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G.R.Nos.7074647September1,1992BIENVENIDOO.MARCOSv.FERNANDOS.RUIZ,ETAL.:SEPTEMBER1992PHILIPPINESUPREME
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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1992 > September 1992 Decisions > G.R. Nos. 7074647
September1,1992BIENVENIDOO.MARCOSv.FERNANDOS.RUIZ,ETAL.:
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THIRDDIVISION
[G.R.Nos.7074647.September1,1992.]
BIENVENIDOO.MARCOS,Petitioner,v.HON.FERNANDOS.RUIZ,RTCJudge,7thJudicial
Region,TagbilaranCity,andTHEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,Respondents.
CarlosA.MarcosforPetitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE MOTION TO DISMISS MAY BE RESOLVED AFTER
ARRAIGNMENT. All the parties agree that the 12 November 1984 Motion to Dismiss was not
resolvedbythetrialcourt.RespondentJudgeassertsthatthepetitionerisestoppedfromquestioning
the inaction on this motion because he voluntarily appeared at his arraignment, entered a plea and
agreedtotheschedulingofthecasefortrialonthemeritsbesides,theProsecution,bypresentingits
evidence,isdeemedtohaveabandonedthemotion.Whilethefirstpropositionisincorrect,thesecond
isinaccurate.Estoppeldoesnotoperateinthepresentcaseforthemotionmaystillberesolvedafter
thearraignmentbyitsnature,itmaybefiledbytheprosecutionatanytime.Asamatteroffact,had
the petitioner not signed his conformity thereto, it would have been to his benefit or advantage that
the motion be resolved after his plea for, by then, if the same is granted, the Prosecution would be
precludedfromrefilingthecaseonthegroundofdoublejeopardy.
DebtKollectCompany,Inc.
2.ID.ID.ID.ACTIONONMOTIONSMUSTBEUNEQUIVOCALANDNOTBELEFTTOCONJECTURE.
The manifestation and withdrawal of the motion (to dismiss) were made in the presence of the
accused and his counsel neither of them objected thereto for they knew too well that they had no
legalbasistherefor.TheonlyflawinthisregardistherespondentJudgesfailuretoexplicitlymakea
ruling on the oral motion. He merely granted the motion impliedly by immediately directing the
arraignment of the accused. He should have taken the trouble of making an unequivocal ruling
thereonbysimplystating:"Motionisgrantedthemotiontodismissisconsideredwithdrawn.Allright,
arraign the accused." The demands of orderly procedure require that a judge of a court of record
mustensurethatactionsonmotionsmustnotbelefttoconjecturebutmust,inamannerofspeaking,
bedoneinblackandwhite.
3. ID. ID. HEARING IN ABSENTIA, PROPER. Having failed to appear on 8 April 1985 despite due
notice,andconsideringthatonsaiddatetheurgentmotionforresettinghadnotyetbeenreceivedby
the court, respondent Judge could not be faulted for believing that petitioners nonappearance was
unjustified. Hence, a hearing in absentia was proper under the aforequoted provision of the
ConstitutionandSections2(c)and1(c)ofRules114and115,respectively,oftheRulesofCourt.
ChanRoblesIntellectualProperty
Division
4. ID. ID. BAILBOND FORFEITURE. A bail bond may be forfeited only in instances where the
presence of the accused is specifically required by the court or the Rules of Court and, despite due
noticetothebondsmentoproducehimbeforethecourtonagivendate,theaccusedfailstoappear
in person as so required. There is no showing that the court had specifically required the bonding
companytoproducethebodyofthepetitioneron8and9April1985.Moreover,sinceCriminalCases
Nos.3890and3892,whichinvolvetwo(2)checkswithafacevalueofP3,000.00each,weremerely
fortheviolationofBatasPambansaBlg.22whichimposesapenaltyof"imprisonmentofnotlessthan
thirty(30)daysbutnotmorethanone(1)yearorbyafineofnotlessthanbutnotmorethandouble
the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both
suchfineandimprisonmentatthediscretionofthecourt,"thepresenceoftheaccusedatthehearing
on8and9April1985wasnotindispensable.
5. ID. ID. ARRAIGNMENT ACCUSED REQUIRED TO PERSONALLY ENTER HIS PLEA. It will,
however, be noted that insofar as the second case, Criminal Case No. 3892, is concerned, the court
made no ruling on the manifestation and offer by petitioners counsel that the reading of the
informationbewaivedandapleaofnotguiltybeentered.Thepetitionerwasneithermadetoconfirm
the manifestation nor directed to personally make the plea. There was, therefore, no valid
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 3892. Section 1(b), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
requirestheaccusedtopersonallyenterhisplea.
6.ID.ID.MOTIONFORPOSTPONEMENTCOUNSELBOUNDTOGIVEPRIORITYTOHEARINGSETON
AGREEDDATE.Themotiontoresetthehearingwasameresubterfugetoobtainapostponementof
and delay the proceedings. Petitioner and his counsel were notified in open court about the 8 and 9
April 1985 hearing on 7 February 1985. Having agreed to that setting, counsel in effect certified that
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hehadnopriorcommitmentonthosedatesandhewastherebyboundtogiveprioritytothesame,
unlesseventsofgreaterimportanceorofamoreseriousnaturerequiringhispresence,supervened.
