Mass Murderers

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

Study 1: 630 spree-shooters [1936-2021] (1,650 deaths; 3,123 injuries; 194 suicides [31%]), 623 controls logistic regression differences (F= 260.44, df=10/1242, R=.82, R2 =.68, p<.01): (1) homicidal ideation; (2) planning-preparation; (3) stressful-life-event; (4) revenge-motive; (5) acquired-multiple-weapons; (6) elicited-concern; (7) school-location; (8) personal-grievance; (9) suicide; (10) current-student. Study 2: 15 spree-shooters differences, adult, teen: [SP] violence (F=17.48, 123.09); [MMPI-2/A] infrequency (F=92.15, 17.22); lie (F=13.13, 33.91); depression (F=37.76, 26.18); psychopathic-deviance (F=44.66, 57.45); paranoia (F=50.58, 23.92); schizophrenia (F=53.85, 21.69); alcohol (F=42.01, 16.84); addiction (F=57.34, 38.88) compared with 23 homicidal, 36 controls. Spree-shooter loss (1936-2021) = [$2,416,042,490 (630 @ $3,834,988.08) + $6,327,730,332 (1,650 @ $3,834,988.08) + $105,474,702.96 (3,123 @ $33,773.52) = $8,849,247,525.36] + [insurance, tax-increases $11,504,021,782.97 ($8,849,247,525.36 x 1.3] =$20,353,269,308.33. Projecting 2021 to 2105 insurance industry with no computer tests, machine learning equations, $40,706,538,616.66, 3,330 deaths, 6,246 injuries, 388 suicides. Projecting 2017 U.S. Church pedophilia loss (2012-2037, 2038-2056, 2057-2082, 2083-2107), $5,719,865,400 x 5 = $28,599,327,000, 5,679 x 5 = 28,395 victims,

Research Summary: In this article, I provide a qualitative analysis of ten perpetrators of mass violence, including five school shooters and five attackers in nonschool settings (a random public shooting, a familicide, and three attacks by White supremacist homegrown violent extremists). The killers are discussed in terms of body-related issues, three psychological categories (psychopathic, psychotic, and traumatized), and social failures. I describe how the attackers sought to overcome their perceived inadequacy, framed as damaged masculinity, through acts of violence.

1. Hitler seeks to be interviewed by a relatively uneducated non-German in his final days in the Bunker 1945. Reason: he does not trust any German to pass on his Final Testament.

2. The Americans agree on the condition all questions can and will be asked. Hitler agrees.

3. Washington DC chooses a 20-year-old Kansas farm girl, Dorothy, a German immigrant. Meanwhile, the naive, gullible Dorothy wants to leave her rural home and be famous and agrees to this mission, which she heartily believes is the right path to follow her dreams of Hollywood fame and glory.

4. Dorothy arrives in Europe and is escorted to the Bunker by German officers. There she meets the Bunkers' inhabitants and begins interviewing the Fuehrer.

5. Since Hitler cannot give her all his time, she mingles with others, conversing with every one of his followers, including Eva Braun, Magdalena Goebbels, Goering, Ribbentrop, Speer, Fegelein, Keitel, Goebbels, Rochus Misch, Himmler, Guderian, et al.

6. At other times, she gets out of the Bunker, and there she speaks to some of Hitler's opponents and victims, such as Sophie Scholl, Chaim Mordechai Rumkowski, and more.

Inevitably Dorothy matures during those final weeks in Berlin, and she is haunted by words such as – ‘Did I ever understand Hitler?’ ‘Is he mentally sick or evil?’ ‘But if Hitler mentally sick and/or evil, what about most ordinary Germans who ardently followed him? Are all of them mentally sick and/or evil?’ ‘What is Good and Evil?’, ‘What is the meaning of Life?’

Stressing that the pronoun "I" picks out one and only one person in the world (i.e., me), I argue against Hunt (and other like-minded Rand commentators) that the supposed "hard case" of destructive people who do not care for their own lives poses no special difficulty for rational egoism. I conclude that the proper response to a terse objection like "What about suicide bombers?" is the equally terse assertion "But I don't want to get blown up."

