Gettier Problem

According to traditional epistemology, a truthful judgment needs a rational justification, at least potentially. Antonio Livi's "alethic logic" follows this principle, which is compatible with some fallibilism, since the available evidence can change in future. In this article Livi's position is discussed facing the famous Gettier's problem: a justified true belief is not equivalent to real knowledge. It is claimed that the problem can be solved in Livi's theory of truth, provided we abandon rationalistic constraints.

The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge.

This paper offers a resolution to the Gettier paradoxes. Knowledge is a categorical concept; justification, however, comes in degrees. The mismatch between the two means that there can be no definition of "x knows that p" that doesn't EITHER sets the standard of justification so high as to imply skepticism, OR allows Gettier-type paradoxes. The important question is what makes evidence better or worse, a belief more or less justified.

Written in 1983, I left this paper stayed in a drawer,thinking the Gettier paradoxes uninteresting; but finally published it in 2009, in the face of yet another wave of Gettierology.

If this paper interests you, you might also want to look at "Epistemology: Who Needs Its?" (2015).

This is a collection of nineteen essays in the tradition of critical rationalism (as advocated by Karl Popper). All but one of the essays is previously unpublished and the one previously published paper has undergone significant revisions. The first four essays tackle topics in the philosophy of science, the first being an exposition of Popper's views, the others discussing falsifiability, truth, the aim of science, and ceteris-paribus law-statements. Five essays follow concerned with Reason, reasoning and reasons, in which faulty conceptions of theoretical and practical reason are criticised, the nature and uses of argument are discussed, and the rationality of debate, agreement and disagreement are explained. Next, there are two papers on economics, one of which is a substantial critique of the so-called subjective theory of value, the other a brief discussion of entrepreneurial insight. The last section of the book contains a miscellany of eight critical essays in which some errors of contemporary philosophers are exposed regarding issues including the interpretation of Popper’s work, the Gettier problem, no-platforming, open-mindedness, homosexual equality, tolerance, philosophical heuristics and the conduct of debate.

O objetivo deste artigo é investigar a resposta de Platão no Menon para as questões sobre a natureza e o valor do conhecimento, criticando a interpretação tradicional que confere à justificação um papel proeminente na determinação do valor do conhecimento e avançando a tese de que esse valor deve ser relativizado ao objeto que se busca conhecer. Investigamos também as consequências dos contraexemplos de Gettier para a definição do conhecimento como crença verdadeira e justificada e para o problema do valor.

Felsefe, bilgiye ve onunla ilgili konulara daima büyük bir önem vermiştir. Hatta bilgi üzerine yapılan çalışmalar kendi içerisinde ayrı bir alan oluşturmuş ve epistemoloji dalının ortaya çıkmasını sağlamıştır. Bilgi felsefesinin ele aldığı birçok sorun var; bilgnin neliği, bilginin nasıl elde edildiği, bilginin çeşitleri... gibi. Tüm bu sorunlar başlangıçta sorun değilmiş gibi görünse de, biraz düşünüldüğünde durumun çok daha farklı olduğu görülmektedir.

W. V. Quine is one of the most prominent advocates of the naturalistic approach to epistemology and he argues that epistemology should be naturalized and transformed into a sub-discipline of psychology and hence a chapter in science. In his famous paper "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine starts to compare epistemology with the logical and set-theoretical studies of the foundations of mathematics.

Setelah terbitnya paper sebesar tiga halaman berjudul Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Pada tahun 1963, Edmund Gettier telah menggoncangkan dunia epistemologi filsafat yang selama ini jarang disentuh untuh dijadikan sebagai kajian penting. Dengan Problematikanya yang dikenal dengan nama Gettier Problem, Gettier menyoroti kelemahan yang dimiliki oleh kondisi-kondisi definisi tripartit tentang pengetahuan yang menjadi landasan epistemik filsafat selama berabad-abad. Penulis ingin menjabarkan kasus-kasus Gettier yang merupakan konter-contoh (counterexamples) dalam misi mematahkan fondasi epistemologi klasik JTB tentang validitas suatu kebenaran.

