Logics

"Khusus menyangkut analogi, penafsiran dan hal-hal lain yang terkait, memang ... tidak mudah menemukan bahan-bahan pustaka yang membahas hingga praktiknya. Oleh karena itu, buku ini menjadi penting." - Prof. Dr. Topo Santoso, S.H., M.H.

Sinopsis:
Pandangan dominan dalam ilmu hukum pidana menyatakan bahwa penerapan analogi dilarang dalam hukum pidana, karena melanggar asas legalitas. Di sisi lain, penafsiran ekstensif justru diperbolehkan, padahal keduanya sama-sama memperluas cakupan makna ketentuan pidana dalam undang-undang, sehingga dapat mencakup perbuatan yang sebelumnya tidak termasuk dalam ketentuan pidana tersebut. Dua hal yang menjadi fokus penelitian buku ini adalah: perbedaan dan persamaan antara penerapan analogi dan penafsiran ekstensif dalam hukum pidana; dan penerapan analogi dalam Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia Nomor 786K/Pid/2015 dan 1417K/Pid/1997. Buku ini mengemukakan perspektif alternatif, juga baru, dalam pemahaman terhadap asas legalitas dan metode penemuan hukum, sehingga patut dibaca oleh peminat kajian ilmu hukum pidana, filsafat dan teori hukum, serta pemelajar ilmu hukum secara umum.

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When digital computers replaced the analog ones, the
computations were mainly based on the Boolean logic in which there were no middle choices between true and false. Although the lack of such choices were inconvenient, the popularity of two-valued (Boolean or binary) logic was helped by the continuous development and ability of micro-electronics to provide efficient two-state devices and circuits. Moreover, the appearance of appropriate mathematical tools, starting with the very early work of Boole [ 1,2 I, followed by the subsequent application of Boolean algebra and associated developments. further helped in enriching the binary logic to a very high level of complexity, sophistication and application.

`This article explores the difficulties caused by the usage of the popular either-or logic to explain the union of the humanity of Jesus with His divine substance. As an alternative, the use of the sentential logic will be offered because it consists of betweenness/neitherness/bothness concepts that the either-or Aristotelian binary logic or Kantian-Hegel logic do not. The sentential logic is useful for dialogue with people who are accustomed to the non-dualist logic such as the mystics of Sufi or the adherents of the Kejawen, and even to trigger the dualist logic users to develop their logic further. As the result, the sentential logic makes it possible to explain Jesus as the form of Manunggaling Kawula Gusti or Unio Mystica as on the one hand a human can be incorporated to the Divine and at the other hand still maintain the human substance that is different from the Master. This logic can be accepted by the non-dualist and the dualist at the same time. Abstrak Artikel ini menelusuri penggunaan konsep-konsep logika either-or yang populer di kalangan Kristen yang menimbulkan kesulitan dalam menjawab persoalan Kemanunggalan Kemanusian dan Keallahan Yesus. Akan dipaparkan penggunaan logika sentential sebagai salah satu pilihan karena, dalam logika ini termuat kemungkinan konsep betweenness/neitherness/ bothness yang tidak dikenal dalam logika biner Aristotelian, atau dalam logika Kantian-Hegel yang populer digunakan di kalangan umum. Konsep logika sentential akan berguna untuk menjembatani dialog dengan pendukung logika non-dualisme seperti kaum mistis Sufi dan penganut keyakinan Kejawen, dan memicu para pendukung mazhab dualism mengembangkan konsep logikanya. Sebagai hasil kajian, ditemukan, logika sentential memungkinkan adanya penjelasan bahwa Yesus adalah wujud Manunggaling Kawula Gusti sejati, ketika manusia dapat serempak disatukan dengan sang Khalik, namun pada saat yang sama tetap berbeda

Abstract: This paper proposes a notion of critique as a public metadiscourse that allows subjects to recognize , rearticulate and/or reconfigure the logics and rationalities that lead to social suffering. It analyses the way critique operates in a controversy triggered by Flemish nationalist politicians who claim that racism is [a] relative [concept]. The author proposes to analyse the associated debate by means of an in-terpretive and functional discourse analysis. This heuristic operationalizes the poststructuralist concept of articulation. The author identifies different types of critical discursive intervention (CDI) that delin-eate the boundaries of the racism-is-relative debate: hegemonic claims, ideological disqualifications, metalinguistic disqualifications, and concretization strategies. Such interventions haven been articulated by citizens, activists, academics, and politicians across a variety of mostly written media between 2013 and 2015. It is through the play of discursive interventions that social actors challenge and negotiate political boundaries for interpretation. The article demonstrates that most critiques on assertions of racism being [a] relative [concept] do not undermine the logics and rationalities informing racism is relative discourse. It also shows that discourse analysts need to differentiate between different modes of critique in order to examine the complex acts of rearticulation that take place in any debate.

