Uzbeks

Хан В. С. К вопросу о методологических принципах изучения узбекской идентичности // Цивилизации и культуры Центральной Азии в единстве и многообразии. Материалы Международной конференции. - Самарканд - Ташкент: МИЦАИ, SMI-ASIA, 2010, стр. 291-297.

Abdurauf Fıtrat tarafından ilk olarak 1927 yılında Özbekistan Devlet Neşriyatı aracılığıyla 3053 adet olarak yayımlanan bu eser, Özbek klasik müziği tarihinin belirli bir dönemini kapsamaktadır. Yazar, Özbek müziğiyle ilgili çalışmaların yeteri kadar yapılmamasından ve konuyu ele alabilecek musikişinasların da o dönemde olmayışından yakınmıştır. Eser genel anlamda şark musikisinden bahsederek anlatıma başlar. Özbek müzik geleneğindeki halk küyleri, çalgıları, genel Türk musikisi tarihi, on iki makam, şeşmakam küyleri ve şubelerinden bahsetmektedir.

Kitap içerisinde çeşitli konular ele alınmış olup Sefiyüddin Urmevi, Abdulkadir Meragî, Necmeddin Kevkebî ve Rauf Yekta gibi büyük müzikologların çalışmalarından ayrıca bahsedilmiştir. Kitapta sıklıkla müzik kavramı ve terimleri kullanılmış, çeşitli edebî eserlerde yer alan unutulmuş çalgılarımızın isimlerine ve özelliklerine de geniş yer verilmiştir. Bu çalgılardan bazıları ayalğu, işret, küngüre, rühefza isimli çalgılardır. Ayrıca, günümüz Özbek halk çalgılarından tanbur, mızrap, dutar, rübap, kobuz-kovuz, çeng, ğıccek, ney, koşney, sürney, balaban, kerney, daire ve nağara gibi çalgıların; tarifi, tarihi, ölçüsü, icra şekli ve icracıları hakkında geniş bilgiler verilmiştir. Bu özelliğiyle, döneminde organoloji yönünden zengin bir kaynak niteliği taşıdığı görünmektedir.

Elinizde tutmuş olduğunuz “Özbek Klasik Müziği ve Tarihi” adlı bu eser, XX. yüzyıl başlarındaki Türkistan makam musikisini anlamamıza yarayacak en değerli kitaplardan birisidir. Geçmişte Arap ve Kiril harfli olarak yayımlanmış olan bu kitabın her iki nüshası karşılaştırılarak yayıma hazırlanmıştır. Kiril nüshasındaki eksik ve yanlışlar Özbek filolog ve müzikologların görüşleri doğrultusunda düzeltilmiştir. Müzikbilim, dilbilim ve tarih yönünden önemli verilere sahip olan eserin gelecekte yapılması muhtemel yeni çalışmalara ışık tutmasını temenni ediyoruz.

Mâverâünnehir ikliminde XVI. yüzyıl, dini/tasavvufî hayat ile siyasî hayatın iç içe geçtiği bir dönem olmuştur. Bu çerçevede Özbeklerin, Şeybânî Hanlığı (906-1007/1500-1599) içinde mutasavvıflarla sıkı bir etkileşim halinde bulundukları görülmektedir. Bu etkileşim ilk zamanlar Ahmed Yesevî sonraları ise ağırlıklı olarak Nakşibendî şeyhi Hoca Ubeydullah Ahrar (ö. 895/1490) ve müridleri mihverinde gerçekleşmiştir. Bu güçlü iletişim Nakşibendîliğin, Şeybânîlerin XVI. asır boyunca siyasî, dinî, ilmî, hukukî hatta iktisadî hayatında derin bir etki bırakmıştır. Hatta bu şeyhlerin hanlığın yönetimine müdahale edecek kadar güçlü bir konuma geldiği anlaşılmaktadır.
Mevzubahs ettiğimiz bu yakınlığın kuşkusuz birtakım dini ve siyasi sâikleri mevcuttur: Bu noktada evvela vurgulanması gereken husus, Sünnî Müslümanlığı temsil eden Özbekler’in Orta Asya halklarının manevi hayatlarında etkin bir güç olan Bahauddîn Nakşibend ve Ahmed Yesevî’ye büyük bir saygı beslemeleridir. Dikkate layık ve üzerinde durulmaya değer diğer bir husus da, Sünnilik ve Şiîlik rekabetinin Fatımiler’den sonra ikinci defa Özbek-Safevî mücadeleleriyle siyasi boyut kazanmış ve tüm hızıyla yüzyılı aşkın bir süre devam etmiş olmasıdır. Nitekim Sünnî eğilimli bu tarikata mensup Şeybânîler, Şiî mezhebinden olan ve Şiîliği resmi devlet dini olarak tanıyan Safevîler’e karşı bu mezhebi bir sığınak olarak görmüşlerdir. Bu sebeple de bu tarikatın sağlamlaşarak örgütlenmesiyle oluşan sosyal yapısı kendileri için Orta Asya’dan İslam dünyasına uzanan koridor oluşturması açısından mühim bir güç oluşturmuştur.