The "Gettier problem", which has become a central problem of analytic epistemology, is not only epistemological. Since it is often formulated as a "conceptual analysis problem", it has also turned into a significant metaphilosophical problem. Thus, today, in the context of the Gettier problem, contemporary analytic philosophy is witnessing three crises or issues of debate: one is a crisis within epistemology, the other is the crisis of methodological justification, and the other is the crisis of the identity of analytical philosophy. In this study, two views are defended regarding these debates. First, contrary to widespread assumption, the Gettier problem is not a "conceptual analysis problem". This widespread assumption is a mistake caused by not interpreting the development of analytic philosophy correctly. Secondly, the method that originates the Gettier problem is nothing but the continuation of the ordinary language philosophy approach, which proposes that propositions containing "knows", "knowledge", "belief" and related words be subjected to linguistic analysis. However, just as Karl Popper warned long ago, the main difficulty in applying the ordinary language philosophy approach to epistemological problems is that it leads to a deviation from the main topic of epistemology.

Virtually every epistemological theory that is currently a live option is committed to two theses: fallibilism and attributabilism.  A new argument for skepticism is advanced, which is grounded in the incompatibility of these two theses.  It is then argued that the main responses to traditional skepticism—epistemic externalism, contextualism, and Moorean common sense—are ineffective with respect to this new type of skepticism.

İÇİNDEKİLER
BAŞLANGIÇ 7
GİRİŞ: BİLGİ VE İNANÇ KAVRAMLARININ ANALİZİ [Ferit Uslu] 15
1. Bilginin Türleri 15
1.1. Önermesel Bilgi 15
1.2. Tanıma Yoluyla Bilgi 17
1.3. Tasvir Yoluyla Bilgi 21
1.4. Nasılın Bilgisi 23
2. İnancın Türleri 24
2.1. Önermesel İnanç 25
2.2. Önermesel Olmayan İnanç 28
3. İnanç-Bilgi İlişkisinin Analizi 31
4. Önermesel Bilgi: ‘Gerekçelendirilmiş Doğru İnanç’ 34
4.1. Bilgi Bir İnanç mıdır? 35
4.2.  Bilgi Her Zaman Doğru İnanç mıdır? 39
4.3. Bir İnancın Bilgi Olabilmesi İçin Gerekçelendirilmiş Olması Gerekir mi? 42
5. Temel İnanç ve Bilgiler 46
I. GEREKÇELENDİRİLMİŞ DOĞRU İNANÇ BİLGİ MİDİR? [Edmund L. Gettier, Çeviren: Hasan Yücel Başdemir] 49
II. BİLGİ VE DAYANAKLAR: GETTIER’İN MAKALESİ ÜZERİNE BİR YORUM [Michael Clark, Çeviren: Hasan Yücel Başdemir] 53
III. BİLGİDE SEBEBE DAYANMA KOŞULU [Alvin I. Goldman, Çeviren: Hasan Yücel Başdemir] 59
IV. BİLGİ: SARSILMAZ GEREKÇELENDİRİLMİŞ DOĞRU İNANÇ [Keith Lehrer ve Thomas Paxson, Çeviren: Hasan Yücel Başdemir] 83
V. GEREKÇELENDİRİLMİŞ DOĞRU İNANÇ OLARAK BİLGİ [Roderick M. Chisholm, Çeviren: Hasan Yücel Başdemir] 105
1. Giriş 105
2. Gettier Durumları 106
3. Zorluğu Gösterme 108
4. Önerilen Çözüm 110
5. Alternatif Bir Çözüm 112
6. Sonuç 113
VI. BİLGİ NEDİR? [Roderick M. Chisholm, Çeviren: Hasan Yücel Başdemir] 115
1. Theaetetus Sorunu 115
2. Gettier Sorunu 116
3. Bir Uyarı Notu 120
4. Örneğe Yakından Bir Bakış 122
5. Bir Bilgi Tanımı 127
6. Birinin Bildiğini Bilmesi (Knowing That One Know) 130
VII. GETTIER SORUNLARININ KAÇINILMAZLIĞI [Linda Zagzebski, Çeviren: Hasan Yücel Başdemir] 135
EK-1
GETTİER VE BİLGİDE ŞANS UNSURU [Hasan Yücel Başdemir] 149
1. Epistemik Şans 151
2. Gettier Karşı-Örnekleri 161
3. Gettier’in Şans Senaryosu 167
4. Sonuç 171
EK-2
GEREKÇELENDİRME, EPİSTEMİK SEVİYELER VE KESİN BİLGİ: FARABÎ VE CHİSHOLM KARŞILAŞTIRMASI [Hasan Yücel Başdemir] 173
1. Sorun 173
2.  Gerekçelendirme: Chisholm 178
3. Gerekçelendirme: Farabî 181
4. Chisholm ve Epistemik Seviyeler 188
5. Farabî ve Epistemik Seviyeler 196
6. Sonuç Yerine: Karşılaştırma 203
EK-3
DOĞAL EPİSTEMOLOJİ MÜMKÜN MÜDÜR? [Şahabettin Yalçın] 209
Geleneksel Bilgi Tanımı 210
Doğal Epistemoloji 214
Doğal Epistemoloji Bir Alternatif Olabilir mi? 218
Sonuç 222
DİZİN 225

