Extended Evolutionary Synthesis

The Synthetic Theory of evolution is an established theoretical framework that, in most cases, is presented by the textbooks used both in basic education and Teacher Training on Biological Sciences as the only or main theoretical axis to explain the evolutionary process. This theory explains the organic diversity based on mutation, genetic drift, migration and natural selection, emphasizing the DNA-centrist perspective of the evolutionary process. However, genes and changes on genetic frequency in populations as a result of selection processes are not the only explanation of organic diversity. The Extended Synthesis represents the contemporary evolutionary framework that references a plurality of processes to explain this diversity: phenotypic plasticity, the niche construction theory, the development bias and inclusive heritage. It is important to say that most didactic materials based on Basic Education or in Teacher Training bring the evolutionary concepts of Evo-devo allocated i...

A mechanism of evolution that ensures adaptive changes without the obligatory role of natural selection is described. According to this mechanism, the first event is a plastic adaptive change (change of phenotype), followed by stochastic genetic change which makes the transformation irreversible. This mechanism is similar to the organic selection mechanism as proposed by Baldwin, Lloyd Morgan and Osborn in the 1890s and later developed by Waddington, but considerably updated according to contemporary knowledge to demonstrate its independence from natural selection. Conversely, in the neo-Darwinian mechanism, the first event is random genetic change, followed by a new phenotype and natural selection or differential reproduction of genotypes. Due to the role of semiosis in the decisive first step of the mechanism described here (the ontogenic adaptation, or rearrangement of gene expression patterns and profile), it could be called a semiotic mechanism of evolution.

A Teoria Evolutiva tradicionalmente aborda o ambiente apenas como agente seletor de variação fenotípica. Um acúmulo crescente de evidências sugere entretanto um papel adicional do ambiente no processo evolutivo: o de induzir variação fenotípica. A presença de plasticidade em vias de desenvolvimento expõe a variação genética existente que estaria " escondida " em outra condição ambiental. Nesse modelo de evolução adaptativa, a plasticidade fenotípica atua juntamente com a variação genética nos processos que originam novos fenótipos em uma população. Mais que seleção: o papel do ambiente na origem e evolução da diversidade fenotípica

For many astronomers, the progressive development of life has been seen as a natural occurrence given proper environmental conditions on a planet: even though such beings would not be identical to humans, there would be significant parallels. A striking contrast is seen in writings of nonphysical scientists, who have held more widely differing views. But within this diversity, reasons for differences become more apparent when we see how views about extraterrestrials can be related to the differential emphasis placed on modern evolutionary theory by scientists of various disciplines. One clue to understanding the differences between the biologists, paleontologists, and anthropologists who speculated on extraterrestrials is suggested by noting who wrote on the subject. Given the relatively small number of commentators on the topic, it seems more than coincidental that four of the major contributors to the evolutionary synthesis in the 1930s and 1940s are among them. Upon closer examination it is evident that the exobiological arguments of Theodosius Dobzhansky and George Gaylord Simpson and, less directly, of H. J. Muller and Ernst Mayr are all related to their earlier work in formulating synthetic evolution. By examining the variety of views held by nonphysical scientists, we can see that there were significant disagreements between them about evolution into the 1960s. By the mid-1980s, many believed that “higher” life, particularly intelligent life, probably occurs quite infrequently in the universe; nevertheless, some held out the possibility that convergence of intelligence could occur across worlds. Regardless of the final conclusions these scientists reached about the likely prevalence of extraterrestrial intelligence, the use of evolutionary arguments to support their positions became increasingly common.

