Strategic Game

8. HANDBOOK OF MONETARY ECONOMICS (in 2 volumes) Edited by Benjamin Friedman and Frank Hahn 9. HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (in 4 volumes) Volumes 1 and 2 edited by Hollis B. Chenery and TN Srinivasan Volumes 3A and 3B edited by Jere ...

Los juegos de estrategia abstracta constituyen un recurso educativo muy importante para desarrollar aptitudes de representación espacial y de pensamiento estratégico. En este sentido, y de forma específica, el juego del QUORIDOR permite adquirir aptitudes relacionadas con la accesibilidad diferencial ("barreras") y la representación espacial.

Issues of responsibility in the world of nanotechnology are becoming explicit with the emergence of a discourse on ‘responsible development’ of nanoscience and nanotechnologies. Much of this discourse centres on the ambivalences of nanotechnology and of promising technology in general. Actors must find means of dealing with these ambivalences. Actors’ actions and responses to ambivalence are shaped by their position and context, along with strategic games they are involved in, together with other actors. A number of interviews were conducted with industrial actors with the aim of uncovering their ethical stances towards responsible development of nanotechnology. The data shows that standard repertoires of justification of nanotechnological development were used. Thus, the industrial actors fell back on their position and associated responsibilities. Such responses reinforce a division of moral labour in which industrial actors and scientists can focus on the progress of science and technology, while other actors, such as NGOs, are expected to take care of broader considerations, such as ethical and social issues.

Too few students consider mathematics to be interesting, not to mention enjoyable or challenging. Integrating strategy games into mathematics classes can make them more exiting, enabling students to learn or practice various topics in a different manner while developing their mathematical thinking and improving their knowledge. 
One example of such a game is NIM, which is a two-player game, and according to Gardner (1983), one of the oldest mathematical games in the world. In this paper, I present a different perspective for the analysis of the game, using more common school knowledge – arithmetic series.

Behavioral studies suggest that making a decision involves representing the overall desirability of all available actions and then selecting that action that is most desirable. Physiological studies have proposed that neurons in the parietal cortex play a role in selecting movements for execution. To test the hypothesis that these parietal neurons encode the subjective desirability of making particular movements, we exploited Nash's game theoretic equilibrium, during which the subjective desirability of multiple actions should be equal for human players. Behavior measured during a strategic game suggests that monkeys' choices, like those of humans, are guided by subjective desirability. Under these conditions, activity in the parietal cortex was correlated with the relative subjective desirability of actions irrespective of the specific combination of reward magnitude, reward probability, and response probability associated with each action. These observations may help place many recent findings regarding the posterior parietal cortex into a common conceptual framework.

Artykuł ten jest czwartym z serii artykułów poświęconych przeglądowej prezentacji poszczególnych metod sztucznej inteligencji (AI) prezentowanych jako wyspy archipelagu, co zostało skomentowane i wyjaśnione w pierwszym artykule tego cyklu. Warto dodać, że wszystkie wcześniejsze artykuły z tej serii są także dostępne w serwisie Academia.edu. W prezentowanym tu artykule przedstawione są programy sztucznej inteligencji grające z ludźmi w gry strategiczne (warcaby, szachy, Go), dalej omówiona jest obszerna dziedzina komputerowego przetwarzania języka naturalnego, a na końcu omówione są uczące się drzewa decyzyjne.

The day-ahead electricity market is modeled as a multi-agent system with interacting agents including supplier agents, load serving entities, and a market operator. Simulation of the market clearing results under the scenario in which agents have learning capabilities is compared with the scenario where agents report true marginal costs. It is shown that, with Q-Learning, electricity suppliers are making more profits compared to the scenario without learning due to strategic gaming. As a result, the LMP at each bus is substantially higher.

Resumen La racionalidad limitada es un fenómeno observado de manera frecuente tanto en juegos experimentales como en situaciones cotidianas. La Neuroeconomía puede mejorar la comprensión de los procesos mentales que caracterizan la racionalidad limitada; en paralelo nos puede ayudar a comprender comportamientos que violan el equilibrio. Nuestro trabajo presenta resultados recientes sobre la bases neuronales del razonamiento estratégico (y sus límite) en juegos competitivos—como el juego del “beauty contest”. ...

Much of experimental research in marketing has focused on individual choices. Yet in many contexts, the outcomes of one’s choices depend on the choices of others. Furthermore, the results obtained in individual decision making context may not be applicable to these strategic choices. In this paper, we discuss three avenues for further advancing our understanding of strategic choices. First, there is a need to develop theories about how people learn to play strategic games. Second, there is an opportunity to enrich standard economic models of strategic behavior by allowing for different types of bounded rationality and by relaxing assumptions about utility formulation. These new models can help us to more accurately predict strategic choices. Finally, future research can improve marketing practice by designing better mechanisms and validating them using experiments.

We propose two variations of the non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalitional form, introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 64:357– 380, 1996a). These strategic games implement, in the limit, two new NTU-values: the random marginal and the random ...

In this paper we use defense trees, an extension of attack trees with countermeasures, to represent attack scenarios and game theory to detect the most promising actions attacker and defender. On one side the attacker wants to break the system (with as little efforts as possible), on the opposite side the defender want to protect it (sustaining the minimum cost). As utility function for the attacker and for the defender we consider economic indexes (like the Return on Investment (ROI) and the Return on Attack (ROA)). We show how our approach can be used to evaluate effectiveness and economic profitability of countermeasures as well as their deterrent effect on attackers, thus providing decision makers with a useful tool for performing better evaluation of IT security investments during the risk management process.