Republic of the Philippines

NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 8

OROPD2001

December 4,

SUBJECT: LOI 40/2001 SANDUGO MASTER PLAN-WARAY (THE PNP ISO MASTER PLAN) TO: I. See Distribution REFERENCES: of Master Plans for Police Operations by

a. A Compendium Mendoza/Aglipay.
b.

Memorandum from The Director for Operations dated October 18, 2001, subject: Compendium of the Six (6) Master Plans for Police Operations.

II.

INTRODUCTION

The insurgency problem, whether of the communist or the secessionist type, has social, economic, political and security dimensions. The security part, as manifested by armed guerilla activities, is the most visible sign or symptom of the problem. The security acts only because of the political organization that provides the leadership and the direction. On the other hand, the dissatisfaction and grievances of the people resulting from the socio-economic and political conditions in the area provide the insurgency movement the reason for its being. Thus, insurgency may not be solved by police/military solution alone (although police/military action is vital and an important part), but by a package of government policies and programs that can effectively and simultaneously address the socio-economic, the political and the military aspects of the situation. Accordingly, the whole government machinery and instrumentalities must strongly and coordinately be made to bear on the problem. A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE:

This serves as the long-range and holistic master plan of the PNP in waging an internal security support operations nationwide. Premised on the estimate of the national situation and other considerations, it prescribes the counter-insurgency support strategy, operational concept, scheme of implementation, service support and coordinating instructions in order to accomplish the PNP's internal security support mission. All subsequent and supplemental Programs of Action, LOIs, and other related issuances to be prescribed and executed by PNP units and personnel at all levels which would have a bearing on internal security, must therefore conform with the intent/spirit and strategic and operational guidelines embodied herein. This is to ensure the continuity, unity, consistency and synergy of all internal security efforts at all times. B. NATIONAL SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS:

1.

General

The Government, through the AFP and the PNP, had launched various campaigns and pacification drives in the past decades to resolve the continuing communist insurgency threat. As a result, the communist insurgent movement experienced a downtrend in its party building, army building and alliance work. This downtrend was attributed among others to the vigorous implementation of the series of the PNP's Sandugo COIN campaign plans and the AFP Campaign Plan Lambat-Bitag. These developments, however, did not lead to the downfall of the Communist Movement. The CPP/NPA, instead, staged a strategic withdrawal to avoid decisive defeat by the government forces. Subsequently, the CPP/NPA launched a rectification campaign to regain control of LCM lost areas and restore its influence in the rural areas. Additionally, the CPP, having experienced a regression in the Yearly substages of the Strategic Defensive Stage focused its activities on ideological, political and organization (IPO) work to rebuild the party, its army and mass organizations. During the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police (PC/INP) era, internal and external security were tasks relegated to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The PC/INP then, as one of the four major services of the AFP had played an indispensable role in counterinsurgency until its deactivation in 1991, with the passage of RA 6975, which resulted in the birth of the PNP. RA 6975 further placed the PNP as the lead agency in the maintenance of internal security although it took until 1995, for the PNP to fully assume its primary role in internal security. However, when RA 8551 was passed into law in 1998, internal security was once again given to the aegis of the AFP. Moreover, Executive Order No. 110 issued on June 15, 1999 mandated the PNP to support the AFP in ISO for the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security. The military and police counter-insurgency campaigns and other complementing efforts by concerned civil government agencies LGUs and NGOs, may be classified into three major operations or activities, namely: (1) Internal Security Operations (ISO) by the AFP and the PNP to provide security to the people and the government; (2) National Development operations by the civil government agencies to address the root causes of insurgency; and (3) Peace Process by the Office of the Presidential Assistant on the Peace Process (OPAPP) to complement the overall government effort to attract rebels back to the mainstream of society, in the spirit of equality, peace reconciliation and unification. Essentially, these three mutually complementing efforts are the government's three-pronged strategy in addressing the country's insurgency problem. In line with the government's three-pronged strategy in addressing the insurgency problem, the PNP and the AFP have expanded their roles and actively participated in the civil government's development activities that strike at the root causes of insurgency. As one recognized weakness of this undertaking is the lack of coordination and unity efforts among the military/police and civil government agencies, thus the National Peace and Development Plan (NPDP) was formulated.

