Neil MacCormick

Among contemporary German jurists, the core thesis of legal positivism is also read that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. Moreover, the prevailing view is to justify or reject this thesis through normative arguments. However, Robert Alexy has proved that the law necessarily lays claims to substantial correctness, which is deduced with analytical arguments. The argument from correctness, together with argument from injustice and argument from principle which are based upon the former, eventually refutes the no-necessary-connection thesis, and reaches the conclusion of a qualifying non-positivism. The claim to correctness has its root in the tradition of neo-Kantian legal philosophy. Connecting with the theory of general practical discourse, this claim grants the law an ideal dimension of procedure and justifiability. In the contrary, Joseph Raz proposed that the law has a claim to legitimate authority, which concerned a different problem as well as from a distinct tradition. Moreover, the target being rejected by Alexy is more likely toward to the inclusive positivism in Anglo-Saxon tradition, while Joseph Raz' response, which was from the standpoint of the exclusive positivism, is no less than a lure to the trap.
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在当代德语法学界，法律实证主义的核心命题同样被表述为：法律与道德在概念上存在必然关联。流行的做法是通过规范性论证来证成或反驳这一命题。Robert Alexy通过分析性论证得出：法律必然作出内容正确性宣称。这一分析性论据为不法论据和原则论据提供了支撑。三项论据最终导向了对“不必然关联命题”的否定，即适格性的非实证主义立场。内容正确性宣称继受了新康德主义法哲学的理论传统，它与普遍实践论辩一道，使法律具有了程序性和可证成性的理想面向。Joseph Raz提出的“合法性权威宣称”具有不同的问题意识和理论渊源；Alexy的批判对象更接近于英美的包容性实证主义，而Joseph Raz站在排除性实证主义的立场给予的回应，容易造成对话的陷阱。

En esta tesis se hace un recuento de los antecedentes retóricos en la Teoría de la Argumentación Jurídica, se revisan los modelos de Robert Alexy y Neil MacCormick y se analizan algunos casos resueltos por la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, en México, bajo el principio de proporcionalidad y la fórmula del peso.

Resumo: H. L. A. Hart propôs uma tese abandonada em seus trabalhos mais tardios a respeito da defeasibility dos direitos subjetivos. Nela, sustentava que existem condições que são capazes de derrotar a existência de um direito subjetivo conferido por lei, mesmo que estas condições não estejam expressas no diploma legal. Em que se pese o abandono pelo proponente inaugural da tese da defeasibility, alguns de seus contemporâneos convenceram-se de que Hart estava inicialmente correto. O presente ensaio almeja demonstrar que o que Neil MacCormick, o principal sucessor na defesa desta tese hartiana, entende em suas considerações sobre a defeasibility, ou seja, a sujeição de todos os direitos à exceptividade de suas condições, é o mesmo fenômeno que Aristóteles, Tomás de Aquino e outros clássicos chamavam de epieikeia ou aequitas, e que foi trazido para a modernidade com o rótulo de equidade. Tal estudo é fundamental para a compreensão das Teorias da Justiça e do Direito em suas interações por ser capaz de resolver aludidos casos de uma forma mais abrangente. Ademais, tendo em vista que a equidade em seus termos clássicos é entendida como uma virtude ética retificadora do justo legal, o presente trabalho avança na demonstração prática da importância de se propor que a justiça é antes de tudo também uma virtude ética dita das pessoas, e de que entender a institucionalização da justiça como condição necessária e suficiente para que haja justiça em uma sociedade é insustentável. Nestes termos, há igualmente relevo no objeto de estudo em questão, na medida em que se examina a hipótese da necessidade de argumentos éticos e da exigência de virtudes morais do próprio julgador. Por fim, como a ética retoma o seu papel de protagonista nas teorias da justiça na presente proposta, passa a ser considerada como uma finalidade própria do Direito.

It is not totally clear why the classic legal institutionalism (CLI) of the first half of XX century has been generally forgotten by the post-war international scholarship. Through the reading of The Legacy of Pluralism by Mariano Croce and Marco Goldoni, this review essay explores the reasons for this disappearance and tries to individuate traces of CLI – of its legacy – in current legal-theoretical debates. By these means, it also tests some arguments advanced in this elegant, accurate, and original book.