7.ID.ID.ID.GRANTINGINCRIMINALCASEISLEFTTOSOUNDDISCRETIONOFCOURT.Counsel
for petitioner should not have presumed that the motion, which he prepared and sent by registered
mailonlyon29March1989,wouldreachthecourtandbegrantedbefore8April1985.Heknew,or
ought to know that the granting of motions for postponement in criminal cases is left to the sound
discretion of the Court a rule which has been steadfastly adhered to since United States v.
LorenzanaandwhichthisCourtmoreexplicitlyexpressedinUnitesStatesv.Ramirez.
8. ID. ID. ID. A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER WHERE NOTICE OF HEARING IS LACKING. The urgent
motion for resetting was a mere scrap of paper. As earlier noted, it does not contain a notice of
hearingtotheProsecutionallithadwasamererequest,addressedtotheClerkofCourt,thatitbe
submittedfortheconsiderationandapprovalofthecourtimmediatelyuponhisreceiptthereof.There
was,therefore,aclearviolationofSection5,Rule15oftheRulesofCourt,whichisalsoapplicablein
motionsforcontinuanceincriminalcase.
9. ID. ID. WHEN NONAPPEARANCE OF ACCUSED CONSIDERED A WAIVER. With respect to an
accusedwhoisnotincustody,hisnonappearanceconstitutesawaiverofhisrighttobepresentonly
for the trial set for the particular date of which he had notice. Upon the other hand, such non
appearance by an accused in custody and who later escapes is considered a waiver of the right on
suchdateandallsubsequenttrialdatesuntilsuchcustodyisregained.
10. ID. LAWYERCLIENT RELATIONSHIP A CLIENT IS BOUND BY THE ACTS OF HIS COUNSEL. A
client is bound by the acts, even mistakes of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique
however, if the former is prejudiced by the latters negligence or misconduct, he may recover
damages.
DECISION
DAVIDE,JR.,J.:
September1992Jurisprudence
In this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner seeks to set
aside, for being null and void, the Orders of respondent Judge of 8 April 1985 which considered the
failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear on that date as a waiver of the right to present
evidence, and of 29 April 1985 denying petitioners motion for the reconsideration of said order in
CriminalCasesNo.3890andNo.3892.
Thefactsarenotcomplicated.
On2August1984,afterconductingtheappropriatepreliminaryinvestigation,Acting2ndAssistantCity
FiscalLorenzoA.LopenaoftheCityofTagbilaranfiledwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofBoholtwo(2)
informations against petitioner herein for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 said violations allegedly
tookplaceon5July1983intheCityofTagbilaranwhenthepetitioner,knowingfullywellthathedid
not have sufficient funds deposited with the Far Fast Bank and Trust Company (Cebu North
ProclamationAreaBranch),deliveredtoFulgenciaOculam,inpaymentforassortedpiecesofjewelry
takenbypetitionerswifeAnacletaMarcos,two(2)checksdrawnagainstsaidbankintheamountof
P3,000.00 each. The informations were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 3890 1 and No. 3892 2 and
were raffled to Branch II of said court. The petitioner posted a surety bond for his temporary
liberty.
c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h : v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
Thearraignmentwassetfor12November1984.Thepetitionerappearedonthatdatebutaskedfora
resettingonthegroundthathislawyerhadjustwithdrawnandhehadtolookforanotherlawyer.The
courtgrantedhisrequestandthearraignmentwasresetto29November1984.3
It turned out, however, that petitioner settled his obligation with the offended party who, on 3
November1984,executedanAffidavitofDesistancewhichshesubscribedandsworetobeforeNotary
PublicPaulinoG.Clarin.Pertinentportionsthereofread:
c h a n r o b 1 e s v ir t u a l1 a wlib r a r y
xxx
"2. That upon my instance, I requested that the cases be remanded to the City Fiscal for
reinvestigationbutwhichmotionwasdenied
3.Thatmeanwhile,therespondentsettledallhisobligationssubjectmatterofthepresentcases
4. That under the circumstances, I possess no ground to further proceed with the prosecution of the
cases
5. That I am willing to have cases dismissed with the consent of the respondent or accused, as I
herebydesistfromfurtherproceedingwiththecase
6. That this affidavit of desistance may be utilized by the City Fiscal of the City of Tagbilaran for the
dismissalofthecases."4
xxx
At10:00oclockinthemorningof12November1984,Acting2ndAssistantCityFiscalLopenafileda
MotiontoDismissCriminalCaseNo.3892ontheground:
jg c : c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h
"1.Thatthecomplainingwitnessinthiscasehasturnedhostileandshownmanifestlackofinterestto
prosecute the aboveentitled case as evidenced by his (sic) Affidavit of Desistance, which is hereto
attachedasAnnex"A"andismadeanintegralparthereof
2. That without the testimony of said complaining witness, the aboveentitled case cannot be
prosecutedsuccessfully,therebeingnootherevidenceofhandtoprovetheguiltoftheaccused."5
ThemotionbearstheapprovalofActing1stAssistantCityFiscalMiguelRelampagoswhoactedforthe
Acting City Fiscal because of the latters absence, and the consent of petitioner. It also contains the
requestofthemovantfiscaladdressedtotheClerkofCourtthatthesamebesetforresolutionofthe
court"uponreceipthereof."