The discipline of biosemiotics applies semiotic terms to nonhuman organisms, even to those that lack neural system and brain. It views semiosis as the core property of life, rather than an advanced type of activity which appears at later stages of evolution when organisms became sufficiently complex. The origin of life was associated with the emergence of most primitive hereditary signs capable of carrying functions to descentent primordial agents. Accordingly, biological evolution is rooted in semiosis – a process of active interpretation by hereditary signs (both, genetic and epigenetic) in the context of other signs that come from the parts of the body and the environment. The biosemiotic concept of agency-driven evolution is opposed to neo-Darwinism that views evolution as a passive change of gene frequency via natural selection, drift, and other processes. The latter gene-centered approach is usually combined with genetic determinism and assumption that innovations are based solely on mutations. In contrast we consider mutations as disturbances that are creatively interpreted by cell subagents based on their experience, encoded genetically and epigenetically. Thus, mutation are not primary causes of adaptation, but being interpreted by subagents, they indirectly facilitate robustness, adaptive plasticity, and genetic assimilation. This reasoning resembles components of Lamarck’s theory. The genome may change passively and randomly, but its interpretation is active and guided by the logic of agent functions and embryo development. Emergence of new functions is based on the reinterpretation of the genome, when old tools, resources, and control algorithms are adopted for novel purposes. The biosemiotic approach to evolution can explain challenging questions, such as (i) emergence of interpretation capacity in primordial systems at the origin of life, (ii) remarkable consistency of phenotypic traits in the absence of genetic determinism, (iii) capacity of lineages to generate new solutions of living problems in critical conditions, (iv) the origin and nature of species, and (v) capacity to integrate into higher-level semiotic systems, such as colonies or super-organisms.

The present book analyses critically the tripartite mimicry model (consisting of the mimic, model and receiver species) and develops semiotic tools for comparative analysis. It is proposed that mimicry has a double structure where sign relations in communication are in constant interplay with ecological relations between species. Multi-constructivism and toolbox-like conceptual methods are advocated for, as these allow taking into account both the participants’ Umwelten as well as cultural meanings related to specific mimicry cases.

From biosemiotic viewpoint, mimicry is a sign relation, where deceptively similar messages are perceived, interpreted and acted upon. Focusing on living subjects and their communication opens up new ways to understand mimicry. Such view helps to explain the diversity of mimicry as well as mimicry studies and treat these in a single framework. On a meta-level, a semiotic view allows critical reflection on the use of mimicry concept in modern biology.

The author further discusses interpretations of mimicry in contemporary semiotics, analyses mimicry as communicative interaction, relates mimicry to iconic signs and focuses on abstract resemblances in mimicry. Theoretical discussions are illustrated with detailed excursions into practical mimicry cases in nature (brood parasitism, eyespots, myrmecomorphy, etc.). The book concludes with a conviction that mimicry should be treated in a broader semiotic-ecological context as it presumes the existence of ecological codes and other sign conventions in the ecosystem.

Any biological species of biparental organisms necessarily includes, and is fundamentally dependent on, sign processes between individuals. In this case, the natural category of the species is based on family resemblances (in the Wittgensteinian sense), which is why a species is not a natural kind. We describe the mechanism that generates the family resemblance. An individual recognition window and biparental reproduction almost suffice as conditions to produce species naturally. This is due to assortativity of mating which is not based on certain individual traits, but on the difference between individuals. The biosemiotic model described here explains what holds a species together. It also implies that boundaries of a species are fundamentally fuzzy, and that character displacement occurs in case of sympatry. Speciation is a special case of discretisation that is an inevitable result of any communication system in work. The biosemiotic mechanism provides the conditions and communicative restrictions for the origin and persistence of diversity in the realm of living (communicative and semiotic) systems.

Contents: 1. Major steps towards the extension: Four women who changed the evolutionary scene. 2. The model of extended synthesis adds the independent role of plasticity. 3. Plasticity and interpretation. 4. Adaptive and neutral modifications. 5. Innovation and test. 6. Selection, adjustment and choice – illusionary and real meaning-making. 7. Inheritance of knowing. 8. Completely extended synthesis tends to be the semiotic theory of evolution. 9. Conclusion.

Abstract: The theory of organic evolution is incomplete until it can explain life’s meaning-making capacity and its role in the evolutionary processes, i.e. until semiosis is included. The extended synthesis theory of evolution has made a decisive step towards such an integrative theory, yet the explicit inclusion of semiotics of life is still to come. Here, we describe the steps made towards the semiotics-based theory of evolution, as the next stage after evo-devo and eco-evo-devo approaches. This includes demonstration of independent roles that natural selection, plastic adjustment, and interpretative choice have in adaptive evolution, and the distinction between adaptive and neutral modifications in genetic, plastic and interpretative mechanisms. Real meaning-making takes place only due to organism’s interpretative processes. It should be complemented with a description of the ways by which knowledge (defined as products of semiotic learning), or rather the constraints of semiosis, can be inherited. This will complete the inclusion of semiosis into the extended mechanism of evolution.

