- Department of Philosophy
Northern Michigan University
1401 Presque Isle Avenue
Marquette, MI 49855 - 906-227-1682
Antony Aumann
Northern Michigan University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Antony Aumann is Professor of Philosophy at Northern Michigan University. In addition, he has held positions at the O... moreAntony Aumann is Professor of Philosophy at Northern Michigan University. In addition, he has held positions at the Ohio State University, St. Olaf College, and Fordham University. He regularly teaches courses on aesthetics, religion, and existentialism, and he coordinates the Religious Studies Minor. His research focuses on existentialism and philosophy of art, but he also has interests in the effects of AI on education. His views on ChatGPT made front-page news in the New York Times in January 2023, and he has appeared on numerous TV and radio shows to discuss the topic. Professor Aumann received NMU's 2017-18 Excellence in Teaching Award, and he co-edits the book series New Kierkegaard Research.edit
In this paper, I argue that art can help us imagine what it would be like to have experiences we have never had before. I begin by surveying a few of the things we are after when we ask what an experience is like. I maintain that it is... more
In this paper, I argue that art can help us imagine what it would be like to have experiences we have never had before. I begin by surveying a few of the things we are after when we ask what an experience is like. I maintain that it is easy for art to provide some of them. For example, it can relay facts about what the experience involves or what responses the experience might engender. The tricky case is the phenomenal quality of the experience or what it feels like from the inside. Thus, in the main part of the paper, I discuss how art can provide us with this as well. I conclude by situating my view in the context of the broader debate over transformative experiences. I maintain that art can solve some but not all of the problems that arise when deciding whether to undergo a transformation.
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This chapter examines why existentialists so often encourage us to become rebels. There are many kinds of rebellion, but the kind at stake here is a social phenomenon. It begins with the observation that, in modern society, we do not just... more
This chapter examines why existentialists so often encourage us to become rebels. There are many kinds of rebellion, but the kind at stake here is a social phenomenon. It begins with the observation that, in modern society, we do not just encounter isolated individuals. We also confront the nameless, faceless masses. Other people merge together into an anonymous collective, often called the ‘crowd’ or the ‘public,’ which seeks to impose its will upon us. It pressures us to conform to its rules or suffer its wrath. The existentialist hero is the person who resists this pressure, who refuses to do what the masses would have them do.
I survey four possible justifications for social rebellion. First, we ought to rebel against the norms of mass society because they are wrong or misguided. Second, our social norms merit resistance because they are insufficiently inflexible: they cannot handle exceptional cases. Third, we should rebel against our social norms because they are one-sided. That is, they ignore the possibility of other equally legitimate points of view. Fourth, we ought to resist the authority of the crowd because we ought to resist all external authorities.
These four lines of argument are not exhaustive. It is possible to find others in the existentialist literature. They also are not mutually exclusive. Embracing one does not require rejecting the rest. Indeed, they overlap at many points. As such, it may be better to regard them as different frameworks for thinking about rebellion than as distinct justifications. Finally, the setup of this chapter suggests that existentialists generally support social rebellion. This is not incorrect. However, there is another side to the story. Many existentialists worry about the costs of social rebellion or regard it as a threat. Accordingly, this chapter concludes with an analysis of social rebellion's downsides.
I survey four possible justifications for social rebellion. First, we ought to rebel against the norms of mass society because they are wrong or misguided. Second, our social norms merit resistance because they are insufficiently inflexible: they cannot handle exceptional cases. Third, we should rebel against our social norms because they are one-sided. That is, they ignore the possibility of other equally legitimate points of view. Fourth, we ought to resist the authority of the crowd because we ought to resist all external authorities.
These four lines of argument are not exhaustive. It is possible to find others in the existentialist literature. They also are not mutually exclusive. Embracing one does not require rejecting the rest. Indeed, they overlap at many points. As such, it may be better to regard them as different frameworks for thinking about rebellion than as distinct justifications. Finally, the setup of this chapter suggests that existentialists generally support social rebellion. This is not incorrect. However, there is another side to the story. Many existentialists worry about the costs of social rebellion or regard it as a threat. Accordingly, this chapter concludes with an analysis of social rebellion's downsides.
