Halakhah

pp. 87-112 in Steven D. Fraade, Aharon Shemesh, and Ruth A. Clements (eds.), Rabbinical Perspectives: Rabbinic Literature and the Dead Sea Scrolls. Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium of the Orion Center for the Study of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Associated Literature, January 7-9, 2003. Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah. Leiden: Brill, 2005.

This essay considers the category of "Jewish law" in Jewish studies while inviting scholarly and historiographic assessment of the ways that Judaism's link to law has come to appear as obvious. Considering that our present concepts of law are invariably linked to a geographically and temporally parochial "mythology of modern law," the essay sounds a preliminary set of interventions and conversations designed to open critical reflection on these links. First, it considers how halakhah is assimilated as law, which is in turn seen as quintessentially Jewish. Second, it invokes critical assessments of law as a modern European colonial construct. Third, it moves to Hindu law and Islamic law as examples of scholarly fields whose histories are implicated in European colonialism. Fourth, it discusses the construction of Jewish law in Israeli Zionist contexts and in the context of the U.S. law school. It then closes with some suggestions for future directions.

KEY WORDS
Jewish law, Halakhah, law, Hindu law, Islamic law, colonialism, law school, Jewish studies

This article seeks to evaluate the recently developed phenomenon of halakhic responsa that are extremely terse and lack argumentation, or contain minimal, usually informal argumentation. These responsa range from Rabbi Ḥayim Kanievsky’s laconic responsa (a.k.a. “postcard responsa”) to the “S.M.S. responsa” by Rabbis Shlomo Aviner and Shmuel Eliyahu. Both are parts of a phenomenon that can appropriately be termed “instant responsa.” This article analyzes the nature of this phenomenon, the changes that it has brought about in halakhic discourse, and the meaning of these changes for understanding the process of halakhic decision-making and the boundaries of the Halakhah. As part of this analysis, the article also investigates the degree to which the theoretical model of Legal Realism, which depicted detailed formal legal reasoning as an artificial covering over the real considerations that enter into judicial decisions,  can be applied to the Halakhah. In doing so, it offers an interpretation of the relevant aspects of this model: the boundaries of the law and the nature of the judicial process.
Legal Realism is usually considered to be an innovation of American legal scholars such as Karl Llewellyn (1893-1962) and Jerome Frank (1889-1957) but was actually formulated about two decades earlier by the Italian social scientist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923). In the context of the Halakhah, Hanina Ben Menahem (born 1944) has insisted, more than any other scholar, that Talmudic law is “governed by men, not by rules,” a phrase that is strikingly similar to one of Llewellyn's. Ben Menahem nevertheless rejects attempts to characterize him as a legal realist about the Halakhah. Ostensibly, “instant responsa” strengthen the impression that halakhic decisions are made in the same intuitive and informal way as those rulings, while the formal argumentation of the traditional rulings is only added as cover. One might think that this phenomenon supports the contention that the legal realists’ understanding of law can be applied to the Halakhah, or at least to modern Halakhah, without much qualification. This article concludes, however, that doing so would be misguided and that the indiscriminate application of legal realist theory (that was developed as a model to analyze modern legal systems) to the Halakhah leads to our missing certain unique elements of Jewish religious law. The article therefore offers a refined model of “halakhic realism,” by the means of which we can offer a better interpretive analysis of the boundaries of Halakhah and the process of halakhic decision-making.

Originally published in Zeramim: An Online Journal of Applied Jewish Thought, I:3 Spring 2017 / 5777, pp. 67-110.

DESCRIPTION:
A responsum on practices and history of the recitation of Addir Addirenu.

ERRATA:
Please note that an omission from this entire article is an emphasis on the fact Addir Addirenu is only included in the liturgical practices certain Jewish geographically focused traditions. Neither Yemenite nor Chabad siddurim, for example, are likely to include Addir Addirenu.

On p. 86, everything from "UNtanneh Tokef" until the note for fn. 70 should read: "UNtanneh Tokef Kedushat HaYom (ונתנה תקף קדושת היום, “and let us grant the power of the sanctity of the day”),".

Note also that "Bereshit 2" on p. 106 should read "BeMidbar 2."

Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (1910–1995) was one of the most influential Halakhic authorities of the twentieth century. Although he was an ultra-Orthodox rabbi, Rabbi Auerbach dealt with the complexity of army and military life. This article shows that he possessed of a clear " operational way of thinking, " reflecting deeply on the unique needs of the military of the Jewish State. Additionally, the article examines various approaches of filling the normative gap in issues of war and the military. Rabbi Auerbach based his specification of the Halakhah on his personal understanding and his own S'vara, that is, Halakhic logic.

Writing history has never been free from considerations of ideology and values.  Discussions of history are not simply descriptions of the past; rather, they are a compilation of information with an impact on the present and sometimes even on the future. This holds true not only for the composition of history books, but also for the descriptions of formative events of the Jewish past by halakhic authorities. This article will explore how Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan, the Hafetz Hayim, (1839–1933), in his work Mishnah Berurah, coped with events of the past. We will analyze four cases dealing with four historical events: the war of the Hasmoneans as discussed in the Laws of Hanukkah; the Bar Kokhba revolt and the fall of Beitar as described in the Laws of Tisha B’av; the assassination of Gedaliah ben Ahikam as discussed in the Laws of Fast Days; and the decree of Haman as discussed in the Laws of the Fast of Esther.  In Mishneh Torah, Maimonides provides the historical backgrounds of these events. R. Joseph Caro omitted these descriptions from the Shulhan Arukh, and R. Abraham Danzig, with some deviations from the language of Maimonides, re-incorporated them into his popular work Hayei Adam.  The Hafetz Hayim followed the lead of Maimonides and the Hayei Adam. However, a comparison of their respective formulations proves instructive. Maimonides does not hesitate to include descriptions with the potential for delivering “problematic” educational messages. The Hayei Adam softens these formulations and the Hafetz Hayim consistently prefers to omit problematic elements from his descriptions, emphasizing instead elements which contain more powerful educational messages for his audience.  Hence, educational considerations do not simply apply to the realm of the Hafetz Hayim’s halakhic rulings; they also consistently guide his presentation of the non-halakhic elements in his work.


כתיבת ההיסטוריה מעולם לא הייתה נקייה משיקולים אידיאולוגיים וערכיים. ההיסטוריה לא נדונה כתיאור של העבר גרידא, אלא כאוסף תכנים שיש להם השפעה על החיים בהווה ואולי גם בעתיד. מאפיין זה נכון לא רק לכתיבת ספרי היסטוריה, אלא גם לאופן שבו מתארים פוסקי ההלכה מאורעות מכוננים בעבר היהודי. המאמר מבקש לראות כיצד התמודד עם מאורעות אלה ר' ישראל מאיר הכהן, החפץ חיים (1933-1839), בספרו משנה ברורה. נבחנים בו ארבעה מקורות העוסקים בארבעה מאורעות: מלחמת החשמונאים, כפי שהיא נזכרת בהלכות חנוכה; מרד בר כוכבא וחורבן ביתר, כפי שהוא נזכר בהלכות תשעה באב; רצח גדליהו בן אחיקם כפי שהוא נזכר בהלכות תעניות; וגזירת המן, כפי שהיא נזכרת בהלכות תענית אסתר. הרמב"ם כתב במשנה תורה את רקעם ההיסטורי של המאורעות הללו, ר' יוסף קארו השמיטם מן השולחן ערוך, ור' אברהם דאנציג שב והעלה אותם, בשינויים אחדים מלשונו של הרמב"ם, בספרו הפופולרי 'חיי אדם'. החפץ חיים הולך בעקבות הרמב"ם וה'חיי אדם', אך השוואה בין הניסוחים מאלפת: הרמב"ם אינו מהסס לשלב בדבריו תיאורים שעלולים להיות 'בעייתיים' מבחינת המסר החינוכי שלהם, ה'חיי אדם' מרכך אותם מעט ואילו החפץ חיים מעדיף דרך קבע להשמיט מן התיאורים הללו את המרכיבים ה'בעייתים' ולהדגיש אחרים, שיש בהם מסר חינוכי חזק יותר עבור קהל קוראיו. השיקול החינוכי משפיע אצלו אפוא לא רק על אופן הכרעת ההלכה, אלא גם על אופן ניסוחם של החלקים הלא-הלכתיים בחיבורו.

