Yusuf Al-Qaradawi

Total Innovation Management (TIM) is the system of forming an innovative synergy between technology, organization and culture to build innovation competence in organizations. Supply Chain (SC) is a global network used to deliver products and services from raw materials to end-customers via an engineered flow of information, physical distribution and cash. This paper appraised TIM on SC in the automobile industry in Nigeria using structured questionnaire and interview. The upshot indicated 40% of SC executives are more concerned with risk associated with supply and thus invest in insurance policies. 80% of trained SC staff applies ICT tools in visibility (trackability). All SC staff were receptive to innovative ideas, indicating sustainability of TIM ideology in the sector.

The late 1970s and early 1980s were a propitious yet challenging time for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as its elites sought to define the movement's priorities in the face of new opportunities to spread their call (da'wa). The debate over preaching, while one of strategic assessment, also involved a negotiation of intellectual hierarchy: Should laymen lead Egypt's oldest Islamist organization, or should scholars? In contrast to previous studies that focus on how laymen led the Brotherhood's return to grassroots preaching, this article reintegrates scholars into the story of da'wa by focusing on the organization's most prominent 'a ¯ lim, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and his vision of institution-based preacher education and extra-institutional activism. Drawing on three books written by Qaradawi on this topic between the mid-1970s and early 1980s, this article casts lights not only on this Islamist scholar's claim to religious authority as he sought to mold the Brotherhood, but also on the ways in which projects of mass mobilization – whether grassroots preaching or the reform of state-sponsored educational curricula – have transformed scholarly claims to authority more broadly. T he late 1970s and early 1980s were a propitious yet challenging time for the Mus-lim Brotherhood in Egypt. The organization had begun to rebuild its infrastructure within a political system that provided it space to mobilize on a grassroots level, even as it forbade national political participation. These new opportunities were particularly fraught for scholars within Egypt's leading Islamist group: Was this to be a movement of intellectuals or activists, of 'ulama ¯' or of laymen? Who was to lead it and how should it relate to state-controlled religious institutions? This article explores how the participation of scholars in the Muslim Brotherhood shaped the region's oldest Islamist organization and how this story reveals a radical

Four thousand eight hundred (4800) questionnaires targeted at establishing the frequency, causes and nature of injuries sustained in road accidents by commercial motorcycle operators within a period of five (5) years (2006 - 2010) were administered on operators, Motorcycle Hire Association (MOHA), Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) and the Transport Unit of the Nigerian Police Force in four major commercial towns of Benue State, Nigeria. Victims were also interviewed on nature of injuries sustained. Analysis of results revealed that, over speeding accounted for 22.9 % of accidents. Brake failure and non-compliant to traffic rules had 17.8 %  respectively, followed by sudden stoppage by the law enforcement agent 15.4 %, recklessness 14.2 % and poor state of the road 11.8 %. Similarly, 38 %, 35 %, and 26 % of injuries recorded in Makurdi were fractures, bruises, and head injuries respectively. Oturkpo recorded 31 % bruises,
30 % fractures and 38 % head injuries. While Gboko recorded 24 % bruises, 22 % fractures and 53.8 % head injuries. ZakiBiam had 25 % bruises, 27 % fractures, and 46.9 % head
injuries. Conclusively Makurdi had 646 accidents, followed by
Oturkpo with 582, Gboko with 520 and Zaki-Biam with 330. These ranking can be justified by the population of the commercial towns. There is an urgent need to enforce the use of safety helmets and speed limits to reduce the number of accidents and the resulting injuries sustained by the users of this mode of transport. This paper also proposed a synergy of stakeholders aimed at manpower development of riders in line with the contemporary Science, Technology and Innovations (STI) policy on Nigeria.

For those who cannot afford the book, please email me at: usaama.al-azami@orinst.ox.ac.uk, and I'll try to direct you to where you can find the most affordable version of the book.

The Arab revolutions of 2011 were a transformative moment in the modern history of the Middle East, as people rose up against long-standing autocrats throughout the region to call for ‘bread, freedom and dignity’. With the passage of time, results have been decidedly mixed, with tentative success stories like Tunisia contrasting with the emergence of even more repressive dictatorships in places like Egypt, with the backing of several Gulf states.

