Transformative Experiences

Purpose-In the emerging transformation economy, there is a shift from staging memorable experiences for many to eliciting life-transformative events for one. This study aims to understand how transformative experiences can be guided and what prerequisites are needed to elicit human transformation when designing experiences. This study borrows positive psychology as a theoretical lens to explore festivals as a prime context for liminal transformative experiences in the hospitality context. Design/methodology/approach-A constructivist qualitative research design was employed through 31 in-depth interviews. To ensure experience recollection, memory formation and integration of the experience into long-term transformative effects, all interviewees had attended an electronic dance music festival in the past twelve months. Findings-Guided by the PERMA model, the thematic analysis revealed a series of psychological and contextual dimensions around positive emotions (P), engagement (E), relationships (R), meaning (M), accomplishment (A) and liminality that need to occur for transformative experiences, personal growth and self-transcendence to happen. Originality/value-This research bridges the emerging transformation economy, experience design and positive psychology. Grounded in PERMA, the study offers a novel theoretical model that serves as a framework for both transformative experience research and practical experience design. Practical implications-This study provides a guideline for event organisers and experiences designers to intentionally design and occasion positive human experiences in temporal and spatial liminal hospitality consumption contexts. Psychological and contextual dimensions are identified as critical factors in facilitating human transformation.

In her ground-breaking and highly influential book Transformative Experience, L.A. Paul makes two claims: (1) one cannot evaluate and compare certain experiential outcomes (e.g. being a parent and being a non-parent) unless one can grasp what these outcomes are like; and (2) one can evaluate and compare certain intuitively horrible outcomes (e.g. being eaten alive by sharks) as bad and worse than certain other outcomes even if one cannot grasp what these intuitively horrible outcomes are like. We argue that the conjunction of these two claims leads to an implausible discontinuity in the evaluability of outcomes. One implication of positing such a discontinuity is that evaluative comparisons of outcomes will not be proportionally sensitive to variation in the underlying features of these outcomes. This puts pressure on Paul to abandon either (1) or (2). But (1) is central to her view and (2) is very hard to deny. We call this the Shark Problem.