Generational Change

Objective indicators suggest that economic and political conditions improved in Chile between the country’s democratization in 1990 and 2011. Average incomes increased, poverty rates decreased, and the number of positive reviews of Chilean democratic institutions rose. Despite this progress, massive student-led protest waves in 2006 and 2011 demonstrated high levels of subjective discontent in Chile. This paper proposes a three-part explanation for the paradoxical emergence and escalation of the post-Pinochet-era Chilean student protests, and, in so doing, contributes to the broader understanding of social movements and political action. The first two parts of the argument relate to generational change. Firstly, a gap between expectations and capabilities provoked discontent amongst a new generation of Chilean students. Secondly, the new generation’s collective identity as “la generación sin miedo” (the fearless generation) motivated the students to turn discontent into political action. Thirdly, government and student actor agency influenced the variance in protest strength between 2005 and 2011.

Review of: LUKÁŠ FASORA, Stáří k poradě, mládí k boji: radikalizace mladé generace českých socialistů 1900–1920, Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury 2015, 242 s.
In Czech language.
Kniha Lukáše Fasory představuje sice limitovanou, ale v českém prostředí přesto pionýrskou aplikaci generační metody a zajímavý příspěvek k moderním českým dějinám. Obzvláště důležité je zachycení obrazu neklidné doby, plné revolučních myšlenek a příklonů k radikální akci. Analýzou tématu mládeže obrací autor naši pozornost zpět k dnes již opomíjeným souvislostem stabilizace první československé republiky po první světové válce.

