modern Halakhah

[To appear in the CCAR Journal, Spring 2020] The inherent tension between Reform theology and halakhah is as foundational as it is enduring.  At the outset, early Reformers in Europe such as Abraham Geiger (1810-1874) focused less on the project of developing an evolving Reform halakhah and more on what they saw as the necessary transformations of Jewish life and prayer precisely because Jewish law had failed to allow for these transformations. While halakhic considerations --as well as the accompanying political and sociological considerations-- were certainly part of their thinking about the transformation of Judaism that these Reform thinkers led, they focused more on the philosophy of Judaism that would provide the foundation for it.  At its core, Reform Judaism sought the re-framing of Jewish life not by creating a new halakhah but, rather, primarily through the development of a new theology –through prayer and practice-- for a Judaism that could thrive in the modern world. ...Although later thinkers inherited the texts of rationalists of early Reform thought some mid-twentieth century American Reform thinkers, attracted to the existentialism of Buber and Rosenzweig, began once again to consider the place of God and halakhah in Jewish thought. However, for the most part, leaders of the Reform movement retained a primary focus on the adaptation of Judaism to modern life in America as the fulfillment of their Jewish duty and wanted it to allow them to be fully American.....

קיימת טענה שהאיגבו מניגריה הם צאצאי בני ישראל. ישנם מיליוני תושבים באיבלנד ומחוצה לה המשתייכים למסורת האיגבו. הרבה נכתב על מסורות האיגבו, שמעיד על הטענה, לרבות יצירות היסטוריות ואנתרופולוגיות, המפרטות תיאוריות, מנהגים, סוציולוגיה, פילוסופיה והיסטוריה. למרות הוכחות חזקות לקשר שלהם לבני ישראל, עקב התנצרות כפויה, יש היום מעט רשויות רבניות שמחליטות שהאיגבו חייבים להתגייר או לעבור הליכים קפדניים, כדי להסיר כל ספק ולשלבם לחיק עם ישראל. מהי ההלכה לגבי הזהות הדתית של האיגבו והאם הם כשרים לבא בקהל ולהנשא עם כל ישראל?

המאמר מנתח את פסקי הדין שניתנו בבית הדין הרבני
האזורי בירושלים ובבית הדין הגדול לערעורים בנוגע
לתביעה נגד הרב אבינר על רקע הטרדה מינית. המאמר
טוען כי הטיה נרטיבית הובילה את ההרכבים של שני
בתי הדין לאמץ את טיעוניו של אבינר, ולדחות את אלו
של התובעת. נוסף על כך, ההטיה הנרטיבית השפיעה
על הניתוח ההלכתי של המקרה, והובילה את בית הדין
הגדול לדיון בהגנה שנותנת כביכול חזקת הכשרות
לאבינר, ולמסקנה המשתמעת מהגנה זו , שדברי
התובעת אינם אלא "דברי השמצה זדוניים". המאמר
קורא לבית הדין להרחיב את הפרספקטיבה הנרטיבית
שלו כדי להימנע מן הסיכון שבהטיות מסוג זה .

This article seeks to evaluate the recently developed phenomenon of halakhic responsa that are extremely terse and lack argumentation, or contain minimal, usually informal argumentation. These responsa range from Rabbi Ḥayim Kanievsky’s laconic responsa (a.k.a. “postcard responsa”) to the “S.M.S. responsa” by Rabbis Shlomo Aviner and Shmuel Eliyahu. Both are parts of a phenomenon that can appropriately be termed “instant responsa.” This article analyzes the nature of this phenomenon, the changes that it has brought about in halakhic discourse, and the meaning of these changes for understanding the process of halakhic decision-making and the boundaries of the Halakhah. As part of this analysis, the article also investigates the degree to which the theoretical model of Legal Realism, which depicted detailed formal legal reasoning as an artificial covering over the real considerations that enter into judicial decisions,  can be applied to the Halakhah. In doing so, it offers an interpretation of the relevant aspects of this model: the boundaries of the law and the nature of the judicial process.
Legal Realism is usually considered to be an innovation of American legal scholars such as Karl Llewellyn (1893-1962) and Jerome Frank (1889-1957) but was actually formulated about two decades earlier by the Italian social scientist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923). In the context of the Halakhah, Hanina Ben Menahem (born 1944) has insisted, more than any other scholar, that Talmudic law is “governed by men, not by rules,” a phrase that is strikingly similar to one of Llewellyn's. Ben Menahem nevertheless rejects attempts to characterize him as a legal realist about the Halakhah. Ostensibly, “instant responsa” strengthen the impression that halakhic decisions are made in the same intuitive and informal way as those rulings, while the formal argumentation of the traditional rulings is only added as cover. One might think that this phenomenon supports the contention that the legal realists’ understanding of law can be applied to the Halakhah, or at least to modern Halakhah, without much qualification. This article concludes, however, that doing so would be misguided and that the indiscriminate application of legal realist theory (that was developed as a model to analyze modern legal systems) to the Halakhah leads to our missing certain unique elements of Jewish religious law. The article therefore offers a refined model of “halakhic realism,” by the means of which we can offer a better interpretive analysis of the boundaries of Halakhah and the process of halakhic decision-making.