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Risk is central to any meaningful life, says Kierkegaard. Yet, risks don’t always pan out. So, how do we recover when things go south? The answer, Kierkegaard claims, lies in religion: faith is the cure for despair. A crucial example... more
Risk is central to any meaningful life, says Kierkegaard. Yet, risks don’t always pan out. So, how do we recover when things go south? The answer, Kierkegaard claims, lies in religion: faith is the cure for despair. A crucial example comes from his neglected discourse on Anna the Prophetess. Anna takes a risk and marries her beloved—only to have him pass away. Distraught, she turns to God. She copes with her loss by praying and fasting in the temple.
My paper explores how religion is supposed to help Anna. I identify two answers in Kierkegaard’s corpus. The first is a quasi-stoic position. Kierkegaard sometimes says finite goods aren’t the proper objects of deep care. Thus, Anna was wrong to devote herself wholeheartedly to her husband. She should’ve clung to something eternal, like God.
This first answer suffers from “otherworldliness,” however. Better is Kierkegaard’s second. He sometimes says faith isn’t about leaving behind the finite world. It’s how we maintain hope in it. Turning to God helps because “God is this—that everything is possible.” I conclude by discussing the conditions for cultivating such religious hope. Drawing on Sickness, I argue it’s not something we can do on our own.
My paper explores how religion is supposed to help Anna. I identify two answers in Kierkegaard’s corpus. The first is a quasi-stoic position. Kierkegaard sometimes says finite goods aren’t the proper objects of deep care. Thus, Anna was wrong to devote herself wholeheartedly to her husband. She should’ve clung to something eternal, like God.
This first answer suffers from “otherworldliness,” however. Better is Kierkegaard’s second. He sometimes says faith isn’t about leaving behind the finite world. It’s how we maintain hope in it. Turning to God helps because “God is this—that everything is possible.” I conclude by discussing the conditions for cultivating such religious hope. Drawing on Sickness, I argue it’s not something we can do on our own.
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This paper aims to defend the value of art museum audio guides. Modern guides have many functions, but I will focus on two that pertain directly to art appreciation. First, audio guides offer tours that direct visitors’ attention to... more
This paper aims to defend the value of art museum audio guides. Modern guides have many functions, but I will focus on two that pertain directly to art appreciation. First, audio guides offer tours that direct visitors’ attention to museum highlights. Second, they have individual stops that offer commentary and criticism about individual works of art. I will concede that the tours do not serve the interests of all visitors. However, I will defend the merits of the individual stops. In particular, I will argue that they provide information about the associated works that it would be difficult for us to learn just by looking at them for ourselves. In so doing, the guides put us in a better position to appreciate the works. Crucially, this benefit obtains even if art appreciation turns out to be subjective, must be undertaken autonomously, or has to be grounded in empirical observation.
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Encounters with art can change us in ways both big and small. This paper focuses on one of the more dramatic cases. I argue that works of art can inspire what L. A. Paul calls transformations. Classic examples include getting married,... more
Encounters with art can change us in ways both big and small. This paper focuses on one of the more dramatic cases. I argue that works of art can inspire what L. A. Paul calls transformations. Classic examples include getting married, having a child, and undergoing a religious conversion. Two features distinguish transformations from other changes we undergo. First, they involve the discovery of something new. Second, they result in a change in our core preferences. These two features make transformations hard to motivate. I argue, however, that art can help on both fronts. First, works of art can guide our attempt to imagine unfamiliar ways of living. Second, they can attract us to values we currently reject. I conclude by observing that what makes art powerful also makes it dangerous. Transformations are not always for the good, and art's ability to inspire them can be put to immoral ends.
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Kierkegaard seeks to inspire transformations. His aim is to get us to devote our lives to God or the Good rather than our own personal enjoyment – to abandon the aesthetic life in favour of the ethical or religious one. Drawing on Laurie... more
Kierkegaard seeks to inspire transformations. His aim is to get us to devote our lives to God or the Good rather than our own personal enjoyment – to abandon the aesthetic life in favour of the ethical or religious one. Drawing on Laurie Paul and Agnes Callard’s recent work, I maintain that two obstacles stand in Kierkegaard’s way. First, transformations involve adopting a new perspective on the world, one we cannot fully grasp ahead of time. Second, transformations also involve coming to care about something we do not yet care about. On my interpretation, Kierkegaard sees art, especially literature, as central to overcoming both obstacles. Good stories afford us a glimpse into what it would look and feel like to live in ways other than we currently do. In addition, they have the power to attract us to points of view we would ordinarily reject.
