Summary: Project Location Reservoir and Underground Power House
Summary: Project Location Reservoir and Underground Power House
Summary: Project Location Reservoir and Underground Power House
1. Project Description
Project Location
1.1 Background
Electricity demand in India showed rapid growth of as much as an annual average of 5.2%
since 1996. The country, however, has suffered from severe electricity shortages due to
deterioration of the financial condition of state electricity utilities and sluggish private sector
involvement, which has meant that there has not been adequate investment in infrastructure. In
response to this, the Indian Government began to concentrate on the effective utilization of the
generation facilities owned by the central government in each state, the rehabilitation and
modernization of existing power generation plants to secure energy production and to cope with
peak demand, the development of new generation facilities with foreign assistance, and the
improvement of transmission and distribution networks.
The northern electricity grid of India extends to Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana,
Himachal Pradesh, Jammu Kashmir and the National Capital Territory of Delhi 1 , where
electricity deficit has been as severe as anywhere in the entire country. Against 19,240 MW at
peak demand, the electricity supply remained at 12,455 MW (64.8%) in 1993 2. The electricity
supply in the same year was 90,106 GWh against the required amount of 102,416 GW (a
shortage of 12%). Coping with the growing energy demand thus required immediate action
from the Indian Government.
Part of Uttar Pradesh State became an independent state called Uttaranchal in 2000, which was later renamed as
Uttarakhand. As of 2011, Uttarakhand State and the Union Territory of Chandigarh are among those connected in
the northern grid.
2
The Indian fiscal year starts in April and ends in March.
Electricity (GWh)
Northern
129,587
24,234
Western
121,159
19,587
Southern
103,191
18,150
Eastern
56,011
10,254
North-Eastern
6,169
1,388
157
43
Islands
Country
416,274
Source: Central Electricity Authority. 14th Electric Power Survey (1991)
73,656
According to the data provided by NHPC, electricity demand and peak demand in the
northern region continued to increase (Figure 1). Power demand reached 245,137 GWh in
2010/11 while peak demand reached 37,431 MW. The power supply on the other hand saw a
deficit of as much as 16,958.8 GWh (6.93%) and peak power lacked 3,360 MW (8.92%). Out
of power demand, 31% was for domestic consumers, 29% for industrial consumers, 22% for
agricultural consumers, 10% for manufacturing consumers, and 8% for others.
Electricity (GWh)
300,000
60,000
Peak Electricity Demand
250,000
50,000
200,000
40,000
Electricity Supply
150,000
30,000
100,000
20,000
50,000
10,000
0
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
0
10 Fiscal Year
Source: NHPC.
Adding thermal power generation to the existing installed capacity was suggested at 58,644 MW in the Eleventh
Five Year Plan.
10
Uttarakhand, Jammu Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh are states where hydro power has a large share among all
generation sources.
11
Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-2012), Volume III.
Hydro
MW
Thermal
%
MW
Nuclear
%
MW
Total
Renewable
15,122.8 28.04
32,791.8 60.81
1,620.0 3.00
MW
MW
4,391.4
8.14
53,925.9
100.00
Western
7,447.5 11.57
47,196.8 73.29
1,840.0 2.86
7,910.0 12.28
64,394.2
100.00
Southern
11,338.0 21.50
28,512.6 54.06
1,320.0 2.50
11,569.3 21.94
52,739.9
100.00
Eastern
3,882.1 14.77
22,005.1 83.71
0.0 0.00
398.7
1.52
26,285.9
100.00
North-Eastern
1,200.0 48.88
1,026.9 41.83
0.0 0.00
228.0
9.29
2,454.9
100.00
6.1
8.01
76.1
100.00
24,503.5 12.26
199,877.0
100.00
0.00
70.0 91.99
0.0 0.00
Country
38,990.4 19.51
Source: Central Electricity Authority.
Islands
0.0
131,603.2 65.84
4,780.0 2.39
production almost reached the estimated amount, except in 2006/07 and 2008/09. Net energy
production exceeded the estimated amount except for the above two years. According to
NHPC, the reason for lower achievement than the estimate in 2006/07 and 2008/09 was that
there were forced outages due to problems with main inlet valve of turbines in 2006/07, while in
2008/09 there was less inflow in the river. In any case, planned production was almost
achieved every year.