Zusammenfassung: Der folgende Artikel plädiert für einen Kritikbegriff, der Kritik als öffentlichen Meta-Diskurs konzipiert, welches es Subjekten ermöglicht, all jene Logiken und Rationalitäten, die so-ziales Leiden verursachen, zu erkennen, zu re-artikulieren und zu re-konfigurieren. Veranschaulicht wird dies anhand einer Analyse der spezifischen Kritikformen bzw.-modi innerhalb der von flämisch-nationalistischen Politikern initiierten Debatte um die vermeintliche Relativität von Rassismus. Die Analyse dieser Debatte orientiert sich hierbei an einer interpretativen und funktionalen Konzeption der Diskursanalyse. Für diese Analyseheuristik ist eine Operationalisierung des poststrukturalistischen Ar-tikulationskonzepts zentral. Im Zuge der Untersuchung werden verschiedene Arten und Weisen der kritisch-diskursiven Intervention in diese Debatte identifiziert. Dadurch können gleichsam die Grenzen bzw. Grenzmarker der »Rassismus-ist-relativ-Debatte« skizziert werden: hegemoniale Ansprüche, ideo-logische und metalinguistische De-Legitimierungen sowie Konkretisierungsstrategien. Die identifizier-ten kritischen Interventionen wurden von einer Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Akteure (Bürger, Aktivisten, Wissenschaftler und Politiker) innerhalb verschiedenster Medienpublikationen, im Zeitraum zwischen 2013 und 2015, artikuliert. Die Grenzen politischer Interpretationsräume werden von sozialen Akteu-ren durch dieses Spiel diskursiver Interventionen verhandelt und herausgefordert. Der folgende Artikel veranschaulicht, dass die meisten Kritiken der Behauptung, Rassismus sei relativ, die diesem rassisti-schen Diskurs zugrundeliegenden Logiken und Artikulationsformen nicht radikal genug herausfordern bzw. untergraben. Auf theoretischer Ebene sollte er zudem DiskursforscherInnen für die Differenzie-rung spezifischer Kritikmodi sensibilisieren, da nur durch eine solche differenzierende Identifizierung die komplexen Artikulationsformen einer öffentlichen Debatte angemessen analysiert werden können.

Dans la première moitié du xixe siècle en Angleterre, autour de Charles babbage (1791–1871), John F. W. Herschel (1792–1871), George Peacock (1791–1858), Duncan F. Gregory (1813–1844), Augustus de Morgan (1806–1871), George Boole (1815–1864), et d'autres auteurs moins connus, un réseau d'algébristes renouvelle singulièrement la conception de l'algèbre, à tel point que leur travail est le plus souvent interprété comme émergence des travaux sur l'algèbre abstraite. Comme ces algébristes sont également des réformateurs impliqués dans la réorganisation de la science, il s'agira de proposer de ces travaux une lecture plus contextuelle, afin d'éclairer leur inscription parmi les effects de la Révolution industrielle (1760–1830), et d'analyser leur rôle de médiation culturelle entre les racines d'un savoir universitaire fondé sur la fidélité aux Anciens, et de nouvelles formes d'élaboration des connaissances. Une médiation marquée par un premier rapprochement entre algèbre et logique. In England, during the first half of the xixth century, a network organised around Charles Babbage (1791–1871), John F. W. Herschel (1792–1871), George Peacock (1791–1858), Duncan F. Gregory (1813–1844), Augustus de Morgan (1806–1871), George Boole (1815–1864), and other less known authors renewed the status of algebra in a peculiar way. As a result, their works are often considered to mark the birth of abstract algebra. But these algebraists were also involved, as reformers, in the new organisation of science. Taking this into account, I propose a more contextual reading of their works, which can then be understood as side-effects of the Industrial Revolution (1760–1830). These works are analysed as cultural mediators between the roots of University teaching, founded on fidelity to the Ancients on the one hand, and new forms of construction of knowledge on the other. Such a mediation brought together algebra and logic for the first time. Während der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts in England erneuert ein Netzwerk von Algebraikern um Charles Babbage (1791–1871), John F. W. Herschel (1792–1871), George Peacock (1791–1858), Duncan F. Gregory (1813–1844), Augustus de Morgan (1806–1871), George Boole (1815–1864), und andere weniger bekannte Autoren, auf außerordentliche Weise die Konzeption der Algebra so sehr, daß ihre Arbeiten meist als der Beginn der Arbeiten zur abstrakten Algebra interpretiert werden. Da diese Algebraiker gleichzeitig Reformatoren sind, die sich für die Reorganisation der Wissenschaft einsetzen, wäre es angebracht für diese Arbeiten eine kontextuellere Lektüre vorzuschlagen, um ihre Einbettung in die Auswirkungen der Industriellen Revolution (1760–1830) zu erläutern, und ihre Rolle in der kulturellen Vermittlung zwischen den Wurzeln eines universitären Wissens, das auf der Treue zu den Alten beruht, und den neuen Formen der Wissenserarbeitung zu analysieren. Diese Art der Vermittlung ist gekennzeichnet durch eine erste Annäherung von Algebra und Logik.

