Henri Poincare

Architects have a role to play in interplanetary space that has barely yet been explored. The architectural community is largely unaware of this new territory, for which there is still no agreed method of practice. There is moreover a general confusion, in scientific and related fields, over what architects might actually do there today. Current extra-planetary designs generally fail to explore the dynamic and relational nature of space-time, and often reduce human habitation to a purely functional problem. This is compounded by a crisis over the representation (drawing) of space-time. The present work returns to first principles of architecture in order to realign them with current socio-economic and technological trends surrounding the space industry. What emerges is simultaneously the basis for an ecological space architecture, and the representational strategies necessary to draw it. We explore this approach through a work of design-based research that describes the construction of Ocean; a huge body of water formed by the collision of two asteroids at the Translunar Lagrange Point (L2), that would serve as a site for colonisation, and as a resource to fuel future missions. Ocean is an experimental model for extra-planetary space design and its representation, within the autonomous discipline of architecture.

The special theory of relativity is a little over 100 years old, and in 2015 the general theory of relativity will reach the century mark. Part 1 of this report will explore the origins of the special theory of relativity, while part 2 will cover the origins of the general theory of relativity. For many it is not clear what science went before relativity, for most believe Einstein constructed every aspect of relativity. In terms of special relativity it was really about a conceptual leap rather than constructing a whole new theory and mathematics, for all the science was there waiting for someone to properly interpret it.

Alfred North Whitehead, Le Principe de relativité et ses applications en physique [The Principle of Relativity. With application to Physical Science, 1922]. Traduction de Henri Vaillant relue par Sylviane Schwer, Louvain-la-Neuve, Les Éditions Chromatika, 2012. (978-2-930517-34-6 ; 147 p. ; 17 €)
Le philosophe et algébriste britannique Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) est une figure marquante, quoique peu connue en Europe francophone, de la pensée du XXe siècle. Le principe de relativité (1922) constitue probablement le livre le plus controversé et le moins étudié de Whitehead. Développant plus avant les conséquences épistémologiques de la « méthode de l’abstraction extensive » introduite dans ses Principes de la connaissance naturelle (1919/1925), il y propose une théorie de la relativité générale aussi — si pas plus — puissante (i.e., cohérente et applicable) que celle d’Einstein (1914) mais fondée sur une philosophie strictement processuelle qui lui permet de remédier aux tendances idéaliste et substantialiste de la relativité einsteinienne « orthodoxe ».

Henri Vaillant, ingénieur, philosophe-chercheur sur la philosophie du processus, a traduit Modes de pensée (Vrin, 2003), La Science et le monde moderne (Ontos Verlag, 2006), les Principes de la connaissance naturelle (Chromatika, 2007) et La religion en gestation (Chromatika, 2008).

Sylviane R. Schwer, ancienne élève de l'École Normale Supérieure de Fontenay-aux-Roses, agrégée de mathématiques, est professeur à l'université de Paris 13.

"Guillaume Durand et Michel Weber (éditeurs), Les principes de la connaissance naturelle d’Alfred North Whitehead — Alfred North Whitehead’s Principles of Natural Knowledge. Actes des Journées d’étude internationales tenues à l’Université de Nantes, les 3 et 4 octobre 2005 — Proceedings of the Fourth International “Chromatiques whiteheadiennes” Conference. Publiés avec le concours du Département de philosophie de l'Université de Nantes, Frankfurt / Paris / Lancaster, ontos verlag, Chromatiques whiteheadiennes VIII, 2007. (280 p. ; ISBN 978-3-938793-64-0 ; 89 €)
Les quatrièmes journées « Chromatiques » interrogèrent la philosophie des sciences de la nature qui est caractéristique de l’ « époque de Londres », prolongeant ainsi les travaux menés à Liège (2001) puis à Louvain-la-Neuve (2003). L’objet central de cette rencontre était l’œuvre pionnière dans la philosophie whiteheadienne de la nature : An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (1919/1925), dont tous les principaux traits — à commencer par la méthode de l'abstraction extensive — font ici l'objet de nouvelles réflexions.
The fourth international « Chromatiques whiteheadiennes » conference was devoted to the philosophy of the natural sciences that is characteristic of Whitehead’s « London Epoch ». Continuing the efforts of the Liège (2001) and Louvain-la-Neuve (2003) meetings, the conference focused on An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (CUP, 1919/1925) which constitutes Whitehead’s pioneering work in the field. All its main traits — starting with the Method of Extensive Abstraction — are here questioned anew.
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Dalla quarta di copertina:
La nostra generazione  vede il mondo allo stesso modo  delle precedenti? È possibile che  scienza e arte abbiano,  di volta in volta, mutato il modo di entrare in relazione con la realtà? Molti ancora non ne sono consapevoli perché educati unicamente all’interno del mondo classico della geometria di Euclide, della matematica di Cartesio e della fisica di Newton, ma la scienza del XX secolo ha prodotto due monumentali interpretazioni che hanno minato alla base l’abituale nozione di spazio e di tempo. Negli stessi anni, l’arte ha esplorato lo spazio scoprendone analogie con l’indagine scientifica. Inaugurando la collana «Gli Strumenti» diretta da Antonino Saggio, Claudio Catalano compie un affascinante percorso tra scienza ed arte: da Newton a Boulée da Riemann a Turner, da van Gogh a Poincaré, da Einstein a Duchamp, da Heisenberg e Bohr a Cage. Catalano estrapola materiali  di grande suggestione e li porge al lettore con sicura capacità divulgativa. Ne nasce un percorso ricco di scoperte e a tratti entusiasmante che spingerà il lettore a ipotizzare nuove dimensioni del proprio operare.

