Moral Hypocrisy

Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. Although this claim is widely accepted, it is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception-making involves a rejection of the impartiality of morality and thereby a rejection of the equality of persons, which we argue grounds the standing to blame others. This paper is co-authored with Kyle Fritz.

We live in a society that lays much importance to appearances which necessitate hypocritical behavior to some extent as a strategy of everyday living. However, the practice of hypocrisy becomes worrying when those expected to give a living testimony to moral and religious values, such as consecrated persons, end up living lives that reek of interpersonal deception and moral hypocrisy even at disturbing levels. Such hypocritical behaviour may range from the alarming cases of immorality, abuse of power, position and money involving religious who otherwise are the champions of virtues and ideals in the eyes of the most people, to everyday instances of interpersonal deception and keeping up appearances by religious in order to feel morally superior to the rest. This paper attempts to take a close look at the practice of moral hypocrisy among some consecrated persons, its psycho-dynamic roots, its effects on personal and community life and what may be done to help such individuals to begin to embrace the truth, wholeness and beauty of their real selves.

This essay examines the phenomenon of hypocrisy from a media ecological vantage. It walks through examples and cases of hypocrisy witnessed in the United States today, and then argues that dominant media forms have shaped and are continuing to shape our senses of self, community, constancy and consistency. Accounting for the apparent rise in hypocrisy – its near ubiquity in modern US culture – as well as clarifying why today's accusations of hypocrisy seem to carry little to no weight, the essay furthermore reveals key tensions between reason and rationalization in times of great technological change.

A distinction is made between acting hypocritically and the character trait of being a hypocrite. The former is understood as resulting from the employment of a double standard in order to obtain a wrongful advantage, while a particular problem with the latter is that hypocrites do not give trustworthy testimony.

Almost all readings of E.M. Forster’s Howards End note the famous epigraph – “Only connect…” – but it is not at all obvious how we are supposed to understand it. Connect what, exactly? Here, I propose a new interpretation: that to connect is to come to terms with one’s own embodiment. This notion ought to be of interest to moral philosophers for two reasons: first, because the failure to connect represents a significant form of moral confusion, and second, because this form of confusion is one to which moral philosophers are particularly likely to be subject.

Inconfessata per definizione, l’ipocrisia è una delle categorie polemiche più usate e abusate, ancora oggi, per denunciare il “cinismo mascherato” di certi attori sociali, soprattutto quando rivestono cariche pubbliche. Ma l’ipocrisia è stata sempre e solo questo? Dovremmo davvero diffidarne sempre e contestare ogni sua manifestazione? Quali e quante forme di ipocrisia possiamo distinguere? Quale rapporto esiste fra l’ipocrisia e la scarsa attitudine autocritica di chi è solito contestare le condotte di vita altrui? E soprattutto: quale rapporto esiste fra questo vizio comune, la politica democratica e la riproduzione istituzionale di diverse forme di oppressione e di dominio? Sono solo alcune delle domande che ispirano questo viaggio filosofico a ritroso nella storia di uno dei concetti più camaleontici della cultura occidentale. Le svolte semantiche che da Omero a Sloterdijk scandiscono questa storia sorprendente consentiranno di differenziare diverse accezioni del fenomeno: dall’ipocrisia psicologica di chi dissimula la propria personalità per proteggersi dall’aggressività altrui al narcisismo etico di chi tradisce sistematicamente le qualità professate, passando attraverso diverse manifestazioni di opportunismo auto-indulgente e di moralismo ipocrita. Al termine di questo viaggio, ci si soffermerà sulle forme contemporanee di ipocrisia democratica per analizzare criticamente le “messinscene apologetiche” che gli attori istituzionali sono soliti utilizzare per immunizzare se stessi, il loro operato e le istituzioni che rappresentano, dalle rivendicazioni egualitarie di cittadini e cittadine che contestano diverse forme di violenza e di dominio.