In this paper, I hope to solve a problem that’s as old as the hills: the problem of contingency for religious belief. Paradigmatic examples of this argument begin with a counterfactual premise: had we been born at a different time or in a difference place, we easily could have held different beliefs on religious topics. Ultimately, and perhaps by additional steps, we're meant to reach the skeptical conclusion that very many of our religious beliefs do not amount to knowledge. I survey some historical examples of this argument, and I try to fill the gap between the counterfactual premise and the skeptical conclusion as forcefully as possible. I consider the following possibilities: there are no additional steps in the argument; or there are and they concern the alleged safety condition on knowledge, or the alleged non-accidentality condition on knowledge, or the unclarity produced by disagreement. On every possibility, the argument from the counterfactual premise to the conclusion of widespread skepticism is invalid. It seems, then, that there is no serious problem of contingency for religious belief.

One of the guiding ideas of virtue epistemology is to look at epistemological issue through the lens of practical philosophy. The Gettier Problem is a case in point. Virtue epistemologists, like Sosa and Greco, see the shortcoming in a Gettier scenario as a shortcoming from which performances in general can suffer. In this paper I raise some doubts about the success of this project. Looking more closely at practical philosophy, will, I argue, show that virtue epistemology misconceives the significance of Gettier structures in the practical domain.

This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his belief in p and his justification for believing p covary with the truth of p through a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is that p's truth-maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the justification is grounded in. This position is dubbed 'identificationism.'

Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements – e.g., between foundationalists and coherentists, internalists and externalists – there has been widespread agreement that some form of fallibilism must be correct. According to a rough formulation of this view, it is possible for a subject to have knowledge even in cases where the justification or grounding for the knowledge is compatible with the subject’s being mistaken. In this paper, I examine the motivation for fallibilism before providing a fully general account of the view. I conclude by looking at the two major difficulties for fallibilism: the Gettier problem and the lottery paradox.

Desde que la definición de conocimiento como creencia verdadera y justificada fue puesta en cuestión por Gettier, se han hecho varios intentos por proporcionar una nueva definición. En este artículo, sostengo que lo único necesario para conservar la definición tradicional es una mejor comprensión del concepto de justificación. La teoría de la argumentación, en mi opinión, puede darnos una idea de lo que significa justificación y al mismo tiempo puede ayudarnos a explicar los contraejemplos del tipo de Gettier.

(short). The Gettier problem is conceived as the difficulty of offering an informative Gettier-proof analysis of knowledge. A solution is offered to this problem via anti-luck virtue epistemology. This proposal is then motivated and defended in light of a range of objections. ABSTRACT (long). The Gettier problem is conceived in a specific fashion as the problem of offering an informative (but not necessarily reductive) Gettier-proof analysis of knowledge. A solution is offered to this problem via anti-luck virtue epistemology. This is an account of knowledge which incorporates both an anti-luck condition and a virtue condition, and which is thereby able to avoid problems which face some of the main competing accounts of knowledge, particularly those offered by proponents of robust virtue epistemology. In particular. it is able to accommodate the epistemic dependence of knowledge on external factors, where this has both a positive and a negative aspect. Relatedly, it can also avoid the problem posed by epistemic twin earth cases. Anti-luck virtue epistemology is then motivated and defended in light of a range of objections, in order to demonstrate its potential as a resolution to the Gettier problem, so conceived.