The theoretical tools which are useful for the analysis of legal institutes include models of institutions, models of the application of rules, and models of relations between normative systems. The author analyses the European institute of temporary protection focusing on the related practical problems. Namely, its inadequate application can endanger the functioning of states and the European order, cause tensions in relations between states and attribute unfair responsibility to states. In this study, the author applies the first two theoretical tools and demonstrates their usefulness in determining the following characteristics of institutes: their type, a part of structure related to background principles and possibilities of legal regulation of their application. Starting from the premise that the cause of the neglect of the institute is a lack of its understanding, we will assumd three objections to its application and analyse the objection according to which the decision on the application of the institute is an exclusively political issue.

Resumo: Neil MacCormick concebeu, ao longo de sua obra, critérios que permitem avaliar a racionalidade de uma decisão judicial do ponto de vista argumentativo, tendo como pano de fundo o ideal político do Estado Democrático de Direito: consistência, coerência, consequencialismo e universalizabilidade. Atestamos, em trabalhos aplicados anteriores, que aplicação de tais critérios avaliativos na análise de casos concretos, embora proveitosa, revela certas limitações práticas. Este artigo, portanto, tem como objetivo explorar as possibilidades e limites de aplicação dos critérios avaliativos propostos
por Neil MacCormick na análise de casos concretos. 
Palavras-chave: Argumentação jurídica. Neil MacCormick. Racionalidade.

Abstract: Throughout his work, Neil MacCormick has developed some criteria to evaluate the rationality of the legal reasoning from the argumentative point of view, based on the political ideal of the Rule of Law. These criteria are consistency, coherence, consequentialism and universalizability. In earlier works, we have pointed out that the application of such evaluative criteria in the analysis of concrete cases, while useful, reveals certain practical limitations. This article, therefore, aims to explore the possibilities and limits to the application of the evaluation criteria proposed by Neil MacCormick in the analysis of concrete cases.
Key-words: Legal reasoning. Neil MacCormick. Rationality

Resumo: Este artigo estuda o problema da coerência enquanto critério de justificação normativa das decisões judicativas nos pensamentos jurídico-metodológicos de Ronald Dworkin e Neil Maccormick. Verifica que enquanto para Maccormick a coerência não é um critério forte o bastante para servir de fundamento para uma decisão, em Dworkin ela se apresenta como suficiente para embasar um ato judicativo. Conclui que embora Dworkin assuma um sentido forte de coerência ele peca ao encarar o desvelar do direito como um problema simplesmente hermenêutico. Abstract: This paper studies the problem of coherence as a criterion of normative justification of judicial decisions in the juridical-methodological thoughts of Ronald Dworkin and Neil Maccormick. Its finds that while for Maccormick coherence is not a criterion strong enough to serve as a basis for a decision, in Dworkin it is presented as sufficient to support a judicial act. Its conclude that although Dworkin assumes the coherence in a strong sense, he sins by looking at the unveiling of law as a merely hermeneutical problem Keyword: Coherence; Jurisprudentialism; Law as Integrity.

O exercício da plenitude como indivíduo e o bom funcionamento do sistema econômico mundial atual depende da garantia de certeza no Direito e da previsibilidade das decisões jurídicas – essa conquista da sociedade moderna, para alguns, é chamada de Estado de Direito. O texto trata, sob a perspectiva de Neil MacCormick, a tensão intrínseca ao Estado de Direito, tendo em vista que a garantia de previsibilidade e segurança é falseada pelo caráter argumentativo do Direito.

Trabalho apresentado como requisito parcial de aprovação na disciplina Direitos Fundamentais II na Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo. Dezembro de 2017.

En este trabajo se examinan algunos de los problemas más significativos a los que nos enfrentamos cuando intentamos justificar que sólo los seres humanos son merecedores de consideración moral plena. Para ello, en primer lugar, se exponen las paradojas que se siguen de las dos formas tradicionales de definir el conjunto de los titulares de los derechos humanos: la personalidad moral y la pertenencia a la especie humana. Luego se propone, como vía de escape, la tesis de que sólo debemos ocuparnos de la cuestión de la titularidad una vez que hemos dilucidado cuales son los principios morales de los cuales se derivan los derechos básicos. Para terminar se analiza la clase de derechos subjetivos que son los derechos humanos y se propone un nuevo concepto de derechos básicos.

