Non-Intervention

Em 1955, chefes de Estado de 29 nações asiáticas e africanas e representantes de movimentos de libertação reuniram-se em Bandung, Indonésia. Pela primeira vez, uma significativa parcela da Humanidade, antes marginalizada, fez ouvir a sua voz, rejeitando o enquadramento na rígida racionalidade da Guerra Fria. O “espírito de Bandung” marcou o processo de libertação do mundo colonial, colocando ênfase no “respeito à soberania e integridade territorial de todas as nações” e na defesa da “não intervenção”. O artigo analisa o legado dessa conferência, realizada no marco da Guerra Fria, em particular a alternativa apresentada à divisão ideológica Leste-Oeste.

ABSTRACT
In 1955, heads of state from 29 Asian and African nations and representatives of liberation movements met in Bandung, Indonesia. For the first time, a significant part of humanity, previously marginalized, made its voice heard, rejecting the framing of the rigid rationality of the Cold War. The "spirit of Bandung" featured  the process of liberation of the colonial world, emphasizing "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations" and the defense of "non intervention". The article analyzes the legacy of this conference, held during the Cold War, particularly the alternative presented to the East-West ideological division.

This paper examines the recent practice concerning the relationship
between the Order of Malta and the Holy See with the aim to better define the relationship between the Order of Malta and Italy. It is widely known that in Italy both the judiciary and the executive power qualify the Order as a subject of international law. In particular, to provide the Order with immunities and privileges, the judiciary has often relied on the alleged premise of its international legal personality. The same presupposition has been applied by the Italian Government to justify the stipulation of some “agreements” with the Order. The analysis of the references to the Holy See in the new Constitutional Charter of the Order and of the recent interventions of the Holy See in the internal affairs of the Order shows that the Order legally depends on the Holy See and that the aforementioned Italian practice does not rely on legal bases but on a sort of tradition.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the participation of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian volunteers in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). To build up this historical tale, diverse documentary sources have been processed in order to converge in a common narrative. A topic which remained lost in the oblivion finds nowadays a well documented base over which narrate the feat of the Baltic brigadistas. Meanwhile the authoritarian governments of the all three Baltic States declared themselves neutral towards the Spanish conflict (as most of the European states), took place the mobilization of a peculiar generation of young men and women who understood the conflict of Spain as a struggle against International Nazi-Fascism in an universal dimension. They left their daily routines, girlfriends, families, homes and rolled up in a foreign country to kill and die for. About 900 Baltic volunteers reached Spain intensely since 1937 and joined regular military units, the International Brigades. In terms of numbers their participation was small, but in percentage and narrative terms, their story is
very illustrative. Not all the Baltic volunteers who fought in the Republican side served in the IB. Soviet Union involved in the Spanish Civil War, and a whole intervention mission was launched under Stalin's orders. About 2.000 Soviet officers served in Spain as advisors, instructors, technics or fighters. A considerable group of them were Latvians. Despite being a tremendous and fascinating topic, the existing bibliography about it is very scarce. This study begins filling this literature gap, joining together the existing materials, which combined with documentary sources allow us to make a picture about the Baltics who volunteered for Spain in those uncertain beats of the History.

Key words: Second Spanish Republic, Spanish Civil War, International Brigades, Baltic
volunteers, Comintern, Antifascism, Soviet participation, Non-Intervention Pact.

Military intervention in internal conflicts represents a recurrent practice in international history. This thesis provides a theoretical framework for the study of the political and sociological processes that lead political elites to militarily intervene in internal conflicts. Following the renewed interest in political elites both in Sociology and International Relations, the thesis draws on Elite Theory to address the dual nature of political elites as both domestic and international actors. In doing so, it develops a framework for the study of military intervention centred on political elites that overcomes the limits of existing contributions on the subject. In particular, the thesis highlights how interventionary policies are shaped by three overlapping causal antecedents: elites’ contending ideological claims; elites’ struggle for both domestic and international power; and the relationship established by the intervener’s elite with elite and counter- elite groups in the target state. The thesis tests the plausibility of the proposed framework by examining US decisions in three cases: US intervention in the Cuban War of Independence (1898-1902); US intervention in the Russian Civil War (1918-1920); and US non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). This analysis highlights three elements. First, ideological considerations set significant limits to US cooperation with leaders in the target country despite the strategic rationale for cooperation against common enemies. Second, the interplay between international and domestic political considerations represented a fundamental ‘push factor’, shaping the objectives US elites sought. Third, foreign elite groups played a crucial role in ‘pulling’ US interventions, both by representing local allies instrumental to Washington’s objectives and by directly accessing and influencing US decision-making processes. For the same reasons, the lack of these push and pull factors are key to explaining US non-intervention in the Spanish case. Overall, the thesis offers a twofold contribution to the study of military intervention. First, it explores how military intervention permits decision- makers to affect the ‘circulation of elites’ in both their own societies and in other societies. Second, it indicates how military intervention affects the international system by altering ideological homogeneity, international alliances and hierarchical relations between elites.