Table 3: Major Operation and Effect Indicators
2005/06(1)
Indicator
Gross Electric
Estimate (2)
energy Production
Actual
(GWh per year)
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/1
2011/12(1)
279.00
1,191.75
1,197.10
1,191.75
1,155.00
1,144.56
1,151.68
314.93
1,093.95
1,186.00
1,116.59
1,134.35
1,134.45
982.00
1,110.00
1,110.00
1,110.00
1,110.00
1,110.00
1,110.00
1,110.00
313.99
1,089.14
1,173.52
1,103.70
1,124.04
1,117.43
967.44
Estimate
Maximum
Output
Estimate
280
280
280
280
280
280
280
Actual
280
280
280
280
280
280
280
Plant Load
Capacity Factor
(%)
Estimate
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
26.32
45.06
48.74
46.01
46.74
46.75
N/A
94.79
94.79
91.59
92.93
86.97
87.00
93.74
Availability
Factor (3) (%)
Actual
Actual
Estimate
(2)
Actual
97.83
77.27
92.71
89.85
92.62
92.15
99.51
Source: NHPC.
Note 1: Figures for 2005 were collected from 1 October 2005 to 31 March 2006, and those for 2011 from 1 April to
the end of October 2011.
Note 2: NHPC sets estimated figures for gross electric energy production and availability factor.
Note 3: Plant Load Factor = Net Electric energy Production / (Maximum Output X Hours per Year) X 100
Availability Factor = (Operation Hours per Year / Hours per Year)
The maximum output met the figures planned every year, and the plant load factor almost
reached or exceeded the planned figures. The availability factor also almost reached the target
except in 2006. The figures for the most recent two years were 92.62% in 2009/10 and
92.15% in 2010/11. According to the NHPC annual report, the average availability factor
among all hydroelectric power plants owned by NHPC was 84.1% in 2009/10 and 85.2% in
2010/11. Those for Dhauliganga Power Station far exceeded these.
The total unplanned outage hours from 2007/08 to 2009/10 remained within the estimated
hours (Table 4). Electric energy production reached around 90% of the estimate every year
(Table 3) and exceeded the designed figure (1,134 GWh per year), so there has been no major
effect seen on the operation of the power plant.
The major reasons for forced outages were mechanical failures: the non-opening of the
wicket gate of the francis-type turbine 16 , malfunction of resistance temperature detectors
(RTDs) 17, and shear pin failure 18. There were no unplanned outages due to human errors or
other factors.
16
Spiral shaped inlet at the entry of the francis turbine. This adjusts the amount of water flow by changing the degree
of openness to allow efficient turbine operation.
17
Wire wound and thin film devices that measure temperature. The hotter they become, the larger or higher the value
of their electrical resistance.
18
A safety device designed to shear in the case of a mechanical overload preventing other parts from being damaged.
Indicators
Unplanned
Outage Hours
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
Estimate
(2006)
2009/10
2011/12(1)
2010/1
Actual
100 hrs/year
200.31
777.04
92.20
82.30
86.07
130.59
250.35
90 hrs/year
200.31
777.04
92.20
82.30
86.07
130.59
250.35
Mechanical
Others
10 hrs/year
Planned
Outage Hours
Estimate(2)
Although the total outage hours far exceeded the plan from 2005/06 to 2008/09, they have
been lower than estimate since 2009/10 (Table 4). This did not affect the amount of energy
production. Major reasons for the planned outages were the annual maintenance of four units
of generation facilities, less demand for power generation during the dry season, miscellaneous
maintenance of breakdown equipment / parts and silt flushing of the reservoir every 15 days
during the monsoon period. In some years the replacement of equipment parts was also among
the reasons for planned outages.
The total volume of water inflow to the reservoir of the Dhauliganga Power Station
remained at approximately 70 to 90% of the estimates (Table 5). The hydro utilization factor
stayed at 64.9% (2010/11) to 84.55% (2009/10) against the estimate (61.26%). There has been
no major effect up to now, and the annual energy production has almost been achieved.
The volume of silt in the reservoir was beyond estimate in 2006/07 and 2007/08, but has
remained only 10% of the estimate since 2009/10. According to NHPC, the sharp decline in
sedimentation since 2009/10 results from successful implementation of the catchment area
treatment works, soil conservation works, river bank protection works, check-dam construction
etc. (which were planned at the beginning of project design) together with a reduction of
deforestation though improvements in local peoples traditional ways of living and means of
making a livelihood. Silt reduction in the reservoir is essential to secure full functioning
power plants and electric energy production, which significantly contributes to the project
sustainability.
