Phantasy

This article traces the radical devaluation of the phantasm throughout Western civilization. With the help of Nietzsche's critical perspective, I develop a notion of hystery as the series of collective traumas repeated in each individual's growth, whereby the phantasm changes value from psychosomatic interface, to evil incarnate, to disease of learning. Beginning with the Classical episteme represented by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, then moving up through the Christian era, I focus primarily on Enlightenment thinkers such as Hobbes and Bacon, who represent the last nail in the imagination's coffin. The next section examines Nietzsche's rediscovery of the phantasm and the theoretical contributions of post-structuralism that follow in Nietzsche's wake. Juxtaposing Bataille and Deleuze, I look at Deleuze's early enthusiasm and ultimate betrayal of the phantasm, and I posit Bataille's emphasis on the affective force of the mythological phantasm as an insurrection to reclaim our experience and life along with it. The article ends with speculation, offering Bruno's art of memory as an ontic and epistemic alternative to dominant Western hystery, other pasts opening to other possible futures, an ungrounding that paradoxically leads to a restoration of the human house in a re-enchanted cosmos.

Die Psychoanalyse ist die wohl nachhaltigste der neuen Anthropologien, die das 20. Jahrhundert hervorbringt. Zunächst ist sie eine Anthropologie, die den Menschen grundsätzlich in Relation denkt, in Relation zu einem anderen, das immer doppelt da ist: als anderes in ihm, in seinem Inneren selbst, als Eros und Thanatos, und als anderes in seinem Außen, als soziale Relation, als Relation zu Dingen, als Eingebettetsein in kulturelle Überlieferung. Das Ich ist nicht Herr im eigenen Haus, wie es Sigmund Freud formuliert hat1, es ist aber auch nicht Herr der Bedeutungen der kulturellen Traditionen und Äußerungen, wie Freud in seinen Interpretationen so vieler Formen der Religion und der Kunst immer wieder deutlich gemacht hat. Es gibt für Freud keine Äußerung des Subjekts, deren Intentionalität dem Subjekt vollständig transparent wäre, es gibt auch keinen sozialen oder kulturellen Ausdruck, dessen Bedeutungen sich vollständig erschließen lassen würden, und zwar nicht nur in dem Sin-ne, dass das Subjekt die fremde Äußerung nie vollständig wird verstehen oder entschlüsseln können, sondern auch in dem Sinne, dass ihm nie vollständig transparent werden kann, was die Äußerung mit ihm macht. Das Subjekt ist inmitten einer Konstellation, einer Szene. Und es wäre ein allzu eitles Ziel, sie beherrschen zu wollen. Aber es ist möglich, sich selbst in dieser Szene zu ver-ändern und damit auch die Szene selbst. Das ist der Anspruch der psychoana-lytischen Kur, die ja zugleich die einzigartige und nur in ihrer Verbindung mit der Theorie mögliche Empirie der Psychoanalyse ist. Freuds Anthropologie stellt keine gesonderte Medientheorie heraus. Doch sind die impliziten Annahmen und die expliziten Bezüge auf die Medialität so vielfältig, dass es hier auch nur darum gehen kann, einige zentrale Aspekte aufzuzeigen. Zu den impliziten Annahmen Freuds gehört nicht nur, dass jedes Ding, mit dem wir es zu tun haben, zu einem Medium werden kann, wie es Fritz Heider 1926 in einem erst Jahrzehnte später wirklich beachteten Aufsatz schrieb 2 , sondern vor allem, dass die Bedeutungen selbst immer vielschich-tig und vor allem veränderlich sind. Es geht der Psychoanalyse Freuds dabei 1 Sigmund Freud, ,,Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse", in: ders. Gesammelte Werke, Frank-furt a m Main 1972

