JASPER JOHNS

AND THE INFLUENCE OF

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

by

PETER HIGGINSON
B.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

Fine Arts

We accept t h i s . t h e s i s as conforming to the

required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

July, 1974
In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements for

an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that

the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t freely available for r e f e r e n c e and study.

I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s thesis

f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head of my Department o r

by h i s representatives. It i s understood that copying o r publication

of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my

written permission.

Depa rtment

The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia
Vancouver 8, Canada
 ABSTRACT

The i n f l u e n c e s upon Johns' work stem from v a r i e d f i e l d s of i n t e r e s t s , r a n g i n g

from Leonardo to John Cage, Hart Crane to Duchamp, M a r s h a l l McLuhan to

Wittgenstein. The r o l e that W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s philosophy, p l a y s has never been fully

appreciated. What d i s c u s s i o n has occurred - namely Max K o z l o f f ' s and Rosalind

Krauss' - shows an inadequacy e i t h e r through a l a c k of u n d e r s t a n d i n g or a super-

ficiality towards the p h i l o s o p h i c a l views. An in-depth a n a l y s i s on this,, subject

is invaluable i n f u l l y comprehending the r a m i f i c a t i o n s of Johns' p a i n t i n g of the

60's. The i n t e n t i o n o f t h i s paper i s to examine W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s influence and

a s s e s s how h i s method of s e e k i n g out meaning i n language i s used by Johns i n h i s

p a i n t i n g s to e x p l o r e meaning i n a r t .

Johns' e a r l y work c o u l d perhaps be n u t s h e l l e d as a r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t the

egocentricism of A b s t r a c t - E x p r e s s i o n i s m . Through the F l a g s , T a r g e t s , Alphabets

and Numeral p i e c e s he has suspended the f o r m a l i s s u e s t h a t were p r e v a l e n t i n the

early f i f t i e s i n an attempt to p r o v i d e a l l s i d e s of the argument r a t h e r than some

f a c i l e and unsatisfactory reconciliation. Johns saw that the problems i n p a i n t i n g

l a y not i n wrong answers but i n the l a c k of u n d e r s t a n d i n g the n a t u r e of v i s u a l

communication. It i s impossible to p r e s e n t the a r t i s t ' s s e l f s i n c e the 'success'

of the a r t o b j e c t i n v o l v e s an e q u a l l y important member, the audience, and i t is

within this dialogue t h a t meaning l i e s . The object-paintings of t h i s e a r l y phase

ask, what i s p a i n t i n g ? and pose d i f f e r e n t s u g g e s t i o n s w i t h each b e i n g f e a s i b l e and

r e l e v a n t without b e i n g conclusive. Johns i n s i s t s on keeping the s i t u a t i o n

incapable o f any final resolution.

In 1959 Johns d i s c o v e r e d Duchamp and h i s broader i d e a o f a r t t h a t moved away

from r e t i n a l b o u n d a r i e s i n t o a f i e l d where language, thought and v i s i o n acted upon

one another. F a l s e S t a r t , 1959, r e f l e c t s t h i s i n t e r e s t and can be seen not as any

r a d i c a l change from former work, as Barbara Rose and Sidney T i l l i m suggest, but as
 iii

a development o f p r e v i o u s i d e a s , now t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the r o l e language

p l a y s i n the r e c e p t i o n o f a p a i n t i n g .

W i t t g e n s t e i n began to i n t e r e s t Johns i n 1961. H i s a n a l y s i s of meaning i n

language s e t down i n the P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s not o n l y shared a close

affinity to the ' a r t i s l i f e ' maxim of Johns, Rauschenberg and Cage but more

importantly presented Johns w i t h a methodology to c l a r i f y the d e f i n i t i o n of a r t .

L i k e Duchamp, W i t t g e n s t e i n saw the e s t a b l i s h i n g of meaning l y i n g o u t s i d e the pro-

b l e m a t i c - t h e r e i s no s o l u t i o n s i n c e t h e r e i s no problem. The Investigations -

a complete r e v e r s a l of the e a r l i e r T r a c t a t u s L o g i c o P h i l o s o p h i c u s which claimed

t h a t language i s a l o g i c a l p i c t u r i n g of f a c t s - e s s e n t i a l l y poses that the meaning

of language l i e s i n i t s usage, that t h e r e i s no one a u t h o r i t a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n of a

word but as many as t h e r e a r e uses f o r i t . W i t t g e n s t e i n saw the r o l e of the

p h i l o s o p h e r not as one of p r o v i d i n g new i n f o r m a t i o n but of c l e a r i n g up misconcep-

t i o n s through r e v i e w i n g what we have a l r e a d y known. Philosophy i s 'a b a t t l e a g a i n s t

the bewitchment of our i n t e l l i g e n c e by means of language'.

Johns' p a i n t i n g s from 1961 on become such where he sees the r o l e of the artist

as a b a t t l e a g a i n s t the bewitchment of our s i g h t by not simply language but more

specifically, criticism. The Critic Sees, 1961 and i t s a t t a c k on w r i t e r s whose

motives are v e r y d i f f e r e n t from e x t e n d i n g any v i s u a l awareness s e t s the stage f o r

a c o l l e c t i o n of p a i n t i n g s t h a t q u e s t i o n s the whole aspect of s c h o o l s of criticism

w i t h t h e i r p o l e m i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s as to how we should see. This i n t e r e s t i n meaning

w i t h a b i a s towards New York c r i t i c i s m i s understandable s i n c e i t was from here

t h a t the most i n t r i g u i n g and muddled i d e a s of Johns' work came and i n a d d i t i o n , he

was p a i n t i n g at a p e r i o d when the a r t i s t ' s aim was becoming more and more

p r e s c r i b e d by what the c r i t i c proposed.

Johns' l a r g e s t canvas to d a t e , A c c o r d i n g to What, 1964, i s an a p o l o g i a o f the

n o t i o n of p e r c e p t i o n t h a t he shares w i t h W i t t g e n s t e i n r a t h e r than a grand hommage

 iv

to Duchamp.

A Wittgenstinian analysis of Johns' post-1961 paintings not only gives an

explanation of the imagery employed but reveals to us two fundamental issues

inherent i n them: looking i s r e l a t i v e with the only common denominator being

l i f e , which i n turn shows c r i t i c i s m , i n the controversial from Johns was used to

experiencing i t , as more concerned with reinforcing i n d i v i d u a l claims rather than

any desire to evolve a t o t a l awareness. As with Wittgenstein's philosophy of

anthropocentrism, Johns does not advance any one theory. He does not, unlike the

formalist interest, regard the problems of contemporary painting as empirical but

as a blindness to the numerous inherent and unavoidable v i s u a l aspects i n any one

work.
 v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT i i

LIST OF PLATES vi

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER I : 1955 t o 1961 4

CHAPTER I I : Wittgenstein's Philosophy: A Synopsis 24

CHAPTER I I I : Johns and W i t t g e n s t e i n : The S t a t e o f

C r i t i c i s m so F a r 36

CHAPTER IV : Johns and W i t t g e n s t e i n 45

CHAPTER V : Conclusion 70

FOOTNOTES 74

PLATES 90
BIBLIOGRAPHY 116
 vi

LIST OF PLATES

PLATE I Flag, 1954

PLATE II Target With Plaster Casts, 1955

PLATE III Target with Four Faces, 1955

PLATE IV Construction with Toy Piano, 1954

PLATE V Untitled, 1954

PLATE VI Large Green Target, 1955

PLATE VII White Target, 1957

PLATE VIII Figure 5, 1955

PLATE IX Charles Demuth. I Saw The Figure 5 i n Gold,

PLATE X Gray Alphabets, 1956

PLATE XI Gray Numbers, 1958

PLATE XII Gray Alphabets, 1956

PLATE XIII U n t i t l e d , c.1954

PLATE XIV Tango, 1955

PLATE XV Andy Warhol Dance Diagram - Tango, 1962

PLATE XVI Canvas, 1956

PLATE XVII Drawer, 1957

PLATE XVIII Gray Rectangles, 1957

PLATE XIX Painting With a B a l l , 1958

PLATE XX Tennyson, 1958

PLATE XXI The, 1957

PLATE XXII Shade, 1959

PLATE XXIII Magritte, Human Condition I, 1933

PLATE XXIV Delaunay, Windows on the City, 1912

PLATE XXV False Start, 1959

PLATE XXVI Magritte, The Use of Words, 1928-29

PLATE XXVII Jubilee, 1959

 vii

PLATE X X V I I I Out t h e Window, 1959

PLATE XXIX Thermometer, 1959

P L A T E XXX Painting with Two B a l l s , 1960

PLATE XXXI Device Circle, 1959

PLATE XXXII Painting with Ruler and "Gray", 1960

PLATE X X X I I I Leonardo da V i n c i , V i t r u v i a n Man , c . 1485-90

PLATE XXXIV Device, 1961-62

P L A T E XXXV By t h e S e a , 1961

P L A T E XXXVI Passage, 1962

PLATE XXXVII F o o l ' s House, 1962

PLATE XXXVIII Out t h e Window II, 1962

PLATE XXXIX Field Painting, 1963-64

PLATE xxxx The C r i t i c Sees, 1961

PLATE XXXXI No, 1961

PLATE XXXXII Periscope (Hart Crane)

PLATE XXXXIII Land's End, 1963

P L A T E XXXXIV Diver, 1962

PLATE xxxxv Watchman, 1964

P L A T E XXXXVI According t o What, 1964

PLATE XXXXVII Duchamp T u m'. 1918

PLATE X X X X V I I I ' Fragments - According t o What - H i n g e d Canvas, 1971

P L A T E XXXXIX Cup 4 Picasso, 1972

 1

INTRODUCTION

i
 2

In a f o o t n o t e to her a r t i c l e on Johns, R o s a l i n d Krauss t a l k s of h i s initia-

t i o n into Wittgenstein's philosophy.* Johns r e c o u n t s t h a t i n 1961 someone t o l d

him the s t o r y Norman Malcolm w r i t e s of i n h i s r e m i n i s c e n c e s of W i t t g e n s t e i n .

'Once a f t e r supper, W i t t g e n s t e i n , my w i f e and I went f o r a walk on

Midsummer Common [Cambridge, E n g l a n d ] . We t a l k e d about the movements
of the b o d i e s of the s o l a r system. I t occured to W i t t g e n s t e i n t h a t
the t h r e e of us should r e p r e s e n t the movement of the sun, moon and
e a r t h r e l a t i v e to one another. My w i f e was the sun and maintained a
steady pace a c r o s s the meadow; I was the e a r t h and c i r c l e d her at a
trot. W i t t g e n s t e i n took the most strenuous p a r t of a l l , the moon
and r a n around me w h i l e I c i r c l e d my w i f e . W i t t g e n s t e i n e n t e r e d i n t o
t h i s game w i t h g r e a t enthusiasm and s e r i o u s n e s s , s h o u t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s
at us as he r a n . ' 2

On h e a r i n g t h i s s t o r y Johns d e c i d e d to read a l l the W i t t g e n s t e i n he c o u l d . The

appeal the t a l e had f o r him was one that s t i l l remains i n t r i n s i c to h i s work;

the i d e a of game p l a y i n g , but l i k e the p h i l o s o p h e r , games to be p l a y e d seriously

not l i g h t l y . As language was f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s l a t e r p h i l o s o p h y so i s a r t f o r

Johns - i n f a c t he has o f t e n expressed t h a t p a i n t i n g i s a language.

The i n t e n t i o n of t h i s paper i s to examine W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s i n f l u e n c e and

d i s c u s s how h i s method of s e e k i n g out meaning i n language i s used by Johns to

e x p l o r e meaning i n a r t . For reasons of space, I have kept to the p a i n t i n g up

to 1964 which marks the completion o f perhaps h i s most important canvas so

far, A c c o r d i n g t o What. S i n c e t h a t time Johns has r e s t r i c t e d h i m s e l f , on the

whole, t o g r a p h i c s and o n l y i n the l a s t year or so has begun a r e t u r n to the

p a i n t medium.

I will first g i v e an o v e r a l l view of h i s work from 1955-1961 as a

n e c e s s a r y background t o what f o l l o w s . B e f o r e d i s c u s s i n g the l a t e r p a i n t i n g

from a W i t t g e n s t i n i a n viewpoint, i n Chapter 4, Chapter 2 w i l l be devoted to

p r e s e n t i n g as b r i e f l y as p o s s i b l e a s y n o p s i s of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p h i l o s o p h y and

Chapter 3 t o a d i s c u s s i o n of the p r e s e n t s t a t e of c r i t i c i s m on Wittgenstein's

r o l e i n Johns' work.
 What must be s t r e s s e d at t h i s stage i s t h a t Johns i s not a p h i l o s o p h e r i n

the s t r i c t sense and h i s p r e d i s p o s i t i o n t o W i t t g e n s t e i n does not stem from a

concern f o r the philosopher;!;s p l a c e i n any linguistic tradition. A philoso-

p h i c a l i n q u i r y i n t o the 'accuracy' of Johns' comprehension of W i t t g e n s t e i n

would be p o i n t l e s s . Few p h i l o s o p h e r s themselves are i n agreement i n t h e i r

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and i t must be remembered t h a t Johns' a p p l i c a t i o n was more than

probably c o l o u r e d by John Cage's i n f l u e n c e . Cage's e c l e c t i s i s m has shown

itself i n h i s a b i l i t y to l e t h i s i d e a s ' s l i d e without self-conscious effort into

3

areas f a r beyond c o n v e n t i o n a l thought' - a f a s c i n a t i n g p r a c t i c e but impossible

to e v a l u a t e s u c c e s s f u l l y from a p u r e l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t a n d p o i n t .
 4

CHAPTER ONE: 1955 t o 1961

"Most o f my thoughts I n v o l v e i m p u r i t i e s .... I t h i n k i t i s a form o f p l a y ,

or form o f e x e r c i s e , and i t ' s i n p a r t mental and i n p a r t v i s u a l (and God
knows what t h a t i s ) . But t h a t ' s one of the t h i n g s we l i k e about the
visual arts. The terms i n which we're accustomed t o t h i n k i n g a r e
a d u l t e r a t e d o r abused. Or a term t h a t we're not used t o u s i n g o r which
we have n o t used i n our e x p e r i e n c e becomes v e r y c l e a r . Or what i s e x p l i c i t
suddenly i s n ' t . We l i k e t h e n o v e l t y of g i v i n g up what we know, and we
l i k e t h e n o v e l t y o f coming t o know something we d i d not know. Otherwise,
we would j u s t h o l d on t o what we have, and t h a t ' s not v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g . " x
 5

J a s p e r Johns, l i k e Robert Rauschenberg, began p a i n t i n g i n a p e r i o d that

was becoming steeped i n the s u c c e s s e s and f a i l u r e s of A b s t r a c t Expressionism.

By the e a r l y f i f t i e s i t had a l r e a d y begun to take on the v i s a g e of an academy

of p a i n t i n g . In 1965, Barbara Rose wrote her a r t i c l e , 'The Second G e n e r a t i o n :

2

Academy and Breakthrough' , and a t t r i b u t e d the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g of this

s t y l e to Rosenberg's 'The American A c t i o n P a i n t e r s ' of December, 1952.

Rosenberg's a r t i c l e had a s i m i l a r e f f e c t on New York p a i n t e r s as G l e i z e ' s and

Metzinger's surrogate manifesto,. Du Gubisme had on the P a r i s a r t i s t s of

t 1912.

Du Cubisme o f f e r e d an e x p l a n a t i o n of Cubist aims as understood by i t s a u t h o r s

w i t h the r e s u l t i n g a b s u r d i t y t h a t Bna^ue and Picasso's v i s i o n of a C u b i s t reality

got by-passed. Rosenberg's a r t i c l e , which l i k e w i s e set down the common a s p i r a -

t i o n s of a number of a r t i s t s , a l s o had novel results. Unwittingly he evoked

a f o c a l i s i n g f o r c e t h a t appealed on a n a t i o n a l i s t i c as w e l l as an i n d i v i d u a l

level:
" T h i s new p a i n t i n g does not c o n s t i t u t e a s c h o o l . To form a s c h o o l i n
modern times not o n l y i s a new p a i n t i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s needed but a
c o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s and even an i n s i s t e n c e on
c e r t a i n f o r m u l a s . A s c h o o l i s the r e s u l t of the l i n k a g e of p r a c t i c e
w i t h t e r m i n o l o g y - d i f f e r e n t p a i n t i n g s are a f f e c t e d by the same words.
In the American Vanguard the words, as we s h a l l see, b e l o n g not t o
the a r t but to the i n d i v i d u a l a r t i s t s . What they t h i n k i n common i s
r e p r e s e n t e d o n l y by what they do s e p a r a t e l y - ^ 1

Rosenberg p r o v i d e d the 'consciousness of t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' , a t e r m i n o l o g y

and u l t i m a t e l y a movement t h a t any American a r t i s t could j o i n while being

a s s u r e d of r e t a i n i n g his. s e p a r a t e n e s s .

Even today, Johns i s perhaps best known, w i t h Rauschenberg,for initiating

the c o l l a p s e and, as some w r i t e r s are want to view i t , c a s t r a t i o n of this

n a r c i s s i s m - i n P a i n t i n g w i t h Two B a i l s , 1960 ( p l a t e XXX) Johns even suspends

t h e i r g e n i t a l s between a parody of an A b s t r a c t Expressionist painting. How .

these two managed t h i s , I t h i n k , l i e s i n their exceptional intuition. Both

 6

were s o u t h e r n e r s , both had done time i n the f o r c e s , n e i t h e r had had any artistic

background or l i v e d i n any a r t i s t i c environment. They approached p a i n t i n g w i t h

a naivete that a l l o w e d them to ask fundamental q u e s t i o n s and answer them w i t h a

c l e a r sightedness t h a t perhaps no artist i n the t h i c k of an A b s t r a c t Expressio-

n i s t m i l i e u c o u l d ; as M a r s h a l l McLuhan, another i n f l u e n c e on Johns, says:

' P r o f e s s i o n a l i s m i s e n v i r o n m e n t a l . Amateurism i s a n t i - e n v i r o n m e n t a l .
P r o f e s s i o n a l i s m merges the i n d i v i d u a l i n t o p a t t e r n s of t o t a l
environment. Amateurism seeks the development of the t o t a l
awareness of the i n d i v i d u a l and the c r i t i c a l awareness of the ground
r u l e s o f s o c i e t y . The amateur can a f f o r d to l o s e ... The 'expert' i s
the man who s t a y s put.'4

A marvellous manifestation of t h i s : Albers the p r o f e s s i o n a l , the expert on

c o l o u r and Rauschenberg the amateur who f a i l e d to understand the s i g n i f i c a n c e

of c o l o u r i n t e r a c t i o n theory at the B l a c k Mountain School and ended up doing

an a l l - w h i t e p a i n t i n g . ^ '

a
J o h n s ' i n t u i t i o n and 'amateurism' l e d i n 1954 to p a i n t h i s f i r s t Flag

( P l a t e 1) which set the p a t t e r n f o r the next f i v e y e a r s of an inquiry into

the r e c o n c i l i n g o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h the p i c t u r e p l a n e as w e l l as the whole

n a t u r e of what c o n s t i t u t e s the=art o b j e c t - a p l a y between representation

and replication.

De Kooning had s e t the stage w i t h h i s Woman p a i n t i n g s of the e a r l y fifties

where he b a t t l e d w i t h the s p a t i a l dilemma of f i g u r e and ground. The contours

o f the anatomy are opened to a l l o w the environment to f u s e w i t h the o b j e c t . He

sought to escape from a C u b i s t r e a l i t y and r e t u r n to a representational

d e p i c t i o n , t h a t would somehow not c o n f l i c t w i t h the f l a t s u r f a c e of the canvas.

The t e n s i o n was one of p l u s and minus, l i g h t s and d a r k s , p l a n e and contour,

i l l u s i o n and fact.

Johns' F l a g i s remarkable i n t h a t r a t h e r than f i n d a formal synthesis in

which we can a t t a c h one meaning.he s u c c e s s f u l l y suspends the i s s u e s w i t h o u t

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t h e i r denying each o t h e r and i n s i s t s on keeping the s i t u a t i o n i n c a p a b l e of any

final resolution. Is i t a p a i n t i n g or a r e p l i c a of a f;lag? The 'a p r i o r i '

s t r u c t u r i n g of the f l a g image, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l l y f l a t , i n a b s t r a c t terms may

aread t h r e e d i m e n s i o n a l l y w i t h bands of r e d on a w h i t e background. A l l these

f a c t o r s are immersed as i t were i n a n e u t r a l p a i n t e r l i n e s s which seems to

p r o v i d e a u n i f o r m i t y of s p a t i a l i l l u s i o n u n t i l we r e a l i z e that t h i s i n turn

i s s u b j e c t e d to the p a t t e r n o f the f l a g . We end up mutely dumbfounded by the

i m p o s s i b i l i t y of r e a c h i n g any d e f i n i t e e x p l a n a t i o n and i t becomes an existential

experience.

Greenberg can p l a c e Johns o n l y i n some ' v o i d ' between a b s t r a c t i o n and

representation. He r e c o g n i z e s the v a r i o u s c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , but the nagging

insoluble quality f i n a l l y f o r c e s him to d i s m i s s the whole t h i n g as indicating

a ' c e r t a i n narrowness'. 6
Johns r e f u s e s to p r o v i d e any arrival. U n l i k e , Frank

Stella, f o r example, Johns has gone too f a r f o r Greenberg.

'The o r i g i n a l f l a t n e s s of the p i c t u r e s u r f a c e , w i t h a few o u t l i n e s

s t e n c i l l e d on i t , i s shown as s u f f i c i n g to r e p r e s e n t a l l t h a t a
p i c t u r e by Johns r e a l l y does r e p r e s e n t . The c o v e r i n g of p a i n t
i t s e l f , w i t h i t s de Kooningesque p l a y of l i g h t s and darks i s shown
as b e i n g c o m p l e t e l y s u p e r f l u o u s to t h i s end.'7

In the same w a y , S t e l l a has sought to c r i t i c i z e Johns' c u l t i v a t i o n of 'problems',

e:.g. J a s p e r ' s Dilemma 1962-63. S t e l l a g i v e s h i s e n e r g i e s to s o l v i n g r i d d l e s ,

Johns to c r e a t i n g them. Without the ' s u p e r f l u o u s ' q u a l i t y of the painterly

i n Johns' F l a g i t would indeed take on the f u n c t i o n of S t e l l a ' s work. The

disagreement appears t o be i n the case t h a t f o r f o r m a l i s m i t i s anathema to

emphasize the p r o c e s s of p a i n t i n g i n o r d e r to d i s s o c i a t e the image from the

emblem. ^

For the next t h r e e y e a r s Johns was to c o n t i n u e experimenting with the

i r o n i e s inherent i n the F l a g p a i n t i n g . In 1955 he produced h i s Target pieces.

These make even more demands on the o b s e r v e r because of t h e i r centrality.

 8

P r i m a r i l y the f o c u s of Target w i t h P l a s t e r Casts and Target w i t h Four Faces

( P l a t e s I I and I I I ) i s n e u t r a l i s e d by the deep b l u e of the o u t e r c i r c l e and

the b r i l l i a n c e of the r e d surround. We are unable to c o n f i d e n t l y determine

background and f o r e g r o u n d , but at t h i s stage Johns does not appear too sure of

c o l o u r t o l e a v e i t a t t h a t and i n t r o d u c e s v a r i o u s modulating elements to c a n c e l

out the f o c u s of the image. In Target w i t h P l a s t e r Casts the canvas i s topped

by a s e r i e s of boxes w i t h l i d s c o n t a i n i n g p l a s t e r c a s t s of v a r i o u s a n a t o m i c a l
9

fragments. Both K o z l o f f and Solomon see the p r o t o t y p e f o r t h i s work coming

from a p i e c e done e a r l i e r i n 1954 b e f o r e the F l a g , t i t l e d Construction with

Toy Piano ( P l a t e Iv) where numbered keys of the toy piano l i n e the top of a

box. For Target w i t h Four Faces K o z l o f f f i n d s the source i n an U n t i t l e d p i e c e

from 1954 where a box c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n t a i n i n g c o l l a g e elements and a p l a s t e r

c a s t of a head i s not u n l i k e C o r n e l l ' s work ( P l a t e V)

The t h r e e d i m e n s i o n a l elements of these two works de-emphasize the cen-

t r a l i s i n g form i n such a way t h a t i f we are t o l o o k a t them w i t h a marksman's

eye we are put i n a quandary whether to aim at the c e n t r e of the t a r g e t or the

objects. A further subtlety i s t h a t the s p e c t a t o r i s g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y t o

shut o f f the s i g h t of these c a s t s by c l o s i n g the a t t a c h e d l i d s . Perhaps Johns

i s i n f e r r i n g t h a t t h e s e canvases do have l i t e r a l space - i n s i d e as i t were.

However, s i n c e the r e p r o d u c t i o n s do not show what i s on the b a c k s i d e of the

lids t h i s should not be taken f u r t h e r . S t e i n b e r g ' s attempt to comprehend

the c o l l e c t i o n of u n r e l a t e d elements i s adventurous while s t i l l being v i a b l e :

'In Target w i t h Four Faces .... the t a r g e t o f J a s p e r Johns i s always
" r i g h t h e r e " i t i s a l l the f i e l d there i s . I t has l o s t i t s d e f i n i t e
" t h e r e n e s s " . I went on t o wonder about the human f a c e and came t o
the o p p o s i t e c o n c l u s i o n . A f a c e makes no sense u n l e s s i t i s "here"...
as soon as you r e c o g n i z e a t h i n g as a f a c e , i t i s an o b j e c t no l o n g e r
but one p o l e i n a s i t u a t i o n of r e c i p r o c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s ... I f e l t t h a t
the l e v e l i n g of those c a t e g o r i e s which a r e the s u b j e c t i v e markers of
space i m p l i e d a t o t a l l y non-human p o i n t of view. I t was as i f the
s u b j e c t i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s , which a l o n e can g i v e meaning t o the words
"here and t h e r e " , had ceased t o e x i s t . ' H
 9

The analysis i s warranted since at no time does Steinberg impose i t upon the

a r t i s t ' s intentions. Johns, i n s t r i v i n g to escape the onlooker's grasp by sett-*-

ing up ambiguities of meaning, allows d i f f e r e n t interpretations but never a

12

conclusion. Narrative content i s consciously played down to ensure t h i s .

In the above work the fourth cast has been swapped with the t h i r d to prevent

any theme of progression i n the woman's growing smile.