The imperial ideologies developed in the post-Mongol Persianate world represent both a break with Islamic precedent and a realization of the millenarian universalism inherent in Islam itself.  Early modern Muslim dynasts—styling themselves saint-philosopher-kings, millennial sovereigns and divine cosmocrators—combined Chinggisid, Persian and Islamic symbols of religiopolitical legitimacy in their quest for world domination, emblematized by Alexander the Great, Chinggis Khan and Amir Temür.  During this profoundly messianic era, sultans and saints thus competed for sacral power (walaya); securing access to this power became a driving concern of ruling and scholarly elites, whether by way of sufism, occultism or Alidism, and often eclectic combinations of all three.  The present chapter surveys these new strategies of religiopolitical legitimation pursued between the 14th-17th centuries by the Timurid, Aqquyunlu, Safavid, Uzbek, Mughal and Ottoman Empires, constituent members of the vast Persian cosmopolis stretching from the Balkans and Anatolia in the west to China and India in the east.

Mawlana Yaqub-i Charkhi/ his full name was Ya‘qūb bin Usmân b. Mahmûd el-Ghaznavî al- Charkhi (death 851/1447) (a.d. 851/1447 who had lived at the fifteenth century and was a shakird of Baha al-Din Naqshiband/ Hodja Muhammad b. Muhammad el-Bukhârî (death 791/1389) who has established Naqshibandi tariqah, at the same time, he was a Hodja of Ubeydullah Ahrâr-ı Veli/ Nâsırüddîn Ubeydullāh b. Mahmûd al-Shâshî es-Samarqandî (death 895/1490) who was a sheikh of the Naqshibandis. Mawlana Yaqub-i Charkhi was born in the Charkh city, which is with in the boundras of Afghanistan state in nowadays, then had educated at Bukhara and Egypt etc. After that he adhered to Baha al-Din Naqshiband who was established Naqshibandi tariqah. Mawlana Yaqub-i Charkhi who had a plenty of religious and sufic books, expounded Fatiha, Amma and Tabaraka which are sura of Qoran.

In this study, after discribed Yaqub al- Charkhi’s life and books it is worked about the Persian tefsir (comment) of Mawlana Yaqub-i Charkhi which was written by Hodja Hamadani as Turkish. It was explained when, where, why and what to made in this Turkish translating and widely discussed. Tefsir of Mawlana Yaqub-i Charkhi is a isari’s tafsir and particularly is known and pressed in Iran, Turkiye, India, Malesia, Pakistan. In addition, for the tafsir’s language is Persian it is not understood by the Turks and thus it has translatted Turkish.

В данном сообщении вводятся в научный оборот Y-STR гаплотипы узбеков, уйгуров, таджиков, пуштунов, хазарейцев, моголов из базы данных Family Tree DNA. 37 гаплотипов были исследованы авторами статьи. Остальные 81 гаплотип публиковались ранее другими авторами, либо лежат в открытом доступе в базах данных Family Tree DNA. В статье исследованы также данные по роду барлас, разные части которого относятся к разным этносам (узбеки, моголы). Аргументирована мысль об изначальной принадлежности барласов к субкладу С2-F4002 (старкластер).
Ниже, в Приложении 1, приведены гаплотипы, использованные в этой работе.

""The Book is a Migration Story of Turkestani Refugee Azam Hashmi Turkistani (1915, Andijan-1973, Karachi ) after Socialist Occupation and Revolution in 1931. He migrated from Turkestan to Afghanistan. later on, he moved to the Indian Sub-continent and lived in Delhi, Bombay and Punjab many years. After creation of Pakistan, He migrated to  Karachi, the capital of Pakistan and lived till his death.

He was well known leader of Turk refugees in Indian Sub-continent. He founded "Turk refugees Association" in 1934 in Delhi. He was also Editor of  monthly journal "Tarjuman" from 1938 to 1940 which was published in Urdu, Persian and Turkic language from Delhi. The Journal was a representative  of Turk refugees. He wrote many articles in many Turkic journals e.g "Yash Turkistan" of Mustafa Shokay and "Milli Turkistan", Germany.

He came to Pakistan after partition of sub-continent. He struggled hardly for Turk refugees and Turkestan issue. He represented (West) Turkistan in World Muslim Congress held in Karachi in 1951. He again started his Urdu-turkic magazine "Tarjuman ". Later on, he published "Tarjuman e Afkar " in Turkic languagel from 1952 to 1959. He wrote his migration story in Urdu. He died on 30th July, 1973 in Karachi, Pakistan.