Hypocrites invite moral opprobrium, and charges of hypocrisy are a significant and widespread feature of our moral lives. Yet it remains unclear what hypocrites have in common, or what is distinctively bad about them. We propose that hypocrites are persons who have undermined their claim to moral authority. Since this self-undermining can occur in a number of ways, our account construes hypocrisy as multiply realizable. As we explain, a person's moral authority refers to a kind of standing that they occupy within a particular moral community. This status is both socially important and normatively precarious. Hence, moral agents are right to be vigilant when it comes to hypocrisy, and are often justified in their outrage when they detect it. We further argue that our view can preserve what is attractive in rival accounts, while avoiding their associated problems.

It is a familiar feature of our ethical discourse that the strength of a moral argument often depends on more than its content. Presented interpersonally, its justificatory force may also depend on the identity of the speaker. An argument may serve to justify an action or policy when uttered by one speaker, while others lack the standing to offer the same argument as a justification for the action in question. I argue that this “speaker-relativity” of moral justification has not received the attention from moral philosophers that it merits. Amongst other things, it raises novel problems for a number of prominent moral theories, most interestingly for Scanlonian contractualism. Contractualists hold that an action is morally right if and because it is justifiable to each person (or, in the terms of Scanlon’s formula, because it is ‘licensed by a principle that no-one could reasonably reject’). Like attempts at justification, however, grounds for rejection must be presented in the form of arguments, addressed to the agent by those individuals who are adversely affected by his action. I argue that there are cases in which an action is intuitively wrong on account of its foreseeably bad consequences, yet none of those adversely affected have the standing to reasonably reject the principle that licenses its performance. This finding threatens to drive a wedge between our moral intuitions and contractualism’s account of moral rightness. It suggests that the supposed analysans (justifiability to each person) and the analysandum (moral rightness) can sometimes come apart.

This essay argues that Emily Dickinson's poem "Safe in their Alabaster Chambers" (The 1859 edition that she published during her lifetime) is a poem exposing the hypocrisy of Dickinson's family's church by comparing them to the New Testament Pharisees who are portrayed in scripture as "Whitewashed Tombs". This poem concludes by urging church members to awaken from their hypocrisy.

Resumo: Discute-se neste artigo o tema da probidade ou honestidade intelectual [intellektuelle Redlichkeit] em Nietzsche, contra o horizonte-reaberto na contemporaneidade por M. Détienne e J.-P. Vernant-das práticas de engano e formas de inteligência astuciosa a que os gregos denominavam μήτις [mêtis]. Tomando como contraponto as teses de R. Lopes e W. Stegmaier sobre a probidade nietzscheana, defende-se que, compreendida sob aquele horizonte-de todo, familiar a Nietzsche-a honestidade intelectual, longe de indicar uma submissão a códigos de veracidade moral, ou mesmo acadêmicos, preestabelecidos, diria respeito, antes, à honestidade para consigo, no reconhecimento, reinterpretação e afirmação dos enganos pelos quais se cria a si mesmo-cuja imagem remeteria à ὑπόκρισις [hypókrisis] grega, enquanto arte do ator e, também, arte do engano.

Palavras-chave: honestidade intelectual. verdade. Hipocrisia. engano. autoengano.

Abstract: This article discusses the theme of probity or intellectual honesty [intellektuelle Redlichkeit] in Nietzsche's philosophy, against the backdrop-reopened in contemporary times by M. Détienne and J. P. Vernant-of the cheating practices and forms of astute intelligence the Greeks called μήτις [mễtis]. Taking both R. Lopes' and W. Stegmaier's thesis on Nietzsche's probity as counterpoint, it's defended that, under that backdrop-all familiar to Nietzsche-the intellectual honesty, far from indicating a submission to the pre-set moral codes of veracity-or even academics-it would be related, first, to self-honesty, on the recognition, reinterpretation and affirmation of the deceits for which one creates itself-whose image would refer to the Greek ὑπόκρισις [hypókrisis], while the actor's art, and art of deception.