'Kozloff sums up the differences between various c r i t i c i s m s of Johns thus:

'The formalists, while perhaps admiring the ambition with which formal
q u a l i t i e s were meshed together, judge the f i n a l e f f o r t to be an
i n t e r e s t i n g f a i l u r e . The l a t t e r two [Steinberg and Sylvester 3 ]
x

i n i t i a l l y despairing of finding human and metaphorical expression of

f e e l i n g i n Johns, become aware of a philosophical play upon the
i d e n t i t y and usage of images that transcends the merely p e r s o n a l ' ^

Eventually Johns becomes more relaxed with the target image and i s able to use

i t alone i n paintings. Large Green Target 1955 (Plate VI) could possibly be

regarded as less i n t e r e s t i n g i n that the playing with colour and spatial

i l l u s i o n i s dropped, but on the other hand there i s a new confidence with

the materials. Through a r i c h e r use of encaustic and scrap paper Johns,builds

up a texture that eradicates the s p a t i a l caused by the focalising image. White

Target, 1957 (Place VII) i s even more charged with d i s s o c i a t i o n . The grid-

l i k e pattern of the encaustic dipped pieces of collage are now subdued by a

more expressionistic application with the brush. The result i s an even tighter

conjoining of structure and freedom to the point of almost imminent explosion.

We could ask at this point why Johns did not simply paint a round canvas.

I think there are two reasons. Shaped canvases at this time would have missed

the point and impact that Johns was interested i n , that i s i t would have taken

the subject away from the idea of easel painting. Also, whilst there i s an

element of s p a t i a l recession within the image the placing of i t on a f l a t

ground heightens the irony.

 The number and alphabet s e r i e s were o r i g i n a l l y used i n much the same way

as the f l a g and t a r g e t images - f o r example F i g u r e 5, 1955 (Plate V I I I ) . It i s

g e n e r a l l y accepted t h a t Johns took t h i s m o t i f from C h a r l e s Demuth's, I Saw The

Figure F i v e i n G o l d , 1928 ( P l a t e IX) who i n t u r n took i n s p i r a t i o n from C a r l o s

Williams' poem The Great F i g u r e w r i t t e n a few years previously. "' 1

Demuth's

image i s f u t u r i s t and becomes a c e l e b r a t i o n . Johns' use has no r e l a t e d mea-

ning. I t does not quantify anything, i t attaches no anecdote, i t i s j u s t a

common e v e r y day number as the f l a g was an everyday symbol. ' But there i s a

difference. The d i g i t s , as w e l l as the a l p h a b e t s ^ a r e much r i c h e r forms than

the p r e v i o u s two. The F i g u r e 5 i s f a r l e s s s t a t i c and p o s s i b l y i t was this

q u a l i t y t h a t l e d Johns to l o o k at the q u e s t i o n of n a r r a t i v e i n a b s t r a c t a r t .

He seems to have asked h i m s e l f , how do we i n c l u d e a sense o f time w i t h o u t

denying the p r e s e n t n e s s of painting?

'... The f i r s t number p a i n t i n g s were j u s t s i n g l e f i g u r e s . . . . then I

saw a c h a r t . You know the gray alphabet p a i n t i n g ? I saw a c h a r t i n
a book t h a t had t h a t arrangement o f the a l p h a b e t . Then I, o f c o u r s e ,
r e a l i z e d I c o u l d do the numbers t h a t way t o o . But e a r l i e r than t h a t
w i t h the f i r s t numbers I d i d n ' t do every num ber and I d i d n ' t work
on them i n any o r d e r and I d e l i b e r a t e l y d i d n ' t do them a l l , so t h a t
t h e r e wouldn't be i m p l i e d t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p of moving through
things.' 1 6

Johns t h e n , growing t i r e d of s e e k i n g out flat image a f t e r f l a t image, saw a

means of how he c o u l d b r i n g i n the element of time and l e t the same s i t u a t i o n

deny i t through the use of the c h a r t arrangement. With Gray A l p h a b e t s , 1956

( P l a t e X) or Gray Numbers, 1958 ( P l a t e XI).no l i n e of d i g i t s or l e t t e r s i s

the same whether read h o r i z o n t a l l y or v e r t i c a l l y s i n c e i n Gray A l p h a b e t s the

chart grid i s made up of twenty-seven r e c t a n g l e s by twenty-seven rectangles

w i t h the top left rectangle left b l a n k and l i k e w i s e Gray Numbers i s eleven

r e c t a n g l e s h i g h and eleven wide.

At the same time t h a t Johns i s c a r e f u l not to d u p l i c a t e a l i n e with a

s i m i l a r arrangement of images, t h e r e still remains from one aspect, a constant

 11

p a t t e r n of p r o g r e s s i o n which becomes b o r i n g to the extreme. However t h i s

a l p h a b e t i c a l and n u m e r i c a l r i g i d i t y i s countered by the r i c h painterly

treatment of each r e c t a n g l e so t h a t no l e t t e r or d i g i t l o o k s the same (see

Plate XII). On the one hand we a r e p r e s e n t e d w i t h monotony on the o t h e r with

extreme v a r i e t y . In a statement t o Hopps, Johns s a i d :

'I'm c e r t a i n l y not p u t t i n g numbers to any use, numbers a r e used a l l

the time, and What's b e i n g done i s making something to be l o o k e d
at.'17

There i s another f a c t o r i n these two works t h a t has- not occurred before

w i t h the important exception;, of one e a r l y U n t i t l e d p i e c e done i n 1954 (Plate

XIII). The effect of t h i s work - apart from the b l a c k and w h i t e r e p r o d u c t i o n

l o o k i n g v e r y l i k e a Z o l t a n Kemeny r e l i e f - i s one o f h a l f embedded, h a l f super-

imposing l e t t e r s or d i g i t s . . The Gray Numerals.. and Gray Alphabets are t r e a t e d

i n a s i m i l a r f a s h i o n w i t h the contours of the images b e i n g opened up so t h a t

t h e r e i s a f u s i o n o f f i g u r e and ground i n p r o g r e s s r a t h e r than mutual e x i s -

tence. But t h i s i s absurd and t r a d i t i o n a l l y unnecessary s i n c e number and

ground share the same space. Such a phenomemon i n a d v e r t e n t l y b r i n g s everything

back very c l o s e l y t o de Kooning and h i s opening o f p l a n e s to a l l o w the

background e n t r y , w i t h the p a r a d o x i c a l i n v e r s i o n of now a t t a c k i n g s u r f a c e as

18
if i t were t h r e e dimensional.

D e s p i t e a l l t h i s , l o o k i n g e s p e c i a l l y at Gray Numerals, t h e r e i s a nagging

19

d e s i r e to f i n d some k i n d of meaning behind the permutations of figures.

T h i s i s not so e n t i r e l y p o i n t l e s s as i t may sound even i f we may never a r r i v e

at any s a t i s f a c t o r y answer. K o z l o f f ' s quote from M a r s h a l l McLuhan affords us an

insight into this persistency:

'In i s o l a t i o n , number i s as mysterious as w r i t i n g . Seen as an e x t e n s i o n

of our p h y s i c a l b o d i e s , i t becomes q u i t e i n t e l l i g i b l e . J u s t as
w r i t i n g i s an e x t e n s i o n and s e p a r a t i o n of our most n e u t r a l and
o b j e c t i v e sense, the sense o f s i g h t , number i s an e x t e n s i o n and
s e p a r a t i o n of our most i n t i m a t e and i n t e r e s t i n g a c t i v i t y , our sense
of t o u c h . . . . i t may w e l l be t h a t i n our c o n s c i o u s i n n e r l i v e s the
i n t e r p l a y among our senses i s what c o n s t i t u t e s the sense of touch.
 12

Perhaps touch i s not j u s t s k i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h i n g s , but the v e r y life

of t h i n g s i n the mind.'20

Johns l o v e s p a i n t i n g . There i s i n h i s use of e n c a u s t i c and o i l a deep pleasure

i n the sensual a c t i v i t y of the a p p l i c a t i o n , which at the same time he never

l e t s impose upon the work to any e g o t i s t i c a l and hence c o n f i n i n g degree.

' by d r e s s i n g and d r a p i n g numbers, c a r e s s i n g i n a hundred ways these

u n i t s , of.measurement, Johns' b r u s h c o n f e r s the homage of h i s own
s e n s i b i l i t y upon the human mind. Not as symbols of c a l c u l a t i o n , but
a s ' s i g n s of i n t e r a c t i n g human f a c u l t i e s , the numbers are presented i n
t h e i r deepest f u n c t i o n . ' 1 2

* ft *

The paintings discussed so f a r , d e s p i t e t h e i r o r i g i n a l i t y , do have the

common theme of f l a t symbol. T h e i r indeterminacy p r e v e n t s the s p e c t a t o r from

coming to r e s t and the q u e s t i o n we e v e n t u a l l y ask o u r s e l v e s i s why we are

unable to accept a s t a t e of ambiguity or u n s p e c i f i e d meaning. It i s a state

that i s f a r more profound than the s u r r e a l i s t s ' . With Johns he wants to leave

us free f o r experiences t h a t w i l l come of o u r s e l v e s and not from any p a r t i c u l a r

22
polemical m i l i e u . The p o s s i b l e exceptions are M a g r i t t e , and Breton's

Nadja where t h e r e i s l e s s of t h a t i n t e n t i o n t h a t most of the other surrealists

23
are anxious to remind us of.

At the same time t h a t Johns was doing the above, he was p a i n t i n g works .

that contained o b j e c t s t h a t were themselves painted.

'I t h i n k i f t h e r e was any t h i n k i n g at a l l , or i f I have any now i t would

be t h a t i f the p a i n t i n g i s an o b j e c t , then the o b j e c t can be a p a i n t -
i n g . . . and I t h i n k t h a t ' s what happened. That i f on t h i s a r e a you can
make something, then on t h i s a r e a you can make s o m e t h i n g . ' ^ 2

Tango 1955 ( P l a t e XIV), a l t h o u g h i t does not s t r i c t l y apply to the above

account of Johns, c o u l d be seen as some s o r t of l i n k between the two groups.

Johns i n t r o d u c e s o v e r l a y i n g of d i f f e r e n t tones o f b l u e i n the form o f pieces

of c o l l a g e s e t down i n a g r i d - l i k e p a t t e r n w i t h superimposed and diverse brush

 13

strokes. In a d d i t i o n the bottom edge i s l e f t unworked,serving the same purpose

as P o l l o c k ' s u n t r e a t e d canvas t h a t a i d s i n acknowledging the p i c t u r e p l a n e . In

f a c t , Tango seems to be an e x p l i c i t commentary on P o l l o c k ' s s t y l e . If Pollock

can f l i n g himself around on a canvas and i n t o i t s v e r y mesh, why cannot Johns

dance on it? Again we are given the use of the b a n a l - the dance h a l l - f o r

v e r y non-banal ends. Steinberg c l a r i f i e s t h i s when he asks h i m s e l f , what i s

painting?

' I t i s p a r t o f the f a s c i n a t i o n of Johns' work t h a t many of h i s i n v e n t i o n s

are i n t e r p r e t a b l e as m e d i t a t i o n s on the n a t u r e of p a i n t i n g , pursued as
i f i n a d i a l o g u e w i t h a q u e s t i o n e r of i d e a l innocence and c o n g e n i t a l
blindness.

"A p i c t u r e , you see, i s a p i e c e o f canvas n a i l e d to a s t r e t c h e r . "

" L i k e t h i s " says the blindman, h o l d i n g i t up w i t h i t s f a c e to the w a l l .

Then Johns makes.a p i c t u r e of t h a t k i n d of p i c t u r e to see whether i t
w i l l make a p i c t u r e . Or:

"A p i c t u r e i s what a p a i n t e r p u t s whatever he has into."

"You mean l i k e a drawer?"

"Not q u i t e ; remember i t ' s f l a t . "

" L i k e the f r o n t of a drawer?"

The thought takes form as a p i c t u r e - and don't l e t ' s ask whether

t h i s i s what the a r t i s t had thought w h i l e he made i t . lEiis what
the p i c t u r e g i v e s you to t h i n k t h a t c o u n t s .

" I f p i c t u r e s a r e f l a t " , s a i d the blindman, why do they always speak

of t h i n g s IN p i c t u r e s ? "

"Why, what's wrong w i t h i t ? "

"Things ON p i c t u r e s , i t should be; l i k e t h i n g s on t r a y s or on walls."

"That's right."

"Well then, when something i s IN a p i c t u r e , where i s i t ? Behind the

canvas, l i k e a c o n c e a l e d music box?" (Johns' Tango 1955) ' ^ 2

Tango l o o k s f o r w a r d . t o Warhol's s i m i l a r parody of A b s t r a c t Expressionism i n

Dance Diagram - Tango, 1 9 6 2 . ( P l a t e XV) and f u r t h e r to M o r r i s ' 'gestalts''

that survey the phenomenon of i n t e g r a t i o n between a r t o b j e c t and artist/

 14

audience.

Steinberg's dialogue encapsulesother works of t h i s n a t u r e : Canvas, 1956,

Drawer, 1957 and Gray R e c t a n g l e s , 1957. Canvas ( P l a t e XVI) c o n s i s t s of a

s t r e t c h e d canvas s t u c k f a c e down onto the s u r f a c e o f a l a r g e r canvas. The whole

t h i n g i s then covered w i t h e n c a u s t i c and c o l l a g e , hence the p i e c e i s one of

abstract brush strokes on both the f r o n t and r e a r of a canvas. Johns seems to

be s a y i n g t h a t i f one accepts the space setup by p a i n t i n g on and i n the canvas,

then i n a c t u a l f a c t a s c u l p t u r e i s b e i n g made - what does a P o l l o c k or a Morris

L o u i s l o o k l i k e from behind? T h i s makes Duchamp's use of g l a s s seem almost

superficial. Nevertheless,at the same time Canvas i s a p a i n t i n g and i s hung

as a p a i n t i n g - Johns, remember, would never say i t i s a sculpture.

Both Drawer ( P l a t e XVII) and Gray R e c t a n g l e s ( P l a t e XVIII) ask s i m i l a r

questions. Gray R e c t a n g l e s shows a gray e n c a u s t i c s u r f a c e t h a t has been d i s r u p -

t e d by t h r e e s m a l l e r canvases b e i n g i n s e r t e d i n t o cut out p o r t i o n s of the main

canvas. It f i t s to i n c l u d e t h i s p i e c e i n t o the group of o b j e c t studies as

here we have the i n t r u s i o n of t h r e e compartments. They appear to go one step

beyond c o l l a g e - whose s u r f a c e has always been accepted as compatible to the

p i c t u r e plane p r e v i o u s l y . Now, perhaps we have to ask o u r s e l v e s more r i g o -

r o u s l y ; the r e c t a n g l e s are not s t u c k on they are s t u c k in. T h i s i s the first

time the canvas and not i t s s u r f a c e can be s a i d to be made up of objects.

Drawer t a k e s t h i s i d e a even f u r t h e r . Now the o b j e c t i s r e c o g n i s a b l e .

L i k e c o l l a g e i t i s rendered u s e l e s s i n i t s conventional context by being

a e s t h e t i s e d , but it still remains i r o n i c a l l y i n i t s common context i n the

sense of a f l a t s u r f a c e w i t h knobs on, f l u s h to the facade t h a t r e t a i n s i t .

L i k e S t e i n b e r g , K o z l o f f t r e a t s i t as Johns l o o k i n g at the p i c t u r e s u r f a c e as
26
merely s u r f a c e and hence any s u r f a c e - be i t f u r n i t u r e or whatever - w i l l do.

In P a i n t i n g With a B a l l , 1958 ( P l a t e XIX) the t e n s i o n of o b j e c t s within

the canvas i s i n c r e a s e d t o where a b a l l i s l i t e r a l l y f o r c e d between the

s e c t i o n s o f canvas so t h a t i t d i s p l a c e s the s t r e t c h e r s and l e a v e s a gap

through which t h e w a l l shows. The i n t r u s i o n here i s t o the p o i n t where the

i l l u s i o n o f brush strokes versus f l a t s u r f a c e reaches b r e a k i n g p o i n t and ' a t t a -

ched' o b j e c t s attempt t o take over once and f o r a l l . The t e n s i o n i s extreme.

We a r e a l l o w e d t o see t h e q u i e t space beyond the p i c t u r e p l a n e i f we concentrate

to take our eyes o f f the s u r r o u n d i n g canvas, but i t does not r e a l l y h e l p . The

area o f e x p r e s s i v e paintwork and i t s i n t r u d e r s t i l l remains and we a r e o n l y

more c o n s c i o u s o f t h e a b u s i v e way e v e r y t h i n g has been asked t o change i t s

nature. Canvas v e r s u s space w i t h n e i t h e r g i v i n g an i n c h .

Tennyson, 1959, ( P l a t e XX) which S t e i n b e r g r e g a r d s as one o f Johns' most

b e a u t i f u l works, a l t h o u g h he does n o t e x p l a i n t o us q u i t e why, i s u n l i k e

Tango due t o t h e t i t l e becoming more the s u b j e c t o f t h e p a i n t i n g - as i s t h e

case of The 1957 ( P l a t e XXI). I t seems t o be a l i t t l e different from anything

previous and p o s s i b l y a n t i c i p a t e s h i s i n t e r e s t i n language t h a t b e g i n s w i t h

F a l s e S t a r t , 1959. The word evokes our l i t e r a r y n o s t a l g i a but Johns portrays

it d i s s o c i a t e d from any r e f e r e n c e except t h a t o f i t s p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n which

i s apart from any i n t e n t i o n s toward past or future. The p a i n t i n g i s made up

of v a r i o u s tones o f grey that,do not o b l i t e r a t e the presence o r f u n c t i o n o f

the word, they r a t h e r n e u t r a l i z e a l l the p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e s , emotions,

p r e c o n c e p t i o n s we had over t h e name. Johns a g a i n r e q u i r e s t h a t the audience

l o o k a t a p a i n t i n g not i n terms o f t h e a n e c d o t a l but t o cause us t o ask o u r -

selves questions. The whole work c o n s i s t s of two u p r i g h t p a n e l s on

s e p a r a t e s t r e t c h e r s w i t h a p i e c e o f canvas l a i d over the top o f them l e a v i n g

the top and bottom p o r t i o n s v i s i b l e . K o z l o f f mentions the r i g h t hand edge r e -

vealing a scarlet under-painting - 'enough s u g g e s t i o n of a double l i f e t o

27

d i s t u r b any viewer who t h i n k s p a i n t i n g s should at l e a s t be n o m i n a l l y visible' ,

We can a l s o see t h e canvas f o l d e d underneath and ask o u r s e l v e s what Johns has

 16

been d o i n g under there? ' The p a i n t e r ' s w o r l d i s p r i v a t e and s e c r e t i v e no matter

how much and what he shows us and Johns i n v i t e s the o n l o o k e r t o share i n t h i s

p r i v a c y by c o n s t r u c t i n g h i s own secretive conclusions.

R o s a l i n d Krauss d e s c r i b e s Shade, 1959 ( P l a t e XXII) a s :

'A p a i n t i n g whose f i e l d i s dominated by a p u l l e d down window b l i n d ,

becomes a r e f e r e n c e to the t r a d i t i o n a l analogy between the p i c t u r e
frame and a window frame opening up t o a view of i l l u s i o n i s t i c
space. Johns' shade c l o s e d a g a i n s t the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of t h r e e
..Idimensional space, i s i r o n i c a l l y covered over w i t h a p a i n t e r l y
e v o c a t i o n of the v e r y space the work i s at p a i n s t o deny.'28

The work i s owned by Mrs. Leo S t e i n b e r g and Mr. S t e i n b e r g o d d l y enough t a k e s

delight i n comparing the shade on the canvas t o the c o s t of shades i n d e p a r t -

ment s t o r e s , d i s c o u n t houses and second-hand shops. He a l s o states:

s!On a shade o f f l a t canvas drawn a g a i n s t the o u t s i d e he shows outdoor

darkness; l i k e the dark space known to c l o s e d eyes. How a r e e y e l i d s
lowered l i k e window-shades a g a i n s t o u t e r l i g h t comparable to p i c t u r e
planes? A l b e r t i compared the open p a i n t i n g s he knew to windows.'

Shade has an a f f i n i t y to M a g r i t t e ' s The Human C o n d i t i o n , 1955 (Plate

XXIII). M a g r i t t e , l i k e Johns, has brought the ambiguity of two and t h r e e

d i m e n s i o n a l space t o a p o i n t of f r u s t r a t i o n i n showing t h a t s u r f a c e i s as

much a r e a l i t y as t h e space i t d e p i c t s . There i s a l s o a l i t t l e known work

by Delaunay e n t i t l e d Window on the C i t y , 1912 ( P l a t e XXIV) Which compares

interestingly. A view of a church and some houses, has been p a i n t e d on what

c o u l d be taken f o r e i t h e r the f r o n t or the r e v e r s e of a canvas i n a p i c t u r e

frame. As w i t h Shade i t q u e s t i o n s the whole p r a c t i c e of a t t e m p t i n g to r e c o n -

c i l e r e a l space w i t h s p a t i a l i l l u s i o n , and i n both we a r e not so much shown a

r e c o n c i l i a t i o n as an emphasising of the predicament.

* * *

With the p a i n t i n g of F a l s e S t a r t i n 1959 ( P l a t e XXV) we see b e g i n n i n g s

of a new development. Not o n l y does Johns g i v e up h i s use of f l a t images,

he a l s o changes h i s medium from e n c a u s t i c t o o i l and a p p l i e s i t i n a c o l l e c t i o n

 17

of e x p l o s i v e b r u s h s t r o k e s . Both B a r b a r a Rose and Sidney T i l l i m have regarded

t h i s l a t e r p e r i o d as some s o r t o f major c r i s i s ; Rose as one t h a t was primarily

a f r a n t i c r e s u l t o f an e x h a u s t i o n of the s e l e c t category of images which he sur-

v i v e d o n l y through the i n t r o d u c t i o n to l i t h o g r a p h y v i a Tatyana Grosman's Rhode

30 3 1

I s l a n d workshop i n 1960, a n d
Tillim. as tantamount to the end of a career.

In the l i g h t of p r e v i o u s work the t r a n s i t i o n i s indeed q u i t e overwhelming,

but r a t h e r than c o n v e y i n g a c r i s i s , the development makes much more sense i n

the l i g h t of Johns' c o n t a c t w i t h Duchamp's work i n 1959 and the important ini-

t i a t i o n into Wittgenstein's thought i n 1961. T h i s w i l l be d e a l t w i t h at length

i n Chapter 4 w h i l e at p r e s e n t I will l i m i t myself to d e s c r i b i n g some of the

major p i e c e s t h a t l e a d up t o 1961.

About F a l s e S t a r t Johns says:

' I t got r a t h e r monotonous making f l a g s on a p i e c e of canvas, and I

wanted to add something... the e a r l y t h i n g s to me were v e r y s t r o n g l y
o b j e c t s . . . . I thought then how t o make an o b j e c t which i s not so
e a s i l y d e f i n e d as an o b j e c t , and how to add space and s t i l l keep i t
an o b j e c t p a i n t i n g . And then I t h i n k i n say, F a l s e S t a r t and those
p a i n t i n g s , the o b j e c t i s put i n t o even g r e a t e r doubt and I t h i n k you
q u e s t i o n whether i t ' s an o b j e c t or n o t . ' 3 2

F a l s e S t a r t i s b a s i c a l l y a deeper, i n q u i r y i n t o n e u t r a l i t y . The mood of i t i s

n e u t r a l d e s p i t e the e x p l o s i o n s of c o l o u r . Is t h e r e deep space or shallow

space? Each e x p l o s i o n has. a m o r e o r l e s s u n i f o r m area. The l a b e l s are equally

' c o r r e c t ' and ' i n c o r r e c t ' to the c o l o u r s they are a s s i g n e d and even the colours

of the l e t t e r i n g themselves are e i t h e r apropos or c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n a b a l a n c e d

distribution. The longer one l o o k s at i t the more u n i v e r s a l i t becomes. The

l a b e l s are e q u a l l y imposed upon as they themselves impose. There i s no

hierarchy. I t i s as i f we were b e i n g handed e v e r y t h i n g t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s the

n a t u r e of c o l o u r and i f we l o o k at i t a l l l o n g enough something w i l l 'click'

and we w i l l have formed our own masterpiece. K o z l o f f r e f e r s t o the s i t u a t i o n

as a dilemma but i t c o n s t i t u t e s more the t i m e l e s s n e s s of E l i o t ' s Four

33
Quartets.
 Another way of v i e w i n g t h i s i s an attempt on Johns' p a r t to awaken us to

the p r o c e s s of the v i s u a l and the i n t e l l e c t u a l - between what i s read and what

i s seen. P u r i t y of c o l o u r i s a f a l l a c y , simply an i n t e l l e c t u a l c a t e g o r i s i n g

of s e n s a t i o n f o r m a t t e r s of convenience s i n c e t h e r e i s no such t h i n g as pure

34
sensation.

F a l s e S t a r t may have been the work Greenberg was l o o k i n g at when he r e f e r s

to 'de Kooningesque p l a y o f l i g h t s and darks' i n that i t s brush strokes are

f a r c l o s e r to him than the p r e v i o u s Gustoncome-mmpressionist-like g r i d s .

R o s a l i n d Krauss i n t e r e s t i n g l y suggests t h a t the work:

' a l s o h e i g h t e n s the sense of v i o l a t i o n of pure c o l o u r brought about

by the p a i n t h a n d l i n g o f , f o r example, de Kooning....'35

It would be a m i s t a k e to see the s t e n c i l l e d l e t t e r i n g p u r e l y from a C u b i s t

standpoint of emphasising the two dimensional. The l a b e l s i f anything, empha-

s i s e s p a t i a l i l l u s i o n with t h e i r disappearing through and behind the painted

surface. The s u r r e a l i s t would c i t e M a g r i t t e ' s The Use Of Words, 1928-1929.

( P l a t e XXVI), as the p r o t o t y p e to t h i s work, but there i s a d i f f e r e n c e .

W h i l s t M a g r i t t e ' s work i s a d i r e c t r e f u t a t i o n Johns l e a v e s the q u e s t i o n open.

C a l a s sees i t t h a t M a g r i t t e l i m i t s h i m s e l f to a d i s s o c i a t i o n between image

and l a b e l whereas Johns i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the 'continuous s h i f t i n g between

36

s i g n s and images.' The title itself i s ironic for a t r a n s i t i o n a l piece.

Johns e x p l a i n e d to Hopps:
'I d i d n ' t know what to c a l l i t and i t wasn't l i k e my o t h e r p a i n t i n g s
and one day I was s i t t i n g i n the Cedar Row and looked up at a p o i n t
of a horse r a c e which was c a l l e d "The F a l s e S t a r t " and I s a i d t h a t
was going to be the t i t l e of my p a i n t i n g ' 3 7
Jubilee ( P l a t e XXVII) o f the same y e a r i s the s e q u e l and ultimate

r e s u l t of what Krauss suggests i s happening i n F a l s e S t a r t .