El objetivo de este trabajo es realizar un análisis coyuntural de la presentación efectuada por el Gobierno de facto de Honduras ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ), en la que demanda a Brasil por haber violado el principio de no intervención.

This article examines Indonesia’s reactions towards regional haze management efforts between October 2006 and September 2007. Two significant developments occurred during this time, drawing attention to Indonesia’s sovereignty sensitivities. Firstly, while Indonesia at first seemed to be moving towards ratification of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, it abruptly decided to set up a special commitee to study the treaty, effectively halting the parliamentary ratification process. Secondly, after asking for regional help by inviting ASEAN member countries to assist areas of their choosing, Indonesia later refused to approve their proposals. The article argues that Indonesia is reluctant to give up control over its sovereignty due to the shadow of a bloody colonial history, bitter foreign interventionist experiences, territorial disputes with its neighbours, and ongoing internal conflicts,. External non-intervention is especially important to Indonesia now, in the process of decentralizing and dealing with the arising internal complications, especially those involving forest resources. The paper concludes that these developments could be part of a bigger attempt by Indonesia to regain its past glory as the de facto leader of ASEAN, enabling it to use its influence to strengthen the non-interference principle to protect its sovereignty during the delicate decentralization process.

Cross border investigations are essential for fighting cybercrimes due to the globalization of the Internet, especially with the anonymity and decentralization aspects of dark web and blockchain technologies. However, this extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction clearly collides with international duties of jurisdiction, state sovereignty and non-intervention. This issue has been discussed by the group of experts who wrote the Tallinn Manual. Despite this collision, the United States has amended its domestic law in a way that can be used to allow warrants for remote access to search electronic storage media and seize electronic evidence relevant to a criminal investigation regardless of jurisdiction. There are also clear examples of practice to this extraterritorial jurisdiction in the investigations of Silk Road and Playpen and a NIT warrant issued by a magistrate judge in Colorado. A newly enacted Egyptian law for fighting cybercrimes also can be used to allow such warrants to be issued. These advancements to domestic laws and state practice in the area of cyber investigations and the absence of disagreement by another state or tension in international relations, this paper argues, are currently pushing to create a new customary international law with an exception to the general norms. This exception, as this paper argues, that is being formed currently by state actions and domestic laws, will allow cross border investigative behavior by one state, that involves remotely accessing electronic storage media and collection of electronic evidence from private computers located in the territory of another state without its prior authorization, especially in the dark web and the blockchain network without violation to international duties to a certain extent.

China's foreign policy has been long committed to a principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries. While one could easily point out past and present-day inconsistencies in its implementation, this article argues that defenders and critics of the principle both rely on a limited interpretation of ‘interference’ or ‘intervention’ based on an ideology of Westphalian sovereignty. Particularly problematic is the conceptual distinction between the ‘political’ or ‘diplomatic’, on the one hand, and the ‘economic’, on the other. As Polanyi's concept of embeddedness reminds us, markets, society and politics occur simultaneously, and can only act as discrete realms in epistemological abstractions. It is thus argued that non-interference is a semi-formal institution that governs China's diplomatic engagements and affects its economic activities. While the totality of China's interactions with the world has diverse and sometimes contradictory impacts on global governance, non-interference itself has apparent consequences for the rescaling of regional economic governance. Specifically, this article contends that Chinese non-interference results in the empowerment of political elites at national levels, and thus in the (re-)emergence of the nation state as a gatekeeper and facilitator of the advancement of capitalist enterprises. As a result, through non-intervention, China's foreign policy undermines supranational regulatory approaches and fosters state-based regional architectures.