In the twentieth century Maimonides' Code of Law (Mishneh Torah) served both those who argued that Jewish Law holds an inclusive position on the question of the borders of the Jewish collective, as well as those who hold an exclusive position on this question. This article shows that each one of these interpretive postions utilized different aspects of Maimonides' corpus of law.

Maimonides uses two different terms for the convert (or newcomer) to the Jewish collective: Ger Tzedek and Ger Toshav. This article shows that for Maimonides Ger Tzedek is the preferred modus of joining the Jewish collective during diasporic times, when Jews do not hold political power; while Ger Toshav is the preferred modus of joining the Jewish collective during sovereign times, when Jews hold political power.

It is argued that the the position of inclusion adopts Ger Tzedek (and therefore the diasporic mode of halakha), while the position of exclusion adopts Ger Toshav as its main point of reference (and therefore the sovereign mode of halakha).

במאה העשרים שימשה הלכת הרמב"ם הן את מי שטענו שלהלכה יחס אינקלוסיבי הן
את מי שטענו שלהלכה יחס אקסקלוסיבי בכל הנוגע לגבולות הכניסה לקולקטיב היהודי.
מאמר זה מראה שכל אחד מזרמים פרשניים אלו הסתמך על יסודות אחרים בחיבורו
ההלכתי הגדול של הרמב"ם "משנה תורה". הבחנה יסודית במשנה תורה היא בין "הזמן
הזה" — זמן אשר בו ישראל נמצאים בגלות ואין להם כוח פוליטי, לבין "זמן אשר בו
יד ישראל תקיפה על האומות". המאמר מראה שבמשנה תורה, הדואליות הטמפורלית
משפיעה באופן קונקרטי על הפסיקה המיימונית: כך, הקטגוריה של "גר צדק" היא אופן
ההצטרפות המובהק והמייצג של ה"זמן הזה", בעוד הקטגוריה של "גר תושב" קשורה
בעליל ל"זמן אשר בו יד ישראל תקיפה". המאמר מראה שהקטגוריה "גר צדק" מאומצת
בידי פוסקים בני זמננו הדוגלים ביחס אינקלוסיבי, בעוד הקטגוריה "גר תושב" משמשת
השראה למבקשים להחיל יחס אקסקלוסיבי.

This article seeks, in its first part, to make sense of what has been termed “feminist research in Judaic studies” and proposes differentiating between four types of feminist research: critical feminist research, gendered feminist research, mediating feminist research, and research with a “feminist sensitivity.”
In light of these distinctions, the article will seek to delineate the similarities and differences between feminist research in rabbinics and feminist research in the literature pertaining to modern halakhah.
These distinctions are not just conceptual and are intended to be used
as an analytical tool, an awareness of which could lead to new avenues of research. Therefore, the second part of the article will demonstrate, through a case study of Orthodox legal reactions to male homosexuality, how gendered feminist research in the field of modern halakhah produces new knowledge regarding the manner in which masculine identities are constituted and what they entail. This knowledge will expand critical feminist research, adding dimensions of depth over and above its intrinsic value in and of itself.