c h a n r o b le s la wlib r a r y
When the cases were called on 29 November 1984, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared
however,thecourtreceivedatelegramfrompetitionerswife.LitaMarcos,advisingthecourtthatthe
petitionerwasindisposed.Withoutanyobjectiononthepartoftheprosecution,thecourtcancelledthe
arraignment on that date and rescheduled the same, together with the trial, for 7 and 8 February
1985.6
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G.R.Nos.7074647September1,1992BIENVENIDOO.MARCOSv.FERNANDOS.RUIZ,ETAL.:SEPTEMBER1992PHILIPPINESUPREME
G.R.No.87318September2,1992PEOPLEOFTHE
PHIL.v.JAIMEG.SERDAN
G.R.No.91535September2,1992PEOPLEOFTHE
PHIL.v.EDUARDOL.DEJESUS,ETAL.
G.R. No. 92461 September 2, 1992 ESTATE
DEVELOPERS AND INVESTORS CORPORATION v.
COURTOFAPPEALS,ETAL.
G.R. No. 92789 September 2, 1992 SILLIMAN
UNIVERSITY v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION,ETAL.
G.R.No.9279596September2,1992PEOPLEOF
THEPHIL.v.FREDDIEB.TANTIADO
G.R.No.93141September2,1992PEOPLEOFTHE
PHILv.ESTANISLAOGENERALAO,JR.
On 9 April 1985, the trial court received an urgent motion for the resetting of the hearing filed by
counselforthepetitioner.9Themotion,sentbyregisteredmailanddated29March1985,alleges:
jg c : c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h
"1. That undersigned counsel has a previous legal commitment in Manila needing his personal
attention
2.Thatitwouldbephysicallyimpossibleforhimtoarriveontimeforthehearingoftheaboveentitled
case
3. That because of this unavoidable circumstances (sic) he is constrained to pray for their (sic)
resetting."10
andpraysthatthehearingofthecasesberesetto13and14May1985at2:30P.M.and8:30A.M.,
respectively. This motion does not contain a notice of hearing to the Prosecuting Fiscal but a mere
requestaddressedtotheBranchClerkofCourtreading:
Whenthecaseswerecalledintheafternoonof8April1985,neitherpetitionernorcounselappeared.
Theprosecutionpresenteditsevidenceexparteandresteditscase.ThecourtthenissuedanOrder8
forfeiting the bond posted by the petitioner, directing Paramount Insurance Corp., the bondsman, to
showcause,withinthirty(30)daysformnotice,whynojudgmentshouldbeissuedagainstthebond
and declaring that as no evidence has been submitted by the petitioner, the cases were deemed
submittedfordecision.
G.R.No.93634September2,1992PEOPLEOFTHE
PHIL.v.MASALIMCASIM
G.R.No.95843September2,1992EDILBERTOC.
ABARQUEZ,ETAL.v.COURTOFAPPEALS,ETAL.
On7February1985,thepetitionerappearedtogetherwithhiscounseldeparte,Atty.CarlosMarcos.
Hewasarraignedinbothcasesheenteredapleaofnotguilty.Forthwith,thecourtsetthetrialofthe
casesfor8April1985at2:30P.M.and9April1985at8:30A.M.Thepetitioner,hiscounselandthe
AssistantCityFiscalwerenotifiedinopencourtofthesetting.7
jg c : c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h
"Please submit the foregoing motion for the consideration and approval of this Honorable Court
immediatelyuponreceipthereof."
c r a la wv ir t u a 1 a wlib r a r y
On23April1985,petitionerscounselfileda"MotionforReconsiderationto(sic)Order"dated8April
1985. 11 In justifying petitioners failure to appear at the hearing on 8 April 1985, counsel
contends:
jg c : c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h
"THATinviewofthesaidmotion[forresettingofhearing]theaccused,ingoodfaith,believedthatthe
hearingsetonApril8,1985wouldnotproceedandhispresencewouldthusbeunnecessarythatto
save money for fare and meals in a trip to Tagbilaran City from Cebu City, and vice versa, the
accused who is a government employee did not anymore attend the hearing which he believed was
cancelledonaccountofthemotionaforementioned
THATtheaccusedlikewisebelievedthatasidefromthemotionforpostponement,thependencyofthe
Motion to Dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal, Lorenzo A. Lopena, in view of complaining witness
Affidavit of Desistance, this Honorable Court would not proceed to receive the evidence of the
prosecution. In fact, up to the present, the aforementioned Motion to Dismiss dated November 12,
1984hasnotbeenacteduponbythisHonorableCourt
c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h : v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
THAT the nonappearance of the accused in the scheduled trial is not a sufficient ground for the
cancellationofthebailbondbecausehisfailurecouldstillbeconsideredasawaiverofhispresence.
