, from a measuring interaction, gain a renewed signification. They do not refer to distinct "worlds", but to the points of view "mind" can identify itself to. This idea is compared and contrasted with Squires' "selection" of a branch by the mind (without quotation marks). Finally, the notion of indeterminism in quantum mechanics gains an unexpected and new light from a strict application of the previous ideas.

That Everett's "Multiple Worlds" hypothesis is only of a potential, not actual, physical world in time. The "many worlds" hypothesis stems from confusing the potential quantum (or mental) world with the actual physical world in time. According to the double aspect interpretation of this monistic universe by Leibniz, we compare two descriptions of the same process of change in state of a mental or quantum (named as phi-i) and corresponding particle (psi(t)): http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/everett/thesis.pdf 1. The mental or quantum world probabilistic aspect. This describes a discontinuous (because only potential) description a quantum string, not a continuous physical string, with eigenstates phi-1, phi-2 etc., which are scalar terms, in which the continous physical state psi (t) will be changed in Plato's timeless, spaceless Mind to mental state phi-j with probability | psi(t)*(phy-j)|^2. 2 The continuous (physical particle) aspect featuring equation psi(t), which contains imaginary variables. This is the continuous change of state of the (isolated) system with time according to a deterministic wave equation psi(t) = U*dpsi(t)/dt where U is a linear operator. In Everett's misconceived interpretation, the mental or quantum world phi-j is multiple, but in reality it is only probabilistically, not actually, so, because it is not yet deterministically realized. For the mental or quantum states are in Plato's timeless and spaceless Mind, where potential states are merely possible, so that the tags to the mental states are tags to potential, not actual, monads, not yet actually affixed to actual particles in time (brain molecules). But only one psi(t) curve is realized, because only one curve can be deterministic in a transcendental cybernetic universe such as the one we inhabit. Thus the multiple worlds hypothesis of Everett seems to be fictional.-Ever since Hume, science has imprisoned us in the dark cave of materialism and empiricism and needs to restore us to the quantum sunlight of plato (plotinus)-see my website https:// independent.academia.edu/RogerClough

We consider a theory in which spacetime is a 4-dimensional manifold $V_4$ embedded in an N-dimensional space V_N. The dynamics is given by a first order action which is a straightforward generalization of the well known Nambu-Goto string action. Instead of the latter action we then consider an equivalent action, a generalization of the Howe-Tucker action, which is a functional of the (extrinsic) embedding variables η a (x) and of the (intrinsic) induced metric g µv (x) on V4. In the quantized theory we can define an effective action by means of the Feynman path integral in which we functionally integrate over the embedding variables. What remains is functionally dependent solely on the induced metric. It is well known that the effective action so obtained contains the Ricci scalar R and its higher orders. But due to our special choice of a quantity, the so called "matter" density ω(η) in VN entering the original first order action, it turns out that the effective action contains also the source term. The latter is in general that of a p-dimensional membrane (p-brane). In particular we consider the case of bosonic point particles. Finally we discuss and clarify certain interpretational aspects of quantum mechanics from the view point of our embedding model.

I argue that the Oxford school Everett interpretation is internally incoherent, because we cannot claim that in an Everettian universe the kinds of reasoning we have used to arrive at our beliefs about quantum mechanics would lead us to form true beliefs. I show that in an Everettian context, the experimental evidence that we have available could not provide empirical confirmation for quantum mechanics, and moreover that we would not even be able to establish reference to the theoretical entities of quantum mechanics. I then consider a range of existing Everettian approaches to the probability problem and show that they do not succeed in overcoming this incoherence.

Sugerimos que la función de onda es una descripción del movimiento cuántico de las partículas, que es de naturaleza aleatoria y discontinua. Según esta interpretación, el cuadrado del valor absoluto de la función de onda no solo da la densidad de probabilidad de que la partícula se encuentre en ciertos lugares, sino que también da la densidad de probabilidad objetiva de que la partícula esté allí. Mostramos que esta nueva interpretación de la función de onda proporciona una alternativa realista natural a la interpretación ortodoxa, y también se analizan brevemente sus implicaciones para otras interpretaciones realistas de la mecánica cuántica.

Para empezar, la teoría de De Broglie-Bohm seria problemática. La teoría toma la función de onda como un campo físico (es decir, un campo Ψ) y además agrega el movimiento no ergódico de las partículas de Bohm para interpretar la mecánica cuántica. Esto es obviamente inconsistente con la nueva interpretación sugerida de la función de onda. Hablando concretamente, tomar la función de onda como un campo Ψ conducirá a la existencia de una autointeracción electrostática que contradice tanto la mecánica cuántica como las observaciones experimentales.

Stapp claims that, when spatial degrees of freedom are taken into account, Everett quantum mechanics is ambiguous due to a "core basis problem." To examine an aspect of this claim I generalize the ideal measurement model to include translational degrees of freedom for both the measured system and the measuring apparatus. Analysis of this generalized model using the Everett interpretation in the Heisenberg picture shows that it makes unambiguous predictions for the possible results of measurements and their respective probabilities. The presence of translational degrees of freedom for the measuring apparatus affects the probabilities of measurement outcomes in the same way that a mixed state for the measured system would. Examination of a measurement scenario involving several observers illustrates the consistency of the model with perceived spatial localization of the measuring apparatus.

The so-called Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics has been extant now for nearly sixty years, beginning as H. Everett III’s doctoral dissertation in 1957 [?], with further contributions by B. DeWitt and N. Graham in their 1973 book, The Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics [?]. The Everett approach takes quantum mechanics both realistically and as a stand-alone, autonomous theory of the world, not in need of a separate theory of measurement to bridge the apparent gap between the deterministic evolution of the wave-function in a highly abstract, probabilistic space and empirically observable statistics in the laboratory. Instead, Everett proposed that all of the apparently contradictory macroscopic results assigned some finite probability by the theory are equally real, coexisting in distinct sets of relative states. DeWitt and others later identified these clusters of mutually consistent relative states with distinct and co-existing worlds or branches of the world.

The so-called Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics has been extant now for nearly sixty years, beginning as H. Everett III’s doctoral dissertation in 1957 [?], with further contributions by B. DeWitt and N. Graham in their 1973 book, The Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics [?]. The Everett approach takes quantum mechanics both realistically and as a stand-alone, autonomous theory of the world, not in need of a separate theory of measurement to bridge the apparent gap between the deterministic evolution of the wave-function in a highly abstract, probabilistic space and empirically observable statistics in the laboratory. Instead, Everett proposed that all of the apparently contradictory macroscopic results assigned some finite probability by the theory are equally real, coexisting in distinct sets of relative states. DeWitt and others later identified these clusters of mutually consistent relative states with distinct and co-existing worlds or branches of the w...