In this article, the cosmic vision of the seventh century monk Maximus the Confessor is brought into conversation with developments in modern evolutionary biology. I argue that Maximus’ doctrine of the Logoi of creatures along with his understanding of how Gods works within creation form a helpful theological framework or interpretive overlay for understanding the evolutionary process. I first show that contrary to popular opinion, “New Atheist” Richard Dawkins’s old view of evolution, where genes are entirely cut off from outside influence, is now widely acknowledged to be incorrect and that the evolutionary process sometimes exhibits a high degree of predictability and direction. I then show how some prominent scientists are now using Platonic forms and Aristotelian essences as legitimate frameworks for philosophically interpreting certain aspects of the evolutionary process (while maintaining that science speaks to the “how” and philosophy/theology speak to the “why”). Plato and Aristotle then serve as the springboard for looking at Maximus’ cosmic vision, since his eclectic theology drew deeply from both Aristotelian and Platonic traditions. Lastly, I focus on a number of different scientist’s suggestions that humans are almost an “inevitable” outcome of the evolutionary process and bring this insight into conversation with Maximus’ conception of the human being (particularly the human being Jesus Christ) as the climax of all creation.

Recent debates between proponents of the modern evolutionary synthesis (the standard model in evolutionary biology) and those of a possible extended synthesis are a good example of the fascinating tangle among empirical, theoretical, and conceptual or philosophical matters that is the practice of evolutionary biology. In this essay, we briefly discuss two case studies from this debate, highlighting the relevance of philosophical thinking to evolutionary biologists in the hope of spurring further constructive cross-pollination between the two fields.

k e y w o r d s Origin and evolution of language Units and levels of evolution Evolutionary mechanisms Processes Hierarchies Extended Synthesis Applied Evolutionary Epistemology Philosophy of biology
a b s t r a c t Modern evolutionary biology is currently characterized by epistemological divergence because, beyond organisms and genes, scholars nowadays investigate a plurality of units of evolution, they recognize multilevel selection, and especially from within the Extended Synthesis, scholars have identified a plurality of evolutionary mechanisms that besides natural selection can explain how the evolution of anatomical form and functional behavior occur. Evolutionary linguists have also implicated a multitude of units, levels and mechanisms involved in (aspects of) language evolution, which has also brought forth epistemological divergence on how language possibly evolved. Here, we examine how a general evolutionary methodology can become abstracted from how biologists study evolution, and how this methodology can become implemented into the field of Evolutionary Linguistics. Applied Evolutionary Epistemology (AEE) involves a systematic search and analysis of the units (that what evolves), levels (loci where evolution takes place), and mechanisms (means whereby evolution occurs) of language evolution, allocating them into ontological hierarchies, and distinguishing them from other kinds of evolution. In this paper in particular, we give an in-depth analysis of how AEE enables an identification, examination, and evaluation of levels and mechanisms of language evolution, and we hone in on how hierarchies and mechanisms of language (evolution) can and have been defined differentially. For an in-depth analysis of units of language evolution, we refer the reader to Gontier (2017) for which this paper functions as a follow-up. Thus, rather than present a specific theory of how language evolved, we present a methodology that enables us to unite existing research programs as well as to develop theories on the subject at hand.

Contemporary biology is affected with a controversy between the developmentalist viewpoint and the adaptationist viewpoint proper to the neo-darwinian Modern Synthesis (MS), partly triggered by the rise of Evo-Devo. Some called for a new synthesis, some advocate going on with the basic MS program as likely to integrate Evo-Devo novelties, but some even doubt the possibility of a Synthesis. On the other hand, Kant's views on organisms have often been seen as the philosophical matrix of developmental theory (Gilbert and Sarkar 2000), or as ancestor of current theories of autopoiesis or autonomy (Weber and Varela 2002). Both research programs can be contrasted with the biological viewpoint defended by the MS, which privileges natural selection explanations over developmental or self-organization explanation (the latter being potentially an instance of the former). In this paper, I argue that this diagnostic is partly true, but that Kant's concept of organism is more complex than what those genealogies assume. Kant defends a regulative notion of purposiveness, in which this unique concept is refracted into two criteria in order to capture organisms as natural purposes, namely a design criterion and an epigeneticity criterion. After having reconstructed this concept, I turn to a contemporary interpretation of those two criteria, showing that the first one is indeed still fulfilled by organisms within MS, and the second one is satisfied in the viewpoint of cell and developmental theory by developing organisms. I conclude by showing that Kant's notion of organisms provides a matrix for a synthesis between a developmentalist and an adaptationist viewpoints, and I consider in this light some possible empirical obstacles to this synthesis.