This exploratory study examines the act of mass murder as an attempt by the perpetrators to lay claim to a hegemonic masculine identity that has been damaged or denied them, yet that they feel entitled to as males in American culture. Biographical information was gathered for 28 men who have committed mass murder in the United States since 1970 and examined for evidence of stressors to the perpetrators’ masculine identities. The majority of the sample demonstrated financial (71%), social (61%), romantic (25%), and psychological stressors (32%) and other stressors (18%) that indicated a failure to attain the hegemonic masculine ideal in American culture. There were co-occurring stressors such as financial-social, financial-psychological and social-psychological. These stressors suggest that the motivations for mass murders are numerous and complex. There is no psychological profile unique to mass murderers and many authors have speculated on their motivations. However, in this study, the range of interrelated stressors experienced by the majority of mass murderers threatened their hegemonic masculine identity and these men engaged in violence to protect their identity.

A l'occasion du séminaire de l'Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent intitulé Les camps nazis (textes, images, représentations), nous avons pu constater que les images de la libération des camps ont provoqué une rupture décisive dans le regard sur l'actualité : le discours médiatique y est parvenu d'un coup à l'âge adulte. En particulier, il est apparu que le génocide des juifs européens exécuté par les nazis n'a pas été mis en évidence par ces commentaires, pour différentes raisons : absence d'image concrète des installations de gazage à un moment où photos et films font d'un coup figure de pièces à conviction médiatiques ; fiabilité toute relative des informations en provenance de la zone d'influence soviétique, où l'extermination avait eu lieu ; sentiment de culpabilité des forces alliées qui n'ont pas tenté d'entraver le déroulement du génocide ; volonté d'amalgamer le crime antisémite à l'ensemble des crimes fascistes, pour faire oublier l'inaction malveillante qui l'a rendu possible, sur le plan migratoire en particulier... Il a fallu attendre la fin des années soixante-dix pour que le judéocide vienne occuper le devant de la scène historiographique, sous l'action conjuguée de diverses pressions identitaires. Tout se passe comme si les actualités de 1945 avaient à propos du crime nazi pratiqué une destruction du sujet lui-même. Et paradoxalement, nous faisons souvent commencer notre réflexion sur la représentation cinématographique du génocide juif par ces films d'actualité tournés par les armées de libération soviétiques, américaines et britanniques : des documents qui pourtant n'en rendent aucun compte. Interrogeons-nous maintenant sur la visibilité de l'extermination des juifs dans le cinéma contemporain du crime, entre 1942 et 1945. Un rapide coup d'oeil sur le film romanesque (de propagande directe ou indirecte) des principales cinématographies alliées révèle que seuls les films hollywoodiens évoquent le problème du judéocide au moment de son déroulement. Il convient toutefois de bien distinguer la représentation de l'extermination, que nous allons étudier, de celle de l'antisémitisme nazi : ce dernier motif est présent dans de nombreux films antinazis dès 1940, de façon implicite (The Mortal Storm de Frank Borzage) ou explicite (The great Dictator de Charlie Chaplin). En revanche, l'idée de la destruction massive du peuple juif en Europe ne peut apparaître qu'accidentellement au cinéma dans la mesure où elle ne fait partie du discours cinématographique sur le national-socialisme qu'à partir de l'ouverture des camps. Les représentations dont nous allons parler sont donc des exceptions historiographiques, des anomalies qui surgissent à contre-saison, dans le récit ordinairement calibré du film hollywoodien.

This article examines the media coverage of the case of the “Maníaco do Parque,” the most notorious serial killer in Brazil. It aims to show how this phenomenon cannot be placed in the realms of fantasy or grotesque; on the contrary, it is as much a part of our society as evil, despite our major efforts to suppress it. This work draws parallels between Francisco de Assis Pereira’s story with the pure and raw evil which can be represented by Serial Killers, and our search for extreme violence — which is only shown when we let go of the “spring” that holds our evil inside. It is our goal to discuss a new concept of violence and subjective issues that permeate this particular case — seriation — and to compare it to the fascination that ritualized violence provokes. News stories published by “Folha de S. Paulo” and excerpts of a segment aired on “Fantástico”, Globo TV’s Sunday show, are the qualitative sources used to study the “Maniac”, in which we analyze the language they use, their content, and the spectacularized treatment — somewhat naïve and irresponsible — they give to Serial Killers crimes.