Table 5: River Water Flow, Hydro utilization Factor and Sedimentation in the Reservoir
Indicators
Annual Total
Estimate(2)
Volume of Inflow to
the Reservoir
Actual
(m3 / year)
2005/06(1)
2,546.50
2006/07
2007/08
2,546.50 2,546.50
2008/09
2,546.50
2009/10
2010/11 2011/12(1)
2,546.50 2,546.50 2,546.50
258.57
2,202.33
2,224.86
2,170.33
1,865.75
2,430.65
N/A
(2)
Hydro Utilization Estimate
(3)
Factor (%)
Actual
Volume of
Estimate(2)
N/A
N/A
N/A
61.26
69.08
300,000
61.26
74.13
300,000
61.26
71.53
300,000
61.26
84.55
300,000
61.26
64.90
300,000
61.26
66.86
300,00
Sedimentation in the
Reservoir
(m3 / year)
N/A
410,000
340,000
180,000
30,000
30,000
N/A
Actual
Source: NHPC.
Note 1: Figures for 2005 were collected from 5 November 2005 (start of commercial operation of all four generation
units) to 31 March 2006, and those for 2011 from 1 April to the end of October 2011.
Note 2: NHPC sets estimated figures.
Note 3: hydro utilization factor = Net electric energy production / electric energy which could have been generated
during the particular year 100
3.3 Impact
3.3.1 Intended Impacts
(1) Impact on Economic Development such as Employment Creation in the Northern Region
Figure 2 shows the per capita net state 100,000
INR
domestic product (NSDP) at constant prices
90,000
and the per capita national net domestic
product (NNDP).
Delhi, Chandigarh,
80,000
Haryana, Uttarakhand are among the fastest
70,000
growing economies in the region. The per
60,000
capita NSDP of Uttarakhand, where the
Dhauliganga Power Station is located, was
50,000
24,740 rupees, which was almost same as
40,000
NNDP (24,143 rupees). This grew as much
30,000
as 41,126 rupees in 2009/10, which far larger
than NNDP (33,731 rupees).
20,000
However, as described in the above 3.2.2,
10,000
the installed capacity of the Dhauliganga
Year
Power Station had a share of 0.86% in
0
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10
2005/06 and 0.62% in 2009/10, and therefore
HARYANA
HIMACHAL PRADESH
the impact in the northern region has been
JAMMU & KASHMIR
PUNJAB
RAJASTHAN
UTTAR PRADESH
limited.
UTTARAKHAND
CHANDIGARH
The electric energy produced at the
DELHI
ALL-INDIA
Dhauliganga Power Station is supplied to the Source: Reserved Bank of India. Handbook of Statistics
Bareilly 400 kV Substation 19 in Uttar
on Indian Economy 2010-2011 (2011).
Pradesh which is 233 km away through two
Figure 2: Per Capita Net State Domestic
double circuit lines (Figure 3). One of the
Product at Factor Cost - State-wise
two lines is connected to the Pithoragarh 220
(At Constant Prices)
kV Substation at a point 59 km from the
power station, but as of December 2011, the
substation had not yet started supplying electricity directly to the Pithoragarh District since the
PGCIL had not completed the extension of transmission lines to reach the Pithoragarh 132 kV
S/S from which the surrounding people should have received electric energy. The electric
energy therefore goes through Bareilly S/S, Haldwani S/S and other substations to reach entire
northern region including Pithoragarh. It is therefore not possible to see the degree of the
projects contribution to the Uttarakhand State itself.
The impact on economic development such as employment creation in the northern region
has thus not been analyzed due to difficulties in measurement.
19
The transmission line between the Dhauliganga Power Station and Bareilly 400 kV Substation was extended by
the Northern India Transmission System Project with the JICA ODA assistance loan of 1996 (disbursed amount:
3,726 million yen). The executing agency was the Power Grid Corporation of India Limited (PGCIL). JICA
conducted an ex-post evaluation for the project in 2008 by employing a third-party evaluator.
CHINA
NEPAL
UTTAR PRADESH
Source: Power System Operation Corporation Ltd., Northern Regional Load Dispatch Centre (2011). Annual Report
2010-2011.