THATitisthestandoftheundersignedcounselthatthemotiontodismissbytheprosecutingfiscalbe
firstresolvedbeforethisHonorableCourtcouldproceedwiththefurtherproceedingofthiscase.Letit
bestressedthattheaccusedwasarraignedbythisHonorableCourtovertheobjectionoftheaccused
AFTER the Motion to Dismiss was filed by the prosecution and BEFORE it was, as it still is, resolved
whichcouldbeadenialorgranting(sic)thereof,whichtotheundersigneddoesnotmatteraslongas
itisactedupon."
c r a la wv ir t u a 1 a wlib r a r y
Onceagain,themotiondoesnotcontainanoticeofhearingtotheprosecutingfiscalithasinsteada
mererequestthattheClerkofCourtsubmititfortheconsiderationofthecourtimmediatelyuponhis
receiptthereof.
On 29 April 1985, the court issued an Order 12 denying the aforesaid motion for reconsideration on
thefollowinggrounds:thatthepetitionershouldnotassumethatthemotionforpostponementwould
begrantedheisestoppedfrominsistingonarulingonthemotiontodismissbecauseheagreedto
be arraigned, pleaded not guilty and did not question the scheduling of the cases for trial and the
presentationbytheProsecutionofitsevidenceamountedtoanabandonmentofitsmotiontodismiss.
On3May1985,aNoticeofPromulgationsettingthepromulgationofsentenceinthetwo(2)casesto
17May1985wassenttothepartiesbyAntonioR.Monungol,13theResearchAttorneyofBranchIIof
thecourtbelow.
Hence,thispetitionwhichwasfiledon14May1985andisanchoredonandraisestheprincipalissue
oftheallegeddenialofpetitionersrighttoconfrontthewitnessesfortheprosecutionandtobeheard.
Corollarily, petitioner submits that respondent Judge erred in not acting upon the motion to dismiss
beforesettingthearraignmentoftheaccusedandreceivingthePeoplesevidence.
On 16 May 1985, this Court resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition and to
issueaTemporaryRestrainingOrderenjoiningrespondentJudgefrompromulgatingthejudgmentin
CriminalCasesNos.3890and3892.
Respondent Judge filed his Comment 14 by mail on 30 May 1985. He maintains that petitioner
voluntarilysubmittedtothearraignmentandwasnotdenieddueprocess.Ontheotherhand,Acting
2nd Assistant City Fiscal Lopena mailed his Comment on 8 June 1985. 15 The Office of the Solicitor
GeneralfileditsCommenton6September1985,16andassertsthereinthattheOrderinquestionis
interlocutory and hence, not appealable respondent Judge acted in accordance with law and sound
discretioninissuingtheordersandpetitionerwasnotdeniedhisdayincourt.
On28October1985,petitionermailedhisJointReplytotheComments.
On27November1985,thisCourtresolvedtogiveduecoursetothepetition,considertheComments
as Answer and require the parties to file their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
compliedwith.
The issues to be resolved in this petition are whether or not the respondent Court committed grave
abuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorabsenceofjurisdictionin:
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
(1) ordering the arraignment of the accused and receiving the evidence for the prosecution without
firstresolvingthemotiontodismiss
(2)orderingtheforfeitureofthebailbondwhenpetitionerfailedtoappearon8April1985allowing
theProsecutiontopresentitsevidenceexparteanddeclaringthepetitionerashavingwaivedhisright
topresenthisevidenceand
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(3) denying the motion to reconsider the Order of 8 April 1985 and setting the promulgation of
judgmenton17May1985.
RELATIONSCOMMISSION,ETAL.
G.R.No.105120September4,1992SIMPLICIOC.
GRIO,ETAL.v.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,ETAL.
1. All the parties agree that the 12 November 1984 Motion to Dismiss was not resolved by the trial
court. Respondent Judge asserts that the petitioner is estopped from questioning the inaction on this
motion because he voluntarily appeared at his arraignment, entered a plea and agreed to the
schedulingofthecasefortrialonthemeritsbesides,theProsecution,bypresentingitsevidence,is
deemed to have abandoned the motion. While the first proposition is incorrect, the second is
inaccurate. Estoppel does not operate in the present case for the motion may still be resolved after
thearraignmentbyitsnature,itmaybefiledbytheprosecutionatanytime.Asamatteroffact,had
the petitioner not signed his conformity thereto, it would have been to his benefit or advantage that
the motion be resolved after his plea for, by then, if the same is granted, the Prosecution would be
precludedfromrefilingthecaseonthegroundofdoublejeopardy.
ThisCourtnoted,however,thatthemotiontodismissisforCriminalCaseNo.3892only17although
the instant petition makes it appear, and the respondents seem to accede thereto, that the motion
affectsbothCriminalCasesNos.3890and3892.This,ofcourse,wouldbecomeentirelyirrelevantin
thelightofthesucceedingdiscussiononthesecondgroundstressedbytherespondentJudge.