Cyclone Nargis that hit Myanmar in May 2008 caused catastrophic destruction and the humanitarian situation in the country. Taking into account the specific nature of the military-based Myanmar government, this paper aims to answer four questions: (1) how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) managed to convince the Myanmar government to provide the nation with assistance in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis while initially it was quite reluctant to admit foreign aid into the country; (2) through what process ASEAN formed a tripartite core group with the UN and humanitarian groups; (3) how successful the core group’s three-year action plan was; and (4) how human insecurities arising from the humanitarian situation were addressed and handled by ASEAN and other relevant parties. Some critics have considered ASEAN’s response to the Cyclone Nargis disaster as fairly successful, and there have been debates on how the UN-endorsed concept of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) can be developed in the regional context, building on the humanitarian measures taken during the disaster, as the existing R2P does not include ‘natural disaster’  among its target areas. From such investigation, the paper seeks to make some contribution to the development of the new concept of human insecurity.

International law, as a body of rules governing the relations between States, is founded upon several principles that States should comply with in order to maintain peace and ensure the quality of their relations. 

What we understand by “principles that govern international law” are the principles stated in the 1970 “Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”.

However, as we will see further, the said principles were already existing previously to this declaration, should it be in treaties, customary law, general principles of law, judicial decisions and juristic writings. As such, we should not confuse what is meant by “principles that govern international law” with the “general principles of international law”, since the former are the substantive principles while the latter are a legal basis. 

Consequently, it should be noted that the “principles that govern international law” are to be found across all four legal bases available to he International Court of Justice as defined in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 38 (1).

However, before we start analyzing the said principles, it should also be noted that there is an absence of clarity on the legal status of the text embodying all those principles, namely the “Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”.  Indeed, it is not clear whether the declaration is a simple “recommendation” or a statement of legally binding rules. However, the fact that most of these principles were embodied in the Charter of the United Nation (a legally binding text) would point to the latter.

The principles governing international law are as follows: 1)Prohibition of the threat or use of force 2) Duty to settle disputes peacefully  3) Duty of non‐intervention 4) Duty to cooperate 5) Principle of equal rights and self‐determination of peoples 6) Principle of sovereign equality of States 7) Principle of good faith

In the first place, we will analyze the said principles governing international law, considering previous attempts to codify them

In the second place, we will analyze the principles contained in the “Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and Co‐operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” and their effectiveness in regulating state practice, from a critical perspective.

Memoria oficial frente a memorias autónomas: una perspectiva sobre las memorias de la actuación francesa ante la guerra civil española (segunda mitad del siglo XX)

Resumen: La actuación del Gobierno francés ante la guerra civil española (1936-1939), y especialmente ante el tráfico de armas en Francia, es un tema que sigue creando división hoy en día. En Francia, la memoria sobre esta actuación fue conservada por parte de los antiguos miembros del Gobierno del Frente Popular. De hecho, ellos fueron quienes tuvieron que prestar testimonio ante las comisiones judiciales y políticas y, después, ante historiadores franceses. Sus testimonios, sumados a publicaciones de memorias, han dado forma a una memoria específica de los acontecimientos. Con el tiempo, la manera de presentarlos ha cambiado: la «actuación» del Gobierno francés ante la República española acabó convirtiéndose en "ayuda" francesa. Nace como resultado una memoria oficial. Dicha memoria judicial, y luego histórica, es la que predominó en Francia. Sin embargo, conviene contrastarla con otras memorias más silenciosas, es decir, menos citadas en los grandes ensayos históricos. En ningún momento se mencionan en éstos las memorias de los militantes ni de los antiguos responsables españoles del tráfico de armas durante la guerra civil. Esto nos hace cuestionar las vías utilizadas en el proceso de conocimiento histórico.

I-La "ayuda francesa hacia España": una memoria de gabinete

II-"Todo nos lo negaba Léon Blum": memorias autónomas por una historia otra

Güncel bir tartışmanın bir devletin veya hükümetin tanınması ile ilgili olması, söz konusu
meseleyi doğrudan uluslararası hukukun kapsamına sokmaktadır. Çünkü tanıma kavramı,
politik olduğu kadar hukuki bir kavramdır. Bu çalışmada, tarihte benzeri yaşanmış olan
Venezüella’daki son gelişmeler uluslararası hukuk perspektifinden değerlendirilecek ve
Maduro veya Guiado’nun meşru devlet başkanı olarak tanınmasının uluslararası hukuk
açısından neye tekabül ettiği tartışılacaktır.