The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as justification or understanding, are distinctively valuable. We will call the general question of why knowledge is valuable the value problem.

According to the traditional analysis of propositional knowledge (which derives from Plato's account in the Meno and Theaetetus), knowledge is justified true belief. This chapter develops the traditional analysis, introduces the famous Gettier and lottery problems, and provides an overview of prospective solutions. In closing, I briefly comment on the value of conceptual analysis, note how it has shaped the field, and assess the state of post-Gettier epistemology.

The project of the analysis of knowledge in terms of "justified true belief" is an essential part of both traditional and contemporary epistemology. Mario Bunge has gone beyond Gettier's famous counterexamples and has maintained that the conditions of the standard analysis are not only insufficient, but also unnecessary, and that therefore we should pursue a completely different theory of knowledge. In this paper I shall argue , however, that Bunge's criticisms are not decisive, and also that his alternative naturalized epistemology has serious insufficiencies. In particular I will try to show that it cannot account for the specifically epistemic aspects of inferential and testimonial knowledge.

Articles
Jon ALTSCHUL, Epistemic Deontologism and Role-Oughts
Benoit GAULTIER, An Argument Against the Possibility of Gettiered Beliefs
Michael S. PERRY, Externalism, Skepticism, and Belief
Pierre UZAN, Logique quantique et intrication

Debate
Michael DA SILVA, KK and the Knowledge Norm of Action
Franz HUBER, What is the Permissibility Solution a Solution of? – A Question for Kroedel
Moti MIZRAHI, Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-defeat Arguments: A Reply to Huemer
Timothy PERRINE, Against Kornblith Against Reflective Knowledge

It is the consideration of two epistemic lacunas concerning mathematics provides some amount of serenity for a mathematician who likes to believe in the objectivity of his knowledge. Even if mathematics is vulnerable for the skeptical hypothesis, it remains chaste under the Gettier’s argument.

The contribution deals with knowledge of what to do, and how, where, when and why to do it, as it is found in a multitude of plans, rules, procedures, maxims, and other instructions. It is argued that while this knowledge is conceptual and propositional, it is still irreducible to theoretical knowledge of what is the case and why it is the case. It is knowledge of goals, of ends and means, rather than of facts. It is knowledge-to that is irreducibly practical in having world to mind direction of fit and the essential function of guiding as yet uncompleted action. While practical knowledge is fundamentally different from theoretical knowledge in terms of mind-world relations, the practical and theoretical domains are still parallel in terms of justificatory and inferential relations, they are like mirror images of one another. It is shown that if this view of practical knowledge is accepted, convincing Gettier cases for practical knowledge can be constructed. An extensive analysis of these cases demonstrates the usefulness of the notions of practical deduction, abduction, and induction.

The "epistemology industry today," Haack begins, is often preoccupied with skepticism and the analysis of knowledge. She explains the so-called "Gettier paradoxes," and asks for students' responses ... as a way of leading into her own suggested dissolution of the paradoxes: they arise from the mismatch between a categorical conception of knowledge  and a gradational conception of justification.

