Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente

This article explores how the nationalist, business-centric, elite-led and labour-subsuming logics of development in contemporary China are mirrored in contingent and locally-mediated ways in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In China’s present ‘de-revolutionary’ moment [Wang, 2006], non-elite populations are conceived as labour inputs to be used and moulded in the pursuit of national development through market means. This same developmental ethos, mediated by a plethora of Chinese and non-Chinese actors, underpins the authoritarian tendencies of BRI-branded projects across the world. While authoritarian practices in China have both Leninist and capitalist genealogies and drivers, I argue here that Global China’s most tangible and remarkable impacts on international authoritarianism are found in the practices required to secure capital accumulation along the BRI.

In this commentary, I welcome An et al.’s (2021) commitment to explore the role of Confucian thought in the contemporary practices of statehood in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Nonetheless, I also take issue with the authors’ argument that a Confucian geopolitics is needed to replace inadequate ‘Western geopolitical frameworks’. Confucian philosophies promote a hierarchical social order based on authority and subordination, and the way in which they are selectively and strategically utilized in contemporary China represents an important subject of analysis. However, they should not be viewed as a framework of analysis, as they obscure rather than shed light on spatial and class struggles – even in the hybridized stylization endorsed by An et al. Critical political economic and critical geopolitical perspectives with a global theoretical orientation and a knowledge of place and culture offer more promise in the disentangling of state practices and social relations in the PRC.

The field of global international relations remains to a great extent aspirational and focussed on the critique of Western-centric perspectives or the appraisal of non-Western theories within their specific geographical and historical contexts. In this essay, we go a step further and transpose a set of Caribbean-based theories that gained prominence in the 1960s and 1970s to apply it to the study of China’s contemporary relations with the Caribbean Community, drawing broader implications for China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Caribbean’s tradition of critical and radical thought raises important questions about continuing epistemic dependency, structural impediments to development in small and highly open states, and a number of unresolved issues relating to the postcolonial condition in former plantation societies. Drawing upon these insights, we contend that the expectations placed on the emerging ‘South–South’ link with China are easily overstated, given China’s elitist business-centric approach to development, the eschewing of participatory approaches in Sino–Caribbean ventures and the passive incorporation of the Caribbean into China’s global vision.

This article studies what I describe as “state-coordinated investment partnerships,” an investment modality central to the deployment of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These partnerships bring together state and business actors to export overcapacity and address infrastructural demands in underdeveloped markets. To do so, they require accumulation and sovereignty regimes that mirror, in contingent ways, similar social arrangements within China. The superposition of such regimes and the interests and social imaginaries of local actors produces forms of uneven and combined development and shapes the contours of the BRI's emerging developmental and geoeconomic footprints. The BRI exports also an elite development paradigm which promotes urbanization, connectivity and economic growth over participatory approaches. This paradigm projects a depoliticized version of China's present into the BRI's future to justify social and environmental dislocations, and shields Chinese firms from civil society scrutiny. My analysis rejects this elite perspective and favors a labor-centric approach that unearths the social foundations of the BRI. From this perspective, despite relevant differences in format, the BRI's quintessential investment modality is closely aligned to a contemporary global current of public-private partnerships endeavored to mobilize public resources and state power for the expansion of capitalist social relations.

In this article we argue against influential analyses of neoliberalism that prioritize variegation and the role of ideas as key theoretical foci relevant to understanding neoliberalism’s diffusion into myriad national and political settings. Rather, we contend that crucial to understanding neoliberalism is the role of politically-produced convergence around market rationality that reflects two core processes: the reorganization of production and the ascendency of financialization. We present a theorization and analysis of neoliberalism’s political production and diffusion over time, explaining its contested evolution and impact across diverse settings (both ‘North’ and ‘South’) and emphasizing its ever-intensifying symbiotic relationship with the consolidating world market in which the former has increasingly come to serve as the latter’s operating system (OS). Further, we posit that neoliberalism’s form, function and impact demand analytically prioritizing the leverage of constellations of ideological and material interests within the contradictory context of consolidating relations of production and financialization. Our analysis thus challenges many previous expositions of neoliberalism for their failure to locate neoliberalism’s manifestation as arising out of social conflict within particular junctures that privilege certain social forces and ideas over others. We also distinguish our position by highlighting how manifestations of neoliberalism in various settings have combined to yield a greater world market in which variegation has gradually given way to ever-intensifying disciplinary pressures towards market-policy conformity (mono-policy). While current populist movements may well turn out to be important counter movements to neoliberal hegemony, especially if they can internationalize, the disciplining effect of the world market renders many nationally-oriented policy alternatives costly and politically fraught.

