Tendering and Estimating

Within the sphere of construction, the “estimating process” is a significant element due to the lack of financial
resources available, and out of the branches of estimating, pre-tender cost estimating of road construction projects
requires extensive knowledge and expertise. The aim of this research is to assist clients and consultants in
improving the predictive ability of the cost estimating of road construction in Sri Lanka. This research has been
conducted through a literature review of topics related to the cost estimating process, followed by a questionnaire
survey. The analyzing of 59 factors conclude that the main factors affecting the accuracy of pre-tender cost
estimation of road construction are: accuracy and reliability of cost information, material (prices /availability
/supply /quality /imports), clear and detailed drawings and specifications, completeness of cost information,
designer’s experience level. “Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient” test was used as a measure of agreement
between the three groups of respondents with regard to factors ranking, and it appears that they are generally in
strong agreement. Finally, 15 expert interviews were conducted to identify the existing practices of cost estimation of
road construction in SriLanka. These conclude that the main existing practices are: comparison with past similar
projects based on personal experience, established standards ex. HSR (Highway Schedule Rates) and comparison
with similar past projects based on documented facts The study recommended that both clients and consultants give
more attention to the cost estimating process and to hire qualified technical staff in order to obtain the accurate
estimate and to keep computerized historical data of completed projects.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of cost escalation in transportation infrastructure projects. Based on a sample of 258 transportation infrastructure projects worth US$90 billion and representing different project types, geographical regions, and historical periods, it is found with overwhelming statistical significance that the cost estimates used to decide whether such projects should be built are highly and systematically misleading. Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by strategic misrepresentation, that is, lying. The policy implications are clear: legislators, administrators, investors, media representatives, and members of the public who value honest numbers should not trust cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and their analysts.

Megaproject Planning and Management: Essential Readings contains the seminal articles from the growing body of research on megaproject planning and management along with an original introduction by the editor, Bent Flyvbjerg. The leading and most cited authority in the field, Flyvbjerg has used crowdsourcing and 25 years of experience to cherry-pick from several hundred articles and books the writings that define the field. This volume will be an indispensable source for those wishing to speak with authority about how megaprojects are prepared, delivered, and fought over. The target audience is students, academics, practitioners, and media pundits alike, as well as communities affected by megaprojects.

Back cover text: Megaprojects and Risk provides the first detailed examination of the phenomenon of megaprojects. It is a fascinating account of how the promoters of multi-billion dollar megaprojects systematically and self-servingly misinform parliaments, the public and the media in order to get projects approved and built. It shows, in unusual depth, how the formula for approval is an unhealthy cocktail of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effects. This results in projects that are extremely risky, but where the risk is concealed from MPs, taxpayers and investors. The authors not only explore the problems but also suggest practical solutions drawing on theory, experience and hard, scientific evidence from the several hundred projects in twenty nations and five continents that illustrate the book. Accessibly written, it will be the standard reference for students, scholars, planners, economists, auditors, politicians and interested citizens for many years to come.

The article first describes characteristics of major infrastructure projects. Second, it documents a much neglected topic in economics: that ex ante estimates of costs and benefits are often very different from actual ex post costs and benefits. For large infrastructure projects the consequences are cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and the systematic underestimation of risks. Third, implications for cost–benefit analysis are described, including that such analysis is not to be trusted for major infrastructure projects. Fourth, the article uncovers the causes of this state of affairs in terms of perverse incentives that encourage promoters to underestimate costs and overestimate benefits in the business cases for their projects. But the projects that are made to look best on paper are the projects that amass the highest cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in reality. The article depicts this situation as ‘survival of the unfittest’. Fifth, the article sets out to explain how the problem may be solved, with a view to arriving at more efficient and more democratic projects, and avoiding the scandals that often accompany major infrastructure investments. Finally, the article identifies current trends in major infrastructure development. It is argued that a rapid increase in stimulus spending, combined with more investments in emerging economies, combined with more spending on information technology is catapulting infrastructure investment from the frying pan into the fire.