The article validates the statement by J.Ortega y Gasset that it is people aged 30 to 60 who “make history”, and that they are divided into two generations: the generation of those aged 45-60 prevail, and those aged 30-45 compete for power with the former and replace the former over time.
This statement suggests that each ruler is member of a certain generation; therefore, the “average age of rulers at the time they come to power” conforms to the average age of the respective generations. The article reviews the two generation replacement scenarios: the one with inheriting the authority and the one with elections of the person out of the prevailing population members.
If the authority is inherited, the average age of new rulers is approx. 45 years ((30+60)/2 years). In case of the electoral system, the average age of new rulers is to amount to 52.5 years ((45+60)/2 years). (NOTE 2017. The average age of coming to power depends on the period, for which the Head of State is elected. This effect was ignored in the article.)
Powers were inherited in Russia from the 10th century to 1917. The average age of coming to power in 966-1917 was 33±3 years. After 1917, the election of the leaders began; the age of coming to power in 1917-1985 averaged at 54 (46 in 1917-1953 and 62 in 1953-1985), and 52 in 1985-2008. Therefore, there is a drastic divergence between actual data and theoretical expectations: 33 instead of 45 in 966-1917 and 46 and 62 instead of 52.5 in 1917-1953 and 1953-1985 respectively. A good correlation is observed after 1985 only. The article summarized that 30-year, not 15-year generations, are implemented in Russia: the generations of the 30-60’s in 966-1917 and 1917-1953, respectively, and the generation of the 45-75’s in 1953-1985.
U.S. President and V.P. are elected. The average age came to 55, 55 and 55±2 years for U.S. Presidents and to 55, 55 and 55±2 years for Vice Presidents at the inauguration time in 1800-1901, 1901-1992 and 1800-1992, respectively. Thus, there was just a minor divergence between actual data and theoretical expectations in the U.S.A.: 55 instead of 52, which means that the generations of 45-60’s always ruled in the United States. It is curious to compare the U.S. data with that for Russia for the same periods: the average age came to 54 and 57 for presidents and to 61 and 55 for vice presidents, respectively, in 1917-1953 and 1953-1985.
The article makes a conclusion that the pattern proposed by Ortega y Gasset is surprisingly stable and that the actual potential of the pattern has not yet been revealed.
KEY WORDS: Ortega y Gasset, generations, cycles of generations, rulers, presidents, vice presidents, Russia, U.S.A., Schlesinger, Jr. (There were no key words in the original publication.)
РАСШИРЕННОЕ РЕЗЮМЕ. В статье проверяется утверждение (Х.Ортега-и-Гассет) о том, что именно люди в возрасте от 30 до 60 лет “делают историю”, и что они делятся на два поколения: поколение 45-60-летних доминирует, а поколение 30-45-летних борется с ним за власть и со временем сменит его.
Из этого утверждения следует, что каждый правитель является членом определенного поколения, поэтому “средний возраст правителей в момент прихода к власти” соответствует среднему возрасту соответствующих поколений. В статье рассматриваются два варианта смены поколений: передача власти по наследству и выборы первого лица из состава членов доминирующего поколения.
В случае передачи власти по наследству средний возраст новых правителей должен составить 45 лет ((30+60)/2 лет). В случае выборной власти средний возраст новых правителей должен составить 52.5 лет ((45+60)/2 лет). (ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ 2017 г. Средний возраст прихода к власти зависит от срока, на который избирается первое лицо. В данной статье этот эффект игнорировался.)
Передача власти по наследству происходила в России с X в. до 1917 г. Средний возраст прихода к власти в 966-1917 гг. составил 33±3 года. После 1917 начались выборы первого лица власти; средний возраст прихода к власти составил в 1917-1985 гг. – 54 года (46 лет в 1917-1953 и 62 года в 1953-1985 гг.), в 1985-2008 гг. – 52 года. Таким образом, наблюдается резкое расхождение между реальными данными и теоретическими ожиданиями: в 966-1917 гг. 33 года вместо 45, в 1917-1953 и 1953-1985 гг. 46 и 62 года вместо 52.5 лет. Хорошее соответствие есть только после 1985 г. В статье сделан вывод, что в России реализуются не 15-летние, а 30-летние поколения: в 966-1917 и 1917-1953 гг. это поколения 30-60-летних, а в 1953-1985 гг. поколение 45-75-летних.
В США президент и вице-президент избираются в результате выборов. Средний возраст американских президентов в момент инаугурации в 1800-1901 гг., 1901-1992 и 1800-1992 гг. составил соответственно 55, 55 и 55±2 года, а вице-президентов 55, 55 и 55±2 года. Таким образом, в США наблюдается лишь небольшое расхождение между реальными данными и теоретическими ожиданиями: 55 лет вместо 52 лет. Это означает, что в США всегда правили поколения 45-60-летних. Данные по США любопытно сравнить с данными по России за одни и те же периоды: в 1917-1953 и в 1953-1985 гг. в момент инаугурации средний возраст президентов составил 54 и 57 лет, средний возраст вице-президентов 61 и 55 лет.
В статье сделан вывод о том, что схема Ортеги-и-Гассета является удивительно устойчивой и что реальный потенциал схемы еще не раскрыт.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: Ортега-и-Гассет, поколения, циклы поколений, первые лица власти, президенты, вице-президенты, Россия, США, Шлезингер-мл. (В оригинальной публикации отсутствовали ключевые слова.)

Farm succession is a relevant issue, as it is related to rural and youth migration, sustainability and the ageing of the agricultural sector. Understanding the factors behind the willingness of potential successors to take over the family business is crucial for farm continuity. We examine the factors affecting children's likelihood of carrying on the family business in a sample of 216 potential heirs of Italian horticultural farms. Using local labour market conditions (income gap and employment rate) and surrounding context variables (population density), we plug the farm labour migration/occupational choice theory into farm succession analysis. This approach allows us to treat child succession as the opposite of the choice to migrate out of the farm sector. While farm labour migration theory predicts linear negative effects of labour market/contextual variables on farm transfer, we find that the income gap, employment rates and population density exert both negative and positi...

