For most people visual mental imagery is a common, frequent experience (Galton, 1880; Betts, 1909; Doob, 1972; Marks, 1999; Thomas, 2010 §1). We often recall past events, or imagine possible ones, by forming mental images. Our dreams may...
moreFor most people visual mental imagery is a common, frequent experience (Galton, 1880; Betts, 1909; Doob, 1972; Marks, 1999; Thomas, 2010 §1). We often recall past events, or imagine possible ones, by forming mental images. Our dreams may also consist largely of mental imagery. Indeed, many philosophers and psychologists have held that, together with immediate perceptual experience, imagery makes up the entirety of consciousness (although clearly not just visual imagery, but also imagery in other sense modes, especially inner speech, auditory or vocal-motor imagery of spoken words). If we are to fully understand consciousness, we will certainly need to understand mental imagery. In this article, current theories of mental imagery are described and evaluated in the light of the fact that imagery is consciously experienced (a fact that is, remarkably, largely neglected in most discussions of the topic).
Philosophers have studied mental imagery for many centuries, experimental psychologists have studied it for well over a hundred years, and more recently it has attracted the attention of cognitive scientists and neuroscientists, but many basic questions still remain unresolved (Thomas, 2010). There is controversy not only over what cognitive and neural mechanisms are responsible for imagery, but also over its function (if any) in cognition. Some regard mental imagery (or some closely related notion, such as "perceptual symbols" or "image schemata") to be the necessary vehicle for all thought[1]; some regard it as important only for certain types of cognitive task (such as judging spatial relationships)[2]; and yet others regard it as a functionally insignificant conscious epiphenomenon of the unconscious cognitive processes that really constitute our thinking.[3]
Like percepts, mental images bear intentionality (J.T.E. Richardson, 1980; Harman, 1998; Thomas, 2010 §1.3). That is to say, they are always images (or percepts) of something or other, of some (real or imaginary) "object."[4] (Some philosophers (e.g., Searle, 1992) regard intentionality and consciousness as very closely related phenomena.) However, unlike percepts, images occur in the absence of their object. You cannot perceive a cat when no cat is present, but you can imagine a cat (or any other perceptible thing) at any time. Furthermore, (mistakes aside) you cannot perceive a cat to be other than where and how it actually is, but, whenever you want to, you can imagine (i.e., form an image of) a cat as anywhere, or in any condition. Images thus seem well suited to function as mental representations, allowing us to think of things as they currently are not, and thus to recall the past, plan for the future, fantasize about the unreal, and speculate about the unknown (cf. Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007). Since ancient times, this has generally been believed to be their cognitive function (Thomas, 2010).