Mary Midgley

A characteristic theme and focus of the work of Mary Midgley is her trenchant anti-scientism. Perhaps more than any other writer, she has devoted great energies to examining the historical development and contemporary effects of scientistic attitudes and doctrines – including the many ways that scientism has become entrenched within certain areas of both academic and popular debate about the scope and value of science. Such anti-scientism manifests, for instance, in Midgley’s criticisms of the imperialistic tendencies of those scientists who wish to provide Procrustean ‘theories of everything’, or in the salvific insistence that science can provide, by itself, a morally and spiritually satisfying basis for a good life, or in the complaint that the sensibilities and perspectives on human life offered by the arts and humanities ought to play little or no role in the sober, ‘objective’ study of human beings.
  These sorts of concerns are not just the preserve of dispassionate academic debate, for the issues they raise – such as our judgments about the cognitive and cultural authority of science in the modern world, and the best ways of facilitating deep and informed self-understanding of ourselves as sapient beings – are both practically decisive and, for some at least, of considerable moral and spiritual importance. Certainly Midgley is correct that too much of our modern thinking about science is corrupted by the predomination of crude conceptions of science promoted by scientistic writers. This Chapter, therefore, has three aims: (1) to provide a fairly systematic account of Midgley’s anti-scientism – identifying her particular concerns and arguments, (2) to locate these within the wider historical and contemporary context of anti-scientistic philosophy, and (3) to apply that account to identify some of the issues which we need to gain a clear understanding of if we are to use science in a responsible and informed manner.
  I conclude that at the core of Midgley’s critique of scientism is the important principle that to be scientistic is to do science an injustice: that, far from being ‘anti-science’, Midgley is trying to encourage us to embrace an properly informed and critically diligent attitude towards the sciences, one that will allow us to understand, use, and appreciate them for what they are, and not as they are depicted in the confused fantasies of scientistic writers.

I examine Bernard Williams’s forceful challenge that evolutionary science has done away with the sort of teleological worldview that is needed in order to make sense of an Aristotelian virtue ethic perspective. I also consider Rosalind Hurshouse’s response to Williams and argue that it is not sufficient. My main task is to show what is needed in order to meet Williams’s challenge. First, I argue that we need a deeper exploration of the first-personal evaluative standpoint from within our human form of life than we find in Hursthouse’s ethical naturalist perspective. In particular, we need to recognize the important role of “strong evaluation” for identifying what is noblest and best about us as human beings, which enables us to address the “mixed bag” problem of human nature. Second, I argue—contra John McDowell’s quietism—that in order to make sense of such a normative account of human nature we must overcome Williams’s tragic cosmic outlook according to which human life is seen as ultimately without meaning and purpose.

This paper offers a theologically-orientated examination of some core themes of the works of the philosopher Mary Midgley (1919-2018), identifying areas of possible theological exploration and development. Particular attention is paid to her critique of the reductionist strategies of writers such as Richard Dawkins, her development of the 'mapping' metaphor for engaging complex issues, and her emphasis on the critical role of philosophy. Although the paper offers some brief examples of theological issues which are illuminated by Midgley's philosophical approach (such as soteriological mapping), the primary purpose of the paper is to highlight the theological hospitality which it offers.

Extending ethical considerability to animals consistently takes the form of imperialism:  progressing outward from the core of human morality, it incorporates only those animals deemed relevantly similar to humans while rejecting or reforming those lifeforms which are not.  I develop an ethic of animal treatment premised on the species difference of undomesticated animals, which has the potential to reunite not only animal and environmental ethics, but environmental and interhuman ethics:  each species has evolutionarily specified patterns of behaviour for the proper treatment of members of its own species and members of other species, and vice versa.

Elizabeth Anscombe and Mary Midgley discussed Aristotle’s ethics as an alternative to modern moral philosophy. This idea is best known from Anscombe’s 1958 paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. The mainstream response has been to design a normative theory of ‘virtue ethics’ to rival deontology and consequentialism. This essay argues that that response is inadequate; it misses Anscombe’s point and obscures various aspects of Aristotle’s ethics, in particular his emphasis on friendship and human interconnectedness. This element of Aristotelianism was favoured by Midgley. By returning to Midgley, with the support of Aristotle, it is possible to find an alternative modern Aristotelianism in ethics.