Environment and Forests, there no valuable fauna and flora existed in the project site itself20,
and NHPC and the contractors were aware of the importance of minimizing adverse impacts
on animals and plants during explosion works in the construction period. Contractors
undertook landscaping and restoration works for muck disposal sites and quarry areas, as
stipulated in the contract agreement, both in and around the dam and power house.
Based on the Environmental Action Plan completed by NHPC in March 1995, NHPC
implemented i) a compensatory afforestation scheme, ii) a catchment area treatment plan, and
iii) a rehabilitation & resettlement plan as follows. They also focused on the reduction of silt
sedimentation in the reservoir.
i)
A comparison of the remote sensing data 22 from 1999 and 2004 obtained during the site
survey in this ex-post evaluation indicates that forest areas had rapidly increased in the
catchment area and that soil erosion had been mitigated. Such positive impacts in the
catchment area also had helped reduce the suspended load inflow into the reservoir
consequently.
Forestry activity has been succeeded and integrated into the CSR program for the
Dhauliganga Power Station. Between 2007 and 2011, 32,000 of trees, flowers and fruit trees
have been planted in around the upstream area and in the areas surrounding area of the dam,
powerhouse and colonies from 2007 to 2011.
Confirmed at the first appraisal in 1995, another environmental appraisal was carried out in the third appraisal in
2003. It was then concluded that there was no such protected or endangered species (JICA appraisal documents).
21
Managed by Uttar Pradesh State as Uttarakhand Sate was separated in 2000.
22
Provided by NHPC.
10
dissolved solids, chlorides, Ca, Mg, alkalinity, Nitrate- nitrogen, DO, COD, Iron, and bacteria
etc. There have been no major problems in the water quality tests, and thus no negative
impact has been observed.
(2) Land Acquisition and Resettlement
The total land acquired for the project was 166.7 ha (138.6 ha of forest land and 28.15 ha
of private owned land), and the submergence area was 28.6 ha. 581 families around the
reservoir and dam site were affected in the execution of the project (project affected
households), out of whom 37 were fully affected families for resettlement (22 lost more than
50% of their lands / houses and 15 became houseless).
NHPC was open and shared all manners of information related to these families, and
examined alternatives for the project affected households to choose which type of compensation
they preferred. The local government also extended affirmative actions to the project affected
people. As a result of a long-term comprehensive consultation process, 35 families out of 37
fully affected families for resettlement decided to resettle and rehabilitate their own livelihoods
by themselves and received cash compensation for their land and property. The remaining two
asked NHPC to provide accommodations to their satisfaction. NHPC provided job
opportunities at the Dhauliganga Power Station to 37 members from the 37 families. The
remaining 545 project affected households were provided with compensation for their land and
property through the Land Acquisition Officer of the District. The total amount spent on
compensation amounted to 66.99 million rupees (land: 29.5 million, houses: 17.4 million, fruit
trees: 5.9 million, others: 13.19 million, and registration costs: 20,000 rupees).
The land acquisition and resettlement were executed as planned, and there was no delay to
or effect on the project design caused by social impacts.
NHPC continued CSR activities after the construction was over, to sustain / promote
further communication with project affected people and other people in the local area. Various
assistances have been provided such as scholarships for children, eye camps, river bank
improvement, blankets during wintertime and rice for poor villagers.
(3) Impact on Local People in Downstream of the Dam
A series of local surveys, focus group discussions, in-depth interviews and household
interviews with the project affected people, was conducted in this ex-post evaluation. The
survey outcomes suggested significant positive effects on the affected households and the
community as a whole. Those surveyed reported a significant overall improvement in hygiene
in their living environment, an increase in their income levels through new employment
opportunities given to them, and improvements in their childrens educational environment.
25 of 28 households said that resettlement had had good impact on their lifestyles and
livelihoods, and 16 households felt very comfortable in their new neighborhoods. NHPC says
that they reflect local peoples views and take their opinions into the CSR plan every year.
Consultation is on-going and actions taken when required.
Interview Survey with the Project Affected People
Survey Date: November 2011
Venue: Nigalpani, Chirkela, Tapovan, Jamuka villages of Dharchula town
Survey Method: The survey used household interviews, focus group discussions, and case studies to
gather information.
The main focus of this survey was 37 fully affected and displaced households. However, nine of these
households had moved out of their original villages and could not be reached.