The body, the bodily condition of the human being, or embodiment as an essential aspect of the human situation in the lived world are important topics of phe-nomenological research and phenomenologically oriented anthropology. On the other hand, today also cognitive research and neurosciences are dealing with the topic of embodiment, mainly focusing on so-called embodied cognition. Modern neurosci-ence claims that both, thought and action can only be interpreted in the light of interac-tions between brain, body and environment. New trends in phenomenology stress their familiarity with this position and focus on naturalizing phenomenology. In my view, this development disregards fundamental Husserlian claims concerning the naturalization of human subjectivity. In order to avoid such naturalizing effects, I focus on the transcendental-phenomenological interpretation of the lived body, and underline the intentional-genetic potential of Husserlian analyses. On this path, instead of relying on naturalizing embodiment, I develop a genetic understanding of the intentional embodiment of subjectivity and describe a peculiar form of intentionality as transbodily intentionality, thereby stressing its anthropological and socio-theoretical signifi-cance.

Play cannot any longer be understood as bordered by rituals, it has to be understood by its own special complexity of time. Along Gregory Bateson, Donald W. Winnicott, Daniel Sterne, Peter Fonagy, Jacques Derrida und Gilles Deleuze play is understood as play of différance, as agency of differences of series and, following Deleuze, as dramatization of idea.

A crucial feature of our individual biography is grounded in our common corporeal structure. Our life begins with a strong bodily intertwining that has an essential biographical and existential meaning. To elucidate this pre-egological form of connection between subjects, I refer to a peculiar form of sympathetical experience which precedes the intersubjective experience proper. From the genetic phenomenological point of view, sympathetical experience is characterized by a pre-reflective form of intentionality, which I describe as trans-bodily intentionality, as well as by fusional dynamics realised through a special kind of immediate corporeal fantasy. Focusing on the individuation processes of personal life, I show to which degree trans-bodily intentional dynamics result in the dissolution of the subject's centricity or at least in its fluidification. Such a fluidification, moreover, should be systematically understood as a condition of possibility for the very process of becoming a Self. In my contribution, I discuss to which degree the corporeal phan-tasy plays a decisive rule in the creative process of becoming a Self. Human beings are provided with the primary capacity to live with others, to connect and feel for others. This crucial feature of our individual biography is grounded in our common corporeal structure. Our life begins with a strong bodily intertwining that has an essential biographical and existential meaning. Based on an intentional-genetic phenomenological method, I suggest to interpret this condition not yet as intersubjectivity proper, but as a deeper phenomenon of sympathetic participation 1. To elucidate this pre-egological form of connection between subjects , I will refer to a peculiar form of intentionality that I understand as trans-bodily intentionality. Trans-bodily intentionality is a pre-reflective form of intentionality, characterised by fusional structures and realised through a special kind of immediate corporeal fantasy. Focusing on the individuation processes of personal life, I will

The validity of Husserl's early apprehension/ content of apprehension schema (Auffassung/ Auffassungsinhalt Schema) of intentionality has long been a subject of dispute. In the case of phantasy (Phantasie), commentators often assert that the talk of "non-intentional content," i.e. the phantasm, is abandoned in Husserl's mature phenomenology of phantasy, and his subsequent theory of reproductive consciousness aims precisely to replace the previous schema. Against the current dismissive stance in the literature, this paper argues for the centrality of the concept of phantasm in the phenomenology of phantasy. This is achieved in three steps. First, I argue for a functional interpretation of the schema, which maintains that it is not an empirical-genetic account of how non-intentional "sense-data" is transformed into presentations of intentional objects, but a structural exposition of the essential moments of objectifying consciousness. Second, I revisit Husserl's theory of reproductive consciousness, arguing that in reproduction, what is reproduced is not only the noetic experience but also the hyletic substrate. Hence, the theory of reproductive consciousness, far from calling for an abandonment of the concept of phantasm, instead clarifies this concept and its function in phantasy. To fortify the point that the phantasm is crucial for the phenomenology of phantasy, I examine two features of phantasy, namely the perspectivalness of phantasized objects and the experience of my phantasy Ego being the "zero point of orientation" in phantasy, arguing that these two essential features can only be accounted for by appealing to the concept of phantasm.