Amidst these changes in the operational environment, coupled with the recent political events in our country, the PNP has to formulate and adopt a comprehensive plan that would define the general guidelines/concepts of operations and tasks to be observed and followed by all PNP units/offices in supporting the AFP in the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security in conjunction with the NDPP and Executive Order No. 110. 2. Strategic Guidance a. The National Peace and Development Plan

This Plan sets forth the government's overall plan for addressing insurgency. It recognizes insurgency as a multi-dimensional problem requiring a holistic and collaborative response and involvement of all sectors of government and of the citizenry. It prescribes the Clear - Hold Consolidate - Develop (CHCD) operational methodology and envisions to launch a concerted, integrated and collaborative campaign to address insurgency and its root causes through the "left-hand" and the "right-hand" responses. The "left-hand" response involves the conduct of political and socio-economic reforms to address the root causes of insurgency and win the hearts and minds of the people, while the "right-hand" response involves the conduct of offensive operations that directly contribute to the decisive defeat of the insurgents and the dismantling of their politico-military infrastructures. These offensive operations include diplomatic, political, intelligence, psychological and military offensive. b. Strategy of "Total Approach"

The National Peace and Development Plan has adopted the Strategy of "Total Approach". Its holistic approach to effectively address armed conflicts in the country consists of a security component, a political component and a socio-economic component. The security component directly addresses violent conflicts, the political component seeks to tap the full cooperation of local government units and civil society to promote good governance and local peace initiatives, while the socioeconomic component focuses on ways and means to eradicate/alleviate poverty. c. AFP ISO Campaign Plan "BALANGAI"

This is the implementation of the National Peace and Development Plan and consistent with the National Strategy of "Total Approach" and the Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop Methodology prescribed in the national plan. It envisions the clearing of barangays one after the other by simultaneously and decisively defeating CPP/NPA armed groups, dismantling LCM politico-military infrastructures and more importantly Winning the Hears and Minds of the People. The SOT concept is applied in dismantling the politico-military structure of the enemy and employs the TRIAD of intelligence, combat and psychological operations as separate weapons system to decisively defeat its armed groups. III. COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY A. RD's INTENT:

The primary intent of the PRO 8 leadership is to have all the PNP

Offices and units consistently and vigorously perform our tasks as mandated by RA 8551 and further provided in EO 110. The Police Provincial Offices and other tasked PNP Units shall be employed accordingly to help support the AFP neutralize the LCM regionwide. This way, the armed components, the infrastructures, and the political machinery of the CPP/NPA/NDF will be dismantled by the government. PRO 8 likewise intend to have the organization help Local Government Units (LGUs) re-establish or strengthen government authority and control over insurgency-affected barangays, and have linkages with other security and development agencies and organizations to help attain the aims of the National Peace and Development Plan of the government. In so doing the PNP PRO 8 would be able to effectively implement and succeed in this campaign plan as the PNP will be greatly involved in harnessing all government resources in the fight against insurgency and its root causes. B. OBJECTIVES: 1. Broad Objective

The PNP PRO 8, in strengthening its participation and involvement in the government's peace and development machinery and concurrent with its statutory functions and mandate through Executive Order 110, shall support the AFP in ISO for the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security and to perform its tasks in the National Peace and Development Plan. 2. Specific Objectives

a. To develop the capability of field units to fully operationalize this ISO support plan for the government and the AFP in particular. b. To support the AFP in the isolation of the underground infrastructure and front organizations of the insurgents in the towns and cities form the general population. c. groups. d. insurgents. e. To support the governments' National Peace and Development Plan to include the Peace and Reconciliation plan. C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: 1. Strategic Concept To enhance the conduct of legal offensive against the To enhance intelligence activities against threat

a. The PNP shall basically support the AFP's ISO Campaign Plan "Balangai" through the conduct of limited internal security operations, sustained law enforcement and PCR activities, intensive information gathering and the conduct of investigation and prosecution of ISO related cases.