Of the remaining 28 households covered, 18 household members were still employed at NHPC,
while10 households had retired from jobs provided by NHPC. All the project-affected households
11
were well compensated in the form of cash and employment as per the restoration and rehabilitation
commitment of the project. They restored their livelihoods by purchasing new land and building
houses which had the basic infrastructure of LPG and electricity supply facilities ready and available.
Income stream analysis suggested that all 28 households had annual incomes above 300,000 rupees per
annum.
90% of the interviewed households agreed that resettlement has had a good impact on their lifestyle and
livelihood. In the rehabilitation sites, around 60% of households felt very comfortable in their
neighborhoods, and felt very secure while outside their homes. This indicates that project-affected
households felt socially secure in the post-displacement period. Roads in and around the study
villages however are in need of repair.
This project has largely achieved its objectives; therefore its effectiveness is high.
However, there were constraints in evaluating to what extent this project contributed to the
improvement of the electricity supply in the northern grid due to the fact that the installed
capacity of this project made up less than 1% of the total. Adverse impacts on natural and
social environment have remained at a minimum through a series of actions implemented by the
executing agency. There have been positive impacts such as improvements in the natural
environment and in peoples living conditions in the upstream area.
3.4 Efficiency (Rating: )
3.4.1 Project Outputs
The aim of this project was to construct a 280 MW
hydroelectric power station in the Pithoragarh District of
Uttarakhand State. The major planned outputs were:
reservoir (gross storage volume: 6.2 million m3, max
reservoir level: 1,348.5 above sea level), rock-fill dam (max
height above river bed level 56 m, length of dam crest 270
m), spillway with three gated sluices (10 m high X 6 m
wide), river diversion tunnel, headrace tunnel intake
structure, de-silting chamber, surge shaft, pressure shaft,
underground power house (4 X 70 MW with francis type of
turbine, rated net head: 297 m), tailrace tunnel, tailrace
surge gallery, consulting services (117 man/month), and a
Panel of Experts (45 man/month).
Major changes in the actual outputs were of dam type
and the number of gated sluices of the spillway 23. Other
changes were minor ones and most outputs were realized as
Source: Evaluation Study Team
planned.
Picture 1: Spillway
As for the manning schedule of consulting services,
115 man/month was used against the planned 117, in which
consultants conducted technical reviews and the finalization of the bid level of the project and
of the tender documents. NHPC built a project office for supervision with in-house units for
design, construction, quality control and monitoring.
23
The dam type was changed to a concrete faced rock-fill dam mainly because of the physical difficulty in obtaining
construction materials (clay core) around and in the suburbs of the project site, and because of the financial
inefficiencies in purchasing and transporting raw materials from remote areas. Based on the technical advice of the
POE, the dam design was changed, its technical viability confirmed. Slope failure on the right bank due to
unforeseeable physical conditions also meant changes in spillway design. A two-bay spillway was constructed in
place of a three-bay, and the requirement for the last bay was fulfilled by modifying an existing diversion tunnel into
a tunnel spillway.
12
Actual
Foreign Currency
(Mil. Yen)
Local Currency
(Mil. INR)
1,410
4,075
12,361
1,390
16,380
523
523
8,033
8,033
6,146
562
1. Preparation works
2. Civil work
3. Metal work
4. Electro-mechanical work
Total
(Mil. Yen)
5. Land acquisition
119
344
6. Administration costs
1,259
3,637
857
2,476
8. Price escalation
2,746
2,266
9,293
9. Contingency
1,875
441
3,151
669
18
4,355
721
4,335
Total
(Mil. Yen)
686
25,191
9,476
2,028
482
2,970
Total
30,542
7,760
52,968
47,541
Source: JICA appraisal documents and NHPC.
Note 1: The cost estimate at the first appraisal in 1995 was deemed as the planned cost for plan-actual comparison in
this ex-post evaluation. The exchange rate was INR 1 = JPY 2.89 (April 1995).
Note 2: Taking into consideration the fact that there had been wide ranges of fluctuation between the INR and USD,
and the JPY and USD exchange rates during the project period, exchange rates applied for converting the
actual cost into Japanese yen were taken from the average annual rates issued by IMF at the International
Financial Statistics; Yearbook from 1995 to 2005.
Note 3: As there was no common definition of the expenditures of foreign currency and local currency, a comparison
between planned and actual cost in two currencies was not viable.