A. El Programa: funciones del matemático 1. Estética 2. Física 3. Filosófica Algunos temas del pensamiento matemático de Poincaré 4. Al servicio de la sociedad a. Profesional b. Experto: el affaire Dreyfus c. Crítico social d. Divulgador científico B. Una respuesta insospechada: los 23 Problemas de Hilbert Ante todo, agradecer a la Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales estar hoy, aquí, ante ustedes. No ya a la Real Academia sino a las personas que lo han hecho factible: a José Manuel Aroca y, muy en especial, a Manuel López Pellicer. Nos encontramos conmemorando un aniversario. Algo que puede convertirse en rutina, en autojustificación para reuniones; lo que, en cierta manera, está ocurriendo en otros campos. Aunque entre en esa rutina, me permito una sugerencia: Justamente este verano se cumplirá el centenario del nacimiento del Axioma de elección. Fue en 1904, en el Tercer Congreso Internacional de Matemáticos, cuando Zermelo lo formuló de manera explícita por vez primera. Y todos recordamos las inmediatas discusiones y polémicas a las que dio paso. Estaba en juego el papel de las definiciones y de las demostraciones existenciales, no constructivas. Y el problema, si cabe admitir o no la definición de un objeto sin poder mostrar, construir o calcular ese objeto. Es tema al que dedican su análisis, su crítica y rechazo, y entre otros, los matemáticos de la Escuela de París, los componentes de la denominada escuela semi-intuicionista francesa-Borel, Lebesgue, Baire-. Porque ligado al papel de las definiciones no constructivas se encuentra como problema la existencia o no del infinito actual, de si cabe ir más allá del infinito numerable. Como sugerencia, se podría dedicar una Sesión a conmemorar el nacimiento del Axioma de elección así como sus repercusiones, su papel en el Hacer matemático...

Und wenn jemand noch einen Beweis dafür braucht, dass der gesellschaftliche Werdegang nicht von großen Denkern abhängt, könnte man anführen, dass Albert Einstein, als er den dichten Nebel der gesellschaftlichen Zukunft durchdringen wollte, nichts Wesentliches zu sagen wusste und nur die alten und schal gewordenen Phrasen wiederholte - er, der große Ikonoklast des Denkens, unternahm auch nicht den geringsten Versuch, sich ihrer elenden Fesseln zu entledigen.

Monsters lurk within mathematical as well as literary haunts. I propose to trace some pathways between these two monstrous habitats. I start from Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s influential account of monster culture and explore how well mathematical monsters fit each of his seven theses (Cohen 1996). The mathematical monsters I discuss are drawn primarily from three distinct but overlapping domains. I will describe these in much greater detail as they arise below, but here is a brief preview. Firstly, late nineteenth-century mathematicians made numerous unsettling discoveries that threatened their understanding of their own discipline and challenged their intuitions. The great French mathematician Henri Poincaré characterised these anomalies as ‘monsters’, a name that stuck. Secondly, the twentieth-century philosopher Imre Lakatos composed a seminal work on the nature of mathematical proof, in which monsters play a conspicuous role (Lakatos 1976). He reconstructs the emergence during the nineteenth century of a proof of the Euler Conjecture, which ascribes a certain property to polyhedra. Lakatos coined such terms as ‘monster-barring’ and ‘monster-adjusting’ to describe strategies for dealing with entities whose properties seem to falsify the conjecture. Thirdly, and most recently, mathematicians dubbed the largest of the so-called sporadic groups ‘the Monster’, because of its vast size and uncanny properties, and because its existence was suspected long before it could be confirmed.

The Qualitative quantity notion
in the Myth of the dismemberment of primordial being as creation