Keywords: intellectual honesty. truth. hypocrisy. deceit. self-deception.

A ritual exists whenever a high ranking US or European official meets an official from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), they bring up the issue human rights. The response from the PRC official is ritualistic as well: ‘Yes, of course, human rights is good, we do everything to respect human rights.’ There are two critiques of this that I would like to explore, 1) that such exchanges are hypocritical, and 2) that they actually represent neoimperialist tendencies inherent to capitalism.

In drama, moral judgment is not uttered through words alone; it can also be expressed through non-verbal and seemingly subsidiary things such as props, costumes and stage action. 1 This paper will attempt to clarify how Gnapheus used his Latin plays, especially his Hypocrisis (‘Hypocrisy’, published in 1544 and 1564), in debates on religious matters. Gulielmus Gnapheus Hagiensis, or Willem de Volder (Fuller), or Van de Voldersgraft, of The Hague (1493–1568) is an example of a committed writer. He held outspoken views on the Protestant reformations, which he expounded in pamphlets and plays. Because of his commitment, his oeuvre is pre-eminently suitable as material in an investigation of the role literature played within public debate, and the effect it may have had on public opinion. Hypocrisis is his most outspoken play. It was written and produced in East Prussia, where Lutheranism was proclaimed as a state religion. This enabled the author (he may even have felt obliged) to expound his reformational ideas in a more direct, explicit and uncompromising manner than he would have done in the Low Countries and West Prussia, where he lived before the 1540s, and which at that time still remained officially Catholic. Though even here, in Lutheran East Prussia, Gnapheus came into conflict with the ecclesiastical authorities: he was indicted for heresy by the Lutheran theologian Staphylus.

This essay suggests that Machiavelli’s claim that the moral vice of hypocrisy is inescapable in politics constitutes a real issue for democratic politics today. Indeed, it concludes that democratic societies are implicated in creating the impetus to hypocritical behaviour. The essay questions the prevalent conviction that a liberal democratic polity should be premised on transparency and candour, not on hypocritical manipulation – a conviction which is paradoxically shared by the dirty hands thesis which is mostly owed to Michael Walzer and which purportedly takes Machiavelli’s insights on the moral messiness of politics seriously. Attempts to deny the necessity of political hypocrisy misconstrue the realities of democratic politics – the messy context in which politicians operate and what is distinctive of political friendships. Democratic politicians operate in a context ridden with conflict and dependence which renders hypocrisy a necessary political virtue and the string that holds together a virtuous political life.

Communication pour le colloque « Figurations littéraires du mensonge », dir. Fabrice Wilhelm, Université de Franche-Comté, Centre Jacques-Petit, 3-4 décembre 2014.

Cette étude se propose d’interpréter un personnage de L’École des femmes à la lumière de la notion définie par Jules de Gaultier, le bovarysme. Robert, qui se donne constamment le beau rôle de l’homme vertueux, n’est pas un hypocrite, car il « ment avec sincérité » et, comme l’héroïne de Flaubert, « se conç[oit] autrement qu’il n’est». Animé par une tension vers l’idéal, née de l’inconsistance fondamentale du moi, ce personnage ambivalent fait de ce bref récit méconnu la chambre d’écho des réflexions d’André Gide, qui, dans la lignée de Nietzsche, remet en cause la notion même de vérité, sans pour autant renoncer aux valeurs de sincérité et de naturel.

This paper offers a first step in a theory of religious hypocrisy. Religious hypocrisy is shown to be a rational strategy at the individual level through which the individual maximizes his/her religious gain by accessing religious rewards and minimizing the costs through selective non-compliance to the religion’s objective commitments. The pervasiveness of religious hypocrisy is argued to be a result of group level characteristics, namely the extensiveness of the religious group’s objective commitments. The level of objective hypocrisy can be moderated through variation in the members’ dependence on the group and the group’s capacity to control its members. Religious hypocrisy is a maximizing behavior; however, it is not costless and it can lead to the experience of moral dissonance. This dissonance can have group level outcomes including decline due to exit and secularization.

