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Final Report of Anonymous Letter Investigation - Copeland Investigations Redacted

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Copeland Investigations, LLC

Buckeye Police
Department
Investigation
Multiple Allegations Addressed

Burley Copeland
2-14-2019
Contents
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................ 4
Initiation of Investigation .............................................................................................................. 4
Scope of Investigation .................................................................................................................... 4
Limitations of Investigation .......................................................................................................... 5
Summary of Allegations and Findings ......................................................................................... 6
Complaint Dispositions – Lieutenant Root: ........................................................................... 6
Complaint Dispositions – Lieutenant McGeough ................................................................. 6
Complaint Dispositions – Lieutenant Arlak ........................................................................... 6
Complaint Dispositions – Sergeant Virgadamo ..................................................................... 7
Complaint Dispositions – Chief Hall ...................................................................................... 7
Other Allegations ....................................................................................................................... 8
Discussion of Findings ....................................................................................................................... 8
Background ........................................................................................................................................20
Employee Rights & Confidentiality ................................................................................................22
Investigative Parameters ...................................................................................................................23
Agency Dispositions .....................................................................................................................23
Agency Spectrum of Discipline .......................................................................................................23
Review of Documents ......................................................................................................................25
Initial Documents Provided ........................................................................................................25
Review of Emails Related to Secondary Employment ............................................................26
Associated Companies .................................................................................................................26
Ferrairi Express ........................................................................................................................26
Malca-Amit USA, LLC ............................................................................................................26
Orion Security Services............................................................................................................27
Review of Hall Emails Related to Secondary Employment ....................................................28
2014 Emails Related to Hall’s Secondary Employment ......................................................31
2015 Emails Related to Hall’s Secondary Employment ......................................................33
2016 Emails Related to Hall’s Secondary Employment ......................................................39
2017 Emails Related to Hall’s Secondary Employment ......................................................44
Emails/Documents Related to Harassment Allegations Involving Sergeant Virgadamo ..46
Spillman and UCR Reporting ..........................................................................................................54

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Executive Summary
Initiation of Investigation

In late September 2017, a letter was received by the Buckeye City Manager. This letter was
dated September 18, 2017, and signed, “Anonymous Employees of the Buckeye Police
Department.” The opening paragraph of this letter noted, “It is our intention to bring forth
to you some major internal concerns that we have with the agency and how it is being run.
These concerns include hostile work environment, bullying, general employee misconduct,
as well as criminal offenses to include the falsifying of crime statistics and the
misappropriation of city funds.” This letter provided information pertaining to possible
misconduct by Chief Larry Hall, Assistant Chief Robert Sanders, Lieutenant Gary
McGeough, Lieutenant Charles Arlak, and Sergeant James Virgadamo. Most of these
allegations lacked the specificity needed for independent verification of facts.

The City Manager asked the City Attorney to investigate the allegations in the anonymous
letter. The City attorney’s Office retained Copeland Investigations, LLC, on October 29,
2017.

While gathering documents and awaiting access to the emails of those originally named as
focuses of this investigation a second anonymous letter, dated December 12, 2017, was
received by Copeland Investigations, LLC. Unlike the initial letter, this one identified several
individuals that might have knowledge of these allegations.

Scope of Investigation

Under the direction of the City Attorney’s office, but with instructions to conduct a
complete and objective inquiry and follow where the facts might lead, Copeland
Investigations, LLC initiated an investigation. The scope of investigation excluded
allegations lacking sufficient specificity to investigate and allegations that, even if true, would
not be a violation of policy.

The investigation also required analysis of how to best frame the allegations, which
warranted investigation. Vague and conclusory statements were common in both
anonymous letters. Words were used inconsistently and/or imprecisely.

In formulating a scope of investigation, each allegation must be framed in a reasonable


manner. The goal was to frame allegations based on the central claim and the policy
violated. Specifically, the anonymous letters used terms such as hostile work environment,
bullying, and general employee misconduct in referencing actions by Sergeant Virgadamo.
The investigation framed these allegations as “workplace bullying/discourteousy.” The
anonymous letters also referred to “falsification” of crime statistics, “altering” of crime
statistics, and “changing” of crime statistics. The investigation framed these allegations as
“misclassification of crime statistics.”

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Whether police reports have been misclassified is something that can be determined. An
independent investigator can review police calls for service, reports, and reporting manuals
to verify the accuracy of crime reporting. An investigator can also opine as the effect of
misclassifications, including, as is discussed in more detail in this report, how
misclassifications of reports can lead to an underreporting of serious offenses.

There are many reasons possible for crime reporting errors. Lack of training, supervision,
confusion, and outright intent to downgrade are all possible. However, this investigation is
not well suited to determine intent to misclassify nor is this a criminal investigation.
Accordingly, the focus of the investigation is on whether reports were misclassified, and the
impact of that misclassification. Words like “falsification” are used in this report in
reference to the allegations from the anonymous letters and witness statements. Copeland
Investigations makes no finding or determination of intent in this investigation regarding any
allegation of misconduct.

Limitations of Investigation

Limitations were identified during this investigation that further complicated an already
complex undertaking. An outside entity investigating an organization, without access to that
organization’s executive staff due to their potential involvement in misconduct, is at a
disadvantage. Oftentimes, those most knowledgeable of a document or reporting system
were unavailable for consultation due to their involvement. This limitation was most evident
when a review of the agency’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) reporting procedures and
records management system was necessary. The individual most familiar with this system
was a focus of the investigation. This review was further hampered by an inability to actively
interact with Spillman (the records management system), which limited the ability to adjust
search parameters based on initial findings. Also, because Spillman is a fluid system any
documents provided were specific to that point in time and could be manipulated.

The sheer potential scope of this investigation was also a challenge and delayed this final
report. The broad range of allegations, the multiple identified witnesses and accused, and
the proliferation of documents available for review required parameters be imposed, while
still sufficiently addressing documented concerns.

Ultimately, Copeland Investigations LLC, identified 23 individuals whom were determined


to either be witnesses or have essential background information. 28 interviews were
conducted in total. Initially, in person interviews were conducted with each of these
subjects, except for a Spillman representative who was only interviewed telephonically.
Those of whom were Buckeye police employees were served Notices of Investigation that
identified their roles as witnesses and provided them notice of their employee rights and
responsibilities. Summaries of each of these interviews are contained in the Interview
portion of this investigation.

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Hundreds of emails, offense reports, internal investigations, and similar documents were also
reviewed as part of this investigation. Those documents critical to this investigation are
identified throughout this investigation as Exhibits and are included in this report.

Summary of Allegations and Findings

The summary of allegations and findings is as follows:

Complaint Dispositions – Lieutenant Root:


Allegation I - Failure to Supervise/Dishonesty – UNFOUNDED

Allegation Description: After learning that Officer Dan Hoffmeister had failed to
properly log evidence, Bruce Root, who was a Detective Sergeant, had conspired with
him to conceal this misconduct by somehow “sneaking” the property into the
evidence room.

Complaint Dispositions – Lieutenant McGeough


Allegation I - Blue Knights Securities; Conflict of Interest – SUSTAINED

Allegation Description: Chief Larry Hall and Lieutenant Gary McGeough established
and maintained an off-duty business relationship that presented a real or perceived
conflict of interest and violated established policies concerning secondary
employment.

Allegation II - Homicide Scene; Dishonesty – UNFOUNDED

Allegation Description: Sergeant McGeough lied about his involvement at the scene
of a domestic disturbance and covered up his misconduct.

Complaint Dispositions – Lieutenant Arlak


Allegation I - Misclassification of Crime Statistics – SUSTAINED

Allegation Description: As the Spillman administrator and the individual charged


with assuring criminal UCR offenses were properly categorized and scored,
Lieutenant Arlak exhibited gross incompetence and failed to provide proper oversight
resulting in inadequately reporting criminal activity in the City of Buckeye and
artificially lowering crime rates.

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Complaint Dispositions – Sergeant Virgadamo
Allegation I - Workplace Bullying/Discourtesy – SUSTAINED

Allegation Description: James Virgadamo engaged in a pattern of bullying and


harassing behavior that particularly targeted several of his fellow sergeants, created a
toxic work environment, and disrupted the good order and efficiency of the Buckeye
Police Department.

Allegation II - Misclassification of Crime Statistics – SUSTAINED

Allegation Description: James Virgadamo altered the UCR Codes associated with
police reports, resulting in inadequately reporting criminal activity in the City of
Buckeye and artificially lowering crime rates.

Complaint Dispositions – Chief Hall


Allegation I - Blue Knights Security Conflict of Interest – SUSTAINED

Allegation Description: Chief Larry Hall and Lieutenant Gary McGeough established
and maintained an off-duty business relationship that presented a real or perceived
conflict of interest and violated established policies concerning secondary
employment.

Allegation II - Unbecoming Conduct at Accident Scene - SUSTAINED

Allegation Description: On February 18, 2015, at approximately 1916 hours, while at


the scene of a single vehicle accident and in the presence of his subordinate police
officers, Chief Larry Hall displayed disrespectful behavior and violated policy when
he took at least one photo of the nude, male driver, who was wearing high heels. The
picture was not taken for a legitimate law enforcement purpose and was shared with
at least one individual outside of the police department.

Allegation III - Failure to Supervise-Root Misconduct Investigation – UNFOUNDED

Allegation Description: In an effort to cover up misconduct, then Assistant Chief


Hall intervened in a Professional Standards Unit investigation involving his personal
friend, Bruce Root and failed to properly investigate and render an impartial finding.

Allegation IV - Failure to Supervise-McGeough Homicide Scene – UNFOUNDED

Allegation Description: Larry Hall, at the time the Assistant Chief of Police for the
Buckeye Police Department, covered up misconduct committed by then Sergeant
Gary McGeough pertaining to a homicide investigation.

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Allegation V - Secondary Employment – SUSTAINED

Allegation Description: Chief Larry Hall utilized official Department email and City
time to conduct off-duty/secondary employment and violated established policies
concerning secondary employment.

Allegation VI - Unbecoming Conduct - NOT SUSTAINED

Allegation Description: Chief Hall displayed unbecoming conduct and violated


policy when he created a disturbance at the Phoenix Open by trying to sneak a friend
in without paying and when he operated a City vehicle after consuming alcohol.

Allegation VII - Disparate Treatment - NOT SUSTAINED

Allegation Description: Chief Hall engaged in preferential treatment of his


subordinates, particularly those connected to him either due to their New York roots
or their association with Mesa Police Department. This resulted in disparate handling
of disciplinary outcomes and actions.

Allegation VIII - Failure to Supervise-Crime Statistics – SUSTAINED

Allegation Description: Chief Hall ignored complaints and apparent warning signs
and through his neglect allowed crime statistics to be inaccurately reported.

Other Allegations
Any other allegations in the anonymous letter were not investigated because: they
were allegations lacking sufficient specificity to investigate; they were allegations that,
even if true, would not be a violation of policy; there were no facts to support the
allegation; or they were allegations of co-workers not liking each other or expressing
concerns about “attitude issues,” which do not amount to policy violations.

Discussion of Findings
Ultimately, no specific allegations warranting investigation were found involving Assistant
Chief Robert Sanders and he was never interviewed as part of this investigation. Sergeant
James Virgadamo, Lieutenant Charles Arlak, Lieutenant Gary McGeough, Lieutenant Bruce
Root and Chief Larry Hall were interviewed as focuses of this investigation. All were
interviewed in person and were served Notices of Investigation identifying the allegations
being investigated and their employee rights and responsibilities. These interviews were
recorded; a summary of each interview is contained in the Interview section of this report.

Lieutenant Root was found to have had only a peripheral role in most areas of concern
noted, and no allegations of misconduct involving him were sustained. The anonymous
letter had alleged that Lieutenant Root was complicit in concealing transgressions by Officer

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Hoffmeister related to his failure to log evidence. This investigation found that Officer
Hoffmeister’s actions were found to have been investigated and the incident properly
adjudicated after an unintended delay created by the resignation of the initial assigned
investigator. There was no indication that Lieutenant Root had acted improperly.

Allegations involving Gary McGeough’s mishandling of a crime scene pertaining to a double


homicide were found to be unfounded as was Larry Hall’s alleged involvement in covering
up McGeough’s mistakes. Unfounded, as defined by Buckeye policy means the investigation
revealed that, “…the alleged acts did not occur or did not involve Department personnel.
Additionally, complaints that are determined to be frivolous will fall within the classification
of unfounded.” Police reports and witness interviews support that this double homicide,
committed by the victims’ son, was a tragic situation that, when evaluated without hindsight
bias, leads to the inevitable conclusion that based on the information known at the time,
McGeough’s decision was appropriate. Chief Hall expressed during this investigation that at
the time of this incident he had asked that the incident be investigated by Buckeye PD’s
Professional Standards Unit but the Chief at that time, Mark Mann, overrode his wishes.
While an earlier investigation might have led to further transparency there is nothing to
indicate that it would have resulted in a different finding.

The anonymous letter also attributed behavior to Sergeant Virgadamo that would best be
described as “bullying” in nature. While initially not the primary focus of this investigation,
Sergeant Virgadamo’s behavior became impossible to ignore. Several interviews drew
unsolicited information about negative interactions with Sergeant Virgadamo. Even when
controlling for the fact that the majority of those interviewed in this investigation were
identified in the anonymous letter and thus might not provide an unbiased perspective, their
statements raised concerns.

One issue that seemed to be a source of dissension with the officers and sergeants
interviewed was the changing of police reports by Sergeant Virgadamo. Sergeant
summed it up best when he said that Sergeant Virgadamo had created “internal strife” by
reviewing reports that had already been approved by another sergeant and returning them to
the officer for changes. Other sergeants viewed this as an undermining of their authority.

Former Lieutenant noted that that most of the conflicts arose because Sergeant
Virgadamo bullied and created a hostile work environment for his fellow sergeants. Emails
authored by Virgadamo support this contention and highlight the apparent disdain he felt
for his peers, subordinates, and even his superiors. In one email he complained about his
subordinates describing them as, “… entitled young millennials who never had any
standards or expectations from anyone including their helicopter parents” He mocks other
sergeants and a lieutenant noting, “Then we have some helicopter supervisors and a
helicopter Lieutenant that lead the same way with their T-ball style of supervision, micro-
managing and hovering over people holding them by the hand making sure they are happy
and content and all their needs are being fulfilled so everyone gets a trophy.” He further
notes, “The idea that a five-year officer…can sit in the same room as a Lieutenant and voice
his opinion on how things should be run absolutely baffles my mind.”

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His admitted lack of respect for others might explain several emails sent by Sergeant
Virgadamo to his fellow sergeants, in response to their polite requests or concerns. His
responses could often best be described as verbal warfare. He was condescending, belittling
and patronizing, continually reminding his peers that he considered himself superior to
them. Sergeant Virgadamo responded to polite requests, by sergeants attempting only to
maintain supervisory control of their subordinates, with unbridled disdain. In one email he
told one of his peer sergeants, “Just because you passed the Sgts test or are a Sgt on the swat
team doesn’t mean you know it all. Maybe on the swat team your the top dog but when
your on patrol your just like a rookie Sgt like it or not.”

While an acting lieutenant, bullying behavior was attributed to Virgadamo after Officer
had made accusations against him in an Association meeting. Both Officer
and Sergeant advised that after Virgadamo had learned of the comments, he had
responded in a disruptive manner intended to intimidate Officer Griffith. Sergeant
Virgadamo’s sarcastic manner, such as the instant messages sent out to several police
officers, which mocked Officer Beaver’s rationale for parking his squad car in a specific way
to avoid ambushes, caused even his legitimate supervisory actions to be viewed with
suspicion. While it was proper and obligatory for Sergeant Virgadamo to address this parking
violation by Officer Beaver, his manner of doing so was not. It appears his actions were
meant to demean Officer Beaver as much as they were to correct his behavior.

Even his supervisors did not escape his wrath. He responded rudely and sarcastically to a
lieutenant who dared to override a decision he had made and advised another sergeant that
this lieutenant needed to “stay in his own lane.” That he copied his response to other
sergeants and his own Lieutenant is particularly disturbing and likely contributed to the
perception expressed during this investigation by some individuals that Sergeant Virgadamo
did not have the same level of accountability as other sergeants. These emails are particularly
ironic as earlier emails illustrate that Sergeant Virgadamo in the past has frequently
demanded respect due to his rank and tenure.

When interviewed as part of this investigation, and after being confronted by the many
emails and allegations of his fellow employees, Sergeant Virgadamo initially acknowledged
that some of his emails were inappropriate and he had possibly created dissension when he
interfered with other sergeants’ squads. He then quickly diverted the attention away from
his actions; providing a list of reasons that other sergeants had resented him. He accepted
no accountability for his actions and did not seem to comprehend the division he had
created by his words and actions. In fact, he regularly complained or chastised others in
emails, usually after verbally attacking them, for not meeting with him “one on one” or
“man to man;” to air out their differences. Such behavior was deemed by several of his
peers as threatening.

This investigation found that while Sergeant Virgadamo had been recently investigated and
disciplined for rude interactions with peers and subordinates, nothing had addressed this
pattern of abuse that dated back to 2014 and seemed to be a major source of discontent for
multiple employees.

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Also investigated was an allegation of misconduct related to Larry Hall’s involvement in a
2012 Professional Standards Unit investigation involving Bruce Root. It is likely this
incident drew the attention of critics as not only was Hall’s involvement a deviation from the
standard PSU practice, but a perception also existed that Hall and Root were friends as both
had worked at the Mesa Police Department. Hall insisted that Mark Mann, the police chief at
the time, had directed him to interview Root. In any event, no evidence was found that Hall
violated any policies by intervening in the investigation or that his involvement had unfairly
influenced the outcome.

Other allegations not supported in this investigation include those brought forward in the
anonymous letter accusing Hall of unbecoming conduct at the Phoenix Open and operating
a City vehicle while intoxicated. Nothing was found to support those allegations but,
unfortunately during this investigation, evidence of Hall’s inappropriate conduct at an
accident scene was uncovered.