Focusing primarily on Egypt, this book considers a relatively understudied dimension of these revolutions: the role of prominent religious scholars. While pro-revolutionary ulama have justified activism against authoritarian regimes, counter-revolutionary scholars have provided religious backing for repression, and in some cases the mass murder of unarmed protestors.

Usaama al-Azami traces the public engagements and religious pronouncements of several prominent ulama in the region, including Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Ali Gomaa and Abdallah bin Bayyah, to explore their role in either championing the Arab revolutions or supporting their repression. He concludes that while a minority of noted scholars have enthusiastically endorsed the counter-revolutions, their approach is attributable less to premodern theology and more to their distinctly modern commitment to the authoritarian state.

Mohamad Zaim Isamail, Mohd Farhan Md Ariffin, Mohd Anuar Ramli. 2016. INSTRUMEN IJTIHAD DAN APLIKASINYA DALAM ISU ZAKAT. In Razali Md Jani, Muhsin Nor Paizin, Luqman Haji Abdullah & Muhammad Ikhlas Rosele. Menelusuri Isu-Isu Kontemporari Zakat, hlm. 33-46. Kuala Lumpur: Pusat Pungutan Zakat (PPZ)

This article aims to explore emerging trends for the Sunni religious elite and the Islamic legal tradition in the new context of the Arab Uprisings by focusing on Yusuf al-Qaradawi, arguably the most prominent of these ʿulamāʾ alive today. The article will follow al-Qaradawi’s articulation, transmission and reconstruction of the Islamic legal tradition in his own discourse as he has attempted to negotiate the politically fraught contexts of the Arab Uprisings while also maintaining his horizontal commitments to a diverse base of supporters be they the wider Arab Muslim public, the Muslim Brotherhood or indeed the Qatari royal family. The article will focus on al-Qaradawi’s highly publicised interventions and fatwas in relation to Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria from the perspective of Islamic studies, and also draw on personal interviews with al-Qaradawi, his personal staff, as well as supplementary media. In so doing, the article will elucidate al-Qaradawi and his colleagues’ attempts, ranging from the highly creative to the markedly conservative, to respond to unfolding events through the legal tradition and play an increasingly active role in the public sphere while their own status simultaneously becomes ever more vulnerable and unstable.

This study analyzes the political reasons that allowed the Islamic State to expand successfully in Syria and Iraq, by enabling to ‘franchise’ worldwide, and the role of the regional governments in this issue. The essay provides a different explanation from the classic approach of the “clash of civilizations” theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, ascribing responsibility for the growth and expansion of the Islamic State to the complex framework of geopolitical alliances within the Muslim civilization and the Arab world. The paper highlights the attempt by Turkey to establish itself as a regional power and guidance of the Islamic world, by resurrecting the Caliphate, and, based on this, explains the contrast with the Islamic State, which goal is the foundation of a globalized Caliphate. The plans of the Turkish President Erdoğan for a Great Turkey, allied with Egypt, have foundered with the coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power. The study relates the connection of Ankara with the Kurds, regarding the management of the crisis in Syria and Iraq, and the Turkish liaison with regional powers (Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and other powers (Russia, Cina and USA).

* أعد هذا البحث ليُنشر في الكتاب
                                                      التكريمي لفضيلة الشيخ القرضاوي بمناسبة
                                                        بلوغه التسعين، أطال الله في الخير بقاءه،
                                                            وقد نُشِر بالمجلد الثالث من الكتاب