Many people underestimate the effect that unifying principles have on the study of biology. Unifying principles are used to provide simplifying assumptions to complex problems, which allow them to be effectively tackled by the tools at hand. However, erroneous unifying principles will generate simplifying assumptions that lead towards mischaracterizations of problems which inevitably lead to invalid conclusions. The unifying principles of the current Modern Synthesis of evolution are presently being challenged by the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. However, the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis has so far failed to provide unifying principles of its own, which has caused many to question whether or not the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis is indeed a unique synthesis of evolutionary biology. Here, the concept of evolutionary teleonomy (Ernst Mayr's concept of teleonomy applied to evolutionary processes themselves) is identified as a unifying principle of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. Additionally, specific examples are provided where modern research has been led astray by the unifying principles of the Modern Synthesis which would have been corrected by applying the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis with the unifying principle of evolutionary teleonomy.

We review evidence suggesting that mechanisms of information transfers may exist between different channels of inheritance (genetic, epigenetic, behavioural, etc), which is still almost universally regarded as impossible. This has the potential to change our vision of evolution, especially of the role of genes in evolution.

This paper aims to examine the evolutionary role of affordances, that is, the possibilities for action available in our environments. There are two allegedly competing views for explaining the evolutionary role of affordances: the first is based on natural selection; the second is based on niche construction. According to the first, affordances are resources that exert selection pressure. The second view claims that affordances are ecological inheritances in the organism's niche that are the product of a previous alteration of the environment. While there seems to be a mutually exclusive definition of affordances in each of these views, I argue in this paper that the views are not competing but, rather, complementary. In this sense, affordances play the role of either resources or ecological inheritances depending on the temporal stage of the evolutionary process. I make this argument by analyzing how natural selection and niche construction affect each other even when they function independently from each other. In this light, if these two evolutionary mechanisms exert their power in parallel but at two different stages in the evolutionary history of a given econiche, then there is room to claim that affordances can be understood as both resources and ecological inheritances. This dual aspect of affordances shows their evolutionary role.

This essay discusses the need for evolutionary scholars to consider work outside of genetics in their research. The need to bridge science with other avenues of work is briefly surveyed through reference to relevant examples. Together, it is suggested that a more complete understanding of human evolution will require transdisciplinary engagement. The essay is a development of the essay I submitted to the AJPA in 2011 which won the William S. Pollitzer Travel Award.

La Síntesis Neodarwiniana concibe a los organismos vivos como simples objetos pasivos, sujetos principalmente a dos fuerzas evolutivas: la primera, el ambiente, que genera retos con respecto a la organización del organismo, y la segunda, su maquinaria genética, la cual genera soluciones al azar con respecto a los problemas impuestos por el ambiente. En los últimos años se ha cuestionado bastante este modelo de cambio evolutivo, ya que reduce el origen de la variación a solo mutaciones genéticas y procesos de recombinación, pasando por alto datos y evidencias sobre variación a otros niveles de organización. En 1953, Waddington demostró experimentalmente que en la ontogenia se establecen redes de interacciones dinámicas entre genes, sus productos y el ambiente (a lo que llamó epigenotipo) que al modificarse, dan origen a nuevos fenotipos y propuso que estas propiedades del desarrollo podrían desempeñar un papel importante en el origen de las novedades evolutivas, pero dichos mecanismos no tuvieron lugar en el marco teórico de la Síntesis Neodarwinista. Esa capacidad que tienen los organismos vivos de modificar su fenotipo en respuesta directa a estímulos o entradas de su entorno, se denomina plasticidad fenotípica y refleja una propiedad intrínseca de los sistemas biológicos. A lo largo de la historia, diferentes autores se han interesado en este fenómeno y han propuesto mecanismos evolutivos a partir de su entendimiento: James Mark Baldwin (Selección orgánica y Efecto Baldwin); Conrad Waddington (Asimilación genética); Ivan Schmalhausen (Estabilización genética); Mary Jane West-Eberhard (Acomodación fenotípica y acomodación genética). En el escrito, se defiende que la plasticidad fenotípica involucra procesos autoorganizativos que desempeñan un papel importante en el origen de la Forma Orgánica, y que esta asombrosa capacidad de producir patrones organizados mediante interacciones causales entre los genes, sus productos y el ambiente en el que los sistemas biológicos se desarrollan, puede servir de fundamento para la elaboración de una nueva forma de interpretar la evolución y los propios organismos sin contradecir los presupuestos básicos del neodarwinismo, sino por el contrario, complementar la perspectiva de cómo ocurre el proceso evolutivo.