Cost planning remains an effective medium for administration of construction projects that devoid projects from being under-grouped either cost or time overruns. The construction industry all over the world, thus in both developed and developing countries are characterised with an issue of lack of effective cost planning practices before, during and after construction projects. It is imperative that construction professionals tackle the issue of cost planning with a professional edge using various effective techniques. However, in developing countries, effective cost planning remains pathetic and a major concern to construction stakeholders. For instance, in Ghana nothing can be construed in terms of measures used for effective cost planning. Hence, the abandonment of construction projects resulting from poor construction cost planning and control is a well-known phenomenon in the Ghanaian Construction Industry (GCI) with mass housing projects appearing to have been abandoned as progress of work has stalled over the years. In an attempt to address this problem of construction cost planning in the GCI, the aim of this paper is to examine the relevance for developing tender price index for effective cost planning in the GCI. Cast in the qualitative approach, and adopting content analysis stances, the study established that the relevance of developing tender price index for effective cost planning inevitably cannot be doubted. About 90% of the respondents agreed to this fact. Thus, the foregone research will contribute immensely to the improvement of GCI.

As megaprojects have become ubiquitous, their real benefits and costs have come under increased scrutiny. We interviewed Bent Flyvbjerg, who has extensively studied megaproject development. Flyvbjerg has found systematic problems in the development process: by intentionally misrepresenting information and deliberately disregarding risks, proponents instigate projects that result in fewer benefits and higher costs than promised.

The Supplementary Green Book Guidance on Optimism Bias (HM Treasury 2003) with reference to the Review of Large Public Procurement in the UK (Mott MacDonald 2002) notes that there is a demonstrated, systematic, tendency for project appraisers to be overly optimistic and that to redress this tendency appraisers should make explicit, empirically based adjustments to the estimates of a project’s costs, benefits, and duration. HM Treasury recommends that these adjustments be based on data from past projects or similar projects elsewhere, and adjusted for the unique characteristics of the project in hand. In the absence of a more specific evidence base, HM Treasury has encouraged departments to collect data to inform future estimates of optimism, and in the meantime use the best available data. In response to this, the Department for Transport (henceforth DfT), has contracted Bent Flyvbjerg in association with COWI to undertake the consultancy assignment "Procedures for dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning". The present Guidance Document is the result of this assignment.

"Over budget, over time, over and over again" appears to be an appropriate slogan for large, complex infrastructure projects. This article explains why cost, benefits, and time forecasts for such projects are systematically over-optimistic in the planning phase. The underlying reasons for forecasting errors are grouped into three categories: delusions or honest mistakes; deceptions or strategic manipulation of information or processes; or bad luck. Delusion and deception have each been addressed in the management literature before, but here they are jointly considered for the first time. They are specifically applied to infrastructure problems in a manner that allows both academics and practitioners to understand and implement the suggested corrective procedures. The article provides a framework for analyzing the relative explanatory power of delusion and deception. It also suggests a simplified framework for analyzing the complex principal-agent relationships that are involved in the approval and construction of large infrastructure projects, which can be used to improve forecasts. Finally, the article illustrates reference class forecasting, an outside view de-biasing technique that has proven successful in overcoming both delusion and deception in private and public investment decisions.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of traffic forecasts in transportation infrastructure projects. The sample used is the largest of its kind, covering 210 projects in 14 nations worth U.S.$59 billion. The study shows with very high statistical significance that forecasters generally do a poor job of estimating the demand for transportation infrastructure projects. For 9 out of 10 rail projects, passenger forecasts are overestimated; the average overestimation is 106%. For half of all road projects, the difference between actual and forecasted traffic is more than ±20%. The result is substantial financial risks, which are typically ignored or downplayed by planners and decision makers to the detriment of social and economic welfare. Our data also show that forecasts have not become more accurate over the 30-year period studied, despite claims to the contrary by forecasters. The causes of inaccuracy in forecasts are different for rail and road projects, with political causes playing a larger role for rail than for road. The cure is transparency, accountability, and new forecasting methods. The challenge is to change the governance structures for forecasting and project development. Our article shows how planners may help achieve this.