El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo principal analizar el primer impacto de la Gran Recesión en un colectivo tan volátil y difuso como son los segmentos poblacionales de menor edad. Con ello, se pretende causalizar en la medida de lo posible el comportamiento actual de los jóvenes, observando de este modo los elementos que acompañan, de manera más o menos invariable e inherente, al comportamiento electoral joven. El análisis se centrará en las elecciones de 2008 y 2011, por el salto económico que encontramos entre ambos procesos, y se fundamentará, principalmente, en datos demoscópicos ofrecidos por el Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Los resultados evidencian, más que un surgimiento, la incidencia que la crisis ha tenido en ciertas actitudes políticas, profundizando en tendencias habitualmente pretéritas.

This study aims to investigate the way by which middle-aged men from São Paulo – Brazil – have experienced and perceived their homosexuality in the face of social changes over the last three decades. To this end, the study takes into account several major events such as the emergence of HIV and AIDS epidemics and the resulting moral panic; the emergence of the first Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Community (LGBT) Pride Parades in Brazil; and the recent public debates regarding the legalization of homoaffective unions and the criminalization of homophobic discrimination practices. The study also questions generation as a social marker and seeks to understand the differences those middle-aged men perceive between them and the younger generation of homosexual men.

The cyclical character of definite processes observed under both Polish and American conditions in fact emerges as of a universal nature, finding its analogies throughout the world, though first and foremost within the European cultural circle. It is also possible to speak of its far reaching synchronicity, encompassing change on both local and global scales. This is witnessed by successive culminations of cycles with the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, the revolutionary surges of the 1830s and 1840s, the events of the 1860s and 1870s, the turbulences and wars of the early 20th century (notably World War I), then World War II, the great transformations of the 1980s, and the recently observed increase in political tension in various parts of the world (e.g. the Middle East, Ukraine, etc.). In the economic sphere the symptoms are shifts in the business climate, which can even be calculated by reference to quantitative indicators. Then, in the sphere of culture, it is possible to denote successive periods in literature and the arts. In the political sphere in turn, events that shape the state or territorial order are to be observed readily. The present article thus seeks to propose the existence of a universal and synchronous 30-40 years long generation cycle, which manifests itself in real symptoms in the world of politics, and for instance in the cyclicity seen to characterise intensity of change on the political map of Europe.

Often, and increasingly, social and political life is narrated using the concept of generation. This article looks at contemporary expressions of ‘generationalism’ in British public life.  It identifies the salient themes which emerge, links these to the social and political contexts in which these ideas are produced, and examines the points where they are vulnerable to critique. Bridging science and normativity, the generational view offers a convenient master-narrative for a variety of political orientations – yet one whose democratic credentials are doubtful.

Generational conflict is more contingent than a numbers-based (years and generational cohort) understanding of generations would expect. I suggest that a focus on the concept of ‘creative destruction’, as derived from Nietzsche’s various works, can provide us further theorization of these transitions, and also gain us leverage into the risks, and rewards, that generations face in dislodging older generations still in power.  The chapter proceeds through three sections.  The first extracts the two components from within the generational transition ‘story’, and then brings forth the import of each, reviewing how they have been utilized in generational analysis so far.  The formative element of generations takes issue with the notion that generations ebb and flow purely in terms of ‘epochs’ which can be cleanly divided demographically.  Instead, being a part of a generation is more than just a numbers game, it is a social experience brought into focus during a period of political and philosophical formation, during crises that we might title ‘ruptures’, and often in reaction to an iconic ‘paradigm-changing’ or traumatic event. Thus, the formative experience is not only cohesive (intra-generationally), it is also disintegrative and even destructive. The second section engages various works by Nietzsche, focusing on the import of memory, aesthetics, and history in what some title the ‘creative destruction’ process.  This process provides us another way of understanding– in a ‘politics of forgetting’ fashion -  how particular formative events that prevent previous generations from dynamically engaging the here and now can be left behind.  The third section assesses the analytical benefits of generational analysis; how it is suggestive (if not necessarily predictive) of future political trends, and how it can be improved upon if we recognize both the polyvalence of formative events that can lead to intra-generational splintering, and the inherent contingency of a generational transition as it competes with alternative forms of identity. I conclude with some abbreviated considerations of how generational analyses might engage the domain of the academy and the ebb and flow of trends in, and practices of, IR scholarship.