Resumo: A Teoria Sintética da evolução constitui um arcabouço teórico consolidado que, na maioria das vezes, é apresentado pelos livros didáticos utilizados tanto na educação básica como na formação inicial em Ciências Biológicas como sendo o único ou principal eixo teórico para explicar o processo evolutivo. Essa teoria explica a diversidade orgânica com base nos conceitos de mutação, deriva genética, migração e seleção natural, enfatizando a perspectiva DNA-centrista do processo evolutivo. No entanto, os genes e as alterações da frequência gênica nas populações como resultado de processos seletivos não são a única explicação para a diversidade orgânica. A Síntese Estendida representa o quadro evolutivo contemporâneo que abrange uma pluralidade de processos para explicar essa diversidade: a plasticidade fenotípica, teoria de construção do nicho, viés do desenvolvimento e herança inclusiva. Vale ressaltar que nos materiais

We develop here a semiotic model of evolution. We point out the role of confusion and choice as a condition for semiosis, which is a precondition for semiotic learning and semiotic adaptation. Semiosis itself as interpretation and decision-making between options requires phenomenal present. The body structure of the organism is largely a product of former semiosis. The organism’s body together with the structure of the ecosystem serves also as a scaffolding for the sign processes that carry on the ontogenetic cycle and the organisms’ behaviour, providing the experience-based channels for decision making in the indeterminate situations of choice. The stability and persistence of ontogenesis and behaviour are based on the plasticity, or the multiviality of organic dynamics. The same plasticity or multivial dynamics is providing the material for further potential evolution. Evolution has occurred when some change becomes irreversible via its stabilization, and it usually means a modification of existing constraints, or scaffoldings. Some examples of these processes are described in the article.

ABSTRACT
It’s the structural analysis of anthroposphere-biosphere co-evolution process via social evolution toward sustainable development
The texts from the  below  regards various  aspects  the  current  trial expertise of the Big History  subject. The main factors ensuring the System sustaining evolving  while staying integrated are determined on the basis of that analysis  Presented is the  is the framework for further  research

Genetic intervention, which includes transgenic engineering, gene editing, and other forms of genome modification aimed at altering the information “in” the genetic code, is rapidly increasing in power and scale. Biosemiotics offers unique tools for understanding the nature, risks, scope, and prospects of such technologies, though few in the community have turned their attention specifically in this direction. Bruni (2003; 2008) is an important exception. In this paper, I examine how we frame the concept of “side effects” that result from genetic interventions and how the concept stands up to current perspectives of the role of organism activity in development. I propose that once the role of living systems in constructing and modifying the informational value of their various developmental resources is taken into account, the concept of a “side effect” will need to be significantly revised. Far from merely a disturbance brought about in a senseless albeit complex system, a biosemiotic view would take “side effects” as at least sometimes the organism’s active re-organization in order to accommodate or make use of novelty. This insight is nascent in the work of developmental plasticity and niche construction theory (West-Eberhard 2003; Odling-Smee et al., 2003), but it is brought into sharper focus by the explicitly interpretive perspective offered by biosemiotics. Understanding the “side effects” of genetic interventions depends in part on being able to articulate when and where unexpected consequences are a result of semiotic activity at various levels within the system. While a semiotic interpretation of “side effects” puts into question the naive attitude that would see all unintended side effects as indications of disturbance in system functionality, it certainly does not imply that such side effects are no longer of concern for the viability of the organisms in the system. As we shall see, the fact that such interventions do not respect the translation of information that occurs in multi-level biological systems ensures that disruption is still likely. But it does unprivilege the human agent as the sole generator of meaning and information in the products of biotechnology, with important consequences on how we understand our relationship with other species.