Ganggang (Algae) 1. Pendahuluan Dalam dunia tumbuhan ganggang termasuk kedalam dunia tallopyta (tumbuhan talus), karena belum mempunyai akar, batang dan daun secara jelas.dan ganggang ada yang bersel tunggal dan juga ada yang bersel banyak dengan bentuk Alga (jamak Algae) juga adalah sekelompok organisme autotrof yang tidak memiliki organ dengan perbedaan fungsi yang nyata. Alga bahkan dapat dianggap tidak memiliki "organ" seperti yang dimiliki tumbuhan (akar, batang, daun, dan sebagainya). serupa benang atau lembaran. Tubuh ganggang terdapat zat warna (pigmen), yaitu :-fikosianin : warna biru-klorofil : warna hijau-fikosantin : warna perang/ coklat-fikoeritrin : warna merah-karoten : warna keemasan-xantofil : warna kuning Ganggang bersifat autotrof (dapat menyusun makanannya sendiri). Hampir semua ganggang bersifat eukaryotik. Habitat hidupnya di air tawar, laut dan tempat-tempat yang lembab. Ganggang terbagi menjadi beberapa kelas :-Cyanophyta (ganggang biru), masih prokaryotik.-Chlorophyta (ganggang hijau)-Chrysophyta (ganggang keemasan)-Phaeophyta (ganggang coklat/ perang)-Rhodophyta (ganggang merah) Ganggang atau Alga Orang-orang di negara Jepang banyak yang memakan ganggang, karena tumbuhan itu selain lezat juga merupakan sumber vitamin C dan mineral. Selain ganggang, di dalam laut juga ada bunga laut. Ada lagi yang disebut dengan rumput laut. Rumput laut banyak sekali ditemukan di Laut daerah Mediterania. Sebagian tumbuhan laut dapat ditemukan dekat dengan tepi laut, sebagian lagi dapat ditemukan tumbuh di laut bebas. Tiap tumbuhan memerlukan sinar matahari untuk berfotosintesis maka tumbuhan laut tumbuh dekat dengan permukaan laut. Banyak ilmuwan yang mengemukakan bahwa Alga (Ganggang) sebenarnya bukanlah tumbuhan. Mereka memiliki jenis yang terpisah disebut Protist. Sebagian besar Protist tidak dapat berfotosintesis (membuat makanannya sendiri). Seperti diketahui dari namanya, ganggang laut adalah tumbuhan laut yang hidup di air asin. Ganggang ada yang mengambang secara bebas tetapi sebagian besar hidup berdekatan dengan permukaan laut di batu-batu karang, rumah keong atau siput. Ganggang hidup di sepanjang tepi laut yang dangkal sering juga disebut "Intertidal Zone" (daerah pasang surut air). Ganggang dapat ditemukan dalam jarak 40 meter (130 kaki) dibawah laut atau daerah yang masih terkena sinar matahari. Ganggang biasanya ditemukan di pantai-pantai kecuali di Pantai barat Afrika dan di barat tengah Amerika. Beberapa tumbuhan laut dan Ganggang hidup dengan satu sel yang hanya dapat dilihat dengan mikroskop. Kebanyakan ganggang laut tersusun dari banyak sel, karena itu dapat dilihat langsung dengan mata kita.

This paper will analyse the contributions to the debate by the prolific Syrian scholar Wahba al-Zuḥaylī (1932-2015) who, specialising in Islamic jurisprudence while also treating Quranic exegesis and hadith in multi-volume books, wrote extensively on international relations.  Admittedly, al-Zuḥaylī had not as much to say on the topic as fellow colleagues running Europe’s Islamic institutions due to his distance and rootedness in Syria’s scholarly landscape. Even though he adheres to the wasaṭiyya (moderate path) school championed by Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, having written several chapters on the concept,  he does not always in accord with its opinions as will come into view.
His concise but substantial contribution guised in a robust jurisprudential language in the chapter “Rules Pertaining Doctrinal Novelties which the Problem of Residence Outside the Lands of Islam Calls Forth” (Aḥkām al-nawāzil al-ʿaqadiyya allatī tuthīruhā mushkilat al-iqāma khārij diyār al-Islām)  provides a nuanced legal-intellectual assessment of Muslims’ lives as minorities in the global north.

Term paper in "Islamische Jurisprudenz", B.A. Islamic Studies course by Prof. Dr. Birgit Krawietz at FUB in summer 2020. Grade: 1,0.

***
Vehbe Zuhayli'nin Müslüman azınlıklar hukuku üzerindeki değerlendirmeleri. Bu araştırma, Qadaya l-fıkıh vel-fikir el-muasır kitabındaki Ahkam el-nevazil el-akadiyye bölümünü takiben beş meseleyi incelemektedir, bunlar: darül harpte ikamet ve vatandaşlık, küreselleşme ve İslami kimlik, gayrimüslimlere benzemek, sapık fırkalar ile geçinmek ve nihayet ulusal devletlerde askeri hizmet.