Do different types of megaprojects have different cost overruns? This apparently simple question is at the heart of research at the University of Oxford aimed at understanding the characteristics of megaprojects, particularly in terms of how they are established, run and concluded. In this study, we set out to investigate cost overruns in the Olympic Games. To do so, we examined the costs of the Games over half a century, including both summer and winter Olympics. We looked at the evolution of final reported costs and compared these to the costs established in the Games bids, submitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) up to seven years before the Games occurred. In so doing we established the largest dataset of its kind, and documented for the first time in a consistent fashion the costs and cost overruns for the Olympic Games, from 1960 to 2012. We discovered that the Games stand out in two distinct ways compared to other megaprojects: (1) The Games overrun with 100 per cent consistency. No other type of megaproject is this consistent regarding cost overrun. Other project types are typically on budget from time to time, but not the Olympics. (2) With an average cost overrun in real terms of 179 per cent – and 324 per cent in nominal terms – overruns in the Games have historically been significantly larger than for other types of megaprojects, including infrastructure, construction, ICT, and dams. The data thus show that for a city and nation to decide to host the Olympic Games is to take on one of the most financially risky type of megaproject that exists, something that many cities and nations have learned to their peril. For the London 2012 Games, we find that: (1) With sports-related real costs currently estimated at USD14.8 billion, London is on track to become the most costly Olympics ever. (2) With a projected cost overrun of 101 per cent in real terms, overrun for London is below the historical average for the Games, but not significantly so. (3) The London cost overrun is, however, significantly higher than overruns for recent Games since 1999. London therefore is reversing a positive trend of falling cost overruns for the Games.

As megaprojects have become ubiquitous, their real benefits and costs have come under increased scrutiny. We interviewed Bent Flyvbjerg, who has extensively studied megaproject development. Flyvbjerg has found systematic problems in the development process: by intentionally misrepresenting information and deliberately disregarding risks, proponents instigate projects that result in fewer benefits and higher costs than promised.

In the global construction context, the best value or most economically advantageous tender is becoming a widespread approach for contractor selection, as an alternative to other traditional awarding criteria such as the lowest price. In these multi-attribute tenders, the owner or auctioneer solicits proposals containing both a price bid and additional technical features. Once the proposals are received, each bidder’s price bid is given an economic score according to a scoring rule, generally called an economic scoring formula (ESF) and a technical score according to pre-specified criteria. Eventually, the contract is awarded to the bidder with the highest weighted overall score (economic + technical). However, economic scoring formula selection by auctioneers is invariably and paradoxically a highly intuitive process in practice, involving few theoretical or empirical considerations, despite having been considered traditionally and mistakenly as objective, due to its mathematical nature. This paper provides a taxonomic classification of a wide variety of ESFs and abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC) gathered in several countries with different tendering approaches. Practical implications concern the optimal design of price scoring rules in construction contract tenders, as well as future analyses of the effects of the ESF and ALBC on competitive bidding behaviour.

Back cover text: This book aims to enlarge the understanding of decision-making on mega-projects and suggest recommendations for a more effective, efficient and democratic approach. Authors from different scientific disciplines address various aspects of the decision-making process, such as management characteristics and cost-benefit analysis, planning and innovation and competition and institutions. The subject matter is highly diverse, but certain questions remain at the forefront. For example, how do we deal with protracted preparation processes, how do we tackle risks and uncertainties, and how can we best divide the risks and responsibilities among the private and public players throughout the different phases of the project? - Presenting a state-of-the-art overview, based on experiences and visions of authors from Europe and North America, this unique book will be of interest to practitioners of large-scale project management, politicians, public officials and private organisations involved in mega-project decision-making. It will also appeal to researchers, consultants and students dealing with substantial engineering projects, complex systems, project management and transport infrastructure.