In this paper I take evolutionary biology as an example to reflect on the role of philosophy and on the transformations that philosophy is constantly stimulated to do in its own approach when dealing with science. I consider that some intellectual movements within evolutionary biology (more specifically, the various calls for 'synthesis') express metascientific views, i.e., claims about 'what it is to do research' in evolutionary biology at different times. In the construction of metascientific views I see a fundamental role to be played by philosophy, and, at the same time, a need to complement the philosophical methods with many more methods coming from other sciences. What leads philosophy out of itself is its own attention to scientific practice. My humble methodological suggestions are, at this stage, only meant to help us imagine metascientific views that are built with a more scientific, interdisciplinary approach, in order to attenuate partiality, subjectivity and impressionism in describing the scientific community. And yet, we should not be naïve and imbued with the myth of 'datadriven' research, especially in this field: other complex issues about metascientific views call for a serious, constant philosophical reflection on scientific practice.

Abstract: Natural law perspectives take existing formations of life-matter and translate them into normative templates. From an evolutionary perspective, the normative aspect of natural law is always under suspicion. Because life-forms have histories and futures that are shaped by a dynamic of accidents, they are not susceptible to normative assertions about what they “should” be or do. This is particularly the case with sex. Sexual reproduction is a minoritarian strategy within the full spectrum of life. Like all aspects of life, sex is a product of a fluctuating backdrop of phylogenetic (species-forming) and ontogenetic (individual-forming) accidents. And like all aspects of life, it continues to vary within this field of material processes. My argument in this essay is that, rather than a fully integrated feature of a lawlike apparatus, sex is a mess. From the evolutionary perspective—and especially, I will show, in the light of the new “extended evolutionary synthesis”—sex always has been and always will be barnacled with accidents. This dovetails with what we might call material trans theory, a species of New Materialism that sees sex as a concrescence of material forces and processes introjected into bodies. Both views leave sex fundamentally incompatible with metaphysical explanations or metaphysical norms—including and especially natural law.

Este artículo se sitúa en la perspectiva de la naturalización del conocimiento científico, toda vez que es un intento por caracterizar y describir la evolución del conocimiento a partir de nociones de la biología. El objetivo principal es responder si es posible sostener la analogía que propone la epistemología evolutiva (EE): que la evolución del conocimiento científico (ECC) es similar a la evolución orgánica (EO). La pregunta surge tras las críticas que han atacado el núcleo de la analogía. La respuesta es que la analogía sí se sostiene si se tienen en cuenta las relaciones de retroalimentación, y que es posible proponer a la luz de la síntesis extendida (SE), una teoría posterior que complementa la síntesis moderna (SM). Así, este trabajo comienza con una descripción del estado de la “epistemología evolutiva”, prosigue señalando por qué la síntesis moderna, que sirvió de base para su formulación, no es suficiente para fundamentar la epistemología evolutiva y finaliza proponiendo que es pertinente una modificación que puede describirse como “epistemología evolutiva extendida”.

ABSTRACT:
This paper is situated from naturalized epistemology perspective. It is an attempt to describe the evolution of knowledge using the theoretical structure of the evolution of species. The main objective of this work is to address whether is it possible to maintain the analogy in evolutionary epistemology and which aspects of the evolution of knowledge are similar to organic evolution? This question arises after some critics against the nucleus of its formulation. The analysis presented in this work suggests that the evolution of the knowledge can be understand through an framework analogous to that of the theory of organic evolution. For this, is necessary to take into account novel feedbacks relations between variation and selection, which are part of the Extended Synthesis theory. In such way, this paper begins with an introduction to evolutionary epistemology. After that, it shows why modern synthesis theory is not enough to maintain this kind of epistemology. It ended with the idea of an extended evolutionary epistemology.