In 2011 and 2012 Jane Taylor and David Nirenberg (Medievalist, U of Chicago) exchanged a series of letters in which they jointly considered a range of questions: suebjectivity, the Object, letters, art history, puppetry, the voice and the body, conversion, sincerity and hypocrisy. The letters were published as one of the "NOTEBOOKS" in the series of small publications commissioned for dOCUMENTA 13 by curator Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev. The letters embrace several ongoing projects, as well as the art work of South African artists  WIlliam Kentridge, Penny Siopis, and Gavin Younge.

While in his personal disposition, a liberal is ‘open-minded, not prejudiced’ (his heart), his ideological underpinnings are ‘favouring individual liberty, free trade and moderate political and social reform’ (his mind). On the other hand, a leftist is someone who vouches for ‘radical socialism that advocates the political and economic theory of social organization, wherein a whole community owns and controls the means of production, distribution, and exchange’.

Thus, the left-liberal tag that is loosely bandied about by assorted politicos and upstart elites in the arena of political correctness is nothing but an oxymoron brand. Be that as it may, even as these left-liberals tend to wear their hearts on their sleeves, yet they lock-up their minds in closets of bias.

According to some, contemporary social psychology is aptly described as a study in moral hypocrisy. In this paper we argue that this is unfortunate when understood as establishing that we only care about appearing to act morally, not about true moral action. A philosophically more interesting interpretation of the “moral hypocrisy”-findings understands it to establish that we care so much about morality that it might lead to (1) self-deception about the moral nature of our motives and/or (2) misperceptions regarding what we should or should not do in everyday or experimental situations. In this paper we argue for this claim by elaborating on a fascinating series of experiments by Daniel Batson and his colleagues who have consistently contributed to the moral hypocrisy findings since the late nineties, and showing in what way they contribute to a better understanding of moral agency, rather than undermine the idea that we are moral agents.

Sie, Maureen (2015 Moral Hypocrisy and Moral Reasons, in: Schaubroeck (ed) Special Issue Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.: Volume 18, Issue 2 (2015), Page 223-235 doi 10.1007/s10677-015-9574-8

‘It is necessary to a Prince to learn how not to be good’. This quotation from Machiavelli’s The Prince has become the mantra of the standard dirty hands (DH) thesis. Despite its infamy, it features proudly in most conventional expositions of the dirty hands (DH) problem, including Michael Walzer’s original analysis. In this paper, I wish to cast a doubt as to whether the standard conception of the problem of DH—the recognition that, in certain inescapable and tragic circumstances an innocent course of action is unfeasible—fully captures Machiavelli’s message and its terrifying implications. In particular, I argue that the standard DH thesis is inadequately ‘static’: it conceives the conflict between ordinary morality and political morality as a stark, momentary and rare paradox of action—an anomaly disrupting the normality of harmony. As such it misconceives both the extent and the nature of the rupture between morality and politics. In this sense, the argument I shall advance does not just involve an exercise in the history of political thought. Rather, I want to suggest that, by virtue of its failure to take Machiavelli’s insights seriously, the standard DH thesis fails to live up to its purported capacity to capture the complexity and fragmentation of our moral cosmos and that, consequently, it is nothing more than a thinly veiled version of the idealism and monism it purports to reject.

According to some, contemporary social psychology is aptly described as a study in moral hypocrisy. In this paper we argue that this is unfortunate when understood as establishing that we only care about appearing to act morally, not about true moral action. A philosophically more interesting interpretation of the “moral hypocrisy”-findings understands it to establish that we care so much about morality that it might lead to (1) self-deception about the moral nature of our motives and/or (2) misperceptions regarding what we should or should not do in everyday or experimental situations. In this paper we argue for this claim by elaborating on a fascinating series of experiments by Daniel Batson and his colleagues who have consistently contributed to the moral hypocrisy findings since the late nineties, and showing in what way they contribute to a better understanding of moral agency, rather than undermine the idea that we are moral agents.