The liberal worldview is founded on two interlinked promises: the inherent capacity of markets to deliver prosperity and development globally; and the increased prospects for peace in contexts of inter-state integration along liberal institutional and market lines. This paper takes issue with the latter, now often prescribed as a remedy against the geopolitical instability brought about by unpredictable ‘populist’ leaders. While decades of neoliberal integration have brought nation-states closer together and engendered degrees and forms of inter-state equality within world market capitalism, populations across the world have fallen prey to the violence of markets and growing intra-state inequalities. In such a context, the contemporary rise of nationalism and populisms across the world is not some liberal order antithesis emerging from a vacuum, but rather a logical consequence of this liberal order, constituting an often reactionary ‘counter movement’ that cannot be tackled with prescriptions for increased market globalization. A focus on the everyday forms of violence fomented beyond the inter-state level by processes of marketization demonstrates that neoliberalism’s rescaling of violence and risk from the international stage down to the individual has resulted in the contemporary rise of illiberal politics and, indeed, new prospects for global peace.

Optimistic commentators welcome ‘the rise of the South’ as a phenomenon that will transform geopolitical architectures and development thought. This essay situates this alleged rise and ‘South–South relations’ within world market capitalism and discusses their liberating potential with a case study of Chinese mining investment in Ecuador. Despite the ostensibly differing approaches to development embodied in the Chinese and Ecuadorian alternatives to neoliberalism, the Mirador project reveals eerily familiar outcomes, dominated by visions of national modernization and business-state alliances that reproduce market inequalities and postcolonial exclusions. While the Mirador project grants significant economic clout to pursue development through redistributive means, it also attests to the role of the state in opening new market frontiers and securing conditions for transnational capital accumulation. I argue that in this context and similar ones, it is problematic to project the attributes of the South as a symbol of struggle for emancipation on to the nation-state. Although the South remains a useful concept, it should be understood as a space made up by those who are subject to diverse forms of oppression in the name of globalization and national development – a space that is reshaped by the works of the state in multiple and often contradictory ways.

China's foreign policy has been long committed to a principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries. While one could easily point out past and present-day inconsistencies in its implementation, this article argues that defenders and critics of the principle both rely on a limited interpretation of ‘interference’ or ‘intervention’ based on an ideology of Westphalian sovereignty. Particularly problematic is the conceptual distinction between the ‘political’ or ‘diplomatic’, on the one hand, and the ‘economic’, on the other. As Polanyi's concept of embeddedness reminds us, markets, society and politics occur simultaneously, and can only act as discrete realms in epistemological abstractions. It is thus argued that non-interference is a semi-formal institution that governs China's diplomatic engagements and affects its economic activities. While the totality of China's interactions with the world has diverse and sometimes contradictory impacts on global governance, non-interference itself has apparent consequences for the rescaling of regional economic governance. Specifically, this article contends that Chinese non-interference results in the empowerment of political elites at national levels, and thus in the (re-)emergence of the nation state as a gatekeeper and facilitator of the advancement of capitalist enterprises. As a result, through non-intervention, China's foreign policy undermines supranational regulatory approaches and fosters state-based regional architectures.

This article analyzes the developmental impact of two of the earliest investments made by Chinese companies in South America, the Shougang Corporation's mining activities in Peru and Andes Petroleum's oil extraction operations in Ecuador. The article draws attention to the importance of contextualizing and disaggregating instances of Chinese resource-based investment in order to adequately grasp the complexity of processes that are contingent to particular regimes of natural resource governance, companies' backgrounds, and the strength and nature of local reactions, among other factors. It thereby encourages a critical examination of Chinese investment in South America that explores how the characteristics of that investment are reshaped by the long and contested histories of resource extraction in the region, the promotion of and resistance to particular visions of development, the agency of multiply situated and complex actors, and the wider transnational production networks in which resource extraction processes are embedded.

