Mary Midgley

While being rooted in the academic discourse, The Things That Really Matter comprehensively explores the most fundamental aspects of human life in an accessible, non-technical language, adding fresh perspectives and new arguments and considerations that are designed to stimulate further debate and, in some cases, a deliberate redirection of research interests in the respective areas. It features a series of conversations about the things in our life that we all, in one way or another, wrestle with if we are at all concerned about what kind of world we live in and what our role in it is: things like birth, age, and death, good and evil, the meaning of life, the nature of the self and the role the body plays for our identity, our gendered existence, love and faith, free will, beauty, and our experience of the sacred. Situating abstract ideas in concrete experience, The Things That Really Matter encourages the reader to participate in an open-ended dialogue involving a variety of think...

According to Mary Midgley, philosophy is like plumbing: like the invisible entrails of an elaborate plumbing system, philosophical ideas respond to basic needs that are fundamental to human life. Melioristic projects in philosophy attempt to fix or reroute this plumbing. An obstacle to melioristic projects is that the sheer familiarity of the underlying philosophical ideas renders the plumbing invisible. Philosophical genealogies aim to overcome this by looking at the origins of our current concepts. We discuss philosophical concepts developed in Indigenous cultures as a source of inspiration for melioristic genealogy. Examining the philosophical concepts of these communities is useful because it gives us a better idea of the range of ethical, political, and metaphysical approaches that exist in the world. Members of western societies do not get a clear view of this range, in part because living in large groups presents its own constraints and challenges, which limit
philosophical options. We argue that features of Indigenous philosophies, such as egalitarianism and care for one's natural environment, are not inevitable byproducts of Native material conditions and lifestyles, but that they are deliberate forms of conceptual engineering. We propose that comparative philosophy is an integral part of the genealogical project.

While being rooted in the academic discourse, The Things That Really Matter comprehensively explores the most fundamental aspects of human life in an accessible, non-technical language, adding fresh perspectives and new arguments and considerations that are designed to stimulate further debate and, in some cases, a deliberate redirection of research interests in the respective areas. It features a series of conversations about the things in our life that we all, in one way or another, wrestle with if we are at all concerned about what kind of world we live in and what our role in it is: things like birth, age, and death, good and evil, the meaning of life, the nature of the self and the role the body plays for our identity, our gendered existence, love and faith, free will, beauty, and our experience of the sacred. Situating abstract ideas in concrete experience, The Things That Really Matter encourages the reader to participate in an open-ended dialogue involving a variety of think...

The main subject of this paper is the two significant problems of environmental ethics which are ecofascism and speciesism. This scrutiny offers an evaluative perspective on the main problems of environmental ethics and is conducted with this aim.
Most of the environmental philosophers, all the difficulties notwithstanding, try to find a middle way in the ecofascism-speciesism continuum and their theories get closer to one or the other edge of this continuum. John Baird Callicott is one of the environmental philosophers who struggle with this issue when his theory indicates one of the problems or gets closer to one of the edges, he tries to find a new way to go. There are six turns in Callicott's philosophy starting with strong holism due to accepting Leopold's land ethic as a basis. Then, he constructed a theory that pushes him closer to the speciesist edge, and finally, he found a way out from these fatal consequences.
However, all the environmental philosophers face the same problems in their journey although they are either holists or individualists in the end. In constructing a holistic environmental ethical theory, for instance, they may be in ecofascism difficulty because holism requires man to be an ordinary member of the biotic community as seen in the first turn. Or, establishing a special place for humankind to ditch the ecofascism crisis may cause another equally important crisis, namely, speciesism (see the third turn). Some philosophers prefer to be closer to one of the edges always being on guard against the other. Some others, like Callicott, try to find a middle way equally far from the edges. However, this choice is no easier. Selecting to be a member of both the human community and biotic community brings different problems, such as ranking problems between the duties and obligations toward the communities and their members, i.e. a challenge to decision-making processes. For such problems, they come up with some principles or rules like second-order principles (SOPs) as Callicott did (in the fifth turn). But, these rules or principles are not sufficient enough to solve the ranking problems of setting priorities among our duties to members of both communities, either. Thus, either there is a need for more regulations and rules, or these two communities should be separated in a different dimension and gathered at another level. The second choice is preferred by Callicott and used as a solution to the main problem: constructing an environmental ethical theory that involves whole nature with its members and which is free from two essential problems (see the sixth turn).
As a final point, Callicott's last theory seems to point to the conclusion that an environmental ethical theory is possible without falling into the ecofascism and speciesism traps, i.e. his last stand can facilitate the attainment of the main subject of this essay.