'By means of the c o l o u r names and t h e i r s h i f t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p to the

pure c o l o u r s they i d e n t i f y Johns p o i n t s up the i r o n i c d i s s i p i c a t i o n
of c o l o u r put to the s e r v i c e of m o d e l l i n g i l l u s i o n i s t i c space.'38

Colour d i s s i p a t e d , p o i n t s to o n l y one t h i n g i t would seem: a l l colour i s

u s e f u l f o r i t i s the e s t a b l i s h i n g of i l l u s i o n through darks and lights. This

i s how de Kooning uses i t and a b e l i e f out of which Greenberg has virtually

made a movement. Johns appears to be s a y i n g t h a t i f t h i s i s the case then

why not redo F a l s e S t a r t u s i n g j u s t b l a c k and w h i t e and the tones i n between.

However, he i n d i c a t e s t h i s n o t i o n to be even more s h o r t - s i g h t e d s i n c e our vision,

being c o l o u r s e n s i t i v e , we even see b l a c k and w h i t e i n c o l o u r - w i t n e s s the

h i n t s o f b l u e s and reds.

Out The Window, 1959 ( P l a t e XXVIII) shows a s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of the i d e a of

F a l s e S t a r t by r e d u c i n g the p a i n t i n g to t h r e e a r e a s , RED, YELLOW and BLUE. It

p o i n t s up the a b s u r d i t y of c a t e g o r i s a t i o n f u r t h e r by r e d u c i n g the l a b e l s to the

p r i m a r y c o l o u r s and i n a d d i t i o n the l e t t e r s , not b e i n g stencilled, allow

Johns to f i l l them i n w i t h a v a r i e t y o f c o l o u r s to the extent where not only

t h e i r form becomes d i s p e r s e d , but also their l a b e l l i n g implications. The

i r o n i e s are enhanced by the s t o r y Solomon t e l l s when Johns' s i s t e r v i s i t e d the

s t u d i o and u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y gave the canvas i t s name. F i n d i n g no meaning i n

the 'emptiness' of the p i c t u r e ,

'.... she looked at 'the vacant p a r k i n g l o t a c r o s s the s t r e e t and

remarked t h a t he seemed to p a i n t what he saw out h i s window.'29

Thermometer, 1959 ( P l a t e XXIX) c o u l d be a comment on the concept of

equating c o l o u r to degrees of temperature. At f i r s t the thermometer appears

to be c a l l i b r a t e d s y s t e m a t i c a l l y w i t h the temperature of the c o l o u r s collec-

t i v e l y measuring about 85 degrees. But degrees what? There i s c a l l i b r a t i o n

but no s c a l e . R o s a l i n d Krauss f i n d s i r o n y i n t h a t the p a i n t i n g h a v i n g been

callibrated, the a c t i o n ends up i n the Ciermometer. Nevertheless, maybe the

a c t i o n i s w i t h i n the a r e a of the s p e c t a t o r . The p i c t u r e remains s t a t i c until

the s p e c t a t o r comes a l o n g to set i t o f f . T h i s would t i e i n n i c e l y with

Steinberg's r e f e r e n c e to e y e l i d s . The image w i l l o n l y appear i f we allow i t

40
to become p a r t o f o u r s e l v e s . . ' T r a n s f o r m a t i o n i s i n the head' says Johns.
 P a i n t i n g With Two B a l l s , 1960 ( P l a t e XXX) has a l l the implications the

e a r l i e r one w i t h a s i n g l e b a l l had. I t c o u l d be regarded as a parody on Cubism

w i t h the attempt to render a t h r e e d i m e n s i o n a l o b j e c t w i t h i n a pictorial

field - f o r Johns the s t r e s s i s enough to s p l i t the p i c t u r e a p a r t . There i s

a l s o the g e n i t a l s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , seen as a comment on the indulgent 'machismo'

interest i n abstract expressionists. With the e x c e p t i o n of i t s p r o t o t y p e ,

objects have so f a r p l a y e d a . r e l a t i v e l y passive r o l e with paint being the

only seducer. Now objects a s s e r t themselves and Johns' p i c t u r e s become

41

'readable as p o l a r i t i e s of d o i n g and suffering.'

Device C i r c l e , 1959 ( P l a t e XXXI) shows a s i m i l a r p l a y between 'action

upon' and 'acted upon'. A l e n g t h of wood n a i l e d to the c e n t r e of the canvas

determines the r a d i u s of a c i r c l e . - perhaps a f u t u r e t a r g e t . One i s never

q u i t e sure what came f i r s t , the canvas covered w i t h r e d , y e l l o w , b l u e and

white b r u s h s t r o k e s and c o l l a g e or the s t i c k d e v i c e . The s t i c k has been

covered w i t h p a i n t intimating i t has been acted upon and consequently came

first, a l s o the c i r c l e at times determines the p l a c i n g of c o l o u r areas. On

the o t h e r hand t h e r e are s u g g e s t i o n s t h a t the s t i c k and i t s drawing a c t i o n

was subsequent i n i t s a c t i o n ' upon areas of p a i n t t h a t not only totally, dis-

regard the c o n f i n e s of the c i r c l e but have been s c r a t c h e d by the n a i l at the

end o f the stick.

P a i n t i n g w i t h R u l e r and "Gray", 1960 ( P l a t e XXXII), which i s r e l a t e d to

the above i n i t s use of a r o t a t i n g s t i c k , p r e s e n t s the j u x t a p o s i t i o n of free

e x p r e s s i o n w i t h i n the c o n f i n e s of a measured space. H a r o l d Rosenberg states

i n 'American A c t i o n Painter^?:

'At a c e r t a i n moment the canvas began to appear to one American

p a i n t e r a f t e r another as an arena i n which to act r a t h e r than
as a space i n which t o reproduce, r e d e s i g n , a n a l y s e or " e x p r e s s "
an o b j e c t , a c t u a l or imagined. What was to go on the canvas was
not a p i c t u r e but an e v e n t . ' ^ 2
On one l e v e l Johns i s f o r c i n g t h i s arena to be constrained by the measured

confines of the t h i r t y - t w o i n c h l o n g r u l e r which r o t a t e s from a p i e c e of wood

t h a t b i s e c t s the canvas. However, perhaps measurement: and freedom are not

such c o n t r a d i c t o r y i s s u e s as they f i r s t seem h e r e . I do not t h i n k i t too

far fetched, even i f round about, to approach t h i s p a i n t i n g from the aspect

of Leonardo's drawing of the V i t r u v i a n Man ( P l a t e X X X I I I ) , where the e s s e n t i a l

point i s that 'Man i s the measure of a l l t h i n g s ' and 'master of the square and
43

c i r c l e which he seems to have conjured up around him.' Not only does

P a i n t i n g With Ruler and "Gray" i n c o r p o r a t e the c i r c l e and square but Johns

has always had a great admiration f o r Leonardo's work and thought. Even i f a l l

i s unacceptable, the f a c t remains t h a t the moment P o l l o c k steps on to h i s canvas

his arena i s determined by h i s own s c a l e and i n t h i s sense can be measured.

Rosenberg, goes on to h i n t at something l i k e t h i s , a l b e i t unthinkingly:

'...what g i v e s the canvas i t s meaning i s not p s y c h o l o g i c a l d a t a
but ' r o l e ' . The way the a r t i s t o r g a n i s e s h i s e m o t i o n a l and
i n t e l l e c t u a l energy as i f he were i n a l i v i n g s i t u a t i o n . The
i n t e r e s t l i e s on the k i n d o f a c t t a k i n g p l a c e i n the f o u r - s i d e d arena
- a dramatic i n t e r e s t . ' ^ 4

The c e n t r a l p i e c e of wood has the word 'gray' l i g h t l y stamped on i t .

Even more than J u b i l e e t h i s shows the a b s u r d i t y of r e a d i n g c o l o u r simply in

terms of l i g h t s and darks s i n c e i t would n e c e s s i t a t e the l a b e l l i n g of the

n a t u r a l toned wood, 'gray'. The use of q u o t a t i o n marks around the word i n

the t i t l e insinuates f u r t h e r the a r b i t r a r i n e s s of such a r e d u c t i o n of

phenomena to a s i n g l e term.

D e v i c e , 1961-62 ( P l a t e XXXIV) q u e s t i o n s , among other t h i n g s , what i t s

title i n f e r s , that the n a t u r e of the p a i n t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n depends not only on

the hand but the c h o i c e of t o o l . F r i e d describes the scraped and squeegeed

s e m i c i r c l e s of p a i n t as ' c l e a r l y meant as a m e c h a n i c a l i r o n i c paradigm of

45

de Kooning's d r a g g i n g b r u s h and smeared p a i n t t e c t u r e . ' T h i s may well be

t r u e , but the areas of p a i n t are more than j u s t a paradigm of an earlier

 22

a r t i s t ' s work. Ambiguities of time appear. The c i r c l e s of p a i n t are almost

F u t u r i s t but they c o u l d w e l l have been scraped at a slower r a t e than the more

s t a t i c - l o o k i n g b r u s h s t r o k e s were a p p l i e d . 'There are no objective

46

c o r r e l a t i o n s between g e s t u r e and effect.'

Nevertheless, the c h i e f motive of the work i s one of anonymity. I t shows

once a g a i n a d e s i r e t o cease to impose on the s p e c t a t o r a p a r t i c u l a r view by

t a k i n g away the a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l from g e s t u r e . Johns sees i t t h a t the artist

should e x t r i c a t e himself from the work i n order t h a t what i s on the canvas i s

itself and not simply a r e a s s u r a n c e of the a r t i s t ' s own identity.

'I have attempted t o develop my t h i n k i n g i n such a way t h a t the
work I've done i s not me - not to confuse any f e e l i n g s w i t h
what I produced. I d i d n ' t want my work to be an exposure of
my f e e l i n g s . A b s t r a c t E x p r e s s i o n i s m was so l i v e l y - p e r s o n a l
i d e n t i t y and p a i n t i n g were more o r l e s s the same, and I t r i e d
to operate i n the same way. But I found I c o u l d n ' t do anything,
t h a t would be i d e n t i c a l w i t h my f e e l i n g s . So I worked i n such
a way t h a t I c o u l d say t h a t i t ' s not me. That accounts f o r the
separation.'47

B e f o r e g o i n g on to d i s c u s s the subsequent work from 1961-1964 i n r e l a t i o n

to W i t t g e n s t e i n i t i s , o f c o u r s e , n e c e s s a r y to g a i n some f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the

philosopher's thought. E s s e n t i a l l y i t can be broken u p . i n t o two books, the

Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus and the P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . The

Investigations i s b a s i c a l l y a c o n t r a d i c t i o n of the former and i s the work t h a t

i s relevant to Johns' p a i n t i n g . Not o n l y i s t h i s confirmed by v a r i o u s reports

such as B a r b a r a Rose's who has d i s c l o s e d t h a t i t was his 'bed-time' reading

48

during the s i x t i e s , but I hope i t w i l l become more than e v i d e n t i n the

proceeding chapters. There i s no d e f i n i t e p a i n t i n g t h a t marks a b e g i n n i n g of

Johns' r e a d i n g s i n c e i t caused a f u r t h e r i n g of i n q u i r y r a t h e r than any radical

break and f o r t h i s r e a s o n I w i l l commence w i t h the p a i n t i n g s i n 1961 t h a t show

particular i n t i m a t i o n of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s concepts. In a d d i t i o n to t h i s , I w i l l

a n a l y s e the n a t u r e of what has been w r i t t e n on W i t t g e n s t e i n as an influence on

Johns to t h i s d a t e . There has been much m i s c o n c e p t i o n as to what e x a c t l y

Wittgenstein's role i s and I f e e l i t i s necessary to clear up these mistake;

- which are primarily due to a misunderstanding of the philosopher - before

go any further.
 CHAPTER TWO: WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY:

A SYNOPSIS

"Meaning implies that something i s happening; you can say meaning

i s determined by the use of the thing, the way an audience uses
a painting once i t i s put i n p u b l i c . "

[Jasper J o h n s ] x
 Ludwig Johann W i t t g e n s t e i n was born i n Vienna i n 1889, the youngest of

eight c h i l d r e n a l l generously endowed w i t h i n t e l l e c t u a l and a r t i s t i c talent.

H i s mother was devoted t o music and t h e i r home became a c e n t r e o f m u s i c a l life.

Brahms was a f r e q u e n t v i s i t o r and one o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s b r o t h e r s , P a u l , became

a distinguished pianist.

To b e g i n w i t h W i t t g e n s t e i n s t u d i e d e n g i n e e r i n g i n B e r l i n and then, from

1908, a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f Manchester where he became p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d

i n aeroplane engines and p r o p e l l o r s . The mathematical aspect o f t h i s work l e d

W i t t g e n s t e i n t o develop an i n t e r e s t i n pure mathematics and e v e n t u a l l y i t s

p h i l o s o p h i c a l foundations. A f t e r r e a d i n g R u s s e l l ' s P r i n c i p i a Mathematica and

b e i n g g r e a t l y impressed by i t he d e c i d e d t o move t o Cambridge where he spent

the g r e a t e r p a r t o f 1912-13 working w i t h R u s s e l l - f i r s t as a p u p i l and l a t e r

as a p a r t n e r .

During t h e War he served i n the A u s t r i a n Army as a v o l u n t e e r and a t the

same time c o n t i n u e d t o work at h i s book, T r a c t a t u s L o g i c o - P h i l o s o p h i c u s , which

he completed a t around t h e same time he was c a p t u r e d i n I t a l y i n 1918. The

manuscript was d e l i v e r e d to R u s s e l l v i a d i p l o m a t i c c o u r i e r . The notebooks

used i n the p r e p a r a t i o n o f the T r a c t a t u s were d e s t r o y e d on W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s

request. Three o f them c o v e r i n g the p e r i o d 1914-16 a c c i d e n t a l l y s u r v i v e d and

were p u b l i s h e d i n 1961.

A f t e r the War, W i t t g e n s t e i n d e c i d e d t o become a t e a c h e r and from 1920-26

he taught n i n e and t e n year o l d s i n v a r i o u s A u s t r i a n v i l l a g e . s c h o o l s . During

t h i s time he compiled and p u b l i s h e d a d i c t i o n a r y f o r s t u d e n t s i n elementary

schools. In 1926 he r e s i g n e d as a s c h o o l t e a c h e r and i n q u i r e d a t a monastery

about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e n t e r i n g a c o n t e m p l a t i v e way o f l i f e . He was

f i n a l l y discouraged by t h e f a t h e r s u p e r i o r .

For t h e next two or so y e a r s he l i v e d w i t h h i s f a m i l y i n Vienna and

devoted t h e m a j o r i t y o f h i s time d e s i g n i n g and o r g a n i s i n g the b u i l d i n g o f a

mansion for h i s sister.' ' 1
It was during t h i s period that he met and was visited

by various members of the Vienna c i r c l e - most notably the l o g i c a l - p o s i t i v i s t s ,

Moritz Schluck and F r i e d e r i c h Wausmann. The Tractatus supplied the background

3

to many of t h e i r discussions.

In January, 1929 Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge to devote himself

again to philosophy and for the next three or four years he gradually deve-

loped, l a r g e l y through s e l f c r i t i c i s m , h i s new position i n philosophy. The

e a r l i e r version of these views are to be found i n the Blue and Brown Books

which date from 1933-35. The l a t e r version Philosophical Investigations con-

tain his thoughts from the t h i r t i e s u n t i l h i s death. The Investigations were

posthumously published i n 1953 together with a translation by G.E.M. Anscombe.

In 1939 Wittgenstein became Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge i n

succession to George Moore. With the development of World War I I , Wittgenstein

found i t impossible to remain a spectator and i n 1941 l e f t Cambridge to work

as a porter at Guy's Hospital i n London. He was transferred i n 1943 to the

Royal Infirmary i n Newcastle where he worked as a 'lab' boy. In 1944 he

resumed lectures at Cambridge but became increasingly d i s s a t i s f i e d with h i s

role as a teacher. He f e l t a need to l i v e alone and devote h i s energies to

f i n i s h i n g the Investigations. Consequently i n 1947 he resigned h i s chair.

For the next couple of years he l i v e d i n Ireland and spent a few months

with Norman Malcolm i n the States. In the summer of 1949 he learnt he had

cancer. He v i s i t e d his family i n Vienna and i n 1951 moved to the home of his

physician i n Cambridge. He died on A p r i l 29th, 1951.

Wittgenstein was a very unusual man; as a lecturer he invariably wore

an open neck s h i r t - unheard of for the time. His room i n T r i n i t y College,

was furnished with l i t t l e more than a few deck-chairs. He seemed to want to

lead a f r u g a l , ascetic existence. When h i s father died i n 1912, Wittgenstein

inherited a large fortune and proceeded to donate a big sum of i t to be

d i s t r i b u t e d among needy A u s t r i n poets and w r i t e r s . P a r t of the reason f o r

t h i s a c t i o n was the f e a r o f h a v i n g f r i e n d s f o r the sake of money, but to a

g r e a t extent i t was due to the same s e a r c h f o r a u s t e r i t y t h a t l e d him t o , not

o n l y c o n s i d e r monastic l i f e , but a l s o b u i l d a hut near Skj-olden, Norway i n

1913 where he i n t e n d e d to l i v e a l i f e of s e c l u s i o n . When he was s e r v i n g on

the e a s t e r n f r o n t d u r i n g the F i r s t War, he came a c r o s s a copy of T o l s t o y ' s

r e l i g i o u s w r i t i n g which a p p a r e n t l y had a great a f f e c t on him.

He was s u b j e c t to f i t s of d e p r e s s i o n , o f t e n b o r d e r i n g on the suicidal

and h i s c l o s e f r i e n d s were s u b j e c t e d to unaccountable moody r e a c t i o n s . On

the o t h e r hand, he had a n a i v e charm. Malcolm t e l l s of him washing h i s h o s t ' s

d i s h e s i n the bath and g i v i n g Malcolm's w i f e a d i s h mop i n r e f e r e n c e t o her

4

'unhygenic' c l o t h . He r e a l l y enjoyed r e a d i n g American d e t e c t i v e magazines,

s i t t i n g i n the f r o n t row of the cinema d u r i n g matinee performances and rolling

pennies at f a i r g r o u n d s . Human kindness and concern were f o r him f a r more

important qualities i n a person than i n t e l l e c t u a l prowess or s o p h i s t i c a t e d

taste. There was a profound sense of honesty t h a t l e d him to e n t e r into

p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems p a s s i o n a t e l y . He had a s t r o n g d e s i r e to c l e a r problems

up and be r i d of them.

The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

I w i l l d e a l w i t h the T r a c t a t u s i n as s h o r t a manner as i s n p o s s i b l e

s i n c e , i n t h i s paper, i t i s o n l y n e c e s s a r y to be acquainted w i t h i t to the

p o i n t of u n d e r s t a n d i n g the r a d i c a l i s m of the l a t e r I n v e s t i g a t i o n s as w e l l as

a s s e s s i n g the v a l i d i t y of w r i t i n g s on Johns and W i t t g e n s t e i n i n Chapter 3.

It i s the p h i l o s o p h y s e t down i n the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s t h a t i n f l u e n c e d Johns

as w i l l be made c l e a r f u r t h e r on.

In the T r a c t a t u s W i t t g e n s t e i n puts forward the argument t h a t language i s

a p i c t u r e of r e a l i t y . The w o r l d ( r e a l i t y ) c o n s i s t s e n t i r e l y of simple facts

or atomic f a c t s , none of which are i n any way dependent on one another. This
does not mean t h a t atomic f a c t s cannot be a n a l y s e d but o n l y t h a t they cannot be

analysed i n t o o t h e r atomic facts:

'Each i t e m ( f a c t ) can be t h e case o r n o t t h e case w h i l e everything

e l s e remains t h e same.'5

What W i t t g e n s t e i n i s t r y i n g t o say then i s t h a t r e a l i t y i s made o f f a c t s t h a t

are e n t i t i e s , t h a t i s they cannot be reduced t o other f a c t s . Each f a c t has a

l o g i c a l form - they a r e made up o f t h i n g s o r o b j e c t s whose i n d i v i d u a l form i s

u n a t t e r a b l e , atomic.

'In a manner o f speaking, objects are c o l o u r l e s s . ' ^

' E i t h e r a t h i n g has p r o p e r t i e s t h a t n o t h i n g e l s e has, i n which case

we can immediately use a d e s c r i p t i o n t o d i s t i n g u i s h i t from t h e
o t h e r s and r e f e r t o i t , o r on t h e other hand, t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l
t h i n g s t h a t have t h e whole s e t o f t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s i n common i n
which case i t i s q u i t e i m p o s s i b l e t o i n d i c a t e one o f them.' 7

A fact ( a t o t h e r times termed ' s t a t e o f a f f a i r s ' ) i s made up o f o b j e c t s

t h a t l i n k i n t o one another i n a l o g i c a l p a t t e r n and W i t t g e n s t e i n saw language

as t h e p i c t u r i n g o f these facts. He r e p u t e d l y got h o l d o f t h i s i d e a i n 1914

from an a r t i c l e i n a magazine about a l a w s u i t i n P a r i s c o n c e r n i n g an automobile

accident. During t h e h e a r i n g , a model o f t h e a c c i d e n t was produced. For

Wittgenstein, t h e model served as a d e s c r i p t i o n o f a p o s s i b l e s t a t e of a f f a i r s

and i t occurred t o him t h a t he c o u l d r e v e r s e t h e analogy and say language,

i n t h e form o f s e r i e s o f atomic f a c t s , s e r v e s as a model or p i c t u r e o f

8
reality.

I t i s Important t o r e a l i s e t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n saw language as l i t e r a l l y a

p i c t u r e o f r e a l i t y and n o t merely l i k e a p i c t u r e . Both language and r e a l i t y ,

he posed, share t h e same l o g i c a l form and t h a t a n y t h i n g s a i d o u t s i d e t h i s one

to one correspondence i s ' n o n s e n s i c a l ' . By n o n s e n s i c a l he d i d not mean

v a l u e l e s s but r a t h e r ' u n r e a l ' , t h a t i s w i t h no d e f i n i t e meaning. The o n l y

way we can a s s i g n meaning t o something s a i d i s i f by comparing i t t o what

it p i c t u r e s , through s e e k i n g a l o g i c a l correspondence, we can say t h a t i t i s

 29

e i t h e r t r u e or f a l s e . In other words, i f a statement i s not a picture, i t

depicts nothing d e f i n i t e hence says n o t h i n g d e f i n i t e and therefore cannot

s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g be judged as a r e a l i t y . T h i s i s what W i t t g e n s t e i n means

when he says:

'The whole sense of the book might be summed up i n the f o l l o w i n g

words: what can be s a i d at a l l can be s a i d c l e a r l y , and what we
cannot t a l k about we must pass over i n s i l e n c e . ' 9

The Tractatus i s a guide to the use of language i n p h i l o s o p h y in pointing

out the b o u n d a r i e s of d i s c u s s i o n . Once these l i m i t s have.been recognized

then the p h i l o s o p h e r may proceed i n a l u c i d and l o g i c a l fashion. Matters,

such as at-soul, beauty, God, e t c . , can o n l y be t a l k e d about 'nonsensically' and

hence are o u t s i d e the w o r l d of reality.

In order to determine whether a p i c t u r e or p r o p o s i t i o n ( i . e . , a spoken

f a c t ) i s t r u e o r f a l s e we have to compare i t w i t h r e a l i t y . T h i s suggests t h a t

the t r u t h v a l u e o f elementary p r o p o s i t i o n s have to be a s c e r t a i n e d empirically.

But there are p r o p o s i t i o n s whose t r u t h v a l u e cannot be determined e m p i r i c a l l y .

The s e n t e n c e : " E i t h e r i t i s r a i n i n g or i t x i s not r a i n i n g " i s made up of two

elementary p r o p o s i t i o n s and the t r u t h value of i t i s t r u e r e g a r d l e s s of what

the weather i s d o i n g . Such a p r o p o s i t i o n i s t r u e by l o g i c a l necessity not

empirical necessity s i n c e i t does not d e a l w i t h -reality... W i t t g e n s t e i n called

such an o c c u r r e n c e a t a u t o l o g y and a p r o p o s i t i o n whose t r u t h v a l u e is false

by l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y - " I t i s r a i n i n g and i t i s not raining" - a contradiction.

' T a u t o l o g i e s and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s are not p i c t u r e s of r e a l i t y . They

do not r e p r e s e n t any p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n s . For the former admit
a l l p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n s and the l a t t e r n o n e ' ^ 1

Hence language can o n l y be a p i c t u r e of r e a l i t y i f i t s l o g i c a l form i s t h a t

of r e a l i t y . Without e x p r e s s i n g t h i s form n o t h i n g can be said. Not only

i t c c a n n o t be s a i d , i t cannot be thought s i n c e thought i s a l s o a logical

p i c t u r e of f a c t s . Wittgenstein means by a 'thought' not the psychological

but, i n the l i n g u i s t i c sense, an u n s a i d proposition.

 When t h e Tractatus came o u t i t was eagerly taken up by the Logical-

Positivists i n Vienna f o r what they saw as i t s anti-metaphysical outlook.

But Wittgenstein's point i s not one of rejecting the metaphysical but rather

rejecting the possibility of stating the metaphysical. Through t h i s rejection,

Wittgenstein becomes p a r a d o x i c a l l y m y s t i c a l i n t h a t he establishes a world

beyond the limits of language, a world t h a t must remain in silence. It i s a

realm that cannot be discussed within philosophy s i n c e we cannot impose a

method upon i t .

'The s e n s e o f t h e w o r l d m u s t b e o u t s i d e t h e w o r l d . In the w o r l d
e v e r y t h i n g i s a s i t i s , and e v e r y t h i n g h a p p e n s a s i t h a p p e n s :
i n i t no v a l u e e x i s t s - and i f i t d i d , i t w o u l d h a v e no v a l u e .

If there i s any value t h a t does have v a l u e , i t must be outside

the whole sphere o f what h a p p e n s and i s the case. For a l l
that happens and i s the case is accidental.'H

In the final a n a l y s i s i t c o u l d be argued that the Tractatus contradicts i

itself i n being able to d i s c u s s what i t a f f i r m s c a n n o t be discussed. Russell

in his i n t r o d u c t i o n says for example:

'The w h o l e s u b j e c t o f e t h i c s .... i s p l a c e d b y Mr. Wittgenstein

i n the m y s t i c a l i n e x p r e s s i b l e r e g i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s he i s
capable of expressing h i s e t h i c a l o p i n i o n s . ' ^

Wittgenstein i n the end seemed to agree but sees i t as having a purpose. .