This article reviews dependency postulates and examines whether they are applicable to explain the political economy of China’s contemporary relations with Peru. It argues that the dichotomy between Peru as a commodity-providing periphery and China as a core manufacturing centre is insufficient to explain the ways in which power is embedded in the international economic system, and particularly inadequate to identify winners and losers in the international division of labour. Thereby, in line with some recent international political economy discussions of power, the article proposes that China should not be understood as a self-contained economic entity, but as a hub where natural resources are mobilized for transnational production. Furthermore, contending that a focus on nation-states fails to capture the complexity of (under)-development dynamics, it suggests that notions of internal colonialism, flexible sovereignties and postcolonial analyses of representation provide fresher perspectives from which to understand the distribution of power along the political economy of Sino-Peruvian relations.

Analyses of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) sometimes question the investment criteria of Chinese firms, suggesting that market rules are not fundamental but secondary to political and geostrategic concerns. Questioning the apolitical nature of markets, the present article uses the internationalization of China's mining industry as a case study to ascertain the criteria that guide Chinese FDI. It first examines quantitative data from 2000 to 2010 which suggests that Chinese mining investment in Latin America and worldwide gravitates towards liberal economies. Second, by focusing on the projects of Chinese mining firms in Peru, the article illustrates how China's overseas mineral quest is best explained by probing into the integrated strategies of individual mining firms which seek to capitalize their comparative advantage in accessing Chinese markets and the political momentum of the “Going Out” strategy.

In the last decade, responding in part to an important increase in the number of Chinese state-owned enterprises operating overseas, the study of China’s international relations has gained academic prominence. Research often emphasizes the ways in which domestic characteristics of the Chinese state shape the nature of its transnational engagement. However, the transformations experienced by the state in processes of internationalization remain largely under-researched. This article problematizes the internationalization of the Chinese state, analyzing it as a process of gradual re-territorialization, which induces power redistributions and cultural transformations. Using a variety of examples for illustrative purposes, and drawing upon multidisciplinary work on the state, the article argues that the Chinese state is undergoing a process of decentred internationalization that is the effect of an entrepreneurial statehood rationale. Contrary to essentialist and orientalizing meta-narratives, the analysis of shifting cultures and power redistributions within the internationalized state opens up new avenues for academic enquiry on the micro-politics of everyday affairs in international relations.

China's engagement in South America and Africa's extractive sectors has increased significantly in the last decade. How comparable are the African and South American cases from a developmental perspective? This article explores resource curse theories, arguing that the ‘curses’ often associated to extraction are historically produced dynamic processes that need to be reevaluated in light of China's direct and indirect impacts on resource-endowed countries. It elaborates a framework to compare the developmental dynamics entailed by China's involvement in the South American and African extractive sectors, distinguishing between external, internal and intrinsic ‘curses’. The article holds that China's growth and investment have strengthened the position of resource-endowed countries in the international economy, revitalizing resource industries and improving terms of trade for commodities. Concurrently, the expansion of extractive activities has brought about increased environmental and economic sustainability challenges. Divergences between the African and South American cases are best observed at the national levels, where China's non-interventionist approach has different developmental implications depending on internal trends within investment host countries.

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Chapter 7 focuses on the Caribbean, specifically on Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Taking these two states as cases, it shows how the BRI’s financial muscle and infrastructural building capacity have transformed the Caribbean developmental landscape. Key to this transformation has been China’s capacity to launch new projects in heavily indebted or cash-strapped economies. It has resulted in some of the region’s traditional ‘partners’, such as the IMF or the European Union, losing their undisputed capacity for influence and coercion. However, Sino-Caribbean relations have also helped entrench long-established structural and postcolonial impediments for development. The chapter argues the BRI represents another iteration of neoliberal business-centric development in the region and so does not produce qualitative socio-economic change.