This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large infrastructure projects. First, it identifies as the main problem in major infrastructure development pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is massive cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, the paper explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not the competition's, that gain approval and funding. This results in the "survival of the unfittest," where often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, the paper presents measures for reforming policy and planning for large infrastructure projects, with a focus on better planning methods and changed governance structures, the latter being more important.

The statistical distribution representing bid values constitutes an essential part of many auction models and has involved a wide range of assumptions, including the Uniform, Normal, Lognormal and Weibull densities. From a modelling point of view, its goodness is defined by how well it enables the probability of a particular bid value to be estimated – a past bid for ex-post analysis and a future bid for ex-ante (forecasting) analysis. However, there is no agreement to date of what is the most appropriate form and empirical work is sparse.
Twelve extant construction datasets from four continents over different time periods are analysed in this paper for their fit to a variety of candidate statistical distributions assuming homogeneity of bidders (ID not known). The results show there is no one single fit-all distribution, but that the 3p Log-Normal, Fréchet/2p Log-Normal, Normal, Gamma and Gumbel generally rank the best ex-post, and the 2p Log-Normal, Normal, Gamma and Gumbel the best ex-ante – with ex-ante having around three to four times worse fit than ex-post. Final comments focus on the results relating to the third and fourth standardised moments of the bids and a post-hoc rationalisation of the empirical outcome of the analysis.

Risk, including economic risk, is increasingly a concern for public policy and management. The possibility of dealing effectively with risk is hampered, however, by lack of a sound empirical basis for risk assessment and management. This article demonstrates the general point for cost and demand risks in urban rail projects. The article presents empirical evidence that allow valid economic risk assessment and management of urban rail projects, including benchmarking of individual or groups of projects. Benchmarking of the Copenhagen Metro is presented as a case in point. The approach developed is proposed as a model for other types of policies and projects in order to improve economic and financial risk assessment and management in policy and planning.

A large proportion of the Nigerian government's expenditure on capital project delivery involves civil engineering works, with greater emphasis on roadworks to create access for the conduct of economic activities by citizens. Most of the works of this scope awarded to indigenous contractors involve large volumes of cut and fill earthworks. Accurately estimating the cost of earthworks for most indigenous contractors is an arduous task owing to the stochastic nature of the input variables. This paper, therefore, seeks to identify key factors affecting the accuracy of earthwork cost estimates in civil engineering projects in Nigeria and to determine the effects of the factors on the level of accuracy of the estimates. The methodology of study involved a structured questionnaire survey of 78 indigenous contractors operating in the nation's SouthEast and South-South geopolitical zones. Five (5) major factors affecting the accuracy of earthwork cost estimates (contract requirements and equipment, estimator-related, microeconomic, nature of site and site-level management) were obtained by factor analysis using varimax rotation. However, based on ANOVA test of difference, the study found that the differing levels of accuracy of earthwork cost estimates are caused by contract requirements and equipment, estimator-related and microeconomic factors. Thus, the consideration of these three factors leads to higher levels of accuracy of earthwork cost estimates in civil works. The study recommends that indigenous contractors' earthwork cost estimators for civil works should give more attention to contract requirements and equipment, estimator-related, and microeconomic factors for improved accuracy of their estimates.

Out-of-control information technology (IT) projects have ended the careers of top managers, such as EADS CEO Noël Forgeard and Levi Strauss’ CIO David Bergen. Moreover, IT projects have brought down whole companies, like Kmart in the US and Auto Windscreen in the UK. Software and other IT is now such an integral part of most business processes and products that CEOs must know their IT risks, which are typically substantial – and overlooked. The analysis of a sample of 1,471 IT projects showed that the average cost overrun was 27% — but that figure masks a far more alarming “fat tail” risk.  Fully one in six of the projects in the sample was a Black Swan, with a cost overrun of 200%, on average, and a schedule overrun of almost 70%. This highlights the true pitfall of IT change initiatives: It’s not that they’re particularly prone to high cost overruns on average – it is that there are a disproportionate number of Black Swans. By focusing on averages instead of the more damaging outliers, most managers and consultants have been missing the real risk in doing IT. In conclusion, the article outlines ideas as to what can be done to avoid Black Swans.