Every year in Europe around 1,150 people are shot dead with firearms. These deaths occur in various contexts, including the relational and criminal spheres. The little available research into the weapons used during these fatal crimes suggests that different types of firearms are used in different contexts. In this report we focus on the weapons that were used for one specific form of deadly firearms incidents, namely “public mass shootings”. These are shooting incidents in the (semi-)public space in which the perpetrator(s) use one or more firearms and during which several
people are killed and injured. Under this umbrella term we find numerous types of shooting incidents, ranging from school shootings in which a frustrated pupil murders a number of classmates and/or teachers to terrorist attacks in which groups of perpetrators attempt to spread terror in coordinated attacks. A look at recent mass shootings shows that significant differences can be observed in terms of, for example, the locations where these shootings were carried out,
the number of perpetrators, the motives of the perpetrator(s), the selection of the victims and the firearms used. This report analyses one specific aspect of such shooting incidents, namely the firearms that were used.

Previous studies have demonstrated that public mass shootings are a global phenomenon, but a significant share of such shootings occur in the United States. Recent research comparing public mass shooting rates across 171 countries indicates that 31% of the global public mass shootings between 1966 and 2012 occurred in the United States. Such shootings are not very common in Europe, and mass shootings figures generally represent a limited proportion of the total homicide figures and deaths from firearms in any given country. However, the impact of these deadly shooting incidents is usually considerable. Whereas incidents of criminal score settling generally occur at a distance from everyday life (that is, within the criminal underworld), the violence of these mass shootings in the (semi-)public space occurs extremely close to home. It is also the effect of such incidents on the broad public that leads to societal debate on the role of firearms in society, and consequently these incidents are an important for changes to be made to legislative
frameworks or firearms policies. For example, we can observe that deadly shootings in the public sphere of several European countries have already led to amendments to the national legislative framework dealing with firearms or the development of new policy initiatives in this regard: we only have to consider the new legislation adopted in the immediate aftermath of deadly shooting incidents in, for example, the United Kingdom in 1996 (Dunblane), Belgium in 2006 (Antwerp) and Germany in 2009 (Winnenden). The European Union (EU) has also explicitly referred to such deadly shootings in recent years to motivate new policy initiatives. Moreover, the series of terror attacks
in Europe in which terrorists used firearms have recently led to sharply increased attention being
focused on this problem. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris
in November 2015 the European Commission proposed new measures to amend the EU’s
legislative framework around firearms possession to harmonize it further and significantly
strengthen it.

A lack of basic information and thorough analyses of the European firearms issue is a considerable
stumbling block in the development of effective firearms legislation and policy. The bulk of the
research into the relationship between firearms and violence relates to the situation in the United
States.5 This is also the case for research into public mass shootings: the United States has a long
tradition of researching these violent incidents. In Europe, however, significantly less research has
historically been available on the weapons used in mass shootings. For example, very few studies provide an in-depth examination of the types of firearms used in these deadly shootings, the legal status of these weapons and the ways in which the perpetrators got hold of them. Yet these are important focal points in the societal debate surrounding the role of firearms in general in European society, and the various aspects of firearms legislation and policy in particular. A more
substantial understanding of the problem is crucial, with the aim of developing legislation and policy to prevent these tragic shooting incidents as much as possible.

The aim of this report, therefore, through an analysis of the weapons used in public mass shootings in Europe, is to stimulate the societal and policy-oriented debate around violent shooting incidents in Europe. Specifically, we have approached this issue by analysing the firearms used in a selection of eight recent public mass shootings in Europe. After a brief explanation in the first chapter of the methodological framework used, we analyse the selected shooting incidents in the second chapter. Each case study begins with a concise description of the shooting incident itself, followed by an analysis of which types of firearms were used, and especially how the perpetrator(s) was/were able to obtain these weapons. In the final chapter we will analyse and discuss the findings from the case studies. Using this qualitative approach, we intend to go in search of the stories behind the statistics. By analysing in detail the ways in which the perpetrators of these shooting incidents acquired their firearms we intend to draw lessons for current and future European initiatives to
improve firearms legislation and policy. To this end we should emphasize that, as a result of the observed gaps in European research into weapons use in public mass shootings, this report is intended as an exploratory analysis that, it is hoped, will foster the current European debate around firearms legislation and policy, lead to more research into this issue, and ultimately result in concrete steps being taken to deal with the issues that the report raises.