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This paper defends an account of forgiveness that is sensitive to recent work on anger. Like others, we claim anger involves an appraisal, namely that someone has done something wrong. But, we add, anger has two further functions. First,... more
This paper defends an account of forgiveness that is sensitive to recent work on anger. Like others, we claim anger involves an appraisal, namely that someone has done something wrong. But, we add, anger has two further functions. First, anger communicates to the wrongdoer that her act has been appraised as wrong and demands she feel guilty. This function enables us to explain why apologies make it reasonable to forgo anger and forgive. Second, anger sanctions the wrongdoer for what she has done. This function allows us to explore the moral status of forgiveness, including why forgiveness is typically elective.
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In The Religion of Existence, Noreen Khawaja suggests that Kierkegaard is an ascetic thinker. By this, she means that he regards religious striving as (1) requiring ceaseless renewal and (2) being an end in itself rather than a means to... more
In The Religion of Existence, Noreen Khawaja suggests that Kierkegaard is an ascetic thinker. By this, she means that he regards religious striving as (1) requiring ceaseless renewal and (2) being an end in itself rather than a means to some further end. I raise challenges to both claims in Khawaja's proposal. I argue that the first claim stands in tension with Kierkegaard's contention that his infinitely demanding account of religious existence is meant merely as a corrective. The second claim, I maintain, does not fit well with his assertion that eternal salvation is at stake in religious striving.
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On a common 18–19th c. view, art appreciation ought to be “disinterested.” When engaging a work of art, we should set aside any instrumental benefits it might have; we should value it solely for its own sake. Kierkegaard often appears to... more
On a common 18–19th c. view, art appreciation ought to be “disinterested.” When engaging a work of art, we should set aside any instrumental benefits it might have; we should value it solely for its own sake. Kierkegaard often appears to share this view. In Postscript, we even read that “aesthetically, the highest pathos is disinterestedness.” But, I argue, Kierkegaard ultimately has to abandon the tradition of disinterest. For it requires us to disregard the very thing that he thinks makes art worth attending to in the first place, namely its ability to help us with the project of self-discovery. Instead, I maintain, he develops a new ideal according to which we adequately appreciate a work of art only if we consider its significance for our own personal lives. In other words, proper art appreciation for Kierkegaard must be interested and subjective rather than disinterested and objective.
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Since Plato’s Republic, lovers of art have been challenged to justify its importance. One common defense, embraced by the 19th c. Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard, is to argue that art has “cognitive value.” Works of art matter because... more
Since Plato’s Republic, lovers of art have been challenged to justify its importance. One common defense, embraced by the 19th c. Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard, is to argue that art has “cognitive value.” Works of art matter because they can teach us in important ways. Yet, there is considerable pushback against this view. Critics concede that art may have the ability to teach, but they counter by saying that it cannot do so as well as philosophy or the sciences. For the lessons communicated through art are never as clear-cut or as well-supported by reasons.
In this paper, I explain how Kierkegaard turns this objection on its head. First, he argues that works of art do not teach “directly” by telling us truths and offering us evidence. Instead, art educates us “indirectly” by helping us make our own discoveries. Second, the fact that art does not teach in a straightforward manner is not a defect. On the contrary, it is precisely because art teaches indirectly that it teaches better than philosophy and science do.
In this paper, I explain how Kierkegaard turns this objection on its head. First, he argues that works of art do not teach “directly” by telling us truths and offering us evidence. Instead, art educates us “indirectly” by helping us make our own discoveries. Second, the fact that art does not teach in a straightforward manner is not a defect. On the contrary, it is precisely because art teaches indirectly that it teaches better than philosophy and science do.
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The goal of this paper is to reconcile two competing camps of thinking regarding Dickinson’s poetry. According to the first camp, the form and content of her poems cannot be pulled apart. What she says is tightly bound up with how she... more
The goal of this paper is to reconcile two competing camps of thinking regarding Dickinson’s poetry. According to the first camp, the form and content of her poems cannot be pulled apart. What she says is tightly bound up with how she says it. According to the second camp, we can paraphrase her poems; we can say what they say in other words. To resolve the tension between these views, I defend the following two claims. First, we tend to ask too much of paraphrases. We wrongly demand they reproduce everything contained in the original poem. Second, poets and critics are engaged in different kinds of activities. These activities are governed by different norms. In particular, form and content must be tied together for a poet such as Dickinson but not for a critic intent on a paraphrase.