During interviews, an officer had disclosed that Chief Hall had responded to a vehicular
accident that occurred near his home that involved a male driver who was found to be nude
except for high heels and artificial breasts that had fallen off as he exited his vehicle. This
officer advised that there were other items in the vehicle that indicated that the accident
victim was a cross dresser. This officer alleged that Chief Hall had made jokes about the
victim and had utilized his cell phone to take a picture of the victim and text it to a friend. A
second on scene officer also recalled Chief Hall making jokes about the victim and taking a
photo. Both officers believed that the picture taken was of the naked male driver. Chief
Hall admitted taking a photo at the scene and showing it to his wife before deleting it. He
insisted the photo was only of the vehicle and depicted only part of the victim’s leg hanging
out of the vehicle. Chief Hall offered no legitimate law enforcement reason for taking the
picture.

Chief Hall then said that he knew that he would have to answer for the picture that he took
at the accident scene and when the time came he might have to “split hairs” to prove that
taking the picture was not a policy violation. Chief Hall further said that he might be able to
make the argument that he was not on duty at the point when he responded to the accident
scene, even though he was in his City vehicle and said he had responded to provide lights or
traffic control if needed. Chief Hall’s defense of actions that clearly violated policy is of
concern. It is concerning that Chief Hall would try to defend his actions at all. As the leader
of the Buckeye Police Department he should exemplify behavior he wants emulated in every
interaction with the public and with his officers. His actions of taking an unauthorized
photo of an accident victim and sharing it with a family member were a violation of City of
Buckeye and Buckeye PD policies. That his actions were later used by one of those officers
to discredit the Chief during this investigation and forced the second officer to provide
witness against him is evidence that his behavior adversely impacted the employer-employee
relationship.

The anonymous complainant(s) also addressed the alleged conflict of interest created by a
business established and shared by Larry Hall and Gary McGeough. This business was easily

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verified by a check of the Arizona Corporation Commission website which showed both
Gary McGeough and Lawrence Hall as Members of Blue Knights Securities Group LLC.
(“Blue Knights”). Articles of Organization were filed for Blue Knights, on 6/12/2013 and
published on 6/24/2013 when McGeough was a Buckeye PD Sergeant and Hall was the
Assistant Chief. On 4/12/2014, when a Statement of Change of Statutory Agent was filed
for Blue Knights, Hall was now the Buckeye Chief of Police while McGeough was still a
sergeant.

Buckeye Police Department Policy defines a business relationship as “serving as an


employee, independent contractor, compensated consultant, owner, board member,
shareholder or investor in an outside business, company, partnership, corporation, venture,
or other transaction where the Department employee’s annual interest, compensation,
investment, or obligation is greater than $250.00.” The policy also described how to avoid
conflicts, or the perception of such conflicts, created by such a relationship including not
being in the same supervisory chain and avoiding making promotional decisions.

When interviewed for this investigation both Hall and McGeough stated that they did not
know how their agency defined a business relationship and were unaware of the associated
policies. Both also agreed, after reviewing Buckeye PD Policy 1050, first adopted on July 9,
2013, that by this definition they did have a business relationship at the time the business
was organized, although no policy governed such relationships at the time.

Both Hall and McGeough had argued that at the time they formed Blue Knights, Buckeye
PD policies did not address a business relationship and that Mark Mann, who was the
Buckeye Chief of Police at the time, had knowledge of this business and approved it.
McGeough went so far as to say that he submitted a memo to Chief Mann and had gotten
his approval. This memo was not located during the investigation. While an interview with
Mark Mann may substantiate their claim that seems unlikely as on May 4, 2017, during a
Buckeye PD internal investigation (IA 16-15) Mann submitted a memo to the investigator,
Ron Hergert, that included the Corporation Commission filing for Blue Knights. In that
memo, Mark Mann had requested that the City investigate if Hall and McGeough had
followed proper policy when establishing this business, if this business had created a conflict
of interest, and if they had obtained authorization from the City to work this outside
employment. It seems unlikely, particularly due to the turbulent relationship among
command staff, that Mann would not have brought this forward sooner if he had been
aware of it.

Both Hall and McGeough said that Hall had limited involvement in Blue Knights.
McGeough described Chief Hall as a silent partner in Blue Knights in 2013, said he
“basically had no involvement” in 2014, and was not included in the taxes filed for the
business by 2015. McGeough said he had legally dissolved this company but, did not explain
why the partnership was still listed on the Corporation Commission website. In 2015, after a
high-profile personnel investigation, a public records request was made for the memos
approving off duty employment for Hall and McGeough. Hall said in his interview that he
was unable to produce this document. Despite these requests, neither McGeough nor Hall

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did anything to legally and/or publicly dissolve Blue Knights and resolve the on-going
perception of a conflict of interest. This investigation revealed an apparent lack of
knowledge of Buckeye PD’s policies concerning business relationships, conflicts of interest,
and secondary employment, suggesting that these complaints did not even prompt them to
consult policy to assure they were complying. Despite anonymous complaints and public
records requests, both Larry Hall and Gary McGeough let these perceptions of a business
relationship fester, causing further discontent within the Buckeye PD, with accusations of
preferential treatment towards Gary McGeough by Larry Hall. This formed the basis for
sustained allegations for both Hall and McGeough.

An additional allegation investigated concerned secondary employment worked by Chief


Larry Hall since at least early 2014. Emails located in Larry Hall’s, City of Buckeye Outlook
account during this investigation revealed the extent of his involvement and gave insight into
the impact this employment had on his responsibilities as Chief of Police. Approximately
724 emails were located that were sent or received between February 12, 2014 and April 14,
2017, by Chief Hall on his City of Buckeye email account reference to secondary
employment.

Most of these emails strings were found in Chief Hall’s “Sent” folder and originated from
the email address of lhall@buckeyeaz.com. Emails sent by Chief Hall contained his standard
signature that identified him as the Police Chief for Buckeye.

A review of these emails found that Chief Hall was associated primarily with three
companies; Ferrari Express, Malca-Amit, and Orion. Ferrari Express and Malca-Amit are
companies engaged in the transportation of jewelry and precious commodities. Orion
Security Services is a national coordinator of off duty law enforcement officers for private
security needs.

A review of these 724 emails showed Chief Hall was a coordinator of sorts for Orion, a
company that employs off duty officers from across the United States for security escorts
and couriers. When interviewed, Chief Hall described his role as an unpaid “point of
contact” for Orion. He said, “I don’t get compensated for that. I’m just the guy in
Phoenix.” It was found that there were at least 100 jobs that Chief Hall acted as a
coordinator or point of contact for in 2015 and 2016. Emails revealed that the
responsibilities associated with each of these 100 jobs was much more extensive than
represented by Chief Hall who dismissed his work for Orion as nothing more than an
“annoyance.”

As previously noted, this investigation raises concerns as to Chief Hall’s knowledge of the
City of Buckeye’s and the Buckeye Police Department’s policies concerning off duty
employment. Not only was it found that Chief Hall disregarded policies pertaining to off
duty work but, he insisted that he had other Buckeye police officers working secondary
employment across the Valley that had not gone through the off-duty coordinator. He
referred to their employment as “personally approved off duty” jobs. Current policy
(1040.4.II Mandatory Approval) clearly states that prior to commencing any secondary

13
was willing to have some lower levels of discipline overturned, and the greater good was
served, by streamlining the process.

This not the first time that Chief Hall has been made aware of similar problems with this
practice. Jim Norwood from Arizona Investigations and Professional Consultants LLC
recommended in an investigation that was completed in March of 2016 that all
investigations, no matter who conducted them, be monitored and tracked and that they all
be submitted at the same “level of quality” as a PSU investigation.

It was very clear that this recommendation was not insisting that all investigations be
handled by PSU. What it did recommend is that all investigations be completed to the same
level of quality; that all witnesses, complainants and accused are formally interviewed, that all
appropriate documents gathered and reviewed, and that employee’s rights are protected. It
was noticed that several of these streamlined investigations/supervisory inquiries did not
include interviews with all the witnesses or complainants. This led to the perception that
misconduct was being ignored by the command staff. This was evident with a recent
investigation involving Sergeant James Virgadamo. This Supervisory Inquiry consisted
entirely of the questionable email that had raised the concerns of several of Virgadamo’s
peers. None of these sergeants, including Virgadamo, were interviewed and the written
reprimand consisted largely of an acknowledgement that Sergeant Virgadamo had violated
policy and consequences for similar misconduct in the future. It was apparent through
interviews that other supervisors, particularly those identified as witnesses or victims, did not
know that this investigation had occurred. This led to the perception that Sergeant
Virgadamo was given preferential treatment by not being held accountable for obvious
misconduct.

While inconsistencies on how two similar investigations were handled was noticed, there was
nothing to attribute this to an active attempt to treat different parties differently based on
their relationship with Chief Hall; thus, this allegation was not sustained. It is recognized
that management must retain the prerogative to administer discipline, but it is again
recommended that the Buckeye Police Department must achieve consistency in how they
document such investigations to maintain credibility.

Finally, a central focus of this investigation was the allegation that the Buckeye Police
Department was inaccurately reporting their crime statistics. Specifically, it was alleged that
UCR codes were being changed by members of the Buckeye Police Department. These
changes were done to reduce the number of Part I Crimes including Robbery, Rape,
Aggravated Assault, Burglary and Theft, thus presenting a more positive crime picture for
the City of Buckeye. Many of the errors of crime statistics reporting were attributed to
Sergeant Virgadamo and Lieutenant Arlak. It was also noted that Chief Hall was familiar
with this practice and while he may not have actively promoted it, he did nothing to address
these concerns.

Annual crime statistics provided by Buckeye PD to the Arizona Department of Public Safety
for UCR reporting and published on line also did nothing to dispel concern. Immediately

15
apparent when reviewing these statistics was the dramatic decrease in crime when comparing
2013 to 2014; violent crimes decreased 40.8% and property crimes decreased 13.9%.
Specifically, robberies decreased by almost 49%, aggravated assaults by 43% and burglaries
by 41%. Chief Hall was appointed as the Buckeye Police Chief in January of 2014. This
staggering drop in crime, and the continuing downward trend the following years, at a time
when Buckeye was steadily increasing in population and neighboring cities were experiencing
crime increases, cast doubt on the validity of those figures. Documents reviewed, and
interviews conducted did nothing to dispel those doubts.

Sergeant Virgadamo was repeatedly identified in interviews, particularly by his fellow


sergeants, as having falsely altered police reports prepared by either themselves or their
subordinates. Specifically, he was accused of revising the Nature of the crime and/or the
associated UCR codes often after the report had been approved by a supervisor and without
any knowledge of, or discussion with, the officer. Most often cited by these individuals were
burglary reports being changed to theft or lost property reports and assault or robbery
reports being changed to disorderly conduct or juvenile problems. Written documentation,
including memos and emails located during this investigation and included as Exhibits,
memorialize that such concerns dated back to 2014.

Many also spoke to Virgadamo’s motivation for changing the nature and reducing the UCR
codes on these offenses. Multiple witnesses stated that Virgadamo had told them that he
had changed UCR codes as he did not want the City to look bad or his own home value to
go down. In an email sent on July 8, 2017, by Sergeant Virgadamo to Sergeant and
Sergeant concerning Vehicle Burglary reports, Sergeant Virgadamo admitted to his
knowledge of the importance of the UCR codes in reports. He wrote that offense reports
are uploaded daily to crimereports.com for public viewing and added, “Whatever is in that
UCR offense code box is what gets uploaded to the public, not the nature.” Virgadamo
further wrote that while he knew what the intent of the violator was concerning several
vehicles that were found unsecured and ransacked he saw no need to “paper bomb” the
organization when it wasn’t “wanted or needed.” Virgadamo is suggesting that such criminal
acts do not need to be recorded. In this email he further wrote, “I don’t expect the officers
to be concerned about things like crime stats but that’s what our job as Sergeants is when
these things occur to keep things down low or at the minimum not inflate things that don’t
need inflating.” Sergeant Virgadamo stated in his closing, “I care because I live here and
don’t want my home town or our dept to be perceived as the arm pit of the West Valley
because of an inflated crime rate that is beyond our control and the result of carless [sic]
people who don’t know how to lock their cars.”

When interviewed, Sergeant Virgadamo said it was in 2014, the year crime rates dropped
dramatically, when he was first asked to review all offense reports for quality control
purposes. He said when other sergeants began to complain about changes he had made, he
was told by his supervisor to no longer do such quality control. He said Assistant Chief
Mann again gave him this responsibility when he assumed an Acting Lieutenant Position in
2015, and he had continued to review all reports until just recently when he was told he was
to no longer make any changes. Virgadamo claimed to have a better understanding of UCR

16
reporting requirements than his fellow sergeants but, when asked specific questions he
conveyed a lack of knowledge of this subject. For instance, Virgadamo claimed not to know
what the Hierarchy rule was when scoring Part I crimes and did not know that most
attempts to commit an offense are reported as an actual offense for UCR purposes. He
acknowledged that, except for one Spillman training course, the only training he received on
this topic was provided by Lieutenant Arlak.

Sergeant Virgadamo said he was aware that for UCR purposes the lack of a desire for
prosecution either by the victim or the prosecutor did not change how a crime should be
reported. Despite this, when asked about an attempted burglary he advised that it should be
reported as a trespassing as the County Attorney would not file charges for attempted
burglary. When asked about the theft of a cell phone left in a restaurant he stated that it
should be reported as lost property because without a confession no charges would be ever
filed. Sergeant Virgadamo said it was his practice to report the crime as the lowest offense
possible, knowing it could be changed if an arrest was made.

In fact, a review of the report numbers either provided during interviews or found in emails
or grievances, along with an audit of changes Virgadamo made to reports in the past found a
pattern of these reports having incorrect UCR codes; the crime described did not best meet
the UCR code Virgadamo attributed it to. The full impact his misclassification of reports
has had on Buckeye’s UCR reporting and crime statistics has not yet been determined but of
concern is the number of thefts, assaults, aggravated assaults and burglaries that were
reported incorrectly or not at all. A review of a small sampling of simple assault reports
revealed almost half should likely have been classified as aggravated assaults in 2016 and
2017. In addition, Sergeant Virgadamo’s “quality control” of reports in a 16-month period
resulted in only 20 changes out of 1100 plus changes made to UCR codes that upgraded the
crime (i.e. raised from a Part II to a Part I crime or upgraded the crime within the Part I
hierarchy) while almost 200 of the changes resulted in a lower classification or no crime
being reported.

This investigation found throughout the years, Virgadamo was repeatedly confronted by
other sergeants about his UCR reporting of crime. He had ample opportunity to review
UCR reporting guidelines and adjust his actions over the years. A simple google search
would have found the UCR manual online and available for review. He demonstrated an
extreme indifference to identifying and correcting any problems. While it was the
responsibility of his superior officers, particularly Lieutenant Arlak, to correct his behavior, it
does not alleviate Virgadamo from personal accountability.

His actions in changing UCR codes already deemed as correct by the investigating officers
and their sergeants, and his failure to correct UCR codes that were misreported, attributed to
the underreporting of serious crimes by the Buckeye Police Department. It has cast doubts
and disparagement on the Buckeye Police Department and its executive staff. James
Virgadamo altered the UCR Codes associated with police reports, resulting in inadequately
reporting criminal activity in the City of Buckeye and artificially lowering crime rates.

17
The anonymous letters that initiated this investigation identified Lieutenant Arlak as the
administrator of the Buckeye Police Department’s automated record keeping system,
Spillman, and one of the individuals allegedly involved in changing the City of Buckeye’s
crime statistics. Lieutenant Arlak confirmed that since 2011 he had been the systems
manager for the Buckeye Police Department’s Spillman system and responsible for reporting
Buckeye’s UCR statistics to DPS. Lieutenant Arlak admitted that he was responsible for the
quality control of Buckeye PD’s offense reports to assure the appropriate UCR codes were
recorded and reported. Lieutenant Arlak said that Sergeant James Virgadamo had not
officially been given a quality control function, but that he had relied on him for assistance in
this role as he had a better understanding of UCR reporting requirements than did most
Buckeye Police Department sergeants. Lieutenant Arlak said he had personally provided
additional training to Sergeant Virgadamo, who had also attended a Spillman training course
sometime in the last five years. This investigation revealed that Virgadamo did not have a
proper understanding of UCR reporting.

When asked, Lieutenant Arlak also displayed inadequate knowledge of UCR reporting
guidelines. He understood the Hierarchy rule for Part I crimes, but when asked how scoring
differed for persons versus property crimes he advised that property crimes were scored
lower. This was inaccurate as scoring about UCR codes refers to counting the number of
offenses after they have been classified. He did not offer the fact that a “persons” crime is
scored based on victims while “property” crimes are scored based on incidents. This is
critical as it directly impacts the number of such offenses, including aggravated assaults,
reported.

Lieutenant Arlak’s same ignorance of- or disregard for -UCR reporting requirements is seen
in the many reports for which he had incorrectly modified or changed the UCR codes. A
review of the 2017 simple assault reports that recorded a UCR Offense Code of ASSG,
Assaulted, Aggravated Circumstances, found 34 that should have been reported as
aggravated assaults. In 2016, that same review identified 23 additional aggravated assault
reports involving 30 additional reportable offenses. As the individual in charge of quality
control, Lieutenant Arlak was responsible for reviewing and assuring the accuracy of each of
these reports. He admitted that he knew that the UCR Offense Code ASSG would classify
an assault as a Simple (Part II) Assault. Despite this, a query conducted by Buckeye’s IT
Department found that Lieutenant Arlak had modified in some fashion 16 of the 34 reports
incorrectly reported as simple assaults in 2017. In some cases, he had added an Arizona
Revised Statute to the offense report that indicated the appropriate charge (i.e. ARS 13-1204.
A.1-Aggravated Assault- Serious Physical Injury or ARS 13-1204. A.2 Aggravated Assault-
Deadly Weapon or Dangerous Instrument) but, had not reported the appropriate UCR
Offense code so it could be captured for the UCR report. That these aggravated assaults
were not accurately reported was readily apparent, as there were so few aggravated assaults
reported by the Buckeye Police Department in 2017.

When interviewed, Lieutenant Arlak was asked about 4 different reports that were not
properly classified. This included a burglary classified as a theft, a robbery classified as a
theft, a robbery classified as an aggravated assault, and an aggravated assault classified as a

18
simple assault. In each of these situations Lieutenant Arlak offered no explanation for these
changes except to say he felt they were correct. This investigation identified for each of
these changes there was specific language in the UCR Manual that would have provided
guidance for the proper change if consulted.

