This document outlines the syllabus for an introductory game theory course taught at Lahore University of Management Sciences. The course is 4 credit hours and will meet twice a week for 110 minute lectures and once a week for a 60 minute tutorial. Grading will be based on quizzes, assignments, a midterm exam, and a final exam. Over the course of 28 sessions, topics will range from the foundations of game theory to applications like repeated games, bargaining, and incomplete information. The goal is for students to understand both the methodology of game theory and its applications in economics, especially for strategic decision making.
This document outlines the syllabus for an introductory game theory course taught at Lahore University of Management Sciences. The course is 4 credit hours and will meet twice a week for 110 minute lectures and once a week for a 60 minute tutorial. Grading will be based on quizzes, assignments, a midterm exam, and a final exam. Over the course of 28 sessions, topics will range from the foundations of game theory to applications like repeated games, bargaining, and incomplete information. The goal is for students to understand both the methodology of game theory and its applications in economics, especially for strategic decision making.
This document outlines the syllabus for an introductory game theory course taught at Lahore University of Management Sciences. The course is 4 credit hours and will meet twice a week for 110 minute lectures and once a week for a 60 minute tutorial. Grading will be based on quizzes, assignments, a midterm exam, and a final exam. Over the course of 28 sessions, topics will range from the foundations of game theory to applications like repeated games, bargaining, and incomplete information. The goal is for students to understand both the methodology of game theory and its applications in economics, especially for strategic decision making.
This document outlines the syllabus for an introductory game theory course taught at Lahore University of Management Sciences. The course is 4 credit hours and will meet twice a week for 110 minute lectures and once a week for a 60 minute tutorial. Grading will be based on quizzes, assignments, a midterm exam, and a final exam. Over the course of 28 sessions, topics will range from the foundations of game theory to applications like repeated games, bargaining, and incomplete information. The goal is for students to understand both the methodology of game theory and its applications in economics, especially for strategic decision making.
Instructor Adeel Faheem Room No. 415, CS Department Office Hours 10:30 11-30 am (MW) Email adeel.faheem@lums.edu.pk Telephone Secretary/TA Rida Ayesha TA Office Hours Course URL (if any)
Course Basics Credit Hours 4 Lecture(s) Nbr of Lec(s) Per Week 2 Duration 110 minutes each Recitation/Lab (per week) Nbr of Lec(s) Per Week None Duration NA Tutorial (per week) Nbr of Lec(s) Per Week 1 Duration 60 minutes
Course Distribution Core Elective Yes Open for Student Category Sophomores/Juniors Close for Student Category
COURSE DESCRIPTION Game theory helps us understand situations in which individuals interact. The focus of game theory is interdependence, situations in which an entire group of people is affected by the choices made by every individual within that group. It provides a set of analytical tools to understand and consequently predict behaviour in multi-person decision settings. This course introduces students to the study of this area. No prior knowledge of the subject is assumed. It exposes students to some basic concepts of game theory and explains how these concepts can be used to model a wide variety of game theoretic structures.
The course will be important for all students planning to take Industrial Organization and Advanced Microeconomic courses, and for those planning to pursue graduate studies in economics and business.
COURSE PREREQUISITE(S)
Old [Microeconomics 1 ( Econ 211) , Probability/Probability and Statistics] New [ Principles of Microeconomics AND statistics and Data Analysis)
COURSE OBJECTIVES
To understand a new subject like Game theory and its methodology. To learn application of Game theory in economics especially the strategic behavior of economic agents like firms and consumers.
Yes/No: Yes Combine/Separate: Separate Duration: In class Preferred Date: Exam Specifications: Closed books and closed notes; no help sheet allowed; no formula sheet allowed; calculators allowed.
Final Exam
Yes/No: Yes Combine/Separate: Separate Duration: In class Exam Specifications: Closed books and closed notes; no help sheet allowed; no formula sheet allowed; calculators allowed.
COURSE OVERVIEW Week/ Lecture/ Module Topics Recommended Readings Session 1 Introduction to Game Theory Session 2 First Look at Applications and Theory Chapter1 and 2 Session 3 Strategic Form and Dominant Strategies Chapter 3 Session 4 Dominance Solvability Chapter 4 Session 5 Nash Equilibrium Chapter 5 Session 6 Cournot Duopoly and Cartel Solution Chapter 6 Session 7 Quiz 1: Assignmment 1 Due Mixed Strategies Chapter 8 Session 8 Some Applications: War of attrition, auctions Osborne and Watson (handouts) Session 9 Some Applications: War of attrition, auctions Osborne and Watson (handouts) Session 10 Zero Sum Games Chapter 10 Session 11 Extensive Form and Backward Induction Chapter 11 Session 12 Quiz 2: Assignment 2 due Subgame Perfect Analysis Chapter 13 Session 13 Subgame Perfection contd , (Review for midterm) Chapter 13 Session 14 Mid-Term Session 15 Finitely and Infinitely Repeated Games Chapter 14, 15 and Watson 22 Session 16 Finitely and Infinitely Repeated Games Chapter 14, 15 and Watson 22 Session 17 Finitely and Infinitely Repeated Games Chapter 14, 15 and Watson 22 Session 18 Bayesian Games Chapter 9 Osborne Session 19 Bayesian Games Chapter 9 Osborne Session 20 Quiz 3: Assignment 3 due Bargaining Games Chapter 16 Osborne Session 21 Bargaining Games Chapter 16 Osborne Session 22 Rationalizablity Osborne Ch. 12 Session 23 Moral Hazard and Incentives Chapter 19 (19.1, 19.2, 19.3) Session 24 Quiz 4: Assignment 4 due Incomplete Information Chapter 20 (20.1) Session 25 Incomplete Information Chapter 20 (20.2) Session 26 Trade with incomplete information Chapter 27 (Watson)
Lahore University of Management Sciences
Session 27 Job Market signaling and reputation Chapter 29 (Watson) Session 28 Review and Discussion
Textbook(s)/Supplementary Readings 1) Dutta, Prajit K. (1999) Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice. The MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts. Text:
2) The main text will be: Dixit, Avinash, Susan Skeath, and David H. Reiley, Jr. 2009. Games of Strategy, W.W Norton & Company, Inc. For reference you can consult: 3) Watson, Joel. 2002. An Introduction to Game Theory 4) Osborne, Martin J. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford University Press. 5) Gibbons R. (1992) Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey. A bit advanced but an excellent applied text.