b. The PNP campaign plan shall also follow the ClearHold-Support operational methodology as herein indicated in support to the integration efforts of the military and other civilian agencies of the government as envisioned in the NPDP and the strategy of "Total Approach". The CLEAR Stage shall involve the conduct of combat, Intelligence and Psychological operations as separate weapons systems to directly lead to the destruction of the insurgent armed groups. The end state of this phase is dismantled LCM politico-military infrastructure in the affected barangays and the decisive defeat of the main enemy armed groups in the targeted guerilla fronts. The PNP will support the AFP who is primarily responsible for the Clear Stage.

The HOLD Stage shall involve the utilization of the territorial defense forces to limit the freedom of action and movement of the CPP/NPA, limit its access to resources and reduce mass base support to the CPP/NPA/NDF. This phase shall have the following end state. Integrated Area/Community Public Safety Plan (IA/CPSP) is organized and established, in order to protect the people, defend communities and secure vital assets and installations. The PNP will be primarily responsible for the Hold Stage in areas which are turned over to the PNP or where there are no AFP units assigned. However, other areas, specially in those areas where AFP units are present or where AFP supervises CAFGU then the IA/CPSP is responsible.
The SUPPORT Stage is a "work in progress:. It shall involve police support to consolidation and development activities of other agencies of government. The PNP within its capability shall play a supportive role in these activities, including but not limited to the conduct of medical and dental civic action, adult literacy programs and providing security in support and in coordination with AFP to civil government agencies in their delivery of basic services in far-flung and strife-torn area. The Consolidation Stage aims to strengthen government control and authority in contested barangays and develop the capability of local officials to effectively govern their barangays. This stage has the following end-state:

1) Government authority and control in contested areas reestablished or strengthened. 2) 3) and consolidated; and 4) enhanced.

Government services delivered. Counter-organizations further expanded Mass support for the government is

The Development Stage has the following for 1) Root causes of insurgency effectively

its end state: addressed, and

2) Political and socio-economic planned at the beginning of the campaign are sustained.

reforms

c. The overlapping and interrelated phases of this methodology may be conducted simultaneously or sequentially depending on the prevailing situation in the targeted area. The efforts of the PNP shall focus in supporting the AFP on the Clearing and Holding phases, and within the local unit capability they shall provide appropriate support to local government units and other concerned agencies in the Consolidation and Development Phase. d. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to accomplish an ISO-related mission. This principal thrust requires the PNP, military and the civil government agencies to work cohesively, and to unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing insurgency. The role of the police aside from supporting the AFP in neutralizing the insurgent politico-military infrastructure is to help create a physically and psychologically secured environment conducive for socioeconomic development.

2.

Operational Concept

a. PNP PRO 8, through its directorial staff, shall supervise and support the Police Provincial Offices in implementing the strategic agenda and operational concept of this counter-insurgency strategy. The PRO 8 leadership, through the RLECC, the RDCC and the RPOC, shall coordinate and cooperate with other regional government agencies in the realization of the intent of this counter-insurgency strategy. b. The Police Provincial Offices, through city/municipal police stations and PMGs shall implement their localized counter insurgency plans based on this master plan. Their plan shall be focused towards the implementation of localized activities to attain: (1) development of the capabilities of field units to support the AFT in the resolution of ISO problem; (2) isolation of the underground infrastructure and front organizations of insurgents in towns and cities from the general population; (3) enhancement of intelligence activities against threat groups; and (4) enhancement of legal offensive against the insurgents. c. The Police Regional Mobile Group 8 (PRMG 8) is designated as the reserve mobile/strike unit of PRO 8. It shall be deployed/committed to support the PPOs as situation warrants and/or upon request. d. The PNP National Support Units (NSUs), through their specialized operating units and various regional/provincial offices, shall assist/support the local police units in the conduct of ISO related activities in accordance with their mandated mission and functions. e. Role of PNP and AFP on Enemy Affected Barangays particularly in areas with guerilla fronts. Influenced Infiltrated Threatened