This paper traces, examines, and demonstrates Neil MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning and its evolution. MacCormick’s views were shaped gradually so his theory could be divided into two main stages. Therefore, the use of the diachronic approach is justified. The aim of this paper is to analyse the difference between the theses of the theory of legal reasoning explained in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) and general revisions to this theory marked in Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (2005). According to the author, the most important change in MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning is an examination of the role of deductive reasoning in the process of judicial reasoning. This change leads to an extension of the logical aspects of MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning (legal syllogism) to include rhetorical aspects (argumentative character of law) and ethical aspects (the idea of the rule of law). The evolution of the MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning seems to be a model example of the changes in contemporary philosophy of law.

The present paper analyzes Neil MacCormick's L. H. A. Hart, first published in 1981, mainly dedicated to the analysis of Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law. We will deepen MacCormick's explanations concerning the distinction between legal and moral rules, primary and secondary rules, promises and power-conferring rules, internal and external point of view, as well as some key figures of Hart's normative terminology-namely "acceptance" and "group". Some exclusive outputs by the Scottish philosopher - namely the "hermeneutic point of view" and the "cutoff point"- will be also scrutinized. Finally, we will propose some adjustments to the Author's theories.

Keywords: MacCormick-Hart-social rules-morality-internal and external point of view-primary and secondary norms-power conferring rules-acceptance-hermeneutic point of view

When Neil MacCormick, in the wake of the launch of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, went “beyond the Sovereign State” in 1993, he fundamentally challenged the heretofore dominant paradigm of legal ordering in the European context which considered law to be singular, unified and confined within sovereign nation states. The original insight of MacCormick might, however, be pushed even further, as a historical re-construction reveals that legal pluralism is not only a trademark of recent historical times, marked by the European integration process, but has also been at the very core of legal evolution in Europe throughout its modern history. The introduction of modern law in Europe can be traced back to the eleventh and twelfth century Investiture Conflict between the Church and the Emperor, a conflict which solidified the existence of two parallel universes of law, one Church-based and one empire-based, both of which rested, in principle, upon mutually exclusive claims to superiority, but which nonetheless became institutionally stabilized in a manner which allowed for mutual co-existence between them. The existence of such parallel universes of law has throughout, also in the “Westphalian world”, been a central characteristic of European law. It is suggested that the current constellation between the EU and its Member States should be viewed in this light.

Este artigo estuda o problema da coerencia enquanto criterio de justificacao normativa das decisoes judicativas nos pensamentos juridico-metodologicos de Ronald Dworkin e Neil Maccormick. Verifica que enquanto para Maccormick a coerencia nao e um criterio forte o bastante para servir de fundamento para uma decisao, em Dworkin ela se apresenta como suficiente para embasar um ato judicativo. Conclui que embora Dworkin assuma um sentido forte de coerencia ele peca ao encarar o desvelar do direito como um problema simplesmente hermeneutico.

This Article uncovers the normative political theory underlying the legal doctrine of constitutional pluralism, as it is used in the EU today. Constitutional pluralism, once described as a semi-official legal doctrine in the EU, is now being used by some member states to challenge its authority and rules. By reconstructing the political thought of one of its founders, N. MacCormick, this Article takes issue with two most common interpretations of constitutional pluralism: On the one hand, it has been claimed that the normative political content of constitutional pluralism is virtually identical, or at least compatible, with that of Kantian rights-based cosmopolitanism; on the other, it has been contended, especially with regard to its uses in Hungary and Poland, that it was an inherently dangerous, illiberal, normative theory. This Article offers to move away from current legal debates to go back to the origins of constitutional pluralism. It argues that constitutional pluralism is not a purely liberal theory indeed. But neither is it inherently illiberal. Rather, both liberal and illiberal readings are possible, but partial, interpretations of MacCormickian constitutional pluralism. A more systematic interpretation shows that constitutional pluralism opens a path to move beyond this somewhat archetypical divide.