'My p r o p o s i t i o n s s e r v e a s e l u c i d a t i o n s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g way:
a n y o n e who u n d e r s t a n d s me e v e n t u a l l y r e c o g n i s e s them a s
n o n s e n s i c a l , when he h a s u s e d them - a s s t e p s ; : - t o c l i m b
up b e y o n d t h e m . (He m u s t , s o t o s p e a k , t h r o w away t h e l a d d e r
a f t e r h e h a s c l i m b e d up i t . ) . ' 1 3

The Philosophical Investigations

What p r e c i p i t a t e d the complete r e p u d i a t i o n of the Tractatus is recounted

by both M a l c o l m and von Wright. At one point Wittgenstein was defending his

view of the p r o p o s i t i o n and that which i t describes as having the same logical

form w i t h a colleague of h i s , the Italian economist, Piero Straffa. Straffa

made a g e s t u r e used by Neapolitans to express contempt or d i s g u s t and asked

14
Wittgenstein'what the logical form of t h a t was'. According to Wittgenstein
t h i s was the q u e s t i o n t h a t made him r e a l i s e the a b s u r d i t y of h i s former

position.

Wittgenstein opens the P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n of

St. Augustine's conception of the b a s i s of language. In h i s C o n f e s s i o n s he

claimed he l e a r n t to understand the speech of h i s e l d e r s by ostensive

d e f i n i t i o n . - i . e . , by p o i n t i n g to an o b j e c t and at the same time naming i t ,

he b e l i e v e d the^'word's meaning would become c l e a r . But Wittgenstein points

out t h a t such a system c o n s i s t s o n l y of l e a r n i n g names and what they r e f e r

to. Such a c o n c e p t i o n only creates an o v e r - s i m p l i f i e d language or as he

c a l l s i t , 'language game',

' I t i s as i f someone were to say: "A game c o n s i s t s i n moving o b j e c t s

about on a s u r f a c e a c c o r d i n g to c e r t a i n r u l e s . . . " - and we r e p l i e d :
You seem to be t h i n k i n g of board games, but t h e r e are o t h e r s .
You can make your d e f i n i t i o n c o r r e c t by e x p r e s s l y restricting i t
to those games.' ^ x

The i d e a of g i v i n g meaning to a word by p o i n t i n g to the o b j e c t it represents

does not f u l l y e x p l a i n i t s meaning. I t i s not the whole e x p l a n a t i o n , but

merely one specific training.

'With d i f f e r e n t t r a i n i n g the same o s t e n s i v e t e a c h i n g of these words

would have e f f e c t e d a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g . '

Wittgenstein f e e l s t h a t S t . A u g u s t i n e ' s b e l i e f t h a t a person l e a r n s to

speak by simply memorizing names i s i l l o g i c a l s i n c e i t presupposes a c e r t a i n

knowledge of language. I f someone were to p o i n t to a red o b j e c t and say,

"This i s red", unless the 'student' understands what the word ' c o l o u r ' means

the statement w i l l be meaningless.'Red' may e q u a l l y r e f e r to the s i z e , shape

or m a t e r i a l of the o b j e c t . Therefore ostensive d e f i n i t i o n or naming of ob-

j e c t s does not n e c e s s a r i l y g i v e meaning.

'And now, I t h i n k , we can say: A u g u s t i n e d e s c r i b e s the l e a r n i n g of

human language as i f the c h i l d came i n t o a s t r a n g e c o u n t r y and
d i d not understand the language of the c o u n t r y ; t h a t i s , as i f
i t a l r e a d y had a language o n l y not t h i s one. Or a g a i n : as i f
the c h i l d c o u l d a l r e a d y t h i n k , o n l y not yet speak. And " t h i n k "
would here mean something l i k e " t a l k to i t s e l f " .
In other words ostensive d e f i n i t i o n s only work with people who already have

some knowledge of the language. In order to point to things by : naming them

we have to know f i r s t the nature of what i t i s we are pointing to, that i s

the meaning of the name. Wittgenstein believes the meaning of the word i s

found i n discovering i t s use. If the use of the word i s learned then i t s

meaning i s also.

'For a large class of cases - though not for a l l - -in which we

employ the word "meaning" i t can be defined thus: the meaning
of a word i s i t s use i n the language.'18

We could think of words as tools - things that we understand only i n

association with t h e i r function.

A l l t h i s i s a long way from Wittgenstein's previous views i n the

Tractatus. Picturing or naming the world i s meaningless since there are many

ways of seeing language. Wittgenstein asks:

'But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion

question and command? - There are countless kinds: countless
d i f f e r e n t kinds of use of what we c a l l "symbols", "words",
."sentences". And this m u t i p l i e i t y i s not something fixed:,
given once and for a l l ; but new types of language, new
language games, as we may say, come into existence, and others
become obsolete and forgotten.'

There i s no common basis for language; i t has no one d i s t i n c t i v e property

and likewise language games have no property i n common. Wittgenstein compares

language games with games i n general. There i s no simple property common

to a l l games. Chess and ring-a-ring-o-roses have a very different make up

to each other. However, there may be s i m i l a r i t i e s between games, and i n turn

between language games - i . e . , d i f f e r e n t usages - which Wittgenstein c a l l s

'family resemblances'.
 33

'I can t h i n k o f no b e t t e r e x p r e s s i o n t o c h a r a c t e r i z e these

s i m i l a r i t i e s than " f a m i l y resemblances"; f o r t h e v a r i o u s
resemblances between members o f a f a m i l y : b u i l d , f e a t u r e s ,
c o l o u r of eyes, g a i t , temperament, e t c . , e t c . , o v e r l a p and
c r i s s - c r o s s i n the same way - And I s h a l l say: 'games'
form a f a m i l y . ' 2 0

In the T r a c t a t u s each s t a t e o f a f f a i r s was unique and from a l o g i c a l point

of view t h e r e c o u l d o n l y be one p r o p o s i t i o n f o r i t and the task o f the p h i l o s o -

pher was t o r e v e a l the l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n . In the

Investigations, Wittgenstein not only r e j e c t s the notion t h a t f a c t s have a

l o g i c a l form but a l s o t h a t s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s c o n s i s t of o b j e c t s whose form i s

unatterable, s i n c e whether an o b j e c t i s composite o r non-composite,depends

upon, not an a b o s l u t e , but on the p a r t i c u l a r language game used. He asks us t o

imagine a chessboard and attempt t o determine whether i t i s composite or n o t .

I f t h e i d e a o f an ' a b s o l u t e ' non-composite object i s r e j e c t e d then the n o t i o n

of simple s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s has t o be abandoned. Language i s no l o n g e r a

p i c t u r e o f r e a l i t y but a t o o l w i t h a r i c h v a r i e t y of uses - each a t t r i b u t i n g

a d i f f e r e n t meaning t o i t . There i s no one c o r r e c t form, every sentence ' i s

21

i n order as i t i s . '

Now we d i s c e r n a d i f f e r e n t r o l e f o r the p h i l o s o p h e r . I t i s not t o ensure

the c o r r e c t form o f t h e sentence but t o understand i t , and the remainder of the

I n v e s t i g a t i o n s c o u l d be summarised as a t t e m p t i n g t o do j u s t t h i s - t o seek out

the reasons f o r t h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f language. When one language game i s

wrongly assumed t o be analogous t o a n o t h e r , p h i l o s o p h i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s

needed t o see the e r r o r . The d i f f e r e n c e s a r e hidden not because they a r e

u n f a m i l i a r but because i n o r d i n a r y t h i n k i n g they a r e too f a m i l i a r . In t h i s

l i g h t philosophy i s not a s c i e n c e t h a t p o i n t s out something new but r a t h e r

22

something which p o i n t s out .truisms. Wittgenstein b e l i e v e s t h a t the

philosopher's aim should be t o e s t a b l i s h complete c l a r i t y which would not so

much l e a d t o a s o l u t i o n - something new - but a d i s a p p e a r a n c e of the problem.

He does not pose a c o r r e c t model f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g but simply r e v e a l s the

b l i n d spots.

'What i s your aim i n p h i l o s o p h y ? - To show the f l y the way out of

the f l y - b o t t l e . ' 2 3

I f we see how t o get out of the muddle we can a l s o see how we got t h e r e i n

the f i r s t place. W i t t g e n s t e i n c o n c e i v e s o f p h i l o s o p h y as 'a . b a t t l e a g a i n s t

2A

the bewitchment of i n t e l l i g e n c e by means of language.'

One o f the p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems W i t t g e n s t e i n d i s c u s s e s are those

statements t h a t speak o f a b s t r a c t i o n s r a t h e r than b o d i l y e x i s t e n c e s . Sta-

tements about s e e i n g are a n a l y s e d , but I w i l l d e a l w i t h t h i s a r e a i n Chapter

4 i n s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n t o Johns' works. Another a r e a a r e those statements

to do w i t h comprehension which a r e o f t e n misunderstood i n what they mean by

m i s t a k i n g how the s p e c i f i c words are used. For example, when we say, "Now I

understand", we u s u a l l y t r e a t i t as a r e p o r t a n d the q u e s t i o n a r i s e s : what

does i t r e p o r t ? I t i s not the o c c a s i o n o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g s i n c e i f i t were

so i t would imply an o b s e r v a t i o n of a mental a c t and we would have t o ask our-

s e l v e s whether 'understanding' i s a s i n g l e mental a c t t h a t can be observed.

'We are t r y i n g to get h o l d of the mental p r o c e s s of u n d e r s t a n d i n g
which seems t o be hidden behind those cases and t h e r e f o r e more
r e a d i l y v i s i b l e accompaniments. But we do not succeed; or r a t h e r ,
i t does not get as f a r as a r e a l attempt. For even supposing I
had found something t h a t happened i n a l l those cases of under-
s t a n d i n g - why s h o u l d it_ be the understanding? And how can the
p r o c e s s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g have been hidden, when I s a i d "Now I
u n d e r s t a n d " because I understood?! And i f I say i t i s hidden -
then how do I know what I have to l o o k f o r ? I am i n a muddle.' ^ 2

There are d i f f e r e n t p r o c e s s e s of u n d e r s t a n d i n g and i f the statement "Now

I u n d e r s t a n d " i s t r e a t e d as a r e p o r t i t becomes meaningless as i t i s not a

report of anything i n p a r t i c u l a r . A l s o we cannot say we understand u n t i l we

have a c t u a l l y u n d e r s t o o d . To t r e a t "Now I understand" as an o b s e r v a t i o n i s

absurb as making the r e p o r t "Now I have begun". Rather the statement can o n l y

be m e a n i n g f u l as an e x c l a m a t i o n , l i k e "Ah!" which i s a l o n g way from r e p o r t or

description. Looked at i n t h i s way, such statements cannot be true of f a l s e

even i f they can be j u s t i f i e d later.

'We could also imagine a case i n which l i g h t was always seeming

to dawn on someone - he exclaims. "Now I have i t ! " and then
can never j u s t i f y himself i n practice - It might seem to him as
i f i n the twinkling of an eye he forgot again the meaning of
the picture that occurred to him.' *' 2

The exclamation may be u n j u s t i f i a b l e but the joy or r e l i e f at having thought

one saw the answer to a problem was c e r t a i n l y present. The statement was not

a description of a mental state but more what Wittgenstein c a l l s a " s i g n a l "

which we judge whether i t was r i g h t l y employed by what the person goes on to

A 2 7

do.

Wittgenstein examines numerous philosophical problems from a l l d i f f e r e n t

angles - statements of intention, action, pain, states of mind, seeing,

recognition, etc.. K. T. Fann describes the Investigations as a book of case

h i s t o r i e s of philosophic cures. There i s nothing i n the book that we would

2

o r d i n a r i l y c a l l a reasoning or argument - ' i t i s more a book of rem inders.'

In t h i s sense, the work takes on the aspect of some sort of anthropolo-

g i c a l search where Wittgenstein,repudiating the idea of atomism, seeks the

e s s e n t i a l connection between th ings i n the same way the anthropologist may

look toward the sense of the t o t a l i t y through the study of anthropocentrism

rather than ethnoeentrism. Both involve the understanding of humanity as a

whole.
'What we are supplying are r e a l l y remarks on the natural history
of human beings; we are not contributing c u r i o s i t i e s however,
but observations which no one has doubted, but which have ^
escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes.'
 CHAPTER THREE:, JOHNS AND WITTGENSTEIN:

THE STATE OF CRITICISM SO FAR

"You have i n t h e p a s t shown some impatience w i t h critics.

Would you c a r e t o r e v e a l your p r e s e n t f e e l i n g ? "

A f t e r an e s p e c i a l l y l o n g pause, he answered i n a v e r y small

v o i c e , "I'm v e r y t o l e r a n t , " and laughed.' 1
 37

To date o n l y t h r e e c r i t i c s have d i s c u s s e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f J a s p e r Johns'

work to W i t t g e n s t e i n and one o f these, N i c o l a s C a l a s , devotes o n l y a couple of

2

sentences to the s u b j e c t . Max K o z l o f f ' s comments are more l e n g t h y but on

the whole no more s a t i s f a c t o r y - i n f a c t maybe l e s s so. Although Rosalind

Krauss' d i s c u s s i o n i s l e s s erroneous than K o z l o f f ' s she too p r e s e n t s a number

of 'misunderstandings' t h a t need to be cleared up.

In K o z l o f f ' s d i s c u s s i o n he i s g u i l t y of a s e r i e s of q u i t e gross mistakes

to the p o i n t t h a t we have to throw out most of h i s a p p l i c a t i o n of Wittgenstein's

w r i t i n g to Johns' work. I t w i l l be e a s i e r to s o r t some of t h i s out by quoting

the two most r e l e v a n t passages i n f u l l . He says of the Tractatus

'... i t (the World) comprises s t a t e s of a f f a i r s , or f a c t s ,
r e g a r d i n g the complex r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h i n g s . Our way of
comprehending t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s by p i c t u r i n g ( r a t h e r than
simply naming) i t by language. And t h i s p i c t u r i n g i s o r g a -
n i z e d by combinations o f words, as i n the s t r u c t u r e o f a
sentence, which must i d e n t i c a l l y r e f l e c t the manner i n which .
" s t a t e s of a f f a i r s " i t s e l f i s o r d e r e d . "The f a c t t h a t the e l e -
ments of the p i c t u r e , " says W i t t g e n s t e i n , "are r e l a t e d to one
another i n a d e t e r m i n a t e way r e p r e s e n t s t h a t t h i n g s are
r e l a t e d to one another i n the same way".'

So f a r so good - but he goes on:

'Hypotheses about r e a l i t y , t h e r e f o r e , take the shape of models

or language games, designed to show not what i s t r u e , f o r
what one h o l d s to be t r u e can be v e r i f i e d o n l y e m p i r i c a l l y ,
but what i s p o s s i b l e . ' 3

What K o z l o f f has done i s make the s e r i o u s mistake of b l i n d l y jumping from

the stance taken i n the T r a c t a t u s to t h a t of the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . He shows

t h a t he has understood such passages i n the T r a c t a t u s as:

'A p i c t u r e r e p r e s e n t s a p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n i n l o g i c a l space.
A p i c t u r e c o n t a i n s the p o s s i b i l i t y of the s i t u a t i o n t h a t i t
represents.
A p i c t u r e a g r e e s w i t h r e a l i t y or f a i l s to agree; i t i s
c o r r e c t or i n c o r r e c t t r u e or f a l s e . ' 4

but i n the second paragraph says,

'reality, t h e r e f o r e , takes the shape of language games.'

This i s i n reference to the Investigations^which i s a d i r e c t r e f u t a l of the

 38

Tractatus. So what we are presented with, then, i s K o z l o f f s a y i n g that e l e -

ments of a p i c t u r e are r e l a t e d i n a l o g i c a l way since ' t h i n g s ' are r e l a t e d to

one another i n a d e t e r m i n a t e f a s h i o n , and i n conclusion, that r e a l i t y i s

given form by language games and hence meaning w i l l always be no more than

arbitrary. The c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s such t h a t i t c r e a t e s fundamental problems

f o r K o z l o f f ' s subsequent a n a l y s i s of Johns' work.

Passing beyond t h i s , K o z l o f f d i s c u s s e s the q u e s t i o n of t a u t o l o g y and

c o n t r a d i c t i o n which he says - a p p e a r i n g to quote W i t t g e n s t e i n - express a

"false truth value". Nowhere does W i t t g e n s t e i n use t h i s phrase and in i t s

context i t is difficult to know what e x a c t l y K o z l o f f means. The o n l y way I

can e x p l a i n i t i s t h a t i t r e f e r s to statements t h a t are not models of r e a l i t y -

as indeed T a u t o l o g i e s and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , from W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s e a r l i e r view,

are n o t . But then to use such a term i s to m i s c o n s t r u e what Wittgenstein

says of these types o f p r o p o s i t i o n s . Wittgenstein explains t h a t they both

do have a t r u t h v a l u e . The tautology's i s e s s e n t i a l l y t r u e and the contra-

diction's essentially false. They a r e not p i c t u r e s of r e a l i t y s i n c e we can

determine t h e i r t r u t h v a l u e from l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y and do not require any

empirical verification.

Given t h i s m i s c o n c e p t i o n K o z l o f f goes on to e x p l a i n t h a t what Johns

does i s p r e s e n t us w i t h v a r i o u s p i c t o r i a l elements a n d ' d i s p l a y them as i f

they are s y n t a c t i c a l e n t i t i e s formed to i l l u s t r a t e some p r o p o s i t i o n , rather

than c r y s t a l i z e them i n t o p r o d u c t s of f u s i o n and feeling.'^ The audience

presumably does the l i n k i n g up of these elements and we are f o r c e d t o see

the r e s u l t s as t a u t o l o g i o u s and contradictory:

' I t i s o n l y when they are s c r u t i n i z e d and v e r i f i e d to be r i p e

w i t h t a u t o l o g i e s and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s t h a t they come f u l l y a l i v e
as the c r e a t i o n s they a r e . In other words, t h e i r d i s t i n c t i o n
i s to have addressed themselves to the f a c t that what has a
" f a l s e t r u t h v a l u e " [ i . e . , t h a t which i s not a modeal of r e a l i t y
- I assume] i n l o g i c can have a profound a e s t h e t i c r e a l i t y i n a r t . ' ^
Supposing Johns.' work does contain tautology and contradiction, they are no

more 'models of r e a l i t y ' merely because they are presented to us. Wittgenstein

also presents us with such statements. It i s as i f Kozloff feels Wittgenstein

has a problem over not being able to f i t such propositions into r e a l i t y , that

deep down he would l i k e to somehow and Johns manages i t by being creative -

art to the rescue! Kozloff has also f a i l e d to r e a l i s e that i n the Tractatus

aesthetics i s outside the world of r e a l i t y , the world of f a c t s , and hence

Johns' work i s no 'answer' since i t i s outside the Tractatus' conception of

reality.

Apart from these claims we should look at some of Johns' work to see i f

they stand up to any of them. By the Sea, 1961 (Plate XXXV) i s a useful one

to take since i t i s also discussed by Rosalind Krauss i n r e l a t i o n to

Wittgenstein. In t h i s work there are four colour l a b e l s : RED, YELLOW, BLUE,

and a fourth i n which a l l three words are superimposed to form, not a single

word as Krauss claims, but a coalescing of the three into v i r t u a l l y an

unreadable sign. Each word labels one of four sections of stretched canvas

that go to make up the work. Although for the most part they have been

painted separately, when joined together the e n t i r e surface i s covered by a

more or less uniform p a i n t e r l i n e s s . Kozloff i s asking us to look at these

labels and treat them as either tautologious or contradictory or possibly

even both. Hence we are to say the RED section i s red and the RED section

i s not red>;the YELLOW section i s yellow, the YELLOW section i s not yellow

and so on. However, there i s no tautology since the red section i s not

wholly red and there i s no contradiction since the section i s not wholly not

red. The work i n fact has nothing to do with such propositions and even

Kozloff himself asserts this.when discussing False Start:

 40

1
.... Johns would never confuse a symbol w i t h a s i g n he i s
n e i t h e r i n t e r e s t e d nor u n i n t e r e s t e d i n p r e s e r v i n g c o l o u r
p u r i t y . . . . . You do not ask whether t h a t y e l l o w p a t c h i s
red as the l a b e l says but i n the u n l i k e l y event t h a t you do,
the y e l l o w i s a f f i r m e d and the r e d ( o f the l e t t e r i n g )
acknowledged, but the c o n n e c t i o n i s not i m p l i e d . ' 7

The ambiguity of By the Sea lies i n something f a r d i f f e r e n t t h a t we will look

at l a t e r on.

K o z l o f f proceeds to make a f u r t h e r e r r o r i n c a l l i n g tautologies and

contradictions, " s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s " which from the T r a c t a t u s ' p o i n t of view

they d e f i n i t e l y are n o t . He then s t a t e s t h a t what i s at the c e n t r e o f Johns'

work i s the n o t i o n of usage and t h a t , t r u e enough, he p i c k s t h i s up directly

from r e a d i n g the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . But K o z l o f f i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s w i t h a passage

from the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s t h a t has little to do s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h the usage of

words and more w i t h the f a l l a c y of t h i n k i n g a word s i g n i f i e s one thing.

'Imagine someone's s a y i n g " " A l l t o o l s serve to modify something.

Thus the hammer m o d i f i e s the p o s i t i o n of the n a i l , the saw the
shape o f the b o a r d , and so on." - Arid what i s m o d i f i e d by the
ruler, the glue p o t , the n a i l s ? - "Our knowledge of a thing's
l e n g t h , the temperature of the g l u e , and the s o l i d i t y of the
box." - Would a n y t h i n g be gained by t h i s a s s i m i l a t i o n of
expressions?'^

To d e s c r i b e a t o o l as a ' m o d i f i e r ' i s not sufficient to give i t meaning since

what i t m o d i f i e s i n t u r n may modify. Whilst d e a l i n g w i t h meaning and usage

K o z l o f f takes a b r i e f l o o k at Passage, 1962 ( P l a t e XXXVI) and Johns'

treatment o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s concept.

'But when the a r t i s t l a b e l s an area " s c r a p e " he shows t h a t a ruler

has e f f e c t e d the s c r a p i n g , and t h a t i t has smeared out p a r t of
the w r i t t e n d i r e c t i o n to do what i t has done! Not o n l y i s he
d i s p l a c i n g the p r o p e r f u n c t i o n o f t o o l s , - b u t i n the end he also
d i s p l a c e s "use" showing i t i n i t s t r u e a e s t h e t i c g u i s e of
uselessness. ' 9

Johns i s indeed u s i n g the r u l e r as a s c r a p e r r a t h e r than a t o o l f o r measuring

but K o z l o f f misses the whole p o i n t t h a t b o t h Johns and Wittgenstein make,

namely t h a t t h e r e is_ no 'proper f u n c t i o n ' of the word (the r u l e r has been

l a b e l l e d ) or the o b j e c t : r u l e r . A r u l e r i s o n l y a measuring instrument when

we use i t for measuring. To the boy who i s caught throwing i n k - p e l l e t s i n clas

i t means an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t thing. I f we use i t to scrape paint then that

i s what i t s meaning i s .

The paradox of the word 'scrape' i n Passage that i t s e l f has been scraped

i s not a question of a word being rendered useless since we can s t i l l read i t ,

hence use i t . On the contrary Johns i s very n i c e l y reading i t from the van-

tage point of two language games at the same time - one of report: "The

paint has been scraped" and one of command': " i t says 'scrape' so I scraped i t !

F i n a l l y , Kozloff believes Johns d i f f e r s from Wittgenstein i n 'pointing

out' that there are no rules common to a l l language games - but does not

Wittgenstein do this? - and managing a 'redundant naming of objects.'"*"^

But to presume that naming of objects already present i s a redundancy i s again

to miss the whole point. In Fool's House, 1962 (Plate XXXVII) Johns labels

the broom, towel, stretcher and cup with a scribbled name and arrow pointing

to the object not i n order to indicate any absurdity of r e p e t i t i o n but to

reveal the ill-reasoned notion of names giving meaning. Johns i s , e s s e n t i a l l y

concerned with what Wittgenstein asks us:

'Suppose, however, someone were to object: " I t i s not true that you
must already be master of a language i n order to understand an
ostensive d e f i n i t i o n : a l l you need - of course!' - i s to know or
guess what the person giving the explanation i s pointing to.
That i s , whether for example to the shape of the object, or
to i t s colour, or to i t s number, and so on" - And what does
'pointing to the shape', 'pointing to the colour' consist in?
Point to a piece of paper. - And now point, to i t s shape - now
to i t s colour - now to i t s number (that sounds queer!). - How
did you do i t ? 'H

What i s the word 'towel' pointing to? Something to dry our hands on? A

paint rag, as i t has paint smeared on i t ? A piece of collage? I w i l l discuss

t h i s work further i n the next chapter.

* * *

Rosalind Krauss' a r t i c l e i s more useful and she steers clear of anything

said i n the Tractatus altogether, concentrating s o l e l y on passages from the

 42

Investigations. Her u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s much more s e n s i b l e than K o z l o f f ' s but she

l i m i t s h e r s e l f to a s k i n g q u e s t i o n s s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the l i g h t of Wittgenstein's

idea of 'usage' and does not d e a l w i t h the i m p l i c a t i o n s that h i s philosophy

has i n the w o r l d of a r t as Johns does. The project i s s l i g h t l y marred by

confusing v a r i o u s works and at times s e e i n g what- i s not there.

In Passage, 1962, the s t i c k device o f Device i s r e p l a c e d by a r u l e r and

Krauss succumbs to the temptation of a s s i m i l a t i n g Johns' iconography to

12

Wittgenstein's imagery. This i s spurious work i n the first place, but

even then the paragraph she a t t r i b u t e s the use of the r u l e r to bearSvery

l i t t l e r e l a t i o n s h i p to the context i n which we f i n d i t used i n Passage.

'Suppose I were to ask: i s i t c l e a r to us, w h i l e we are u t t e r i n g ,
the sentences " T h i s rod i s one y a r d l o n g " and "Here i s one
s o l d i e r " , t h a t we mean d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s by "one", t h a t "one"
has d i f f e r e n t meanings? - Not at a l l - .... Asked "Do you mean
the same t h i n g by both 'ones'? one^would perhaps answer: "Of
c o u r s e I mean the same t h i n g ; one!" (Perhaps r a i s i n g one f i n g e r ) .

Now has "1" a d i f f e r e n t meaning when i t stands f o r a measure and

when i t stands f o r a number? I f the question,, i s framed i n t h i s
way one w i l l answer i n the a f f i r m a t i v e . ' x 3

The reason f o r the m i s t a k e appears to be a v i s u a l one. Krauss b e l i e v e s that

the r u l e r manages to e s t a b l i s h the whole s c a l e of the picture:

'The r u l e r seems to me to f u n c t i o n not o n l y as a s c r a p i n g t o o l

but a l s o as a measuring d e v i c e s i n c e the s i z e of the upper
t h i r d of t h e canvas can be read o f f from the r u l e r ' s s c a l e .