Elhanan Shilo (born in 1972) is a scholar of modern Jewish philosophy and Kabbalah as well as an original thinker in his own right. He studied at Yeshivat Or Etzion and afterwards studied Jewish Thought, philosophy, and Bible Studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He wrote his doctoral dissertation in the department of Hebrew Literature at Bar Ilan University on the subject of Kabbalah in the writings of Shai Agnon. The study was adapted into a book and published in 2011. Shilo has taught at Mikhlelet Orot and currently teaches at Mikhlelet Sapir. His second book, Yahadut Qiyumit, was published in 2017. Already at the beginning of Yahadut Qiyumit, Shilo introduces the dialectical tension between reason and revelation, referring to it as a dichotomy between religiosity and secularism. He explains that he wishes to present his own thoughts on the issue, describing a way to eliminate this duality and create a new path. Of all the other thinkers discussed in this book, Shilo is the only one who does not accept each one of the two competing sources of authority as a full truth in its own right, but rather seeks an alternative to rigid halakhic Judaism. In the first chapters of his book, he proposes two approaches. The first is what he terms "practical Judaism." This calls for the creation of less demanding and less rigid religious models, including non-halakhic ones, allowing unification with the secular truth-which is also not self-sufficient, seeking as it does a new form of spirituality as well as closeness to Judaism and its sources. Thus, it is possible to recreate a unified nation with a broad, shared basis of Jewish identity. The second approach is what Shilo calls "existential Judaism." According to this approach secular Jews should also obligate themselves to perform the commandments, not out of a sense of obligation to Halakha, but rather on the basis of existential criteria-identification with the contents of Halakhah and the belief that it has relevance to our lives. Using the first approach it is possible to unite a community around a single idea and set of actions. However, according to the second approach, the collective will be multifarious and pluralistic, a group of individuals, each member choosing the Judaism that best fits him and the commandments he wishes to observe. In Chapter Two of his book, Shilo seeks to undermine the notion that Jewish-religious observance is dependent on the existence of a commanding God-an assumption that has produced a dichotomy between the religious and secular segments of Israeli society. He presents the following possibility: One can choose to fulfill commandments due to a sense of affinity towards their contents, a recognition of their value, or a nationalistic/religious desire to connect oneself to Jewish tradition. This is as opposed to religious observance on the basis of traditional theological beliefs-that one must fulfill the commandments due to a heteronomous fiat, historically connected to the theophany at Sinai. On the one hand, accepting this proposal strengthens the commandments by imbuing them with autonomous status; on the other hand, it leaves leeway for a less demanding observance-one far more lenient than that demanded by intransigent Halakhah. According to this possibility, one can bridge the dialectical tension and close the chasm between atheists and lapsed Orthodox on the one hand and the commandments of the Jewish religion on the other. The religious experience and the sphere of sanctity are not necessarily connected to or dependent upon belief in the existence of a higher being. Up to this point, Shilo seems to be advocating the resolvable dialectical approach. However, he later seems to express a clear preference for the dual truth approach:

Star Trek's replicators are perhaps the most intriguing invention in the star trek universe, and also one of the most frequently debated halachic aspects of the show. When seen on screen, the replicators have the ability to seemingly create any object out of thin air. The exact method of operation of the replicators is unfortunately a matter of some disagreement. The Star Trek technical manual describes one method of operation, while their operation on screen is different. The technical manual explains that the replicators disassemble matter into a matter stream, move it to a new location, and reassemble the matter as a new object. In this conception, the object never exists as pure energy. It is stored and transported as matter. In the TV series however the transporters and replicators are shown to operate as if they were assembling objects from pure energy and not matter. In The Original Series episode The Enemy Within, the transporter duplicates captain Kirk, an alien dog-like animal, and some industrial heaters. In Second Chances Riker is duplicated when a second transporter beam reflects off of the first. In both of these instances if the transporter was sending matter in addition to energy then it would have no way to duplicate the matter present. Only by transporting pure energy could it hope to duplicate the amount of matter present. If that wasn't enough, in the Next Generation episode Lonely Among Us captain Picard is reassembled from pure energy by the transporter. No matter exists when the process begins, but by the end captain Picard is standing on the ship-clearly the product of a process which converted pure energy into matter. (Physicist Lawrence Krauss describes in detail how the depiction in the show and the description in the technical manual are incompatible in his book, The Physics of Star Trek). Like any good machloket, we will have to analyze the issue from both perspectives, however for this blog post we're just going to analyze the replicators from the show's