This book is about his memoirs of migration. it is a historical  document about the Turkestan History of that era. The book is in Urdu language and it has not translated in English yet."
download the book  fom archive.org :
http://archive.org/details/Samarqand-O-Bukhara--Ki-Khuni-Sargazisht

This thesis aims to examine the social significance of Uzbek madrasah in Istanbul in the context of immigration and community experience of the Muslim Uzbeks. The data of the study was collected from fieldwork. Adopting the purposive sampling method, semi-structured interviews are done with seven prominent figures of Uzbek diaspora in Istanbul. Almost all of them are religious leaders from the immigrant Uzbek community in Başakşehir. In the analysis, following qualitative research methods are employed: Narrative analysis, textual analysis, and coding. Transnationalism and diaspora concepts are also alternatively applied to support and reflect the emergent results and theoretical model produced through grounded theory approach in the study. “Formation of society around madrasah” has appeared as the central phenomenon. Consequences of different interaction strategies of the Uzbek group lead to improved globalization of religious life which is also an intervening condition for these strategies. This study aims to make a contribution to the literature of immigration, religion and relevant studies in Turkey.

Keywords: Immigration, madrasah, diaspora, transnationalism

Beginning in the 1990s with the fall of the Soviet Union, American policy has been more and more based on the faulty premise of the War of Terrorism. At the same time American policy turned to supporting an alliance with India as the only “democracy” (because it has a parliamentary form of government) and an ambiguous relationship towards Pakistan because of its military-controlled government. After 9/11 with President George W. Bush’s decision not only to retaliate against Al Qaeda, but attack as well those regimes that gave shelter to them (in this case the Taliban which took control of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops). Even after the overthrow of the Taliban regime and the assassination of Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, by Navy SEALs in May 2011, American foreign policy has been to prevent the Taliban from retaking control of Afghanistan from a corrupt, American-installed regime. The United States has an awkward position towards Pakistan, in whose Northwest Frontier region the Taliban has taken refuge. The suspicion that the Pakistan intelligence agency (ISI) continued to support the Taliban and even Al Qaeda was reinforced by the fact that Bin Laden had been living in plain sight in Abbottabad, Pakistan, not far from a Pakistani Military Academy.

With the Pashtuns as a majority in the strategic Pakistani city of Peshawar at the entrance to the Khyber Pass and in the mountainous region of the Northwest Frontier, the Pakistani government felt it necessary to court the Taliban (or at least overlook them) while at the same time supporting Pashtun fighters active in trying to overturn the Indian government in Kashmir. After the defeat of the Soviet Union, the fundamentalist Pashtun group known as the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, and the radical Islamist group known as Al Qaeda under Osama Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan after having been forced out of East Africa. Bin Laden viewed the United States as its enemy, first because of its support of Israel and second because it stationed troops in Saudi Arabia during and after the first Iraq War (Desert Storm) in 1990-1991. Al Qaeda planned and executed the two attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993 and 2001. After the second attack the administration of George W. Bush declared war not only on Al Qaeda, but on any regime that gave shelter to Al Qaeda, namely, the Taliban. The Taliban regime was overthrown by an alliance led by the United States and eventually Osama Bin Laden was killed by Navy Seals on a raid of his hideout in plain sight in Pakistan. The Taliban was replaced by a moderate but corrupt Pashtun leader, Hamid Karzai, and the Taliban  continued its fight against the new regime from safe havens in the North-West Frontier Provinces of Pakistan.

The United States remains suspect of Pakistan’s motives in Afghanistan. It accuses Pakistan of playing a double-hand in outwardly condemning the Taliban’s use of terrorism and violence against women, as in the attack on the young Pashtun women’s rights activist Malala Yousafzai, while at the same time encouraging Pashtun activists to operate in Kashmir and India (most notably in the 2008 attack in Mumbai, formerly Bombay, India). The problem is not the many Pashtuns adhere to Sharia law; we are willing to accept this from our ally Saudi Arabia. The problem is that the United States again fails to think in terms of the underlying issues of self-determination that have been exploited by Islamist radicals, in this case, the fact that the Pashtun population was intentionally divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to keep them under control. In addition, a legalistic mindset that views any renegotiation of international borders as being off-the-table prevents us from having any negotiated solution to the problem.

