Small Arms Control

As security continues to be a primary challenge in post-Qadhafi Libya, the availability of weapons to nearby opposition groups and armed insur- gencies is a source of major concern for Libya’s neighbours and the international community. Uncontrolled weapons proliferation and the rise of new armed groups have gone hand in hand across various conflict fronts. While what is known about weapons acquisition dynamics does not make it possible to establish a strict causal relationship, by observing variations in the various contexts, critical factors can be identified, such as the emergence of a protection market, the multiplication of tactical options and splintering processes, which facilitate comprehension of how greater circulation of weapons is related to regional volatility and destabilisation.

Conflict resolution ensures that peace is restored to conflict environments. Beyond this lies the need to manage the peace that was obtained via conflict resolution. Certain policies and structural institutions have emerged as key ingredients in managing peace. Redistribution of conflict resources and other structural reforms are crucial to the process which actively engages with peacebuilding and conflict transformation. This study comparatively examines the challenges to peace management in Nigeria and Liberia. It also interrogates the central role of small arms control in this process and how cooperative security, security sector reforms and institutional frameworks and structural reforms can enhance peace management. The paper argues that the absence of small arms can reduce the possibility of recourse to violence in settling disputes, however, the structural violence inherent in African societies retain the capabilities of sustaining demand-side aspects of small arms proliferation. This means that small arms control is futile without commensurate structural reforms.

In July 2001, member states will gather in New York for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade
in Arms in All its Aspects. It represents part of the effort to establish controls on small arms
and light weapons. This article argues that it is possible that nuclear and conventional arms
control represent two ends of a continuum, with common goals and a common set of
mechanisms and processes at work. A decade after the end of the Cold War, it is not surprising
that the international community is working on mechanisms to deal with conventional arms.
The existence of a continuum and connections between conventional and nuclear arms control
is less evident. The two arms coniml communities appear to function in isolation of each other.
The rehlrn to the debate on small arms and light weapons echces post-World War I and XI
periods, The fact that small arms control is back on the-agenda within the context of the UN
may signify recognition that any kind of arms control serves the same purpose - preventing
and mitigating the effects and duration of, and bringmg an end to conflict.

1. This Treaty hereby establishes a Secretariat to assist States Parties in the effective implementation of this Treaty. Pending the first meeting of the Conference of States Parties, a provisional Secretariat will be responsible for the administrative functions covered under this Treaty. 2. The Secretariat shall be adequately staffed. Staff shall have the necessary expertise to ensure that the Secretariat can effectively undertake the responsibilities described in paragraph 3. 3. The Secretariat shall be responsible to States Parties. Within a minimized structure, the Secretariat shall undertake the following responsibilities: (a) Receive, make available and distribute the reports as mandated by this Treaty; (b) Maintain and make available to States Parties the list of national points of contact; (c) Facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for Treaty implementation and promote international cooperation as requested; (d) Facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings under this Treaty; and (e) Perform other duties as decided by the Conferences of States Parties.

At far right, the image above appears to show a Belgian FN CAL (Carabine Automatique Légère; Light Automatic Carbine) rifle in the hands of fighters from the National Resistance Brigades, the paramilitary arm of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The DFLP are an extreme-left member group of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This image was shared by an official National Resistance Brigades social media account in 2014.
The CAL is a self-loading rifle chambered for the commonly encountered 5.56 x 45 mm cartridge. While not especially significant in terms of capability, the presence of the CAL rifle in a conflict zone is noteworthy to those interested in arms proliferation. Although the CAL’s predecessor, the FAL, is commonplace in many conflict and post-conflict regions, and particularly within the Middle East and Northern Africa, the CAL itself is largely unknown outside of Europe.