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Much recent attention has been devoted to Kierkegaard’s views on selfhood. Central to his account is the idea that a self is not something we automatically are. It is something we must work hard to become. The idea that true or authentic... more
Much recent attention has been devoted to Kierkegaard’s views on selfhood. Central to his account is the idea that a self is not something we automatically are. It is something we must work hard to become.
The idea that true or authentic selfhood is a project is not unique to Kierkegaard. Yet, he rejects popular ways of developing the point. He denies Rousseau’s view that we can discover who we really are by looking within ourselves. He also denies the view developed by the Romantics and later adopted by Sartre that we can invent our true selves in a burst of artistic creativity. In fact, for Kierkegaard, becoming an authentic self is not something we can do on our own. We must look beyond ourselves for assistance. In particular, Kierkegaard thinks we must turn to God for help. We must rely on him for the content of our identity.
A longstanding concern about Kierkegaard arises at this point. His account of authentic selfhood is deeply religious. It presupposes not only that God exists but that He has a plan for each of us. Thus, we must ask how much Kierkegaard has to offer the contemporary secular reader. How much of his account can we take on board if we do not share his theological starting points?
This paper aims to defend the secular relevance of Kierkegaard’s writings on authentic selfhood. First, I will argue that secular readers can accept some of his criticisms of popular models of authenticity. Second, I will show that they can embrace the core insight of his own model, namely that becoming authentic requires relying on others. What secular readers cannot take on board, of course, is the idea that the particular other we must depend on is God. Nevertheless, third, I will explain how human others can perform many of the roles Kierkegaard assigns to God. In particular, by turning to our friends and engaging them in dialogue about our lives, we can gain much of the support and guidance Kierkegaard believes can only be acquired from God.
The idea that true or authentic selfhood is a project is not unique to Kierkegaard. Yet, he rejects popular ways of developing the point. He denies Rousseau’s view that we can discover who we really are by looking within ourselves. He also denies the view developed by the Romantics and later adopted by Sartre that we can invent our true selves in a burst of artistic creativity. In fact, for Kierkegaard, becoming an authentic self is not something we can do on our own. We must look beyond ourselves for assistance. In particular, Kierkegaard thinks we must turn to God for help. We must rely on him for the content of our identity.
A longstanding concern about Kierkegaard arises at this point. His account of authentic selfhood is deeply religious. It presupposes not only that God exists but that He has a plan for each of us. Thus, we must ask how much Kierkegaard has to offer the contemporary secular reader. How much of his account can we take on board if we do not share his theological starting points?
This paper aims to defend the secular relevance of Kierkegaard’s writings on authentic selfhood. First, I will argue that secular readers can accept some of his criticisms of popular models of authenticity. Second, I will show that they can embrace the core insight of his own model, namely that becoming authentic requires relying on others. What secular readers cannot take on board, of course, is the idea that the particular other we must depend on is God. Nevertheless, third, I will explain how human others can perform many of the roles Kierkegaard assigns to God. In particular, by turning to our friends and engaging them in dialogue about our lives, we can gain much of the support and guidance Kierkegaard believes can only be acquired from God.
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Works of art can be difficult in several ways. One important way is by making us face up to unsettling truths. Such works typically receive praise. I maintain, however, that sometimes they deserve moral censure. The crux of my argument is... more
Works of art can be difficult in several ways. One important way is by making us face up to unsettling truths. Such works typically receive praise. I maintain, however, that sometimes they deserve moral censure. The crux of my argument is that, just as we have a right to know the truth in certain contexts, so too we have a right not to know it. Provided our ignorance does not harm or seriously endanger others, the decision about whether to know the truth ought to be left to us. Within this limit, therefore, difficult art is morally problematic if it intentionally targets those who have chosen not to know. To illustrate the problem, I discuss the literary writings of Søren Kierkegaard, which aim to deceive readers into seeing unpleasant truths about themselves that they seek to ignore.
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It is sometimes held that “the aesthetic” and “the cognitive” are separate categories. Enterprises concerning the former and ones concerning the latter have different aims and values. They require distinct modes of attention and reward... more
It is sometimes held that “the aesthetic” and “the cognitive” are separate categories. Enterprises concerning the former and ones concerning the latter have different aims and values. They require distinct modes of attention and reward divergent kinds of appreciation. Thus, we must avoid running together aesthetic and cognitive matters. In this paper, I challenge the independence of these categories, but in unorthodox fashion. Most attempts proceed by arguing that cognitive values can bear upon aesthetic ones. I approach from the opposite direction. I show that a work’s aesthetic merits can affect its cognitive ones and, more provocatively, its philosophical ones.