Archaeology is indispensable for understanding the genesis and development of halakhah, Jewish ritual law, and the impact of its observance on the functioning of ancient Jewish societies. Using examples from my own work over the past few years, this paper seeks to illustrate the kinds of data archaeology can provide on how ancient halakhah was practiced, information which is simply not to be found in texts. The topics to be surveyed include mikva’ot (ritual baths), chalkstone vessels and tefillin (phylacteries). The unique contribution of archaeology to the study of each of these halakhic phenomena is explored with special focus on what archaeology has to teach us about these rituals which we would not have known from the texts alone. Some of the potential hazards and pitfalls of using archaeology together with texts of a halakhic nature are discussed as well, including the anachronistic use of written sources in interpreting earlier remains and the mistaken privileging of rabbinic halakhah over alternative possibilities. Archaeology and texts tend to provide very different kinds of information, and if brought together prudently, hold the potential to afford a much more comprehensive and accurate understanding of how halakhah was observed in the ancient past.

This edition contains a vocalized text of Levush Malkhuth, supplemented by the translator with historical and clarifying footnotes throughout. In order to enhance the reader’s experience, this edition also contains endnotes with relevant sources and translations from both Rabbanite and Karaite literature. These sources are particularly useful for readers who wish to understand either the basis of the claims in Levush Malkhuth or the extent to which Karaite Judaism in the day of the author was similar to Karaite Judaism as reflected in classical Karaite literature.

Abstract Iris Brown Hoizman


Supervised shaming: contemporary Jewish law facing the challenge of social networks


This article compares the approaches of Jewish law and Israeli law to the practice of shaming that has burgeoned with the rise and expansion of social networks. It focuses specifically on those instances in which something true is made public, making the shaming potentially beneficial yet still disquieting.
In this comparative study, the author probes the positions of Jewish and Israeli law. The analysis covers theoretical aspects, especially the proper balance between reputation and freedom of speech, and practical ones that follow therefrom, such as the appropriate punishment for acts like shaming, all the while noting the differences between the two systems of law. Finally, it tests the different approaches through a case study: the shaming of “get refusers,” namely, recalcitrant husbands who refuse to give a get (bill of divorce) to their wives, as viewed by Israeli rabbinical judges, on the one hand, and by Israeli Supreme Court justices, on the other.
The article shows that contemporary Jewish law has developed a unique approach in which shaming, including by social media, is affirmed as a social sanction, but only when it is supervised by a rabbinic authority. This is mainly an outgrowth of the clear preference for reputation over freedom of speech, especially given the fact that the Internet is everywhere. This line of reasoning and action raises the jurisprudential problem of permitting a judicial body to instruct society to apply shame as a sanction.
The case of the “get refusers” brings this issue to the fore. The rabbinical court decided to use public censure, so the refusers petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court. The justices, however, did not reach a consensus. Their disagreement highlights the gap between the two systems of law: one of the foundations of Israeli law is the principle of legality, so any violation of it infringes on the very core of the law; Jewish law, or at least its interpretation by the rabbinical court in this case, does not even consider this an issue, and does not deem the recruitment of the public extrajudicial justice but a time-honored type of legitimate sanction. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court appears to uphold the approach of the rabbinical court, given the justices’ sensitivity to the plight of the aggrieved women, but despite the rejection of the petition, most of the justices felt that it would have been proper to overcome the problem of get-refusers in other ways, that use the enforcement powers of the state.

This article deals with the obligation to maintain a clean body (the requirement to clear one’s bowels before prayer and the related prohibition to delay bowel movements) as a case study on the tension between Halakhah, Kabbalah, and Hasidism.  It surveys the development of the prohibition in Hasidism throughout the ages, from its beginning until our times. 
A change occurred in the understanding of the concept, both at the level of discourse as well as at the substantive level.  At the level of discourse, in early Hasidism the discussion focuses on the Kabbalistic basis for the commandment, whereas in later Hasidic sources it revolves around its halakhic parameters and associated hygienic and rational considerations.  On the substantive level, Hasidism moved from the drastic and extreme demand for a clean body (to the point that the Ba’al Shem Tov ruled that one must always keep himself diarrheal) to demanding only the minimum halakhic requirement and even less.
This shift indicates a historic change in the attitudes of the Hasidic movement towards the Halakhah and to deviations from it. It also reflects the growing awareness of the Hasidic leadership to the dangerous consequences of customs that were adopted or ‘invented’ by early Hasidism and the tensions that arose in certain situations between Hasidic leaders, who wished to revive pre-Hasidic halakhic norms, and some of their followers, who sought to uphold the customs of their rebbes, the founders of Hasidism.

With what name do you call to the Torah someone whose father abandoned Judaism? Naming the apostate amounts to honoring him but omitting his name risks embarrassing his sons. This article discusses historical attempts to grapple with this dilemma.