Lacan’s conception of the end of analysis is different from Freud’s original conception of the end of analysis, which has different goals or aims, which were as follows: (1) when the unconscious “conveys” itself into the preconscious; (2) the overcoming of internal resistances; (3) the replacement of repression with condemnation; (4) the advance from the pleasure principle to the reality principle; (5) saving mental energy to make the best of one’s inherited capacities to become as capable of enjoyment as possible; and (6) partial or complete sublimation. There is debate about whether Jacques Lacan is to be considered a post-structuralist, but there is no doubt that he professed a unique school of psychoanalysis. According to Lacan there are six goals or aims of psychoanalysis that mark the end of analysis: (1) to articulate the truth about one’s desire; (2) the advent of true speech and the realization by the subject of their history; (3) to traverse the radical fantasy; (4) identification with the sinthome; (5) when the analyst becomes the object-cause of the analysand’s desire and falls from position of subject-supposed-to-know; and (6) if the analysand passes to become an analyst themself.

Resumen. El presente artículo se propone explorar la noción de mundo ficcional desde la filosofía de Edmund Husserl, destacando la potencialidad de la fenomenología para los campos de la estética y la teoría de la ficción. Para ello, partiré de la descripción de las estructuras sobre las que se erige la vivencia ficcional, que aquí será tratada como una vivencia de fantasía. Bajo este enfoque, el análisis muestra primero la correlación entre conciencia de fantasía y mundo de fantasía, pasando a continuación a explicitar las estructuras de cada uno de los polos de experiencia. Para Husserl, esta correlación se sustenta lógicamente en la doctrina del idealismo trascendental y en su concepción del mundo de fantasía como mundo posible.
Palabras clave: Husserl; ficción; fantasía; mundo de fantasía; fenomenología; idealismo trascendental.

The Fictional World: A Phenomenology of the Phantasy-World
ABSTRACT. This article explores the notion of fictional world from the viewpoint of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy, highlighting the potentiality of phenomenology for contributing to the fields of aesthetics and theory of fiction. To this aim, the analysis will depart from the description of the structures of the fictional experience, which here is going to be treated as a phantasy experience. From this standpoint, the analysis first makes visible the correlation between phantasy consciousness and phantasy world and, next, explains the structures of each of the poles of experience. For Husserl, this correlation is logically grounded on the doctrine of transcendental idealism and its conception of the phantasy world as a possible world.
Keywords: Husserl; fiction; phantasy; phantasy world; phenomenology; transcendental idealism.

It would be easy to look at this new collection of academic essays and write something along the following lines: this incisive and wide-ranging essay collection provides a much-needed point of engagement with the exponential growth of contemporary popular fantasy, in which new ways of performing sexuality and gender are continually emerging, as the social constraints of traditional binaries and hierarchies dissolve before our eyes. However, while this would be true enough, it would also do a disservice to the work that Jude Roberts and Esther MacCallum-Stewart have put into commissioning and assembling a volume that ambitiously seeks to chart not only...

The state of our current world has brought about a very active discussion concerning possible alternatives to our current society. In this article, I wish to consider Marx's idea of communism as a possible alternative, by understanding it as an undetermined concept that only proposes a society without classes and private property. The thesis I will defend here is that we can meaningfully think about such an alternative through the means of Science Fiction literature. In particular, I will take Ursula Le Guin's The Dispossessed (2006) as a case study. To clarify this relation between science fiction (SF) literature and communism as a particular case of an alternative society, I will introduce some concepts of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological theory. Thus, I shall argue that in SF we can presentify in bounded phantasy an alternative lifeworld, so furnishing with content the undetermined idea, and in doing so, strengthen the belief in the possibility of such an alternative society