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On the standard view, paraphrasing Kierkegaard requires no special literary talent. It demands no flair for the poetic, unless clarity and straightforwardness should count. However, Kierkegaard himself does not ascribe to this view. At... more
On the standard view, paraphrasing Kierkegaard requires no special literary talent. It demands no flair for the poetic, unless clarity and straightforwardness should count. However, Kierkegaard himself does not ascribe to this view. At least not exactly. He claims that we cannot paraphrase some of his ideas in a straightforward fashion. To use the words of Johannes Climacus, these ideas defy ‘direct communication’. In this paper, I piece together and defend the justification Kierkegaard offers for this position. I also provide an account of its implications for contemporary scholarship.
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One striking feature of On the Genealogy of Morals concerns how it is written. Nietzsche utilizes a literary style that provokes his readers’ emotions. Recently, Christopher Janaway has argued that this approach is integral to Nietzsche’s... more
One striking feature of On the Genealogy of Morals concerns how it is written. Nietzsche utilizes a literary style that provokes his readers’ emotions. Recently, Christopher Janaway has argued that this approach is integral to Nietzsche’s philosophical goals: feeling the emotions Nietzsche’s style arouses is necessary for understanding the views he defends. This paper shows that Janaway’s position is tempting but mistaken. The temptation exists because our emotions often function as “tools of discovery.” They bring things into focus we otherwise could not see. However, once we grasp what they reveal, we can communicate it to others without first having to arouse their emotions. Thus there may be truths none of us would know unless one of us consulted his or her emotions. But it is not the case that each of us must consult his or her emotions in order to understand these truths.
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Kierkegaard faces an apparent dilemma. On the one hand, he concurs with the biblical injunction: we are to love our neighbors as ourselves. He takes this to imply that self-love and neighbor-love should be roughly symmetrical, similar in... more
Kierkegaard faces an apparent dilemma. On the one hand, he concurs with the biblical injunction: we are to love our neighbors as ourselves. He takes this to imply that self-love and neighbor-love should be roughly symmetrical, similar in kind as well as degree. On the other hand, he recommends relating to others and to ourselves in disparate ways. We should be lenient, charitable, and forgiving when interacting with neighbors; the opposite when dealing with ourselves. The goal of my paper is to solve this puzzle. I first consider addressing it by appealing to Gene Outka’s idea that equal love does not entail identical treatment. After rejecting this solution, I offer my own: Asymmetry between the two loves is not a moral ideal for Kierkegaard but a rehabilitative strategy. He recommends being more latitudinarian with others than with ourselves to correct against a common tendency toward the opposite extreme.
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In The Ethics of Authorship, Daniel Berthold depicts G. W. F. Hegel and Søren Kierkegaard as endorsing two postmodern principles. The first is an ethical ideal. Authors should abdicate their traditional privileged position as arbiters of... more
In The Ethics of Authorship, Daniel Berthold depicts G. W. F. Hegel and Søren Kierkegaard as endorsing two postmodern principles. The first is an ethical ideal. Authors should abdicate their traditional privileged position as arbiters of their texts’ meaning. They should allow readers to determine this meaning for themselves. Only by doing so will they help readers attain genuine selfhood. The second principle is a claim about language. To wit, language cannot express an author’s thoughts. I argue that if the claim about language holds, the ethical ideal becomes superfluous. In addition, if Berthold has identified Hegel and Kierkegaard’s views regarding the issues in question by reading their works, then either they failed to execute their ethical project or their views about language are false.
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Recent scholarship has shown that the success of Pascal’s wager rests on precarious grounds. To avoid notorious problems, it must appeal to considerations such as what probability we assign to the existence of various gods and what... more
Recent scholarship has shown that the success of Pascal’s wager rests on precarious grounds. To avoid notorious problems, it must appeal to considerations such as what probability we assign to the existence of various gods and what religion we think provides the greatest happiness in this life. Rational judgments concerning these matters are subject to change over time. Some claim that the wager therefore cannot support a steadfast commitment to God. I argue that this conclusion does not follow. By drawing upon the line of reasoning employed in getting married, I explain how unstable considerations can provide a sufficient rational foundation for a stable commitment.