AFP (Diminishing Scope) PNP (Expanding Scope)

As shown in the above schematic diagram, the AFP takes the primary responsibility in responding to affected areas, particularly in areas with very active and active guerilla fronts. In these areas, the AFP will seek to dismantle/neutralize the insurgent political and armed components by mobile battalions of a tasked unit applying the Special Operations Team (SOT) concept and the TRIAD concept of Intelligence. In built-up areas not affected by insurgency, including cities and urban center, the PNP takes the lead role. It shall continue its normal police functions, such as the enhancement of law enforcement activities, maintenance of peace and order to ensure public safety intensified intelligence, police community relation activities and other related police operations. f. In areas where the AFP due to its limited resources, cannot physically occupy or adequately secure an area, and where PNP units are present or available, the PNP within its capability shall initially provide security in the area until AFP reinforcements shall have arrived. However, in areas where there is preponderance of AFP forces or where it is declared by MOA/policy that they are the OPR, the PNP shall, through the conduct of limited combat support operations assist the AFP mainly because the police personnel to be committed on this aspect are the same personnel that are performing law enforcement functions. On the ground, the Provincial Directors and Chiefs of Police are enjoined to enter into memorandum of understanding with their AFP counterparts purposely to delineate and define their respective responsibilities/tasks and command relationship based on their capabilities, limitations and the prevailing threat situation and within the limits of the MOA set by DILG/PNP and DND AFP. PNP PRO 8 through the PPOs/CPO and MPS shall undertake the following specific activities during the Clearing and Holding Phases of the operational Methodology.
g.

1) following:

Operations

This

shall

focus

on

the

1.1) Conduct of population and resource control/ denial measures depending upon the prevailing situation and legal consideration, such as but not limited to the establishment of checkpoints and roadblock, employment of overt and covert population surveillance, screening and controlling of displaced persons in the affected areas. 1.2) Deployment of police visibility patrols in rear areas to prevent the entry/incursion of the enemy in threatened/conflict areas. 1.3) Conduct of limited police operations such as ambush, raid, clearing and other similar operations depending upon the capability and limitation of forces and threat situation on the ground.

1.4) Implementation of the crime prevention and suppression programs provided for in LOI Sandigan-Milenyo. 1.5) Intensification of the preventive and proactive measures and guidelines set forth in LOI AGAP dated October 16, 2000. 1.6) Provision of appropriate security measures to government vital installations/facilities, defense of communities and protection of the people from insurgent terroristic actions. 1.7) Conduct holding operations in areas cleared by the AFP forces to protect the community from possible enemy depredations and terroristic activities, with the support of CAFGUs, CVOs and the local government units upon request of, or in coordination with local AFP. 1.8) Operationalization of the Integrated Area/ Community Public Safety Plan (IA/CPSP) through close coordination with the Local Government Units, Local Peace and Order Councils, Law Enforcement and Disaster Coordinating Councils, in order that it shall appropriate serve as the unified and integrated direction of the local public safety programs and create an active shield against the problems associated with internal security. 1.9) Strengthen the various programs for public safety and internal security.
2)

Intelligence Operations: This shall focus on intensive and sustained groups and monitor their

the following: 2.1) Conduct intelligence gathering to identify threat movements, plans/activities etc.

2.2) Conduct of special projects and case operations to neutralize or negate insurgent leadership, logistics fund support, plans and terroristic activities, safe houses and other support facilities. 2.3) Intensify counter intelligence operations to detect and neutralize enemy infiltration, sabotage and subversion, in coordination with the intelligence units of the AFP and other law enforcement agencies.
3)

Police Community Relations - This shall

focus on the following: 3.1) Conduct public information campaign that would reduce the influence of the insurgent on the populace through the tri-media. 3.2) Implement measures to gain, preserve and strengthen civilian support for the programs of the government in counter-insurgency.