The Afghanistan problem cannot be separated from its relationship to Pakistan and from Pakistan’s relationship with India over control of Kashmir. It is the reason why Pakistan has employed Pashtun fighters to undermine Indian control of mostly-Muslim Kashmir and has supported the Taliban sanctuary in the Northwest Frontier Province, while publicly condemning at the same time the Taliban’s actions in enforcing Sharia law. The fact that the Taliban gave sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden helps explain why he was able to hide in plain sight in western Pakistan. Any solution to these problems needs to take into account the fact that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank (one of the motifs for Al Qaeda’s view of the United States as its enemy), the division of the Pashtun ethnic group between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Indian’s control of the mostly Muslim state of Kashmir are inter-related. The United States needs to rethink fundamentally its foreign policy; and instead of trying to defeat the Taliban by military means, we must support an international regional conference to settle these issues by peaceful means based on the principle of self-determination.
The American people and our leaders tend to be ahistorical. Rather than learning from the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, which contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States made the same mistake. Without the support of the Soviet Union, a fundamentalist Pashtun group named the Taliban led by an imam named Mullah Oman overturned the Communist regime imposed by the Soviets in Afghanistan. They gave shelter to the anti-American terrorist organization named Al Qaeda led by the Egyptian exile Osama Bin Laden. Like Adolph Hitler, who published his agenda in Mein Kampf, Bin Laden made known his complaints about the United States in his manifestos. There were two: first that the United States unconditionally supported the State of Israel despite its occupation of Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank and second that the United States stationed troops with the approval of the king in Saudi Arabia in order to launch its attack on Saddam Hussein, who had invaded Kuwait. While both Saudi Arabia and Saddam Hussein were Sunni Muslims, the Saudis saw Hussein’s invasion as a threat to the Saudi oil fields in the Persian Gulf.

Al Qaeda launched several attacks against the United States overseas, but its two attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, and the second attack in 2001 that brought down the twin towers and killed almost 4,000 people was seen as an act of war. President George W. Bush not only declared war on Al Qaeda, he also viewed those countries, namely Afghanistan under the Taliban, that supported Al Qaeda to be enemies as well. In the resultant war, the United States and its allies overturned the Taliban regime and installed a corrupt government led by a pro-American Pashtun leader named Hamid Karzai. The Taliban from its base in the Pashtun province of Kandahar launched an insurgency that has lasted to the present day. Osama Bin Laden escaped first to the Tora Borah region of Afghanistan and from to the Pashtun region of northwestern Pakistan.

The government of Pakistan continued to play a double game in regard to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Its Inter-Service Intelligence organization (ISI) filtered United States aid to the mujaheddin fighting the Soviets and helped organize the Taliban. It made use of Pashtun fighters in its efforts to overthrow the Indian government in the mostly Muslim state of Kashmir. Realizing that its so-called North-West Frontier Province was predominantly Pashtun, Pakistan didn’t want to alienate the Taliban sympathizers there. At the same time, it wanted to court the aid and support of the United States. Eventually, both Mullah Omar and Osama Bin Laden fled to Pakistan, where Omar died of natural causes and Bin Laden was killed by U.S. Navy Seals. The United States remains suspicious of how both were able to hide in plain sight of Pakistani authorities. Both Al Qaeda and the Taliban continue and even expand to the present day.
What the United States continues to forget is that it was Al Qaeda, not the Taliban, that attacked the United States in 2001. While the Taliban is fundamentalist Islamist organization that imposes Sharia law on the people under its control, so is the Wahhabi regime in Saudi Arabia that is an ally of the United States. Once again, we see how the problems throughout the Middle East and South Asia are interrelated. One issue that motivates much of the anti-American attitude in the region, including Al Qaeda’s attacks on the World Trade Center, is our unconditional support for Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and our military involvement in the region. Another issue is our failure to understand that the Pashtun people were divided by the British-imposed Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The lesson of the Afghan Civil War following the Soviet withdrawal in the early 1990s is that Pashtun, Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazara ethnic groups do not necessarily want to live together in the same country. Any long-time solution to these problems needs to involve the redrawing of political boundaries, not only between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but between Pakistan and India.

The Modern Uzbek Turkic is the spoken and written language used in the Uzbekistan since the first half of the 19th century to the present day. The beginning of the formation of the Uzbek Turkic, which is considered to have been in the 1930s, begun with the occupation of the Turkistan Khanates (Fergana Khanate, Khiva Khanate and the Bukhara Khanate) by Soviet Russia. The works of written literature that developed around the idea of unity and solidarity in the aftermath of the occupation of Turkestan by Soviet Russia may be regarded as the beginning of the New Uzbek Turkic. The New Uzbek Turkic, which is a mixture of the Karluk, Kipchak and Oghuz dialects, constitutes the Old and Middle Turkic (as a sub-base) and Persian and Russian (as the upper-base). Due to the oppression and impositions, particularly during the era of the (Soviet) Council, the New Uzbek Turkic, which had taken a great number of words from the Russian language, was interrupted by the Second World War. However, following the war, accrued pain, yearning, longing and other similar emotions and thoughts were reflected in language and literature. The New Uzbek Turkic, which underwent a different process with the independence of Uzbekistan, has been sustaining its progress with literary works written as prose or poem. The lifting of pressure on poets and writers, following the independence in particular, led to freer thoughts and national elements coming to the forefront in the field of language and literature. In this study, the scope, qualities, historical process and establishment phases of New Uzbek Turkic are discussed from the perspective of the author, the period and language.