This i s wishful t h i n k i n g s i n c e i t does no such t h i n g . Each t h i r d of the

canvas i s 18" x 40", whereas the r u l e r i s j u s t under 14" long. It i s also

unnecessary to f o r c e t h i s a n a l y s i s s i n c e the d i f f e r e n t usages are already

implied as p o i n t e d out previously. In a d d i t i o n to t h i s Krauss confuses the

imagery o f Passage w i t h Out the Window, I I , 1962 ( P l a t e XXXVIII) which makes

reading difficult. ^ 1

Rosalind K r a u s s ' view of By the Sea i s f a r c l o s e r to the t r u t h than

K o z l o f f ' s but even then she does not q u i t e make i t . She sees Johns as
 43

'demonstrating the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of s e p a r a t i n g out m e a n i n g f u l a s p e c t s of an

object'"*"^ and f i n d s a p a r a l l e l i n the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s .

'... i f I am shown v a r i o u s d i f f e r e n t l e a v e s and t o l d " t h i s i s

c a l l e d a ' l e a f , " I get an i d e a of the shape o f a l e a f , and a
p i c t u r e of i t i n my mind. - But what does the p i c t u r e of a
l e a f l o o k l i k e when i t does not show us any p a r t i c u l a r shape,
but 'what i s common to a l l shapes of l e a f ? Which shade i s
the 'sample i n my mind' o f the c o l o u r green - the sample of
what i s common t o a l l shades o f green?... Ask y o u r s e l f : what
shape must the sample o f the c o l o u r green be? Should i t be
rectangular? Or would i t then be the sample of a green r e c t a n g l e ?
- So s h o u l d i t be ' i r r e g u l a r ' i n shape? And what i s t o prevent
us then from r e g a r d i n g i t - t h a t i s , from u s i n g i t - o n l y as a
sample o f i r r e g u l a r i t y o f s h a p e ? ' ? 1

T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y the p o i n t o f By t h e Sea. The naming of c o l o u r s p l a y s a

v e r y s m a l l p a r t i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g them. -We have t o take i n t o consideration

how we are u s i n g t h e s e names. A P e r u v i a n blanket-maker may have o n l y one

or two c o n c e p t i o n s of what 'red' i s w h i l s t Greenberg would presumably only

read i t i n terms of b r i g h t n e s s .

What Krauss omits a r e the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the lower p a n e l where a l l

t h r e e words have been superimposed but the o v e r a l l c o l o u r i n g remains the same.

L i t e r a l l y Johns i s c o n v e y i n g the a b s u r d i t y o f naming to a stage where he says

to t r y t o d e s c r i b e a c o l o u r t h a t has been made up of the primary pigments i s no

more s u c c e s s f u l than a c t u a l l y p h y s i c a l l y mixing t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l names i n t o

one meaningless sign. I t becomes i n the end a q u e s t i o n o f what we mean by a

composite colour:

'We use the word "composite" (and t h e r e f o r e the word "simple") i n

an enormous number of d i f f e r e n t and d i f f e r e n t l y r e l a t e d ways.
(Is the c o l o u r o f a square on a chessboard s i m p l e , o r does i t
c o n s i s t o f pure w h i t e and pure y e l l o w ? And i s white s i m p l e , or
does i t c o n s i s t o f the c o l o u r s of the rainbow?...).

To the p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n : " I s the v i s u a l image o f t h i s t r e e

composite, and what a r e i t s component p a r t s ? " The c o r r e c t answer
i s : "That depends on what you understand by "composite"." (And
t h a t i s of c o u r s e not an answer but a r e j e c t i o n of the
question)'.18

The o n l y o t h e r work Krauss d i s c u s s e s s p e c i f i c a l l y i n r e s p e c t to

W i t t g e n s t e i n i s F i e l d P a i n t i n g , 1963-64 ( P l a t e XXXIX) where she sees Johns

actually ' u s i n g ' c o l o u r i n a new way by making i t l i t e r a l l y three dimensional

i n the form of wooden l e t t e r s of the words, Red, Yellow and Blue t h a t stand

out from the canvas. Johns indeed has shown t h a t new uses g i v e now meanings

but he has not enabled us, as Krauss s u g g e s t s , to p o i n t to c o l o u r any more

meaningfully than b e f o r e . The q u e s t i o n s t i l l would remain, as Johns e x p r e s s l y

wants i t t o : e x a c t l y what are you p o i n t i n g to?

Beyond the v a r i o u s e r r o r s and omissions d i s c u s s e d , a common undertone

t h a t appears i n K o z l o f f ' s and to a l e s s e r extent i n Krauss' i s t h a t Johns

i s i n some way anxious to r e f u t e W i t t g e n s t e i n - as i f somehow he were t r y i n g

to p r e s e n t a s i t u a t i o n where we can i n a c t u a l i t y d e s i g n a t e something specific

or r e s o l v e d i n p a i n t i n g . T h i s i s not o n l y to deny the n a t u r e of a l l the

work we have looked at i n Chapter I but a l s o to go a g a i n s t h i s own remarks

i n the v a r i o u s i n t e r v i e w s . In the next Chapter I hope to make t h i s much

c l e a r e r i n showing how Wittgenstein provided a methodology where Johns was

not o n l y a b l e to remain even more s u b t l y o u t s i d e h i s work but among o t h e r

t h i n g s t o o f f e r c o u n c i l to c r i t i c i s m i n g e n e r a l .
 CHAPTER FOUR: JOHNS AND WITTGENSTEIN

'Furthermore he disposes of the whole matter of influence by

observing:

"The problem with influences i s that the thing or person you

say i s an influence has to accept some of the blame for what
you've done,"and laughing uproariously.'1
 Through h i s c o n t a c t w i t h Duchamp i n 1959 and W i t t g e n s t e i n i n 1961 Johns

was essentially refining h i s i n q u i r y i n t o the meaning of a r t . With h i s

p r e v i o u s work he p r o b a b l y saw a c e r t a i n s u p e r f i c i a l i t y i n simply showing

f e a s i b l e s i t u a t i o n s where c o n t r a r i e s c o u l d e x i s t s i d e by s i d e . As Fried

suggests:

'An a r t i s t w i t h Johns' c r i t i c a l powers c o u l d not but be aware

sooner or l a t e r , t h a t h i s p u t a t i v e s o l u t i o n was no s o l u t i o n at
a l l but r a t h e r a y o k i n g o f i n c o m p a t i b l e s .

... From b e i n g an attempt, to s o l v e a f o r m a l problem i n h e r e n t i n

abstract e x p r e s s i o n i s m Johns'"'art Becomes' an exploring,
h e i g h t e n i n g and showing o f f of the problem i t s e l f . ' 2

F r i e d , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , would read i t i n terms of a H e g e l i a n d i a l e c t i c , but

it seems more f r u i t f u l t o b r i n g i t c l o s e r t o home and simply a s c e r t a i n the

n a t u r e of Johns' d e v e l o p i n g methodology from the two f i g u r e s t h a t were

becoming prominent d u r i n g these y e a r s .

An a n a l y s i s of Johns' growth v i a Duchamp would, of course be a paper i n

itself and s i n c e t h i s i s fundamentally a l o o k i n t o the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the

'problem' g i v e n by W i t t g e n s t e i n , I w i l l be b r i e f . A f t e r Johns' f i r s t one-

man show, h e l d a t the C a s t e l l i G a l l e r y (January 20th February 8 t h , 1958),.

3

he was spoken of f r e q u e n t l y as a neo-Dadaist. Having little i d e a what this

meant he read M o t h e r w e l l s ' a n t h o l o g y , Dada P a i n t e r s and Poets. In 1959

Robert L e b e l came out w i t h h i s monograph on Duchamp. T h i s , together with a

visit t o the A r e n s b e r g C o l l e c t i o n i n P h i l a d e l p h i a i n the same y e a r , deeply

a f f e c t e d Johns. S h o r t l y a f t e r , N i c o l a s C a l a s brought Duchamp t o Johns' s t u d i o .

Johns began to c o l l e c t h i s works and wrote a s h o r t review of a new translation

4

of Duchamp's notes from the Green Box. Such d e v o t i o n was unprecedented and

goes to show the s t r o n g a f f i n i t y he f e l t f o r the o l d e r man.

I c o n o g r a p h i c a l l y we c o u l d l i n k much o f Johns' subsequent work w i t h

Duchamp's - the use of r u l e r s w i t h T r o i s Stoppage E t a l o n , 1913-14, Johns'

Thermometer w i t h the one i n Why not Sneeze, 1921. The c o l o u r c h a r t s of

According t o What w i t h t h e same i n Turn', 1918. The scraped Device circles

with the r o t o - r e l i e f s and so on. In h i s review i n Scrap, Johns showed

p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i n t h e famous passage from the notes t o the Large Glass.

'To loose the p o s s i b i l i t y of recognizing

2 s i m i l a r objects
\ 2 colours, 2 laces
2 h a t s , 2 forms whatever
to reach t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f s u f f i c i e n t v i s u a l memory to
toatransfer
from one
l i k e o b j e c t t o another
the memory i m p r i n t
Same p o s s i b i l i t y
w i t h sounds, w i t h b r a i n f a c t s . '

For Duchamp the e x e r c i s e o f t r a n s f e r a l i s p r i m a r i l y an i n t e l l e c t u a l one

whereas Johns' would-(like t o see i t take p l a c e perceptually:

'My i d e a has always been t h a t i n p a i n t i n g t h e way i d e a s a r e

conveyed i s through the way i t l o o k s and I see no way t o
a v o i d t h a t and I don't t h i n k Duchamp can e i t h e r . ' 6

T h i s does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t a c l a s h o f i n t e r e s t s s i n c e the aims a r e

the same. But Duchamp i s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e c o n c e p t u a l 7

w h i l s t Johns i s

specifically i n t e n t i n p o i n t i n g out the f a l l a c y o f g e n e r a l i s a t i o n , n o t from

any cosmological aspect - although, o f course, i t i s r e l a t e d - but w i t h i n

the v i s u a l p r a c t i c e i t s e l f . Johns i s a p a i n t e r and consequently f i n d s

enough t o t h i n k about i n terms of t h e p a i n t i n g a l o n e . Duchamp encouraged

him t o d e p o l a r i s e t h e s i t u a t i o n and showed a way out of the n o t i o n of the

g
p r o b l e m a t i c - 'there i s no s o l u t i o n s i n c e t h e r e i s no problem'.

Johns saw Duchamp as moving h i s work from one o f r e t i n a l b o u n d a r i e s

9

' i n t o a f i e l d where language, thought and v i s i o n a c t e d upon one a n o t h e r . '

We have seen the b e g i n n i n g s o f t h i s i n t e r e s t i n F a l s e S t a r t and P a i n t i n g With

Ruler and "Gray". Wittgenstein provided a method o f d e a l i n g w i t h this i n a

way t h a t t h e a c t i v i t y would remain without the p r o b l e m a t i c - i t was a method

that c l a r i f i e d the d e f i n i t i o n o f l o o k i n g .
 Wittgenstein's l a t e r stance i s not u n l i k e Duchamp's. His conception of

the p h i l o s o p h i c a l problem was a need to e l u c i d a t e i t - a procedure t h a t l e d

not to any s o l u t i o n but to i t s d i s a p p e a r a n c e . A passage from the Investigations

c o u l d w e l l serve as Johns' dictum:

'We do not advance any k i n d of t h e o r y . There must not be a n y t h i n g

h y p o t h e t i c a l i n our c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . We must do' away w i t h a l l
e x p l a n a t i o n , and d e s c r i p t i o n a l o n e must take i t s p l a c e . And
t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n gets i t s l i g h t , t h a t i s to say, i t s purpose,
from p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems. These are of course not e m p i r i c a l
problems. They are s o l v e d , r a t h e r , by l o o k i n g i n t o the
workings.... The problems are s o l v e d not by g i v i n g new i n f o r m a -
t i o n , but by a r r a n g i n g what we have always known. P h i l o s o p h y i s
a b a t t l e a g a i n s t the bewitchement of our i n t e l l i g e n c e by means of
language.'10

As w i t h W i t t g e n s t e i n , Johns does not advance a t h e o r y , there i s no explanation,

but r a t h e r he looks i n t o the a c t u a l workings of p a i n t i n g and the p e r c e i v i n g of

it. Unlike, i n fact d i r e c t l y opposed t o , the f o r m a l i s t i n t e r e s t , he does not

regard the problems of contemporary p a i n t i n g as e m p i r i c a l but as a blindness

to the i n h e r e n t and u n a v o i d a b l e v i s u a l aspects.. Johns attempts to d i s s o l v e

the problems by 'arranging what we have always known' and i t c o u l d be said

t h a t he sees h i s r o l e as a r t i s t , as a b a t t l e a g a i n s t the bewitchment of our

s i g h t - as w e l l as i n t e l l i g e n c e - by not j u s t language, but more specifically

criticism.

In 1961, Johns made the s c u l p m e t a l p i e c e , The C r i t i c Sees ( P l a t e XXXX).

It c o n s i s t s of a small b r i c k of p l a s t e r coated with sculpmetal, (3-1/4 x

6-1/4 x 2"). The f r o n t of t h i s shows a p a i r of s p e c t a c l e s b e h i n d whose g l a s s

each eye has been r e p l a c e d by a mouth, one open, the o t h e r not so much c l o s e d

as the t e e t h b a r r e d . I t i s an important work s i n c e to misunderstand i t i s

to confuse the a r t i s t ' s stance i n f u r t h e r works. Johns r e l a t e s t h a t this

p a r t i c u l a r p i e c e was i n s p i r e d by a three minute v i s i t of a c r i t i c to one of

his exhibitions. 1 1
I f i t has not done a l r e a d y the i n t e n t i o n becomes c l e a r from

t h i s information. The critic i s not as i n t e r e s t e d i n l o o k i n g at a r t as he is

t a l k i n g about i t . This does not assume that the c r i t i c does not look at a l l ,

only that looking i s a means to another end. From a Wittgenst'inian outlook

the message becomes doubly c l e a r . In the Investigations Wittgenstein discusses

the sensation of seeing and the describing of that sensation. When we look

at something, we are not simply involved i n the act of the sensory but also

in an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of that something. When we look we experience d i f f e r e n t

aspects of a figure which i n fact are d i f f e r e n t interpretations of i t . Our

judgement of that figure w i l l only be one of many that could be made. Conse-

quently there i s no authoritative view of the thing seen. Perhaps t h i s i s

obvious, but Wittgenstein f e e l s i t necessary to warn us of the danger i n

forgetting i t . As with the mistake of attaching meaning to a word by i t s

naming function so we must remember that aspects of a painting can be d e s c r i -

bed but not explained and ultimately the only authority i s the painting

itself.

This i s what Johns i s saying. The practice of c r i t i c i s m i s meaningful

only to the extent of suggestion. We are a l l involved i n i t - even though I

think the work points d i r e c t l y at the professional - and must beware. To

argue over i n t e r p r e t a t i o n where i t becomes a question almost of dogma comes

p e r i l o u s l y close to l o s i n g one' s sense of sight.

'Here i t occurs to me i n conversation on aesthetic matters we

use the words: "You have to see i t l i k e t h i s , this i s how i t
i s , how i t i s meant"; "When you see i t l i k e t h i s , you see where
i t goes wrong";"You have to hear this bar as an introduction"; ^
"You must hear i t i n t h i s key"; "You must phrase i t l i k e t h i s " . '

New York c r i t i c i s m i n p a r t i c u l a r has become so out of control as to

almost impose rules of perception not only on to the audience but the a r t i s t
13

himself - e.g., some of the c o l o u r - f i e l d painters. The status of the

c r i t i c i s nigh similar to a f i l m star and consequently there i s an a t t r a c t i v e

position to be held, a reputation that must be c a r e f u l l y nurtured. In the

Sketchbook Notes Johns says that 'looking i s and i s not eating and being
eaten' which indeed i s the case of the mouths i n The C r i t i c Sees. Not only

i s this a reference to the more mundane f i n a n c i a l aspect of the critic^'s

a c t i v i t y but also to the whole process of chewing over and regurgitating the

artwork. Nicolas Calas, one of the few American art writers to watch out f o r

the dangers of c r i t i c i s m , notes:

'When c r i t i c s treat pictures as texts rather than images, the

public i s expected to see a r t i n terms of problems and solutions.
Marcel Duchamp was fond of comparing c r i t i c s to parasites feeding
on a r t i s t s ; today many formalist a r t i s t s could seem to aspire to
be fed on. '-> x

In such a state where material as well as psychological s u r v i v a l plays a large

r o l e , such work as Johns' that refuses to be pinned down poses i t s e l f even

more as a threat and hence more ingenuity must be brought to bear to bring i t

under c o n t r o l .

This would explain the reluctance of a writer l i k e Kozloff to accept

The C r i t i c Sees f o r what i t i s and to interpret i t i n a way that i s compatible

to h i s own ends.

'It i s perhaps not as worth belabouring the obvious inference that

a c r i t i c sees with h i s mouth as i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that
the piece i s f i g u r a t i v e l y endowed with a sensory capacity of i t s
own ... Taken i n i t s e l f the object would imply, not that sight i s
more important than speaking, but that they are Peers , brought
together i n an unnatural s i t u a t i o n . . . the p r o b a b i l i t y remains
that they are necessarily mutual reinforcements, components of
an integrated f u n c t i o n . ' l ^

So for Kozloff, Johns i s celebrating the glorious practice of the c r i t i c who

brings about the i n t e r a c t i o n of sight and voice - 'the prime motive of any

work i s the wish to give r i s e to discussion'! Not only i s this r i d i c u l o u s l y

biased, i t i s an actual example of the c r i t i c seeing. He has avoided the

implications of the aggressive mouths, the absence of any perceptual organ -

we see mouths not eyes, spectacles i n f e r poor v i s i o n not clear sightedness -

purely i n order to safeguard h i s p o s i t i o n that the f i r s t reason for painting

i s not simply to look at i t , but so somebody can t a l k about i t !

 51

Johns i s attacking the c r i t i c whose motives are very d i f f e r e n t from

learning to see. Wittgenstein sees the role of the philosopher as some sort

of doctor who cur.es diseases of misunderstanding and likewise Johns takes i t

upon himself to clear up bad habits about looking. He does this not by

advancing any kind of theory on the meaning of art but by conveying to us

that irony i n the discussion of art i s unavoidable. For every interpretation

of a c o l l e c t i o n of p i c t o r i a l elements another w i l l follow and application of

language to the art object must take t h i s i n consideration.

'Well suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you
hear the word "cube", say the drawing of a cube. In what sense
can t h i s picture f i t or f a i l to f i t a use of the word "cube"? -
Perhaps you say: " I t ' s quite simple - i f that picture occurs
to me and I paint to a triangular form for instance, and say i t ' s a
cube then t h i s use of the word doesn't f i t the p i c t u r e . " - But
doesn't i t f i t ? I have purposely so chosen the example that i t
i s quite easy to imagine a method of projection according to which
the picture does f i t a f t e r a l l .

The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us,
but i t was possible for me to use i t d i f f e r e n t l y . ' x 7

The effect of Wittgenstein's argument i s that i t c a l l s attention to the fact

that there are other processes, apart from the one we o r i g i n a l l y think of,

to applying apicture to the word "cube". The connection between, word and

image i s tenuous.

'What i s e s s e n t i a l i s to see that the same thing can come before

our minds when we hear the word and the application s t i l l be
d i f f e r e n t . Has i t the same meaning both times? I think we s h a l l
say not.'

Johns must have been a l i t t l e bewildered to begin with over the varied

and c o n f l i c t i n g interpretations h i s work received i n the l a t e f i f t i e s - not

to mention the d i f f e r e n t schools they gave r i s e to. Contact with

Wittgenstein's work probably came as a welcome r e l i e f . In another sense,

however, because of i t s e f f e c t i n providing Johns with a f a r subtler v i s i o n

and methodology of eluding dogmatic interpretations, he has brought most of

the North American 'heavies' to have a go i n an e f f o r t to put him i n some

comprehensible slot. The s i t u a t i o n of course i s not new, but what i s different

i s that Johns i s the f i r s t to construct an oeuvre that leaves himself out e n t i -

rely i n the same way Wittgenstein deals with what we have rather than giving us

yet another hypothesis. Because of t h i s , h i s work i s considered impenetrable

and thus d i f f i c u l t and a common result i s that l i t e r a t u r e on his work i s also

difficult. Max KOzloff, with the intent of producing the d e f i n i t i v e work,

produces:aumonograph that at times of uncertainty almost hides behind mysti-

19

fication. In a world of c r i t i c i s m where interpretation i s h i e r a r c h i a l such

measures are understandable, even i f unforgivable, whereas Johns' work addres-

ses i t s e l f to nobody and everybody.

Johns i s p a r a l l e l i n g Wittgenstein's anthropocentrism where the meaning

of the painting i s only relevant to the s p e c i f i c context i t i s being viewed

in and nothing else. What the c r i t i c s , and consequently ourselves, have

done i s to perceive through bringing certain concepts to a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a -

tion. The r e s u l t has been that the painting's success i s dependant on whether

i t affirms these preconceptions or not.

'What i s meant i s that we often see and come to know things only
in terms of habit, of conditioned response of mental set, of
necessary and predictable cues. We tend to o b l i t e r a t e those
facts which contradict that which we already know and
anticipate. '20

Johns began a compaign as i t were to remedy this mistake and i f under-

stood i n terms of Wittgenstein's philosophy h i s works became much easier to

l i v e with. Presumably the d i f f i c u l t y the professional c r i t i c would have

l i e s i i i the requirement that he take a r a d i c a l relook at what he i s doing

21

and ultimately a t o t a l requestioning of his motives for writing.

Before I go on to look at some of Johns' painting i n a Wittgenstiirian

context, an interesting thought occurs at t h i s stage. We have been talking

about the dangers of generalisation when trying to find meaning i n a r t .

However, at the same time, both Wittgesntein's and Johns' anthropocentrism

inversely has a l e v e l l i n g e f f e c t . Pears on the Investigations states:
;i

'It does not assimilate one kind of discourse to another:

on the contrary, i t i s always the differences betwen them
that are emphasized ... But i t does bring a l l the great
philosophical questions which arise within them back to
the same l e v e l , ordinary human l i f e , from which philosophy
started. Philosophy i s the voyage out, and the voyage back,
both of which are necessary i f the l o g i c a l space of our
ordinary l i n g u i s t i c practices i s to be understood.' 22

This i s p r e c i s e l y what Johns' l a t e r work emphasises. We are presented with

the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of setting any of our perceptions within a s p e c i f i c frame-

work of reference and this i n the end paradoxically leads us to the generali-

sation that a l l our perceptions, the c r i t i c ' s , the a r t i s t ' s can f i n a l l y be

reduced only to human l i f e from which art started.

'He i s engaged with the endlessly changing ancient task: the

imitation of nature i n her manner of operation.... he does so
without structure, he sometimes introduces signs of humanity
to intimate that we, not birds for instance, are part of the
dialogue.' 23

The painting No, 1961 (Plate XXXXI) reveals a painted surface where the

cut out l e t t e r s of the word 'NO' hang from a wire casting both a r e a l and a

painted shadow. The work as i t s t i t l e implies deals with things and their

opposites - the wire-looking shape i n the upper l e f t i s the outline of an

imprint Johns made with the base of a cast of Duchamp ,'s Female F i g Leaf - which
24

in turn i s an imprint. The l e t t e r s on the wire serve as a pointing device.

Johns w i l l s us to select an area of the painting - or even the whole painting

i t s e l f - define i t and then attempt to v e r i f y the d e f i n i t i o n by swinging the

word on the end of the wire over to that area. We are continuously denied.

Informed, we proceed to affirm that our f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n i s not the right one

for that area and f i n d ourselves doubly denied. Whatever portion we select

and interpret not only i s i t negated but the negation i s denied. The irony

here i s that there i s no persuasion on anybody's part towards a d e f i n i t e

conclusion. Nor i s i t a stance of n e u t r a l i t y since each time the word 'NO'

 54

r e f u t e s , i t a f f i r m s the e x i s t e n c e of something new.

'He s a i d t h a t even the n e g a t i v e c o n d i t i o n imposes the

"... e x p r e s s i o n o f new sense which can h e l p one i n t o what
one has not known".'25

Again t h i s work i s i n q u i r i n g i n t o the l i m i t a t i o n of d e s c r i p t i o n and the fallacy

of l o o k i n g w i t h a mind to c a p t u r i n g . Wittgenstein agrees t h a t t h e r e i s no such

t h i n g as pure s e n s a t i o n , that each time we l o o k at something our thought

p r o c e s s and i t s p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n i n g by e x p e r i e n c e produces involuntary

judgements. Wittgenstein nor Johns deny the v a l i d i t y of these but never must

they be thought of as c o n c l u s i v e . In a passage t h a t i s s u p r i s i n g l y a p p l i c a b l e

to NO, Wittgenstein says:

'Suppose we s a i d , t h a t we cannot d e s c r i b e i n words the e x p r e s s i o n

of God i n M i c h e l a n g e l o ' s 'Adam'. But t h i s i s o n l y a matter of
t e c h n i q u e , because i f we drew a l a t t i c e - w o r k over h i s f a c e
numbered,

; * * ? ? f ? * ?
.| :

x =
3 . ;

<+

6 : '

7 ..

ft

<)l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
 I would j u s t w r i t e down numbers and you might say: "My God!
I t i s grand." I t wouldn't be any d e s c r i p t i o n . You wouldn't
say such a t h i n g at a l l . I t would o n l y be a d e s c r i p t i o n i f
you c o u l d p a i n t ( a c t ? ) a c c o r d i n g to t h i s p i c t u r e , which of
course i s c o n c e i v a b l e . But t h i s would show t h a t you can't at
a l l t r a n s m i t the i m p r e s s i o n by words, but you'd have a g a i n to
paint.'26

In o r d e r to reach a s a t i s f a c t o r y d e s c r i p t i o n of the f a c e of M i c h e l a n g e l o ' s God,

Wittgenstein suggests t r y i n g . ; a system whereby a s e r i e s of g r i d r e f e r e n c e s may ...

create the necessary impression. That i s by a c o l l e c t i o n of p i n - p o i n t e d references

we may c o n j u r e up the image i t s e l f . The a b s u r d i t y of t h i s n o t i o n i s obvious.

Likewise, Johns i n v i t e s us to d e s c r i b e the canvas by s e l e c t i n g as many p o i n t s on

it as we like i n the. hope o f c r e a t i n g the image i t s e l f . After continual negation

and double n e g a t i o n we w i l l be f o r c e d to r e a l i s e t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n does not

capture,.and t h a t , as W i t t g e n s t e i n says, f i n a l l y the o n l y s a t i s f a c t o r y answer i s

the p a i n t i n g itself.