پدیده شناسی هوسرل را می‌توان فلسفه‌ای معطوف به معنا دانست (چگونه چیزها معنا می‌یابند و مبنای تمایز میان معناهای مختلف چیست؟). پدیده شناس در سویه‌ رادیکالِ روش خود، امر بدیهی را به پرسش می‌کشد تا معنای آن را در فرایندی روشن و متقن از نو تحلیل و تقویم کند. در چنین رویکردی ادراک و «اکنونِ» آن اهمیت مرکزی دارند، چرا که آشکارگی در مواجهه مستقیم (ادراک) محقق می شود. آنچه مسئله  تخیل و تصویر را  در پدیده شناسی به هم پیوند می دهد، نسبت هردوی آن‌ها با ادراک است: مرکز ثقلِ ادراک زمانِ حال است، در حالیکه چه در تخیل و چه در آگاهی به تصویر، مواجهه ما با چیزی است که نه به مانند ادراک حاضر و نه کاملا غایب است. پرسش اینجاست که در تخیل چه اتفاقی می افتد؟ آیا آنچه در مبنا از ادراک اخذ شده بود، دستخوش بازی خیال می شود یا آنکه تخیل را خود سهمی شناختی است؟

بعد از دوره ای که درباره پدیده شناسی مکان داشتیم، به سراغ درس گفتارهای هوسرل درباره پدیده شناسی تخیل و تصویر ایراد شده در سال های ۱۹۰۴ و ۱۹۰۵ و یادداشت‌های پیوست شده به آنها می‌رویم. مبنای جلسات ما جلد بیست و سوم مجموعه آثار هوسرل Husserliana XXIII خواهد بود.

In this paper I draw from Husserl's lectures on ethics and manuscripts on phantasy to clarify the role and the structure of aesthetic education within a phenom-enological theory of experience. First, I show that Husserl's take on emotions as material contents of value experiences involves the problem of justifying the validity of the relation between factual emotions and ideal values. I then suggest, on the basis of some of Husserl's phenomenological claims on phantasy, that this discrepancy can be bridged through the enjoyment of art: that is, through a process of aesthetic education. I will focus, as Husserl does, on theatre as a case study. His approach to the experience of theatre provides the possibility of an education of emotions by helping the spectator to explore the eidetic structure of emotional states in their individuality, but regardless of their isolated here and now (that is, of their facticity). After a presentation of the elements that play into the phenomenologi-cal perspective, the first part of the argument refers to the last chapters of Husserl's Einlei-tung in die Ethik (1920/1924). The second part focuses on a 1918 manuscript. I conclude by hinting at the possibility of widening Husserl's account of aesthetic education beyond the experience of theatre.

[EN] This article explores the notion of fictional world from the viewpoint of Edmund Husserl's philosophy, highlighting the potentiality of phenomenology for contributing to the fields of aesthetics and theory of fiction. To this aim, the analysis will depart from the description of the structures of the fictional experience, which here is going to be treated as a phantasy experience. From this standpoint, the analysis first makes visible the correlation between phantasy consciousness and phantasy world and, next, explains the structures of each of the poles of experience. For Husserl, this correlation is logically grounded on the doctrine of transcendental idealism and its conception of the phantasy world as a possible world.

У раду се разматра теорија фантастичне књижевности савременог немачког теоретичара књижевности Увеа Дурста, теорија која се надовезује, али уједно представља и оштру критику теоријске позиције Цветана Тодорова. Исто тако, у раду се разматрају
и неке сличне савремене књижевнотеоријске позиције, као што је феноменолошка или позиција филозофије знака, које свеколику књижевност посматрају као аутономну и фантастичну. Основне методе овог рада су херменеутичка и феноменолошка. Раздвајање
књижевности на ’реалистичку’ и ’нереалистичку’, тј. на књижевност која одражава стварност и ону која ово избегава, доводи до ишчезнућа разлике између фикције и стварности, па је отуда у погледу фантастичног ирелевантно да ли се закони приповеданог света, који су нарушени елементима страним конвенцији, заснивају на емпиријској реалности или се не заснивају.