For: On Transversality - Research in Practice and Research Day One: Water https://ontransversality.wordpress.com/ Deep mapping is a folding of site specific representations in which epistemic and ontological dynamics of power interweave. As a process, it does not strive to either please or attain authority, making no claim on definitive opinion (Kavanagh, 2018). Rather, its diverse performativity connects into tentacular structures within which a conversation, or conversations, can flourish between multiple perspectives, creating a string figured (SF) enquiry (see Haraway, 2016). Fluid, fragile, flexible, deep mapping morphs and absorbs both traditional and unconventional inputs, provoking new insights through the ambient manifold of transversality; as a by-product rather than as an intentional aim. In this way, the inherent hybrid liminality facilitates poly-dimensional signification in accordance with Karen Barad's concept of intra-acting agencies (Barad 1999; 2003; 2007). This also tallies with what the moral philosopher Mary Midgley considered to be a pragmatic application of reason: "Much of the time, we are exploring unknown or partially known matters, and we use whatever forms of thought turn out to be needed for them" (2004:26). This 'many maps, many windows' approach is posited by Midgley as a response to Descartian reductionism in which (a misunderstood singularity of) science is hailed above all other disciplines. She countered this by arguing for a pluralistic reflexivity, maintaining that "all perception takes in only a fraction of what is given to it" (ibid) and therefore we should embrace our partiality, without self-limiting from the offset. This short presentation summarises these points, whilst emphasising how deep mapping as praxis can decentralise knowledge in such a way as to widen a research's audience, as well as to empower neuro-divergent and interdisciplinary thinking. Examples are offered via concrete poetry, where intersectionality is the raison d'etre of form, and also through a short film called 'Layers in the Landscape' (2016) (to be viewed separately).

Mary Midgley (1919-2018) è stata una pensatrice inglese di riferimento per i suoi studi di filosofia morale e di critica all'imperialismo accademico, ed è nota per la sua accesa e duratura diatriba con Richard Dawkins e il suo riduzionismo scientifico. Venuta tristemente a mancare lo scorso ottobre, sarà ricordata sicura-mente per il suo pensiero e per il suo stile tagliente, ma anche per essere stata una figura davvero "a tutto tondo", capace di imporsi al di fuori della torre d'avorio del mondo accademico. Non è un caso, infatti, se si guadagnò il soprannome di «flagello della scienza come religione» e se fu descritta nel 2001 dal «The Guardian» come «la più terribile filosofa del Paese, quella dinanzi a cui risulta essere meno piacevole sembrare stupidi». What is Philosophy for? è l'ultima opera di un repertorio importante e, aven-do visto le stampe un mese prima della sua scomparsa, può considerarsi a tutti gli effetti il suo testamento filosofico.

For: On Transversality - Research in Practice and Research
Day One: Water
https://ontransversality.wordpress.com/


Deep mapping is a folding of site specific representations in which epistemic and ontological dynamics of power interweave. As a process, it does not strive to either please or attain authority, making no claim on definitive opinion (Kavanagh, 2018). Rather, its diverse performativity connects into tentacular structures within which a conversation, or conversations, can flourish between multiple perspectives, creating a string figured (SF) enquiry (see Haraway, 2016). Fluid, fragile, flexible, deep mapping morphs and absorbs both traditional and unconventional inputs, provoking new insights through the ambient manifold of transversality; as a by-product rather than as an intentional aim. In this way, the inherent hybrid liminality facilitates poly-dimensional signification in accordance with Karen Barad's concept of intra-acting agencies (Barad 1999; 2003; 2007).

This also tallies with what the moral philosopher Mary Midgley considered to be a pragmatic application of reason: "Much of the time, we are exploring unknown or partially known matters, and we use whatever forms of thought turn out to be needed for them" (2004:26). This 'many maps, many windows' approach is posited by Midgley as a response to Descartian reductionism in which (a misunderstood singularity of) science is hailed above all other disciplines. She countered this by arguing for a pluralistic reflexivity, maintaining that "all perception takes in only a fraction of what is given to it" (ibid) and therefore we should embrace our partiality, without self-limiting from the offset.

This short presentation summarises these points, whilst emphasising how deep mapping as praxis can decentralise knowledge in such a way as to widen a research's audience, as well as to empower neuro-divergent and interdisciplinary thinking. Examples are offered via concrete poetry, where intersectionality is the raison d'etre of form, and also through a short film called 'Layers in the Landscape' (2016) (to be viewed separately).