Contagion and copycat behavior among mass killers is often discussed in the media when there are multiple attacks within a short span of time. Proximity in time, however, does not necessarily mean that one attack inspired another. This study examines the most straightforward cases of role-modeling and fame-seeking among mass killers, in which the perpetrators personally acknowledged these types of influence and motivation in their own lives. Instead of simply categorizing potential copycat offenders in a "yes"/"no" binary fashion, it outlines many different types of influence, imitation, and inspiration and then provides evidence on perpetrators who represent examples of each type. Overall, findings suggest that most killers were not gaining insights into attack methodology from their role models, but rather were drawn to the prior perpetrators for a variety of personal reasons. Looking ahead, because of the frequency of mass killers citing previous perpetrators as role models or sources of inspiration , it is critical that media outlets give careful consideration to how they cover such incidents.

This book reframes the study of multicide (that is, serial and mass murder) to use objective measures, and aims to expand our understanding of multicide offending through descriptive and inferential statistical analyses of different homicide patterns of the offenders. Criminal homicide and multiple murders are rare occurrences that typically account for a very small percentage of all violent crimes in most countries. Despite this low occurrence, homicide continues to be an area of intense study, with a focus on subjective measures and classifications. The research and analysis based on a database of over 1300 cases contributes to the criminological study of violence and draws distinctions between types of offenders (partnered and solo, serial and mass, male and female, etc.) from a range of different countries and across decades.

Traditionally, studies of homicide focus on male offenders, and theories of offending are then applied to females and co-offenders. The research presented in this book reveals that women and partnered offenders have very different homicide patterns from men. Looking at the history of multicide offending, this book uses descriptive and inferential statistical analyses to directly compare differences in offending and outcome patterns across multicide offender types.

This exploration of the multidimensionality of homicide at an international level is useful for scholars and students interested in criminal justice, criminology, psychology, sociology, or law.

Militaries are institutions of violence. This chapter considers the dark side of military violence: violence within the military. While many criminological studies have attended to the violence and crime of, and within, environments of war, the study of the source of that violence, the military institution, has been neglected. This chapter draws upon the criminological literature of the dark side of organisations to argue violence within the military: hazing, brutalisation, and sexual assault of, and between service personnel, are a structured element of militarism. This is predominantly male violence and crime. By drawing upon critical gender studies and critical theory, the phenomenon of male violence within the military is considered along three key themes: the scission of civil and military, the production of violent subjectivities through military training, and the fraternal character of military masculinities and military organisation.

Study 1: 630 spree-shooters [1936-2021] (1,650 deaths; 3,123 injuries; 194 suicides [31%]), 623 controls logistic regression differences (F= 260.44, df=10/1242, R=.82, R2 =.68, p&lt;.01): (1) homicidal ideation; (2) planning-preparation; (3) stressful-life-event; (4) revenge-motive; (5) acquired-multiple-weapons; (6) elicited-concern; (7) school-location; (8) personal-grievance; (9) suicide; (10) current-student. Study 2: 15 spree-shooters differences, adult, teen: [SP] violence (F=17.48, 123.09); [MMPI-2/A] infrequency (F=92.15, 17.22); lie (F=13.13, 33.91); depression (F=37.76, 26.18); psychopathic-deviance (F=44.66, 57.45); paranoia (F=50.58, 23.92); schizophrenia (F=53.85, 21.69); alcohol (F=42.01, 16.84); addiction (F=57.34, 38.88) compared with 23 homicidal, 36 controls. Spree-shooter loss (1936-2021) = [$2,416,042,490 (630 @ $3,834,988.08) + $6,327,730,332 (1,650 @ $3,834,988.08) + $105,474,702.96 (3,123 @ $33,773.52) = $8,849,247,525.36] + [insurance, tax-increases $11,504,0...