The idea of the Being as structure of numbers and notion of quality of the numbers could be seen in the myth of creation of the world from the disremembered body of the primordial man. This myth differs in its presentation by the specific ethnos, but the concept of the quality of the numbers remains the same in these different cultures - the dismemberment of primordial being as creation. Creation by Division of primordial unity is the primary theme of the conquest of dismemberement of a chaotic god by a force representing order. The dismemberment of the body of primordial man is the source of creative emanation of the world. The body of Adam Kadmon in Kabbala, the body of Purusha in the Indian Rig Veda, Osiris-Tot in Egypth’s “Book of the Death”, Dionis-Zagrey or Orpheus in Thracian Orphism, are explicit notion of the quality of numbers. The notion of the act of creation is the notion of the qualitative quantity. The creation of the world and the life is the act of exhibition of the quality of the members, numbers, quantitative parts of the body. The body of Adam Kadmon is the motion of the number. This alive number-ment in motion is the cause of the cosmos and the being. The idea of the time, as the quality of the quantitative being of the motion, is the prime factor for the order of the mythological thinking. This generalized knowledge, of the quality of number in motion, concentrated in the myth later becomes represented as category of thinking – the category of qualitative quantity. The specific role of “counting” numbers is typical for the act of creation. The act of counting numbers is the speciality of the Demiurg – the God and the Creator. This demiurgical role aims to transform the profane nature in sacral one. This task is self organization out of chaos. This is the qualitative quantity matter. The numbers and their motions are technical means and vehicle for the transformation of the chaos to order.

The notion of qualitative quantity in the Thracian Orphism
And the concept of the creation of the Universe, as quality of numbers is based on Alexander Fol’s Orphica Magica I

This paper examines whether, and in what contexts, Duhem’s and Poincaré’s views can be regarded as conventionalist or structural realist. After analysing the three different contexts in which conventionalism is attributed to them – in the context of the aim of science, the underdetermination problem and the epistemological status of certain principles – I show that neither Duhem’s nor Poincaré’s arguments can be regarded as conventionalist. I argue that Duhem and Poincaré offer different solutions to the problem of theory choice, differ in their stances towards scientific knowledge and the status of scientific principles, making their epistemological claims substantially different.

This paper offers a systematic analysis of Poincaré's understanding of beauty in science. In particular, the paper examines the epistemic significance Poincaré attributes to aesthetic judgement by reconstructing and analysing his arguments on simplicity and unity in science. I offer a consistent reconstruction of Poincaré's account and show that for Poincaré simplicity and unity are regulative principles, linked to the aim of science – that of achieving understanding of how phenomena relate. I show how Poincaré's account of beauty in science can be incorporated within his wider philosophy of science.

We can only know what determines us as being and by the fact that it determines us as being.
Our knowledge is therefore logically limited to what determines us as being.
Since representation is defined as the act that makes knowledge dicible, our representation is logically limited to what dynamically determines us as being.
Our representation is included in our becoming.
Nothing that we represent, no infinite, can exceed the mere necessity of our becoming.
The world, my physical being and my consciousness are subsumed by the necessity of my becoming.
We know nothing but “we become” 
To the question "Is there anything else to know?" we can give no logical answer
Article summary:
Reality is pure logical interdependence, immanent, formless, unspeakable.
Logos is a principle of order in this interdependence.
Individuation is the necessary asymptote of any instance of the Logos.
Each knowing subject is Individuation, a mode of order among infinites of infinites of possible modes of order.
Everything that appears to the subject as Existing participates in his Individuation.
This convergence into Individuation defines a perspective that gives meaning.
The subject is representation.
It is in this representation that exist the subject, objects and laws of the world.
Without subject there are no objects, no laws, no framework.
The representation is not isomorphism but morphogenesis.
The physical world and the Spirit have the same logical nature: they are categories of representation.
The representation is animated because meaning is an Act.
Representation is limited by a horizon of meaning.
Below this horizon the subject represents the universe and itself.
Beyond this horizon there is no prevailing space, time or form.
The predicate expresses, below the horizon of meaning, a necessity whose source is beyond this horizon, unfathomable.
The OK is neither materialism nor idealism and frees itself from any psychological preconceptions.
The OK does not propose an "other reality" than that described by common sense or science, but another mode of representation.
The OK is compatible with the current state of science, while offering new interpretive avenues.
The OK differs from ontic structural realism (OSR) in various ways:
Just like being, the relationship is representation,
The knowing subject is present in any representation,
the real is non-founded.

How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness?  If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity?  How do people react to being accused of talking nonsense themselves?  Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life?  In dream-reports perhaps?  Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs?  Or in certain jokes and hoaxes?  Are contradictions felt to be meaningless?  I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties.  First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others.  Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.

Sur l'échelle de la Ligne platonicienne, le passage de relais où Lautman transmet latéralement les anneaux du prolongement analytique à Deleuze est prolongé verticalement par Deleuze en un réinvestissement intégral de la Ligne par l'ensemble-union des points de Leibniz, de Poincaré, de Péguy et de Proust.

he author is using the personality of Milan Rastislav Štefánik to show how secular ideas permeated into Slovak society at the turn of 19th century. Štefánik came from a family of an evangelic priest and until his university studies in Prague, he was a devout believer. However, in the Czech metropolis, he met new modern views on faith and religion which were in stark contrast with his traditional perception of the role of the Church and creed. An important turning point stemmed from this and he decided to devote himself to science and astronomy. It also provoked a serious dispute with his father. But one cannot say that his world-view was definitely formed at the time. In fact, he got into a state of permanent development, being strongly influenced by the French environment where he was living after having finished his studies in Prague. He inclined to positivism, which was then popular in science at that time, nevertheless he did not renounce his faith in God or metaphysics.