Ripeness Theory

This paper offers a theoretical perspective on the relationship between ripeness theory and readiness theory within the structuralism paradigm of international mediation as a part of international conflict resolution. In order to do so, it explains the foundations of international mediation and these theories in question, discusses their primary notions and further argues and offers some practical generalizations for conflict analysis. It suggests that, first using readiness theory to understand each party separately, then using ripeness theory to map the bilateral coordination may be a better way to grasp basic foundations and change dynamics of the conflict to catch the 'ripe' moment.

Ripeness theory advocates that the promotion of certain conditions in regional conflicts that can increase the chance for a ‘ripe moment’ in which parties involved willingly pursue negotiations to de-escalate violence. Can ripeness theory be applied to the Islamic State to increase the chances of
conflict de-escalation? This paper will argue that ripeness theory is a useful framework for conflict resolution generally speaking and is compatible with the Islamic State specifically. Integrating ripeness theory tenets with the Islamic State is not flawless, with some tenets of ripeness not being
applicable in the current environment. In spite of this, ripeness theory can be shown, in totality, to be an effective tool for actors to leverage to increase the probability of a ‘ripe moment’ occurring with
the Islamic State.

Building on the existing notions of 'push and pull' in ripeness theory-the perceptions of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) and of a Way Out (WO)-this article aims to explore a less scrutinized third element which proves to be essential for ripeness to achieve its full potential: the perception of Mutually Enticing Opportunities (MEO). While the MHS has the capacity to disincentivize the conflicting parties from further pursuing confrontational strategies, and the WO may embolden them to explore negotiations as a viable alternative, neither one guarantees that what is negotiated will be sufficiently attractive for the parties to truly commit to the peacemaking process and see the negotiated agreement come through and make it endure in time. This article will provide conceptual clarity about the MEOs, by surveying four essential characteristics that need to exist for an opportunity to be truly mutually enticing: mutuality, exclusivity, interdependency, and cooperation. Furthermore, building on Zartman's earlier work on MEOs, the article will expound procedural and substantive elements that 'lock-in' the parties into the peacemaking process, by having their needs, interests and demands fulfilled by newly formulated solutions.

The conflict in Angola saw some of its most intense periods after the end of the Cold War, missing a favorable period of conflict resolution in this transition. This chapter analyzes the reasons that were behind the failure to reach a successful peace process at this specific time when Namibia worked out a peaceful solution but Angola failed with the Gbadolite initiative. The analysis uses a “ripeness” model focusing on agency and processes over the 1989 Gbadolite Accords and its immediate context of the 1988 New York Accords and the aftermath of the 1991 Bicesse Accords. It is proposed that there was a lack of “ripeness” in Angola. On one hand, a resolution of the Angola conflict was not essential to finding a regional solution for Southern Africa, and on the other hand, both parties, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), lacked the conditions to effectively engage in a political solution. Namely, the parties were monolithic, the military process had not reached a point of hurting stalemate, and the incentive structures in terms of oil and diamond wealth in the country hindered both party predispositions. It concludes that finding a point of “ripeness” might take time; it is an agency envisioned process and as such can be possible within virtual new solutions that accommodate old power concerns.

This paper offers a theoretical perspective on the relationship between ripeness theory and readiness theory within the structuralist paradigm of international mediation as a part of international conflict resolution. In order to do so, it explains the foundations of international mediation and these theories in question, discusses their primary notions and further argues and offers some practical generalizations for conflict analysis. It suggests that, first using readiness theory to understand each party separately, then using ripeness theory to map the bilateral coordination may be a better way to grasp basic foundations and change dynamics of the conflict to catch the ‘ripe’ moment.