I present the initiatives, papers, and ideas of Pigliucci, Müller, and others, who are proposing an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES). I then advance some reasons for concern raised by those claims, including uncertainties in timing, historical inaccuracies, lack of a theoretical structure, arbitrariness and instability of the included concepts, stereotypical characterization of the Modern Synthesis, and dissent among evolutionary biologists. Then I mention the studies by historian of the Modern Synthesis, Joe Cain, who is very detailed and careful in explaining that Mayr, Dobzhansky, Huxley & co. who claimed they were part of a Modern Synthesis, they did also for strategic and political reasons, related to their own careers and to more general cultural battles of the time. What I want to argue is not that the Modern Synthesis was an invented product of a marketing operation; rather, it is that the social and interactive dynamics of science are very important in understanding what is going on. The same could be true for the EES in our years. I maintain the primary importance of understanding how biology is today, how it has changed, what future expects us. Pigliucci's question, "Do we need an EES?", thus suggests very important issues. But I propose that we shouldn't take at face value what the protagonists of evolutionary biology see and say. The 'expert review' or the 'small group of architects' methods cannot work. No solution either comes from a traditional philosophical approach of 'describing the structure of evolutionary theory', because scientists don't work 'inside' theories; they use them in different ways. Correct methods for answering could be developed, with the help of advanced technology for analyzing the scientific literature, the ways of doing science, the 'hot topics', the birth and death of fields, etc., through time. This would mean to look seriously at the scientific community, avoiding, on t he one hand, the authority principle, and, on the other hand, the surrender to an 'all flows, everything ever changes' perspective. In the context of such an endeavour, I suggest a specific look at the Italian evolutionary biology community as important for the future prospects of this science in our country.

Welch (Biol Philos 32(2):263-279, 2017) has recently proposed two possible explanations for why the field of evolutionary biology is plagued by a steady stream of claims that it needs urgent reform. It is either seriously deficient and incapable of incorporating ideas that are new, relevant and plausible or it is not seriously deficient at all but is prone to attracting discontent and to the championing of ideas that are not very relevant, plausible and/or not really new. He argues for the second explanation. This paper presents a twofold critique of his analysis: firstly, the main calls for reform do not concern the field of evolutionary biology in general but rather, or more specifically, the modern evolutionary synthesis. Secondly, and most importantly, these calls are not only inspired by the factors, enumerated by Welch, but are also, and even primarily, motivated by four problematic characteristics of the modern synthesis. This point is illustrated through a short analysis of the latest reform challenge to the modern synthesis, the so-called extended evolutionary synthesis. We conclude with the suggestion that the modern synthesis should be amended, rather than replaced.

The great advances of the last decades both in cognitive theories and in evolutionary biology have not yet fully merged. Most evolutionary hypotheses around the mind still rely on classical cognitivism, while most theories of cognition still look for adaptive explanations. We believe that the merging of novel cognitive theories into a pluralistic account can greatly improve our understanding of both what cognition is and how it evolved.

Abstract. In order to  understand the  general  model of evolution  at various levels of complexity  the model of multilevel selection is to be worked out. It should depend not on the various heredity’ vehicles but on  the methods of natural selection determined by 2nd law of energy conservation,. In this article an engineering approach is  applied to analysis of the  publication of Dr J Scott Turner the  Extended Organism and Purpose & Desire. What Makes Something “Alive” and Why Modern Darwinism Has Failed  to explain  It.  Together with new findings in heredity theory and  neuropsychology  in may give some clues to working out engineering approach to  sustaining  the  process of continuous  life evolution – ie to facilitating  working out the strategy for sustainable development.  It may facilitate working out free of the  ideological biases of the 20th century but scientific and reliable  model of evolution at various levels of complexity.

