The Safety Condition for Knowledge

The global method safety account of knowledge states that an agent’s true belief that p is safe and qualifies as knowledge if and only if it is formed by method M, such that her beliefs in p and her beliefs in relevantly similar propositions formed by M in all nearby worlds are true. This paper argues that global method safety is too restrictive. First, the agent may not know relevantly similar propositions via M because the belief that p is the only possible outcome of M. Second, there are cases where there is a fine grained belief that is unsafe and a relevantly similar coarse-grained belief (with looser truth conditions) that is safe and where both beliefs are based on the same method M. Third, the reliability of conditional reasoning, a basic belief-forming method, seems to be sensitive to fine-grained contents, as suggested by the wide variation in success rates for thematic versions of the Wason selection task.

[This is for an author-meets-critics symposium on Thomas Scanlon's Being Realistic About Reasons, with replies from Scanlon, Canadian Journal of Philosophy.]

One of the key aims of Scanlon's Being Realistic about Reasons is to demystify knowledge of normative and mathematical truths. In this paper, I develop an epistemological challenge that Scanlon fails to explicitly address. I argue that Scanlon’s “metaphysical pluralism” can be understood as a response to that challenge. However, it affords an answer to the challenge only to the extent that it undermines the objectivity of normative and mathematical inquiry.

In order to deal with the problem caused by environmental luck some proponents of robust virtue epistemology have attempted to argue that in virtue of satisfying the ability condition one will satisfy the safety condition. Call this idea the entailment thesis. In this paper it will be argued that the arguments that have been laid down for the entailment thesis entail a wrong kind of safety condition, one that we do not have in mind when we require our beliefs to be safe from error in order for them to be knowledge.

A new account of the epistemic significance of disagreement is offered which is grounded in two assumptions; (i) that knowledge is the norm of belief and, (ii) that the safety condition is a necessary condition for knowledge. These assumptions motivate a modal definition of epistemic peerhood which is much easier to operate on than the more traditional definitions of epistemic peerhood have been. The modal account of the epistemic significance of disagreement yields plausible results regarding cases of disagreement. Furthermore, it is able to tap into the intuitions that have motivated the conformist and the nonconformist positions and locates a fruitful middle-ground between these two conflicting positions. It will be shown that the conformist were correct in that cases of real peer disagreement force us to suspend our judgment. The reason for this is that in cases of real peer disagreement our beliefs fail to be safe. The nonconformists, on the other hand, were right in that disagreement in itself does not have any epistemic power. It is only by the grace of nature that we gain knowledge. The fact that someone disagrees with you does not mean that you do not have knowledge.

According to the extended mind thesis, cognitive processes are not confined to the nervous system but can extend beyond skin and skull to notebooks, iPhones, computers and such. The extended mind thesis is a metaphysical thesis about the material basis of our cognition. As such, whether the thesis is true can have implications for epistemological issues. Carter has recently argued that safety-based theories of knowledge are in tension with the extended mind hypothesis, since the safety condition implies that there is an epistemic difference between subjects who form their beliefs via their biological capacities and between subjects who have extended their cognition. Kelp, on the other hand, has argued that a safety-based theory of knowledge can be correct only if the extended mind thesis is true. While these claims are not logically inconsistent, they do leave the safety theorist in an uncomfortable position. I will argue that safety-based theories of knowledge are not hostage to the truth of the extended mind thesis, and that once the safety condition is properly understood it is not in tension with the extended mind thesis.

This paper critically explores Timothy Williamson's view of evidence, and it does so in light of the problem of epistemic luck. Williamson's view of evidence is, of course, a crucially important aspect of his novel and influential "knowledge-first" epistemological project. Notoriously, one crucial thesis of this project is that one's evidence is equivalent to what one knows. This has come to be known as the E = K thesis. This paper specifically addresses Williamson's knowledge-first epistemology and the E = K thesis in the context of anti-luck epistemology (i.e., the view that knowledge is not compatible with certain forms of epistemic luck) and the idea that knowledge is factive (i.e., the view that knowledge implies truth). Williamson's views on these matters are worth investigating in some detail because he subscribes to a well-worked out anti-luck view of knowledge that incorporates what is perhaps the most common anti-luck condition (i.e., the safety condition). But this paper is also of more general importance because the critique of Williamson's views on these matters reveals some important things about the nature of evidence and evidence is one of the most fundamental concepts in epistemology.