This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large-infrastructure projects. First, it identifies as the main problem in major infrastructure developments pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, it explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not those of their competition, that gain approval and funding. This results in the ‘survival of the unfittest’, in which often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, it presents measures for reforming policy and planning for large-infrastructure projects with a focus on better planning methods and changed governance structures, the latter being more important.

A major source of risk in project management is inaccurate forecasts of project costs, demand, and other impacts. The paper presents a promising new approach to mitigating such risk, based on theories of decision making under uncertainty which won the 2002 Nobel prize in economics. First, the paper documents inaccuracy and risk in project management. Second, it explains inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Third, the theoretical basis is presented for a promising new method called "reference class forecasting," which achieves accuracy by basing forecasts on actual performance in a reference class of comparable projects and thereby bypassing both optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Fourth, the paper presents the first instance of practical reference class forecasting, which concerns cost forecasts for large transportation infrastructure projects. Finally, potentials for and barriers to reference class forecasting are assessed.

Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman must be commended for their clear identification of causes and cures to the planning fallacy in “Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives’ Decisions” (July 2003). Their look at overoptimism, anchoring, competitor neglect, and the outside view in forecasting is highly useful to executives and forecasters. However, Lovallo and Kahneman underrate one source of bias in forecasting—the deliberate “cooking” of forecasts to get ventures started. My colleagues and I call this the Machiavelli factor.

Results from the first statistically significant study of the causes of cost escalation in transport infrastructure projects are presented. The study is based on a sample of 258 rail, bridge, tunnel and road projects worth US$90 billion. The focus is on the dependence of cost escalation on: (1) the length of the project‐implementation phase, (2) the size of the project and (3) the type of project ownership. First, it was found, with very high statistical significance, that cost escalation was strongly dependent on the length of the implementation phase. The policy implications are clear: decision‐makers and planners should be highly concerned about delays and long implementation phases because they translate into risks of substantial cost escalations. Second, projects have grown larger over time, and for bridges and tunnels larger projects have larger percentage cost escalations. Finally, by comparing the cost escalation for three types of project ownership - private, state‐owned enterprise and other public ownership - it was shown that the oft‐seen claim that public ownership is problematic and private ownership effective in curbing cost escalation is an oversimplification. The type of accountability appears to matter more to cost escalation than type of ownership.

This paper explores how theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may be used to conduct quality control and due diligence in project management. First, a much-neglected issue in project management is identified, namely that the front-end estimates of costs and benefits – used in the business cases, cost-benefit analyses, and social and environmental impact assessments that typically support decisions on projects – are typically significantly different from actual ex post costs and benefits, and are therefore poor predictors of the actual value and viability of projects. Second, it is discussed how Kahneman and Tversky’s theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may help explain and remedy this situation through quality control of decisions. Third, it is described what quality control and due diligence are in the context of project management, and an eight-step procedure is outlined for due diligence based on the outside view. Fourth, the procedure is tested on a real-life, multibillion-dollar project, organized as a public-private partnership. Finally, Akerlof and Shiller’s recent discussion in economics of “firing the forecaster” is discussed together with its relevance to project management. In sum, the paper demonstrates the need, the theoretical basis, a practical methodology, and a real-life example for how to de-bias project management using quality control and due diligence based on the outside view.

Economic crisis and its growing antecedent continues to be a growing sensation in developing countries. The much anticipated growth by these countries can be measured by its industrial growth, especially with the construction industry. As a result, clients in the determination of prices of the products in which their money can afford and at the same time ensuring value for money has recent times become a critical issue. Thus, the motivation of this study was to critically review literature as conduit for developing a conceptual framework that underpins Tender Price Index (TPI) development. On this basis, a conceptual framework was developed based on three main concepts including cost analysis, pricing and indices. In addition, these concepts are influenced by two indicators namely: Construction Industry Environment and Economic Environment. These indicators largely influence the Tender Price Index acting as external factors. This framework offers the basis for both stakeholders and researchers in the construction industry aiming at establishing a robust understanding for the development TPI.