This paper is a revision and correction of Chapter 3 of my 2008 monograph ('Russian Rule in Samarkand') in which I made a number of errors and misjudgements. The most glaring of these was to confuse a Bukharan tax official (the amlakdar) with the owner of 'mulk' (a category of landed property which usually carried some form of tax exemption). I have disentangled these, added some further evidence, and reconsidered the evidence which I put forward in my book. I argue that Russian attempts to implement at what is sometimes called 'land reform' in the Zarafshan Valley in the 1860s and 1870s are better understood as a fiscal measure, rather than anything to do with property rights. The Russians found the Bukharan land tax system impossible to understand, and so proceeded to dismantle it, abolishing the annual assessment of the quantity and value of the harvest (which had been the responsibility of the amlakdar) and also refusing to recognise claims made by religious elites in the region that they were entitled to tax breaks on their mulk property. However, the system the Russians put in place instead placed enormous power in the hands of village oligarchies, ensuring that at the lower levels the Russians had little control over how the tax burden was allocated, and almost certainly collected far less than their Bukharan predecessors. The Russians also failed in their attempt to have the region's land declared the patrimony of the state. The paradoxical result was that, at least in the Zarafshan Valley (and quite possibly in other sedentary regions of Central Asia) the advent of the colonial regime meant a reduced tax burden, less state oversight, and security of property at least equal to what had existed before.

Objective: The purpose of the article is an attempt to determine the appro­ximate boundaries of Baraq Khan’s nomads’ territories, to summarize information from various written sources and modern literature, and to determine how the name of this famous ruler should actually be written.
Research materials: To achieve this goal, we used medieval Muslim written sources. Among these sources, we have identified four groups based on language. The first group is written in Arabic. It is represented by one source – the work of al-Aini “Iqd al-juman”. The second group is more plentiful: here we drew on the data of Samarkandi’s “Matla ‘as-sa’dain”, Hafiz-i Abru’s “Zubdat at-tavarih”, Mirkhond’s “Rauzat al-safa”, and also Ibn Ruzbihan’s “Mihaman name-yi Bukhara”. The third group includes works in the Turkic language, among them Ötemish Haji’s “Kara Tavarih”, Qyrymi’s “Umdet al-Akhbar”, and Qadyrgali’s “Jami at-tavarih”. Another group of sources is written in Russian; these are the data of the chronicles and materials of the Ambassadorial Department of the Russian state. In addition to these sources, we used numismatic data and that from the letter of the Golden Horde Khan, Ulugh-Muhammad, to the Turkish Sultan Murad I.
Results and novelty of the research: According to al-Aini, the lands of Baraq Khan bordered on the lands of Amir Temir. The materials of the Ambassadorial Department drew a direct continuity between the ulus of Baraq Khan and the khanate of the Qazaqs. Persian chroniclers called Baraq Khan the ruler of the Uzbek Ulus whose territory was contingent with the Qazaq Ulus that arose later. Ötemish Haji and Qyrymi call Baraq Khan’s property the “Qazaq summer pasture”. The same lands were called Uzbekiya in the work of Qadyrgali. Coins of Baraq Khan do not clarify his main possessions but nevertheless indirectly refer to the fact that the main territory of his nomads was the steppes east of the Volga. All this information has led to several important conclusions. The main conclusion is that the Baraq Khan’s ulus was located in the eastern part of the Jochid Ulus, mainly in the left-bank area of the Volga region, on the Ural and Emba rivers, and in the northern Aral and Syr Darya regions. Baraq Khan did not pursue the goal of annexing these lands to his possessions. Geographically, the lands of his ulus were contingent with the lands of the future Qazaq Khanate, founded by his son, Zhanibek. Russian and Nogai contemporaries of the Qazaqs perceived them precisely as the heirs of Baraq Khan and his grandfather Urus Khan. That last fact testifies to the continuity of not only the dynasty, but also the territories. In conclusion, the etymology of the name Baraq, which is a common Turkic anthroponym, is considered while attempts to establish Arabic roots for it are ruled out as erroneous.