WhatactuallytranspiredbeforethecourtaquowasthattheProsecutionorallywithdrewthemotionto
dismiss. In the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the proceedings on 7 February 1985, 18 We
findthefollowing:
jg c : c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h
"ASST.CITYFISCALL.LOPENA
G.R.No.91915September11,1992DIVINEWORD
UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN v. SECRETARY OF LABOR
ANDEMPLOYMENT,ETAL.
YourHonorplease,Ihaveconferredwiththecomplainingwitnessandshemanifestedherwillingness
totestifyinthiscasefortheprosecution.Inviewofthisdevelopment,weareconstrainedtowithdraw
ourmotiontodismiss.
c r a la wn a d
COURT
Allright,thenarraigntheaccused."19
This manifestation and withdrawal of the motion were made in the presence of the accused and his
counsel,neitherofthemobjectedtheretofortheyknewtoowellthattheyhadnolegalbasistherefor.
The only flaw in this regard is the respondent Judges failure to explicitly make a ruling on the oral
motion. He merely granted the motion impliedly by immediately directing the arraignment of the
accused.Heshouldhavetakenthetroubleofmakinganunequivocalrulingthereonbysimplystating:
"Motionisgrantedthemotiontodismissisconsideredwithdrawn.Allright,arraigntheaccused."The
demands of orderly procedure require that a judge of a court of record must ensure that actions on
motionsmustnotbelefttoconjecturebutmust,inamannerofspeaking,bedoneinblackandwhite.
G.R.No.103903September11,1992MELANIOD.
SAMPAYAN,ETAL.v.RAUL.A.DAZA,ETAL.
G.R.No.57475September14,1992REPUBLICOF
THEPHIL.v.RUFONERI,ETAL.
G.R. No. 74851 September 14, 1992 RIZAL
COMMERCIAL
BANKING
CORPORATION
v.
INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATECOURT
2. Considering that he had been arraigned which both the parties and the court thought that the
same was for both cases petitioner was not required to appear at the trial on 8 and 9 April 1985.
Whileitmaybetruethathehastherighttobepresentateverystageoftheproceedings,i.e.,from
thearraignmenttothepromulgationofjudgment,hecanwaivehispresence.Thesecondsentenceof
paragraph(2),Section14,ArticleIIIofthe1987Constitutionprovidesasfollows:
jg c : c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h
"However,afterarraignment,trialmayproceednotwithstandingtheabsenceoftheaccusedprovided
thathehasbeendulynotifiedandhisfailuretoappearisunjustifiable."20
Section1(c),Rule115oftheRulesofCourtprovides,inpart,asfollows:
G.R.No.7591516September18,1992SPS.GOIT
BUN,ETAL.v.BALTAZARR.DIZON,ETAL.
jg c : c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h
"...Theaccusedmay,however,waivehispresenceatthetrialpursuanttothestipulationssetforth
inhisbailbond,unlesshispresenceisspecificallyorderedbythecourtforpurposesofidentification.
Theabsenceoftheaccusedwithoutanyjustifiablecauseatthetrialonaparticulardateofwhichhe
hadnoticeshallbeconsideredawaiverofhisrighttobepresentduringthattrial."
WhileSection2(c),Rule114oftheRulesofCourt,onthedifferentconditionsattachedtoabailbond,
provides:
xxx
G.R.No.9451113September18,1992PEOPLEOF
THEPHIL.v.ALEJANDROC.VALENCIA
"(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice shall be
deemedanexpresswaiverofhisrighttobepresentonthedatespecifiedinthenotice.Insuchcase,
thetrialmayproceedinabsentia:"
c r a la wv ir t u a 1 a wlib r a r y
c h a n r o b 1 e s v ir t u a l1 a wlib r a r y
Having failed to appear on 8 April 1985 despite due notice, and considering that on said date the
urgent motion for resetting had not yet been received by the court, respondent Judge could not be
faulted for believing that petitioners nonappearance was unjustified. Hence, a hearing in absentia
was proper under the aforequoted provision of the Constitution and Sections 2(c) and 1(c) of Rules
114and115,respectively,oftheRulesofCourt.
c h a n r o b le s la wlib r a r y
However,respondentJudgegravelyabusedhisdiscretionwhenheorderedtheforfeitureofthebond
andrequiredthebondingcompanytoshowcausewhynojudgmentshouldberenderedagainstitfor
theamountofthebond.Oneotherconditionforthegrantingofbail,setforthinSection2(b),Rule114
oftheRulesofCourt,isthattheaccusedshallappearbeforethepropercourtwheneversorequired
bythecourtortherulesofCourt.
A bail bond may be forfeited only in instances where the presence of the accused is specifically
requiredbythecourtortheRulesofCourtand,despiteduenoticetothebondsmentoproducehim
beforethecourtonagivendate,theaccusedfailstoappearinpersonassorequired.21Thereisno
showing that the court had specifically required the bonding company to produce the body of the
petitioner on 8 and 9 April 1985. Moreover, since Criminal Cases Nos. 3890 and 3892, which involve
two(2)checkswithafacevalueofP3,000.00each,weremerelyfortheviolationofBatasPambansa
Blg.22whichimposesapenaltyof"imprisonmentofnotlessthanthirty(30)daysbutnotmorethan
one(1)yearorbyafineofnotleasthanbutnotmorethandoubletheamountofthecheckwhichfine
shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court," the presence of the accused at the hearing on 8 and 9 April 1985 was not
indispensable.