The cyber attack WannaCry, which occurred in May 2017, caused serious damages to international private companies and to more than 150 States located all over the world. After a preliminary description of the facts related to the attack, this article aims to frame it under the law of the international responsibility of States. More precisely, the objective and the subjective elements of the international wrongful act must be identified in the case at stake. Conclusively, by observing the extreme difficulty in attributing WannaCry’s conducts to a State, the article points out the potential relevance of the application of the general principle of due diligence in cyberspace, in order to find a juridical deterrent to the production and proliferation of malwares on the internet.

In 1954, China and India signed an agreement to enshrine the policy of non-interference as the cornerstone of their foreign relations. China, in particular, has championed non-interference as a key aspect of their international relations ever since. The definition of non-interference has been difficult to conceptualise, due to the changing attitudes and trends in the international system. This research defines the policy of ‘non-interference’ as deriving from the sovereign rights of a state, rooted in abstaining from any non-consensual political, coercive or economic intervention in another state’s internal affairs. China is required to intervene internationally under the ‘responsibility to protect’ principle if a state is disregarding the welfare of its citizens. However, in the 2003 humanitarian crisis in Darfur China strictly adhered to the traditional policy of non-interference, despite evidence that the government was enacting a genocide against civilians in the south. Chinas relations with Sudan and less than enthusiastic engagement with the international community during a humanitarian crisis led to intense criticism from multiple sources. In 2007, the Chinese position on intervention in Darfur changed, with Beijing supporting the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Sudan, against Khartoum’s wishes. Claims China violated non-interference derive firstly from Beijing’s pressuring the Sudanese government to accept the UN forces it explicitly did not want. Secondly, those initiating the rebellion in the south accused China of interfering in the civil war by transferring arms to the government who in turn were using the arms against civilians, despite the UN imposing multiple arms embargos. China had multiple self-interested reasons to act in Darfur, such as declining image resultant of international pressure, the 2008 Olympics and major stakes in Sudanese oil exploration. However, Beijing was hesitant to stray from its model of relation-building based on non-interference, as it had been the key to its success in forging relationships with African states. This analysis concludes that China did not violate its policy of non-interference, rather it strictly adhered to it. Pressuring the Sudanese government as a result of pressure from the international community and commitments to uphold a ‘responsibility to protect’ does not translate as interference. Rather, it translates to a paradigm of non-interference that Shanghai Professor Zhao Huasheng (2013) conceptualises as ‘constructive engagement’, best understood through a lens of constructivism.

This chapter investigates Brazils approach to norms about foreign intervention in international society. It does so from the perspective of the relationship between the country’s foreign policy and what has been frequently called the contemporary “liberal international order.” In particular, it seeks to specify and locate more precisely the potential disagreements Brazil has had historically with the enforcement of liberal norms in an international context.

This article proposes to explain the post-Cold War practice of humanitarian
intervention by drawing on the English School’s international society
approach. It argues that although the sovereignty versus human rights debate
traditionally was framed in dichotomized terms, the post-Cold War practice of
humanitarian intervention illustrated the possibility of a via media approach
to these competing normative claims. Post-Cold War developments regarding
the place of the conventional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention on the
one hand and the growing space for the protection of human rights on the other,
have eased worries about the prospect for order in the international system
and created a suitable environment for including of humanitarian intervention
without jeopardizing that order. To contextualize this development, the article
will argue that Hedley Bull’s discussion of such key terms as the international
society, the centrality of states, the importance of norms, and normative change
helps explain intervention in today’s world. By building on that framework, the
article draws attention to the enabling and constraining factors highlighted
by the international society approach, and as such, concludes that the
English school suggests both promise and caution regarding the prospects for
humanitarian intervention in modern international relations.

Cet article propose une lecture du premier moment, généralement négligé par les commentateurs, des « Quelques mots sur la non-intervention » de John Stuart Mill (1859). Il montre que loin qu’on puisse considérer ces pages comme l’apologie – quelque peu naïve – de la politique extérieure anglaise, il faut au contraire prendre au sérieux les propositions de leur auteur concernant l’opinion publique et la nécessité, pour les diplomates, de réformer leur langage. Il n’est ainsi possible de comprendre les visées émancipatrices de John Stuart Mill dans ce texte, qu’en saisissant quelles sont pour lui la nature de l’opinion publique et son rôle dans la fondation d’un « principe de non-intervention » efficace. Le retour aux textes de ses prédécesseurs, Bentham et James Mill, ont alors pour fonction d’éclairer le rôle nouveau et décisif de « l’esprit public » dans les relations internationales tel qu’il apparaît ici.