In the last chapter of author Mary Midgley's book, she makes the following judgment of
value "It would be a great pity if we repeated the same mistake with that gift authentically
extraordinary is our ability to make moral judgments.
This telling a story of a person who never opened his mail, and for that reason
missed at the very least, meeting a very important gift from Johann Sebastian Bach.
What I take from that analogy is that our ability to make moral judgments is
as a very valuable gift that we have, and that if we do not open (in the sense of using that
ability to make moral judgments), we may be missing something very
special that only the human has.
In this investigation, after making an analysis in each quote of the author, I will try to
answers the question Why would it be such a shame if we repeated the same mistake with
that truly extraordinary gift that is our ability to make judgments
morals?

This paper offers a theologically‐orientated examination of some core themes of the works of the philosopher Mary Midgley (1919–2018), identifying areas of possible theological exploration and development. Particular attention is paid to her critique of the reductionist strategies of writers such as Richard Dawkins, her development of the ‘mapping’ metaphor for engaging complex issues, and her emphasis on the critical role of philosophy. Although the paper offers some brief examples of theological issues which are illuminated by Midgley’s philosophical approach (such as soteriological mapping), the primary purpose of the paper is to highlight the theological hospitality that it offers

The Women are Up to Something is a book title lifted from a remark made by a male philosopher who anticipated trouble from one of the women philosophers at Oxford. The occasion at which the trouble was feared was Oxford University's conferring of an honorary degree on then U.S. President Harry S. Truman. What's told in this recent book by Benjamin Lipscomb is the story of Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch, four women who had a pioneering impact on the English-speaking philosophical world. Never mind what was troubling Elizabeth Anscombe about Truman, the honoree at Oxford that year. To my ears, the book's title applies more widely to an intellectual universe that was-by definition, by all the habits of speech, by all the instruments that measured social reality-masculine. Thought was masculine. Feeling was feminine. That was the world in which Anscombe, Foot, Midgley, and Murdoch came to womanhood.

Guy Kahane holds that theism has unattractive consequences, since it threatens both privacy and autonomy. Here, I suggest that Kahane's position echoes that of Dostoevsky's famous Underground Man. But the Underground Man is ensnared in difficulties that resemble the problem of absurdity as developed by Thomas Nagel. Dostoevsky's own solution to that problem involves love-but love naturally invites compromises with respect to privacy and autonomy. Perhaps the best way to solve the problem of absurdity is to make precisely the opposite of Kahane's axiological judgment-which would recommend pro-theism over antitheism.

CRUELTY AND CALLOUSNESS IN VIRTUE ETHICS: WHY THE VIRTUOUS AGENT ACTS WELL TOWARDS ANIMALS Michael Furac Advisor: University of Guelph, 2019 John Hacker-Wright The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question: “Do the virtues prevent the virtuous agent from acting badly towards animals?” I conclude that an agent who is truly virtuous will not act viciously towards animals due to the agent’s virtue. In chapter one I show that a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic does not have any aspect internal to the theory that would prevent care or concern for animals. In chapter two I defend the theory from outside critiques, each of which challenges the viability of virtue ethics as an approach to animal ethics. Finally, chapter three is a study of two vices: cruelty and callousness. I define both vices and show why each is necessary for discussing virtue and animal ethics.

Perhaps the most familiar understanding of “naturalism” derives from Quine, understand- ing it as a continuity of empirical theories of the world as described through the scientific method. So, it might be surprising that one of the most important naturalistic moral realists, Philippa Foot, rejects standard evolutionary biology in her justly lauded Natural Goodness. One of her main reasons for this is the true claim that humans can flourish (eudaimonia) without reproducing, which she claims cannot be squared with evolutionary theory and biology more generally. The present argument concludes that Foot was wrong to reject evolutionary theory as the empirical foundation of natural- ized eudaimonist moral realism. This is based on contemporary discussion of biological function and evolutionary fitness, from which a definition of “eudaimonia” is constructed. This gives eudaimonist moral realism an empirically respectable foundation.