Three classic distinctions specify that truths can be necessary versus contingent, analytic versus synthetic, and a priori versus a posteriori. The philosopher reading this article knows very well both how useful and ordinary such distinctions are in our conceptual work and that they have been subject to many and detailed debates, especially the last two. In the following pages, I do not wish to discuss how far they may be tenable. I shall assume that, if they are reasonable and non problematic in some ordinary cases, then they can be used in order to understand what kind of knowledge the maker's knowledge is. By this I mean the sort of knowledge that Alice enjoys when she holds the information (true content) that Bob's coffee is sweetened because she just put two spoons of sugar in it herself. The maker's knowledge tradition is quite important but it is not mainstream in modern and analytic epistemology and lacks grounding in terms of exactly what sort of knowledge one is talking about. My suggestion is that this grounding can be provided by a minimalist approach, based on an information-theoretical analysis. In the article, I argue that (a) we need to decouple a fourth distinction, namely informative versus uninformative, from the previous three and, in particular, from its implicit association with analytic versus synthetic and a priori versus a posteriori; (b) such a decoupling facilitates, and is facilitated by, moving from a monoagent to a multiagent approach: the distinctions qualify a proposition, a message, or some information not just in themselves but relationally, with respect to an informational agent; (c) the decoupling and the multiagent approach enable a re-mapping of currently available positions in epistemology (Classic, Innatist, Kant's and Kripke's) on these four dichotomies; (d) within such a re-mapping, two positions, capturing the nature of a witness' knowledge and of a maker's knowledge, can best be described as contingent, synthetic, a posteriori, and uninformative and as
contingent, synthetic, weakly a priori (ab anteriori), and uninformative respectively. In the conclusion, I indicate why the analysis of the maker’s knowledge has important consequences in all those cases in which the poietic (constructive) intervention on a system determines the truth of the model of that system.

Philosophy’s role is typically a reflective one. Yet this stance is in peril of being corrupted. Because it is being driven to specialized inquiries, the subdisciplines of which it is comprised may develop into separate fields, whose presence will then need to be justified in the same way the sciences are. This is impossible, however, given their diverging objectives. If this course of action persist, philosophy’s end in the sense of its ending is imminent, on account of its no longer having an end in the sense of its objective.

Haack teaches epistemology in not-quite-the-usual way. first, her approach is historical; second, it is classical-pragmatist in tone and tenor. nonetheless she also covers most of the topics in contemporary analytic epistemology (context, virtues, etc.) as well.

Readers may be amused to see that Haack's fall semester is, as so often, interrupted by a hurricane!

Spunti teoretici e didattici dal paradosso di Gettier 1. Platone: la conoscenza come credenza vera e giustificata Che cos'è la conoscenza? Platone aveva già una risposta che si può considerare a grandi linee completa e corretta: una credenza vera e giustificata; vediamone brevemente le motivazioni. I sofisti tendevano a identificare la conoscenza con la sensazione, che è la forma più immediata di rapporto tra soggetto e oggetto. Platone riteneva inaccettabile questa identificazione, per una serie di buoni motivi: ascoltando le parole di una lingua sconosciuta, chi sa la lingua e chi non la sa hanno le medesime sensazioni, ma ne ricavano diverse conoscenze 1 . Utilizzando un esempio moderno, supponiamo che un oggetto formato da un quadrante circolare con una lancetta sia visto dal gatto, da Carla e da Vincenzo: il gatto non pensa nulla, Carla pensa, erroneamente, che sia un orologio, e Vincenzo pensa, correttamente, che sia una bussola. In questo caso, tutti hanno le medesime sensazioni, ma solo Vincenzo ha la conoscenza. Inoltre, la sensazione è momentanea, mentre la conoscenza è duratura, e in particolare permane anche quando non vi sia più la sensazione 2 . Ancora, posso aver la sensazione di un colore, e aver la sensazione di un suono; ma che il colore non è il suono, che sono diversi, che entrambi esistono, ecc., sono conoscenze che non coincidono con nessuna delle due sensazioni (né con nessun'altra) 3 ; in generale, la conoscenza ha sempre a che fare con la predicazione, ossia con il pensiero che qualcosa (sensazione o oggetto) è o non è qualcos'altro, che ha o non ha una certa proprietà: che due sensazioni sono o non sono identiche, o che una cosa è o non è salata, che il due non è dispari, ecc. 4 Infatti, come mostra anche l'esempio precedente della bussola, conosce solo chi crede il vero. La conoscenza deve dunque essere qualcosa di vero, mentre la sensazione non è né vera né falsa: ad esempio, la sensazione che mi dà un miraggio nel deserto, non è falsa, è semplicemente una particolare sensazione; falsa è piuttosto la mia credenza che quella sia la visione di una pozza d'acqua. Verità e falsità spettano solo alle credenze che noi abbiamo (sulle sensazioni o sugli oggetti). La conoscenza non è dunque una sensazione, ma una credenza, e precisamente una credenza vera 5 .