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Following the pattern set by the early German Romantics, Kierkegaard conveys many of his insights through literature rather than academic prose. What makes him a valuable member of this tradition is the theory he develops to support it,... more
Following the pattern set by the early German Romantics, Kierkegaard conveys many of his insights through literature rather than academic prose. What makes him a valuable member of this tradition is the theory he develops to support it, his so-called “theory of indirect communication.” The most exciting aspect of this theory concerns the alleged importance of indirect communication: Kierkegaard claims that there are some projects only it can accomplish. This paper provides a critical account of two arguments Kierkegaard offers in defense of this claim. The first argument is that he needs to use indirect communication in order to discourage people from losing themselves in the “crowd”. The second argument is that he needs to use it in order to help people out of a “monstrous illusion”. It is shown that while both arguments justify Kierkegaard’s decision to use indirect communication, neither one supports the original claim about its indispensability.
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This paper provides an account of Kierkegaard’s central criticism of the Danish Hegelians. Contrary to recent scholarship, it is argued that this criticism has a substantive theoretical basis and is not merely personal or ad hominem in... more
This paper provides an account of Kierkegaard’s central criticism of the Danish Hegelians. Contrary to recent scholarship, it is argued that this criticism has a substantive theoretical basis and is not merely personal or ad hominem in nature. In particular, Kierkegaard is seen as criticizing the Hegelians for endorsing an unacceptable form of intellectual elitism, one that gives them pride of place in the realm of religion by dint of their philosophical knowledge. A problem arises, however, because this criticism threatens to apply to Kierkegaard himself. It is shown that Kierkegaard manages to escape this problem by virtue of the humorous aspect of his work.
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This dissertation concerns Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect communication. A central aspect of this theory is what I call the “indispensability thesis”: there are some projects only indirect communication can accomplish. The purpose of... more
This dissertation concerns Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect communication. A central aspect of this theory is what I call the “indispensability thesis”: there are some projects only indirect communication can accomplish. The purpose of the dissertation is to disclose and assess the rationale behind the indispensability thesis.
A pair of questions guides the project. First, to what does ‘indirect communication’ refer? Two acceptable responses exist: (1) Kierkegaard’s version of Socrates’ midwifery method and (2) Kierkegaard’s use of artful literary devices. Second, for what end does Kierkegaard use indirect communication? There are two acceptable responses here as well: (1) helping others become religious and (2) making others aware of the nature of existence.
These responses are interrelated. First, Kierkegaard’s notion of religion places restrictions on the means he can use to get readers to become religious. These restrictions ultimately entail that the only viable form of religious pedagogy is the midwifery method. Second, Kierkegaard engages in the midwifery method in part by making readers aware of the nature of existence (especially religious existence). But given the problems plaguing his readers, he thinks a straightforward approach to this project will likely fail. An approach that used artful literary devices such as deception and humor would be more successful. Third, Kierkegaard believes that there is one aspect of religious existence (viz. subjectivity) that people can come to know only first-hand. As such, he cannot directly impart knowledge of subjectivity to his readers. He argues that this means he must use the midwifery method. And he thinks the most productive way to do so is to provide readers with the kind of fictional narratives found in his early pseudonymous writings. Thus artful rhetorical devices play a role here as well.
All of Kierkegaard’s arguments for the indispensability thesis turn on debatable assumptions. But the arguments concerning artful rhetorical devices have the additional defect of being merely probabilistic in nature. They lack the strength to support the indispensability thesis even if we grant the relevant background assumptions. Therefore, to the degree that the indispensability thesis has merit, it lies with the arguments concerning the midwifery method.
A pair of questions guides the project. First, to what does ‘indirect communication’ refer? Two acceptable responses exist: (1) Kierkegaard’s version of Socrates’ midwifery method and (2) Kierkegaard’s use of artful literary devices. Second, for what end does Kierkegaard use indirect communication? There are two acceptable responses here as well: (1) helping others become religious and (2) making others aware of the nature of existence.
These responses are interrelated. First, Kierkegaard’s notion of religion places restrictions on the means he can use to get readers to become religious. These restrictions ultimately entail that the only viable form of religious pedagogy is the midwifery method. Second, Kierkegaard engages in the midwifery method in part by making readers aware of the nature of existence (especially religious existence). But given the problems plaguing his readers, he thinks a straightforward approach to this project will likely fail. An approach that used artful literary devices such as deception and humor would be more successful. Third, Kierkegaard believes that there is one aspect of religious existence (viz. subjectivity) that people can come to know only first-hand. As such, he cannot directly impart knowledge of subjectivity to his readers. He argues that this means he must use the midwifery method. And he thinks the most productive way to do so is to provide readers with the kind of fictional narratives found in his early pseudonymous writings. Thus artful rhetorical devices play a role here as well.