Study 1: 630 spree-shooters [1936-2021] (1,650 deaths; 3,123 injuries; 194 suicides [31%]), 623 controls logistic regression differences (F= 260.44, df=10/1242, R=.82, R2 =.68, p&lt;.01): (1) homicidal ideation; (2) planning-preparation; (3) stressful-life-event; (4) revenge-motive; (5) acquired-multiple-weapons; (6) elicited-concern; (7) school-location; (8) personal-grievance; (9) suicide; (10) current-student. Study 2: 15 spree-shooters differences, adult, teen: [SP] violence (F=17.48, 123.09); [MMPI-2/A] infrequency (F=92.15, 17.22); lie (F=13.13, 33.91); depression (F=37.76, 26.18); psychopathic-deviance (F=44.66, 57.45); paranoia (F=50.58, 23.92); schizophrenia (F=53.85, 21.69); alcohol (F=42.01, 16.84); addiction (F=57.34, 38.88) compared with 23 homicidal, 36 controls. Spree-shooter loss (1936-2021) = [$2,416,042,490 (630 @ $3,834,988.08) + $6,327,730,332 (1,650 @ $3,834,988.08) + $105,474,702.96 (3,123 @ $33,773.52) = $8,849,247,525.36] + [insurance, tax-increases $11,504,0...

Study 1: 630 spree-shooters [1936-2021] (1,650 deaths; 3,123 injuries; 194 suicides [31%]), 623 controls logistic regression differences (F= 260.44, df=10/1242, R=.82, R2 =.68, p&lt;.01): (1) homicidal ideation; (2) planning-preparation; (3) stressful-life-event; (4) revenge-motive; (5) acquired-multiple-weapons; (6) elicited-concern; (7) school-location; (8) personal-grievance; (9) suicide; (10) current-student. Study 2: 15 spree-shooters differences, adult, teen: [SP] violence (F=17.48, 123.09); [MMPI-2/A] infrequency (F=92.15, 17.22); lie (F=13.13, 33.91); depression (F=37.76, 26.18); psychopathic-deviance (F=44.66, 57.45); paranoia (F=50.58, 23.92); schizophrenia (F=53.85, 21.69); alcohol (F=42.01, 16.84); addiction (F=57.34, 38.88) compared with 23 homicidal, 36 controls. Spree-shooter loss (1936-2021) = [$2,416,042,490 (630 @ $3,834,988.08) + $6,327,730,332 (1,650 @ $3,834,988.08) + $105,474,702.96 (3,123 @ $33,773.52) = $8,849,247,525.36] + [insurance, tax-increases $11,504,0...

Study 1: 630 spree-shooters [1936-2021] (1,650 deaths; 3,123 injuries; 194 suicides [31%]), 623 controls logistic regression differences (F= 260.44, df=10/1242, R=.82, R2 =.68, p&lt;.01): (1) homicidal ideation; (2) planning-preparation; (3) stressful-life-event; (4) revenge-motive; (5) acquired-multiple-weapons; (6) elicited-concern; (7) school-location; (8) personal-grievance; (9) suicide; (10) current-student. Study 2: 15 spree-shooters differences, adult, teen: [SP] violence (F=17.48, 123.09); [MMPI-2/A] infrequency (F=92.15, 17.22); lie (F=13.13, 33.91); depression (F=37.76, 26.18); psychopathic-deviance (F=44.66, 57.45); paranoia (F=50.58, 23.92); schizophrenia (F=53.85, 21.69); alcohol (F=42.01, 16.84); addiction (F=57.34, 38.88) compared with 23 homicidal, 36 controls. Spree-shooter loss (1936-2021) = [$2,416,042,490 (630 @ $3,834,988.08) + $6,327,730,332 (1,650 @ $3,834,988.08) + $105,474,702.96 (3,123 @ $33,773.52) = $8,849,247,525.36] + [insurance, tax-increases $11,504,0...

ABSTRACT People who kill strangers all have their own macabre reasons for their acts. There is much to learn from those who are willing to divulge their reasons, and sometimes from the acts of those who don’t. Lieutenant Nelson Andreu retired from the Miami Police Department in 2002 where during his tenure as a detective, he investigated six serial murder cases. In this article he first attempts to track similarities among people who kill strangers and then presents how the six cases he investigated may or may not have conformed to these generalities. Five generalities are discussed based on a consensus of the majority of criminal profilers, based on actual cases investigated: (1) common knowledge, (2) genesis of a serial killer, (3) victim selection, (4) victim objectification, and (5) denouement. A summary of these generalities begins with that most, although not all, serial killers begin their lives as petty criminals. They frequently suffer from low self-esteem, often complicated by some type of sexual dysfunction. Many were victims of sexual abuse or raised in a violent household. Generally, serial killers select their victims based on certain physical and/or personal characteristics. When a serial killer begins their hunt for human prey, it is almost always true that they know absolutely nothing about the person who is to become their victim. Lastly, once a serial killer is in possession of a living victim and has the victim where he/she feels safe enough to act out his/her fantasies, the acts are often performed as if on “autopilot.” The killer’s acts appear to be a close reenactment of what they previously did in his/her imagination.