3.3) Support the comprehensive, integrated and holistic peace process of the Government pursuant to Executive Order No. 3 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on February 28, 2001. 3.4) Maintain a databank of issues against the insurgents and develop positive issues for the PNP and AFP for media exploitation. 3.5) Conduct civic action, information drives, dialogues, livelihood projects, civil assistance and development, and other allied PCR activities designed to win back the enemy mass base.
4)

Legal Offensive Activities: This shall involve

the following: 4.1) Provide efficient and well-coordinated investigation documentation and prosecution of all ISO related cases, in coordination with the DND/AFP, DOJ and the Commission on Human Rights. 4.2) Sustain the filing of ISO related cases and follow-up the prosecution of cases in court against the insurgents. In the Consolidation and Development Phases, the activities are as follows:
h.

1) Assist the Local Government Units (LGUs) and concerned civil government agencies in the strengthening and consolidating control and authority over targeted barangays/areas pursuant to the strategic concept laid down in the NPDP. 2) Provide/extend appropriate security coverage to civil government agencies, local government units, NGA, NGOs and Gos in the delivery of basic services and development projects to the community during the consolidation and development phases. 3) Participate in, and support the Local Chief Executives (LCEs) in the selection process of the Civilian Volunteer Organizations (Bantay Bayan/Kababayan). 4) Intensify intelligence gathering.

5) Ensure that the Integrated Area/Community Public Safety Plan (IA/CPSP) is fully operationalize in coordination with the local government units. i. Counter-organization effort insurgents/secessionists above ground organizations. against

Counter-organization such as the CVOs/Bantay Bayan/Kababayan and CAFGUs are organized in barangays that have been de-influenced or cleared from enemy control. The CAFGUs and CVOs/Bantay Bayan/Kababayan shall, during the holding phase, augment the PNP for territorial defense in order to free the AFP maneuver forces to go on all offensive. The CVOs shall

help mobilize the people to support the government, the police and the military against the insurgents. Another important element of counter-organization is the setting-up of people's organizations and cooperatives in the cleared barangays for various livelihood projects and community-based reforestation (when appropriate). The people's organization (POs) and Cooperatives can also serve as the nuclei for rural economic development and environmental protection to be orchestrated by concerned government agencies under the baton of the governor or mayor. j. Organization of CVOs for ISO Support

The CVO is an overt but unarmed component of the Local Defense Organization. They are directly under the control and supervision of the local chief executives who shall be assisted by the local police and/or military elements in the community. The PCR elements of PNP units/offices in collaboration with the local officials, recruit volunteers to become members of the CVOs from all sectors of society such as peasants, workers, students, professionals, businessman, religious sectors, out of school youth and others. The CVOs shall among others perform the following tasks in support of the police and the military in the area: 1) 2) watch activities. 3) information. 4) in cases of emergency. 5) Support and assist in the identification and implementation of community development projects, and 6) Perform other related tasks. Assist in providing safety and security services Assist in the dissemination of public Collect intelligence reports. Conduct ronda and similar neighborhood

k. Conduct of regular meetings of Coordinating Councils to plan, monitor, supervise and revitalize ISO government efforts. Government fora such as the peace and order councils, development councils, and the disaster coordinating centers and area coordinating centers are excellent venues or facilities through which various government programs are discussed and facilitated. Concerned PNP units are therefore directed to actively participate in the activities of these bodies for the attainment of a revitalized internal security support operations to the AFP and the government as a whole.

l. Joint IRR to EO 110

The operationalization of the DILG/PNP and DND/AFP

The core objective of the Joint IRR is to delineate the roles and responsibilities of the PNP and AFP in the implementation of the provisions of EO 110 in the areas of Operations, Intelligence, Police Community Relations and Investigation of ISO related cases and other related activities. Likewise, it set forth the concept in Internal Security Operations to be conducted jointly by the AFP with the PNP in the support role in order to preserve the internal security of the State against insurgents and other serious threats to national security. Relatedly, the Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop operational methodology shall be applied to carry out the integrated and focused effort of the military, police, the entire government machinery and the NGOs, Gos, POs in addressing insurgency as outlined in the National Peace and Development Plan and the Strategy of Total Approach. D. TASKS:

In furtherance of the intent and purpose of this Plan the following shall also be undertaken by offices/units concerned:
1. DRDO - Command Group Supervisor, responsible in the successful implementation of this Master Plan. 2.