Fast alle Menschen reden dann und wann über Gott und die Welt. Aber wie ist eine reale Beziehung zwischen Gott und der Welt denkbar, wenn Gott im strengen Sinn unbegreiflich sein soll? Thomas von Aquin (1225-1274) und Peter Knauer (*1935) schlagen originelle Lösungen für dieses Problem vor. Beide greifen dabei auf die aristotelische Definition der Relation als „das worauf hin“ (τò πρός τι) zurück. Ich halte die Beschreibung des Gott-Welt-Verhältnisses in Knauers relationaler Ontologie für kohärenter, klarer und deshalb für pastoral hilfreicher als die thomanische, etwas ausfransende aber theologisch erstaunlich einflussreiche Darstellung.

Qui n’a jamais parlé sur le monde et le bon Dieu ? Or, comment est-il possible de penser une relation entre Dieu et le monde, si Dieu est absolument incompréhensible ? Saint Thomas d’Aquin (1225-1274) et Peter Knauer (*1935) proposent des pistes pour une réponse à cette question. J’estime plus cohérente et pastoralement utile la description de la relation entre Dieu et le monde dans l’ontologie relationnelle proposée de Knauer. Là où Thomas paraît avoir cédé au paradoxe d’une relation de raison entre Dieu et le monde qui, selon ses propres mots, n’est pas une relation réelle, Knauer va jusqu’au bout du problème logique pour proposer une approche théologique qui est sans pareil. 

Every now and then, soon or late in our lives, we might talk or think about God and the world. However, it is far from evident to claim a true relationship between God and the world if God is to be considered as beyond any kind of understanding. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and Peter Knauer (*1935) suggest different ways how to approach the problem. I argue that Knauer’s concept of a real relation between God and the world is more coherent and therefore more convincing than the one Aquinas proposes, even though he might not interpret Aquinas accordingly. Going logically straight to the very end of the problem, Knauer suggests a solution that revolutionizes theology.

Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) was a prominent German philosopher, intellectual historian, and one of the first modern, systematic theorists of cultural studies.  Although he sometimes addressed political and sociological topics, his influence on contemporary sociological theory is largely indirect.  Cassirer is mainly important to sociology because of the position that he occupied in the German intellectual field at a critical historical juncture, the way he addressed the research problems at hand, and the influence that he had on a subsequent generation of scholars who went on to create their own influential theoretical programs in the cultural and social sciences. Three of Cassirer’s ideas are particularly relevant to the concerns of sociologists — his distinction between substantialism and relationalism (as developed in his writings on science), his conceptualization of cultural analysis (as worked out under the framework of his various studies of cultural fields) and his approach to understanding institutional logics as discursive systems (as expressed in his efforts to construct a general philosophy of symbolic forms).

Message design logics are the principles that individuals use to generate and interpret messages. The key insight of the message design logics model is that there are three distinct sets of logics. The distinct logics are evident when a situation is complex enough that different people communicate in markedly different ways. The expressive design logic values the clear expression of a person’s thoughts and feelings. The conventional design logic conceptualizes communication as a game with fixed rules for successful communication. The rhetorical design logic views communication as a means by with the social situation and identities can be renegotiated. In general, the rhetorical design logic is the most sophisticated, the conventional design logic is moderate in sophistication, and the expressive design logic is the least sophisticated.