The concept of "institutionalism" in the usual word use covers a whole range of inflential philosophical and legal doctrines of the XX century. Due to fundamental diffrences between them, the general theoretical and legal reconstruction of institutionalism as a single doctrine and, consequently, the clarifiation of its content cause diffilties. At the same time, the popularity of this trend is growing in the discussions of contemporary legal scholars, and some of the representatives of the Russian philosophical and legal thought believe themselves to be the followers of this tradition. The paper proposes to proceed from the established division of institutionalism into "old" ("classical") and "new". Representatives of classical institutionalism (M. Hauriou, S. Romano) predictably believed that the basis for the validity of norms was institution, but the source of the validity of institutions themselves as legal phenomena was understood by them diffrently. For M. Hauriou, this was the "idea" which, from within, structured the institution and organized its activities. Among other things, it also determined the fair balance of power and individual autonomy for a particular institution, which, in the end, predetermined the legal character of this or that institution. S. Romano, adhering to more positivist positions, believed that the reality of so-called "original" institutions (whose reality is not justifid by other institutions) is a consequence of their effctive organisation, which distinguishes the institution from any other social group. An important step in the theoretical understanding of institutionalist ideas in law was Schmitt’s teaching about three types of legal thinking: decisionism, normativism, and thinking about law as a specifi order and form. The latter was formulated by a German lawyer under the inflence of the ideas of institutionalism and, according to his idea, should have included it as one of the subspecies. Despite the fact that Carl Schmitt’s affiation to institutionalism is a subject of discussion, the ultimate basis of the reality of the rule of law postulated by him is quite within the logic of the latter — these are the collective metaphysical notions that exist within a specifi order. The modern version of institutionalism is legally represented by the institutional legal positivism of O. Weinberger and N. MacCormick. The "new" institutionalism is based on the concept of institutional fact, which diffrs from the facts of the physical world. Institutions themselves are understood as systems of human action based on practical information (legal norms). In contrast to the "old" institutionalists, O. Weinberger and N. MacCormick do not consider norms secondary to institutions — one simply cannot be imagined without the other. The reality of norms is understood in the spirit of H. Kelsen’s theory, as based on their origin and having a complex connection with the notion of efficy. The historical development of legal institutionalism reflects the evolution of ideas about the relationship between reality and efficy of law — while classical institutionalism denied any connection between them, "new" institutionalism considers these categories as interrelated, which reflcts the normative tendencies of the latter.

The subject of this article is Neil’s MacCormick late legal views and their adherence
to the post-positivist approach in the theory and philosophy of law. MacCormick’s
views were shaped gradually. The impact on their final version was, on the one hand, the legacy of Anglo-Saxon legal positivism, and on the other, his own scientific biog-raphy, because he was both an observer and active participant in the significant changes that were made in theory and philosophy of law in the second half of the twentieth century. This article presents the main assumptions of institutional theory
of law, which is Neil MacCormick’s fundamental contribution to the development of contemporary law theories and philosophy of law. MacCormick’s transition from the
positivist to post-positivist ideas seems to be a model example of a broader process which are the transformations in the contemporary theory and philosophy of law. However, what is particularly important is the intellectual coherence of
McCormick’s entire academic achievement, which shows that the Scottish philosopher’s turn to post-positivism is evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Sob o enfoque da teoria de Neil MacCormick sobre argumentação e justificação, analisa-se a decisão do Supremo Tribunal Federal acerca da inconstitucionalidade da Lei Estadual do Rio de Janeiro nº 2.895/98 que visou regulamentar a atividade conhecida como “briga de galos”. Com base no levantamento dos argumentos linguísticos, sistémicos e teleológicos-deontológicos, é feita a verificação da correção da decisão, a partir do atendimento aos requisitos da consistência, coerência e universabilidade. Conclui-se que, embora a decisão final do STF atenda estes dois últimos, falha quanto à consistência, tendo em vista que, a afirmação encampada na ementa sobre a inexistência de qualquer manifestação cultural a ser discutida no caso, não é condizente com o argumento exposto no voto da posição predominante. Se a decisão não está baseada em argumentos consistentes, não pode ser considerada uma solução adequada, nem legítima no âmbito de um Estado Democrático de Direito.