"Der Autor untersucht die Frage, wie mündliche biographische Erzählungen in gesellschaftliche Generationendiskurse eingebettet sind. Um dies zu beantworten, werden im Beitrag anhand von Einzelinterviews die Strukturen von Biographien im Hinblick auf die narrative Verarbeitung von Erfahrungsbrüchen, aber auch als Prozess der Aneignung von gesellschaftlichen Diskursen und Erzählungen perspektiviert. Anhand der Analyse von lebensgeschichtlichen Erzählungen einer 68erin, ihrer Mutter und ihrer Tochter werden - nach Einbrüchen in deren Lebensgeschichte - unterschiedliche sprachliche Formen der Re-Konfiguration ihrer biographischen Figuren herausgearbeitet. Diese Formen sind, so der Autor, in Prozessen der sprachlichen Aneignung von öffentlichen und familiären Diskursen in der Jugendphase begründet, die sich verfestigende, sprachliche Muster der Welterschließung hervorbringen. Im Beitrag wird gezeigt, dass diese 'generationalen Gattungsmuster' in den drei Erzählungen die Grenzen zwischen weitgehend inkommensurablen Erfahrungs- und Erzählräumen innerhalb der Familie markieren. Die generationalen Gattungen präfigurieren dabei nicht nur gegenüber den Erzählungen der anderen Familienmitglieder widerständige Sprachbilder, sondern auch gebrochene Formen der Einbettung in die 'Großen gesellschaftlichen (Generationen-)Erzählungen'."

One crisis prompted the formation of a community of Protestant nuns in Germany. Another crisis led their community to occupy the public spotlight for a season. A further crisis drove them to the margins of German society, where they have persisted in proclaiming their message of repentance.
The young women of a Lutheran Bible study fell to their knees in prayer when their city, Darmstadt, Germany, was destroyed by Allied bombers in 1944. Their Bible study leaders had sought their repentance since 1936, not long after the beginning of the Third Reich. Repentance now overflowed in the hearts of the young women, many of whom perceived God’s wrath against their sinful nation in their city’s suffering. A few in their number felt called to devote their lives fully to God in a radical fashion, the details of which they had yet to determine. With the help of monastically-inclined Protestant mentors, the Bible study’s leaders and a handful of its members established the Ecumenical Sisterhood of Mary in 1947.
Their charism was one of radical dependence on God in poverty, celibacy, and obedience to him rather than to any external authority. They perceived God’s leading through the manifestation of the gifts of the Spirit, including speaking in tongues and discernment, as well as through the careful meditation on Bible verses drawn from a hat, which they applied directly to their life as a community. Mother Basilea Schlink served as the primary theologian-in-residence for the sisterhood, with Mother Martyria Madauss guiding the day-to-day operations and pastoral care of the community. They prayed that God would provide and received sufficient financial and material gifts for them to survive. Out of the rubble, they built their own Motherhouse. Meanwhile, they embraced a semi-cloistered lifestyle, balancing significant time in prayer with serving guests and publicly spreading their message of repentance. The sisters established their own publishing house to that end, printing a growing number of books and tracts authored by Mother Basilea. As evidenced by the name of the sisterhood – the Ecumenical Sisterhood of Mary – the sisters desired for their simple message of humble repentance to be in the spirit of the Mother of Christ and to reach across confessional lines.
By 1955, in a crisis of conscience, Mother Basilea’s vision of national guilt expanded beyond Germany’s sins in the Third Reich generally or in World War II. She became fixated on “our German guilt” and the “guilt of the German Volk” against the Jews. Citing the long history of German anti-Semitism, Schlink framed the Holocaust as the climax of the sins of the German people against God and against his chosen people, the Jews. Indeed, her vision had roots in both her reading of the Hebrew Bible, in which entire nations could be culpable before God, and in German nationalism, in which the German Volk was Gentile and Christian, and possessed collective moral agency. For much of the next decade, Schlink and the sisterhood represented Germany’s most prominent Christian Zionists. In particular, the dramatic productions they staged at church conventions and at their Motherhouse reached a broad audience with Schlink’s message of German guilt against the Jews.
After the Arab-Israeli wars of the early 1960s, Schlink’s writings waxed apocalyptic. By 1964, Germany was in the throes of the sexual revolution. In response, a distinctive shift occurred in the sisters’ mission, radically altering in their place in German public life. Whereas they had formerly considered themselves as “standing in a solidarity of guilt” with the German people, to borrow terms from the likeminded Stuttgart Confession of Guilt, Schlink now guided the sisters to adopt a stance of righteous indignation toward their nation’s promiscuous youth. As part of the generation who had survived the war, the sisters could not relate to the cultural currents defining much of the new generation. It appeared to many that the sisters considered widespread pre-marital sex as a greater harbinger of the apocalypse than murder. The sisters thus effectively marginalized themselves from the mainstream of German public life. Once Schlink issued an ultimatum to all of Germany’s Protestant bishops to sign her manifesto for national moral renewal, she made cooperation with her already anomalous organization politically unfeasible. Emblematic of these shifts and the sisters’ disillusionment with the formal ecumenical movement, the sisterhood changed its name from the Ecumenical Sisterhood of Mary to the Evangelical Sisterhood of Mary.
Shaped by crisis but not limited by it, the Evangelical Sisterhood of Mary remains a complex expression of what it means to be female, German, Protestant, and Christian, and to grapple with the legacy of genocide, no less genocide committed on their behalf.