Zienkowski concludes that political awareness and engagement require reflexive rearticulations of one’s sense of self with a dynamic network of signifiers, identities, practices and institutions. It also implies the articulation of interpretive logics that challenge hegemonic discourse. Debates about equality, diversity and integration can be counted among the most emotionally challenging language games subjects may engage in. Political awareness often emerges in response to emotionally challenging feelings of misrecognition. Without a metapragmatic ability to articulate such experiences to political theories, explanations or narratives, subjects run the risk of getting ensnared in hegemonic logics that leave little room for reflexivity and critique. A heightened degree of metapragmatic and political awareness allows subjects to loosen—but not to lose—the interpretive and ideological hold of hegemony. If your library has access to Springer Link you can download this book chapter or the entire book using the link provided above.

The term "Information Thermodynamics" came in use as early as in 1979  and is being used, e.g., in Physical review E (to the author's complete surprise, for he was convinced about his own and autonomous authorship of this term for many years, roughly between 2001 and 2012.
The author made an attempt to unify systematically the typical branches, dealing with the (even broader) sense of the term "information" and also with this term itself.
His unification of Thermodynamics, Information Theory and the Theory of Computing and Logics together, by  the term "structure" and the term "information" just as the measure of the structure (structure - is the distribution of energy in space and time) and especially by the term "information transfer" (which is the measuring/observation of the structure as well as the communication by messages and also the recording of messages), is also called (by him) the Information Thermodynamics.
The information-thermodynamic approach seems to be of a great power in a variety of branches.

Rudolf Carnap interpretó la filosofía como un proceso de
análisis lógico, explicando pormenorizadamente las propiedades formales
del lenguaje y proporcionando una comprensión del lenguaje de la
ciencia. Mostramos aquí cómo, mediante la definición y relación de Lconceptos,
Carnap justifica la distinción entre verdad lógica y verdad
fáctica, fundamental en las discusiones del Círculo de Viena. En este
artículo, mostramos cómo la lógica solo tiene sentido como método de
formalización del lenguaje significativo y no como conocimiento de la
realidad.

How, why and what for we should combine logics is perfectly well explained in a number of works concerning this issue. But the interesting question seems to be the nature and the structure of the general universe of possible combinations of logical systems. Adopting the point of view of universal logic in the paper the categorical constructions are introduced which along with the coproducts underlying the fibring of logics describe the inner structure of the category of logical systems. It is shown that categorically the universe of universal logic turns out to be a topos and a paraconsistent complement topos.

Recent consumer research has examined contexts where market-based exchange, gift-giving,
sharing, and other modes of exchange occur simultaneously and obey several intersecting logics,
but has not conceptualized these so-called hybrid economic forms, nor explained how these
hybrids are shaped and sustained. Using ethnographic and netnographic data from the
collaborative network of geocaching, this study explains the emergence of hybrid economies.
Performativity theory is mobilized to demonstrate that the hybrid status of these economies is
constantly under threat of destabilization by the struggle between competing performativities of
market and non-market modes of exchange. Despite latent tension between competing
performativities, the hybrid economy is sustained through consumer-producer engagements in
collaborative consumption and production, the creation of zones of indeterminacy, and the
enactment of tournaments of value that dissipate controversies around hybrid transactions.
Implications are drawn for consumer research on the interplay between market and non-market
economies.

The dispute between rhetoric and philosophy is as old as the one between poetry and philosophy (cf. Plato, Phaedrus 266). The history of logic in particular has been one of interesting divisions of labor and struggles of power between rhetoric and logic. Yet, for most contemporary mainstream philosophers brought up on turn-of-the-century logic paradigms, this dispute has settled into a disinterest in logic’s sister art. Peirce’s semiotic, I think, encourages us to revisit this dispute and, in fact, suggests an interesting resolution, a  “new rhetoric,” that could have appeal to the traditional concerns of both logic and rhetoric. Although it is only developed programmatically, Peirce’s rhetoric concerns the practice of inquiry, and calls for an integration of rhetoric and logic on that basis, one which could possibly transform both disciplines in a fruitful way.

The fundamental link between logical and semantic inquiries is emphasized, and by relating some of Frege's ideas on the concepts of logic and truth with others of Davidson's on the Tarskian structure of interpretation, an attempt is made to clarify the Fregean point of view about the nature of the logical-semantic reflection.