ROPD a) Monitor the progress and development of this

campaign plan. b) Coordinate/work closely with the Joint AFP-PNP Secretariat on Internal Security Coordinating System (ISCS) for the continuous evaluation and assessment of internal security condition of the region. c) Prioritize the deployment of PRMG operating units to critical areas, especially when there are more critical areas than the available operating units. d) Monitor the operationalization of the Integrated Area/Community Public Safety Plan (IA/CPSP). e) Generate and maintain additional reserve elements from available personnel at PRO 8 Headquarters. f)
3.

Perform other tasks as directed.

RPHRDD -

a) Fill-up personnel strength of all mobile forces in accordance with the staffing pattern. b) Recommend the replacement and/or reshuffle of field commanders when necessary.

c) Prioritize the distribution of recruitment quota to areas where the AFP is not present. d) Come-up with policies and guidelines on the proper selection of key positions in insurgency affected areas. e) tasked units. f) Supervise the SCOUT Training of all mobile forces. Supervise and monitor the training activities of

g) Direct and supervise the training to improve police investigative techniques. h) Continue to conduct personnel of the mobile forces are trained. i)
4.

SCOUT

Training

until

all

Perform other tasks as directed.

RIID a) Provide policy direction to PPOs in their intelligence the conduct of intelligence and CI and

efforts. b) Intensify operations in support of the AFP.

c) Provide timely and estimates of the situation to all tasked units. d) requirements. Assess continuously

relevant the

intelligence

intelligence

priority

e) Supervise the PPOs in their investigation efforts and in the service of warrants of arrest against DT personalities. f) Monitor and follow-up the cases filed against the insurgents in the proper court and/or at the Commission on Human Rights. g) Supervise the PPOs and other units/offices in the implementation of the legal offensive. h)
5.

tasked

PNP

Perform other tasks as directed.

RLD -

a) Allocate and re-allocate vehicles, firearms and communication facilities based on criticality of the area and threat situation. b) Plan for requirement of tasked units. and support the additional logistical

c) Conduct continuous research on organizational and individual equipment that may be appropriate for use in ISO.

d) Conduct continuous evaluation on the existing organizational and individual equipment for usefulness, serviceability and applicability in ISO. e)
6.

Perform other tasks as directed.

RPCRD a) Plan, develop and supervise the PCR activities of

tasked units. b) Assist the PPOs in the establishment of effective inter-agency linkages with concerned government units and NGOs. c) Develop and pursue PCR activity design to gain the support and cooperation of the populace on the government. d) Conduct civic action, information drives, dialogues and counter propaganda using the print and broadcast media to discredit and isolate the threat group politico-military hierarchy. e) Conduct series of coordination with other government agencies and NGOs for possible support in conjunction with the implementation of this plan. f) Assist PPOs in the processing of the threat group's members who will avail of the amnesty and balik-baril programs. g)
7.

Perform other tasks as directed/requested.

RCD a) b) Provide additional fund requirements of tasked units. Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

8.