My talk will focus on an ethical declination of Husserl’s phenomenology of phantasy and emotions. The role that emotions play in Husserl’s late work on ethics is well-known. However, in the effort of clarifying the role of emotions within a phenomenology of the ethical sphere, many puzzling issues arise. Some of these issues are particularly troubling, not only for Husserl’s ethics but even for the possibility of phenomenological ethics as a whole.
The key problem appears to be the following: how can factual emotional states contribute to the establishment of a rational law of the will? I will argue that Husserl’s phenomenology of phantasy can in fact provide an account of fictional emotions such that a certain phantasy experience (that is, the artistic experience) can help bridge the gap between the contingency of factual emotional states and the necessity of the eidetic laws of the ethical sphere.
After trying to outline the issue, I will characterize phantasy as a quasi-experience (quasi-Erfahrung), emphasizing both its neutrality with respect to facticity (i. e., positing of real existence) and its a priori relation with actual emotional experiences. I will then consider how a certain type of this quasi-experience finds a privileged field of expression within art. Lastly, I will propose that, when experienced through art, fictional emotions can effectively deepen and articulate our experience of actual emotions through education.
Artistic experience will be presented both as the field of expression of a specific declination of phantasy and as a pivotal moment of this education process. Education will be presented as a moment of integration between aesthetics and ethics: as an interested, practical use of disinterested aesthetic contemplation, so to speak. The possibility of this integration stems from the consideration that our praxis can profitably and repeatedly incorporate a reflexive, “disinterested” aesthetic moment. In the possibility of this unending refinement of our quasi-experience of emotions lies the opportunity for an exploration of emotions as structured material contents and motivations of the will.
I will conclude my talk by suggesting a possible use of this perspective within the current debate about fictional objects. I will also point out how the idea of an education of emotions through phantasy could contribute to a unitary interpretation of Husserl’s ethical investigations.

This article proposes a model for analyzing transformations of phantasy formations triggered by radical social change. Phantasy has been rarely addressed by scholars studying radical social change, yet it is a key social element that functions as the “glue” that keeps a community together. Trauma associated with radical social change, such as revolution, market collapse, radical economic reform, genocide, or acts of terrorism, has the potential radically to transform phantasy formations. This is the case because trauma is a sudden opening between registers that were once discrete, the opening of which facilitates unforeseen connections (Luckhurst 2008). After discussing radical social change as a traumatic event, and three key elements of phantasy, that is, discourse, topography of commonplaces, and structure of phantasy, this article proposes four ways in which trauma can be dealt with in phantasy formations.

This Summer School will focus on imagination and fantasy in Husserl’s phenomenology. The topics of the courses will be fantasy as a case of intentionality, the relation of fantasy and image consciousness, seeing of essences and eidetic variation, fantasy as cognitive function, body-fantasy and the second-person perspective, fantasy in non-linguistic thinking, fantasy and understanding others, motivation, Sartre and Ricoeur on fantasy and the relation of fantasy, feeling and sociality.

These topics will be presented in lectures, each day in the time 10-13.00 including discussions. On two afternoons in the time 15-17.00 there will be a textual analysis that should go into some details and in this way enhance the understanding.
Beside this on two afternoons there will be the possibility to present own doctoral research in short presentations of 10-15 minutes. Because of the limited time please indicate to us if you would like to present your project.

The lecturers are: Prof. Dr. Saulius Geniusas (Chinese University of Hongkong), Prof. Dr. Andrea Staiti (Boston College/Cologne), Jun. Prof. Thiemo Breyer (A.R.T.E.S. Cologne), Dr. J. Brudzinska (Köln / Warschau), Prof. Dr. Alice Pugliese (Palermo), Prof. Dr. D. Lohmar (Köln), Dr. Emanuele Caminada (a.r.t.e.s. Cologne), Marco Cavallaro (a.r.t.e.s. Cologne).

We are planning for a medium level that should inform intensively on the different aspects of fantasy in Husserl’s phenomenology but we are also open for discussions of questions on the level of doctoral students and postdocs.

This course will be also handled as a "Hauptseminar" for the students of Cologne University. For students of the University of Cologne who want to reach a qualified certificate for this Hauptseminar a written paper on a topic to be determined is expected.

This international Summer School is open for students from all countries. The courses will be held in English and German.

Because we have no financial support to offer for participants we strongly encourage you to apply for short term grants at your university or other institutions.