موقف الشيخ وهبة الزحلي من بعض مسائل فقه الأقليات المسلمة وهي المواطنة والعولمة والتشبه بغير المسلمين والتعايش مع الفرق الضالة والتجنّد في جنود الدولة القومية العصبية

In Christine Schirrmacher's postdoctoral thesis, for the first time one finds reviews of original voices coming from Islamic theology on the topic of religious freedom and apostasy. Arabic, Eng-lish, French, and Urdu texts have been translated and analyzed and thus made accessible. There are basically three positions which are defended on falling away from the Islamic faith: Complete advocacy of religious freedom, the complete denial of religious freedom with a call for the immediate application of the death penalty for apostates, and the centrist position. The centrist position, however, which allows inner freedom of thought and warns against premature persecution, calls for the death penalty in the case of open apostasy (e.g., in the case of conversion to another faith). Within established Islamic theology, the latter approach is nowadays the most frequent point of view found. These three main positions on apostasy are introduced in this postdoctoral thesis by means of the publications of three influential 20th century theologians: Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926), Ab-dullah Saeed (b. 1960), and Abu l-A'la Maududi (1903-1979). They all have followings of many millions of people and have political influence at their disposal. The study explains why in many Muslim majority countries there is still today only very limited or sometimes no freedom of religion (in the sense of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948) for converts, critical intellectuals, artists and progressive Quranic studies specialists, journalists and secularists, agnostics and confessing atheists, enlightened thinkers, women's rights and human rights activists as well as adherents of non-recognized minorities.

Usaama al-Azami’s Islam and the Arab Revolutions: The Ulama Between Democracy and Autocracy (Oxford University Press, 2022) focuses on the responses of several prominent Muslim religious scholars towards the 2011 Arab popular revolts, particularly in Egypt, that toppled long-standing autocratic leaders. It also looks at their reaction to the subsequent military coup in 2013 that overthrew Egypt’s first and only democratically elected leader and led to the brutal and bloody repression of anti-coup protests.

If you would like a copy of this paper, please email me at usaama.al-azami@orinst.ox.ac.uk

Neo-traditionalism is trying to develop its own transnational Islamic political discourse, but it is struggling in the shadow of Islamism. The Arab Spring, which put forward the proposition of popular participation in the political process created the impetus for this. Islamists had a readymade discourse backed by reasonably effective civil society institutions to fall back on that helped galvanize their activists relatively successfully even if it has so far proved a mostly abortive effort. Counter-revolutionary Neo-traditionalism which has contrasted with Islamism in its statist orientation has consequently only had relatively sclerotic civil society institutional infrastructure. In the wake of the Arab revolutions, one of the most important state-backed Arab scholars to attempt to remedy this state of affairs has been 'Abdullah Bin Bayyah (b. 1935). Yet his ideas appear largely derivative of, or reactions to, Islamist ideas and institutions. This article traces the evolution of some of Bin Bayyah’s activities and ideas from the beginning of the Arab revolutions in 2011 to his decisive break with the Islamists in 2013, and finally his establishment of counter institutions and institutional initiatives to the Islamists in the years that followed. I argue that many of his ideas and initiatives appear to be little more than the repackaging of Islamist discourse in Neo-traditionalist garb. Given that counter-revolutionary Neo-traditionalism is, by design, structurally subordinate to an authoritarian state, it seems unlikely that it will develop any long-lasting and independent Islamic political discourse.

A comparison of the ideas of the reformist Muslim thinkers Khaled Abou El Fadl and Tariq Ramadan with those of the more traditionalist scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi illustrates that, in contrast to what is generally assumed, there is substantial common ground between these reformist and traditionalist positions in four areas; human rights and democracy, women's rights, jihād and peace, and dialogue and collaboration. This consensus among these Muslim intellectuals on these important issues has arisen because they share a theory of interpretation that necessitates the utilization of and reliance upon "objectives of Sharī'a" (maqāṣid al-sharī'a) to adjudicate between conflicting points of view. Since these thinkers espouse this methodology of jurisprudence and do not differ substantially concerning their views of the foundational principles of Islam, it becomes possible for them to propound similar ideas regarding the four areas mentioned above.