Dil ve edebiyat eserlerini incelerken onların beslendiği kaynakları tespit etmek edebî tasnif çalışmaları bakımından son derece önemlidir. Modern Özbek Edebiyatını ele alan çalışmalarda onun ilham aldığı ana kaynaklara belirli bir tasnif ve tavsif olarak yer veren pek az çalışma mevcuttur. XIX. yüzyılın ikinci yarısını başlangıç olarak kabul edebileceğimiz Modern Özbek Edebiyatının ana kaynaklarını ele alırken bu edebiyata ve kaynaklarına tüm cihetlerden bakmak gerekir. Bu çalışmada, Modern Özbek Edebiyatına genel bakışın bir yansıması olarak onun ana kaynakları, çeşitli temel başlıklar altında toplanmış ve öne çıkan eserler bazında irdelenmiştir.
x
It is extremely important in terms of literary classification studies to figure out the sources that they are fed while examining language and literary works. There are very few studies that give a specific classification and description of the main sources of inspiration in the studies dealing with Modern Uzbek Literature. When considering the main sources of Modern Uzbek Literature, which we can accept as the beginning of the second half of the 19th century, it is necessary to look at this literature with all its aspects. In this study, as a reflection of the general view of Modern Uzbek Literature, its main sources were gathered under various main titles and examined on the basis of prominent works.

Özbekistan, tarihi geçmişiyle Orta Asya'da hep merkez ülke olmuştur. Zengin bir kültüre sahip olan bu coğrafyanın daha iyi araştırılması, Türk tarihi açısından önemlidir. Bu kitapta Özbekistan; tarihinden iç ve dış siyasetine, ekonomisinden enerji politikalarına, tarih yazıcılığından anayasasına, din ile ilişkisinden edebi varlığına kadar incelenerek çok yönlü biçimde tanıtılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Личность и время. Николай Остроумов: востоковед, просветитель, летописец эпохи. Материалы международной научной конференции, посвященной 170-летию со дня рождения русского ученого-туркестановеда, исламоведа, деятеля народного образования в Средней Азии Николая Петровича Остроумова. Ташкент: Turon zamin ziyo, 2017, c.102-110

Manuscript of the keynote address was presented on the international conference
“The Middle East: Language, Literature and History” dedicated to the 125th anniversary
of the prominent orientalist Joseph Orbeli (1887-1961) was held in in Yerevan, Armenia, October 30-31, 2012

Földvári, Sándor / Mr. / dr.
Sandor Foldvari, research fellow; cell-phone +36-30-6709134
Debrecen Univ. Baltic Studies; - home: H-2119 PECEL, P.O.B. 36.
E.mail: alexfoldvari@gmail.com
Professional: http://unideb.academia.edu/SandorFoldvari
Private: http://www.facebook.com/Alex.Foldvari

Oriental Studies in Hungary
in the 20-30-ies of the 20th century.

Abstract. The activity of Ignac Goldziher was finished by his passing away in 1921 and still influenced the research life for a longer time, mainly on the hadis and the Islam law. Being a Jew, he had sympathy to the Islam and consequently he was under oppression by his rabbinic colleagues as prof. Wilhelm Bacher. However, parallelly with this famous orientalist, another line of the Islam studies flew in Hungary. Ignác Kúnos was the first, who studied the Turkish folklore, gathered folk-tales and performances (Karagöz) on the academic level, at the same time he published also popular books, too, for the wide audience including the youth, too. These books were reissued several time and made the Moslem folk-culture very popular in Hungary in the 20-30-ies. Research papers of Kúnos have influenced not only the Hungarian but the Turkish and wide Moslem academic life for a half of a century. His student and follower was Abdul-Karim Germanus, who converted to the Islam and became a very hajji also a famous professor at various Moslem universities (in India, Egypt, etc). Germanus worked a lot for popularizing Moslem culture in Hungary on the professional level. His articles published in the Budapesti Szemle (“The Budapest Review”, the academic monthly of the capital of Hungary) remained unknown for the international audience, being written in Hungarian. Although he was the first who analyzed the forgotten türbe of Gül Baba in Budapest and some other buildings, remained from the Turkish era of Hungary (16-17 cc.), and for his initiative the restorations of these ruined buildings were begun. A pupil of him was the famous archeologist Győző (Yusuf) Gerő, who excavated all the ruins remained from the Turkish era in Hungary. Beyond the “History of Arabic Literature” and such well-known works, Abdul-Karim Germanus published apologies for the Islam on the “race” question, too, in Hungarian, when the chauvinism and nationalism had been rising in the 20-ies. Moreover, Germanus was a pupil and follower of Ármin Vámbéry (Efendi Reshid) who became only known as an expert of the Central-Asian Turkish languages and Sunni costumes, but not for his other studies on the Moslem pilgrimage and shia culture, too. "Meine Wanderungen und Erlebnisse in Persien" [My Wanderings and Experiences in Persia] was published in the late 19th but influenced in the early 20th century, determining the folklorist investigations made by his followers as Kúnos and Germanus..

Keywods: Hungary, Moslem_pilgrimage, Moslem_folklore, Germanus, Kunos, Vámbéry, Gül_Baba, Islam architecture

This article seeks to understand why, although widely predicted, very little ethnically motivated political mobilisation has occurred in post-Soviet Central Asia. Building on the contribution of frame analysis, the article examines the case of Uzbek communities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Different frames have been articulated by the elites and have been used to mobilise and demobilise the community. The more successful ones (those that resonated) were less confrontational, and ultimately led the Uzbek communities towards a non-confrontational path with the authorities. The article concludes that frame analysis sheds important insights on the process of the mobilisation of ethnic minorities in Central Asia, and also contributes to the literature on ethnic mobilisation.