РАСШИРЕННОЕ РЕЗЮМЕ. В настоящее время на территории Евразии существует пять “живых” локальный цивилизаций -- Китай, Индия, “пояс” исламских государств (включая Северную Африку), Западная Европа и Россия Территория России разделена между Европой и Азией, поэтому исследователи иногда называют Российскую цивилизацию Евразийской. В статье предложена общая концепция развития Евразийской цивилизации от ее рождения до современного состояния (IX-XX вв.).
Евразийская цивилизация является самой молодой из пяти цивилизаций. Поэтому ее развитие изначально приобрело “догоняющий” характер. С первых веков своего существования евразийский социум должен был выживать рядом с более зрелыми (или более сильными) соседями. Только активное заимствование технических и организационных новшеств из-за рубежа и их адаптация для нужно евразийского социума обеспечили Руси/России способность к соперничеству с соседями.
В результате российская история стала историей чередования двух типов доминирующих поколений, которые могут быть названы «поколениями перемен» и «поколениями стабилизации и стагнации». Например, в последние два века российской истории «поколению перемен» соответствуют правления Александра I (1801-1825), Александра II (1855-1881), ленинско-сталинский период (1917-1953) и период, начавшийся в 1985 с перестройки (и закончившийся в 2020 -- прим.2022-го года); «поколению стабилизации и стагнации» соответствуют правление Николая I (1825-1855), период правления Александра III и Николая II (1881-1917), а также хрущевско-брежневский период (1953-1985) (прим.2022 года: а также период, начавшийся в 2020) .
Средняя длительность доминирующих поколений 32 года (32.5±2.5 лет, от 16 до 43 лет). Любая пара «поколения перемен» и «поколения стабилизации и стагнации» образует 65-летний цикл (65±5 лет, от 49 до 81 лет), пары 65-летних циклов образуют 130-ление циклы (130±14, от 112 до 154 лет), etc.
Благодаря заимствованию новшеств из Западной Европы евразийский режим с XVI в. развернул мощную территориальную экспансию в Азию и частично в <Центральную> Европу. В начале XX в. евразийский режим доминировал на огромном пространстве от Финляндии, Польши и устья Дуная до Персии, Манчжурии и Камчатки.
Однако территориальная экспансия не может быть бесконечной. Со второй половины XVIII в. евразийскому режиму власти предстояло перейти от экстенсивного роста за счет территориальной экспансии к интенсивному росту в постоянных границах. Российская империя не смогла решить эту проблему и потерпела крах в 1917 г. Советский Союз не смог решить эту проблему и потерпел крах в 1991 г. Российская Федерация стоит перед той же проблемой.
Приложение к статье включает таблицы и графики, характеризующие закономерности ритма поколений трех цивилизационных регионов: России (765-2056 гг.), Китая (471-2007 гг.) и Индии (1173-1707 гг.). Спектры состоят из циклов длительностью ок.16(14÷20)—ок.32(30÷34)—ок.64(62÷68)—ок.128(115÷147)—ок.256(256÷267)—ок.512(519÷560)—ок.1024(1038÷1119) лет.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: локальные цивилизации, поколения, поколение перемен, поколение стабилизации, инновации, территориальная экспансия, крах империй, история России, история Китая, история Индии.
ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ 2017. В оригинальной публикации статьи резюме и ключевые слова отсутствовали. Развитие этих идей см. в моей монографии «Пространственно-временная динамика человеческих сообществ разного масштаба», 2011, в которой также рассмотрены: 20-летний инновационный цикл, экономические циклы длительностью 3-5, 7-10 и 15-20 лет и др.