As the individual primarily responsible for the quality control of reports, Lieutenant Arlak
did not provide proper oversight to Sergeant Virgadamo. Most of the witnesses interviewed
said that Arlak was well aware of these accusations against Virgadamo and did nothing to
investigate or correct them. These allegations were brought up at least twice in a public
forum (a BPA meeting), at least one of which Arlak attended. Others, including Sergeant
and Officer said they had personally brought their concerns about
Virgadamo to Lieutenant Arlak and he failed to address them. When interviewed,
Lieutenant Arlak acknowledged that he had received complaints about Virgadamo’s actions.
He attributed some of these complaints to “personality conflicts” and said that officers
complaining did not have a complete understanding of UCR reporting. While Lieutenant
Arlak offered several defenses of Virgadamo’s activities he never advised that he had audited
Virgadamo’s changes for accuracy.

Lieutenant Arlak’s actions in changing UCR codes already deemed as correct by the
investigating officers and their sergeants, and his failure to correct UCR codes that were
misreported, contributed to an underreporting of serious crimes by the Buckeye Police
Department. His willingness to abdicate his responsibilities for quality control of criminal
reports to a subordinate, Sergeant James Virgadamo, without providing him the necessary
oversight not only created dissension within Buckeye PD’s ranks but also further negatively
impacted the accuracy of UCR reporting. While cautioning that it is only an estimate, when
extrapolating the findings of this investigation, it appears that UCR crimes, particularly Part I
crimes, have been significantly underreported by the Buckeye Police.

This investigation also revealed that Chief Hall was made aware of the allegations regarding
misclassification of crime stats on at least two occasions. The first occurred in a Buckeye
Police Officers Association meeting in 2016. Chief Hall said after this meeting he met with
Assistant Chief Mann and asked him if they were “square” on this crime stats changing issue.
Hall said he had asked Assistant Chief Mann if they were doing sufficient quality control
checks on their reports, and Mann had said, “Yeah, we’re good. Charlie’s (Arlak) doing a
good job.” Chief Hall said this was an immediate response from Assistant Chief Mann,
which led him to believe that Mann was already aware of the concern and may have
previously had conversations with Arlak or Virgadamo about this issue. When told that it
appeared he was unsure what level of investigation went into Assistant Chief Mann’s
response, Chief Hall said that he did not think there was any investigation.

Chief Hall also described an incident that occurred during a CompStat meeting where
someone jokingly said that the problem with vehicle burglaries could be solved with a few
key strokes. Hall said he had replied to this by saying “No, we’re not doing that because
that’s how police chiefs go away.” This statement indicates that Chief Hall understood the
magnitude of this problem in contemporary law enforcement.

19
Despite clearly stating that he understood the seriousness of this issue, when confronted
with this allegation, the totality of Chief Hall’s investigation into this matter consisted of a
brief conversation with Assistant Chief Mann. Chief Hall was not aware of the fact that
Sergeant Virgadamo was doing UCR quality control and did not know who gave him this
authority. Hall stated that if he knew the scope of the problem, he certainly would have
“drilled down” to find out what was happening. Chief Hall stated, “Yeah. Getting ahead of
this would have been a good thing, but when it is unknown…” He added, “It doesn’t
matter at the end of the day, I still own it.”

As the head of the Buckeye Police Department Chief Hall had an obligation to be aware of
issues that might create problems and address them. In this situation Chief Hall was made
aware of this problem on at least two occasions and failed to take reasonable steps to
confront this problem. Because of this, the Department has been subjected to intense
public scrutiny, and the reputation of the agency has suffered. This leads to the
recommendation included in this report that a complete audit be conducted of Buckeye PD
crime reports and reporting, by neutral individuals experienced in UCR reporting. The
Police Department should also receive training on UCR reporting requirements and
implement adequate quality control measures to immediately correct the deficiencies noted
in this Report.

Finally, individuals questioned expressed fear of retaliation as they had been identified and
interviewed as part of their investigation. Many were visibly upset and at least one said he
was considering leaving the agency as he believed his involvement would lead to harassment.
Individuals involved are cautioned against retaliating against anyone involved. In several
interviews with the focuses of these allegations comments were directed at the author of the
anonymous letters. Individuals should be reminded that their focus should lie in correcting
deficiencies.

Background
Investigator Burley Copeland of Copeland Investigations, LLC AZ Agency License
#1689887

On October 29, 2017, I, Burley Copeland, an investigator for Copeland Investigations LLC,
officially received this case assignment from Ms. Trish Stuhan, an attorney at the law firm of
Gust Rosenfeld, PLC at One East Washington Street Suite 1600 Phoenix, AZ 85004. Ms.
Stuhan explained that her law firm serves as the City Attorney for Buckeye, AZ. Ms. Stuhan
indicated Nancy Love, the Human Resource Director for the City of Buckeye, was
designated as the contact person for the Buckeye Police Department reference this matter.

Recent information submitted by Ms. Love to the Buckeye City Attorney concerned a
request for an investigation into multiple allegations made against members of the Buckeye
Police Department executive staff, including Chief Larry Hall, Assistant Chief Robert
Sanders, Lieutenant Gary McGeough, Lieutenant Charles Arlak, and Sergeant James

20
As part of this investigation, several documents were reviewed; these included un-redacted
copies of original police reports, supplemental reports, disciplinary investigations and police
audio-video recordings. Copies of any relevant documents and files are listed as exhibits and
are furnished with this report.

Upon completion of witness interviews and a review of documents, Chief Larry Hall,
Lieutenants Charles Arlak, Gary McGeough, and Bruce Root, and Sergeant James
Virgadamo were identified as subjects in this investigation. In person, recorded interviews
were conducted with each of these individuals.

Employee Rights & Confidentiality


As this investigation included the questioning of governmental employees, formal Notice of
Investigation (“NOI”) forms compelling their participation were prepared and served on all
involved employees. With the agreement of Ms. Love and the City Manager, these
documents included the written notification that any untrue statement or refusal to comply
with requests for full and recorded statements would result in discipline up to and including
termination of employment with the City of Buckeye. The form required the officers
participate and did not give them the right to remain silent. As such, this inquiry was
administrative and not criminal in nature. The NOI form along with existing departmental
policies further advised employees that any untruthfulness or failure to participate and
furnish required statements during this investigation would result in discipline that could
include termination of employment. It also required that none of the involved personnel
were allowed to discuss these matters outside the purview of this investigation. All NOI
forms served on members of the BPD during this investigation were authorized or served by
Ms. Love or her designee and signed copies are included in Exhibit 4.

According to existing laws and policies set by state and federal courts, Copeland
Investigations, LLC recognizes the procedures required in the administration of Garrity
Rights and the confidentiality of protected information. Although investigative reports
furnished to client legal firms and employers are complete, careful redaction is required by
the employer prior to the distribution of material subject to public record release requests.
This private investigation agency does not furnish copies of any portion of any investigation
to anyone other than our client unless required to do so by a court of law. Any requests or
need for copies of this investigation should only be directed to the City of Buckeye who will
produce copies in coordination with Gust Rosenfeld, PLC. No personnel records of any
kind were retained by Copeland Investigations, LLC.

This agency also recognizes the rights of an employee to be represented by legal counsel,
have a witness present during interviews, and to receive a copy of any document they are
asked to sign. All such requests, as well as others, are considered in concert with our client
attorney, Gust Rosenfeld, PLC. During this inquiry, each police employee cooperated with
the investigative process without reservation and no recommendation for discipline was
required due to non-compliance.

22
Investigative Parameters
Agency Dispositions

The spectrum of dispositions for a finding issued by this agency associated with an internal
police investigation, include the following categories:

Policy Review Required - No violation of an existing law or policy occurred but the
allegation or investigation calls for an immediate review and policy implementation to cover
future procedures.

Unfounded – Evidence examined during the investigation of a given complaint shows the
allegation to be a misunderstanding, false, or disproved and no policy violation occurred.

Not Sustained – An allegation made against the employee from any source was not proved
nor conclusively disproved as alleged, based on evidence available at the time of inquiry.
This disposition requires the investigative file be preserved according to retention policy. It
allows for the re-opening of an internal investigation into a given allegation if additional and
applicable evidence is found at a later date.

Sustained – An allegation made against the employee by a citizen, fellow employee, or


evidence uncovered by investigators during the inquiry supports a specific policy violation
and requires discipline.

Agency Spectrum of Discipline


Although decisions regarding discipline are within the exclusive purview of the City of
Buckeye, in the event a complaint investigation resulted in a finding of “Sustained,” this
agency may recommend discipline. The nature of any recommended discipline reflects the
severity of the policy violation as supported by the evidence. The spectrum of discipline
recommended by this agency could include one of the following categories:

Oral Reprimand – This is the least serious level of disciplinary action and can involve
additional training. The employee is verbally informed that the conduct in question violated
a policy and is counseled to avoid future mistakes. Additionally, notes are placed in the
employee’s personnel file to document the counseling and for use as reference and possible
entry in the employee’s next annual performance evaluation. This level of discipline is
appropriate in instances where the extent of policy violation is minor, and it is the
employee’s first policy violation. Still, the violation may be considered adversely in transfer
and promotional determinations.

Written Reprimand – The employee is informed in writing that conduct violated a policy
through a formal memorandum placed in the employee personnel file. The memorandum
documents the violations and mistakes and remains in the employee’s file. The purpose is to
ensure and verify that the employee does not repeat substandard performance in a specific
area. This documentation may be considered adversely in connection with employment

23
decisions such as a transfer to a specialty assignment or promotional testing. Examples of
the policy violation subject to a written reprimand could include minor on duty traffic
accidents, late or unfinished reports, minor and unrepeated incidents of conduct
unbecoming an officer, tardiness, missed court appearances, or issues concerning excessive
use of sick leave.

Notice of Unsatisfactory Performance – The employee is found to be in significant violation


of a crucial policy such that the appropriate discipline may include time off without pay on a
first offense, and suspension, demotion, or termination on a serious first-time offense or any
second offense. Supervisory personnel disciplined in this category also face potential
demotion depending on the seriousness of the current offense. The accused employee is
issued a formal written notice regarding their substandard performance and policy violation.
The employee is required to make a specific written statement explaining their actions.

The notice and written response typically remains in a personnel file for at least three years
but may be kept in file indefinitely, according to departmental document retention policies.
This level of discipline would apply to misconduct such as sexual harassment, any
malfeasance on duty, or lying during an internal investigation. Serious violations of this
nature may be reported to the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training Board
(“AZPOST”) for review of further discipline including suspension or revocation of law
enforcement certification in the State of Arizona.

Criminal Violations – This applies only where an employee is accused of a crime associated
with on- or off duty conduct and was not at issue in this investigation. The findings of any
investigation conducted into these matters are typically turned over to a prosecutorial
agency, such as the County Attorney’s Office. The prosecutorial agency may then conduct a
review to assess whether to bring a criminal indictment.

Simultaneously with or after a review of alleged criminal conduct, additional discipline


stemming from a separate internal investigation of any violation of employer policies may
result in immediate suspension or termination according to policies in place with the
employer. This level of discipline requires legal review by the employer prior to
implementation. Examples of this type of violation may include Driving While Intoxicated,
Domestic Violence, or Theft. Violations of this nature are also reported to AZPOST for
consideration of additional discipline concerning the permanent revocation of law
enforcement certification and termination of employment.

24
Review of Documents
Initial Documents Provided

On November 7, 2017, after the initial scope of the investigation was agreed upon, a request
was made for specific physical and electronic documents related to the allegations discussed
in the initial anonymous letter [Exhibit 1]. As follows are the items requested and the date
each item was received by Copeland Investigations, LLC.

CD or Link that provides access to all City of Buckeye Policies- Received November 28,
2017

CD or Link that provides access to Buckeye Police Department Operational Orders,


General Orders, Policies and Procedures, Etc.- Received November 28, 2017

CompStat reports dated from September 18, 2016 through October 31, 2017-Received
November 28, 2017

Any information related to Pursuit Reviews (i.e. pursuit review board findings, policies)-
Received November 30, 2017

Police report involving possible pursuit by Officer that involved a


motorcyclist losing control and being seriously injured (160120063) - Received
November 30, 2017 [Exhibit 5]

Professional Standards Unit report(s) or allegations involving Sergeant Root having


engaged in sexual conduct while on duty (IA 2013-0003)- Received November 30, 2017
[Exhibit 6]

Copy of offense reports related to double homicide (121021003; 121021007)-


Received November 30, 2017 [Exhibit 7]

Police reports, and property and evidence log from an investigation by Officer
Hoffmeister related to theft of a half a million dollars- Received November 30, 2017
[Exhibit 8]

Chief Hall’s calendars and travel reimbursements including City travel card statements-
Received December 7, 2017; includes additional statements and claims submitted by
Chief Larry Hall when he was interviewed on April 24, 2018 [Exhibit 9]

Documents stored on individual drives for Chief Larry Hall, Lieutenant Gary
McGeough, Lieutenant Charles Arlak, Sergeant James Virgadamo, and Sergeant Bruce
Root- Received December 13, 2017

25
Copies of Outlook accounts, dated from September 18, 2016 through October 31, 2017,
(inbox, sent, archived, etc.)- for Larry Hall, Robert Sanders, Gary McGeough, Charles
Arlak, James Virgadamo, and Bruce Root-Received January 2, 2018

Review of Emails Related to Secondary Employment

As part of this investigation, I was given access to the emails of several Buckeye Police
Department members including those of Chief Larry Hall; this included emails in the Inbox,
Sent Items, Deleted, and Permanently Deleted folders of his Outlook account. Located
within these emails were approximately 724 emails dealing with Chief Hall’s secondary
employment. These 724 emails were sent or received between February 12, 2014 and April
14, 2017, by Chief Hall on his City of Buckeye email account. All these emails are included
in Exhibit 10. Individual emails referred to during interviews or in the complaint
dispositions will be noted as separate exhibits. Most of these emails strings were found in
Chief Hall’s “Sent” folder. Those sent by Chief Hall primarily originated from the email
address of lhall@buckeyeaz.com and contained his standard signature as follows:

Larry Hall
Police Chief
Buckeye Police Department
200 North Apache Road
Buckeye, AZ 85326
623-349-6438-Desk Phone
LHALL@BUCKEYEAZ.GOV- Email

Associated Companies

Ferrairi Express
The first company that the emails showed Chief Hall associated with was Ferrari Express
(“Ferrari”). In his email of February 25, 2014, Chief Hall described Ferrari as an “Italian
company.” The company’s website, ferrariexpress.com, describes Ferrari as an Italian
company involved in the transportation of “jewelry, gems, and valuable cargo.” It explains
that the company had expanded to the Ferrari Group, “a world-wide network of established
companies and correspondents.” In the earliest email found reference secondary
employment (2/12/2014), Chief Hall identified Gary McGeough as the coordinator for the
Las Vegas jewelry show and described the work as “armed manual labor.” In a subsequent
email, Ferrari is identified as the company for which McGeough was coordinating work.

Malca-Amit USA, LLC


The emails identified Malca-Amit USA, LLC (“Malca-Amit”) as a second company
associated with Chief Hall. The Jewelers Security Alliance website,
(www.jewelerssecurity.org) a non-profit trade association that provides crime information
and assistance to the jewelry industry and law enforcement, describes Malca-Amit as the,

26
After this email, Chief Hall continued to occasionally use his Buckeye PD email for
secondary employment purposes until the last such email was found in his Sent emails on
April 14, 2017.

Chief Hall’s involvement with Orion is documented in an email of February 26, 2014, which
Chief Hall sent to Steven Raz (“Raz”). This email included a forwarded email from
December 4, 2013, which had been sent to several individuals, including Chief Hall, by
Settles of Malca-Amit. The subject of this email was “Malca-Amit MIDLEVEL SOP.” This
email sent to Hall read in part, “In our ongoing effort to improve, we have developed a SOP
for our mid-level providers. Please thoroughly review and familiarize yourself with it.” In
another email dated January 14, 2015, Robinson of Malca-Amit sends an email to Hall
noting, “…I am renewing the Orion badges. Please forward a .jpg image to me via email by
the end of the week.” Chief Hall replied on Tuesday, January 20, 2015 writing, “Attached is
my photo for the Malca ID.” The attached image pictures Chief Hall in what appears to be
his police uniform. Although no police patches or a badge are visible you can note what
appears to be gold stars on his collar and his radio microphone attached to his lapel.

Review of Hall Emails Related to Secondary Employment

From a review of the approximately 724 emails found in Chief Hall’s Buckeye PD Outlook
account related to secondary employment, it appeared that Chief Hall worked as a
coordinator for Orion/ Malca-Amit jobs within Arizona. Specifically, he located personnel
for Orion, primarily to handle Malca- Amit jobs in Arizona. These emails indicated Hall’s
duties as a coordinator were multifold.

Chief Hall’s duties in this coordinator role, appeared to be initiated when an email had been
sent to him that requested he schedule several “guards” (1 or 2) and indicated where and
when that guard (or guards) would be needed. For the years of 2015 and 2016, emails related
to 100 such jobs that Chief Hall coordinated were found in his Outlook account. For
example, in a forwarded email with a Subject of, “PHX-ORION inbound 3-7-14” Aterburn
had requested of Chief Hall, “We need a 1pm delivery on Friday March 7th…” Another
example of this was a February 2nd, 2015, email Settles sent Chief Hall in which she wrote in
part, “Need one officer to accept parcel from MALCA rep at PHX.” This email included
delivery details. On April 8, 2015, Arterburn sent Hall another a message asking him, “Please
schedule 2 guards…” In another email dated May 2, 2016, which was sent Chief Hall by
Arterburn she wrote, “Please arrange for a pick up from the below location on Monday May
2nd with 1 guard(s) and tender to the airport.”