20 May 2021 U.S. dollar cost for assault = $33,773.52; homicide, $3,834,988.08, domestic terror, mass murder, spree-shooting, 3 dead, $11,504,964.24, pedophilia, $139,430.28. Over 85 years, domestic-terror, mass-murder, spree-shooter assaults cost = 1 to 5,000. $33,773.52 x 5,000 = $168,867,600; dead victims = from 1 to 1,000. $3,834,988.08 x 1,000 = $3,834,988,080. 1936-2021 U.S. insurance industry mass murder costs = [$2,416,042,490 (630 @ $3,834,988.08) + $6,327,730,332 (1,650 @ $3,834,988.08) + $105,474,702.96 (3,123 @ $33,773.52) = $8,849,247,525.36] + [insurance, tax-increases $11,504,021,782.97 ($8,849,247,525.36 x 1.3] =$20,353,269,317.93. Projecting 2021 to 2105 insurance industry no policy change (i.e., computer tests, machine learning equations), $40,706,538,616.66, 3,330 deaths, 6,246 injuries, 388 suicides. U.S. Roman Catholic Church pedophilia costs, 1986-2011, $2,486,898,000, payouts + lost-donations [($2,486,898,000.00 x 1.3) = $3,232,967,400 = $5,719,865,400 + 5,679...

20 May 2021 U.S. dollar cost for assault = $33,773.52; homicide, $3,834,988.08, domestic terror, mass murder, spree-shooting, 3 dead, $11,504,964.24, pedophilia, $139,430.28. Over 85 years, domestic-terror, mass-murder, spree-shooter assaults cost = 1 to 5,000. $33,773.52 x 5,000 = $168,867,600; dead victims = from 1 to 1,000. $3,834,988.08 x 1,000 = $3,834,988,080. 1936-2021 U.S. insurance industry mass murder costs = [$2,416,042,490 (630 @ $3,834,988.08) + $6,327,730,332 (1,650 @ $3,834,988.08) + $105,474,702.96 (3,123 @ $33,773.52) = $8,849,247,525.36] + [insurance, tax-increases $11,504,021,782.97 ($8,849,247,525.36 x 1.3] =$20,353,269,317.93. Projecting 2021 to 2105 insurance industry no policy change (i.e., computer tests, machine learning equations), $40,706,538,616.66, 3,330 deaths, 6,246 injuries, 388 suicides. U.S. Roman Catholic Church pedophilia costs, 1986-2011, $2,486,898,000, payouts + lost-donations [($2,486,898,000.00 x 1.3) = $3,232,967,400 = $5,719,865,400 + 5,679...

Study 1: 630 spree-shooters [1936-2021] (1,650 deaths; 3,123 injuries; 194 suicides [31%]), 623 controls logistic regression differences (F= 260.44, df=10/1242, R=.82, R2 =.68, p&lt;.01): (1) homicidal ideation; (2) planning-preparation; (3) stressful-life-event; (4) revenge-motive; (5) acquired-multiple-weapons; (6) elicited-concern; (7) school-location; (8) personal-grievance; (9) suicide; (10) current-student. Study 2: 15 spree-shooters differences, adult, teen: [SP] violence (F=17.48, 123.09); [MMPI-2/A] infrequency (F=92.15, 17.22); lie (F=13.13, 33.91); depression (F=37.76, 26.18); psychopathic-deviance (F=44.66, 57.45); paranoia (F=50.58, 23.92); schizophrenia (F=53.85, 21.69); alcohol (F=42.01, 16.84); addiction (F=57.34, 38.88) compared with 23 homicidal, 36 controls. Spree-shooter loss (1936-2021) = [$2,416,042,490 (630 @ $3,834,988.08) + $6,327,730,332 (1,650 @ $3,834,988.08) + $105,474,702.96 (3,123 @ $33,773.52) = $8,849,247,525.36] + [insurance, tax-increases $11,504,0...