Interrogating the cultural roots of contemporary Malayali middle classes, especially the upper caste Nambudiri community, The Fall of Gods is based on a decade-long ethnography and historico-sociological analyses of the interconnections between colonial history, family memories, and class mobility in twentieth-century south India and in the diaspora. It traces the transformation of normative structures of kinship networks as the community moves from colonial to neo-liberal modernity across generations. The author demonstrates how past family experiences of class and geographical mobility (or immobility) are retrieved and reshaped in the present as alternative ways of conceiving kinship, transforming the idea of collective suffering and sacrifice, and strengthening the felt necessity of territorial, caste, and religious mingling. Rich in anthropological detail and incisive analyses, the book makes original contributions to the understanding of connection between gendered family relations and class mobility, and foregrounds the complex linkages between political history, memory, and the ‘private’ domain of kinship relations in the making of India’s middle classes.

In the mid-VI BC Athens established a colony in the Thracian Chersonese, under the leadership of the noble Miltiades I. The literary and archaeological evidence for the history of this settlement outlines an elaborate scenario of co-habitation among different ethnic, social, and political entities: in the peninsula the Athenian enterprise was confronted with pre-existing Aeolian and Ionian colonies and the different local Thracian tribes, and on the other shore of the Hellespont, with hostile Greek poleis, the long-established kingdom of Lydia, and the expanding Persian empire. If we analyze the Thracian Chersonese in terms of population studies, it emerges as a richly multicultural and internationalizing environment: featuring diverse social groups with distinctive ethnic and civic identities, political makeup, and institutions, economic models and interests, and bound in reciprocal relations. The aristocratic family of the Philaids managed the control of such composite territorial scenario throughout two generations and three tyrannies, until they were ousted by Darius in 493 B.C. I argue that we may study the relationship between social groups, élites, and tyranny, in a socioeconomic and generational perspective. In the course of half-century the Chersonesitai developed a local territorially defined identity; economic and cultural changes generated social stratification and the rise of a local élite. On this account we can explain the shift from reverence to dissent towards the Philaid leadership, as well as the shift of the Philaids towards allegiance with Thracian royalty. The methodological interest of this case-study lies in the virtuous cross-referencing between family history and biography, on one hand, and the reconstruction of a history of broader social groups and regional networks.

http://shcyhome.org/2015/03/chc-episode-9-the-challenges-of-childhood-history/  Episode 9 of CHC offers audio and video recordings of the keynote lectures delivered January 16, 2015 at “Challenges of the History of Childhood” hosted by Queen Mary University of London. 

CHC is a series of interviews, essays, and happenings in historical studies of childhood presented for the Society for the History of Children and Youth.