Revelations of donations to the Clinton Foundation after Hillary Clinton joined the Obama administration in January 2009, invite a second look at her decisions as Secretary of State.

In early January 2011 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was en route to the Gulf region with planned visits to Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Her office announced that she will discuss “regional security issues including Iraq, the Middle East peace process, Lebanon, Yemen…and Iran….”She’ll want to take stock of where we are on the sanctions regime.” The growing tension in Egypt was not on her agenda.

But on February 11, 2011, violent clashes between demonstrators and security forces in Egypt led to President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation and transfer of his powers to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Next, violent protests, the first major Libyan protests in years against Gaddafi rule, erupted in Benghazi, Libya.

Gaddafi’s days were then numbered when on 25 February the U.S. flew its diplomats out of Libya.  Within minutes of their departure the Obama administration, citing numerous human rights violations, announced it had imposed sanctions on the Gaddafi family and the Libyan regime. President Obama stated, “We will stand steadfastly with the Libyan people in their demand for universal rights, and a government that is responsive to their aspirations. Their human dignity cannot be denied.”....

During the same week Saudi Arabia’s crown prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) admitted to the Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg that Saudi nationals have funded terror groups, a prominent Georgetown University counterterrorism expert and field researcher has published his findings based on extensive interviews with former ISIS members which identifies Saudi Arabia as a key source of the now defunct Islamic State’s prior rapid growth.

The findings were summarized in the Government and Technology Services Coalition’s Homeland Security Today online journal, and authored by Georgetown University professor Ahmet Yayla, who during the past four years has interviewed over 40 ISIS defectors in Turkey while conducting on the ground research along Syria’s border.

Yayla’s findings entitled, To Truly Fight Terror, Counter Salafist Jihadist Ideology First, confirm that:

“The majority of the ISIS shaykhs (imams and teachers) who were preaching in ISIS-controlled territories and schools were from Saudi Arabia.”

https://madhousenews.com/2018/04/new-study-provides-yet-more-proof-of-saudi-state-sponsorship-of-isis/

Total Innovation Management (TIM) is the system of forming an innovative synergy between
technology, organization and culture to build innovation competence in organizations. Supply
Chain (SC) is a global network used to deliver products and services from raw materials to
end-customers via an engineered flow of information, physical distribution and cash. This
paper appraised TIM on SC in the automobile industry in Nigeria using structured
questionnaire and interview. The upshot indicated 40% of SC executives are more concerned
with risk associated with supply and thus invest in insurance policies. 80% of trained SC staff
applies ICT tools in visibility (trackability). All SC staff was receptive to innovative ideas,
indicating sustainability of TIM ideology in the sector.
Keywords: Total Innovation Management, Supply Chain, automobile industry, Nigeria

Most new or wasati Islamist movements are moving toward recognition of citizenship rights, including the notions of equal civil rights, civic freedoms, and equal economic rights. This chapter presents an insight into the discourses of wasati (e.g. nonviolent and democratically oriented) Islamist social and political movements on citizenship in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The wasati current, which started in the 1990s, is in many ways an extension, or rather an evolutionary by-product of the region’s intellectual, political, and religious discourses that have often been inspired by historical Islamic reformist movements. Much like the related discussion about nationalism in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Europe, classical political Islam or Islamism in the post-colonial period came to symbolize a polyphonic intellectual and activist project. Nevertheless, one central notion of all Islamist movements has been their attempts to shape a modern political Muslim identity, which they then place right at the center of the political deliberations and state building in the MENA region. The concept of Islamism in this chapter is not an analytic category that seeks to determine if a particular political or a social group is Muslim/Islamic or not. It is rather used in the broader sense of signifying part of a new, dynamic, nonviolent sociopolitical movement that produces important elements in public discourses to which Muslim political identity is central.