F o o l s House, 1962 c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d , among o t h e r t h i n g s , as the next step

i n l i n e from Courbet's L ' A t e l i e r , 1855 and Rauschenberg's White P a i n t i n g , 1952.

As Rauschenberg's w h i t e p a i n t i n g s were ' a i r p o r t s f o r the l i g h t s , shadows and

27

particles' so Johns' canvas becomes a l a n d i n g s t r i p f o r o b j e c t s from h i s s t u d i o .

On i t he has f i x e d a number of a r t i c l e s and p l a c e d them not i n a haphazard way

but as i f concerned i n t h e i r c o m p o s i t i o n a l factors. They a r e not d e t r i t u s i n

the Rauschenberg sense but important elements of the a r t p r o c e s s - even to the

cup of teal

The fundamental i r o n y l i e s i n t h e naming of the o b j e c t s . The broom i s

labelled "broom", but i t i s a l s o a p a i n t brush. The s t r e t c h e r by i n f e r e n c e of

the common c o n n o t a t i o n of the broom c o u l d a l s o be taken as the f l o o r . They are

also compositional elements, c o l o u r , t e x t u r e . K o z l o f f even goes as f a r as to

suggest t h a t the d i v i d i n g of the canvas down the middle by the broom handle i s
28
a p r e c u r s o r of the s i m i l a r d i v i s i o n i n F i e l d P a i n t i n g . An i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of
 56

the naming irony was provided bythe occurence of a friend who seeing the picture
29

for the f i r s t time exclaimed, "Any f o o l knows i t ' s a broom." Johns has given

an i l l u s t r a t i o n of Wittgenstein's maxim, 'the meaning of language i s i n i t s usage'

and s i m i l a r l y the meaning of art i s i n i t s usage. Such a b e l i e f of Johns' i s what

Cage meant i n his 'Statements re Duchamp'.

'Duchamp showed the usefulness of addition (mustache).
Rauschenberg showed the function of subtraction (de Kooning).
Well we look forward to m u l t i p l i c a t i o n and d i v i s i o n . It i s
safe to assume that someone w i l l learn trigonometry. Johns.'^0

Johns does not simply add or subtract to give extra or changed meaning. He

shows the whole i n a way that can be understood from numerous angles. As with

Wittgenstein's philosophy i n which he sees a duty not to impose a uniform grid

on the space of language, Johns, by naming various objects that we rapidly begin

to a t t r i b u t e d i f f e r e n t uses to, i n v i t e s us to look at things from d i f f e r e n t con--

texts and not merely from a single preconceived one. To treat the proposition,

"This i s a broom" as an atomic fact denies the other associations we cannot help

making. It i s t h i s complexity of meanings that Johns i s anxious that we recognise.

Pears on Wittgenstein describes this as an i n t e r s t i n holism - a procedure that

creates an enormously involved task i f i t i s to be f u l f i l l e d . The object must

be approached again and again i n order to r e c a l l a l l i t s aspects that make up the

whole meaning. From a mathematical point of view the a c t i v i t y i s trigonometrical

in that two aspects of a work would constitute one triangle and so on.

The idea of usage that occurs i n Passage has already been discussed i n the

previous chapter. In addition,a piece of collage that i s l a b e l l e d "envelope" not

only indicates the meaningless of naming but i s also a pun on what language and

art constitute, - a l i t e r a l enveloping of several meanings. A piece of wire and

chain joined together by a fork when used i n the painting plays the role of l i n e ,

a b a r r i e r to the action of the r u l e r , another reference to eating and, of course,

a piece of chain and wire joined together by a fork.

 57

Andrew Forge speaks of Johns' work i n almost W i t t g e n s t i n i a n terms:

'Johns' motive i s not t o a s t o n i s h or e n t e r t a i n but t o open our eyes

to the w i d e s t p o s s i b i l i t i e s of p a i n t i n g as a language and to
i n t r o d u c e t o i t a new concept of a c c u r a c y . ' i 3

T h i s concept of accuracy i s e n v i s i o n i n g t h a t realnwhere a l l t h i n g s meet, where

all i m p l i c a t i o n s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s can e x i s t t o g e t h e r . Johns says:

'Beware of the body and mind. Avoid a p o l a r s i t u a t i o n . Think of

the edge o f the c i t y and the t r a f f i c there'32

Look to t h a t p o i n t where extremes meet, the c o u n t r y and the c i t y and i n By the

Sea where l a n d and sea meet - the t i d a l s t r e t c h where n o t h i n g d e f i n i t e can be

s a i d but a l l i s p r e s e n t . W i t t g e n s t e i n t a l k s about t h i s domain i n almost humorous

tones.

' C e r t a i n drawings a r e always seen as f l a t f i g u r e s , and o t h e r s sometimes,

or always t h r e e d i m e n s i o n a l l y .

Here one would now l i k e t o say: the v i s u a l i m p r e s s i o n of what i s seen

t h r e e d i m e n s i o n a l l y i s t h r e e d i m e n s i o n a l ; w i t h the schematic cube,
for instance. (For the d e s c r i p t i o n of the i m p r e s s i o n i s the
d e s c r i p t i o n of a cube).

And then i t seems queer t h a t w i t h some drawings our i m p r e s s i o n should

be a f l a t t h i n g and w i t h some a t h r e e d i m e n s i o n a l t h i n g . One asks
o n e s e l f "Where i s t h i s going t o e n d " ? ' 3 3

P e r i s c o p e (Hart Crane) , 1963 ( P l a t e XXXXII) and Land's End, 1963 (Plate

XXXXIII) take t h e i r cue i n i t i a l l y from the 'Cape H a t t e r a s ' s e c t i o n of Hart Crane's

poem The B r i d g e . I t would be a study i n i t s e l f to c o n s i d e r Johns' work i n

34

r e l a t i o n t o Hart Crane's as w e l l as Frank O'Hara's p o e t r y . S u f f i c e i t to say

t h a t a t the b e g i n n i n g of 'Cape H a t t e r a s ' Crane has reached a v i s i o n of the abso-

l u t e on r e t u r n i n g to h i s n a t i v e l a n d , but i t i s never more than momentary and even

as he enjoys i t he f o r e s e e s i t s d i s a p p e a r a n c e :
, ... w h i l e time c l e a r s
Our l e n s e s , l i f t s a f o c u s , r e s u r r e c t s
A p e r i s c o p e to glimpse what j o y s or p a i n
Our eyes can share o r answer - then d e f l e c t s
Us s h u n t i n g t o a l a b y r i n t h submersed
Where each sees o n l y h i s dim p a s t r e v e r s e d ....' -* 3
 58

The p e r i s c o p e symbolises our everyday v i s i o n t h a t views the w o r l d from a l l

i t s s i d e s but never c o m p l e t e l y , h o l i s t i c a l l y as our s p i r i t u a l sense can and

Johns a d v i s e s t h a t we r e g a r d our v i s u a l p e r c e p t i o n of t h i n g s i n t h i s light.

When we l o o k , we view the whole even though we a r e o n l y aware of one aspect of

it at a time. On t h i s q u e s t i o n o f a s p e c t - s e e i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n b r i n g s to a t t e n t i o n

the Jastrow d u c k / r a b b i t which can e i t h e r be viewed as the head of a duck or the

head of a r a b b i t .

'The change o f a s p e c t : "But s u r e l y you would say t h a t the p i c t u r e

i s a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t now?"

But what i s d i f f e r e n t : my impression? my p o i n t of view? - Can I

say? I d e s c r i b e the a l t e r a t i o n l i k e a p e r c e p t i o n ; q u i t e as i f
the o b j e c t had a l t e r e d b e f o r e my eyes.

"Now I am s e e i n g t h i s " , I might say ( p o i n t i n g to another p i c t u r e ,

f o r example). T h i s has the form of a r e p o r t of a new p e r c e p t i o n .

The e x p r e s s i o n of a change of aspect i s the e x p r e s s i o n of a new

p e r c e p t i o n and at the same time of the p e r c e p t i o n s b e i n g
unchanged. ' 36

P e r i s c o p e has been d i v i d e d up i n a s i m i l a r way to Passage i n t h r e e equal

areas l a b e l l e d RED, YELLOW and BLUE. The segment of the scraped circle is now

l a r g e r and to the r i g h t - h a n d edge. I n s t e a d of a r u l e r , a p a i n t e d hand and f o r e -

arm appear to cause the s c r a p i n g a c t i o n . The s e m i - c i r c l e c o n t a i n s a deep

illusionistic space l i k e the tube of a p e r i s c o p e . R o s a l i n d Krauss b e l i e v e s the

arm m o t i f to have a s p a t i a l q u a l i t y of an X-Ray photograph of a limb. But from

the r e p r o d u c t i o n i t seems r a t h e r to emulate v e r y c l o s e l y the space of the ruler

d e v i c e i n b e i n g d e f i n e d w i t h i n a f l a t b a n d - l i k e shape. The scraping action i s

different than p r e v i o u s l y , though. Now i t has a s t a c c a t o , s t o p - s t a r t rhythm and

 59

instantly we are reminded of the probing concentric action of a periscope

viewer. Krauss refers to the hand as suggesting the 'materiality of the paint
37

manually applied to the l i t e r a l surface of the canvas'. But taken i n a

Wittgenstinian context we read i t as the a r t i s t spreading before us the holism

of v i s i o n by separating i t into the segments or aspects that we cannot avoid

reducing i t to when attempting to grasp i t either i n language or thought.

The areas l a b e l l e d RED, YELLOW and BLUE are a l l the same metallic blues

and grays and expose the same concept of meaning as they did i n By the Sea.

However, there are now additional questions brought up with the use of l e t t e r i n g .

Rather than enforce the picture plane they set up a s p a t i a l i l l u s i o n even i f an

uncertain one. The word RED i s echoed by a smaller one behind and a n t i t h e t i c a l l y

the word BLUE i s shadowed by a larger one behind. The word YELLOW i s preceded

by a mirror image of the f i r s t two l e t t e r s 'EY'.'b'y the back of the canvas being

suggested as i n the e a r l i e r Canvas, or, as Kozloff asks, has the canvas been
38

folded to produce a negative?

Another word RED i s shown with the 'R' upside down and the 'ED' back to

front, and a word BLUE i s turned i n upon i t s e l f . 'Cape Hatteras' has an under-
39

l y i n g theme dwelling on space and the t r a v e l l i n g through i t and i t i s evident

that Johns i s interested i n giving us not a defined or even contradictory one

but an experience of a l l space i n producing a c o l l e c t i o n of d i f f e r e n t aspects

of seeing the same word. The irony rests i n the fact that even though we view

these words from d i f f e r e n t angles, they are always recognizable as either RED,

YELLOW or BLUE. It seems too close to Wittgenstein's similar interest not to be

linked.
 60

'Hold the drawing of a f a c e u p s i d e down and you can't r e c o g n i z e

the e x p r e s s i o n of the f a c e . Perhaps you can see t h a t i t i s
s m i l i n g , but not e x a c t l y what k i n d of s m i l e i t i s . You cannot
i m i t a t e the s m i l e or d e s c r i b e i t e x a c t l y .

And y e t the p i c t u r e which you have turned around may be the most
exact r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a person's face.'^0

Land's End employs s i m i l a r thoughts i n terms of l e t t e r i n g . Both p i c t u r e s

c o n t a i n an arrow p o i n t i n g downwards. In Land's End the arrow i s made to look

more l i k e a s i g n than i n P e r i s c o p e and i t p o i n t s c o n t r a r y to the d i r e c t i o n of

the u p s t r e t c h e d arm. The s i t u a t i o n emphasises t h a t i n D i v e r , 1962 (Plate

XXXXIV) where tiny"arrows a r e p l a c e d on two e i t h e r o u t s t r e t c h e d or diving-down

arms (depending on how you look at them) i n opposing d i r e c t i o n to the limb's

gestures. Wittgenstein t a l k s to h i s f i c t i t i o u s questioner:

' "Then can whatever I do be brought i n t o a c c o r d w i t h the r u l e ? " -

l e t me ask t h i s : what has the e x p r e s s i o n of a r u l e - say a s i g n -
post - got to do w i t h my a c t i o n s ? What s o r t o f c o n n e c t i o n i s
t h e r e here? - W e l l perhaps one>: I have been t r a i n e d to r e a c t to t h i s
s i g n i n a p a r t i c u l a r way, and now I do so r e a c t to i t .

But t h a t i s o n l y to g i v e a c a s u a l c o n n e c t i o n ; to t e l l how i t has

come about t h a t we now go by the s i g n - p o s t ; not what t h i s going-by-the-
s i g n r e a l l y c o n s i s t s i n . On the c o n t r a r y ; I have f u r t h e r indicated
t h a t a p e r s o n goes by a s i g n - p o s t o n l y i n so f a r as t h e r e exists a
r e g u l a r use of s i g n - p o s t s , a custom.'41

What a r e the v a l i d i t y of r u l e s i n p a i n t i n g ? A s i m i l a r m i s t a k e as the above i s

o f t e n made i n t a l k i n g about Johns' work. I f a word 'red' l a b e l s a jumbled

c o l l e c t i o n o f c o l o u r the r e s u l t i s explained as an a b s u r d i t y or d a d a i s t i n t e n -

tion. However, the r e s u l t i s an i r o n y on the whole n o t i o n o f r u l e s g i v i n g

meaning. Rules can o n l y be understood w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of a p a r t i c u l a r custom

and Johns i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the i d e a of l o o k i n g not i n the r e i n f o r c i n g of any pre-

established ideas about i t .

'To obey a r u l e , to make a r e p o r t , to g i v e an o r d e r , to p l a y a

game of chess, are customs (uses, i n t u i t i o n s ) ' ^ 2

I f the background o f a custom i s removed, the r u l e s embedded i n the custom

would a l s o d i s a p p e a r . In t h i s way to a n a l y s e Johns' use of arrows as c o n t r a d i c t o r y

 61

i s merely to see them within a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n . Solomon reads the

arrows i n Diver as creating a tension but Johns i s not concerned with presenting

contradictions rather he i s intent on preventing us resting i n any one frame of

reference i n order that we may see h o l i s t i c a l l y . Absurdity i s only brought about

by retaining an accepted way of seeing. Wittgenstein asks:

'How does i t come about that this arrow ^points?

Doesn't i t seem to carry i n i t something besides i t s e l f ? -
"No, not the dead l i n e on paper;only the psychical thing,
the meaning can do that" - That i s both true and f a l s e .
The arrow points only i n the application that a l i v i n g human being
makes of i t . ' ^ 3

Wittgenstein r e a l i s e s that following rules i s an a c t i v i t y which i s involved

i n v i r t u a l l y everything we do and hence the importance of understanding the

concept of the r u l e , before we become completely subordinate to them. Seen i n

t h i s way Johns' work i s highly moralist. His rigorous search for the curing of
44

misconceptions has the undertones of asceticism. It i s a methodology that

i n t e r e s t i n g l y enough has close a f f i n i t y with Zen and i t i s not at a l l inconcei-

vable that the poetic beauty of this approach could have strongly rubbed off

from Cage to Johns. K..T. Fann i n his analysis of Wittgenstein's philosophy

regards i t i n much the same way. Wittgenstein's contribution i s not r e a l l y a

philosophy but a method, an a r t :

' .'. . Zen masters were very much concerned with giving peace to
those who were tormented by abstract philosophical questions
... [and were] well known for t h e i r a b i l i t y to show the
nonsensicality of metaphysical questions by replying to the
questioner with nonsense, a joke, an irrelevancy, a gesture or
what not. The state of 'enlightement' i n which the mind i s free
from philosophical questions i s not unlike the state of 'complete
c l a r i t y ' Which Wittgenstein was s t r i v i n g for.'^5

Johns' hunt for t h i s 'complete c l a r i t y ' makes i t not too farfetched to suggest

that he also enjoys an i r o n i c sense of humour i n Periscope and Land's End. In

the interests of holism we are given the representational aspects as w e l l .

Periscope i s painted i n the metallic colours associative of a submarine and

Land's End can also work as an expressionistic view out to sea with the sun
 62

going down on the horizon!

46
'One thing working d i f f e r e n t ways at d i f f e r e n t times.'

Watchman, 1 9 6 4 (Plate XXXXV) i s a more kindly development of the C r i t i c Sees -

probably because the e a r l i e r pace deals with the careerist and the latter with the

everyday onlooker. Watchman i s almost a manifesto of Johns' idea of perception

and we gain a great deal of insight into i t s nature from the Sketchbook Notes:

'The watchman f a l l s " i n t o " the "trap" of looking. The "spy" i s a d i f f e -

rent person. "Looking" i s and i s not "eating" and "being eaten"
(Cezanne ? - each object r e f l e c t i n g the other). That i s there i s con-
t i n u i t y of some sort among the watchman, the space, the objects. The
spy must be ready to "move" must be aware of h i s entrances and e x i s t s .
The watchman leaves h i s job and takes away no information. The spy must
remember and must remember himself and h i s remembering. The spy designs
himself to be overlooked. The watchman "serves" as a warning. W i l l the
spy and the watchman ever meet?'47

The work consists of two stretched canvases, the left-hand one divided into areas

l a b e l l e d RED, YELLOW and BLUE (or p a r t i a l l y so anyway) which have the o v e r a l l

muddy tones as i f the three pigments, had been mixed. On the other panel, a chair

with the lower part of a body cast of a Japanese a r t c r i t i c s i t t i n g on i t has been

48

inverted and fixed to the upper h a l f . The cast has been truncated at the waist

and the remainder of the anatomy replaced by a series of bold brush-strokes of

green, orange and greys. To the right are three rectangles representing the

primaries. Much of the paint has run down from the figure into and over a c o l l a -

ged newspaper. The whole bottom section of both canvases shows a length of

scraped paint which not so much wipes out the painting as 'cheekily' covers i t

with a mechanical and a r b i t r a r y scheme of dark to l i g h t s . The s t i c k that has been

used to do the scraping rests against a b a l l near the left-hand edge.

The explanatory notes read i n a style l i k e a cross between Duchamp and
49

Wittgenstein. They survey the whole practise of the creation of and the

confrontation with the art object i n a way reminiscent of the more detailed search
i n the Green Box notes.

There are a number of p a r a l l e l s i n Watchman to passages i n the Investigations.

The s i g n i f i c a n c e of l a b e l l e d areas i s clear. The inverted figure on the chair i s

 63

being confronted w i t h a schematised v e r s i o n o f c o l o u r - the p r i m a r i e s - although

the s i t t e r ' s own makeup i s one of d i v e r s e p e r m u t a t i o n s . It recalls Wittgenstein's

d i s c u s s i o n o f the p l a y between sample and memory. The sample o f a c o l o u r appears

to be a s t a t i c a f f i r m a t i o n o f i t s q u a l i t i e s but even then our c r i t e r i a f o r l o o k i n g

at i t each time change s i n c e our memory changes. Consequently, a sample i s no

more ' f i n a l ' than i s our memory.

'Imagine t h a t you were supposed t o p a i n t a p a r t i c u l a r c o l o u r "C"

which was the c o l o u r t h a t appeared when t h e chemical substances X
and Y combined - Suppose t h a t the c o l o u r s t r u c k you as b r i g h t e r
on one day than on another; would you not sometimes s a y : " I
must be wrong, t h e c o l o u r i s c e r t a i n l y the same as y e s t e r d a y " ?
T h i s shows that we do not always r e s o r t t o what memory t e l l s us
as t h e v e r d i c t o f t h e h i g h e s t c o u r t o f appeal'50

The brown s t r e a k i n g of the p a i n t on t o the c o l l a g e d newspaper or j o u r n a l

again i n f e r s , as an a s i d e , what p u b l i s h e d c r i t i c i s m i s f e d w i t h and reprocesses

i n t o terms t h a t s u i t t h e p a r t i c u l a r argument the w r i t e r i s concerned i n . The

s t i c k and b a l l h i n t a t t h e t o y s o f a c h i l d - a reminder o f the 'game' view.

Barbara Rose i n h e r C.A.A. t a l k t h i s year a t t r i b u t e d the use o f the c h a i r

i n Watchman and A c c o r d i n g t o What d i r e c t l y to a passage i n the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s .

'...We see component p a r t s o f something composite ( o f a c h a i r

f o r i n s t a n c e ) . We say t h a t t h e back i s p a r t o f the c h a i r ,
but i t i s i n t u r n i t s e l f composed o f s e v e r a l b i t s o f wood;
w h i l e a l e g i s a s i n g l e component p a r t . We a l s o see a whole
which changes ( i s d e s t r o y e d ) w h i l e i t s component- p a r t s remain
unchanged. These a r e t h e m a t e r i a l s from which we r e c o n s t r u c t
that p i c t u r e of r e a l i t y . ' 5 1

Of c o u r s e nobody c o u l d d i s c l a i m t h i s a s s o c i a t i o n o f imagery c o m p l e t e l y but i t

does not seem t h a t p l a u s i b l e . I f the c h a i r r e f e r s s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h i s passage

then why has n o t Johns emphasised t h i s q u e s t i o n i n g o f component p a r t s ? Actually

the passage would have c l o s e r a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h the p l a s t e r c a s t . Field suggests

t h a t the c h a i r has c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h a passage from Understanding Media - surely

read by Johns':
 64

'If the nineteenth century was the age of the e d i t o r i a l chair [the
private point of view - F i e l d ] , ours i s the century of the
p s y c h i a t r i s t ' s couch. As extension of man the chair i s a
s p e c i a l i s t ablation of the posterior, a sort of oblative absolute
of backside, whereas the couch extends the i n t e g r a l being.'^2

However, even this sounds a l i t t l e speculative to warrant too much attention.

F i n a l l y we come to what has been regarded as Johns' most d i f f i c u l t and impor-

tant painting, According to What, 1964 (Plate XXXXVI). It i s made up of seven can-

vases which c o l l e c t i v e l y offer some sort of grand apologia of painting. Reading

i t from l e f t to right the f i r s t panel contains a repeat of the Watchman chair and

plaster cast theme with the difference that this time the image i s not only facing

in the opposite d i r e c t i o n but we see the i n t e r i o r surface of the cast as well as a

cross-section of the chair. Attached to the bottom of this section by hinges i s

a small canvas that can be opened or closed. When closed i t shows simply the back

of a t y p i c a l canvas with the t i t l e of the work s t e n c i l l e d on as well as the date

and signature. On opening i t we see a p r o f i l e of Duchamp, the s t e n c i l l e d l e t t e r s

'M.D.' and a spot of paint that has been allowed to dribble a l i t t l e . The area

that this small canvas covers when closed i s a 'trompe l ' o e i l ' version of the

rear view of a canvas and has been l a b e l l e d 'stretcher'.

Next to a l l t h i s i s a large section very s i m i l a r to F i e l d Painting. Here

the l e t t e r s of the words RED, YELLOW and BLUE are made of s o l i d aluminum rather

than wood and have none of the studio objects magnetically attached as the e a r l i e r

piece does. Also the neon l e t t e r 'R' of F i e l d Painting has been omitted but the

l e t t e r s of 'BLUE' have been constructed bent. To the right i s a narrow v e r t i c a l

band that looks a b i t l i k e a multi-coloured t r a f f i c l i g h t and has been described

as a colour chart. What would have been the metal s t e n c i l used to draw each

c i r c l e has been bent out and attached at the base. A wider s t r i p of canvas joins

t h i s colour band and simply shows a passage from white to blue-black through a

procession of blended blue-gray tones.

The right-hand section consists of a large area covered with abstract-

 65

e x p r e s s i o n i s t brush strokes together with three f l a t rectangles of red, yellow

and b l u e to c r e a t e a Hoffmanesque ' p u s h - p u l l ' e f f e c t o f s u r f a c e and i l l u s i o n .

Beneath t h i s i s an u n p a i n t e d s u r f a c e - w i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f a few s p l a s h e s

and d r i p s from above - on which a common w i r e coat-hanger i s attached. H a l f of

i t has been bent back t o show a t r a c i n g t h a t c o i n c i d e s w i t h the p r o t r u d i n g por-

t i o n i n a way t h a t we can read the hanger as a f l a t image and a bent one a t the

same time. A c r o s s the whole l e n g t h of A c c o r d i n g t o What i s a l o n g s t r i p o f c o l l a -

ged newspaper and each s e c t i o n i s l i n k e d t o another by the p a i n t ' b l e e d i n g ' over

the edges.

A c c o r d i n g t o What has been read as not o n l y a hommage t o Duchamp, but as a

p o s s i b l e paradigm t o h i s p a i n t i n g Tu m', 1918 ( P l a t e XXXXVII), i n t h a t they both

employ c o l o u r c h a r t s . I c o u l d i n c l u d e w i r e coat-hanger w i t h hat r a c k , both of

which have been t r a c e d around. Barbara Rose l i n k s the work w i t h Duchamp i n

53
making the c o n n e c t i o n between p l a s t e r mold and m a l i c mold and we b e g i n t o see that
54

w i t h enough i n g e n u i t y the a s s o c i a t i o n s c o u l d be i n f i n i t e .

C e r t a i n l y Duchamp i s thought o f but i f we were t o r e l y s o l e l y on t h e work

and Johns' Notes t h e r e i s no evidence t h a t i t has t h a t much attachment to him.

In Johns' n o t e s t h e r e i s t h i s inclusion:
'Profile? Duchamp ( ? ) . D i s t o r t e d a s a shadow. Perhaps on a f a l l i n g
hinged s e c t i o n . Something t h a t can be erased or s h i f t e d . (Magnetic
area) I n WHAT use a l i g h t and a m i r r o r . ' 5 5

Too many c r i t i c s have wanted to make the t i t l e , A c c o r d i n g t o What e i t h e r a q u e s t i o n

which should be answered, "Duchamp", o r i n i t ' s ' q u a l i t y o f e l l i p t i c a l abbrevia-

56

tion' a r e f l e c t i o n o f Tu m' o r any o t h e r Duchampian word p l a y . From the Notes

the hinged canvas seems t o be more i n d i c a t i v e of Duchamp as an onlooker - some-

body t h a t c o u l d 1 eave, be ' s h i f t e d ' or 'erased'. N i c o l a s Calas w r i t e s :

'Johns i s not r e c a p i t u l a t i n g or remembering but assembling w i t h
Duchamp as watchman.'57
 66

Even the t i t l e may have been simply intended as 'WHAT' which would l e s s e n Duchamp

b e i n g the core o f the work.

From our knowledge o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n the t i t l e takes on q u i t e

d i f f e r e n t connotations. I t asks a q u e s t i o n : " a c c o r d i n g to what?" - Johns'

interpretation? Yours? Mine? Duchamp's? Max K o z l o f f ' s ? B a r b a r a Rose's?