Marginal figures. South Tyrol’s parliamentary representative in the national parties from 1948-2013

The phenomenon of generational change has been edging more prominently into the foreground of European political debate for some years now. In South Tyrol, the resignation of 72-year-old Province Governor Luis Durnwalder provided the thematic impetus for the year 2013. This article draws upon the topicality of the subject, and tries to present the generational change in South Tyrolean policy since 1948 in a more comprehensive way. In order to simultaneously make a number of largely unknown CVs available for regional historical research for the first time, the analysis refers to the biographies of the 63 parliamentary representatives who belonged to a state (Italian) party. The systematic comparison of political careers sheds light not only on the causes that have led to a gradual increase in the average age in the state parliament: the social origins of the parliamentary representatives and their various career paths make it equally clear that the dynamics of the South Tyrolean party system cannot be accurately captured solely with ethnic categories of thinking, but only by taking economic ones into consideration as well.

Abstract: This article asserts that the impact of generational replacement on gendered political participation patterns is not sufficiently taken into account by existing analyses of participatory gender inequalities. In this longitudinal study, gender and generational differences in French protest patterns are systematically examined. The article tackles two interrelated questions: what is the impact of
generational replacement on gender differences in political action in France, and from an individual-level perspective, how do we explain the different participation levels from different generations of women and men? A longitudinal quantitative analysis of survey data from the European Values Study from 1981 to 2008 confirms the significance of generational differences as well as the multi-dimensionality
of participatory gender differences.

В статье проверяется гипотеза, согласно которой игроизация современного общества неодинаково воспринимается представителями нескольких поколений, принимающих решения в сфере массовых коммуникаций. При моделировании эффективного межпоколенческого диалога необходимо учитывать, что игровая деятельность у разных коммуникаторов может ассоциироваться с разными действиями: соперничеством, фантазией, творчеством и интригой. А это осложняет рефлексивное взаимодействие. Автор, опираясь на основные положения теории Штраусса-Хоува, высказывает предположение о конкретных поколенческих предпочтениях в сфере игр. В статье дается информация об анкетировании респондентов из четырех поколений, обнародуется статистика ответов на один из вопросов анкеты «Игра и я». Исследование проведено на кафедре массовых коммуникаций Российского университета дружбы народов. Авторская гипотеза была частично подтверждена. Статья может быть полезна исследователям и непосредственным участникам коммуникационных процессов, в которых используется форма игрового взаимодействия.
Communicators from different generations understand all gaming activities in different ways: as a competition, imagination, creativity, and intrigue. This creates problems in the interaction and should be considered when designing effective communication. The author examines the hypothesis associated with games and generations. The author relies on Strauss-Howe generational theory. The article presents some results of questioning "Game and I". The study was conducted at the Department of mass communications of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Author's hypothesis was partially confirmed. The article can be useful to researchers and the direct participants of the communication process for creating effective gamification.

This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of historical and generational influences in the incorporation of immigrants in the United States. The first part addresses the importance of spelling out historical contexts for understanding virtually any aspect of the study of immigration and incorporation. By not doing so, we are left with an elegant but ahistorical positivism. The second section specifies the size and composition - and definition - of what are loosely referred to as the immigrant first and second “generations” in the United States, outlines a typology of distinctive generational cohorts (based on differences in nativity and age at arrival), and analyzes their patterns of acculturation as well as educational and occupational attainment. In particular, I consider the utility and validity of “lumping” vs. “splitting” such generational cohorts in the study of the adaptation of foreign-born immigrant children and the native-born children of immigrants. These distinctions - in a field where the study of intergenerational relations has been criticized as ahistorical - underscore the importance of situating and understanding generational processes in specific historical contexts.