As the contracts in the road construction sector in Poland are usually of extremely high value and financed from the state budget, the tender procedures should not allow for the non-concurrent behaviours of tender participants. Otherwise, the clients' losses will be of high value too. A database comprising hundreds of bidding procedures in the road construction industry in Poland has been developed. It includes the tenders' participants, the locations of the road sections, bids' values, the winners, and the types of roads. Every procedure has been evaluated and assigned to the set with a given level of collusion occurrence probability. The evaluation has required the analysis and the transformation of - described in the literature - collusive types of behaviours to the parameters of procedures that can be shown as numbers or ranks. Four criteria of a collusion threatened contracts have been chosen and applied for evaluation. Then, two methods of machine learning were app...

This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior of bidders in Best Value or multi-attribute construction auctions, where both the (dollar) bid and technical non-price criteria are scored according to a scoring rule. From a sample of Spanish construction auctions with a variety of bid scoring rules, it is found that bidders are influenced by the auction rules in significant and predictable ways. The bid score weighting, bid scoring formula and abnormally low bid criterion are variables likely to influence the competitiveness of bidders in terms of both their aggressive/conservative bidding and concentration/dispersion of bids. Revealing the influence of the bid scoring rules and their magnitude on bidders’ competitive behavior opens the door for the engineer to condition bidder competitive behavior in such a way as to provide the balance needed to achieve the owner’s desired strategic outcomes.

The clear majority of pre-existing work in the published domain of competitive bidding requires large sample sizes for reliable econometric,
probabilistic or game-theoretic modelling techniques. Such unrealistic large data requirements have prevented the successful
application of bid modelling in managerial practice. This article presents a new predictive analytics method for very small samples of
historical bidding data. Requiring as few as nine competitive bid prices for a group of pooled/aggregated competitors over a 30-month
period is the standout differentiator of this research from any previously published research. This minimizes the demands on competitive
intelligence and, therefore, realistically enables its application in the real world of practice. Maximum likelihood estimations are
used to evaluate two new, revolutionary bid strategies against a range of evaluation criteria, taking into account the pricing judgements
made by competitors, including a degree of competitive reaction among them. Using off-the-shelf analytics software, a case study of
a bidder from the telecommunications infrastructure sector demonstrates how commercial outcomes can be improved substantially:
A 400 per cent improvement in win ratio, an 86 per cent increase in contribution margin and 76 per cent revenue growth. In addition,
the difference between the submitted bids and the lowest-priced competing bids (which is an opportunity cost, sometimes referred to
as the ‘spread’ or ‘money left on the table’), has been reduced to 2 per cent on a total revenue of US$210 million.

As the contracts in the road construction sector in Poland are usually of extremely high value and financed from the state budget, the tender procedures should not allow for the non-concurrent behaviours of tender participants. Otherwise, the clients' losses will be of high value too. A database comprising hundreds of bidding procedures in the road construction industry in Poland has been developed. It includes the tenders' participants, the locations of the road sections, bids' values, the winners, and the types of roads. Every procedure has been evaluated and assigned to the set with a given level of collusion occurrence probability. The evaluation has required the analysis and the transformation of -  described in the literature - collusive types of behaviours to the parameters of procedures that can be shown as numbers or ranks. Four criteria of a collusion threatened contracts have been chosen and applied for evaluation. Then, two methods of machine learning were applied. The first method was to train an artificial neural network (ANN) to classify the procedures to the aforementioned sets. The other method was to utilize artificial neural networks predictive capabilities enriched by the fuzzy sets theory. The multiple output from ANN was defined as membership function values. The use of the fuzzy sets theory - the process of defuzzification - helps to classify the tender procedures to the sets of different level of risk (of collusion appearance). The results achieved in these two separate processes are compared and discussed. The created tool can be applied for the future tender procedures as a pre-test of a collusion appearance.