Universal Darwinism was a concept developed by Richard Dawkins in 1983. It responds positively to the conjecture “If there is life beyond Earth, the organisms evolve as living beings on Earth?”. Since it implies an empirical question, testable only when we find extraterrestrial life, the question can be
reformulated as follows: “if there is life beyond Earth, we could detect it using tools based on Universal Darwinism?”. We should evaluate if adaptive complexity focused on natural selection would be sufficient to explain the organic evolution in the whole universe. Charles Darwin himself advocated
an explanatory pluralism to evolution. Herein, the proposal is to discuss a general definition of life not exclusively based on the idea of natural selection, but also including concepts such as selforganization, which explains the emergence of biological order from the intrinsic characteristics of the physical-chemical systems. The extended Darwinism is a possible theoretical framework that seeks a universal understanding of life as an emerging phenomenon in order to rehabilitate the universality and autonomy of biology based on different evolutionary mechanisms. Thus, a new epistemological niche is opened, which allows the development of a pluralistic vision for the philosophy of biology.
Keywords: self-organization; biosignature; Universal Darwinism; natural selection; life.
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Resumo
O Darwinismo Universal foi um conceito desenvolvido por Richard Dawkins em 1983. Ele responde positivamente à conjectura “Se existe vida fora da Terra, os organismos evoluem como os seres vivos da Terra?”. Por implicar em uma pergunta empírica, testável apenas quando encontrarmos vida extraterrestre, ela pode ser reformulada nos seguintes termos: “se existe vida fora da Terra,
conseguiríamos detectá-la utilizando ferramentas baseadas no Darwinismo Universal?”. Cabe avaliar se a complexidade adaptativa centrada na seleção natural seria suficiente para explicar a evolução orgânica em qualquer parte do universo. O próprio Charles Darwin defendia um pluralismo explicativo para a evolução. Aqui, a proposta é discutir uma definição geral de vida não
fundamentada exclusivamente na ideia de seleção natural mas incluindo conceitos como a autoorganização, que explica a emergência da ordem biológica a partir de características intrínsecas dos sistemas físico-químicos. O darwinismo estendido é um possível quadro teórico que busca uma compreensão universal da vida como um fenômeno emergente no intuito de reabilitar a universalidade e autonomia biológica, tendo como norte diferentes mecanismos evolutivos. Assim, abre-se um novo nicho epistemológico, que permite desenvolver uma visão plural para a filosofia da biologia.
Palavras-chave: auto-organização; bioassinatura; Darwinismo Universal; seleção natural; vida.
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Referência completa: Alabi, L.P. & Santos, C.M.D. 2015. Elementos para uma filosofia universal da biologia: vida e a origem da ordem. Amazônia: Revista de Educação em Ciências e Matemáticas, Vol. 11, No 22, 34-45.
Online in: http://www.periodicos.ufpa.br/index.php/revistaamazonia/article/view/2136

This paper examines cognitive processes from an evolutionary, ecological and systemic perspective. Starting from Darwinian theory and the development of Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, the reference to evolutionary biology allows a rethinking of minds as complex phenomena "at the crossroads" between organisms (and their structures) and the environments they inhabit and contribute to build. It is proposed that this vision opens a space to overcome philosophical traditions that see in the minds "things" and in cognition a mirroring or representation of the world, to come to an understanding of the former in terms of complex systems and to interpret the latter through the concept of "enaction".

The paper describes the context and the origin of a particular debate that concerns the evolution of phenotypic plasticity. In 1965, British biologist A. D. Bradshaw proposed a widely cited model intended to explain the evolution of norms of reaction, based on his studies of plant populations. Bradshaw’s model went beyond the notion of the “adaptive norm of reaction” discussed before him by Dobzhansky and Schmalhausen by suggesting that “plasticity” – the ability of a phenotype to be modified by the environment – should be genetically determined. To prove Bradshaw’s hypothesis, it became necessary for some authors to identify the pressures exerted by natural selection on phenotypic plasticity in particular traits, and thus to model its evolution. In this paper, I contrast two different views, based on quantitative genetic models, proposed in the mid-1980s: Russell Lande and Sara Via’s conception of phenotypic plasticity, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is linked to the evolution of the plastic trait itself, and Samuel Scheiner and Richard Lyman’s view, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is independent from the evolution of the trait. I show how the origin of this specific debate, and different assumptions about the evolution of phenotypic plasticity, depended on Bradshaw’s definition of plasticity and the context of quantitative genetics.

The discovery and popularisation of the study of different evolutionary processes outside the current evolutionary framework provide researchers of different areas with new tools to make progress in their field. In this work, I explored how genetic assimilation may have played a role in human evolution, more specifically the evolution of our brains. The results indicate that human brain evolution concerning neuroplasticity fits within a context of genetic assimilation. However, further studies in comparative genomics and neurogenetics are needed to fully understand how the evolutionary changes happened at the genetic level.