Resumen: Comparación de los resultados de los censos económicos de los hogares llevados a cabo por Diane L. Rus y Jan Rus en una comunidad de habla tsotsil en el municipio de Chamula, Chiapas, México, en 1974, 1987 y 1996-98, mostrando cómo tres generaciones de campesinos indígenas se adaptaron a la profunda crisis económica de la década de 1980 y a la rebelión zapatista de 1994. Comienza con una muestra inicial de 138 hogares, y presenta las respuestas de los descendientes directos de esa muestra, que finalmente llegaron a 353 hogares, muchos de los cuales habían emigrado a colonias urbanas y rurales lejanas para 1996-98. Estensos gráficos y tablas.

رسم بازار سیاست این شده که هر رویکرد نامطلوب یا ناخوشایند را با وصف ماکیاولیستی همراه کنند. دانسته نیست (و در پاره‌ای موارد پذیرفته نیست) که تمام این رویکردهایی که "ماکیاولیستی" نامیده شده با فلسفه ماکیاولی تطابق داشته باشد. آنچه مسلم است آنکه دیدگاه عام بدین‌نتیجه رسیده که هر رویکرد ابزارانگارانه در سیاست را با چنین وصفی بشناساند. هدف این نوشته در اصل نه بررسی فلسفه سیاسی نیکولو ماکیاولی، که پرداختن به سیاست ماکیاولیستی (در مفهوم عام آن) در مورد مشخص آیت الله خمینی و بازتولید این نوع خوی و خصلت سیاسی و نحوه حضور در عرصه کسب قدرت در نسل کنونی و آنتی‌تز سکولار اوست.

EXPANDED RESUME. Currently, there are five "live" local civilizations on the territory of Eurasia -- China, India, a “string” of Muslim countries (including North Africa), Western Europe, and Russia. Russian (or Eurasian) civilization is the youngest of the five ones. Therefore, its development was “catching up” by nature from its very inception. From the first centuries of its existence, Eurasian society adopted the cultural forms of neighbors.
As a result, the Russian history is the history of the alternation of two types of ruling generations that can be called “generations of changes” and “generations of stabilization and stagnation”. For instance, in the last two centuries of Russia’s history, the “generations of changes” corresponded to the reign of Alexander I (1801-1825), Alexander II (1855-1881), Leninist-Stalinist period (1917-1953), and the period that began in 1985 with perestroika (2022's note: ended 2020); the “generations of stabilization and stagnation” corresponded to the reign of Nikolai I (1825-1855), Alexander III and Nikolai II (1881-1917), Khrushchov-Brezhnev period (1953-1985); (2022's note: and the period that began in 2020).
The average duration of ruling generations is 32 years (32.5±2.5 years, from 16 to 44 years). Any pair of “generation of changes” and “generation of stabilization and stagnation” formed a 65-years cycle (65±5 years, from 49 to 81 years), the pairs of 65-cycles formed 130-years cycles (130±14, from 112 to 154 years), etc.
Starting to borrow innovations from Western Europe in 15th-16th centuries, the Eurasian regime had the opportunity to deploy a powerful territorial expansion in Asia and partly in Europe. In the early 20th century, the Eurasian regime dominated on the vast area from Finland, Poland and the Danube mouth to Persia, Manchuria and Kamchatka.
Territorial expansion may not be infinite. From the second half of the 18th century the Eurasian power regime was destined to move from the extensive growth due to territorial expansion to the intensive growth within permanent borders. The Russian Empire could not solve this problem and collapsed in 1917. The Soviet Union was unable to solve this problem and collapsed in 1991. The Russian Federation faces the same problem.
ANNEX to the article includes tables and charts illustrating the patterns of rhythm of generations of three civilizations: Russia (765-2056), China (471-2007), and India (1173-1707). Generations are the basis for cycles with a duration of about 16 (14÷20)—32 (30÷34)—64 (62÷68)—128 (115÷147)—256 (256÷267)—512 (519÷560)—1024 (1038÷1119) years.
KEYWORDS: local civilizations, generations, generations of changes, generations of stabilization and stagnation, innovations, territorial expansion, collapse of empires, Russia’s history, China’s history, India’s history.
The summary and keywords were missing in the original publication.