All PDs & CD OCPO -

The main implementors of this Master Plan, thus you are directed to perform the following subject of the MOA with the AFP, PNP priority for Anti-Crime, available PNP resources, threat level and other local considerations: a) Conduct limited internal security operations, gathering of information and PCR activities in support to the AFP. b) Re-deploy forces, firearms, communication equipment to address the enemy threat. vehicles and

c) Determine own "force-mix" in the deployment of forces for ISO and law enforcement, giving more emphasis to the identified primary thrust or local areas.

d) Coordinate closely with the AFP Area Commanders within your respective AORs in the conduct of internal security operations. e) See to it that all MPS have IA/CPSP's and COPS Plans and are fully implemented. f) Strengthen the organization of COPs and/or organize new ones in cleared areas in respective AORs to bolster the existing IA/CPSP. g) present. h) Coordinate closely with Peace and Order Council/ Development Coordinating Council (POCs/DCC) on other activities that require the active participation of civilian agencies and the private sector. i) Render quarterly report on the Internal Security Condition (ISC) of cities/municipalities within your respective jurisdiction j)
9.

Prepare to conduct ISO in areas where no AFP are

Perform other tasks on orders.

PRMG 8 a) Act as the primary mobile force of PNP PRO 8.

b) Sustain training and retraining of personnel for ISO to maintain the highest level of tactical proficiency. c) Sustain and enhance the security of vital installations and VIPs from atrocities. d)
10.

Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

ASG 8 a) Maintain and enhance the serviceability of primary

air assets. b) Prioritize the allocation of flights for an efficient delivery of air support to ISO. c) Establish, communications system. maintain and improve air-to-ground

d) Conduct a sustained training on the operation and deployment of air assets as a measure to maintain the highest level of air tactical proficiency in support to ISO. e)
11.

Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

RMO 8 a) Maintain and enhance the serviceability of primary

maritime assets.

b) Prioritize the allocation of materials for an efficient delivery of Maritime support to ISO. c) Maintain communications system. and improve ship-to-ground

d) Conduct a sustained training on the operation and deployment of watercrafts. e)

Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

RIO 8 gathering and intelligence

a) Intensify information operations against CPP/NPA/NDF. b) units. c)

Provide timely intelligence information to tasked Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

CIDG 8 build-up and other

a) Assist PPOs in the case documentation against CPP/NPA/NDF personalities. b) c)

Provide investigation teams to other tasked units. Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

RCEO 8 a) Provide additional communication requirements to Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

tasked units. b)

15.

All other NSUs -

a) Assist and support the ISO of PPOs in conformity with their respective area of interest or field of expertise. b) E. Continue to perform your respective missions.

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Respect for human rights shall be paramount, and strict adherence with the PNP Operational Procedures (Revised Rules of Engagement) shall always be emphasized in all police operations. 2. All PNP units shall re-assess respective resources and capabilities. All IMPLANs and SOPs, shall be updated to conform with this master plan.

3. Tasked units shall operate on the existing logistical and financial allocations. PNP PRO 8 shall provide additional logistical and financial support on a case-to-case basis. 4. Maximum coordination with local government agencies/units, non-government organizations and all sectors of the community, for the success of the anti-crime strategy, is authorized and highly encouraged. 5. In order to ensure uniformity in adopting/implementing the COPS and IA/CPSP concepts, all chiefs of police/police supervisors implementing them must always be guided by the "Community-Oriented Policing System (COPS) Manual for the PNP" issued thru NAPOLCOM Resolution Nr 2000-157 dated October 31, 2000 and IA/CPSP guidelines and requirements. This Master Plan shall supersede PNP LOI 41/96 CAMPAIGN PLAN SANDUGO III (PNP Counter Insurgency Strategy). However, all applicable
6.

issuances, MOUs/MOAs not in conflict with this Master Plan are still in effect.

7. All PDs, CD OCPO and Chiefs, NSUs shall submit IMPLANs to this Plan and periodic reports on its implementation. 8. This Master Plan shall take effect upon approval.

F.

COMMAND & SIGNAL:

a. Command: PRO 8 Operation Center: Regional Operations and Plans Division, Camp Kangleon, Palo, Leyte. Tel. No. 323-3023 and Fax No. 323-7267 or e-mail at ropd@moscom.com . b. Signal: Current CEOI in effect. NARDITO IBUOS YORO Police Chief Superintendent Regional Director Distribution: All Tasked Units
LOI 40-2001 SANDUGO/Plans