Due to additional civil work after the slope failure on the right bank and construction of the
tunnel spillway, together with road widening and the strengthening of bridges for the
transportation of construction equipment and heavy machinery, the actual cost in Indian rupees,
18,589 million rupees, exceeded the planned project cost of 15,783 million rupees sanctioned by
the Indian Government in 2000. However, the yen value steadily appreciated against the
Indian rupee throughout the project implementation period, which resulted in a lower cost than
planned when converted into Japanese yen.
24
13
Actual
Jan 1996
Jan 1996
Selection of consultants
Jul to Dec1997
Prequalification
Tender / contracts
2000 to 2001
Preparation works
1998 to 2000
Civil works
Hydro-mechanical works
Electro-mechanical works
Commissioning
The major factor causing delay in construction start was the receipt of clearances from
Central Government. NHPC was required to receive various clearances from relevant
authorities: the Techno Economic Clearance (TEC) was issued in 1988 from the Central
Electricity Authority (CEA) prior to JICAs involvement. Another clearance from the Public
Investment Board (PIB) was issued in 1991. The last clearance from the Cabinet Committee
on Economic Affairs (CCEA) was issued in 2000.
Time overrun of the construction period was caused by a delay of eight months in the
spillway construction works due to slope failure on the right bank and the resulting design
change. Delays were also caused by the change in surge shaft type, and the delay in the
extension of transmission lines. Leakages were observed from the headrace tunnel when it
was tested in March 2005, and repair works there lasted until July in the same year. The
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd (PGCIL) completed the extension works of the
transmission lines to the Dhauliganga Power Station at the end of July 2005.
3.4.3 Results of Calculations of Internal Rates of Return (IRR) (for ODA Loan project)
3.4.3.1 Financial Internal Rate of Return
FIRR as calculated at the first appraisal (1995) and at the second appraisal (1997) was
7.24%. At the third appraisal (2003), it was recalculated as 8.5%. FIRR calculations were
based upon the preconditions below. The result of recalculation of FIRR for the project at the
25
The project start was defined as the signing of the first loan agreement.
The project completion was defined as the commissioning date of commercial operation of all four generation
units.
26
14
3rd Appraisal
FIRR
7.24%
8.5%
Cost
Benefit
Project Life
3rd Appraisal
EIRR
12.83%
15.6%
Cost
Project cost
Benefit
Project Life
Although the project cost was within the plan, the project period slightly exceeded it,
therefore the efficiency of the project is fair.
3.5 Sustainability (Rating: )
3.5.1 Structural Aspects of Operation and Maintenance
The operation and maintenance (O&M) agency of this project is NHPC Ltd. The total
number of employees at NHPC was 11,000 as of November 2011, topped by the Chairman and
Managing Director, Directors in personnel, finance, technical and projects departments were
allocated and underneath them were regional offices and power stations. The total electric
power generated by NHPC power stations increased year by year, from 12,567 GWh (2005/06)
to 18,606 GWh in 2010/11. The following figure shows NHPCs organizational structure.
NHPC owned twelve power stations nationwide as of March 2011. Out of these, the
Dhauliganga Power Plant was supervised by the Dehradun Regional Office located in the
Uttarakhand State capital. The power station had 303 employees as of the end of November
2011: 68 executives including the general manager, chief engineer, senior managers, managers
and others; 26 supervisors such as junior engineers; 201 highly skilled, skilled and unskilled
workmen and eight paramedic staff. In addition, 270 local residents were also employed.
27
NHPC submitted a project completion report to the Planning Commission of the Central Government at the end of
October 2009, in which they calculated FIRR and EIRR as 9.05% and 9.27% respectively.
15
Director
(Personnel)
Director
(Finance)
Director
(Technical)
Director
(Projects)
Construction,
Engineering &
Planning
IT &
Communication
Planning
Design (E&M)
Design (Civil)
Geo-Tech
Commercial
Regional Office
Banikhet
Regional Office
Kolkata
Rural Roads
& RE Works
REW
(Chattisgarh)
REW
(Orissa)
Regional Office
Jammu
Regional Office
Nagwain
Regional Office
Siliguri
Project
Management
Regional Office
Dehradun
Regional Office
Itanagar
Dhauliganga
Power Plant
Regional Office
Kolaptukar
Source: NHPC
Note: Concerned departments are extracted related to this project.