Reform in the Muslim world, Islam and modernity and the politics of Islamic movements are increasingly being debated in discussed especially in the post Arab Spring context. Much of the more recent and critical literature produced has dealt with the idea of “moderate Islam” as a U.S.-backed program of religion-building and the ways in which the desire to create a modern Muslim subject is intertwined with the generative powers of the Secular State. However, little has been written about the ways in which the idea of a moderate Muslim subject was debated within the Muslim world. This thesis seeks to contribute to this burgeoning body of literature through a critical intervention and examine the genealogy of wasaṭiyya – or Islamic centrism. What did a ‘moderate’ Muslim or movement mean for Muslim scholars and thinkers? To explore the genealogy of this concept, this thesis will cover a wide historical period, beginning with premodern scholars like Shāfi'ī (d 820) to modern scholars like the Egyptian jurist Yusuf al-Qaradawi. In explicating the differing moral vocabulary, problem-space and historical imagination(s) that informed the genealogy of wasaṭiyya, this thesis will demonstrate that the concept is a modern neologism and critically engage with the politics which the wasaṭiyya movement reproduces.

Kedudukan Laki-laki dalam pola keluarga bangsa Arab jauh lebih tinggi jika dibandingkan dengan perempuan. Meskipun demikian, satu sama lain mempunyai ketergantungan yang sangat kuat. Disamping sebagai sepasang suami-istri, juga relasi antar batin dan fisik yang saling melengkapi. struktur fungsionalisme, melihat ada sesuatu yang menarik dalam hal ini. Dimana ketika saling ketergantungan semakin kuat, namun eksistensi tetap dipertahankan karena budaya yang telah melekat dengan sistem sosial.

In the wake of the Arab Revolutions of 2011, countries in the Middle East are grappling with how Islamists might be included within a regime of democratic political pluralism and how the aspirations for an “Islamic state” could affect the citizenship status of non-Muslims. While Islamic jurisprudence on this issue has traditionally classified non-Muslims in Islamic society as protected peoples or dhimma, endowed with what the authors term “minority citizenship”, this article will examine how the transnational intellectual Wasatiyya or Centrist movement, of which Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi is the figurehead, have sought to develop a new fiqh of citizenship in which Muslims and non-Muslims have equal civil and political rights. This article will focus on Yusuf al-Qaradawi on the basis that his very recent shift in 2010 on the issue is yet to be studied in depth, as well as in view of the fact that the dilemma faced by reformist Islamic scholars—how to integrate modern concepts into a legal tradition while simultaneously arguing for that tradition’s continuing relevance and authority—is for him rendered particularly acute, given that this tradition is itself the very source of his own authority and relevance. It will therefore be argued that the legacy of the Islamic legal  tradition structures his discourse in a very specific way, thereby having the potential to render it more persuasive to his audience, and worthy of a more detailed examination.

This article examines one of several ways in which the Muslim presence in Europe is discussed or justified in Islamic terms. It mainly analyses the position of those scholars, some of them close to the Muslim Brotherhood (like Al-Qaradawi and Mawlawi), who have claimed that not only can Muslims live in Western Europe, but that they should live there. In fact, according to them Europe is a context in need of Muslims and that Muslims need it too: Europe needs the moral example Muslims can set there and Muslims need Europe in order to spread Islam. In this light, the presence of Muslims in Europe is both legitimate and necessary, and their absence unthinkable. This article is the result of an examination of particular essays and edicts which Sunni Arab Muslim scholars have contributed to the debate surrounding Muslim minorities in Europe, published between the years 1960-2000.

Islamic orthodoxy is often relegated by liberal voices in academia to being traditionalist and literalistic, especially in the domain of law. 'Ulema are seen as having little to contribute with regards to modern challenges presented to the Muslim world.

Conversely, Islamic conservative orthodoxy often treats important practical reforms to legal approaches, as sacrilegious and unorthodox. I posit that a new approach to Islamic legal theory has emerged in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, characterised by its adherence to orthodox principles and the traditional schools of law, while providing practical, modern solutions. I call this approach: Orthodox Pragmatism.

I suggest a new typology for examining modern Islamic legal trends. Orthodox Pragmatists like Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, build upon the work of earlier modernist scholars, but lie between the protectionism of  ultra-conservatives and the 'surrender' of the Islamic legal identity arising from liberal approaches. They are rooted in the classical tradition but seek to use its tools for tajdid (renewal).

Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood is commonly portrayed as realpolitik, simply part of Gulf power politics. However, the personal history of Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi in Qatar, and his influence on Qatari society, is just one example of how the connection between the country and the social movement has a long history.