For each of the jobs he coordinated for Orion/ Malca-Amit, Chief Hall would have to find
someone to work the job if he could not. This responsibility is evidenced repeatedly in Chief
Hall’s emails. On February 26, 2014, Chief Hall forwarded an email requesting a delivery on
March 7th to Raz and wrote, “Let me know if you can do it.” On Monday, March 3, 2015,
at 9:50 AM, in response to an email from Aterburn which read, “Is this scheduled?”, Chief
Hall wrote, “Yes…its been scheduled.” On February 3, 2016, Chief Hall, in a string of
emails with a Subject of “phx-Orion INBOUND 2-15-16,” advised Arterburn, “Working on

28
This paperwork also instructed the employee to submit several items including, “A copy of
your law enforcement identification and/or state security guard or company documents.” In
addition to the employment paperwork, Chief Hall would also forward copies of Malca-
Amit’s Standard Operating Procedures.

After determining who would work the job, Chief Hall would ask the Malca-Amit/Orion rep
to send him the required paperwork. If it was not Chief Hall that was working the job he
would forward the paperwork to the guard(s) scheduled to work. Again, this responsibility is
evidenced in multiple emails. In correspondence of April 13, 2015, for a PHX-Outbound-
Orion job that same day, Arterburn wrote at 12:08 PM, “Anything on this? Customer is
requesting pickup by 330pm.” Hall replied to her at 12:45 PM, “It’s covered. Send me the
paperwork.”

In addition to being the initial point of contact for each Orion job, assuring each job had a
guard to handle it, and handling much of the associated paperwork, Chief Hall was also the
point of contact if there were problems with the job or an update was needed. On several
occasions, including March 31, 2015, Chief Hall was contacted by Garvin reference missing
“PODs.” On October 7, 2015, Chief Hall was contacted by Settles of Malca-Amit and
advised of an issue with a parcel. In this email she wrote, “Please take a minute to review
the attached parcel. This was picked up in PHX yesterday. Please remind your team
members of our size requirements for shipments.” Chief Hall replied at 11:32 AM that same
day, “I will get with and ensure it doesn’t happen again.” On April 23, 2016, Chief Hall
received an email from Arterburn of Malca-Amit reference a job for “MWI.” In these
emails Chief Hall tells Arterburn, “ and are covering.” Arterburn then writes,
“ask them to text him if that already have not been done.” Hall then sent an email to
that read, “Follow up needed.” On May 3, 2016, at 4:21 PM, Chief Hall
again received an email from Arterburn that read, “I NEED STATUS ON PICKUP.” At
4:25 PM Chief Hall sent a message to the individual working ( ) directing
him, “Call malca.”

There were also emails located that suggest that there was a business relationship between
Chief Larry Hall and Gary McGeough. Specifically, Gary McGeough was responsible for
staffing jobs for Ferrari and employed Larry Hall while Larry Hall was responsible for
staffing jobs for Orion and employed McGeough.

In an email dated February 12, 2014, Chief Hall identifies Gary McGeough as the
coordinator of an “annual gig” escorting jewelry in Las Vegas. Larry Hall, who was the
Buckeye Police Chief at the time of this email, identifies Gary McGeough as a sergeant with
the Buckeye Police Department. This email also indicated that Chief Hall will be working
this job coordinated by Sergeant McGeough as he wrote, “We will be staying at the South
Point.” This same email indicated that those working will be compensated $250.00 for those
days they worked the Vegas detail. In a related email Larry Hall sent to Daniel Brown on
February 25, 2014, Ferrari, is identified as the company for which McGeough coordinated
the Las Vegas job.

30
March 3 2014 Monday 1 9:50 AM N/A
March 5, 2014 Wednesday 6 9:15 AM 2:48 PM
March 6, 2014 Thursday 6 11:29 AM 8:11 PM
March 16, 2014 Sunday 1 5:26 PM N/A
March 19, 2014 Wednesday 5 7:45 AM 2:15 PM
March 25, 2014 Tuesday 2 12:45 PM 12:45 PM
March 31, 2014 Monday 1 1:28 PM N/A
April 2, 2014 Wednesday 2 5:20 PM 5:47 PM
April 3, 2014 Thursday 9 7:25 AM 3:57 PM
April 7, 2014 Monday 3 8:27 AM 4:56 PM
April 9, 2014 Wednesday 2 11:00 AM 12:51 PM
Sept 26, 2014 Friday 2 3:37 PM 5:23 PM
Sept 29, 2014 Monday 3 8:45 AM 11:30 AM
Dec 16, 2014 Tuesday 1 1:48 PM N/A
Dec 17, 2014 Wednesday 1 9:01 PM N/A
Dec 18, 2014 Thursday 2 8:35 AM 4:58 PM
Dec 19, 2014 Friday 1 12:33 PM N/A

As previously noted, it appeared that Chief Hall was some type of coordinator for Orion
jobs. Because of that role and its associated duties, I felt it might help to look at the number
of such jobs he coordinated and/or worked to understand the impact it had on his primary
responsibilities. It is important to note that most of these emails were found in Chief Hall’s
“sent” emails, indicating there were probably many that had went to his inbox and were
deleted.

2014 ORION/FERRARI JOBS NUMBER DATES OF RELATED


REFERRED TO IN CHIEF OF (I.E.) SCHEDULING
HALL’S EMAILS GUARDS EMAILS
Las Vegas- Ferrari (McGeough UNK 2/12/14;
Coordinator) May 27-June 3, 2014 2/21/14;2/22/14;2/24/14;
2/25/14; 2/26/14;
Job No. 14-0372; February 27, 2014
PHX-ORION-Inbound 2-27-14 2/26-2/28/2014; 3/3-3/5/2014

PHX-ORION inbound 3-7-14 (x2) 2/28/14; 3/3/14; 3/5/14;


3/6/14;
PHX-Outbound-ORION-3-20-14 3/19

PHX-Outbound-ORION-3-31-14 3/25

KP Job -4/4/14 (“picked up guys”) 3/31/14; 4/4/14;

Ferrari 10 AM Delivery (4/4/14) 3/31/14; 4/2/14 4/3/14;


4/7/14

32
2015 Emails Related to Hall’s Secondary Employment
In 2015, there were 356 secondary employment related emails found in Chief Hall’s Outlook
account that had been sent or received by him. They are detailed in the table below.

DATE DAY OF NUMBER OF TIME OF FIRST TIME OF LAST


WEEK EMAILS EMAIL EMAIL
EXCHANGED REF
SECONDARY
EMPLOYMENT

January 14, 2015 Wednesday 1 1:46 PM N/A


January 20, 2015 Tuesday 5-Malc-Amit ID 9:26 AM 1:17 PM
Renewal; Picture
February 2, 2015 Monday 2 2:32 PM 2:37 PM
February 10, 2015 Tuesday 2 11:31 AM 12:23 PM
February 18, 2015 Wednesday 12 (Billable thru 11:29 AM 4:37 PM
Malca or Alca)
March 3, 2015 Tuesday 9 11:51 AM 3:57 PM
March 4, 2015 Wednesday 4 7:22 AM 7:55 AM
March 20, 2015 Friday 6 7:32 AM 3:08 PM
March 31, 2015 Tuesday 5 6:16 AM 11:15 AM
April 8, 2015 Wednesday 4 1:04 PM 7:39 PM
April 9, 2015 Thursday 1 2:31 PM N/A
April 13, 2015 Monday 6 11:28 AM 2:33 PM
April 22, 2015 Wednesday 2 11:54 AM 12:38 PM
April 28, 2015 Tuesday 2 5:53 AM 6:27 AM
April 29, 2015 Wednesday 1 3:24 PM N/A
May 5, 2015 Tuesday 3 11:00 AM 11:01 AM
May 12, 2015 Tuesday 13 10:20 AM 2:15 PM
May 15, 2015 Friday 4 1:43 PM 4:33 PM
May 16, 2015 Saturday 3 4:35 PM 6:18 PM
May 18, 2015 Monday 2 4:11 AM 7:18 AM

33
June 10, 2015 Wednesday 5 2:13 PM 4:13 PM
June 22, 2015 Monday 4 10:23 AM 1:29 PM
June 23, 2015 Tuesday 5 4:14 AM 3:12 PM
June 26, 2015 Friday 4 1:39 PM 1:49 PM
July 7, 2015 Tuesday 2 8:19 PM 9:07 PM
July 9, 2015 Thursday 2 7:27 AM 9:51 AM
July 10, 2015 Friday 2 10:39 AM 10:44 AM
July 13, 2015 Monday 7 2:15 PM 6:35 PM
July 14, 2015 Tuesday 4 2:14 PM 3:21 PM
July 15, 2015 Wednesday 10 4:01 AM 5:27 PM
July 20, 2015 Monday 17 10:26 AM 6:10 PM
July 21, 2015 Tuesday 5 4:35 AM 12:24 PM
July 30, 2015 Thursday 2 5:12 PM 6:18 PM
August 1, 2015 Saturday 1 10:28 AM N/A
August 3, 2015 Monday 2 7:35 AM 8:03 AM
August 4, 2015 Tuesday 5 12;11 PM 4:04 PM
August 12, 2015 Wednesday 3 8:13 AM 8:22 AM
August 18, 2015 Tuesday 3 9:32 AM 11:53 AM
August 26, 2015 Wednesday 6 9:57 AM 2:41 PM
August 27, 2015 Thursday 5 8:27 AM 11:30 AM
August 28, 2015 Friday 3 8:40 AM 11:40 AM
August 31, 2015 Monday 2 10:00 AM 10:14 AM
September 3, 2015 Thursday 4 4:03 AM 8:15 AM
September 9, 2015 Wednesday 4 11:19 AM 11:30AM
September 16, Wednesday 10 9:08 AM 10:02 AM
2015
September 17, Thursday 2 1:24 PM 1:37 PM
2015

34
September 22, Tuesday 3 1:04 PM 4:01 PM
2015
September 23, Wednesday 1 1:11 PM N/A
2015
September 24, Thursday 6 8:11 AM 12:48 PM
2015
September 30, Wednesday 7 12:06 PM 5:51 PM
2015
October 1, 2015 Thursday 4 2:40 PM 3:26 PM
October 5, 2015 Monday 6 9:03 AM 2:11 PM
October 6, 2015 Tuesday 6 2:27 PM 4:54 PM
October 7, 2015 Wednesday 6-Team member- 3:54 AM 12:59 PM
size of pkg
October 9, 2015 Friday 4 2:52 PM 4:22 PM
October 10, 2015 Saturday 2 5:10 PM 5:16 PM
October 15, 2015 Thursday 4 3:19 PM 4:02 PM
October 16, 2015 Friday 3 4:46 AM 7:25 AM
October 19, 2015 Monday 5 2:05 PM 4:39 PM
October 22, 2015 Thursday 1 6:26 PM N/A
November 2, 2015 Monday 6 12:14 PM 4:36 PM
November 3, 2015 Tuesday 2 1:23 PM 1:25 PM
November 4, 2015 Wednesday 9 9:04 AM 4:50 PM
November 9, 2015 Monday 2 1:48 PM 4:53 PM
November 10, Tuesday 3 9:05 AM 2:44 PM
2015
November 12, Thursday 6 11:50 AM 1:50 PM
2015
November 13, Friday 4 8:36 AM 8:10 PM
2015
November 14, Saturday 4 7:35 AM 12:54 PM
2015

35
November 15, Sunday 1 10:12 AM N/A
2015
November 16, Monday 12 9:18 AM 12:57 PM
2015
November 17, Tuesday 10 5:14 PM 9:22 PM
2015
November 18, Wednesday 6 5:40 PM 5:53 PM
2015
November 19, Thursday 13 3:03 PM 4:43 PM
2015
November 20, Friday 6 10:07 AM 6:28 PM
2015
November 25, Wednesday 3 10:23AM 11:12 AM
2017
November 27, Friday 1 9:21 AM N/A
2015
November 30, Monday 4 5:15 PM 7:06 PM
2015

This following chart provides the individual jobs, including dates, for which email
documentation was found in Chief Hall’s Outlook account. In 2015, documentation for 51
different jobs were located. These were likely only a portion of the jobs Chief Hall had
coordinated as these emails were found only in his sent emails.

2015 SECONDARY NUMBER DATES OF RELATED


EMPLOYMENT REFERRED TO OF (I.E. SCHEDULING)
IN CHIEF HALL’S EMAILS GUARDS EMAILS
1 15-0116; Jan 19, 2015 1 (LH) 1/20/2015
2 PHX-Outbound-NEEDED 2-2-15 1 2/2/2015
3 PHX-Outbound-ORION 2-10-15 1 2/10/2015
4 PHX-Outbound Service Needed 2-18- 1 2/18/2015
15
5 PHX-Outbound-ORION 3-4-15 1 3/3/2015;3/4/2015

36
6 PHX-ORION-INBOUND 3-4-15 1 3/3/2015
7 PHX-OUTBOUND SERVICE 1(LH) 3/20/2015
NEEDED 3-20-15
8 3/27/15; phx; 50787838 MA-15-770 3/31/2015
9 PHX-ORION-INBOUND 4-9-2015 2 4/6/2015
10 PHX-Outbound-ORION 4-13-15 1 4/13/2015
11 PHX-Outbound-ORION 4-28-2015 2 (LH) 4/8/ &4/9/ &; 4/22/
&4/28 2015
12 PHX-Outbound-ORION 5-12-15 1 5/12
13 PHX-Outbound-ORION 5-18-2015 1 5/15, 5/16, 5/18
14 PHX-ORION-INBOUND 6-11-15 1 6/10
15 PHX-Outbound-ORION 6-23-15 1 6/22, 6/23
16 PHX-Outbound-ORION 6-16-15 1 6/26
17 PHX-Outbound-ORION 7-9-15 1 7/7, 7/9
18 PHX-Outbound-ORION SERVICE 1 7/10
NEEDED 7-10-15
19 PHX-Outbound-ORION 7-14-15 1 7/13,
20 PHX-Outbound-ORION 7-15-15 1 7/13, 7/14, 7/15
21 PHX-Outbound-ORION 7-16-15 1 7/15
22 PHX-Outbound-ORION 7-21-15 1 7/20
23 PHX-Outbound-ORION 7-21-15 1 7/21
24 PHX-Outbound-ORION 7-31-15 2 7/30
25 MA job 2080 8-1-2015 (?) 2 8/1, 8/3
26 PHX-ORION INBOUND 8-5-15 1 8/4, 8/12
27 PHX-ORION- INBOUND 8-6-15 1 8/4
28 PHX-Outbound-ORION 8-28-15 1 8/26, 8/28
29 PHX-Outbound-ORION 8-31-15 1 8/31
30 PHX-Outbound-ORION 9-3-15 1 8/27, 9/3
31 PHX-Outbound-ORION 9-10-15 2 9/9,

37
32 PHX-Outbound-ORION 9-16-15 1 9/16
33 PHX-ORION- INBOUND 9/18 1 9/17
34 PHX-ORION- INBOUND 9/25 2 9/22, 9/23, 9/24, 9/30
35 PHX-ORION- INBOUND 10-2-15 1 10/1
36 PHX-OUTBOUND 10-5-15 1 910/5
37 PHX-Outbound-ORION 10-6-15 1 10/5
38 PHX-Outbound-ORION 10-7-15 1 10/6, 10/7
39 PHX-Outbound-ORION 10/16 2 (LH) 10/9, 10/15, 10/16
40 PHX-Outbound-ORION 10/22 1(LH) 10/9, 10/10
41 PHX-ORION- INBOUND 10-20-15 2 (LH) 10/19
42 PHX-ORION- INBOUND 11-3-15 1 11/2
43 PHX-ORION- INBOUND 11-5-15 (2 1 11/4
stops)
44 PHX-Outbound-ORION 11-10-15 1 11/2, 11/3, 11/10
45 PHX-Outbound-ORION 11/13 1 (LH) 11/4, 11/12, 11/13, 11/25
46 PHX-Outbound-ORION for 11/16 1 11/14, 11/15
47 PHX-Outbound-ORION 11/16/15 1 11/16
48 EFFY/Hall; 11/24-Escort rep to 1 11/17
Airport
49 PHX-ORION- INBOUND 11-19-15 1 11/18
50 PHX-ORION- INBOUND 11-20-15 1 11/19
51 PHX-Orion- INBOUND 11-21-15 1 11/20

38
2016 Emails Related to Hall’s Secondary Employment
In 2016, there were approximately 274 secondary employment related emails found in Chief
Hall’s Outlook account that had been sent or received by him. They are detailed in the table
below.