This paper offers a theologically-orientated examination of some core themes of the works of the philosopher Mary Midgley (1919-2018), identifying areas of possible theological exploration and development. Particular attention is paid to her critique of the reductionist strategies of writers such as Richard Dawkins, her development of the 'mapping' metaphor for engaging complex issues, and her emphasis on the critical role of philosophy. Although the paper offers some brief examples of theological issues which are illuminated by Midgley's philosophical approach (such as soteriological mapping), the primary purpose of the paper is to highlight the theological hospitality which it offers.

For: On Transversality - Research in Practice and Research
Day One: Water
https://ontransversality.wordpress.com/


Deep mapping is a folding of site specific representations in which epistemic and ontological dynamics of power interweave. As a process, it does not strive to either please or attain authority, making no claim on definitive opinion (Kavanagh, 2018). Rather, its diverse performativity connects into tentacular structures within which a conversation, or conversations, can flourish between multiple perspectives, creating a string figured (SF) enquiry (see Haraway, 2016). Fluid, fragile, flexible, deep mapping morphs and absorbs both traditional and unconventional inputs, provoking new insights through the ambient manifold of transversality; as a by-product rather than as an intentional aim. In this way, the inherent hybrid liminality facilitates poly-dimensional signification in accordance with Karen Barad's concept of intra-acting agencies (Barad 1999; 2003; 2007).

This also tallies with what the moral philosopher Mary Midgley considered to be a pragmatic application of reason: "Much of the time, we are exploring unknown or partially known matters, and we use whatever forms of thought turn out to be needed for them" (2004:26). This 'many maps, many windows' approach is posited by Midgley as a response to Descartian reductionism in which (a misunderstood singularity of) science is hailed above all other disciplines. She countered this by arguing for a pluralistic reflexivity, maintaining that "all perception takes in only a fraction of what is given to it" (ibid) and therefore we should embrace our partiality, without self-limiting from the offset.

This short presentation summarises these points, whilst emphasising how deep mapping as praxis can decentralise knowledge in such a way as to widen a research's audience, as well as to empower neuro-divergent and interdisciplinary thinking. Examples are offered via concrete poetry, where intersectionality is the raison d'etre of form, and also through a short film called 'Layers in the Landscape' (2016) (to be viewed separately).

Elizabeth Anscombe and Mary Midgley discussed Aristotle’s ethics as an alternative to modern moral philosophy. This idea is best known from Anscombe’s 1958 paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. The mainstream response has been to design a normative theory of ‘virtue ethics’ to rival deontology and consequentialism. This essay argues that that response is inadequate; it misses Anscombe’s point and obscures various aspects of Aristotle’s ethics, in particular his emphasis on friendship and human interconnectedness. This element of Aristotelianism was favoured by Midgley. By returning to Midgley, with the support of Aristotle, it is possible to find an alternative modern Aristotelianism in ethics.

A brief reflection on what - based on her ideas about beastliness, human nature, and community - Midgley might have said about the current epidemic, the responsibility of politicians, and other topics of public importance.

https://www.notesfromabiscuittin.com/project/tokyo/

Mary Midgley (1919-2018) è stata una pensatrice inglese di riferimento per i suoi studi di filosofia morale e di critica all'imperialismo accademico, ed è nota per la sua accesa e duratura diatriba con Richard Dawkins e il suo riduzionismo scientifico. Venuta tristemente a mancare lo scorso ottobre, sarà ricordata sicura-mente per il suo pensiero e per il suo stile tagliente, ma anche per essere stata una figura davvero "a tutto tondo", capace di imporsi al di fuori della torre d'avorio del mondo accademico. Non è un caso, infatti, se si guadagnò il soprannome di «flagello della scienza come religione» e se fu descritta nel 2001 dal «The Guardian» come «la più terribile filosofa del Paese, quella dinanzi a cui risulta essere meno piacevole sembrare stupidi». What is Philosophy for? è l'ultima opera di un repertorio importante e, aven-do visto le stampe un mese prima della sua scomparsa, può considerarsi a tutti gli effetti il suo testamento filosofico.

This paper explores the intersection of animal and environmental ethics through the thought of Mary Midgley. Midgley’s work offers a shift away from liberal individualist animal ethics toward a relational value system involving interdependence, care, sympathy, and other components of morality that were often overlooked or marginalized in hyperrationalist ethics, though which are now more widely recognized. This is most exemplified in her concept of “the mixed community,” which gained special attention in J. Baird Callicott’s effort to create a “unified environmental ethics.” In this, Callicott saw the potential in Midgley’s thought for bringing animal and environmental ethics “back together again.” However, this paper argues that he oversimplified and misapplied her complex concept. This is primarily due to his attempt to harmonize her approach with a rigid dichotomy between domestic and wild animals—as well as one between individuals and collectives—in his conception of the land ethic in the tradition of Aldo Leopold. Throughout, this paper also highlights Midgley’s value as an early contributor to the convergence of animal and environmental ethics.