UndertheRulesofCourt,theaccusedhastobepresent:
c h a n r o b 1 e s v ir t u a l1 a wlib r a r y
(a)atthearraignmentpursuanttoparagraph(b),Section1,Rule116
(b) at the promulgation of judgment, except when conviction is for a light offense, in which case the
judgmentmaybepronouncedinthepresenceofhiscounselorrepresentativepursuanttoSection6
ofRule120,orunlesspromulgationinabsentiaisallowedunderthethirdparagraphofsaidsection
and
(c)whentheprosecutionintendstopresentwitnesseswhowillidentifytheaccused.22
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Beforetheadventofthe1985RulesonCriminalProcedure,theaccuseddidnothavetobepresentat
the arraignment if the charge was for a light offense triable by the then justice of the peace or any
otherinferiorcourtofsimilarjurisdiction.Also,hispleamaybeenteredonhisbehalfbyhisattorneyif
the charge is for a misdemeanor or a minor offense in which the penalty that may be imposed is a
finenotexceedingP200.00.23
3.Petitioner,however,isnotfullyjustifiedinclaimingthathewasdeniedhisrighttodueprocessby
therespondentJudge.Inthefirstplace,itisnottruethatpetitionerwasarraignedoverhisobjection.
The transcript of the proceedings on 7 February 1985 24 reveals that his counsel merely asked for
"enoughtimetoconfronttheaccusedandadvisehimofwhattoplea(sic)incasethearraignmentwill
push through" for the reason that it was his initial appearance. He asked for a deferment of the
arraignment for ten (10) days. The court, however, gave him until 10:00 oclock that morning to
prepareforthearraignment,towhichheagreed.Whenthecaseswerecalledagainat10:00oclock
thatmorning,thefollowingtranspired:
jg c : c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h
"ATTY.CARLOSMARCOS
Your Honor please, before the arraignment, may I make it of record that the Fiscal just have (sic)
todayturnedovertheinformationwhichisforreadingbytheClerkofCourt.
c h a n r o b le s la wlib r a r y : r e d
COURT
Allright,arraigntheaccusednowinthetwocases?
COURT(Toaccused)
NOTEInformationwasreadtotheaccusedafterwhich...
Whatisyourplea?
ACCUSED
Notguilty,YourHonor.
ATTY.CARLOSMARCOS
Your Honor please, the reading of the information of the other case, may we pray that it be waived
andtheaccusedwillenterthepleaofnotguilty?
COURT:
c h a n r o b 1 e s v ir t u a l1 a wlib r a r y
So,whatisthepleasurenowofthedefense?
ATTY.C.MARCOS
Consideringthattheaccusedsarraignmenthasjustbeenterminated,maywebegivenampletimeto
preparethedefenseofourcase,YourHonor.
COURT
Allright,youagreeonthedate?
COURT
ORDER
In the aboveentitled two cases, the accused assisted by counsel, Atty. Carlos Marcos, pleaded not
guiltyuponbeingarraigned.
LetthejointtrialofthesecasesbesetonApril8at2:30p.m.andApril9,1985,at8:30a.m.
NotifiedinopencourtareAsst.CityFiscalLorenzoLopena,Atty.CarlosMarcos,andtheaccused.
Notifytheprivateprosecutor,Atty.PaulinoG.Clarin.
SOORDERED."25
c r a la w: r e d
Itwill,however,benotedthatinsofarasthesecondcase,CriminalCaseNo.3892,isconcerned,the
court made no ruling on, the manifestation and offer by petitioners counsel that the reading of the
informationbewaivedandapleaofnotguiltybeentered.Thepetitionerwasneithermadetoconfirm
the manifestation nor directed to personally make the plea. There was, therefore, no valid
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 3892 Section 1(b), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
requirestheaccusedtopersonallyenterhisplea.
Inthesecondplace,themotiontoresetthehearingwasameresubterfugetoobtainapostponement
ofanddelaytheproceedings.Petitionerandhiscounselwerenotifiedinopencourtaboutthe8and9
April 1985 hearing on 7 February 1985. Having agreed to that setting, counsel in effect certified that
hehadnopriorcommitmentonthosedatesandhewastherebyboundtogiveprioritytothesame,
unlesseventsofgreaterimportanceorofamoreseriousnaturerequiringhispresence,supervened.
The only reason he gave for the notice was that he "has a previous legal commitment in Manila
needing his personal attention." 26 He did not elaborate on what that legal commitment was. If he
indeedhadsuchacommitmentandhisconformitytothe8and9April1985settingwasamistake,he
should have immediately filed a motion for the resetting of hearing. It hardly needs to be said that
either the socalled "legal commitment" in Manila whatever that could have been was made
sometimeafter7February1985orthatitneverexistedatall.Inthemotiontoreconsiderthe8April
1985 Order, petitioners counsel did not bother to explain the importance of that commitment or
convincethecourtthatheactuallymadethetriptoManila.
c h a n r o b le s la wlib r a r y : r e d n a d
Thirdly,counselforpetitionershouldnothavepresumedthatthemotion,whichhepreparedandsent
byregisteredmailonlyon29March1989,wouldreachthecourtandbegrantedbefore8April1985.