T h i s c r i t i c ' s or t h a t c r i t i c ' s ? and so on. I t i s a l s o a statement, "the work

has been done a c c o r d i n g to 'what'." S i n c e t h e f i n a l word d e f i n e s n o t h i n g specific

we a r e i n v i t e d t o use i t i n any way we choose. Johns does not make the title

s o l e l y a q u e s t i o n s i n c e i t would pose him as a q u e s t i o n e r s e e k i n g answers.

W i t t g e n s t e i n s i m i l a r l y seeks c l a r i t y not answers; He acknowledges the meaning of

a word a c c o r d i n g t o a c e r t a i n usage but t h a t i s not the e n t i r e meaning.

The use of the c h a i r has a l r e a d y been d e a l t w i t h . In the hinged canvas,

the Duchamp p o r t r a i t i s a copy o f h i s S e l f P o r t r a i t in Profile, 1958 [ I have

chosen the l i t h o g r a p h v e r s i o n o f t h i s s e c t i o n s i n c e the r e p r o d u c t i o n s o f the

o r i g i n a l a r e u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ( P l a t e XXXXVIII)]. In the l i g h t of W i t t g e n s t e i n i t

is c l e a r why Johns chose t h i s image i n p a r t i c u l a r . W i t t g e n s t e i n d e s c r i b e s the

diagram below as a w h i t e c r o s s on a b l a c k background and a b l a c k c r o s s on a

w h i t e background.

'(The temptation t o say, " I see i t l i k e t h i s " , p o i n t i n g to the

same t h i n g f o r " i t " and " t h i s " ) . Always get r i d of the i d e a
of the p r i v a t e o b j e c t i n t h i s way: assume t h a t i t c o n s t a n t l y
changes but t h a t you do not n o t i c e the change because your
memory c o n s t a n t l y d e c e i v e s you.'58

The Duchamp p o r t r a i t p r o v i d e d Johns w i t h an image he c o u l d not r e s i s t . What i s

the background and what i s the foreground? In 1972 as a b i r t h d a y p i e c e to

%
 67

Picasso, Johns made a lithograph, Cup 4 Picasso (Plate XXXXIX) which uses the old par-

ty t r i c k of two p r o f i l e s facing each other which i n turn describe a chalice or

candle-stick i n the middle. Wittgenstein's admonishing of the "private object' once

more i s Johns' sentiment as well.

Richard F i e l d , describes the small paint spot alongside the p o r t r a i t i n

terms of Duchamp's declaration, 'a work of art i s dependent on the explosion

59

made by the onlooker' as well as a symbol of the sperm that appears i n Munch's

lithograph The Madonna and a reminder of Duchamp's 'bachelor s h o t s ' . ^ Be this

as i t may, i t ' s loneness - there are many examples of 'impact and drip' within

Johns' work - does encourage p a r t i c u l a r attention and seems to r e f l e c t

Wittgenstein again.
'But i f a sentence can s t r i k e me as l i k e a painting i n words, and
the very i n d i v i d u a l word i n the sentence as l i k e a p i c t u r e ,
then i t i s no such marvel that a word uttered i n isolation and
without purpose can seem to carry a p a r t i c u l a r meaning i n i t s e l f . ' ^

Taken i n this way the isolated paint spot i s p a r t i c u l a r l y appropriate to the

'lonliness' of Duchamp's own unique p o s i t i o n , and i t i s interesting that when

Johns himself refers to this i n h i s obituary he counters i t , as i t were, with

a quote of Wittgenstein's.

'He [Duchamp] said that he was ahead of his time. One guesses at a
certain lonliness there. Wittgenstein said that "time has only one
d i r e c t i o n " must be a piece of nonsense'^

The canvas that has i t s prototype i n F i e l d Painting i s not only a pun on

making colour three dimensional by constructing the words i n wooden r e l i e f but

also as i n By the Sea an attempt by l a b e l l i n g to establish the stereotype of red,

yellow or blue. The l e t t e r s of the words never quite match up with their imprints.

The l e t t e r s of 'RED' affirm a redness but never of a uniform tone, due not only

to the pigements themselves, but also to the d i f f e r e n t background colours.

 68

'Does i t make sense t o say people g e n e r a l l y agree i n t h e i r judgements

of c o l o u r ? What would i t be l i k e f o r them not to? - One man would
say a f l o w e r was red which another c a l l e d b l u e , and so on. - But
what r i g h t s h o u l d we have t o c a l l these p e o p l e ' s words " r e d " and
" b l u e " our ' c o l o u r words'? -

How would they l e a r n to use these words? And i s the language-game

which they l e a r n s t i l l such as we c a l l the use of 'names'of c o l o u r ' ? There

are e v i d e n t l y d i f f e r e n c e s o f degree here.'^3

The word 'BLUE' has l i t e r a l l y been bent. Does t h i s change i t s meaning i n

any way l i k e a c o l o u r b l u e g e t s 'bent' by i n d i v i d u a l p e r c e p t i o n s ? The l e t t e r '0'

of YELLOW shows i t s i m p r i n t to have b u r s t i n t o the c o l o u r i t supposedly was meant

to s i g n i f y but i t s b r i g h t n e s s q u i c k l y d u l l s i n t o a d i r t y ochre. I t i s as i f Johns

has t r i e d t o a c t u a l l y d e p i c t the mental p r o c e s s between language and image.

The c o l o u r c h a r t and graded tone s c a l e make the same r e f e r e n c e s as F a l s e

S t a r t , J u b i l e e and D i v e r . The l a r g e r i g h t - h a n d a r e a f i n d s p a r a l l e l s i n

W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s q u e s t i o n i n g o f two and t h r e e d i m e n s i o n a l i t y i n drawing (see

above quote, page 5.7, I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , page 202e) .

The l o n g canvas benath shows a coat-hanger t h a t can be viewed i n a number

of d i f f e r e n t ways. Johns has taken a v e r y common o b j e c t , t r a c e d around i t and

a l s o bent i t , changing i t s nature w h i l e at the same time r e t a i n i n g i t s

recognizability.
'Take an obj e c t .
Do something t o i t .
Do something e l s e t o i t .
it II il il II I b4

The procedure i m i t a t e s W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a n a l y s i s of the cube diagram:

 69

'You c o u l d Imagine t h e i l l u s t r a t i o n ... appearing i n s e v e r a l p l a c e s

i n a book, a text-book f o r i n s t a n c e . I n t h e r e l e v a n t t e x t some-
t h i n g d i f f e r e n t i s i n q u e s t i o n every time: here a g l a s s cube,
t h e r e an i n v e r t e d open box, t h e r e a w i r e frame o f t h a t shape, t h e r e
t h r e e boards forming a s o l i d angle.'65

'... i f you see the schematic drawing o f a cube as a p l a n e f i g u r e

c o n s i s t i n g o f a square and two rhombi you w i l l , perhaps c a r r y out
the o r d e r . " B r i n g me something l i k e t h i s " d i f f e r e n t l y from someone
who sees the p i c t u r e t h r e e dimensionally.'66

I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t the l e n g t h o f newspaper i s a r e f e r e n c e to c r i t i c i s m

which w i l l h o l d i t s e l f r e s p o n s i b l e f o r embracing a l l these i d e a s i n t o some

manageable u n i t . Johns i n v i t e s , a l l u d e s and i l l u d e s but i n the end escapes a l l

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r meaning. I t may have been Johns whom IGage had i n mind when

he said:

'When you s t a r t working, everybody i s i n your s t u d i o - the p a s t ,

your f r i e n d s , enemies, the a r t world and above a l l , your own
ideas - a l l are there. But as you c o n t i n u e p a i n t i n g , they s t a r t
to l e a v e , one by one, and you a r e l e f t completely a l o n e . Then,
i f you're l u c k y , even you leave.'*'''
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION
 71

Wittgenstein said:

'The r e a l discovery i s one that makes one capable of stopping doing

philosophy when I want to - the one that gives philosophy peace,
so that i t i s no longer tormented by questions which bring i t s e l f
into question.' 1

If philosophy i s a voyage out and back rather than a move towards different

things so i s art for Johns and consequently, l i k e Duchamp, he does not have to

prove anything. Recently he has bought some land i n St. Maarten, i s b u i l d i n g a

house and intends to l i v e there most of the time. In the interview with Vivien

Raynor he was asked what he intended to do there, he r e p l i e d :

'Swim! No, I'm t r y i n g to get i t set up so that I can paint. I

assume I ' l l continue painting,. I don't know. I don't have that
kind of plan r e a l l y . ' 2

Cage writes that Johns i s 'not interested i n working but only i n playing
3
games' and he says himself:

'I just know that i n the studio I'm doing a l l the work and I'm
f a i r l y lazy, and have never taken any pleasure i n compulsive
work.'4

Painting i s not a l i n e a r process and i t : i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine there being any

anguish with Johns since he i s comfortably aware that the moment a work leaves

his studio i t w i l l take on d i f f e r e n t meanings, i t w i l l be 'used' d i f f e r e n t l y .

'There i s a great deal of intention i n painting; i t ' s rather

unavoidable. But when a work i s l e t out by the a r t i s t and
said to be complete, the intention loosens. Then i t ' s subject
to a l l kinds of use and misuse and pun. Occasionally someone
w i l l see the work in-a way that even changes its significance
for the person who made i t ; the work i s no longer "intention",
but the thing being seen and someone responding to i t . They
w i l l see i t i n a way that makes you think that i s a possible
way of seeing i t . ' 5

Once c r i t i c i s m bothered him, now i t does not matter. 6

He has seen the

essential humanity behind i t and Wittgenstein was c e r t a i n l y a teacher i n t h i s

awareness. In the various interviews many of Johns' comments reveal not only a

knowledge, but a deep sympathy with the philosopher's thought.

 72

'In one person's work, say i n my work, where t h e r e are two or t h r e e

f o r m a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s and i n another person's work where o n l y one of
t h r e e formal p u r s u i t s i s developed - i t doesn't n e c e s s a r i l y mean
t h a t he has l e s s p r e s e n t i n h i s work than I have i n mine. T h i s can
mean t h a t t h e r e i s a new language or aspect of a r t . I don't b e l i e v e
i n the q u a n t i t y of i n v e n t i o n or a e s t h e t i c q u a l i t y . When two t h i n g s
come out of the a i r so c l o s e l y , one i s apt to see two a r t i s t s whose
work i s r e l a t e d , and compare them and to say t h a t one does more or
l e s s ;than another. T h i s , I f e e l , i s j u s t an aspect of your a t t e n t i o n
at t h a t time. I don't b e l i e v e i n n e g a t i n g one man's work i n r e l a t i o n
to a n o t h e r ' s . ' 7

'One of the c r u c i a l problems i n a r t i s the b u s i n e s s of "meaning i t " .

I f you are a p a i n t e r , meaning the p a i n t i n g s you make; i f you a r e an
o b s e r v e r , meaning what you see. I t i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t f o r us to
mean what we say o r do. We would l i k e t o , but s o c i e t y makes t h i s
v e r y hard f o r us to succeed i n d o i n g . ' ^

'I t h i n k ... the a r t i s t i s not t i e d to the p u b l i c use of h i s work.

There can be feed back, but i f one has to i d e n t i f y w i t h the way one's
work i s used, then I t h i n k most a r t i s t s w i l l f e e l misused. So I
t h i n k i t ' s b e s t to cut o n e s e l f o f f from what happens a f t e r . ' 9

'If an a r t i s t makes something - or i f you make dhewing gum and e v e r y -

body ends up u s i n g i t as g l u e , whoever made i t i s g i v e n the
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f making g l u e , even i f what he r e a l l y i n t e n d s i s
chewing gum. You can't c o n t r o l t h a t k i n d of t h i n g . As f a r as
b e g i n n i n g to make a work, one can do i t f o r any r e a s o n . '

Apart from p r o v i d i n g the n e c e s s a r y a i d i n understanding Johns' use of

imagery i n the l a t e r p a i n t i n g from 1961 on, from a study of W i t t g e n s t e i n we

have l e a r n t two fundamental t h i n g s about Johns' work:' l o o k i n g i s r e l a t i v e and,

l i k e meaning i n language, the o n l y common denominator i s l i f e - the human a c t i v i t y

of looking. T h i s i n t u r n l e a d s us to view c r i t i c i s m i n a much l e s s anxious and

c o n t r o v e r s i a l f a s h i o n and the need f o r polemics and t h e o r i e s are d i s s o l v e d .

Johns' has been a 'problem' to such p r a c t i t i o n e r s s i n c e h i s work does not address

itself to t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r a p p e t i t e s . In o r d e r to 'eat' i t they must r e s o r t to

d r e s s i n g i t i n a way t h a t makes f o r a p a l a t a b i l i t y c l o s e r to t h e i r own personal

ambitions. Cage summed up t h e s e two elements of acknowledgement of l i f e and

its a t r o p h y i n g e f f e c t on 'rule-book' c r i t i c i s m p e r f e c t l y i n h i s hommage to

Johns:
 'We imagine ourselves on a tightrope only to discover that we are
safe on the ground. Caution i s unnecessary. Nevertheless, we
tremble more v i o l e n t l y than we did when we thought we were i n
danger.

Johns has given us our freedom but i n so doing has denied us the comforts

resting secure i n our prejudices.

FOOTNOTES INTRODUCTION

1. R o s a l i n d Krauss, 'Jasper Johns' Lugano Review, v o l . 1, No. 2, 1965, p.97

2. Norman Malcolm, Ludwig W i t t g e n s t e i n : A Memoir, Oxford Paperbacks, 1958,

p. 51-52.

3. R i c h a r d K o s t e l a n e t z , John Cage, Praegar,1968, p.3.

 75

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER ONE

1. Joseph Young, 'Jasper Johns; An A p p r a i s a l ' , A r t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , September,

1969, p. 51.

2. Barbara Rose, 'The Second G e n e r a t i o n : Academy & Breakthrough', A r t f o r u m,

September, 1965.

3. Harold Rosenberg, 'The American A c t i o n P a i n t e r s ' , A r t News, December,

1952, p. 22.

4. Marshall McLuhan, The Medium i s the Massage, Bantam Books, 1967, p. 93.

5. C a l v i n Tomkins, The B r i d e , and the B a c h e l o r s , V i k i n g Press, 1962, p. 200.

I w i l l not go i n t o any d i s c u s s i o n on the d i f f e r e n c e s between Johns
and Rauschenberg f u r t h e r than t h i s f o o t n o t e . Perhaps i t c o u l d be
summarised by Edward Lucie-SmitHs comment t h a t :

'Of the two, Rauschenberg i s the more v a r i o u s and Johns i s the

more e l e g a n t ; elegance has a genuine i f r a t h e r uneasy p a r t to
p l a y i n any d i s c u s s i o n of what these two represent.'

L a t e Modern: The V i s u a l A r t s Since 1945, Praegar, 1969, p. 122.

T h i s i s i n agreement w i t h P e l l e g r i n i ' s b e l i e f t h a t , u n l i k e
Rauschenberg, Johns' p a i n t i n g i s so s e n s i t i v e 'That he i s a b l e
to produce e x t r a - o r d i n a r y c o n t r a s t s t o the b a n a l i t y of the
a r t i c l e s used.'

New Tendencies i n A r t , (Trans. Robin L a r s o n ) , E l e k , London 1966, p. 215.

6. Clement Greenberg, 'After Abstract Expressionism', Art International,

October, 1962, p.27.

7 . i b i d , p. 26-27.

8. Nicolas Calas, Icons and Images of the S i x t i e s , Dutton Paperback, 1971,

p. 192.
9. S t e i n b e r g asked Johns why he had i n s e r t e d these p l a s t e r c a s t s . His answer
was t h a t they happened to be l y i n g around i n the s t u d i o .
Leo S t e i n b e r g , J a s p e r Johns, New York, 1963, p. 18.
( o r i g . p u b l i s h e d i n Metro, M i l a n , May 1962).

10. Max K o z l o f f , Jasper Johns, Harry Abrams, New York, 1968, p. 15.

11. Leo S t e i n b e r g , 'Contemporary A r t and The P l i g h t of i t s P u b l i c ' , Harper's

Magazine, March 1962, p. 38.
 76

12. The degrees of a b s u r d i t y t h a t w r i t e r s have gone to i n order t o f i n d

c o n c l u s i v e messages i n Johns' work should be mentioned. P i n c u s Witten's
'Theater of The C o n c e p t u a l : Autobiography and Myth', Artforum, October
1973, p. 41, e x p r e s s e s an attempt to prove t h a t Johns was aware o f
Duchamp w e l l b e f o r e h i s r e a d i n g of L e b e l ' s book i n 1959 and t h e r e f o r e
t h a t the t a r g e t was p a i n t e d to compliment Duchamp's c a s t , O b j e t Dard 1951
w i t h Johns r e a d i n g i t as ' d a r t ' .

Such a tenuous thought would g i v e e q u a l v a l u e to the n o t i o n t h a t the

t a r g e t image cameffrom Johns' a c q u a i n t a n s h i p w i t h Cage and Zen.
H e r r i g e l ' s famous book, Zen and the A r t of A r c h e r y had been t r a n s l a t e d
f o r the American p u b l i c i n 1953. I t was p r e f a c e d by D a i s e t z S u z u k i ,
under whom Cage was s t u d y i n g at the time; he would almost c e r t a i n l y have
read i t .

P i n c u s Witten's c l a i m i s no more v a l u a b l e than M e l v i l l e ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of

F l a g on Orange F i e l d , 1957 as a p o l i t i c a l comment on America:, and the
d r o p p i n g o f the atomic bomb: "The orange g l a r e at H i r o s h i m a ' - 'Master
of the S t a r s and S t r i p e s ' , A r c h i t e c t u r a l Review, March 1965, p. 226.

13. David S y l v e s t e r , 'Jasper Johns a t the Whitechapel', unpub. t a l k on B.B.C.

T h i r d Programme, December 12th, 1964 (excepted i n K o z l o f f Jasper J o h n s ) .

14. K o z l o f f , J a s p e r Johns, p. 14.

15. See Henry G e l d z a h l e r , 'Numbers i n Time: Two American P a i n t i n g s ' , M e t r o p o l i t a n

Museum B u l l e t i n , A p r i l 1965, pp. 295-298.

16. Walter Hopps, 'An I n t e r v i e w w i t h J a s p e r Johns', A r t f o r u m , March 1965, pp. 34-

35.

17. i b i d . , p. 35.

18. Seen i n t h i s l l i g h t the alphabet and n u m e r i c a l s e r i e s are a d i r e c t r e f u t a t i o n

of S t e i n b e r g ' s analysisc.of the f l a t images. 'Was i t , I wonder, a p a i n f u l
d e c i s i o n t h a t p a i n t was to be no l o n g e r a medium of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ?
P r o b a b l y n o t ; f o r the p a i n t e r i t must have been merely the t a k i n g of the
next s t e p . But once taken, i t p l a c e d him at a p o i n t o u t s i d e the crowded-
room, whence one s u d d e n t l y saw how Franz K l i n e bundles w i t h Watteau and
G i o t t o . For they are a l l a r t i s t s who use p a i n t and s u r f a c e to suggest
e x i s t e n c i e s o t h e r than s u r f a c e and p a i n t ' . J a s p e r Johns, p. 18. This
i s t r u e f o r the f l a g s and t a r g e t s but v e r y d e f i n i t e l y not the case w i t h
the numeral and alphabet c h a r t s which have been transformed by the p a i n t
a c t i v i t y t o suggest q u a l i t i e s they do not o r d i n a r i l y have.

19. T h i s becomes even worse (or b e t t e r ) w i t h the l a t e r Colour Numerals s e r i e s of

l i t h o g r a p h s , 1969 where we are p r e s e n t e d w i t h permutations of primary and
secondary c o l o u r s as w e l l . In l o o k i n g a t Joseph Young's diagrams of t h i s
s e r i e s (Art I n t e r n a t i o n a l , September 1969, p. 53) i t i s v e r y tempting t o
s e a r c h f o r some meaning behind the graphs. T h i s comes a c r o s s so f o r c e -
f u l l y as to suggest i t o n l y b e i n g a matter of time b e f o r e the s t r u c t u r a l i s t s
get h o l d o f i t .

20. M a r s h a l l McLuhan, Understanding Media, McGraw H i l l , 1964, p.ll.

 77

21. K o z l o f f , Jasper Johns, p . 19.

22. Johns, t o g e t h e r w i t h Rauschenberg and R o s e n q u i s t , was i n v i t e d by the

S u r r e a l i s t s to e x h i b i t w i t h them i n the 1960, ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l E x h i b i t i o n
of S u r r e a l i s m ' , d'Arey G a l l e r i e s , New York.

23. See A l a n Solomon ' P a i n t i n g i n New York: 1944 to 1969', Pasadena A r t Museum,

November 1969 - January 1970 - p. 15.

24. Hopps, Artforum, March 1965, p. 35-36.

25. S t e i n b e r g , J a s p e r Johns, p. 27.

26. K o z l o f f , J a s p e r Johns, p. 21.

27. i b i d . , p. 21.

28. R o s a l i n d Krauss, J a s p e r Johns, p. 89.

29. S t e i n b e r g , J a s p e r Johns, p. 23-24.

30. See Barbara Rose, 'The G r a p h i c Work of J a s p e r Johns. P a r t I ' , Artforum,

March 1970, pp. 39-45. Rose saw l i t h o g r a p h y as g a i n i n g the s u r f a c e
i n t e g r i t y t h a t Johns, having a c h i e v e d i n h i s e a r l i e r work,loses from
F a l s e S t a r t on when he becomes a p a i n t e r of space, and views the l a t t e r
as some s o r t of compromise. She i s c o r r e c t i n a s s e r t i n g t h a t Johns'
e a r l i e r work i s non-Cubist f o r the v e r y f a c t t h a t none of them a r e
concerned w i t h r e c o n c i l i n g t h r e e d i m e n s i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h the
picture plane. But Rose i s wrong i n assuming he i s not a s p a t i a l
p a i n t e r d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . In f a c t we c o u l d argue t h a t Johns has
i n v e r t e d the C u b i s t procedure s i n c e h i s f l a g s , e t c . are r e c o n c i l i a t i o n s
of the i l l u s i o n i s m of a p a i n t e r l y s u r f a c e t o f l a t images. Greenberg
h i n t s a t something c l o s e to t h i s :
' E v e r y t h i n g t h a t u s u a l l y s e r v e s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and i l l u s i o n i s l e f t
to s e r v e n o t h i n g but i t s e l f , t h a t i s a b s t r a c t i o n ; w h i l e e v e r y t h i n g
t h a t u s u a l l y connotes the a b s t r a c t of d e c o r a t i v e - f l a t n e s s bare
o u t l i n e s , a l l over o r symmetrical d e s i g n - i s put t o the s e r v i c e of
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' ( G r e e n b e r g , A r t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , October 1962, p. 27).

T h i s would h e l p t o e x p l a i n Johns' use of e n c a u s t i c and c o l l a g e i n t h a t an

o i l medium, w i t h such 'a p r i o r i ' s t r u c t u r i n g as the f l a g image f o r i n s t a n c e ,
would not be so s u c c e s s f u l i n g e n e r a t i n g the i l l u s i o n i s m i n h e r e n t i n
p a i n t i n g t h a t Johns wished t o r e t a i n . Rose intended - and c o n t i n u e s d o i n g
so* - to e s t a b l i s h h e r s e l f as an a u t h o r i t y through way of an adventure
i n t o Johns' g r a p h i c s , p o s i n g t h a t s p a t i a l s u g g e s t i o n was taboo f o r Johns
and t h a t g r a p h i c s became the o n l y v i a b l e medium. But, as I hope to
emphasise l a t e r , the r e t e n t i o n of the s u r f a c e ' s i n t e g r i t y was not the
o b j e c t of Johns' work so much as an e x p l o r a t i o n i n t o the a b s u r d i t y of
. a t t e m p t i n g such a s o l u t i o n .

* (I am indebted to P r o f . George Rosenberg f o r h i s resume on Barbara Rose's

t a l k at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the C.A.A. h e l d i n D e t r o i t : Recent
Graphic Works of J a s p e r Johns From R e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o R e p r o d u c t i o n ) .
 78

31. ' I t seems r i d i c u l o u s t o speak o f the d e c l i n e of an a r t i s t not y e t t h i r t y -

f i v e y e a r s o l d . Yet t h a t i s the c o n c l u s i o n I f e e l one has to draw from
the J a s p e r Johns r e t r o s p e c t i v e a t the Jewish Museum.... t h e r e i s c e r t a i n l y
l e s s i r o n y i n h i s new p a i n t i n g s . There i s i n s t e a d a s o r t of v i s u a l k i n -
k i n e s s , and even as a f a c i l e t e c h n i c i a n Johns has become a l i t t l e seedy.'
Sidney T i l l i m , 'Ten Years of J a s p e r Johns', A r t s Magazine, A p r i l 1964,
pp. 22-26.

32. Hopps, A r t f o r u m , March 1965, p. 35.

33. 'At the s t i l l p o i n t o f the t u r n i n g w o r l d . N e i t h e r f l e s h nor f l e s h l e s s ;

N e i t h e r from nor towards; at the s t i l l p o i n t , t h e r e the dance i s ,
But n e i t h e r a r r e s t n o r movement. And do not c a l l i t f i x i t y ,
Where p a s t and f u t u r e a r e g a t h e r e d . N e i t h e r movement from n o r towards,
N e i t h e r a s c e n t nor d e c l i n e . Except f o r the p o i n t , the s t i l l p o i n t .
There would be no dance, and t h e r e i s o n l y the dance.'

T.S. E l i o t , C o l l e c t e d Poems 1909-1962, Faber, 1963, p. 191.

34. L i k e w i s e John Cage went i n t o an anechoic chamber a n t i c i p a t i n g he may expe-

r i e n c e pure s i l e n c e and ended up h e a r i n g h i s own body. At the r i s k of
s c h o l a r s h i p , i t i s tempting to draw such p a r a l l e l s between the two
friends. We wonder i f perhaps Johns may have used the chance methods
of Cage precedence i n d e t e r m i n i n g where and what l a b e l s would be used
in False Start. Very o c c a s i o n a l l y the' l a b e l s may match up w i t h the
c o l o u r s but how more i n t e r e s t i n g i t i s when the two are i n wide d i s -
agreement. Then t h e awareness of c o l o u r becomes f a r r i c h e r . It i s l i k e
the I Ching i n t h a t the more d i s j o i n t e d a r e t h e hexagrams the g r e a t e r need
t h e r e i s to e x e r c i s e one's f a c u l t i e s .