DATE DAY OF WEEK NUMBER OF TIME OF FIRST TIME OF LAST


EMAILS EMAIL EMAIL
EXCHANGED
REF
SECONDARY
EMPLOYMENT

January 5, 2016 Tuesday 1 2:07 PM N/A


January 6, 2016 Wednesday 12 8:05 AM 1:31 PM
January 11, 2016 Monday 2 2:17 PM 2:20 PM
January 12, 2016 Tuesday 2 5:03 AM 8:46 AM
January 21, 2016 Thursday 4 1:25 PM 1:31 PM
January 25, 2016 Monday 2 12:44 PM 1:00 PM
January 27, 2016 Wednesday 8 3:35 PM 7:49 PM
February 1, 2016 Monday 9 4:54 PM 7:02 PM
February 3, 2016 Wednesday 14 9:17 AM 3:38 PM
February 4, 2016 Thursday 5 12:38 PM 1:46 PM
February 12, 2016 Friday 1 1:37 PM N/A
February 13, 2016 Saturday 6 7:25 AM 12:47 PM
February 18, 2016 Thursday 2 12:42 PM 12:56 PM
February 19, 2016 Friday 2 1:55 PM 2:31 PM
February 29, Monday 3 4:58 PM 6:52 PM
2016*
March 1, 2016 Tuesday 2 7:53 AM 8:08 AM
March 4, 2016 Friday 2 11:12 AM 11:13 AM
March 15, 2016 Tuesday 3 8:23 AM 1:10 PM
March 16, 2016 Wednesday 4 7:18 AM 1:34 PM

39
March 17, 2016 Thursday 2 8:36 AM 8:57 AM
March 21, 2016 Monday 2 7:26 AM 7:27 AM
March 28, 2016 Monday 1 1:22 PM N/A
March 31, 2016 Thursday 4 8:35 AM 12:35 PM
April 3, 2016 Sunday 1 10:26 AM N/A
April 4, 2016 Monday 2 4:16 PM 4:45 PM
April 5, 2016 Tuesday 3 11:36 AM 7:47 PM
April 6, 2016 Wednesday 2 6:44 AM 8:09 AM
April 7, 2016 Thursday 1 7:41 PM N/A
April 18, 2016 Monday 4 7:56 AM 10:54 AM
April 19, 2016 Tuesday 1 3:45 PM N/A
April 20, 2016** Wednesday 11 5:30 AM 4:22 PM
April 23, 2016 Saturday 6 7:16 PM 9:22 PM
April 24, 2016 Sunday 2 9:12 AM 10:39 AM
April 25, 2016 Monday 4 9:57 AM 12:32 PM
April 28, 2016 Thursday 5 10:36 AM 3:41 PM
May 2, 2016 Monday 11 11:08 AM 9:40 PM
May 3, 2016 Tuesday 21 6:28 AM 5:36 PM
May 9, 2016 Monday 1 8:57 PM N/A
May 10, 2016 Tuesday 13 6:28 AM 10:56 AM
May 19, 2016 Thursday 9 11:18 AM 2:42 PM
May 25, 2016 Wednesday 4 1:35 PM 4:02 PM
May 26, 2016 Thursday 4 7:23 AM 2:06 PM
May 31, 2016*** Tuesday 14 11:13 AM 6:09 PM
June 1, 2016 Wednesday 1 1:31 PM N/A
June 22, 2016 Wednesday 3 6:44 AM 2:36 PM
June 27, 2016 Monday 7 1:21 PM 2:56 PM
July 5, 2016 Tuesday 4 4:36 AM 11:09 AM

40
July 25, 2016 Monday 12 8:38 AM 1:53 PM
July 28, 2016 Thursday 2 4:08 PM 4:08 PM
July 29, 2016 Friday 2 1:44 PM 1:47 PM
August 3, 2016 Wednesday 1 4:48 PM N/A
August 4, 2016 Thursday 6 9:33 AM 2:02 PM
August 5, 2016 Friday 2 9:13 AM 9:29 AM
August 19, 2016 Friday 3 2:10 PM 4:40 PM
August 23, 2016 Tuesday 7 9:50 AM 12:19 PM
September 2, 2016 Friday 7 9:27 AM 1:26 PM
September 14, 2016 Wednesday 2 9:41 AM 1:55 PM
September 21, 2016 Wednesday 2 1:45 PM 2:57 PM
November 24, 2016 Thursday 1 7:42 PM N/A

*First email from Orionsecser@aol.com, sent with a scheduling request that included the line;
“EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY-If we are using a government email for you we need to stop
using it and start using a personal email address.

** “Effective immediately- If you are using a government email address, please do not send your
invoices/logs using this address. Use a personal email address, not government. If you have any
questions on this matter, please contact Bill

***Also, I spoke with Bill and was advised to no longer use government email. Please delete
and LHALL@buckeyeaz.gov. Please use .

41
This following chart provides the individual jobs, including dates, for which email
documentation was found in Chief Hall’s Outlook account. In 2016, documentation for 49
different jobs were located. These were likely only a portion of the jobs Chief Hall had
coordinated as these emails were found only in his sent emails.

2016 ORION JOBS REFERRED TO IN GUARDS DATES OF


CHIEF HALL’S EMAILS RELATED (I.E.
SCHEDULING)
EMAILS
1-2 PHX-Outbound-ORION 1-6-16 (2 Jobs) 1 1/5 -1/6/2016
3 PHX-Outbound-ORION service needed 1-12-16 1 1/11-1/12/2016
4 PHX OUTBOUND 1-21-16 2 1/21/2016
5 PHX-ORION INBOUND 1-26-16 1 1/25/2016
6 PHX-ORION-INBOUMD 2-2-16 (2 Deliveries) 2 2/1/2016
7 PDX-Orion INBOUND 2-5-16 2 2/3/2016
8 PHX-ORION INBOUND 2-10-16 (PHX to 2 (LH) 1/27/2016
Tucson 9AM)
9 PHX ORION PU 2-14-16 2 (LH) 1/27/2016;
2/3/2016;2/12/2016;
2/13/2016
10 PHX-Outbound-ORION 2-18-16 1 2/18/2016
11 PHX-Orion Outbound- Monday, February 22, 1 2/19/2016
2016
12 PHX-Outbound-ORION 3-1-16 1 2/29, 3/1
13 PHX-Outbound-ORION service needed 3-4-16 1 3/4/2016
14 PHX-Outbound-ORION SERVICES NEEDED 1 3/15-3/16/2016
3-16-16
15 PHX-Outbound-ORION 3-17-16 1 3/16/ & 3/2016
16 PHX-Outbound-ORION 3-21-16 1 3/15 & 3/21
17 PHX-Outbound-ORION SERVICE NEEDED 1 3/28/2016
3-28-16
18 PHX-ORION_INBOUND 4-1-16 1 3/31/2016

42
19 PHX-Outbound-ORION 4-4-16 1 4/4/16
20* 4/5/16- Macy’s Arrowhead to Macy’s Camelback 1 (LH- 3/31/2016
Rd 4/6)
4/6/16-Macy’s Camelback to Macy’s
4/7/2016-Macy’s Camelback-Airport (EFFY)
21 PHX-Outbound-ORION 4-6-16 (Officer Activity 1 4/5; 4/6; 4/28/2016
Effy- April 6, 2016)
22 PHX-Outbound-ORION 4-18-16 1 (LH) 4/18 &4/20
23 Orion Officer Activity Log- Job 16-1095-April 1 (LH) 8/4/2016; 8/19-8/20
19, 2016
24 PHX-Outbound-ORION 4-20-16 1 4/20
25 April 24, 2016- Ben Bridge Tucson to Ben Bridge 2 4/7 & 4/23/2016
Chandler (MWI-Hall)
26 Eaton Diamond Job; April 26, 2016 2 4/23-4/24-
4/25/2016;5/2/2016
27 April 26, 2016; Ben Bridge Chandler to Ben 2
Bridge Scottsdale
28 April 27, 2016 From Ben Bridge Scottsdale to 1
Airport
29 PHX-Outbound-ORION 4-29-16 1 4/28
30 PHX-Outbound-ORION 5-2-16 1
31 PHX-Outbound-ORION 5-3-16 1 5/2-5/3/2016
32 PHX-Outbound-ORION 5-10-16 1 5/9-5/10/2016
33 PHX-ORION-INBOUND 5/20/16 1
CORRECTION
34 PHX-Outbound-ORION 5-26-16 1 5/25/2016
35 PHX-ORION-INBOUND 5-27-16 1 5/26/2016
36 PHX-Outbound-ORION 5-27-16 2 5/19/2016
37 PHX-ORION INBOUND 6-2-16 1 5/31-6/1-6/2
38 Orion Officer Activity Log- Job 16-1528- June 3, 1 (LH) 8/4/2016
2016

43
39 PHX-Outbound-ORION 6-22-16 1 6/22/2016
40 PHX-Outbound-ORION 6/27/16 1 6/27/16
41 PHX-Outbound-ORION 6/28/16 1 6/28/2016
42 PHX OUTBOUND PAPERWORK 7-5-16
43 PHX Orion-INBOUND 7-30-16 (2 jobs) 1 7/29/2016
44 PHX-Outbound-ORION 8/4/16 1 8/3-8/4/2016
45 PHX Orion 8-20-16 2 8/19/2016
46 PHX-Outbound-ORION 8-23-16 2 8/23/2016
47 PHX-Outbound-ORION 9-8-16 2 9/2/2016
48 Orion Officer Activity Log -Effy-11-21-16 1930 1 (LH) 11/24/2016
Hrs.
49 Orion Officer Activity Log-Effy-11-22-16 2030 1 (LH) 11/24/2016
Hrs.

2017 Emails Related to Hall’s Secondary Employment


In 2017, there were approximately 6 secondary employment related emails found in Chief
Hall’s Outlook account that had been sent or received by him. They are detailed in the table
below.

DATE DAY OF WEEK NUMBER OF TIME OF FIRST TIME OF LAST


EMAILS EMAIL EMAIL
EXCHANGED
REF
SECONDARY
EMPLOYMENT

January 27, Friday 1 9:46 AM N/A


2017
March 3, 2017 Friday 1 12:22 PM N/A
March 24, 2017 Friday 2 10:19 AM 11:45 AM
April 13, 2017 Thursday 1 3:43 PM N/A
April 14, 2017 Friday 1 6:55 AM N/A

In 2017, documentation for 10 different jobs were located. These were likely only a portion
of the jobs Chief Hall had coordinated as these emails were found only in his sent emails.

44
2017 SECONDARY EMPLOYMENT GUARD DATES OF
ASSIGNMENTS REFERRED TO IN CHIEF S RELATED (I.E.
HALL’S EMAILS SCHEDULING)
EMAILS
1 Effy: Wednesday, January 23, 2017; Sales Rep Bob 1 (LH) 1/27/2017
Yousefian (Macy’s Williams Field Rd to Macy’s
Arrowhead Mall) 1930 hrs
2 Effy: Wednesday, January 24, 2017; Sales Rep Bob 1 (LH) 1/27/2017
Yousefian (Macy’s Arrowhead Mall to Macy’s,
Camelback Rd)1930 hrs.
3 Effy: Wednesday, January 25, 2017; Sales Rep Bob 1 (LH) 1/27/2017
Yousefian (Macy’s Camelback Rd, PHX, to Macy’s,
Camelback Rd, Scottsdale) 1930 hrs.
4 Effy: Thursday, January 26, 2017; Sales Rep Bob 1 (LH) 1/27/2017
Yousefian (Macy’s, Camelback Rd, Scottsdale to
Comfort Inn Scottsdale) 1930 hrs.
Effy: Monday, March 20, 2017; Sales Rep Robert 1 (LH) 3/24/2017
Karmely (Macy’s Williams Field Rd to Macy’s Chandler)
5 Effy: Tuesday, March 21, 2017; Sales Rep Robert 1 (LH) 3/24/2017
Karmely (Macy’s Chandler to Macy’s, E. Cactus Rd,
Phoenix) 1945 hrs.
6 Effy: Wednesday, March 22, 2017; Sales Rep Robert 1 (LH) 3/24/2017
Karmely (Macy’s, E. Cactus Rd, Phoenix to Macy’s,
Southern Ave, Mesa) 1945 hrs.
7 Effy: Thursday, March 23, 2017; Sales Rep Robert 1 (LH) 3/24/2017
Karmely (Macy’s, Southern Ave, Mesa to Airport) 2000
hrs.
8 Effy: Tuesday, April 4, 2017; Sales Rep Robert Karmely 1 4/13/2017
(Macy’s Arrowhead Mall to Macy’s, Camelback Rd)
9 Effy: Wednesday, April 5, 2017; Sales Rep Robert 1 4/13/2017
Karmely (Macy’s Camelback Rd, Phoenix, to Macy’s,
Camelback Rd, Scottsdale)
1 Effy: Thursday, April 6, 2017; Sales Rep Robert 1 4/13/2017
0 Karmely (Macy’s, Camelback Rd, Phoenix to Macy’s,
Camelback Rd, Scottsdale)

45
asking that we ALL follow it. I give you and every other member of this department that
respect, I ask you give me the same.”

Sergeant Virgadamo replied to Sergeant original email at 2:10 AM; his response
is rude, abrasive, and condescending. Some of the troubling phrases in this email included
the following:

After explaining the timesheet changes Virgadamo writes, “Do I need to take this to a
higher level? I said my piece and it is my lane as the FTO Sgt who trained you and as
your senior Sgt. I wasn’t hired to work here to have tunnel vision, I was the one who
taught you these things, so I do have a stake in this it reflects on me…”

“Be grateful that you have experienced Sgts. to learn from especially one with 29
years police experience who worked in one of the world’s most complex and difficult
police departments for 20 years very successfully...”

“Just because you passed the Sgts test or are a Sgt on the swat team doesn’t mean you
know it all. Maybe on the swat team your the top dog but when your on patrol your
just like a rookie Sgt like it or not.” This was followed by Virgadamo questioning
as to why he didn’t discuss it in person when he had a chance.

“I am sure your Lt as a veteran officer himself would give you the same advice as I
am giving you, I doubt he would be encouraging you to constantly push back and
question or criticize other senior Sgts. I think he would tell you to follow their lead
and learn from us rather than fight us. We can be an asset to your or we can be
something else it’s your choice asking questions is ok but questioning or criticizing is
a little different.”

“I am absolutely shocked that junior Sgts would even feel it’s their place to respond
in this manner perhaps I come from a different generation with a different code. I
tell you though I’m not changing. From now on come to me and discuss these things
in person.”

“I have a plenty more your going to hear about that I was never going mention
because I have more important things to worry about because you opened this door
your going to hear it! Don’t even bother responding with another email because I
refuse to read another email about this.”

After discussing some personal health issues Sergeant Virgadamo wrote, “…so you can
probably guess how little your nonsense concerns me right now but at least I am awake and
able to respond to this ridiculessness.”

On July 11, 2016, Chief Mann sent an email [Exhibit 15] to Lieutenant and Acting
Lieutenant Virgadamo requesting that the three of them meet; this initiated an email
exchange between Assistant Chief Mann, Chief Hall and Acting Lieutenant Virgadamo. This

47
meeting request had come towards the end of Virgadamo’s acting lieutenant assignment.
While in this position, Virgadamo has instituted performance measures that were hotly
contested by several of his subordinates. It is apparent by Virgadamo’s response to Mann
that he is frustrated. This email exchange is included to further highlight his attitude towards
many of the officers and sergeants he works with. It should be noted that Virgadamo does
not include in his response but, he does copy it to Chief Hall. This email chain was
located within the Outlook emails of Hall and/or Virgadamo. The email opens with Acting
Lieutenant Virgadamo requesting to be excused from this meeting as he was “finished with
this issue…” He proceeds to write a lengthy email that included the following statements:

“…we have created an atmosphere where everyone feels they have say in everything
that goes on and everything has to be approved by committee. We’ve created this by
giving everyone too much buy-in and handing out too much empowerment to
everyone.”

“There is no respect for rank or authority in this department and everyone feels
entitled”

“Then we have entitled young millennials who never had any standards or
expectations from anyone including their helicopter parents”

“Then we have some helicopter supervisors and a helicopter Lieutenant that lead the
same way with their T-ball style of supervision, micro-managing and hovering over
people holding them by the hand making sure they are happy and content and all
their needs are being fulfilled so everyone gets a trophy.”

“The idea that a five year officer such as can sit in the same room as a
Lieutenant and voice his opinion on how things should be run absolutely baffles my
mind.”

In a follow-up message Virgadamo wrote, “…people like having too much


input on how things are being done on patrol he needs to stay in his own lane. I
remember watching him work on patrol and saw his performance as a sergeant he is
right where he belongs now…”

“It’s no secret I have no love lost for some of those on the swat team and in training
I am sure the feeling is mutual.”

Another email exchange was initiated December 31, 2016 [Exhibit 16], after Sergeant
Virgadamo had addressed one of Sergeant officers about a report he had taken
concerning a burglary at a school. Sergeant Virgadamo disagreed with the reporting
officer’s, and Sergeant , assessment of the nature of the crime. After debating the
proper UCR code, Sergeant Virgadamo wrote to Sergeant , “That’s what 32 years police
experience and almost 9 years as a sgt has taught me.” He later added, “Come on I
know you better than this you are a man of common sense and experience. I just want to

48
The email contained hiring links for the Phoenix Police Department and sparked additional
emails from Sergeant [Exhibit 22] and Acting Sergeant [Exhibit 23].
Sergeant response was copied to all on the original message and was sent on
Monday, August 28, 2017, at 3:19 PM. It was very measured and respectful. The first
paragraph was addressed to “Jimmy” and opened with the statement, “Although I appreciate
the information I do not believe the context of the comment was anyone wanting to leave
this department. If I remember correctly we were asked by command staff for inputs as
Sergeants. I believe these meetings are the perfect place for us to address concerns and or
frustrations.” The rest of the email is addressed to “All.” Sergeant continued to
express his hopes for future meetings. He also mentioned that someone had put
applications to Tucson PD on the back counter in the Patrol area.

Sergeant reply to Virgadamo, which was also copied to everyone on the original
email, was sent August 28, 2017 at 3:53 PM, and was much more direct then Sergeant
. opened by writing, “This email you sent was exactly the type of drama the
chiefs want to stop. I was appalled when I read it, as were the other Sergeants I spoke
with…It was a cut at a very thinly veiled attempt at trying to be “helpful.”
While I do not agree with specialty rotations, has the right to bring it up in the forum in
which he did, and to have a constructive discussion about it.” He tells Sergeant Virgadamo
his email with job information was “confrontational” and “incredibly harassing.”

On August 28, 2017, at 4:38 PM, Lieutenant also ‘replied all’ to Virgadamo’s original
email writing, “Gentlemen, Enough. No more emails. Please focus on our Department, our
Officers, Our Community…that is our mission.” [Exhibit 24]

Sergeant in his grievance paperwork also provided copies of text messages that
showed a time of either 4:56 or 4:58 PM. [Exhibit 25]. advised that these text
messages had been sent to by Virgadamo on August 28, 2017, after Lieutenant
had sent his email telling the sergeants “Enough.” This string of text messages read as
follows:

Virgadamo: “ can fight his own battles he is a big boy he knows where to
find me if he has a problem”

Virgadamo: “I never put any applications in his box or anywhere near his office”
: “OK Jimmy.”

Virgadamo: “Like i said the same people who complain there needs to be more
communication are the first ones to complain when they don’t like what they hear
and I don’t really give a shit what you think is professional have a nice day”

“Lol”

Again, after Lieutenant email, Sergeant Virgadamo also replied to Sergeant


on August 29, 2017, at 3:15 PM [Exhibit 26]. He wrote:

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Sergeant Virgadamo wrote:

“So yes the question the way it was asked did rub me the wrong way especially since
it took me over 22 years to move up in rank and I worked in a big department with a
lot of opportunities but I didn’t have the required degree.”