Articles
Rodrigo BORGES, How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the Dark Side of Knowledge
Thomas HALL, In Defense of the Compossibility of Presentism and Time Travel
Ned MARKOSIAN, Do You Know That You Are Not a Brain In a Vat?
Rinat M. NUGAYEV, Maxwellian Scientific Revolution: A Case Study in Kantian Epistemology
Shane RYAN, A Humean Account of Testimonial Justification

Debate
Michael HUEMER, Alternative Self-Defeat Arguments: A Reply to Mizrahi

Nel Teeteto Platone si chiede cosa sia la conoscenza, e giunge a sostenere che è (i) una credenza, (ii) vera, e (iii) "con ragioni", ossia, come comunemente si dice, e diremo anche qui, giustificata . Dev'essere una credenza, e non una semplice sensazione, perché gli esempi mostrano che si possono avere sensazioni senza conoscere nulla; inoltre la conoscenza è vera, mentre la sensazione non è vera né falsa. Dev'essere vera, in quanto se fosse falsa non sarebbe una conoscenza ma un'illusione. Infine dev'essere giustificata perché per conoscenza intendiamo un possesso sicuro e non causale o incerto della verità, fondato sui dati stessi che rendono la credenza vera, e non su fattori estrinseci o accidentali. L'analisi di Platone si arena però al momento di offrire una definizione adeguata e non circolare o vuota di cosa sia una giustificazione (207-210).

In recent years, there has been a lot of debate in philosophical methodology about the best rational reconstruction of philosophical thought experiments. Concerning this debate, I argue against the current consensus that our intuitive judgments about Gettier thought experiments should be interpreted in modal terms. In order to provide a non-modal alternative, I present a detailed reconstruction of a paradigmatic Gettier thought experiment in terms of suppositional thinking. Next, I explore a problem that all rational reconstructions must face, namely that there is a large gap between the explicit case description of a thought experiment and our total supposition of the relevant scenario. In the final section, I use these considerations to make room for alternative explanations of some challenging results from experimental philosophy – explanations that are friendlier to the method of thought experimentation than the skeptical conclusions of experimental philosophers of a ‘restrictionist’ stripe.

This inquiry aims at exploring the complex relationships between the basic epistemological concepts found in the “traditional analysis of knowledge”, namely: truth, belief and justification. After having clarified what is left aside by the standard way of framing reflection on knowledge (ch. II - particular attention is paid to the relation between know-that and know-how), focus is directed onto the relationship to truth. Truth is conceived as a norm,
that is as an object of commitment: the commitment to truth is called “the claim to truth” (ch. III - particular attention is paid to the Aquinas theory of truth). Such a notion is then explored in depth, first in relation to the difference between “the state of belief” and “the act of judgment” or “act of assent”: their nature is clarified through the notion of “holding-truth” (ch. IV - particular attention is paid to the Moore’s Paradox). The problem of justification is then explored on the basis of the relation between assent and commitment to holding evidential considerations (ch. V - particular attention is paid to the relation between justification, being justified, having a reason to believe and context relativity). At the end, the difference between the claim to truth and the claim to knowledge is elucidated and both the Gettier Problem and the relations between knowledge and human fallibility are discussed
(ch. VI).

Research Articles
Mark J. BOONE, Inferential, Coherential, and Foundational Warrant: An Eclectic Account of the Sources of Warrant
T. Ryan BYERLY, A Dispositional Internalist Evidentialist Virtue Epistemology
Tjerk GAUDERIS, On Theoretical and Practical Doxastic Attitudes
Patrizio LO PRESTI, Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms

Discussion Notes/Debate
Giovanni MION, Grueing Gettier

A conceptual exploration of the umbrella notion Wisdom, as well as dimensions, characteristics and components of the idea of wisdom as suggested by experimental philosophy, neurosciences and other studies and a comparison of the notion of wisdom with those of knowledge, truth, insight and understanding.