16
Actual
2006/07
Plan
Actual
2007/08
Plan
2008/09
Actual
Plan
Actual
2009/10
Plan
2010/11
Actual
Plan
2011/12*
Actual
Plan
Actual
592.6 1,207.1 1,292.8 1,228.8 2,188.5 1,308.5 3,046.3 2,146.9 2,288.1 2,180.3 3,968.6 2,258.9 1,628.4
Source: NHPC
Note: Figures for 2011were collected from 1 April to the end of October 2011.
As of 2011, the Dhauliganga Power Station sold electricity to eight states and two union
territories (Delhi, Chandigarh, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab, Jaipur, Rajasthan,
Uttarakhand, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh) 28. Energy sales had increased steadily for
consecutive six years, reaching 3,116 million Rs. in 2010/11 (Table 9).
The electricity tariff is decided based on the regulations of the Central Electricity
Regulatory Commission 29, and the tariff for the electricity sold from Dhauliganga was Rs. 2.68 /
kWh as of November 2011.
Table 9: Profit and Loss of Dhauliganga Power Station
2005/06
Income
Of which energy sales
Expenditure
Of which generation
administration and other expenses
Of which Depreciation
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
939.6
1,794.9
3,039.6
3,810.1
3,010.3
5,187.3
903.8
1,744.8
2,028.9
2,265.7
2,837.1
3,116.2
592.6
1,292.8
2,188.5
3,046.3
2,288.1
3,968.6
80.6
199.6
134.4
24s6.4
389.2
297.1
200.0
410.8
403.9
471.6
976.5
938.7
347.2
502.1
851.1
763.9
722.2
1,218.7
347.0
494.5
794.2
761.6
721.6
1,150.7
Profit and loss figures for NHPC and its subsidiary companies including Dhauliganga,
shows that the whole group has increased sales and income as well as profit (Table 10). Return
on Assets (ROA) has remained at around 4 to 5% (Table 11), which indicates that long-term
profitability is secured.
28
Energy sales to the Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. and the Punjab State Electricity Board account for over
40%.
29
The Central Government and State Governments have worked since late 1990 on power sector reforms resulting in
the establishment of regulatory bodies, improvements in transparency and avoidance of political intervention in
regulating tariff structures, improvements in the management of distribution companies by utilizing private
investments, and the abolition of state subsidies. The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) was
established in July 1998, and the current electricity sales price follows a tariff structure for 2009 to 2014 as stipulated
in the Notification No.L-7/145(160)/2008-CERC (dated 19 Jan 2009).
17
2008/09
34,298.3
40,720.4
57,945.5
59,507.4
29,821.0
35,334.9
51,638.7
49,166.6
18,984.9
25,802.7
30,392.5
33,499.9
3,235.7
3,690.8
2,919.0
5,851.5
Of which depreciation
5,455.4
6,440.7
12,683.5
11,665.5
15,313.4
14,917.7
27,553.0
26,007.5
12,994.4
13,310.9
22,775.6
24,627.7
NHPC and its subsidiary companies have shown favorable figures in their current ratio and
fixed ratio. Total equity has exceeded total liabilities, and the equity to assets ratio also shows
good figures, which indicates a high solvency of the NHPC group. Budget allocation and
financial back-up for the Dhauliganga Power Station is thus secured in the long-run.
Table 11: Major Financial Indicators of NHPC Group
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
Current Ratio
145.86%
135.68%
208.31%
142.87%
N/A
Fixed Ratio
143.44%
151.35%
128.78%
134.01%
N/A
57.58%
54.29%
56.95%
56.29%
N/A
Equity / Assets
4.92%
N/A
Return on Assets
4.08%
3.57%
5.56%
Source: NHPC Annual Report (2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-2011)
2011/12
Notes
Current Assets / Current
Liabilities
Fixed Assets / Equity
The profit and loss, and financial status of NHPC and the Dhauliganga Power Station are
deemed firm. There is no particular problem with financial self-sustainability since the
operation and maintenance budget is firmly secured for this project
3.5.4 Current Status of Operation and Maintenance
(1) Power Station Facilities
Based on the technical manual, there are 211 check items including 49 items for generators
and 27 for rotors. Routine and major maintenance is conducted monthly and yearly
respectively.