He further wrote:

“Maybe I offended some people that wasn’t my intention but someone asked the
question so rather than me single someone out I sent it to all because it applies to all
of us…”

Sergeant Virgadamo said that if the sergeants did not like his response they should not have
asked the question. He writes that if the sergeants have something to say to him they should
come see him “one on one.” He also tells Lieutenants and McGeough that he does
not think having a sergeants’ only meeting in the future is a good idea. He wrote, “…it is
way past the point of repair for me with two or three of them.” He writes he will remain
professional but, believes that the lieutenants should “referee” these meetings. He also
writes, “Sgt. has never once sat down with me and discussed
their issues with me so who are they to try to complain about communication!” He tells the
lieutenants, “Right now its too hostile between a few of us and I am tired of the games being
played.”

The original email sent by Sergeant Virgadamo that references the hiring opportunities with
the Phoenix Police Department became the subject of an administrative investigation that
ultimately resulted in a letter of reprimand.

This investigation, P17-0025 [Exhibit 26], consisted entirely of the original email sent by Sgt.
Virgadamo addressing career opportunities with Phoenix PD. There was no other
investigation done, nor were the resulting email exchanges addressed. No possible
complainant was interviewed. The remainder of the investigation was a written reprimand
that in addition to listing the policy violated contained the opening statement as follows:

“On Friday August 25, 2017 you sent the attached email to your fellow sergeants
regarding career opportunities. This email is a violation of the following policy…”

Spillman and UCR Reporting


One of the primary allegations evident throughout the anonymous letter was the issue of the
inaccuracies in crime reporting. Like most law enforcement agencies, Buckeye reports crime
statistics to the federal government for inclusion in the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)
program. To understand Uniform Crime Reporting better, and particularly those crimes
designated as Part I crimes, the DOJ/FBI 2013 Summary Reporting System User Manual,
Version 1.0 (“UCR Manual”) was referenced [Exhibit 28]. This manual is readily available

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on-line at UCR.FBI.gov. The UCR Manual noted both the classification and the scoring of
offenses as core functions for reporting crime in the UCR program. The classification of
offense is determining the proper crime categories in which to report offenses while UCR
scoring is counting the number of offenses after they have been classified.

UCR Classification of Offenses

An offense’s classification is based on the facts of an agency’s investigation of crimes. Part I


offense classifications include (in this order): 1. Criminal Homicide; 2. Forcible Rape; 3.
Robbery; 4. Aggravated Assault; 5. Burglary; 6. Larceny-theft (except motor vehicle theft); 7.
Motor Vehicle Theft; 8. Arson; 9. Human Trafficking, Commercial Sex Acts; and 10. Human
Trafficking, Involuntary Servitude. This order is important due to the “Hierarchy Rule”
which requires that when there are multiple Part I offenses involved in a single incident, the
law enforcement agency must report only the offense that is highest on the hierarchy list.
The offenses of justifiable homicide, motor vehicle theft, human trafficking, and arson are
exceptions to this Hierarchy Rule.

The classification of an agency’s offenses is dependent on the Part I or Part II standard


offense categories as defined by the UCR Program; standardized definition of these
categories are contained in the UCR Manual. These full standardized definitions were
adopted to assure uniformity in reporting among states, each of which has their own
statutory classification of crimes. The UCR manual also notes that attempts to commit a
crime should be reported as though the crimes were completed. The only exception to this
rule applies to attempted murder which should be classified as an aggravated assault. The
UCR Manual also clearly states that offense classifications and counts are not dependent on
prosecutorial decisions determining whether charges are filed or the finding of a court, jury,
or medical examiner.

UCR Scoring of Offenses

Scoring refers to counting the number of offenses after they have been classified. For Part I
offenses, crimes against persons are scored differently than are crimes against property. The
UCR Manual designates criminal homicide, rape, human trafficking, and aggravated assault
as crimes against persons. For these crimes, one offense is counted (scored) for each victim.
The remaining Part I offenses of robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and
arson are crimes against property. For these property crimes, one offense is counted
(scored) for each “distinct operation” or attempt.

The UCR Manual also addresses those offenses that after being reported to police, an agency
determines it to be unfounded, meaning that the complaint was false, and no crime was
attempted or occurred. UCR procedures dictate that the agency reports the offense in the
month it occurred or was reported to them and then score it as unfounded in the month it
was determined to be unfounded. The UCR Manual is once again clear that the recovery of
stolen property, the victim’s refusal to cooperate with prosecution, the failure to make an

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arrest, and the findings of a prosecutor, a coroner, a jury or a court do not unfound offenses
or attempts that law enforcement investigations have established to be legitimate.
Aggravated Assaults

The UCR Manual defines an aggravated assault as:

“An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe
or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault usually is accompanied by the use of
a weapon or by means likely to produce death or great bodily harm.”

A simple assault is defined as:

“An unlawful physical attack by one person upon another where neither the offender
displays a weapon, nor the victim suffers obvious severe or aggravated bodily injury
involving apparent broken bones, loss of teeth, possible internal injury, severe
laceration, or loss of consciousness. To unlawfully place another person in
reasonable fear of bodily harm through the use of threatening words and/or other
means is also an assault.”

Aggravated Assaults are recognized both by the UCR Manual, as well as major law
enforcement agencies across the United States, as a difficult crime to both classify and score
for UCR purposes. Past audits of major agencies such as the Los Angeles, Chicago, and the
City of New York Police Departments have found severe underreporting of aggravated
assaults. Some agencies have attributed this to the fact that unlike other UCR offenses,
assaults are separated into two groups based on the seriousness of the offense. Part I
Aggravated Assaults are determined based on the use of a weapon, the seriousness of
injuries sustained, and the intent of the perpetrator, all of which can be open to
interpretation.

UCR and the Crime in Arizona Report

While the federal UCR program was originally designed as a voluntary program, in 1992
Arizona legislators made participation for Arizona law enforcement agencies mandatory
when they adopted Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 41-1750(A)(2), which states that the
Department of Public Safety shall:

"Collect information concerning the number and nature of offenses known to have
been committed in this state and of the legal steps taken in connection with these
offenses, such other information that is useful in the study of crime and in the
administration of criminal justice and all other information deemed necessary to
operate the statewide uniform crime reporting program and to cooperate with the
federal government uniform crime reporting program."

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Further, A.R.S. § 41-1750(D) states:

"The chief executive officers of law enforcement agencies of this state or its
subdivisions shall provide to the central state repository such information as
necessary to operate the statewide uniform crime reporting program and to cooperate
with the federal government uniform crime reporting program."

Buckeye’s Annual Part I Crime Statistics

Arizona law enforcement agencies report these statistics to the Access Integrity Unit of the
Arizona Department of Public Safety. These statistics are published in the annual Crime in
Arizona Report that is available online at https://www.azdps.gov/about/reports/crime.
This report includes statistics for individual cities including those provided by the Buckeye
Police Department for the City of Buckeye. A summary of these statistics reported by
Buckeye for the years 2010 through 2016 are reflected in the table below.

Crime Violent Murder Rape Robbery Agg Property Burglary Larceny Motor Arson Population
Index Crime Assault Crime Vehicle
Total Total Total Theft

2010 1299 43 1 0 13 29 1256 344 815 86 11 51,026


2011 1389 43 0 1 11 31 1346 397 898 46 5 52,334
2012 1287 50 3 1 11 35 1237 337 836 64 0 54,102
2013 1385 49 1 1 17 30 1336 334 925 69 8 56,460
2014 1180 29 1 4 7 17 1151 195 878 68 10 58,795
2015 1143 28 2 1 7 18 1115 189 855 59 12 61,173
2016 1062 35 2 2 15 16 1027 115 839 71 2 65,509

A review of these statistics showed that from 2013 to 2016, while Buckeye’s population
increased 16%, violent crimes decreased 23.3% and property crimes decreased 23.1%. The
most dramatic decreases were seen in aggravated assaults (46.7%), burglaries (65.6%), and
larceny (9.3%). This was of interest as the anonymous letter that initiated this investigation
specifically noted that crimes that were allegedly changed included, “burglaries to theft or
lost properties, Aggravated Assaults to simple assaults, and recently changed an Arson…to a
‘fire’.” The chart above also brings to light a striking decrease in crime in just one year from
2013 to 2014, when violent crimes decreased 40.8% and property crimes decreased 13.9%.

Per the DPS Crime in Arizona 2016 report, Buckeye, with a population of 65,209 reported
35 violent crimes and 839 property crimes. That same year a neighboring community,

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Goodyear, population 78,189, reported 310 violent crimes and 2063 property crimes.
Goodyear led Buckeye PD in the reporting of all Part I crimes except for homicide and
arsons. Of note was the 264 aggravated assaults reported in the city of Goodyear compared
with only 16 in Buckeye. Concerns were amplified after being provided the Buckeye Police
Department’s 2017 UCR Report [Exhibit 29] and finding they had only reported 10
aggravated assaults for the entire year.

Audit / Investigation of Crime Reporting

As previously noted, the changing of UCR codes misclassified crimes and contributed to the
under reporting of serious crimes in Buckeye. Considering Buckeye’s remarkable drop in
crime documented from 2013 to 2014 and the continuing decrease in criminal offenses even
as the City grew, a complete audit of Buckeye’s crime reporting is warranted to fully
understand the impact of Buckeye’s misclassification of crimes. This should include not just
a review of criminal reports filed but also a look at calls for service in which no criminal
report was prepared to include lost property reports, suspicious person calls, and
information only reports.

Limitations

Such an audit of reports and calls for service necessary to fully explore this allegation is
outside the scope of this investigation as it is not necessary to render a finding. Instead, a
two-pronged approach was taken when investigating this allegation that included a review of
a subsection of assaults to assure they were properly categorized and a review of changes
attributed to Sergeant Virgadamo and Lieutenant Arlak.

As noticed throughout this investigation, an outside entity investigating an organization


without access to that organization’s executive staff due to their potential involvement in
misconduct is at a disadvantage. Oftentimes, those most knowledgeable of a document or
reporting system were unavailable for consultation due to their involvement. Never was this
limitation more evident than in the investigation of this specific allegation. The City of
Buckeye employee most familiar with Spillman, Buckeye Police Department’s record keeping
system, was the system’s administrator, Lieutenant Charles Arlak, one of the focuses of this
investigation. I was further hampered by my inability to actively interact with Spillman.
While I worked closely with Buckeye’s IT Department and Lieutenant Kelly Angel, both
who were responsive to my requests, I was required to provide specific search parameters
and could not adjust searches based on initial findings. Also, because Spillman is a fluid
system any documents provided to me were specific to that point in time and could be
manipulated. In fact, Lieutenant Angel had advised that in response to media requests the
agency was currently reviewing and revising offense reports if they found the wrong UCR
codes were utilized.

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Review of Assaults

Buckeye’s 2017 UCR report which reported a significant reduction in aggravated assaults, a
crime already low when compared to neighboring communities, prompted a closer
evaluation of assaults versus aggravated assaults in the City of Buckeye.

The Buckeye Spillman system provides specific codes for different offenses. An automated
Spillman report pulls information based on these offense codes for UCR reporting. The
following Offense Codes are associated with assault offenses:

AFRM Assault With a Firearm


AINT Assault Intimidation
AKNF Assault With a Knife
AOWP Assault, Other Dangerous Weapon
APFR Assault Police, Firearm
APKN Assault Police, Knife
APNA Assault Police, Aggravated Injury
APOW Assault Police, Other Weapon
APSM Assault Police, No Serious Injury
ASAI Assault, No Weapon, Aggravated Injury
ASIM Assault, Simple
ASSG Assaulted, Aggravated Circumstances

Only 4 of the above Offense Codes are used for simple assaults; AINT, APSM, ASIM, and
ASSG. The Spillman automated UCR report would classify and report those four codes as
Part II Assaults. The remainder of the codes are used by Spillman to identify the Part I,
aggravated assault crimes.

For UCR purposes the UCR Manual defines an aggravated assault as, “The unlawful attack
by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury.
This type of assault usually is accompanied by the use of a weapon or by other means likely
to produce death or great bodily harm (pg. 37).”

The UCR Manual further breaks down Aggravated Assaults into 4 categories, the first being
Firearms. This category includes all assaults in which a firearm of any type is used or is
threatened to be used. Assaults with revolvers, automatic pistols, shotguns, zip guns, rifles,
etc. are included in this category.

Aggravated Assaults involving a Knife or Cutting Instrument is the second category and
includes assaults where weapons such as knives, razors, hatchets, axes, cleavers, scissors,
glass, broken bottles, arrows, and ice picks are used as cutting or stabbing instruments, or
their use is threatened.

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Another category of Aggravated Assaults includes assaults involving the use or threatened
use of any object as a weapon that could inflict serious injury or death. The weapons in this
category include, but are not limited to, Mace®, pepper spray, clubs, bricks, jack handles, tire
irons, bottles, or other blunt instruments used to club or beat victims. Attacks by explosives,
acid, lye, poison, scalding, burnings, BB guns, pellet guns, Tasers®, stun guns, etc. are also
included in this category. It is not necessary that injury result from an aggravated assault
when a weapon is used.

The final category is Aggravated Assault—Hands, Fists, Feet, etc. which includes those
assaults where personal weapons such as hands, arms, feet, fists, and teeth are used that
results in serious or aggravated injury. The UCR Manual advises that agencies should
consider the seriousness of the injury as the primary factor in establishing whether the
assault is aggravated or simple. The assault is aggravated if the personal injury is serious; for
example, there is loss of consciousness, broken bones, internal injuries, or lacerations
resulting in stitches.

As previously noted, if multiple people are involved in a disturbance and law enforcement
investigation cannot distinguish the aggressors from the victims, reporting agencies must
count the number of persons assaulted as the number of offenses.

According to the UCR Manual, when classifying assaults careful consideration of the
following factors should be considered when agencies are classifying assaults.

The use or threatened use of a weapon.

The seriousness of the injury.

The intent of the assailant to cause serious injury.

For further clarification, particularly on the factor related to the intent of the assailant, I
referred to a report published December 2, 2015, by the Los Angeles Police Department’s
Office of Inspector General [ Exhibit 29] which details UCR clarification their agency had
received from the FBI, particularly concerning choking/strangulation assaults. This report
notes that their agency had previously only classified strangulation cases as aggravated
assaults when there was loss of consciousness. They advised their guidance by the FBI
indicated that strangulation, defined as a deliberate restriction of blood or airflow may be
classified as an aggravated assault when there is an “apparent attempt to cause death or
serious injury.” It further notes:

According to the guidance received, indications of such intent or potential


serious injury may be present when the victim states that they had difficulty
breathing, were losing consciousness, felt dizzy or was blacking out or ‘seeing
stars.’ Intent is also indicated by accompanying threats to kill or seriously
injure the person.

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Simple Assaults -Offense Code ASSG
Initially, Lieutenant Angel, who assisted me with this research, was asked about providing all
2016 and 2017 simple assault reports; those with offense codes of AINT, APSM, ASIM and
ASSG. It was soon realized the sheer number of these reports made a review prohibitive.
Instead, it was determined that a review would be conducted of those simple assault reports
with a primary UCR Code of ASSG, Assaulted, Aggravated Circumstances. Lieutenant
Angel queried Spillman with these parameters for 2016 and 2017 reports and provided me
with 72 offense reports for 2017 and 44 offense reports for 2016 which he advised were
reports classified as simple assaults based on this code.

2017 Simple Assaults-Offense Code ASSG


The 72 Buckeye reports provided for 2017 were reviewed. It was found that 34 of these
reports were classified incorrectly and should have been reported as aggravated assaults. The
scoring of these offenses, based on victims, would have resulted in a scoring of an additional
40 Part I Aggravated Assaults in 2017.

A document summarizing each of these offense reports along with a copy each of the 2017
reports believed to be incorrectly coded are include as Exhibit 30. As following is a list of
these reports, as evaluated by the previously cited 3-pronged test: 1) Was a weapon used or
threatened? 2) Was there serious injury? or 3) Was there intent to cause serious injury or
death?

The use or threatened use of a weapon.

Firearm

170904052
171001010
171122023
171225039
170727118
170824025

Knife or Cutting Instrument

170626008
170708001
170205091-Beer bottle
170207058- Screwdriver
170409065-Beer bottle

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Dangerous Weapon

171104098- Baton
170205092- Metal bar
170623129- Vehicle
170720132-Baseball bat
170828010- White Plastic PVC Pipe
170629134-Statue
171107090-Vehicle
171108012-Tire Iron
171230048-Rock
171004070-Vehicle
171221078-Vehicle

The seriousness of the injury (hands, body, feet, etc.)

170515138-Left orbital fractured 3 places, fractured nose, stitches


170517012-Stragulation- loss of consciousness
170616050-Fractures to face
170716089-Loss of blood, softball size knot to right eye
170802072-Strangulation-loss of consciousness
170930112-Strangulation-35 injuries consistent with strangulation
171105089-Nasal fracture
171117040-Strangulation

The intent of the assailant to cause serious injury

170531102- Strangulation
170625101-Strangulation
170708006-Strangulation
171117086-Strangulation

The review of these cases found no apparent reason for the misclassification of these
offenses except for most of the offense reports documenting strangulation. While
strangulation or choking assaults that impede breathing are classified as aggravated assaults
by Arizona Revised Statutes, for UCR purposes they must either involve serious injury or
intent to cause serious injury. With the additional guidance previously discussed, I was
comfortable classifying the 8 additional offenses involving strangulation/choking with no
loss of consciousness as aggravated assaults. It is possible that the Buckeye individuals
responsible for quality control are not familiar with these guidelines.

The remaining 27 reports seem straight forward; unlike other areas of UCR reporting, there
was no conflict with state law meaning each of the offenses would have been classified as
aggravated assaults under Arizona Revised Statutes. In fact, in 28 of these reports, including

62
all those reports involving a dangerous weapon, an arrest was made for aggravated assault. It
is also believed that these reports were properly classified by the reporting officers since the
Nature of most of these reports had remained aggravated assault.

2016 Simple Assaults – Offense Code ASSG


The 48 Buckeye reports provided for 2016 that were classified as Simple Assaults using the
Spillman offense code of ASSG, were reviewed. It was found that 24 of these reports were
classified incorrectly; 1 should have been reported as a robbery and 23 should have been
reported as aggravated assaults. The scoring of these offenses would have resulted in a
scoring of an additional 30 Part I Aggravated Assaults in 2016 and 1 additional Robbery
offense.