This article discusses Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaraḍawi’s approach toward Judaism, Zionism and the State of Israel. Using Irwin Cotler’s nine-point definition of anti-Semitism, it will endeavour to position Qaraḍawi’s on an anti-Semitism-anti-Zionism scale.

Anhand einer empirischen Studie eruiert die Arbeit den normativen Anspruch des European Council for Fatwa and Research im deutschen Kontext. Ausgehend von der Forschungsfrage, welchen Wirkungsgrad der European Council for Fatwa and Research bei muslimischen Gemeinden in Deutschland im Kontext religiöser Normgebung hat, wird mittels einer qualitativen Studie das Meinungsbild von sieben in Deutschland lebenden und wirkenden Imamen eruiert. Die Ergebnisse sind vor dem Hintergrund des Forschungsmodells nicht als repräsentativ zu verstehen. Vielmehr liegt das besondere Erkenntnisinteresse in der Beantwortung der Frage, inwieweit die befragten Imame im Kontext ihrer Arbeit als religiöse und soziale Berater Zugang zu islamrechtlichen Entwicklungen haben, und welches Verständnis sie vom Diskursfeld des Islamischen Rechts und seiner Institutionalisierung durch den ECFR in Deutschland aufweisen.

This research examines the political thought of Yusuf al- Qaradawi, who is one of the prominent Muslim scholars in the contemporary world. In particular, he considered the vital theorist of Islamic movements and Islamist political parties. He has a massive contribution in forming political thought of the second generation of the Muslim Brotherhood after Sayyid Qutb’s period when the extremism came in front. He is often regarded as the theorist of the Wasatiyyah school of thought. Al-Qaradawi intended to develop a “wise political Fiqh (understanding)” concerning current time, environment, and circumstances in the light of overall text toward an objective of flexible Islamic Shari’ah. He was also concerned about the negative political Fiqh and advised the Islamic movement to reject these negative ideologies in their works and politics. Following this concern, he featured an Islamic state based on wise political Fiqh. His perception of the Islamic state positively approaches modern state terms, i.e., democracy, pluralism, women participation in the legislative council, etc. This paper discusses his concept of state in general and his thought toward a wise political Fiqh in particular. This research is a qualitative content research based on primary data at a large and secondary data in some context. Primary data was collected from the al- Qaradawi’s text on state, where secondary data were collected from the texts written on al-Qaradawi’s political thought.

this article presents Sheickh Yusuf Qaradawi's view on the historical and religious background for the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. As the spiritual leader of the Hamas, he believes that the current struggle is a continuation of an historical struggle that began with the sibling rivalry between Ishmael and Isaac over the right to be Abraham’s heir. Qaradawi analyzes today’s events through a religious prism and uses the Quran to re-explain the Bible in a way that fits his political agenda. From a theological point of view, Qaradawi does not say anything new. According to him, Ishmael was Abraham’s real spiritual heir and for that reason today’s muslims, who are Ishmael’s descendants, have the right to inherit Palestine. The jews, the descendants of Isaac, lost their rights to the land as a result of their unfaithfulness to the covenant between god and Abraham, as the Bible itself shows. thus, today’s Israeli-Palestinian conflict stems from an ancient struggle over the birthright and choice. that, atleast, is how Qaradawi and his followers perceive the roots of the conflict.
His sentiments may be deeply felt both by him and his followers. But neither the Bible nor the Quran—historical, religious, and political books of the highest magnitude—is a real estate deed. In the end, the issue at hand is the present, andbuilding a road to a better future for both Israeli and Palestinian inhabitants of the land. ultimately, the answer to this conflict does not lie in the distant past.

Three themes formulate the structure of this paper; human security, economic security, and the Islamic economic theory. Human Security is a bottom up approach that focuses on the individual rather than the state, and is not limited to quantitative measures of economics, but also qualitative. This research sheds light on the work of Imam Al-Shatibi and Imam Al-Qaradawi. The goal of this theoretical research is to propose a definition to Human Economic Security from an Islamic perspective, and introduce the Islamic method of resolving the economic problem. Additionally, to show the rich classical Islamic literature in such social sciences. What makes an Islamic perspective unique is the role of religion in every aspect of a Muslims life.