Executive Summary
1. Territorial conflicts in Southeastern Europe have hampered the implementation of international agreements on arms control and confidence- and security-building
measures (CSBMs) in disputed territories under the effective control of de facto regimes. These grey areas have resulted in uncertainties about the capabilities and
activities of irregular and stationed forces, produced unchecked risk perceptions and aggravated sub-regional instability and insecurity.
2. At the same time, disputes over the status of de facto regimes and host nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces in disputed territories have also obstructed the development of all-European arms control mechanisms and produced spillover effects detrimental to security and stability.
3. There is no unified opinion in international law about the position of de facto regimes. In ceasefire agreements and informal talks, de facto regimes are sometimes referred to as “parties to the conflict”, with limited rights and obligations. It is an incontrovertible fact that, in the absence of international recognition, only recognized
central governments are entitled to carry out state functions in international relations
and to exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations of States Parties to international agreements, such as arms control treaties and CSBMs. However, de facto regimes can
also be included in agreements if there is the political will to do so.
4. De facto regimes categorically reject central governments’ claims to implementing these rights in territories under their actual control, such as acting as the host state for observations of or collecting and distributing data on armaments, which are subject to international information exchanges or limitations and are held by
irregular forces. De facto regimes either want to exercise such rights themselves or deny that the disputed territories belong to the area of application of arms control and CSBM agreements.
5. Third states that have not recognized de facto regimes are not permitted by international law to neglect the positions of central governments seeking to implement such agreements in disputed territories, even if de facto regimes do not object to inspections on the spot. Thus, third states are not allowed to elevate their status by agreeing to procedures that would cede to their representatives' state functions, such as the rights of a “host state” (e.g. determining the points of
entry/exit, providing escort teams, signing inspection reports etc.).
6. Consequently, state-centric CSBMs can be implemented in disputed territories only if all sides involved are prepared to make compromises that value transparency and stability more highly than status-related positions. In practice, almost all attempts to bring about a compromise on mutually acceptable procedures have
failed.
7. The recognition by certain states of the independence of breakaway regions and
their claim that de facto regimes have provided “host nation consent” to the stationing
of forces in such territories have complicated the situation. By contrast, central
6 | CORE Working Paper 28
governments of internationally recognized states categorically reject this
interpretation and regard stationing in disputed territories as unlawful occupation in
violation of their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
8. Ceasefire agreements usually have only limited transparency and limitation
provisions, which are mainly confined to small, partially demilitarized, “security
zones” or “restricted weapon zones”. However, wider geographical areas, which are
relevant to transparency and the restraint of military capabilities and activities in the
sub-region, remain unrestricted and inaccessible. In the case of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) has access only to areas controlled by
the Georgian government adjoining the two breakaway regions.
9. Against this background, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs aim at enhancing
sub-regional security in and around disputed territories and creating a peaceful and
stable environment for talks without detriment to status-related positions of
principle by parties involved and without pre-empting the outcome of conflict
settlement processes, which will ultimately define the eventual political status of
such territories.
10. To that end, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs avoid any procedures and
terms that could be interpreted as providing political status, such as references to
state functions or rights and obligations reserved for states (“inspecting”/“inspected
state”, “host state”, official titles of persons, “borders” or contested geographical
names of disputed territories, etc.).
11. Consequently, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs should be formulated
beyond the existing framework of state-related international agreements. This
requires facilitation by an impartial third party that is trusted by both sides, such as a
neutral state, an international organization or a private enterprise. In such a
framework, status-bound functions and personnel would be replaced by statusneutral
functions and personnel.
12. Status-neutral arms control and CSBMs should provide for information,
observation and, as far as possible, limitation of certain military capabilities and
activities, particularly in areas close to the Lines of Contact. In such areas, reciprocity
of rights and obligations may be an indispensable condition for an agreement,
provided it can be attained without compromising government positions that reject
equality vis-à-vis breakaway regions. At the same time, both sides may see the value
of increasing trust and stability and, thus, enhancing security in a fragile political
environment without relinquishing status-related positions of principle.
13. To ensure smooth implementation, avoid misunderstandings and prevent
escalation, the establishment of an impartial coordination and conflict resolution
mechanism is advisable. It can be linked to existing informal formats geared to
enhancing the implementation of ceasefire agreements or other relevant mechanisms
to prevent and respond to incidents.
14. This paper discusses the limitations of existing international arms control and
CSBM agreements and outlines, in considerable detail, a status-neutral approach
towards increasing security and stability in and around disputed territories. An
illustrative example of how such an approach could be modelled is given in the
annex.

JURIST Guest Columnist Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, of Bournemouth University in the UK, discusses the present use of incendiary weapons within its legal framework and why the use of such weapons is most likely to continue, as a response to Human Rights Watch's call to end incendiary weapon use in Ukraine and Syria ...

Distinct patterns of small arms proliferation have emerged over four decades of Nigeria’s turbulent history. Each pattern is essentially qualified by its primary source and sustained by the viability of such sources. The paper essentially identifies three patterns namely conflict, state security and local economic patterns of small arms proliferation. It attempts an analysis of the determinant factors behind the volume of each pattern and argues that proliferation levels change with the dominant patterns and as such control measures can also adopt methods reflecting the nature and patterns of small arms proliferation. This is because each pattern provides a unique control approach. A massive flow of weapons was recorded during the Nigerian Civil War, however the state security and conflict patterns that this early levels of proliferation adopted made control more effective over a given period. This however cannot be said for more recent local economic patterns of proliferation that have become pronounced due to the parallel growth in the other two patterns. The paper advocates that control strategies focused on local craft and state production may significantly impact Small arms and Light weapons control in Nigeria.