The robbery was reported in departmental report 161223057 and involved an assault with a
dangerous weapon by a suspect that was stealing a vehicle. Per UCR, this offense should be
reported as a Robbery.

The remaining 21 offense reports included 12 aggravated assaults involving a weapon and 9
involving serious injury or the intent to inflict serious injury or death. Of those 9 involving
serious injury, 6 were aggravated assaults involving strangulation/choking.

A document summarizing all these reports, along with each of the 2016 reports believed to
be incorrectly coded are included as Exhibit 31.

The results of a review of just a limited portion of the simple (Part II) assaults reported by
Buckeye PD is troublesome and indicates significant underreporting of aggravated assaults.
A review of the remaining simple assaults as well as disorderly conduct, fighting, and juvenile
problems reports is warranted.

Report Changes
The anonymous complainant alleged that Sergeant James Virgadamo was the primary
individual responsible for the altering of crime statistics. This same sentiment was echoed
throughout many of my interviews. In investigating this allegation, I first looked at report
numbers provided by members of the police department during interviews. These included
the following:

These report numbers were provided by Sergeant and are documented in a


memo he prepared that was dated March 7, 2015, and sent to Lieutenant
Because of the date of the changes, except where indicated, I was unable to document who
had actually made the change although credibility is given to Sergeant memo due to
his timeliness in reporting. This memo and the associated police reports are included in
Exhibit 32.

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140805072 Originally Theft/Changed to Lost/Found Property: Cell phone taken at
Walmart- traced to home where 13-year-old said they had found it and intended to return it.
Phone was returned. Lost appropriate.

140603055 Package Delivered to Front Door-Missing; Originally reported as theft;


Changed to lost property by Virgadamo

141216050 Package Delivered to Front Door-Missing; Originally reported as theft;


Changed to lost property by Virgadamo (noted in report)

141216064 Cell phone was taken from backpack at school; Originally reported as theft;
Changed to lost property by Virgadamo (noted in report)

141217043 Package Delivered to Front Door-Missing; Originally reported as theft;


Changed to lost property by Virgadamo (noted in report)

150119022 Purse left in grocery cart; Originally reported as theft; Changed to lost
property

150214030 Wallet left in grocery cart; Originally reported as theft; Changed to lost
property

The following offense report was referenced in an email exchange-initiated December 31,
2016, between Sergeant Virgadamo and Sergeant . This email and the below police
report are included as Exhibit 33.

161231033 School was burglarized over Christmas break; rooms vandalized, food taken.
Sergeant Virgadamo argues that this should be reported as simply a criminal damage because
he believes officers cannot prove the school was even broken into.

Spillman Query
Lieutenant Charles Arlak, who was also named in the anonymous complaint, is a Spillman
administrator for the Buckeye Police Department. With both limited knowledge of- and
access to-Buckeye’s Spillman system, on February 1, 2018, I spoke to Giuseppe De Fazio,
my IT contact within the City of Buckeye. I explained that I was looking for a report that
would track changes made to UCR codes by a specific individual. He advised that he
believed he could retrieve that information from the system. On February 6, 2018, Mr. De
Fazio provided me with a print out of changes to UCR codes made between October 2016
and January 2018 by Sergeant Virgadamo [Exhibit 34]. Mr. De Fazio said Sergeant
Virgadamo had made a large number of changes when compared to other patrol sergeants.
This was not unexpected as I had been told that Sergeant Virgadamo had administrator
privileges within Spillman. What was unexpected was the large number of changes made by
Sergeant Virgadamo.

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The reports showed the number of changes to UCR codes in the time period from October
2016 to January 2018 were as follows:

Sergeant E. Glenn 113


Sergeant D. Grannis 16
Sergeant E. Halim 9
Sergeant M. Miller 102
Sergeant J. Weeks 225
Sergeant J. Virgadamo 1120

To understand the changes made by Sergeant Virgadamo, the information was transferred to
a spread sheet. After doing so, an initial review of Sergeant Virgadamo’s changes raised
several questions and concerns. The 1120 changes Sergeant Virgadamo made to UCR codes
involved approximately 797 offense reports. Of those 797 offense reports, 28 were 2015
and 2016 offenses in which Virgadamo had made a change to a UCR code more than a year
after the report was originally filed. In reviewing those reports, I observed that most of
those delayed changes had occurred in the three months following the publication of the
anonymous letter questioning Buckeye’s crime statistics. I noted that 22 of those reports
documented offenses that had originally been reported as a theft related offense but had
been changed soon after they were filed to either Information Only or Lost Property.
Virgadamo had made 15 of those 22 changes, none of which seemed supported by the
elements of the crime described in the offense report. Between October 28, 2017 and
November 3, 2017 these 22 reports had again been changed by Sergeant Virgadamo.
Fourteen of those reports had been changed to theft offenses. This activity seemed
suspicious as there was no reason to change the UCR codes. These UCR changes would not
have impacted UCR reporting as the changes were made after Buckeye had reported their
offenses for the year in question. This change would have only resulted in the physical
report being changed.

An additional concern immediately noted was that, absent the 28 reports reference above, of
the remaining offenses, only 20 of Sergeant Virgadamo’s changes resulted in an UCR
Offense Code being elevated and only nine of those UCR changes resulted in a new Part I
UCR crime being reported. By contrast, at least 122 of these offense reports had a UCR
code change that either reduced the crime within the Part I hierarchy (i.e. Burglary Residence
to Theft) or changed the reported offense from a Part I crime to either a non-crime or non-
Part I crime. In addition, there were 59 offense reports that documented the theft of a
garbage can that were either changed to a non-criminal code such as civil matter,
information only, or agency assist or were ultimately unfounded. Such disproportionate
results are not reflective of a valid qualitative review of offense reports.

For many of these reports, including several of the garbage cans thefts, Sergeant Virgadamo
made multiple changes to the UCR codes, sometimes over an extended period of time. For
those reports that had multiple changes in a calendar year, it was almost impossible to
determine how the report was coded at the time the crimes were reported to DPS for UCR

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reporting. I requested a Spillman report noting which report numbers were associated with
the crimes reported each year to DPS for UCR purposes, but no one was able to produce
such a report. This information will be critical to any audit eventually conducted.

Also noted on the spreadsheet were several dates when there were numerous changes made
by Virgadamo in a short period of time, which made it difficult to believe that Virgadamo
took enough time to review these reports before making the changes. For instance, on July
22, 2017, Sergeant Virgadamo made 40 changes to UCR codes. All except 2 of these
changes were made in just over two hours (between 16:59:45 and 19:02:56 hours). Twenty-
nine of these changes were made when a trespassing code was changed to either trespass real
property or theft property from motor vehicle. All these 29 UCR codes, except for 1, had
been previously changed by Sergeant Virgadamo. Many of those changes occurred the
previous day (July 21, 2017) between 05:51:13 and 23:59:52 hours, when Sergeant Virgadamo
made 17 changes to UCR codes. Fifteen of those changes involved a change from a theft or
burglary vehicle related UCR code to a trespassing related code [Exhibit 35].

On August 21, 2017, Sergeant Virgadamo made 41 changes to UCR codes between the time
of 20:29:34 and 21:02:04 hours. Thirty-six of those changes made in that approximately 32-
minute period were a change from the UCR code for Information Only (INFO) to Theft
Property Other (TPOT). A closer look at those 36 UCRs found that for 34 of those changes
it was Sergeant Virgadamo who initially changed the UCR code to Information Only
(INFO). That initial changes were made between January 19, 2017 and June 22, 2017; these
dates were all shortly after the original offense report had been submitted [Exhibit 36].

On September 21, 2017, Sergeant Virgadamo made 30 changes to UCR codes between
21:33:02 and 22:50:13 hours. Most of the UCR codes changed were theft or burglary related
including 23 Theft Property Other (TPOT) that had been changed. Many of these changes
were from one Theft related UCR code to another, but 9 of these UCR codes had been
changed to Information Only [Exhibit 37]. When asked in his interview, Lieutenant Arlak
was unable to provide an explanation for Virgadamo’s unusual pattern of changes. Arlak
also said that he did not train Virgadamo to make these types of changes.

There is no readily apparent reason for these changes. This, coupled with the
disproportionate amount of changes that could have a positive impact on crime statistics,
and the inexplicable changes made by Sergeant Virgadamo on certain dates, cast doubt on
the validity of his quality control actions. A review of many of these reports did nothing to
dispel these concerns.

Like the multiple garbage can theft reports, there were several reports that Virgadamo had
changed that were not supported by the report itself and there was no supplemental
information that supported the change. As follows is a sampling of some of the 2017
reports changed by Virgadamo as noted in the report ran by Buckeye IT.

170202089 This report documents both an assault on a juvenile and a disorderly conduct
charge on the mother of the victim. The offense report notes that the victim was punched

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in the face without provocation. Officer (4675) recorded an UCR assault code on
2/2/2017. Virgadamo changes the assault UCR code to disorderly conduct on 2/5/2017 at
23:11:21 hrs. [Exhibit 38]. The UCR Manual defines Other Assaults-Simple, Not
Aggravated as:

The category Other Assaults—Simple, Not Aggravated (4e) includes all


assaults which do not involve the use of a firearm, knife, cutting instrument,
or other dangerous weapon and in which the victim did not sustain serious or
aggravated injuries. Simple assault is not a Part I offense— it is a Part II
offense but is collected under 4e as a quality control matter and for the
purpose of looking at total assault violence.

Agencies classify simple assault for offenses such as assault and battery, injury
caused by culpable negligence, intimidation, coercion, and all attempts to
commit these offenses. Under certain circumstances, offenses of disorderly
conduct, domestic violence, or affray is classified as simple assault.

170323073 The reporting Officer observed a female suspect chasing a male subject with a
bat and watched as she swung it at him. When the officer intervened and spoke to the
subjects the male said the female first tased him while the female said the male suspect had
punched her first. This should have been coded as 1 aggravated assault and 1 simple assault
as primary aggressor couldn’t be determined. On 3/23/2017 at 17:42:39 Officer (4504)
records UCR code of Simple Assault. On 3/25/2017 at 23:01:01 not only does Sergeant
Virgadamo not recognize the agg assault that occurred but, also changed the Simple Assault
to a Citizen Dispute [Exhibit 39]. An assault with either a blunt instrument (bat) and a Taser
are recognized by UCR as Aggravated Assaults-Other Dangerous Weapon. Specifically, the
UCR Manual reads:

The category Aggravated Assault—Other Dangerous Weapon (4c) includes


assaults resulting from the use or threatened use of any object as a weapon in
which serious injury does or could result. The weapons in this category
include, but are not limited to, Mace®, pepper spray, clubs, bricks, jack
handles, tire irons, bottles, or other blunt instruments used to club or beat
victims. Attacks by explosives, acid, lye, poison, scalding, burnings, BB guns,
pellet guns, Tasers®, stun guns, etc. are also included in this category.

The UCR Manual also notes how to score an aggravated assault if the primary aggressor
cannot be determined. It reads:

Aggravated assault is a troublesome crime to score. If a number of persons


are involved in a dispute or disturbance and law enforcement investigation
cannot distinguish the aggressors from the victims, reporting agencies count
the number of persons assaulted as the number of offenses.

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170623129 Suspect arrested after he deliberately tried to run down a victim after road rage
incident. Witnessed by off duty police officer. Suspect arrested and booked for aggravated
assault. UCR Codes recorded as Agg Assault/ Dangerous Weapon and Endangerment on
6/24/2017 at 00:32:59. Virgadamo changed these UCR later that same day removing the
Aggravated Assault UCR Code. As noted above, the UCR Manual defines an assault with a
dangerous weapon as:

The category Aggravated Assault—Other Dangerous Weapon (4c) includes


assaults resulting from the use or threatened use of any object as a weapon in
which serious injury does or could result.

The next 3 offenses incorrectly coded by Virgadamo were offenses which, if recorded
correctly, would be a burglary or attempted burglary. The UCR Manual defines a burglary as:

The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft.

The UCR Program classifies offenses locally known as burglary (any degree),
unlawful entry with intent to commit a larceny or felony, breaking and
entering with intent to commit a larceny, housebreaking, safe-cracking, and all
attempts at these offenses as burglary.

The first two of these 3 reports are offenses that were originally recognized by the
responding officers as attempted burglaries.

170209128 On 2/9/17, 21:32:53 hours, Officer (4430) recorded UCR Code for Burglary
Residence Attempted Force Entry after someone used a cinder block to break window in an
attempt to enter a residence. On 2/11/2017, Virgadamo changed the burglary UCR code to
a criminal damage [Exhibit 41].

170323080 On 3/23/2017, at 19:02:32 hrs, Officer (4675) recorded UCR Code for
Burglary Residence Attempt Forced Entry after someone attempted to pry door open. On
3/24/2017 at 14:42:33 hours, Virgadamo changed this burglary code to Criminal Damage
[Exhibit 42].

The UCR Manual further defines Burglary-Attempted Forcible Entry as:

This category includes those situations where a forcible entry burglary is


attempted but unlawful entry is not achieved. Once the thief is inside a locked
structure, the offense becomes a Burglary—Forcible Entry (5a). Agencies
classify attempts to enter an unlocked structure as well as actual trespass to an
unlocked structure as Burglary—Unlawful Entry—No Force (5b). Only
situations in which a thief has attempted to break into a locked structure are
classified as Burglary—Attempted Forcible Entry.

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170630047 On 6/30/2017, at 18:42:53 hours, the responding Officer (3932) correctly
recorded a Burglary Residence Unlawful Entry after items were stolen out of an open garage.
On 7/6/2015, at 18:18:15 hours, Virgadamo changed this to a Theft Property from Building,
a lesser Part I UCR code [Exhibit 43]. As noted above a burglary is defined as the entry of a
structure to commit a theft or felony. The UCR Manual notes that the UCR program
includes a garage in its definition of a structure.

170317080 Victim reported a handgun stolen from the trunk of his vehicle. On
3/17/2017, at 18:46:34, Officer (4504) recorded a UCR Code of Burglary Vehicle Unlawful
Entry. This offense would be recognized as a larceny/theft for UCR purposes. On
3/19/2017 at 22:28:26 Virgadamo changed this report to a Lost Property. No explanation
was recorded and in fact, on 4/11/17 this weapon was recovered in the custody of two
suspects [Exhibit 44.] The UCR manual defines theft as:

Definition: The theft of articles from a motor vehicle, whether locked or


unlocked.

This type of larceny includes thefts from automobiles, trucks, truck trailers,
buses, motorcycles, motor homes, or other recreational vehicles. It also
includes thefts from any area in the automobile or other vehicle including the
trunk, glove compartment, or other enclosure. Some of the items included in
this theft category are cameras, suitcases, wearing apparel, cellular phones,
MP3 players, and packages.

Certain state statutes list theft from motor vehicles in their criminal codes as
burglaries. For the UCR Program, however, agencies classify these thefts as
Theft From Motor Vehicles.

171019107 [Exhibit 45] A female victim was shot in the face with a BB gun by an unknown
assailant. The responding officer incorrectly classified it as a simple assault (ASIM) on
10/19/2017 at 17:31:56. Virgadamo reviewed it and changed it to an assault aggravated
circumstances (ASGG) at 22:23:42. True quality control would have assured this was
properly classified as an Aggravated Assault-Other Dangerous Weapon; as noted below the
UCR Manual specifically includes a BB gun in its definition of Aggravated Assault-Other
Dangerous Weapon. It reads:

The category Aggravated Assault—Other Dangerous Weapon (4c) includes


assaults resulting from the use or threatened use of any object as a weapon in
which serious injury does or could result. The weapons in this category
include, but are not limited to, Mace®, pepper spray, clubs, bricks, jack
handles, tire irons, bottles, or other blunt instruments used to club or beat
victims. Attacks by explosives, acid, lye, poison, scalding, burnings, BB guns,
pellet guns, Tasers®, stun guns, etc. are also included in this category.

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170306068 As suspect stole 30 pack of beer from Bashas. Officer (4278) correctly
recorded it as Theft-Shoplifting on 3/6/2017 at 14:57:01. For unknown reasons Virgadamo
changed this UCR code on 7/14/2017 at 18:43:59 to Suspicious Person [Exhibit 46]. The
UCR Manual defines a theft as:

The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of property from the
possession or constructive possession of another.

A category of theft within UCR is shoplifting. The UCR Manual defines shoplifting as:

Definition: The theft by a person (other than an employee) of goods or


merchandise exposed for sale.

By definition, the offender in a shoplifting incident has legal access to the


premises and, thus, no trespass or unlawful entry is involved.

The category includes thefts of merchandise displayed as a part of the stock in


trade outside buildings such as department stores, hardware stores,
supermarkets, fruit stands, and gas stations.

This sampling of reports casts further doubts on the validity of Sergeant Virgadamo’s quality
control. Virgadamo’s changes resulted in 1 aggravated assault not being reported and 3
others being incorrectly reported as simple assaults. This also resulted in 2 attempt
residential burglaries being reported as criminal damage and one residential burglary being
reported as a theft. An additional theft was changed to a suspicious person and a simple
assault to a disorderly conduct. If this small sampling is indicative of his review process,
serious crimes are likely being significantly underreported.

After reviewing Virgadamo’s changes I requested from Buckeye IT representative Giuseppe


De Fazio a similar report of changes made to UCR codes by Lieutenant Arlak, Buckeye
Police Department’s Spillman administrator. Mr. De Fazio ran this query on March 27, 2018
and provided me with the resulting report which documented changes made by Lieutenant
Arlak between November 2, 2016 and March 27, 2018 [Exhibit 47].