Routine and preventive maintenance is conducted daily, weekly and monthly, and major
maintenance is conducted yearly at both power house and dam. As for annual maintenance for
generators in 2010, for instance, 28 days were spent on maintenance for Unit 1, 25 days for Unit
2, 22 days for Unit 3, and 18 days for Unit 4.
It was confirmed during the field survey of this ex-post evaluation that Dhauliganga
technical staff members continue to record data on O&M for all facilities of the power house
and dam, and the condition remains good.
(2) Countermeasures for Sedimentation
NHPC and other state power bodies with hydroelectric power plants are fully aware of the
serious operation risk caused by accumulated silt in reservoirs. Countermeasures were taken
in the design of the Dhauliganga Power Plant with the addition of a de-silting chamber and silt
ejector, and in the catchment area treatment works. Compensatory afforestation and technical
guidance given to the local people were commenced prior to the construction of the Power
Station, which also helped reduce the amount of the suspended load inflow from the upstream
18
area.
In the site survey of this ex-post evaluation, it was seen that the volume of sedimentation in
the reservoir has sharply declined from 410,000 to the present 30,000 m3 (see 3.2.1). In
addition to the collection of silt at the de-silting chamber, silt is ejected in the upstream area
before full operation of dam during monsoon season, and silt in the reservoir is flushed every
fifteen days during the same period. The Dhauliganga Power Station monitors and keeps
records of the suspended sediment upstream of the silt ejector and tailrace tunnel every day in
order that quick action may be taken in the case that any abnormal condition is found.
(3) Monitoring of Glacier Lakes
It was confirmed that there seven glacier lakes existed in the upstream tributary and the
Dhauliganga river basin at the time of the first appraisal in 1994. In response to the suggestion
that countermeasures against glacier lake outburst floods be taken immediately, JICA conducted
the Dhauliganga Hydroelectric Power Project Special Assistance for Project Implementation
(SAPI) in 2001. Then, the volumes and transitions of glacier lakes were observed and analyzed
using digital satellite images from 1994 and 2000 taken by the National Remote Sensing
Agency (NRSA). It was found that the size of the glacier lakes remained 1.0 to 1.2 million m3,
and that their volumes did not change very much. Since the inventory did not indicate any
imminent potential hazard, it seemed that no immediate action was required, for example, in
developing a detection system. However, it was recommended that inventories and analysis of
the glacier lakes should be carried out periodically as this was not indicative of longer-term
trends. In the case that a significant potential hazard in any of the glacier lakes in the
Dhauliganga river basin be revealed, then the GLOF forecast warning system would be
implemented without delay.
Up to present, NHPC has conducted remote sensing data collection every five years since
1994, but there has been no detection of any indicative features of outburst flood, or of increases
or decreases in the area of glacier lakes. These lakes at present are not significant enough to
have an adverse impact on the Dhauliganga Power Station. NHPC will continue to monitor
the condition of the glacier lakes based on the recommendation drawn up in the SAPI study.
No major problems have thus been observed in the operation and maintenance system,
therefore the sustainability of the project effect is high.
19
4.2 Recommendations
4.2.1 Recommendations to the Executing Agency
Not applicable.
4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA
Not applicable.
20
Original
(1) Reservoir
Max level: 1,348.5m asl
Full level: 1,345m asl
Minimum level: 1,330m asl
Gross storage volume: 6.2 million m3
Live storage volume: 1.54 million m3
Actual
(1) Reservoir
As planned
(2) Dam
Type: rockfill dam
Max height above river bed level:
56m
Length of dam crest: 270m
(elevation: 1,351m asl)
(2) Dam
Type: concrete faced rockfill dam
(changed)
Max height above river bed level: as
planned
Length of dam crest: as planned
(3) Spillway
Type: gated sluices with open chute
and flip bucket
Design flood: 3,210m / s
Invert level of gated sluices: 1,307m
No and size of sluices: three (10 m
high X 6 m wide)
(3) Spillway
Type: as planned
Design flood: as planned
Invert level of gated sluices: as
planned
No and size of sluices: Two
(changed) (10 m high X 6 m wide)
and the existing diversion tunnel was
modified to one tunnel spillway (crest
level: 1,332.87 m, radial gate size: 9
m X 16 high).
21
Item
Original
Actual
2. Project Period
N/A
N/A
(N/A)
Total
Exchange rate
1INR = 2.73yen
(Average from 1995 to 2005)
3. Project Cost
22