Writing history has never been free from considerations of ideology and values.  Discussions of history are not simply descriptions of the past; rather, they are a compilation of information with an impact on the present and sometimes even on the future. This holds true not only for the composition of history books, but also for the descriptions of formative events of the Jewish past by halakhic authorities. This article will explore how Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan, the Hafetz Hayim, (1839–1933), in his work Mishnah Berurah, coped with events of the past. We will analyze four cases dealing with four historical events: the war of the Hasmoneans as discussed in the Laws of Hanukkah; the Bar Kokhba revolt and the fall of Beitar as described in the Laws of Tisha B’av; the assassination of Gedaliah ben Ahikam as discussed in the Laws of Fast Days; and the decree of Haman as discussed in the Laws of the Fast of Esther.  In Mishneh Torah, Maimonides provides the historical backgrounds of these events. R. Joseph Caro omitted these descriptions from the Shulhan Arukh, and R. Abraham Danzig, with some deviations from the language of Maimonides, re-incorporated them into his popular work Hayei Adam.  The Hafetz Hayim followed the lead of Maimonides and the Hayei Adam. However, a comparison of their respective formulations proves instructive. Maimonides does not hesitate to include descriptions with the potential for delivering “problematic” educational messages. The Hayei Adam softens these formulations and the Hafetz Hayim consistently prefers to omit problematic elements from his descriptions, emphasizing instead elements which contain more powerful educational messages for his audience.  Hence, educational considerations do not simply apply to the realm of the Hafetz Hayim’s halakhic rulings; they also consistently guide his presentation of the non-halakhic elements in his work.

כתיבת ההיסטוריה מעולם לא הייתה נקייה משיקולים אידיאולוגיים וערכיים. ההיסטוריה לא נדונה כתיאור של העבר גרידא, אלא כאוסף תכנים שיש להם השפעה על החיים בהווה ואולי גם בעתיד. מאפיין זה נכון לא רק לכתיבת ספרי היסטוריה, אלא גם לאופן שבו מתארים פוסקי ההלכה מאורעות מכוננים בעבר היהודי. המאמר מבקש לראות כיצד התמודד עם מאורעות אלה ר' ישראל מאיר הכהן, החפץ חיים (1933-1839), בספרו משנה ברורה. נבחנים בו ארבעה מקורות העוסקים בארבעה מאורעות: מלחמת החשמונאים, כפי שהיא נזכרת בהלכות חנוכה; מרד בר כוכבא וחורבן ביתר, כפי שהוא נזכר בהלכות תשעה באב; רצח גדליהו בן אחיקם כפי שהוא נזכר בהלכות תעניות; וגזירת המן, כפי שהיא נזכרת בהלכות תענית אסתר. הרמב"ם כתב במשנה תורה את רקעם ההיסטורי של המאורעות הללו, ר' יוסף קארו השמיטם מן השולחן ערוך, ור' אברהם דאנציג שב והעלה אותם, בשינויים אחדים מלשונו של הרמב"ם, בספרו הפופולרי 'חיי אדם'. החפץ חיים הולך בעקבות הרמב"ם וה'חיי אדם', אך השוואה בין הניסוחים מאלפת: הרמב"ם אינו מהסס לשלב בדבריו תיאורים שעלולים להיות 'בעייתיים' מבחינת המסר החינוכי שלהם, ה'חיי אדם' מרכך אותם מעט ואילו החפץ חיים מעדיף דרך קבע להשמיט מן התיאורים הללו את המרכיבים ה'בעייתים' ולהדגיש אחרים, שיש בהם מסר חינוכי חזק יותר עבור קהל קוראיו. השיקול החינוכי משפיע אצלו אפוא לא רק על אופן הכרעת ההלכה, אלא גם על אופן ניסוחם של החלקים הלא-הלכתיים בחיבורו.

Rabbi Dr. Immanuel Jakobovits was the founder of the modern subject of Jewish medical ethics. His views on abortion, particularly regarding public policy, carry great weight. This article explores his views on public policy regarding abortion in light of Jewish law and thought.

Is a child obligated to honor a parent who leaves Torah observance? We are speaking here of the child’s obligation and what is best for the child, not the parent’s right however that may be defined. Let’s say that a child whose parent stopped being religiously observant asks what the Torah requires him to do, given that the child wants to remain in the same religious place.