All of Kierkegaard’s arguments for the indispensability thesis turn on debatable assumptions. But the arguments concerning artful rhetorical devices have the additional defect of being merely probabilistic in nature. They lack the strength to support the indispensability thesis even if we grant the relevant background assumptions. Therefore, to the degree that the indispensability thesis has merit, it lies with the arguments concerning the midwifery method.
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This paper illuminates the central arguments in Sartre's UNESCO address, 'The Singular Universal." The address begins by asking whether objective facts tell us everything there is to know about Kierkegaard. Sartre's answer is negative.... more
This paper illuminates the central arguments in Sartre's UNESCO address, 'The Singular Universal." The address begins by asking whether objective facts tell us everything there is to know about Kierkegaard. Sartre's answer is negative. The question then arises as to whether we can lay hold of Kierkegaard's "irreducible subjectivity" by seeing him as alive for us today, i.e., as transhistorical. Sartre's answer here is affirmative. However, a close inspection of this answer exposes a deeper level to the address. The struggle to find a place for Kierkegaard within the world of objective knowledge is an allegory. It mirrors Sartre's struggle to find a place for his existentialism within the Marxism that dominates his later thinking.
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"According to Kierkegaard, art can help us make better choices." Philosopher Antony Aumann explains why a goat in the middle of a museum can be life-changing. This is an English translation of an interview with Filosofie Magazine's... more
"According to Kierkegaard, art can help us make better choices." Philosopher Antony Aumann explains why a goat in the middle of a museum can be life-changing.
This is an English translation of an interview with Filosofie Magazine's Claudia Galgau. For the Dutch original, follow the link provided.
This is an English translation of an interview with Filosofie Magazine's Claudia Galgau. For the Dutch original, follow the link provided.
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This dossier served as the basis for the 2017 Excellence in Teaching Award given to me by Northern Michigan University.
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When making decisions, we often turn to our imaginations for help. We try to simulate what life would be like if we embraced this or that option. Such forecasting faces difficulties, however, when the option at stake is unfamiliar. This... more
When making decisions, we often turn to our imaginations for help. We try to simulate what life would be like if we embraced this or that option. Such forecasting faces difficulties, however, when the option at stake is unfamiliar. This paper investigates whether art can help. I defend an ambivalent view. On the one hand, art can reveal what a novel experience is like for others. On the other hand, this may not reflect what it will be like for us. Moreover, art often obscures this difference, leading us to believe we have learned more than we actually have.
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Art museum audio guides provide background information about the works on display. Such information seems beneficial: if we know more about a work, we will get more out of it. Yet, uptake rates for audio guides are low. One reason is that... more
Art museum audio guides provide background information about the works on display. Such information seems beneficial: if we know more about a work, we will get more out of it. Yet, uptake rates for audio guides are low. One reason is that visitors often believe the guides will be distracting. Listening to experts talk about art history and theory will pull their attention away from how the works look. It will ruin the aesthetic experience they hope to enjoy. My aim is to rebut this objection. I will maintain that audio guides help with even immediate and subjective forms of aesthetic appreciation. I will rest my case on two arguments. First, to appreciate a work of art, we must understand it. But understanding a work often requires background information. Second, perceiving a work’s aesthetic properties is a skill, and those who lack this skill may benefit from expert guidance.
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Hatton begins his paper with some troubling observations. Kierkegaard lived during the time of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. He was well aware that Denmark participated, as it was a hot topic in the Danish newspapers. Yet, he wrote next... more
Hatton begins his paper with some troubling observations. Kierkegaard lived during the time of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. He was well aware that Denmark participated, as it was a hot topic in the Danish newspapers. Yet, he wrote next to nothing about it. The thinker we hail as a champion of freedom almost never mentions slavery. Hatton's paper seeks to explain these facts by arguing for two theses. First, Kierkegaard did indeed reject slavery. But, second, Kierkegaard thought it would've been wrong for him to condemn slavery in a public way. This paper responds to Hatton's position by arguing that Kierkegaard was neither against the slave trade nor had an adequate justification for remaining silent if he had been against the slave trade.