Notes about phantasy and praxis in Th. W. Adorno. In Adorno’s gnoseology, fantasy carries out an essential task. It allows thought to keep reality at a distance in a critical way, thus making its interpretation and therefore its knowledge possible. At the level of the social critique, Adorno observes a contraction (restriction) of fantasy – especially in Minima Moralia and in his writings on the crisis of the subject, in the early 1940s – that seriously influences the dynamics of progressive alienation and reification of individuals in mass society. This involves real anthropological changes that substantially alter the possibility of knowing and experiencing reality, of understanding and elaborating experience. Only can the thought that doesn’t renounce to the role of fantasy  give rise to an authentic critical consciousness of reality, able to demand a transformation of reality itself.

Yaoi/BL Fandom Survey (only takes 10 mins to complete): https://leeds.onlinesurveys.ac.uk/blfandomsurvey
Extract from draft:-
Almost Crying: The ‘Doll’ in Non-Fantasy Boys’ Love
In order to understand some of the specific affordances of the fantasy genre for BL, it is useful to compare Hybrid Child with a non-fantasy BL story with the same central ‘doll’ trope. Almost Crying by Mako Takahashi was first published in Japanese in 2002 and in English in 2006. It is a one-book manga consisting of eight separate stories all set in a seemingly contemporary Japan with improbable, but non-fantastical, plots. In Celluloid Closet , Takaido has lost his beloved doll and is overjoyed to find her in the Lily -look-a-like Sakurada.
Celluloid Closet: Sakurada and Takaido
No, not just like her. He is her! Ever since my Lily mysteriously disappeared from my closet, I’ve been searching for her! This is a fated reunion! Of course I had to hug her!

Sakurada has started working in a toy shop after school. Takaido comes in every restocking day to search the shelves. Sakurada asks if he is looking for something. To Sakurada’s horror, Takaido hugs him with joy: “Lily! I’ve finally found you!” A photo reveals that Sakurada does, indeed, look very like the lost Lily-doll and the security guard finds Takaido’s bag to be stuffed with toys: “They keep me from being lonely.” Takaido begins to work at the toy shop and is very attentive to Sakurada. Sakurada is annoyed but tolerates his ministrations, although this does not include wearing a Lily outfit that Takaido brings to work. Sakurada is overjoyed when he finds that the Lily-doll is being re-released and Takaido tries to be happy when he is told the news. However, Sakurada begins to feel despondent that he was “just a substitute for the doll” and begins to cold-shoulder Takaido. Takaido forcible carries Sakurada to his house where Sakurada discovers that Takaido has already found his Lily-doll but has not stopped loving him. Sakurada then accepts that they have a relationship. However he still refuses to wear Lily clothes.
The paranoid-schizoid position – stuck in a ‘good’ place
Whereas the Hybrid Child stories can be viewed as explorations of the depressive position, Celluloid Closet can be understood as a parody of a relationship founded on the paranoid-schizoid functioning of one partner. Young children’s object relations are often facilitated by a ‘transitional object’ – usually a blanket, doll, or soft toy - which acts as an intermediary between their internal good object and developing, more realistic but also increasingly, ambivalent relationships with external whole objects (Winnicot, 1964). Older children and adults can continue to use a transitional object invested with the qualities of the ‘loved object’ to provide reassurance, required less with increasing integration of a good object within the ego. Takaido’s Lily-doll appears to be such a transitional object.
What is unusual about this scenario is that, when Takaido misplaces Lily, he transfers the projection onto a stranger with similar physical characteristics in a particularly distorting way such that “the early primitive ideal is clung to, controlled and transfixed in its primitive, all-giving form in order to avoid reality” (Likierman, 2001, p.96). This is an extreme defence against depressive integration of good and bad part-objects and Takaido wards-off the loneliness of the ‘loss of the loved object’ through clinging to paranoid-schizoid forms of relating. Sakurada at first rejects the projection, then tolerates it, and eventually is worn down by the intensity of Takaido’s passion. Circumstances provide Takaido the opportunity to mature through developing an intense relationship with a person whose agency might catalyse modification of unconscious phantasy in the direction of more reality-based relating. However, the story ends with Takaido still largely unable to distinguish Sakurada from his internal loved object and omnipotent disavowal of his separate existence.