According to the safety condition, a subject knows that p only if she would believe that p only if p was true. The safety condition has been a very popular necessary condition for knowledge of late. However, it is well documented that the safety condition is trivially satisfied in cases where the subject believes in a necessary truth. This is for the simple reason that a necessary truth is true in all possible worlds, and therefore it is true in all possible worlds where it is believed. But clearly, all beliefs concerning necessary truths do not amount to knowledge. The safety theorists have attempted to deal with the problem caused by necessary truths by restricting the safety condition to purely contingent truths and by globalizing the safety condition to a set of propositions. Both of these solutions are problematic. The principal aim of this paper is to develop a version of the safety condition that is able to deal with cases featuring necessary truths.

According to robust virtue epistemology the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is that in cases of knowledge the subject's cognitive success is attributable to her cognitive agency. But what does it take for a subject's cognitive success to be attributable to her cognitive agency? A promising answer is that the subject's cognitive abilities have to contribute to the safety of her epistemic standing with respect to her inquiry, in order for her cognitive success to be attributable to her cognitive agency. Call this idea the contribution thesis. I will argue that the contribution thesis follows naturally from virtue epistemological accounts of knowledge and that it is precisely the contribution thesis that allows the virtue epistemologist to deal with a with a wide variety of objections. Nevertheless, the principal aim of this paper is to argue that virtue epistemological theories of knowledge that are committed to the contribution thesis are ultimately untenable. There are cases of knowledge where the subject's cognitive abilities do not improve the safety of the subject's belief. According to robust virtue epistemology the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is that in cases of knowledge the subject's cognitive success is attributable to her cognitive agency. But what does it take for a subject's cognitive success to be attributable to her cognitive agency? One way of answering this question would be to claim that the subject's cognitive abilities have to contribute to the safety of her epistemic standing with respect to her inquiry in order for her cognitive success to be attributable to her cognitive agency. Call this idea the contribution thesis. In Section 2 I will argue that the contribution thesis follows naturally from virtue epistemological accounts of knowledge, and that it is the contribution thesis that allows the virtue epistemologist to deal with cases of testimonial knowledge and with cases featuring

this paper introduces a new argument for the safety condition on knowledge. It is based on the contention that the rejection of safety entails the rejection of the factivity condition on knowledge. But, since we should maintain factivity, we should endorse safery.

I intend to argue that the counterexamples inspired by the Frankfurt-type cases against the necessity of an epistemic safety condition for knowledge are not plausible. The epistemic safety condition for knowledge is a modal condition recently supported by Sosa (2007) and Pritchard (2015), among others, and can be formulated as follows: (SC) If S knows that p on basis B, then S's true belief that p could not have easily been false on basis B. I will try to argue that the safety condition, expressed in (SC), is still necessary for knowledge and that, therefore, epistemic safety is not threatened by Frank-furt type cases. In particular, I want to show that Kelp's counterexamples are ineffective against (SC).

Abstract: Most philosophers believe that testimony is not a fundamental source of knowledge, but merely a way to transmit already existing knowledge. However, Jennifer Lackey has presented some counterexamples which show that one can actually come to know something through testimony that no one ever knew before.

Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Sosa, Pritchard, and Vogel have all argued that there are cases in which one knows something inductively but does not believe it sensitively, and that sensitivity therefore cannot be necessary for knowledge. I defend sensitivity by showing that inductive knowledge is sensitive.

This paper introduces a new argument against Richard Foleys threshold view of belief. Foleys view is based on the Lockean Thesis (LT) and the Rational Threshold Thesis (RTT). The former thesis is the claim that it is epistemically rational to believe a proposition if and only if it is epistemically rational to have a degree of confidence in that proposition sufficient for belief. The latter thesis is the claim that it is epistemically rational to believe a proposition if and only if it is epistemically rational to have a degree of confidence in that proposition that meets or exceeds a specified threshold. The argument introduced here shows that the views derived from the joint endorsement of the LT and the RTT violate the safety condition on knowledge in way that threatens the LT and/or the RTT.