Few studies are dedicated to the concept of non-intervention, which is frequently equated with states' sovereignty-deduced right to independence. The paper consequently questions how, historically and discursively, the notion of non-intervention emerged and evolved. The research, investigating 'How has the conceptual system of (non)intervention been articulated and (de)constructed in international discursive practices between 1648 and 1815?' will be conducted as a Foucauldian archaeology. This theoretical framework suggests looking at the relations, continuities and discontinuities around discursive formations; here the one of 'non-intervention' defined as the 'external (non)interference in the internal affairs of a political entity'. Assumptions guiding the research suggest that 1) concepts of non-intervention and sovereignty did not emerge in a neat package during the Peace of Westphalia; 2) these concepts might have been disconnected and have evolved differently though time. Empirically, the paper qualitatively investigates several bodies of discourses (international treaties, lawyers, politicians and historians) around key historical junctures from the Peace of Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna, to uncover discursive practices having governed understandings of (non)intervention through time. This contribution fills the gap in our knowledge on the concept of non-intervention, contributing to the literature of International Relations and shedding a renewed light on key contemporary events.

The capacity for non-violent interaction acts as the most important professional competence of specialists in the socionomic (helping) sphere. In accordance with this, the problem of studying the factors determining future specialists’ propensity for coercion, manipulate, non-violence, and non-intervention becomes especially urgent. The objective of the work is to identify the psychological profile of the students that in the process of interaction tend to give preference to the methods of coercion or manipulation, non-violence and non-interference.
The study involved 407 students of Moscow Humanitarian and Cherepovets State Universities. Of these, 338 were females (83.05%), 69 (16.95%) were males, and the average age was 22 years. The study was conducted during 2018 and in the first half of 2019. The author’s questionnaires were used as the diagnostic tools to identify students’ interaction positions, irritability towards people, human sensitivity (interest, empathy, understanding, and help), danger and safety needs, sensitivity to threats, the ways of response in situations of danger, as well as tests and questionnaires used in psychology to identify the level of self-confidence, egocentrism, motivation to achieve success and avoid failure, risk appetite. The results were processed using the methods of mathematical statistics (t-Student criterion).
It was established that students who were inclined to use coercion (manipulation) were generally able to trust themselves, were moderately egocentric, irritable, they were not characterized by high sensitivity to people, the motivation for success achievement prevailed over the motivation for avoiding failures, they were capable of risk, they had a greater degree of the need for experiencing a sense of danger than the representatives of other groups, they were hardly sensitive to threats, and often neglected the danger. Students who were inclined to use non-violent means could also generally trust themselves, were not self-centered, not irritable, they had a high sensitivity to a person, especially the empathy and a willingness to help, the motivation for achieving success prevailed, they were able to take reasonable risks, the need for security dominated in them, they were sensitive to threats, and they preferred adequate methods of response in situations of danger. Students who were prone to nonintervention more often did not trust themselves, were self-centered, irritable, had a poor understanding of people, motivation to avoid failure prevails, along with the need for security, the need for experiencing a sense of security dominates, they were not sensitive to threats, therefore, they were ready to exaggerate the value of any danger.
The results can be used in the process of educational work arrangement at a university, as well as in the process of elaboration of special programs for developing the ability of non-violent interaction in future socionomic specialists.

Notions of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ and ‘the responsibility to protect’ are often framed as radical departures from the ‘traditional’ conception of sovereignty. Many assume that sovereignty has, until recently, entailed only rights and not responsibilities. In contrast, this article argues that sovereign authority has been understood to involve varied and evolving responsibilities since it was first articulated in the 16th and 17th centuries. It then traces the historical emergence of the tension between the right of sovereign states to be self-governing and free from outside interference and their responsibility to secure the safety of their populations. It cautions against a simplified story of ‘traditional’ sovereignty which reifies supposedly concrete and ahistorical rights of sovereigns while casting sovereign responsibilities as a morally abstract and late-arriving challenge.