Batıda Hazar Denizi’nden doğuda bugün Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti sınırları
içinde yer alan Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi’nin doğu ucundaki Hami (Kumul) şehrine uzanan, kuzeyde Sibirya’dan güneyde Afganistan’ın kuzeyi (Afgan Türkistanı) ile İran’ın kuzeydoğusunu (İran Türkistanı) içine alan Türkistan bölgesinde 16. yüzyılın başından 20. yüzyılın başına kadar hüküm sürmüş devletler “Türkistan Hanlıkları” olarak isimlendirilmiştir. Bu hanlıklardan Buhara Hanlığı (1500-1920), Hive Hanlığı (1511-1920) ve Hokand Hanlığı (1709-1876) halkının büyük bir kısmı Özbeklerden oluştuğu için Özbek hanlıkları olarak da bilinmektedir. Bu Özbek hanlıklarında tarih yazıcılığı ve temsilcileri genel olarak işlenmiştir.

Buhara Özbek Hanlığı 1500 yılında Çingiz Han’ın oğlu Cuci soyundan gelen Şibanlılar sülalesinden Muhammed Şibani Han tarafından Maveraünnehr’de kurulmuş, kısa sürede Batı Türkistan’ın hâkimi olmuş ve daha sonra sınırları küçülse de XIX. asrın ortalarına kadar bağımsız bir şekilde varlığını sürdürmüştür. Devletin askeri gücünün temeli kuruluş aşamasından itibaren Özbek ulusunu oluşturan kabile birliklerine dayanmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra Özbeklerden ve başka topluluklardan sağlanan insan unsuru ile hassa birlikleri oluşturulmuş ve ayrıca Kazak, Kırgız, Karakalpak ve Türkmenler gibi devletin idaresi altında bulunan topluluklardan da yardımcı birlikler sağlanmıştır. Buhara Özbek ordusu, Çingiz Han’dan sonra kurulan Türk-Moğol kökenli devletlerin askeri müesseselerinden büyük oranda etkilenmiştir. Askeri terimler ve askeri birimler büyük oranda Altınorda Hanlığı, İlhanlılar ve Timurlulardan miras alınmıştır. Buhara Özbek Hanlığı’ndan sonra Türkistan’da kurulan Hive ve Hokand Hanlıklarının askeri müesseselerinde de bu yapının etkisi görülmektedir. Ne var ki klasik Ortaçağ Türk-Moğol ordu geleneği üzerine şekillenen Buhara Özbek ordusu, XVI. asırda etkin bir muharip güç olsa da, XVII. asırdan itibaren Orta Asya’nın siyasi, iktisadi ve kültürel gerilemesine paralel olarak XIX. asrın ortalarına kadar pek bir gelişim gösterememiş, modern dünyanın askeri sisteminin çok gerisinde kalmıştır. Bu durum XVIII. ve XIX. asırlarda devleti istilalara karşı savunmasız bırakmıştır.   

Bukhara Uzbek Khanate was founded in 1500 in Transoxiana by Muhammed Shibani Khan from Shibanid Dynasty, which descends from Jochi, son of Genghis Khan, and in short time frame dominated West Turkestan and albeit its territory shrinking afterwards, it continued its sovereign existence upto the middle of the XIX century. From the beginning, foundation of the state’s military power was based on tribal unions comprising Uzbek Ulus. Alongside this, royal units were formed from elements obtained from Uzbeks and other groups and furthermore, auxiliary forces were provided by communities like Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Karakalpaks and Turkmens who were under the state’s control. Bukharan Uzbek Army was influenced to a great extend by military institutions of Turko-Mongol states founded after Genghis Khan. Military terminology and military units were largely inherited from Golden Horde, Ilkhanates and Timurids. The influence of this organisation is also seen in military establishments of Khiva and Hokand Khanates, which were founded in Turkestan after Bukhara Uzbek Khanate. Yet, eventhough Bukharan Uzbek Army, which was formed on the classical Medieval Turko-Mongol military tradition, was an effective combat force in XVIth century, from XVIIth century on wards and upto the middle of XIXth century, in paralel to Central Asia’s political, economic and cultural regression, it couldn’t make any progress and heavily lagged behind modern world’s military system. This condition left the state defenceless against invasions in XVIIIth and XVIIIth centuries.