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Kierkegaard’s project is a therapeutic one. His aim is to help us get better, existentially speaking—to cure us of our spiritual ills. What he thinks we need to overcome the anxiety and despair that plague our lives is a transformation.... more
Kierkegaard’s project is a therapeutic one. His aim is to help us get better, existentially speaking—to cure us of our spiritual ills. What he thinks we need to overcome the anxiety and despair that plague our lives is a transformation. We have to turn our backs on the goal of self-gratification. We must devote ourselves to God or the Good rather than ourselves. The central question facing Kierkegaard is thus a practical one: how can he inspire such transformations? How can he get us to change who we are at a fundamental level? In this paper, I will argue that reason is not the proper tool for this task. No mere argument, even if cogent or sound, can move people in the way Kierkegaard wants to move them. Yet, I will maintain that where reason fails, art can succeed. Indeed, to the degree that Kierkegaard ever inspires transformations, it is in virtue of the aesthetic appeal of his words and stories rather than the force of his logic.
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Encounters with art can change us in ways both big and small. This paper focuses on one of the more dramatic cases. It explains how art can inspire what L. A. Paul calls transformations. Transformations are difficult to inspire for two... more
Encounters with art can change us in ways both big and small. This paper focuses on one of the more dramatic cases. It explains how art can inspire what L. A. Paul calls transformations. Transformations are difficult to inspire for two reasons. First, they involve adopting new perspectives on the world—ones we cannot fully understand ahead of time. Second, they involve coming to care about things we do not already care about. I argue that art can help with both problems. First, works of art can offer us glimpses into what it would be like to live in ways other than we currently do. Second, art has the ability to attract us to values we currently reject. I conclude by observing that what makes art powerful also makes it dangerous. Transformations are not always for the good, and art’s ability to inspire them can be put to immoral ends.
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This paper focuses on the concept of chaoran wubiao (超然物標), which Sarah Mattice depicts as central to traditional Daoist aesthetics. Mattice derives this concept from the Zhuangzi and other Daoist texts. She defines it variously as... more
This paper focuses on the concept of chaoran wubiao (超然物標), which Sarah Mattice depicts as central to traditional Daoist aesthetics. Mattice derives this concept from the Zhuangzi and other Daoist texts. She defines it variously as integration, non-differentiation, self-transcendence (going/leaping beyond the self), and the identification between oneself and the object.
My goal is to trace the parallels between these ideas and three common (but controversial) themes in Anglo-analytic aesthetics: disinterest, sympathy, and immediacy. Mattice’s account of chaoran wubiao does not map perfectly onto any of these Western notions. Nevertheless, examining the similarities and differences between them will be fruitful. It will provide Western scholars with a better understanding of traditional Daoist aesthetics and open up some new options for thinking about aesthetic appreciation in the Anglo-analytic tradition.
My goal is to trace the parallels between these ideas and three common (but controversial) themes in Anglo-analytic aesthetics: disinterest, sympathy, and immediacy. Mattice’s account of chaoran wubiao does not map perfectly onto any of these Western notions. Nevertheless, examining the similarities and differences between them will be fruitful. It will provide Western scholars with a better understanding of traditional Daoist aesthetics and open up some new options for thinking about aesthetic appreciation in the Anglo-analytic tradition.
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This book lies at the intersection of existentialism and the philosophy of art. On the philosophy of art side, it addresses questions about why art matters and how we ought to appreciate it. On the existentialism side, it attends to... more
This book lies at the intersection of existentialism and the philosophy of art. On the philosophy of art side, it addresses questions about why art matters and how we ought to appreciate it. On the existentialism side, it attends to questions pertaining to authenticity or authentic selfhood. That is to say, it focuses on issues and problems having to do with our personal identity or our sense of who we are. The goal of the book is to bring these two topics together in a productive manner by showing that works of art matter because they can help us with the project of selfhood. They can offer us much needed guidance and support as we try to figure out who we really are.
To make the case for this thesis, On Art and Selfhood draws on the works of the Danish thinker, Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55). It mines his writings for insights regarding aesthetics and personal identity, and then uses these insights to contribute to current discussions of these topics. Thus, the book speaks not only to those with interests in contemporary analytic philosophy but also to those with interests in historical scholarship on Kierkegaard.
To make the case for this thesis, On Art and Selfhood draws on the works of the Danish thinker, Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55). It mines his writings for insights regarding aesthetics and personal identity, and then uses these insights to contribute to current discussions of these topics. Thus, the book speaks not only to those with interests in contemporary analytic philosophy but also to those with interests in historical scholarship on Kierkegaard.