Heknew,oroughttoknowthatthegrantingofmotionsforpostponementincriminalcasesisleftto
thesounddiscretionoftheCourtarulewhichhasbeensteadfastlyadheredtosinceUnitedStates
v.Lorenzana27andwhichthisCourtmoreexplicitlyexpressedinUnitedStatesv.Ramirez28inthis
wise:
jg c : c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h
"Applications for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In this respect, it
maybesaidthatthediscretionwhichthetrialcourtexercisesmustbejudicialandnotarbitrary.Itis
theguardianoftherightsoftheaccusedaswellasthoseofthepeopleatlarge,andshouldnotunduly
forcehimtotrial,norforlightcausesjeopardizetherightsorinterestsofthepublic.Wherethecourt
conceives it to be necessary for the more perfect attainment of justice, it has the power upon the
motion of either party to continue the case. But a party charged with a crime has no natural or
inalienablerighttoacontinuance."
c r a la wv ir t u a 1 a wlib r a r y
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This rule was succinctly stated in Section 2 of Rule 119 before its amendment by the 1985 Rules of
CriminalProcedureasfollows:
jg c : c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h
"SEC.2.Continuanceorpostponementofthetrial.Thecourtontheapplicationofeitherpartyoron
itsownmotion,mayinitsdiscretionforgoodcausepostponethetrialofthecaseforsuchperiodof
timeastheendsofjusticeandtherightofthedefendanttoaspeedytrialrequire."
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
Asamended,itnowreads:
jg c : c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h
"SEC 2. Continuance trial until terminated postponements. Trial once commenced shall continue
fromdaytodayasfaraspracticableuntilterminatedbutforgoodcause,itmaybepostponedfora
reasonableperiodoftime."
c r a la wv ir t u a 1 a wlib r a r y
Finally, the urgent motion for resetting was a mere scrap of paper. As earlier noted, it does not
containanoticeofhearingtotheProsecutionallithadwasamererequest,addressedtotheClerkof
Court, that it be submitted for the consideration and approval of the court immediately upon his
receipt thereof. There was, therefore, a clear violation of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
which is also applicable in motions for continuance in criminal cases. Said section provides as
follows:
jg c : c h a n r o b le s .c o m.p h
"SEC. 5. Contents of notice. The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state
thetimeandplaceforthehearingofthemotion."
c r a la wv ir t u a 1 a wlib r a r y
InBankofthePhilippineIslandsv.FarEastMolassesCorp.,29thisCourtexplicitlyruledthatamotion
thatdoesnotcontainanoticeofhearingisbutamerescrapofpaper,itpresentsnoquestionwhich
meritstheattentionandconsiderationofthecourt.Itisnotevenamotionforitdoesnotcomplywith
therulesandhence,theclerkhasnorighttoreceiveit.
Sinceon8April1985themotionforresettinghadnotyetbeenreceivedbythecourt,therespondent
Judge committed no error, much less abuse of discretion, in allowing the prosecution to present, ex
parte, its evidence and rest its case immediately thereafter in Criminal Case No. 3890 the same,
however,cannotbesaidaboutCriminalCaseNo.3892for,asearliermentioned,novalidarraignment
hadasyetbeenconductedthereon.Petitionershouldblamenooneelsebuthiscounsel.Nonetheless,
a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique
however, if the former is prejudiced by the latters negligence or misconduct, he may recover
damages.30
However, respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when he capriciously and arbitrarily considered Criminal Cases Nos. 3890 and 3892 more
particularly the latter wherein there was no valid arraignment submitted for decision after the
prosecution rested its case on 8 April 1985. He thus blatantly ignored and disregarded Section 2(c),
Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court which merely consider the accuseds non
appearanceduringtrial8April1985,inthiscaseasawaiverofhisrighttobepresentfortrialon
suchdateonlyandnotforthesucceedingtrialdates.ThisisquiteclearfromSection1(c)ofRule115
whichfurtherprovides:
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
"...Theabsenceoftheaccusedwithoutanyjustifiablecauseatthetrialonaparticulardateofwhich
he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an
accusedundercustodyhadbeennotifiedofthedateofthetrialandescapes,heshallbedeemedto
have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is
regained."(Emphasissupplied)
Thus,withrespecttoanaccusedwhoisnotincustody,hisnonappearanceconstitutesawaiverofhis
righttobepresentonlyforthetrialsetfortheparticulardateofwhichhehadnotice.Upontheother
hand,suchnonappearancebyanaccusedincustodyandwholaterescapesisconsideredawaiverof
therightonsuchdateandallsubsequenttrialdatesuntilsuchcustodyisregained.