WAS THE PRE-SOVIET CITY ETHNIC? ON THE PALETTE OF THE
IDENTITY OF BUKHARA IN EARLY 20th CENTURY Ghaybullah Babayarov, Eldar Аsаnоv
In Bukhara, in the beginning of the 20th century there were very diverse identities that were religious, ethnic, tribal, local or class in nature. In the course of turbulent political events, tribal groups and sedentary communities in the region united into larger alliances, which, however, were still far from the concept of a nation. These enlarged groups gave rise to the traditional for Central Asia of the 16th – 19th centuries identities that we call ethnic. These identities were radically revised in the beginning of the 20th century within the framework of Soviet nationality policy. Some of them received official recognition and were filled with national content, i.e. their understanding has been revised; others, on the contrary, were ignored and incorporated into other identities. The largest ethnic groups of the Bukhara Emirate – Uzbeks and Tajiks – began to be considered nations, and these names acquired slightly different connotations.

The paper has attempted to show some reasons for the power of survival of the qalin (bride-price or bride-money) to survive in spite of all the efforts to eliminate it in the past and seeks to reveal the incomprehensible, even somewhat enigmatic, reasons of its existence at present. Although it was an important part of marriage, the size of the qalin was different. Because it was a burdensome yoke for poor people, there appeared some attempts to abolish or to replace this custom. They were bridegroom’s working instead of the qalin payment (‘ich kuyov’, ‘kuch kuyov’, ‘kuchuk kuyov’), interchanging the girls between two families, ‘bel quda’, ‘beshik kuda’ and covering the expenses for the wedding incurred by the girl’s kinsmen. Here is also included one of such customs as to pay a qalin in several stages, i.e. by installments. And the qalin is still used by local people.

Термин «92 узбекских племени», появившийся в XV в. в Дешт-и Кыпчаке, в последующие столетия стал использоваться с самым различным смыслом в зависимости от политического и культурного контекста. Значительная роль представителей племен, выходцев из бывшей Золотой Орды, в политической жизни среднеазиатских ханств с XVI века, миграции кочевых племен из Дашт-и Кипчака в Мавераннахр на протяжении XVI века, а затем основание в XVIII веке в среднеазиатских ханствах династий из среды этих племен обеспечили актуальность и относительно широкое использования термина «92 узбекских племени».  Для полукочевых племен этих ханств принадлежность к «92 узбекским племенам» означала в определенных случаях привилегированное положение и более высокий социальный, экономический статус. В определенных случаях выражение «92 узбекских племени» использовался с политическим смыслом для легитимации правящих узбекских династий мангытов, мингов, а также, следуя давней традиции, возможно, преследуя политические цели,  подчеркивались давние связи между казахами, ногайцами, узбеками и каракалпаками. Наряду с числом 92 сосуществовали такие числа, как 32 и 96 племен, которым придавались другие значения.

This paper examines the changing survival strategies of Uzbeks in the aftermath of
mass violent conflict in Osh in June 2010. After the riots, Osh Uzbeks were exposed
to many difficulties. The Kyrgyz government used economic and political pressure to
isolate minority groups from the titular nationality, and this opened the door to
mistreatment of minorities in the form of the seizure of properties, job losses, and
even verbal and physical abuse. Despite this mistreatment, however, Uzbeks have
proved reluctant to leave the Osh area. Uzbeks have a long history of living in the
region of Osh; strong emotional and historical sentiments bind them to the region
and its graveyards and sacred sites. Uzbeks have thus had to develop alternative
ways to cope with the uncertainty and insecurity of their situation. They have
adopted strategies which reinforce their vulnerability on the one hand, but provide
security for their children during post-conflict reconstruction on the other. These
strategies include avoidance of public spaces and public attention, marrying
daughters early, and sending male family members to Russia as labor migrants.
These strategies are geared to the underlying aims of protecting the honor of the
community, maintaining social networks, and preserving Uzbek identity without
attracting attention. Uzbeks describe this strategy of patience as sabyrdu.

The monograph for the first time in a science based on a new integrated approach from the perspective of the social and psychological anthropology, social and ethnic psychology, religious psychology, as well as ethno-sociology investigated features of modern premarital and marriage relations of Uzbeks. The new forms of marriage in Uzbeks were revealed, new classification of marriage modern forms was made. The dynamics of actions before courtship and woo was observed. Pre-marriage relations of Uzbeks were investigated, as well as major factors in choice of spouse. Was Investigated expectations of youth from marriage and reality with which they have to be faced. The factors that influence on family stability were analysed. The influences of pre-marriage relations on the factors that lead to divorces were analysed. The new factors of divorces, in particular mistakes in choice of spouse at the pre-marriage period were investigated

Relevance: In article is investigated the role and influence of sexual life, sex of literacy on the strength of family.
Methods: Observation; the conversation – in-depth interviews; questionnaires and statistical mathematical methods.
Conclusion: research has shown that many Uzbeks refer to intimate problems of with insufficient responsibility, and on this matter would have preferred to refer first of all to the parents than to the doctors, and almost in the last turn to the psychologists.