Sie, Maureen (2015 Moral Hypocrisy and Moral Reasons, in: Schaubroeck (ed) Special Issue Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.: Volume 18, Issue 2 (2015), Page 223-235 doi 10.1007/s10677-015-9574-8

Ipocrisia. Simulazione e dissimulazione nella sfera pubblica (XI, n. 2, 2020)
A cura di Leonard Mazzone
A differenza dei classici lemmi che hanno attirato l'attenzione dei critici sociali dall'antica Grecia ai giorni nostri-dall'errore (Platone) al cinismo (Sloterdijk), passando attraverso la menzogna (Agostino, Kant) e l'ideologia (Marx)-la categoria di ipocrisia è stata in larga parte trascurata dalla filosofia. Una delle ragioni principali a monte di questa disattenzione filosofica consiste nella riduzione dell'ipocrisia a un caso particolare della menzogna o a una forma particolarmente subdola di cinismo, che all'ostentata auto-affermazione del soggetto preferirebbe la più prudente e, spesso, efficace strategia indiretta del mascheramento. Nell'uno e nell'altro caso, però, si finisce per assecondare una concezione assai riduttiva del fenomeno: a differenza della menzogna, l'ipocrisia può anche essere involontaria (non si può, invece, mentire senza volerlo); diversamente dalle ben note forme di cinismo mascherato esemplificate da personaggi letterari come il Tartufo di Molière, inoltre, l'ipocrisia può consistere anche in svariate forme disinteressate o, addirittura, altruistiche di inganno. La mancanza di un approfondimento del concetto di ipocrisia, delle sue sfumature e delle sue implicazioni è tutt'altro che secondaria, perché rende impossibile riuscire a cogliere adeguatamente un fenomeno che sembra comunque costitutivo delle interazioni nella sfera pubblica: le varie forme del simulare e dissimulare, del darsi o non darsi a vedere, rispetto agli altri e rispetto a se stessi. A questo vuoto di attenzione teorica il presente numero di Lessico di etica pubblica intende porre rimedio, ospitando le riflessioni di invited contributors di rilievo nazionale e internazionale e selezionando tramite la presente call for papers contributi che:
-tenteranno di elaborare una distinzione accurata e argomentata del fenomeno dell'ipocrisia rispetto alle nozioni di menzogna e/o ideologia;
-indagheranno i rapporti fra l'ipocrisia e uno o più dei seguenti fenomeni sociali, solitamente annoverati fra le patologie sociali della società moderna: dalla dissimulazione all'inautenticità, passando attraverso l'alienazione e l'incoerenza;
-indagheranno la problematizzazione dell'ipocrisia nell'opera di autori che hanno dato un contributo particolarmente decisivo nel rinnovamento del significato del concetto lungo la storia della filosofia;
-approfondiranno le implicazioni normative dell'ipocrisia in politica, con particolare attenzione al contesto delle democrazie costituzionali;
- analizzeranno criticamente le possibili nuove forme di ipocrisia che si sviluppano o potrebbero svilupparsi all’interno della società della trasparenza e della disintermediazione informatico-digitale.

Experimental research in behavioral economics has revealed a high degree of prosocial tendencies in human interactions. These results have been interpreted as suggesting a necessary shift from a model of selfish preferences toward social preferences—the assumption that people intrinsically are concerned about others' well-being (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). In this article, we first introduce research on prosocial behavior from an economics perspective. We then review several studies that invalidate this social preferences hypothesis by demonstrating that prosocial behavior is reduced when behavior is not observable by relevant others and expectations to behave prosocially are lowered. We argue that people primarily pursue self-interest as long as they can retain the appearance of being fair to others and even themselves—an interpretation referred to as moral hypocrisy (Batson, 2011). Further, we highlight implications for research of this assumption.