The hearing on 8 April 1985 was actually the initial hearing for the two (2) cases, albeit erroneously
forthesecondduetotheinfirmityreferredtoearlier,itwaslikewiseforthepurposeofreceivingthe
evidencefortheprosecution.Itcannotbefairlypresumedthatsaidsettingwasalsoforthepurpose
of presenting the accuseds evidence considering that neither the court nor the parties knew in
advance the number of cases to be tried on those dates and the length of the direct and cross
examinationsofthewitnesses.Besides,evenassumingforthesakeofargumentthattheprosecution
could rest its case on 8 April 1985, the defense could have still filed a demurrer to evidence under
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which would have necessarily meant a deferment of the
receptionoftheevidencefortheaccused.
The order of the respondent Judge declaring the two (2) cases submitted for decision is not only a
violation of Section 1(c) of Rule 115 but is also a pronouncement that the petitioner had waived his
constitutionalrighttobeheardbyhimselfandcounsel,31andpresenthisevidence.Thisiscertainly
lamentable for he thus allowed his court to breach one of its highest, duties the protection of the
citizenandthemaintenanceofhisconstitutionalrights.32
Whileconstitutionalrightsmaybewaived,33suchwaivermustbeclearandmustbecoupledwithan
actualintentiontorelinquishtheright.34Thereisnothingonrecordtosuggestconductonthepartof
the petitioner from which it may be reasonably inferred that he had waived his right to submit his
evidence.Onthecontrary,hiscounselsmotionforresettingrequestedspecificallyforthehearingof
thecaseson13and14May1985.
WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrendered:
c h a n r o b 1 e s v ir t u a l1 a wlib r a r y
1. SETTING ASIDE that portion of the Order of respondent Judge of 3 April 1985 forfeiting the bond
posted by petitioners bondsmen and declaring Criminal Cases Nos. 3892 and 3892 submitted for
decision
2.DECLARINGthattherewasnovalidarraignmentinCriminalCaseNo.3892
c h a n r o b le s la wlib r a r y : r e d
3. UPHOLDING the validity of the exparte reception of the prosecutions evidence on 8 April 1985
insofarasCriminalCaseNo.3890isconcernedandDECLARINGpetitionerashavingwaivedhisright
tocrossexaminethewitnesspresentedbytheprosecutioninsaidcase
4.SETTINGASIDEtheNoticeofPromulgationissuedon3May1985and
5.DIRECTINGthecourtbelowtoarraignthepetitionerinCriminalCaseNo.3892,setthecasefortrial
for the reception of the evidence for the prosecution, hold a joint hearing of both cases for the
receptionoftheevidenceforthepetitionerand,induecourse,renderjudgmentthereon.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Gutierrez,Jr.BidinandRomero,JJ.,concur.
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Feliciano,J.,isonleave.
Endnotes:
1.Rollo,1415.
2.Id.,1819.
3.Orderof12November1984Id.,47.
4.Annex"C"ofPetitionsRollo,20.
5.Annex"D",Id.21.ItisnotexplainedwhythemotiontodismissisforCriminalCase
No.3892.Nocopyofaseparatemotiontodismissisattachedtothepetition.
6.Orderof29November1984Rollo,48.
7.Orderof7February1985Id.,50.
8.Annex"F"ofPetitionId.,25.
9.Firstparagraph,CommentsofrespondentJudgeRollo,2324.
10.Annex"E"ofPetitionId.,2324.
11.Annex"G",Id.Id.,2627.
12.Annex"I"ofPetitionRollo,29.
13.Annex"H",Id.Id.,28.
14.Rollo,4447.
15.Id.,5761.
16.Id.,7283.
17.Seefootnoteno.5.
18.AttachedtotheCommentsofActing2ndAssistantCityFiscalLopenaRollo,5761.
19.Id.,58.
20.ThiswasliftedfromSection19,ArticleIV,1973Constitution.
21.Section18,Rule114,RulesofCourt.
22. Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546 [1975] People v. Salas, 143
SCRA 163 [1986]. See REGALADO, F.D., Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. Two, Fifth
RevisedEd.,1988,292.
23.OldSection2,Rule116andoldSection3,Rule118,1964RulesofCourt.
24.Rollo,5761.
25.Rollo,6061.
26.Rollo,23.
27.12Phil.64[1908].
28.39Phil.738,74142[1919].SeealsoPeoplev.Mendez,28SCRA880[1969].
29. 198 SCRA 689 [1991], citing Firme v. Reyes, 92 SCRA 713 [1979] and the cases
cited therein. See also Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. v. Revilla, 52 SCRA 246
[1973]Sacdalanv.Bautista,56SCRA175[1974]Pradov.VeridianoII,204SCRA654
[1991].
30. Isaac v. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279 [1951], citing United States v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33
[1910]andInReFilart,40Phil.205[1919].SeealsoGordulanv.Gordulan,3SCRA205
[1961] Macavinta v. People, 54 SCRA 420 [1973] Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. v.
CourtofAppeals,61SCRA87[1974].
31.Section14(2),ArticleIII,1987Constitution.
32.Rodriguezv.Villamiel,65Phil.230[1937].
33.Peoplev.Donato,198SCRA130[1991].
34.Peoplev.Burgos,144SCRA1[1986].
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