A characteristic theme and focus of the work of Mary Midgley is her trenchant anti-scientism. Perhaps more than any other writer, she has devoted great energies to examining the historical development and contemporary effects of scientistic attitudes and doctrines – including the many ways that scientism has become entrenched within certain areas of both academic and popular debate about the scope and value of science. Such anti-scientism manifests, for instance, in Midgley’s criticisms of the imperialistic tendencies of those scientists who wish to provide Procrustean ‘theories of everything’, or in the salvific insistence that science can provide, by itself, a morally and spiritually satisfying basis for a good life, or in the complaint that the sensibilities and perspectives on human life offered by the arts and humanities ought to play little or no role in the sober, ‘objective’ study of human beings.
  These sorts of concerns are not just the preserve of dispassionate academic debate, for the issues they raise – such as our judgments about the cognitive and cultural authority of science in the modern world, and the best ways of facilitating deep and informed self-understanding of ourselves as sapient beings – are both practically decisive and, for some at least, of considerable moral and spiritual importance. Certainly Midgley is correct that too much of our modern thinking about science is corrupted by the predomination of crude conceptions of science promoted by scientistic writers. This Chapter, therefore, has three aims: (1) to provide a fairly systematic account of Midgley’s anti-scientism – identifying her particular concerns and arguments, (2) to locate these within the wider historical and contemporary context of anti-scientistic philosophy, and (3) to apply that account to identify some of the issues which we need to gain a clear understanding of if we are to use science in a responsible and informed manner.
  I conclude that at the core of Midgley’s critique of scientism is the important principle that to be scientistic is to do science an injustice: that, far from being ‘anti-science’, Midgley is trying to encourage us to embrace an properly informed and critically diligent attitude towards the sciences, one that will allow us to understand, use, and appreciate them for what they are, and not as they are depicted in the confused fantasies of scientistic writers.

I examine Bernard Williams’s forceful challenge that evolutionary science has done away with the sort of teleological worldview that is needed in order to make sense of an Aristotelian virtue ethic perspective. I also consider Rosalind Hurshouse’s response to Williams and argue that it is not sufficient. My main task is to show what is needed in order to meet Williams’s challenge. First, I argue that we need a deeper exploration of the first-personal evaluative standpoint from within our human form of life than we find in Hursthouse’s ethical naturalist perspective. In particular, we need to recognize the important role of “strong evaluation” for identifying what is noblest and best about us as human beings, which enables us to address the “mixed bag” problem of human nature. Second, I argue—contra John McDowell’s quietism—that in order to make sense of such a normative account of human nature we must overcome Williams’s tragic cosmic outlook according to which human life is seen as ultimately without meaning and purpose.

Most people agree that science is a good thing, and that scientism, by contrast, is a bad thing. But justifying those sentiments is hard work owing to the complexities and uncertainties surrounding those two terms. But two things are clear. The first is that whatever science is – and that is a large and on-going debate – it does not need scientism to merit our admiration and appreciation. The second is that, given the poor state of public understanding of science, society does not need scientism either, especially when there are real enemies of science - like climate change deniers - to tackle as a matter of urgency. Science is great stuff without overheated rhetoric and aggrandising myths and inflated hopes and fancies - so let's do away with scientism.

Extending ethical considerability to animals consistently takes the form of imperialism:  progressing outward from the core of human morality, it incorporates only those animals deemed relevantly similar to humans while rejecting or reforming those lifeforms which are not.  I develop an ethic of animal treatment premised on the species difference of undomesticated animals, which has the potential to reunite not only animal and environmental ethics, but environmental and interhuman ethics:  each species has evolutionarily specified patterns of behaviour for the proper treatment of members of its own species and members of other species, and vice versa.

This paper defends the claim that questions about the epistemic value of the sciences cannot be detached from wider ethical questions about ‘the good life’ for human beings. Science cannot be conceived as valuable solely or primarily because of its capacity to provide Truths about the world. The reason is that Truth can only appear as a valuable and meaningful in relation to a wider conception of the Good. Identifying and articulating the conception of the Good which animates the modern sciences is therefore a neglected project for the philosophy of science.