Imagination as a problem of evolutionary epistemology is in the
focus of attention of the authors of the book. Achievements of the modern cognitive science, life sciences, and neuroscience are involved in the analysis of this traditional epistemological problem, i.e. the problem is under discussion here in the interdisciplinary prospects. The ability of productive imagination is considered in the connection with the newest studies in creativity, the human creative capabilities. The consideration
of imagination is placed in the context of the modern discussions of mental imagery, of perceptive thinking, of the role of visualization in mind's games, in the mental processes which take place in different states of consciousness. Imagination is studied in connection with the problems of individual, bodily and spiritual, cultural and social components of the cognitive processes.

В центре внимания авторов сборника - воображение как проблема эволюционной эпистемологии. К анализу этой традиционной для эпистемологии проблемы привлекаются данные современных когнитивных наук, наук о жизни, нейронауки, т. е. проблема обсуждается в междисциплинарной перспективе. Способность продуктивного воображения рассматривается в связи с новейшими исследованиями креативности, творческих способностей человека. Исследование воображения помещается в контекст современных дискуссий о ментальных образах, перцептивном мышлении, роли визуализации, встроенной в игры разума, в ментальные процессы, происходящие в различных состояниях сознания. Воображение исследуется в связи проблемами индивидуальной, телесной и духовной, культурной и
социальной составляющих познавательных процессов.

Taking Freud's "Creative Writers and Daydreaming" as a starting point, the paper draws on interviews with contemporary artists to trace the trajectory of the artist's creative process. It critiques Freud's paper in the light of the writings of other psychoanalysts including Donald Winnicott, Marion Milner and Christopher Bollas.

I present some aspects of Sein und Zeit’s phenomenology of possibility as a key feature of Heidegger’s theoretical confrontation with the crisis of European culture. I draw from paragraphs 73-74 for an inquiry into the relation between possibility and historicity within the structure of the Dasein. Specifically, I consider the concept of repetition in light of Heidegger’s idea that authentic historicity is to be grounded in temporality. Many interpreters found the concept of repetition to be the mark of a conservative conception of history. However, I ague that this is not the case. The concrete act of repetition involves all moments of the temporal horizon – even the future. If we can find our concrete possibilities of action only within our contingent historical situation, the act of repetition is always also a decision for a certain contingent future. This future is radically unpredictable. It is neither identical to the (repeated) possibility of the past, nor definable through rigid normative laws or dogmatic political positions. I then examine the concept of being-towards-death as a heuristic instrument for the task of historical decision. I argue that this ontological structure allows for a critical use of Sein und Zeit’s fundamental ontology. By deciding towards our death, we decide towards the entirety of our existence. This decision is a possible response to the crisis of culture: in front of the rationalization, the atomization and disenchantment of our experience of the world, we can react by perpetually trying to invent new possible forms of reconciliation between the values of our historical Gemeinschaft and the essential novelty of the future. I conclude by presenting Richir’s Phénoménologie et Institution symbolique as an elaboration of this suggestion and as a path for a possible renewal of Heidegger’s critical phenomenology of possibility.

Snyder's 'Sucker Punch' would seem to offer audiences the same type of phallocentric pleasure first articulated by Laura Mulvey in her essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”. This analysis aims to complicate such an assumption by reconceptualising Mulvey’s psychoanalytic theorisation of “the male gaze” not as an act of scopic domination but as patriarchal fantasy that masks the impossibility of the subject’s desire. By showcasing that fantasy impulse throughout its narrative, Sucker Punch manifests its own phallocentric discourses, alerting the spectator to their own “looked-at-ness” as the women on screen become not fetishised objects but instead manifestations of the objet petit a.