35. K r a u s s , J a s p e r Johns, p. 88.

36. C a l a s , Icons and Images, p. 74.

37. Hopps, p. 36.

38. K r a u s s , J a s p e r Johns, p. 88.

39. Solomon, Jewish Museum C a t a l o g u e , p. 13.

40. G. R. Swenson, 'What i s Pop A r t ? - An I n t e r v i e w w i t h J a s p e r Johns'.

Art News, F e b r u a r y 1964, p. 67.

41. S t e i n b e r g , J a s p e r Johns, p. 24.

42. Rosenberg, A r t News, December 1952, p. 22.

43. M i c h a e l Levy, E a r l y R e n a i s s a n c e , S t y l e and C i v i l i s a t i o n S e r i e s , Penguin Books,
1967, p. 123.
 79

44. o p . c i t . , p. 23.

In Cage's, 'Jasper Johns; S t o r i e s and Ideas', he quotes Johns as r e g a r d -

i n g t h e dancer, Merce Cunningham's f o o t as 'another k i n d o f r u l e r ' .
(John Cage, A Year From Monday, Wesleyan U n i v . P r e s s 1963, p. 82.

45. Michael F r i e d , 'New York L e t t e r ' , A r t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , F e b r u a r y , 1963, p. 61.

46. K o z l o f f , J a s p e r Johns, p. 30.

47. V i v i e n Raynor, 'Jasper Johns, (Interview)' A r t News, March, 1973, p. 22.

48. Rose, C.A.A. 1974.

 80

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER TWO

1. G. R. Swenson,; 'What i s Pop A r t ? - An I n t e r v i e w w i t h Jasper Johns',

A r t News, February 1964, p. 66.

2. See Bernhard L e i t n e r , The A r c h i t e c t u r e of Ludwig W i t t g e n s t e i n , Nova S c o t i a

C o l l e g e of A r t and Design, ( c o - p u b l i s h e d by S t u d i o I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,
London) 1973.

Bernhard L e i t n e r , ' W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s A r c h i t e c t u r e ' , Artforum February 1970.

3. See the r e c e n t l y p u b l i s h e d book by A l a n J a n i k and Stephen Toulmin

Wittgenstein's V i e n n a , Simon and Schuster, New York 1973.

4. Norman Malcolm, Ludwig W i t t g e n s t e i n : A Memoir, Oxford Paperback, 1958, p.46.

5. Ludwig W i t t g e n s t e i n , Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge and Kegan

P a u l , 1961, #1.21, p. 7.

6. ibid., #2.0232, p. 11.

7. i b i d . , #2.02331, p. 11.
8. See George H e n r i k von Wright's ' B i o g r a p h i c a l Sketch' published i n Malcolm,

W i t t g e n s t e i n : A Memoir, p. 8.

9. op. c i t . , p. 3.

10. ibid., #4.462, p. 69.

11. ibid., #6.41, p. 145.

12. i b i d . , p. x x i .

13. ibid., #6.54, p. 151.

14. Malcolm, W i t t g e n s t e i n : A Memoir, p. 69.

15. W i t t g e n s t e i n , P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , ( t r a n s . G.E.M. Anscombe)
B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1958, #3, p. 3e.

16.. ibid., #6, p. 5e.

17. ibid., #32, p. 15e-16e.

18. ibid., #43, p. 20e.

19. ibid., #23, p. l i e .

20. ibid., #67., p. 32e.

21. ibid., #98, p. 45e.

22. J u s t u s Hartnack, W i t t g e n s t e i n and Modern P h i l o s o p h y ( t r a n s . Maurice

Cranston) Methuen, 1962, p. 67.
 81

23. op. c i t . , #309, p. 103e.

24. ibid., #109, p. 47e.

25. ibid., #153, p. 60e.

26. i b i d . , #323, p'. 106e.

27. ibid., #180, p. 73e.

28. K. T. Fann, W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s Conception o f P h i l o s o p h y , B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1969,

p. 107.

29. op. c i t . , #415, p. 125e.

 82

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER THREE

1. V i v i e n Raynor, A r t News, March 1973, p. 22.

2. N i c o l a s C a l a s , Icons and Images o f the S i x t i e s , p. 76.

3. Max K o z l o f f , Jasper Johns, p. 40.

4. Ludwig W i t t g e n s t e i n , T r a c t a t u s , #2.202 - #2.21, p. 17.

5. pp. c i t . , p. 40.

6. i b i d . , p. 40.

7. i b i d . , p. 27-28.

8. W i t t g e n s t e i n , P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , #14, p. 7e.

9. op. c i t . , p. 40.

10. ibid., p. 41.

11. Wittgenstein, I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , #33, p. 16e.

12. Johns has used t h e r u l e r b e f o r e i n P a i n t i n g With Ruler and "Gray", and i t

would be a s h o r t step t o s u b s t i t u t e t h e s t i c k of D e v i c e w i t h a r u l e r
from t h i s p r e c e d e n t . Good Time C h a r l e y 1961 a l s o uses a r u l e r .

13. op. c i t . , #552, p. 147e (abbrev. by K r a u s s ) .

14. Rosalind Krauss, 'Jasper Johns', Lugano Review, v o l . 1, no. 2, 1965, p. 92.

15. T h e spoon and w i r e b e l o n g t o Out The Window IT whereas the f o r k and w i r e

b e l o n g t o Passage not v i c e v e r s a .

16. op. c i t . , p. 93.

17. Wittgenstein, I n v e s t i g a t i o n s #73, p. 34e-35e.

18. ibid., #47, p. 22e-23e.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER FOUR

1. V i v i e n Raynor, A r t News, March 1973, p. 20.

2. Michael F r i e d , 'New York L e t t e r ' A r t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , February 1963, p. 60-61

F r i e d l i k e n s Johns' development t o the Renaissance/Mannerism transtion:

' S i m i l a r l y I t a l i a n Mannerist'.architects d e l i b e r a t e l y accentuated the
a m b i g u i t i e s and begged q u e s t i o n s i n h e r e n t i n the great achievements
o f t h e High Renaissance', p. 61.

3. See H i l t o n Kramer, 'Month i n Review', A r t Magazine, February 1959, p. 49

Newsweek ( e d i t o r i a l ) March 31st, 1958, p. 94-96.

'His Heart Belongs to Dada', - Time, May 4 t h , 1959 p.58,'

M i c h e l Ragon, Cimaise, January, 1959.

P i e r r e S c h e i d e r , ' A r t News from P a r i s ' , 'Art News, March 1959, p. 48

Emily Genauer, New York H e r a l d T r i b u n e , A p r i l 3rd, 1960.

4. J a s p e r Johns, 'Duchamp', Scrap, v o l . 1. December 23rd, 1960.

5. M a r c e l Duchamp: From t h e Green Box, ( t r a n s . Hamilton) New Haven 1960.

6. Walter Hopps, A r t f o r u m , p. 35.

7. P i e r r e Cabanne, D i a l o g u e s w i t h M a r c e l Duchamp (trans.' Ron Padgett) Viking

P r e s s , 1971, p. 77.

8. i b i d . , p. 53.

9. J a s p e r Johns, 'Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968)', A r t f o r u m , November 1968.

10. W i t t g e n s t e i n , I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , #109, p.47e.

T h i s passage i s e x p l a n a t o r y enough t o counter T i l l i m ' s c o m p l a i n t : 'But

t h e r e i s no deep engagement o f p a i n t and o b j e c t so t h a t a new and
g r e a t e r s i n g l e v i s u a l g e n e r a l i t y does n o t r e s u l t . On the whole t h i s
has been Johns' " c r i s i s " , one from which he has n o t e x t r i c a t e d h i m s e l f . '

A r t s Magazine, A p r i l 1964, p. 26.

11. K o z l o f f , J a s p e r Johns, p. 10.

12. op. c i t . , p. 202e.

LEAF 84 OMITTED IN PAGE NUMBERING.
 85

13. C a l a s , i n Icons and Images e l a b o r a t e s on t h i s phenomenon:

'Experimentation i n a r t has had the p a r a d o x i c a l e f f e c t of making

of methodology the s u b j e c t matter of a r t , an i d e a most e l o q u e n t l y
i l l u s t r a t e d i n L i c h t e n s t e i n ' s use of the b r u s h - s t r o k e as the con-
t e n t o f a new image. In the s i x t i e s a r t i l l u s t r a t e s methodology
the way the i m a g i s t s of o l d i l l u s t r a t e d the Le'gende Doree, w i t h
t h i s d i f f e r e n c e , t h a t today i t i s the c r i t i c who has to j u s t i f y
the use of t h i s new s u b j e c t matter', p. 17-18.

14. Jasper Johns, 'Sketchbook Notes', A r t and L i t e r a t u r e , S p r i n g 1965, p. 185.

15. op. c i t . , p. 18.

16. K o z l o f f , p. 10.

17. Wittgenstein, I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , #139, p. 54e.

18. i b i d . , #140, p. 553.

19. Robert M e l v i l l e d e s c r i b e s such c r i t i c i s m where the motto seems to be, ' i f

i t l o o k s d i f f i c u l t make i t d i f f i c u l t ' , as a p r o c e s s of 'mystery-mongering'.
(Master of the S t a r s and S t r i p e s ) , A r c h i t e c t u r a l Review, March 1965, p. 226.

20. R i c h a r d F i e l d , J a s p e r Johns: P r i n t s 1960-1970, P h i l a d e l p h i a Museum of A r t ,

A p r i l 15th - June 14th, 1970.

21. N i c o l a s Calas has a l r e a d y come to terms w i t h h i s r o l e as c r i t i c , valuing

i t as a p r o c e s s of s e l f - k n o w l e d g e not d e c e i t :

'Let us go on w a t c h i n g how Johns performs, how he r e p e a t s a move, or

t r i e s a new manoeuvre, p i t t i n g b l a c k a g a i n s t w h i t e , green a g a i n s t
r e d , b l u e a g a i n s t orange.

I w i l l watch h i s performance i n and out of h i s game, f o r t h i s i s my

game.' Icons and Images, p. 82.

22. David Pears, W i t t g e n s t e i n , Fontana Modern M a s t e r s , 1971, p. 173.

23. John Cage, A Year From Monday, Wesleyan U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1973, p. 75-76.

24. Richard F i e l d , Jasper Johns: P r i n t s

F i e l d quotes Johns' comment i n h i s Notes: "Japanese p h o n e t i c 'NO'

(possessive ' o f ' ) . " Johns has v i s i t e d Japan a number o f times
and F i e l d extends the q u e s t i o n of o p p o s i t i o n w i t h t h i s i n mind.
'Thus the 'NO' i m p l i e s a YES, j u s t as the Noh Theater i m p l i e s
i t s o p p o s i t e , Kabuki.'

25. A l a n Solomon, Jewish Museum Catalogue, p. 15.

26. W i t t g e n s t e i n , L e c t u r e s and C o n v e r s a t i o n s on A e s t h e t i c s , Psychology and

R e l i g i o u s B e l i e f , (ed C y r i l B a r r e t t ) B l a c k w e l l , 1966, p. 38-39.
 86

27. John Cage, S i l e n c e , M.I.T. P r e s s , 1961, p. 102.

28. K o z l o f f , J a s p e r Johns, p. 34. Rosenberg i n 'Things the Mind A l r e a d y

Knows' a s s o c i a t e s the sweeping a c t i o n of the broom as a n o s t a l g i a
towards the t a r g e t m o t i f . The Anxious O b j e c t , H o r i z o n P r e s s , 1964,
p. 183.

29. Quoted i n Solomon, Jewish Museum Catalogue, p. 16.

30. John Cage, A Year From Monday, p. 71.

31. Andrew Forge, 'The Emperor's F l a g ' , The New Statesman, v o l . 68, December
11th, 1964, p. 938.

32. Johns, Sketchbook Notes, p. 185. T h i s a r e a i s the same t h a t concerned

Leonardo and t h a t Johns p i c k e d up on, namely t h a t a r e a where the boundary
of a body i s n e i t h e r a p a r t of the e n c l o s e d body nor a p a r t of the
s u r r o u n d i n g atmosphere.

33. W i t t g e n s t e i n , I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , p. 202e.

34. The t i t l e Passage c o u l d have come from Hart Crane's poem of the same
name which i n t u r n comes from Walt Whitman's Passage t o I n d i a . Barbara
Rose i n her C.A.A. t a l k suggests i t comes from Duchamp's The V i r g i n ' s
Passage t o the B r i d e . E q u a l l y i t c o u l d be a t t r i b u t e d Cezanne's use of
'passage' - t h e r u n n i n g t o g e t h e r o f p l a n e s o t h e r w i s e s e p a r a t e d i n
space - as we see a r e f e r e n c e t o the same i d e a of Cezanne's i n Johns
Sketchbook Notes (p. 187) and i n a quote i n c l u d e d i n Cage's 'Jasper
Johns" S t o r e s and Ideas' (A Year From Monday, p. 79).

35. Hart Crane, C o l l e c t e d Poems of tart Crane (ed. and i n t r o . Waldo Frank)
L i v e r i g h t I n c . , 1933, p. 32.

36. W i t t g e n s t e i n , Inve s t i gat i o n s, p. 195e-196e.

Gombrich r e f e r s t o t h i s image i n A r t and I l l u s i o n London, Phaidon

p. 5-6. 'True, we can s w i t c h from one r e a d i n g to another w i t h
i n c r e a s i n g r a p i d i t y ; we w i l l a l s o "remember" the r a b b i t w h i l e
we see the duck, but the more c l o s e l y we watch o u r s e l v e s , the
more c e r t a i n l y we w i l l d i s c o v e r t h a t we cannot e x p e r i e n c e a l t e r -
n a t i v e r e a d i n g s a t the same time. I l l u s i o n , we w i l l f i n d , i s
hard t o d e s c r i b e or a n a l y z e , f o r though we may be i n t e l l e c t u a l l y
aware of the f a c t t h a t any g i v e n e x p e r i e n c e must be an i l l u s i o n ,
we cannot, s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , watch o u r s e l v e s h a v i n g an i l l u s i o n ' .

37. Krauss, J a s p e r Johns, p. 92.

38. K o z l o f f , J a s p e r Johns, p. 34.

39. 'The c a p t u r e d fume of space foams i n our e a r s ' arid i s p e n e t r a t e d

by the p r e s e n t day image, the a e r o p l a n e :
'Man hears h i m s e l f an engine i n a c l o u d
... the n a s a l whine of power whips a new u n i v e r s e . '
Hart Crane, C o l l e c t e d Poems, p. 32-34.
 87

40. W i t t g e n s t e i n , I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , p. 198e.

41. ibid., #198, p. 80e.

42. ibid., #199, p. 81e.

43. ibid., #454, p. 132e.

44. Johns, i n f a c t , i s o f t e n d e s c r i b e d i n t h i s way. V i v i a n Raynor s a y s :

' N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s hard - and p o i n t l e s s p r o b a b l y to t r y - to
r e c o n c i l e Johns' aura o f s o c i a b i l i t y w i t h the o t h e r i m p r e s s i o n of
almost p r i e s t l y a p a r t n e s s . ' A r t News, March., 1973, p. 22.

Cage w r i t e s : 'The thermostats a r e f i x e d t o the r a d i a t o r s but l e a d

i n e f f e c t u a l l y t o two bare w i r e s . The Jaguar r e p a i r e d and ready
t o run s i t s i n a garage unused. I t has been t h e r e s i n c e October.
An e l e c t r i c i a n came t o f i x the thermostats but went away b e f o r e h i s
work was f i n i s h e d and never returned.The a p p l i c a t i o n f o r the
r e g i s t r a t i o n of the c a r has not been found ... For odd t r i p s a c a r
i s rented. I f i t g e t s too hot a window i s opened. The f r e e z e r i s
f u l l of books.' A Year From Monday, p. 78-79.

45. K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein:?^ Conception of P h i l o s o p h y , p. 110.

46. Johns, Sketchbook Notes, p. 192.

47. i b i d . , p. 185-187.

48. See F i e l d , Jasper Johns: P r i n t s 1960-1970.

49. Barbara Rose, draws the same p a r a l l e l between the Sketchbook Notes and
Investigations. C.A.A., 1974.

50. W i t t g e n s t e i n , I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , #56, p. 28e.

W i l l i a m Lycan i n h i s a r t i c l e , 'Gombrich, W i t t g e n s t e i n , and the Duck-

R a b b i t , J o u r n a l o f A e s t h e t i c s , v o l . 30, Winter 1971, examines the
degree to which A r t and I l l u s i o n and the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s a r e i n agree-
ment. He c i t e s an example of a c t u a l c o l o u r d u a l i s m : 'But c o n s i d e r
the c o l o u r of a s l i p of l i t m u s paper i n a p e r f e c t l y n e u t r a l e l e c t r o l y t i c
solution. Sometimes i t i s l i t e r a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o say whether the
paper i s b l u e or p i n k . In t h i s case, "Now I see i t as b l u e ... now
p i n k " makes sense, even i f the c o l o u r o f i t h e paper a c t u a l l y remains
c o n s t a n t . ' p. 236.

51. ibid., #59, p. 29e.

52. M a r s h a l l McLuhan, Understanding Media, p. 5. Quoted i n F i e l d Jasper

Johns: P r i n t s 1960-1970, 1970.

53. Rose, C.A.A. 1974.

 88

54. Walter Hopps i n the b r o c h u r e f o r Gemini's e d i t i o n of Johns' l i t h o g r a p h s

Fragments - A c c o r d i n g t o What, A p r i l 1971 takes t h i s a s s o c i a t i o n t o
absurd l e n g t h s : 'Both p a i n t i n g s a r e of e l o n g a t e d and h o r i z o n t a l format,
combine v a r i o u s p a i n t i n g and g r a p h i c t e c h n i q u e s , i n c l u d e l i t e r a l '
o b j e c t s and the i l l u s i o n of o t h e r l i t e r a l o b j e c t s and p o r t r a y images
d e r i v e d s p e c i f i c a l l y from p r i o r work? We have simply t o l o o k at a
Rauschenberg, Dine, Wesselman, e t c . t o see how Johns' p a i n t i n g
s p e c i f i c a l l y f i t s Tu m' .

55. Johns, Sketchbook Notes, p. 185.

56. K r a u s s , J a s p e r Johns, p. 94.

57. C a l a s , Icons and Images, p. 81.

58. W i t t g e n s t e i n , I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , p. 207e.

59. Dore Ashton, 'An I n t e r v i e w w i t h M a r c e l Duchamp', S t u d i o International

June 1966, p. 245.

60. F i e l d , J a s p e r Johns: P r i n t s 1960-1970.

61. W i t t g e n s t e i n , I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , p. 215e.

62. Johns, 'Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968)', A r t f o r u m , November, 1968.

63. op. c i t . , p. 226e.

64. Johns, Sketchbook Notes, p. 192.

65. op. c i t . , p. 193e.

66. i b i d . , #74, p. 35e.

As an a s i d e , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t i n K o z l o f f ' s r e p r o d u c t i o n
the shadow c a s t by the bent coat-hanger and w i r e t h a t i s a t t a c h e d ,
a c c i d e n t a l l y i s t a n g e n t i a l t o t h e bends. In the Fragments - A c c o r d i n g
to What l i t h o g r a p h : Coathanger and Spoon t h i s l i n e i s r e p r e s e n t e d by
one p a i n t e d i n the c o l o u r s o f the rainbow or spectrum. Johns used
K o z l o f f ' s r e p r o d u c t i o n as a model r a t h e r than j u s t the work i t s e l f
(Walter Hopps, Gemini b r o c h u r e , 1971) and the spectrum l i n e becomes a
comment on the n a t u r e of l i g h t t h a t c a s t s the shadow.

67. Quoted i n Maurice Tuchman, The New York S c h o o l , Thames and Hudson, 1965,
p. 76.
 89

FOOTNOTES CONCLUSION

1. Wittgenstein, Investigations, #133, p. 51e.

2. V i v i e n Raynor, A r t News, March 1973, p. 21.

3. Cage, A Year From Monday, p. 77.

4. op. c i t . , p. 21.

5. G. R. Swenson, A r t News, February 1964, p. 67.

6. 'I o b j e c t t o none anymore. I used t o o b j e c t t o each as i t o c c u r r e d ' .

Swenson, p. 43.

7. Joseph Young, A r t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , September 1969, p. 54.

8. i b i d . , p. 54.

9. Raynor, A r t News, p . 21.

10. Swenson, A r t News, p. 66.

11. A s p e c t a c u l a r example o f t h i s type o f w r i t i n g i s found i n K o z l o f f ' s 'Johns

and Duchamp', A r t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , March 1964, p. 45. 'Each o f Johns'
s t r o k e s i s a l a r v a l p a l p i t a t i o n o f p l e a s u r e i n the l i v e n e s s o f the
pigment - a s t r o k e whose morbidezza and cadenced slowness s t r i v e s t o
i d e a t e sense i t s e l f . '

12. Cage, A Year From Monday, p. 83.

 90

PLATES
 91

PLATE I F l a g , 1954. E n c a u s t i c and c o l l a g e on canvas 41-1/4 x 60-3/4"

C o l l e c t i o n P h i l i p Johnson, New Canaan C o n n e c t i c u t .

PLATE I I Target With P l a s t e r C a s t s , 1955. E n c a u s t i c and c o l l a g e on

canvas w i t h p l a s t e r c a s t s , 51 x 44 x 3-1/2". Collection
Mr. and Mrs. Leo C a s t e l l i , New York.
 92

m\\W \WW\W\x

PLATE IV C o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h Toy Piano, 1954. G r a p h i t e and c o l l a g e w i t h

toy p i a n o , 11 x 9 x 21". C o l l e c t i o n Mr. and Mrs. R. S c u l l ,
New York.
PLATE V U n t i t l e d , 1954. O i l and c o l l a g e w i t h p l a s t e r c a s t , 26-1/4 x

PLATE VI Large Green T a r g e t , 1955. E n c a u s t i c and c o l l a g e on canvas,

60 x 60". Museum of Modern A r t , New York.
PLATE VIII F i g u r e 5, 1955. E n c a u s t i c and c o l l a g e on canvas 17-1/2 x 14"
C o l l e c t i o n the a r t i s t .
 95

PLATE IX Charles Demuth. I Saw The Figure 5 i n Gold, 1928. O i l

36 x 29-3/4". Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

PLATE X Gray Alphabets, 1956. Encaustic and collage on canvas

66 x 49". Private c o l l e c t i o n .
PLATE XI
Collection Mr. and Mrs. John Powers.

PLATE XII Gray Alphabets, 1956. D e t a i l of Plate X.

PLATE X I I I U n t i t l e d , c.1954. O i l and collage on s i l k . C o l l e c t i o n Edwin
J a n s s , Los Angeles.

PLATE XIV Tango, 1955. E n c a u s t i c on canvas 43 x 55". Collection

Mr. and Mrs. Burton Tremaine, Meriden, C o n n e c t i c u t .
PLATE XVI Canvas, 1956. E n c a u s t i c and c o l l a g e on wood and canvas
30 x 25". C o l l e c t i o n the a r t i s t .
 99

PLATE XVII Drawer, 1957. E n c a u s t i c on canvas and wood, 30-1/2 x 30-1/2

Rose A r t Museum, B r a n d e i s U n i v e r s i t y , M a s s a c h u s e t t s .

PLATE X V I I I Gray R e c t a n g l e s , 1957. E n c a u s t i c on canvas, 60 x 60"

C o l l e c t i o n Mr. and Mrs. V i c t o r Ganz, New York
PLATE XIX P a i n t i n g With a B a l l , 1958. E n c a u s t i c on canvas 31-1/2 x
24-1/2. C o l l e c t i o n Edward Power, London.

PLATE XX

California.
PLATE XXI The, 1957. Encaustic on canvas, 24 x 20". Collection Mrs.
Herbert Lee, Belmont, Massachusetts.

PLATE XXII Shade, 1959. Encaustic on canvas with objects, 52 x 39".

C o l l e c t i o n Mrs. Leo Steinberg, New York.
PLATE XXIV Delaunay, Windows on the C i t y , 1912.
PLATE XXV F a l s e S t a r t , 1959. O i l on canvas, 67-1/4 x 54". Collection
Mr. and Mrs. R. S c u l l , New York.

PLATE XXVI Magritte, The Use of Words, 1928-29, 21-1/2 x 28-1/2,

W i l l i a m Copley, New York.
PLATE XXVII Jubilee, 1959. O i l on canvas 67-1/4 x 54". Collection
Robert Rauschenberg, New York.

PLATE XXVIII Out the Window, 1959. Encaustic and collage on canvas
54-1/2 x 40". Collection Mr. and Mrs. R. S c u l l , New York.
 105

PLATE XXIX

PLATE XXX Painting with Two B a l l s , 1 9 6 0 . Encaustic and collage on

canvas with objects, 65 x 5 4 " . C o l l e c t i o n the a r t i s t .
 106

PLATE XXXII P a i n t i n g w i t h R u l e r and "Gray", 1960. O i l and c o l l a g e on

canvas w i t h o b j e c t s , 32 x 32". C o l l e c t i o n Mr. and Mrs.
Helman S t . L o u i s .
PLATE XXXIV
 108

PLATE XXXVI Passage, 1962. Encaustic

and collage on canvas
with objects, 54 x 40".
C o l l e c t i o n Georges Marci
de Saqqarah, Gstaad,
Switzerland.
PLATE XXXVIII Out the Window I I , 1962. O i l on canvas w i t h objects,
72 x 48". C o l l e c t i o n the a r t i s t .
PLATE XXXIX F i e l d P a i n t i n g , 1963-64. O i l on canvas w i t h objects.
72 x 36-3/4. C o l l e c t i o n the a r t i s t .

PLATE XXXX The C r i t i c Sees, 1961. Sculpmetal on p l a s t e r w i t h

glass. 3-1/4 x 6-1/4 x 2". C o l l e c t i o n Mr. and Mrs. R.
S c u l l , New York.
 Ill

PLATE XXXXI No, 1961. Encaustic

c o l l a g e and s c u l p -
metal on canvas
w i t h o b j e c t s , 68 x
40". Collection
the a r t i s t .
 112

PLATE XXXXIII Land's End, 1963. O i l on canvas w i t h wood. 67 x 48".

C o l l e c t i o n Edwin Janss, Los A n g e l e s .

PLATE XXXXIV D i v e r , 1962. O i l on canvas w i t h o b j e c t s 90 x 170".

A l b e r t A. L i s t Family C o l l e c t i o n .
 113

PLATE XXXXVI According to What, 1964. O i l on canvas with objects,

88 x 192". C o l l e c t i o n Edwin Janss, Los Angeles.
PLATE XXXXVII Duchamp Tu m', 1918. 27-1/2 x 122-3/4. Collection
Katherine S. Dreier.
PLATE XXXXIX Cup 4 Picasso, 1972 l i t h o g r a p h , Leo Castelli Gallery.
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