The paper discusses the norm of self-determination as a core element of and a difficult challenge to international democracy promotion. Collective self-determination is part and parcel of the promise of democracy and, hence, of democracy promotion. Yet, at the same time, the idea that political communities should determine themselves clashes with democracy promotion’s aim to shape political orders from the outside. Given the scarce attention to the question of self-determination in the academic and political debates about democracy promotion, the paper is mainly of a conceptual and theoretical nature: Its aim is to review the literature on self-determination in order to clarify the concept – or, in fact, the competing concepts – of self-determination and discuss its relation with democracy in general and democracy promotion in particular. The paper (1) shows that the claim to collective self-determination constitutes a common normative denominator between contemporary opponents and supporters of democracy promotion; (2) reviews the range of conceptions of collective self-determination from a maximalist notion of liberal-democratic self-rule to a minimalist understanding of self-determination based on a rather broad notion of popular sovereignty; and (3) discusses implications for democracy promotion understood as the promotion of democratic self-determination.

Hispanglia's first session of 2020 analyses British interference in the Spanish Civil War, since both directly from Great Britain and through its colony of Gibraltar, it proved to be decisive in the contention and the consolidation of Franco in power under a dictatorial regime.

During his visit to Gibraltar in March 1935, Franco found the logistical support necessary to materialise the uprising, gaining an initial advantage that the Republican Government never managed to counteract. This interference did not end Franco's victory in 1939 but instead continued and determined Franco's policy for many years.

The conference will be given by the historian from Campo de Gibraltar José Beneroso Santos, writer of the book Franco en Gibraltar, marzo de 1935: antecedentes, desarrollo y consecuencias de una conspiración silenciada (Imagen: Tarifa, 2019).

Hispanglia is a programme that seeks to assert the contribution of the different characters that throughout history have contributed in some way to consolidate the visions shared by both countries. It comprises of a series of lectures in which the historical figures, their legacies and the importance of their contributions will be analysed deeply. Therefore, we will be inviting leading researchers and academics – both Spanish and British – to participate and who will offer insights on each of the historical figures.

Talk fully in Spanish. Free, just turn up.

Image Info: José Beneroso Santos

Non-interventionism was a guiding principle in Cold War era debates about the United States’ proper role in Latin American affairs, and it also serves as a paradigm for understanding inter-American cultural exchange during the period. The Latin American travels of composer, poet, and multimedia artist John Cage provide a means of exploring this. Cage’s writings about his visits to São Paulo and San Juan, as well as his correspondence with Latin American colleagues like Brazilian Poet Augusto de Campos, point to the ways in which Cage’s aesthetics of indeterminacy became a model for non-interventionist cultural diplomacy. This idealistic vision of hemispheric relations stands in stark contrast with the aggressive Cold War cultural policy initiatives that the US carried out throughout Latin America. However, as Cage’s reception at the 1985 Bienal de São Paulo indicates, non-interventionism’s manifestation as cultural practice became fraught in similar ways to its implementation as policy.

Análisis en profundidad de la situación en Haití que dio lugar a una acción armada de una fuerza multinacional para restituir al Gobierno legítimo y de la posible legitimación de la misma en el reconocimiento de un incipiente derecho de los pueblos a un régimen democrático en el Derecho internacional. Se muestra que el considerado como derecho humano a la participación política constituye una manifestación del derecho a la autodeterminación de los pueblos. Igualmente, se hace un estudio de la existencia de un reconocimiento del principio de régimen democrático en numerosos textos internacionales. La estrecha conexión entre la paz y la seguridad internacionales y los regímenes de carácter democrático aparece también constatada en la realidad social internacional. Sin embargo, se considera que, en el actual Derecho internacional, no puede entenderse que el principio de régimen democrático constituya una base para legitimar una acción armada destinada a restituir un Gobierno legitimo. No se descarta la posibilidad de emprender este tipo de acciones cuando la situación lleve aparejada una masiva violación de los derechos humanos fundamentales como en el caso de Haití.

The principle of non-intervention remains a significant legal issue, particularly in Asia, for regional efforts to address a wide range of transnational security issues in the absence of a regional collective security mechanism. This article revisits the principle of non-intervention with a particular focus on the application and interpretation of the principle by Asian states for the purpose of identifying whether and in what respect an Asian approach or approaches can be found, and considering its implications for regional efforts to address transnational security issues. This article finds that the emerging regional norm of comprehensive security requires clear demarcation between the principle of non-intervention and the norm of comprehensive security, as well as an institutionalized mechanism to ensure that regional efforts to address transnational security issues are not used as a disguised form of intervention and that the fear of intervention does not impede those regional efforts.

The traditional debate concerning humanitarian intervention has changed since the publication of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report. This thesis addresses both the debate before the publication of the R2P report and the report itself by examining in-depth ...