Walter Benjamin es uno de los filósofos más influyentes del siglo XX y, asimismo, es uno de los mayores exponentes de la Teoría Critica. Sus postulados acerca de la filosofía de la historia, la teoría del lenguaje, la estética, entre otros, han catapultado al pensador berlinés hacia el reconocimiento y el respeto por parte de profesionales de diversas áreas de estudio. Aun así, se hace latente una dimensión del pensamiento benjaminiano que, en comparación con otros aportes realizados por el autor, no ha sido tratada con la misma profundidad y exhaustividad entre la crítica especializada. Esta es: la importancia que posee la niñez, la mimesis y la phantasie a la hora de examinar la sociedad en la que se vive. Lo anterior es de sorprender si se tiene en cuenta lo fundamentales que son dichas ideas a la hora de tratar con otras nociones de Benjamin, como lo son el ensueño de la cultura de masas o su concepción de la experiencia. Ya que, para él, la relevancia de la niñez es tal que en ella se da una oportunidad de liberar al ser humano de la mitificación y la opresión propia de la Ilustración y la modernidad, modificando –para ello- el modo en que las personas se están relacionando con el mundo y las fuerzas de producción. Mejor dicho, por medio de la infancia, se podría -y se puede, desde luego- replantear el modo en que la humanidad concibe su experiencia. En ese sentido, el autor dedica varios escritos a examinar aquel fenómeno mediante las implicaciones que la phantasie tiene en la vida del infante y, con ello, también en la vida del adulto. Esto debido a que es por medio de la fantasía y la facultad mimética -experimentadas de sobremanera al momento de jugar- que el niño va fortaleciendo sus capacidades creativas e intelectuales, a la par que va desarrollando una posición crítica frente a la cotidianidad. Pues, no está de más aclarar que la libertad al momento de fantasear crea la posibilidad latente de replantear el mundo en el que se habita. Lamentablemente, la sociedad tanto en la época de Benjamin, como en la actualidad, ha manejado ciertos modelos de adiestramiento que terminan por socavar la phantasie del menor y coaccionando su imaginación. Aquello puede hacerse evidente en la constante necesidad de criar niños como si de adultos en miniatura se tratara, ya que, en vez de sacar provecho a la vivacidad y las ganas de jugar que la juventud trae consigo, buscan recluir a la infancia dentro de una actitud pasiva y sumisa. Por tal motivo, surge el interés del alemán por cuestionar la formación recibida por el menor y, a su vez, pensar la educación que en realidad se debería brindar para que la infancia pudiera cumplir con su respectiva misión liberadora. De esta forma, el presente texto se dedica a examinar la postura del autor respecto a la relación entre educación, phantasie e infancia. Evidenciando, como consecuencia, la relevancia que la fantasía tiene en la educación de la niñez. De modo que esta ponencia se divide en dos secciones: una dedicada al vínculo entre la infancia y la phantasie y otra dedicada al Proyecto de un teatro infantil proletario. Esto último radica en la apuesta de Benjamin por un plan educativo que no impida el desenvolvimiento del niño por medio del juego y la imaginación. Así pues, el lector se encontrará con una dimensión filosófica y didáctica que permitirá comprender, en alguna medida, el pensamiento de Walter Benjamin sobre la infancia y el papel que ella desempeña al concebir el porvenir de la sociedad.

The article aims to distinguish memory and fiction in Husserl’s early phenomenology and it reveals other concepts that are directly related to memory and fiction. What is the role of and the connection between perception, memory, imagination, fantasy, and expectation in the phenomenological context?
The memory from the Husserl’s early philosophy is associated with the experience of the past. Husserl shows, that every act of consciousness is intentional, that is, that the consciousness has a direct connection to the objects. The intentional object are contained in mental acts. But according to Husserl, this cannot be done, because the believe that mathematics is contained in temporal acts of thinking is meaningless. The numbers, the figures, the laws are not psychological objects, because the same object can be understood as in a different intentional acts, there is no identity between act and object.
Every act of consciousness has direct connection to the objects, memory is not an exception to this rule. The article shows why memory is a part of the intentional acts.