Because Lieutenant Arlak’s allegations of misconduct stemmed from his role as the
administrator of the Spillman records keeping system, and his review, classification, and
scoring of UCR offenses, I did not analyze these changes to the same degree as I did
Virgadamo’s. While I had requested changes to UCR codes I noted that some of the
changes reported were changes of dollar amounts, while other entries documented only an
ARS code and did not include either the original or new Spillman code used. I noted that
Arlak had made approximately 694 changes to reports in that 16-month period; some of
those changes were multiple changes to the same offense report. Many of the assaults
identified above, improperly classified as simple assaults using the Spillman code for Assault,
Aggravated Circumstances (ASSG), were noted in this report as having been reviewed and
modified by Lieutenant Arlak. In addition, to those reports several additional reports were

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identified as not being properly classified for UCR purposes. As follows are a few of these
reports identified from this query, in which Lieutenant Arlak had either made an improper
change or failed to identify an improper UCR code, leading to the offense being reported
incorrectly for UCR purposes:

170315070 [Exhibit 48] This offense involved a suspect that went to a home improvement
store, stole several items, and swung garden shears at employees that attempted to stop him
and was booked for this crime. Arlak changed the UCR code from Robbery to Aggravated
Assault on June 20, 2017. The UCR Manual describes a Robbery- Knife or Cutting
Instrument as follows:

The category Robbery—Knife or Cutting Instrument (3b) includes Robberies


and attempts in which a knife, broken bottle, razor, ice pick, or other cutting
or stabbing instrument is employed as a weapon or as a means of force to
threaten the victim or put the victim in fear.

The UCR Manual offered the following scenario as a Robbery-Strong-arm.

A juvenile was observed by a store security guard concealing compact discs


under his shirt. When he was confronted, the youth punched the security
guard and fled the store, leaving the compact discs behind

This scenario makes it clear that the incident documented in offense report 170315070 was a
robbery and the weapon used makes it clear it should be a Robbery-Knife or Cutting
Instrument as opposed to an Aggravated Assault.

171101105 [Exhibit 49] A female Pizza Hut delivery person attempted to deliver to an
address where there were no lights on in the residence, a lock box on the door, and a For
Rent sign in the yard. After ringing the doorbell and getting no response the delivery person
began to walk back to her car when two male subjects walked out of the desert area near the
home. One of the male subjects approached her and demanded the pizza. He was wearing
all black and had a bandana that looked like a skeleton covering the bottom of his face. He
demanded the pizza saying, “Give me the pizza bitch.” The delivery person advised that she
felt she was in danger and would be hurt if she did not comply with his demands. She held
out her arms and the male suspect grabbed the two pizza carriers containing food and took
off running.

The responding officer classified this as a robbery and Lieutenant Arlak changed this to a
theft, a lesser Part I crime. The UCR manual notes that taking something from a person by
force, or putting the victim in fear that force will be used, is a robbery. Specifically, the UCR
Manual reads:

Robbery—The taking or attempted taking of anything of value from the care,


custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or
violence and/or by putting the victim in fear.

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Robbery is a type of theft committed in the presence of the victim. The victim
is directly confronted by the offender and is threatened with force or is put in
fear that force will be used. Robbery involves a theft or larceny but is
aggravated by the element of force or threat of force

171224086 [Exhibit 50] A female had reported that while speaking with the father of her
daughter near a store he had reached into her purse and stolen cash and gift cards; he then
ran away and got into the passenger side of a vehicle and left the area. Victim did not desire
prosecution. The reporting officer classified this as a theft. Lieutenant Arak changed this to
an Information Received (INFO) UCR code which is not reported for UCR purposes. Per
UCR this is a theft and should have been reported as such. Specifically, the UCR Manual
defines theft/ larceny as:

The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of property from the
possession or constructive possession of another…Also, agencies report all
larceny offenses regardless of the value of the property stolen.

The UCR Manual further reads:

The recovery of stolen property, the low value of stolen property, the refusal
of the victim to cooperate with prosecution, or the failure to make an arrest
does not unfound a legitimate offense. Also, the findings of a coroner, court,
jury, or prosecutor do not unfound offenses or attempts that law enforcement
investigations establish to be legitimate. If, after scoring an actual offense in
one of the Part I categories, new information is developed through
investigation showing the offense did not occur, an agency records an
unfounded offense on the next monthly Return A the agency submits.
Additionally, if the offense the agency unfounded has a property value, the
agency records an unfounded value as well.

The next two offense reports both involve an assault involving a firearm. In each of these
cases a suspect was arrested for Aggravated Assault With a Deadly Weapon. Lieutenant
Arlak changed the UCR for both offenses to a simple assault utilizing the Spillman code of
ASSG. He also added a Weapons Offense (WOFF) to each report. UCR defines an
aggravated assault as follows:

An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting
severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault usually is accompanied
by the use of a weapon or by means likely to produce death or great bodily
harm.

The UCR Program considers a weapon to be a commonly known weapon (a


gun, knife, club, etc.) or any other item which, although not usually thought of
as a weapon, becomes one in the commission of a crime.

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The categories of Aggravated Assault (4a–4d) include assaults or attempts to
kill or murder, poisoning, assault with a dangerous or deadly weapon,
maiming, mayhem, assault with explosives, and assault with disease (as in cases
when the offender is aware that he/she is infected with a deadly disease and
deliberately attempts to inflict the disease by biting, spitting, etc.). All assaults
by one person upon another with the intent to kill, maim, or inflict severe
bodily injury with the use of any dangerous weapon are classified as
Aggravated Assault. It is not necessary that injury result from an aggravated
assault when a gun, knife, or other weapon that could cause serious personal
injury is used.

It is the practice of local jurisdictions to charge assailants in assault cases with


assault and battery, disorderly conduct, domestic violence, or simple assault
even though a knife, gun, or other weapon was used in the incident. This type
of offense is reported to the UCR Program as Aggravated Assault

180105136 [Exhibit 51] During a domestic argument the female retrieved a gun and pointed
it directly at the victim, she then moved the gun slight to his left and fired one shot into the
wall. She attempted to rack the slide and the gun jammed. After a SWAT standoff this
female was arrested and charged with Aggravated Assault with a Firearm. Lieutenant Arlak
changed this to a simple assault. It is important to understand that unlike Arizona state
statutes, for UCR purposes, a threat of violence to an individual is considered an assault.
The UCR Manual notes:

Agencies classify simple assault for offenses such as assault and battery, injury
caused by culpable negligence, intimidation, coercion, and all attempts to
commit these offenses.

The following scenarios illustrate incidents known to law enforcement


classified as Other Assaults—Simple, Not Aggravated (4e):

An employee of a local retail establishment received numerous e-mail


messages at work from her ex-boyfriend, against whom she had a restraining
order. The e-mail messages contained sexually offensive material and threats
of violence to the employee, she turned them over to the police.

When a firearm or other dangerous instrument is used in an assault, including threatening


and intimidating, it is considered an aggravated assault. The UCR manual notes:

The category Aggravated Assault—Firearm (4a) includes all assaults in which a


firearm of any type is used or is threatened to be used. Assaults with
revolvers, automatic pistols, shotguns, zip guns, rifles, etc. are included in this
category.

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180129116 [Exhibit 52] A couple reported their daughter had unwelcome visitors to their
home that had assaulted them. The wife said one subject displayed a baseball bat and told
her “Fuck you. I’ll fuck you up.” The victim said he swung the bat at her face and head
numerous times. The male homeowner said after telling another subject to leave this
individual reached into his waistband where he could see a handgun and said, “Back up, I
got you, I will kill you.” He said the weapon was never pointed at him, but he felt
threatened and feared for his life. This weapon was located in an adjacent yard and turned
out to be an airsoft gun.

The category Aggravated Assault—Other Dangerous Weapon (4c) includes


assaults resulting from the use or threatened use of any object as a weapon in
which serious injury does or could result. The weapons in this category
include, but are not limited to, Mace®, pepper spray, clubs, bricks, jack
handles, tire irons, bottles, or other blunt instruments used to club or beat
victims. Attacks by explosives, acid, lye, poison, scalding, burnings, BB guns,
pellet guns, Tasers®, stun guns, etc. are also included in this category.

There were also two reports in which the responding officers not only documented a simple
assault, domestic violence, but also arrested a suspect for the assault. For both reports,
180211052 and 180211071, Lieutenant Arlak reviewed these reports and made changes but,
either removed the assault charge or did not recognize it was not included. 180211052 was
reviewed and modified by Lieutenant Arlak on February 22, 2018 and 180211071 was
reviewed and modified by Lieutenant Arlak on February 21, 2018. While this report did not
note if a simple assault code was ever included within the offense codes, Lieutenant Arlak
should have noticed this missing as part of his quality control reviews. While both are
simple assaults, the accurate collection of this information is still important, as noted in the
UCR Manual:

Simple assault is not a Part I offense— it is a Part II offense but is collected


under 4e as a quality control matter and for the purpose of looking at total
assault violence.

With Lieutenant Arlak being the primary reviewer of these reports, these errors are
concerning and raise doubts about the validity of the Buckeye Police Department’s crime
reporting and statistics.

Interviews
Interview of Sergeant

On December 18, 2017, I met with Sergeant at the City of Buckeye’s Human
Resources office, to interview him reference this investigation. Present during our interview
was his employee representative, Kathryn Baillie, an attorney with the Law Offices of
Napier, Coury and Baillie, P.C. Prior to the interview, Sergeant was served a Notice
of Investigation (“NOI”) that described the allegations and identified his role as a witness in

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conveyed to Sergeant by any of his supervisors that Sergeant Virgadamo would be
reviewing and changing reports.

Sergeant said he had no knowledge of Lieutenant Arlak changing the nature of criminal
offenses to lower crime statistics. He referred to Lieutenant Arlak as an “in-house guru” for
Spillman and said he is responsible for updates, mapping, and upgrades within Spillman.
Sergeant agreed that it would be unusual for a sergeant to change reports approved by
another supervisor.

Sergeant then discussed a specific incident involving a burglary at a local school that
occurred over a holiday break. A newer officer had responded and took a burglary report
and Sergeant Virgadamo had changed it to a criminal damage. Sergeant said Sergeant
Virgadamo insisted that many people had access to the school during the break even though
the reporting party had asserted that no one should have been in the school. Sergeant
Virgadamo insisted that it should be labeled a criminal damage unless an arrest was made.
Sergeant said that ultimately detectives did make an arrest on this case and the suspects
were charged with burglary. He said this incident occurred at Verrado Middle School over
Christmas break in December 2016 and the reporting officer was Stephen Borquez. He also
said that all entries and changes in Spillman are time and date stamped.

When asked, Sergeant said he had heard that Chief Hall and Lieutenant McGeough
were partners in a security firm but, he had no first-hand knowledge of this. He also had no
knowledge of Chief Hall covering up misconduct by Lieutenant McGeough or interfering in
PSU’s investigation into a sergeant having sex on duty.

I asked Sergeant if he had any knowledge of Lieutenant McGeough covering up the


misconduct of his subordinates. Sergeant then relayed an incident that had occurred
when he was a “fairly new” sergeant and Lieutenant McGeough was transitioning from PSU
Sergeant to Lieutenant. Sergeant said he had learned an officer on his squad, Josh
Haley, had committed a policy violation concerning body cameras. He said Officer Haley
had recorded a portion of a body camera recording of a traffic stop on his cell phone and
had sent that video to his fellow officers through a text message. Sergeant said he was
in the process of investigating this when one of his officers, Dan Hoffmeister, relayed this
information to Lieutenant McGeough. Sergeant said it was his understanding that
Officer Hoffmeister was friends with Lieutenant McGeough and relayed this information to
him when they had met off duty for lunch.

Sergeant said he was concerned that Officer Hoffmeister had gone around him and had
not allowed him to address the misconduct. He said had learned from other sergeants that
this was not the first time Officer Hoffmeister had gone outside the chain of command.
Sergeant said he wanted to document the violation of chain of command and that this
basically turned into a two hour “screaming match,” with Lieutenant McGeough cursing and
yelling to the point that Sergeant told him if he did not stop he was leaving the office.
Sergeant explained at this point Lieutenant McGeough was transitioning between
sergeant and lieutenant and it was unclear what his rank was; it had been announced he was

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a lieutenant but, he had not yet transitioned to the position. He said Lieutenant McGeough
had argued it was not a violation of the chain of command as Officer Hoffmeister had
relayed this incident to him as a “hypothetical” situation.

Sergeant said that in discussions with Sergeant and Sergeant he had


learned that they had similar issues with Officer Hoffmeister circumventing the chain of
command. According to these sergeants when they tried to document it in writing it was
turned down and they were advised by Lieutenant McGeough to stop “targeting” Officer
Hoffmeister.

When asked, Sergeant said he had no first-hand knowledge of a possible pursuit


involving Officer He had heard from Sergeant and Sergeant
that they were investigating an incident involving Officer Hoffmeister failing to impound
evidence of a theft, but he had no first- hand knowledge of it. He also had no knowledge an
incident involving an autistic child. He said he had minimal involvement in the double
homicide investigation and had no knowledge of any problems with the reports involving
this incident.

Sergeant said he had never supervised Officer so he does not know if


Lieutenant Arlak had covered up his misconduct. He said that Sergeants ,
and were all previous supervisors of Officer and might have further
information. Sergeant also said he had no direct knowledge of misconduct involving
Chief Hall including operating a City vehicle after consuming alcohol and unbecoming
conduct at the Phoenix Open golf tournament.

After ascertaining that Sergeant had nothing further to add, our interview was
concluded at 5:21 PM.

Interview of Detective

On January 11, 2018, I met with Buckeye Detective at the City of Buckeye’s
Human Resources office, to interview him reference this investigation. Present during our
interview was his employee representative, Kathryn Baillie, an attorney with the Law Offices
of Napier, Coury and Baillie, P.C. Prior to the interview, Detective was served a NOI
that described the allegations and identified his role as a witness in this investigation. This
NOI provided Detective with notification of his Garrity rights as well as the
requirements that he be honest and maintain investigation confidentiality. Detective
advised he understood his rights and responsibilities and signed the NOI indicating the
same. Our interview began at approximately 2:40 PM. This interview was recorded with
Detective knowledge. For full details of this interview refer to the digital recording;
as follows is a summary.

Prior to the commencement of our interview, Detective had explained that he had
filed a grievance with the City of Buckeye and felt that some of the issues addressed in the
grievance were related to this investigation. He confirmed that he did not have a copy of the

81
grievance to review but wished to go forward with the interview. Detective noted
that he had filed the grievance in September, but he would relay information to the best of
his recollection.

When asked if he had any knowledge of Chief Hall allowing subordinates to falsify crime
statistics to lower the crime rate in Buckeye, Detective replied, “Not personally, no.”
When asked to explain his knowledge of UCR reporting he advised that officers, when
preparing their report in Spillman, are prompted to enter a UCR code. He advised that they
select a code based on what the call and state statutes dictate. He said that as part of “work
flow” the report is sent to the officer’s supervisor for approval and they are responsible for
making sure the UCR code selected by the officer is accurate.

When asked if he had knowledge that Sergeant Virgadamo had changed or falsified crime
statistics to lower the crime rate in Buckeye, Detective replied, “Yes. I do.” He later
noted, “It’s been widely known for a long time that Sergeant Virgadamo goes in and changes
the UCR codes.” He said that he had heard that Sergeant Virgadamo had changed burglaries
to thefts, an arson to a fire, and a homicide to a dead body.

Detective described a conversation with Sergeant Virgadamo that had occurred in July
or August of 2017. Detective told me that in May or June of 2017 he was “promoted”
to the rank of sergeant. He further explained this was an acting position and Sergeant
Virgadamo had trained him as part of the field training program for sergeants. Detective
said after completing the field training, he was supervising a squad that had been
“inundated” with burglaries from vehicles which were attributed to a Maryvale gang. He said
Sergeant Virgadamo insisted that these vehicle burglaries needed to be reported as thefts or
trespassing. This led to a heated conversation in which Sergeant Virgadamo, citing his years
of experience with NYPD, told then Sergeant that he was “one dimensional” and he
needed to look at “the bigger picture.” He said that he is certain detectives and others
passing by heard their “heated” exchange.

Detective said during this conversation he told Sergeant Virgadamo that, “…everyone
knows why you do it- you want to make the Chief look good. The Chief is your friend- you
want that.” Detective said he told Sergeant Virgadamo that he realized that he wanted
to make the City look good, but by inaccurately reporting these vehicle burglaries as thefts or
trespassing, he was “screwing” the Department out of resources to address these issues. He
explained that the state vehicle and gang task forces use predicative analysis to deploy
personnel. He said with crimes categorized incorrectly, the task forces would not note a
problem and wouldn’t send resources to combat the crime.

Detective said that Sergeant Virgadamo told him, “Come on …You own a house
here. He goes-you don’t want the crime stats to hurt your property values.” Detective
said Sergeant Virgadamo then told him he also had a house in Buckeye and didn’t want his
property value to drop. Detective said he told Sergeant Virgadamo, “Are you kidding
me? I go -are you frickin’ kidding me? We can’t- you can’t do that for yourself.” Detective
said he then posed a scenario to Sergeant Virgadamo; he said if he was at his home

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claim there was no internal investigation conducted and he never received any
paperwork supporting the action taken against him.

Detective said that he was extremely frustrated about what happened to him then
appeared to have difficulty expressing himself. His representative, Kathryn Baille, then
asked to clarify thoughts. Neither Detective or myself objected to this
request. Ms. Baille began speaking about Sergeant Virgadamo allegedly sending out
derogatory emails to other Sergeants after having been told to stop by Lieutenant
Ms. Baille said that Lieutenant attempted to file a complaint against Sergeant
Virgadamo for possible insubordination and harassment, but instead, Lieutenant and
were investigated for the comments made on the body camera, while Sergeant
Virgadamo was never investigated. Ms. Baillie said that because and were
disciplined and Virgadamo allegedly was not, this forms the foundation for a claim of
disparate treatment. Detective added that during his meeting in the Chief’s office
when he was informed of his demotion, he was told that his performance as a supervisor
was good, and he was praised for fostering a career development program for his officers.
Both Detective and Ms. Baille then attempted to explain and
comments about selecting an outside agency investigator.

I then asked both Detective and Ms. Baillee if they had any further comments. Ms.
Baillie said two female officers had also filed grievances against Sergeant Virgadamo. She
explained that these officers were present in Las Vegas, Nevada during the mass shooting
that occurred on October 1, 2017. Around that same time messages were sent out over the
Department’s instant messaging system in support of the two officers. Sergeant Virgadamo
allegedly sent out a disparaging message questioning whether the females would need
“special rooms” or “teddy bears” to cope with the situation. Ms. Baille said another sergeant
sent out an instant message in support of the two females and denouncing Sergeant
Virgadamo’s comments. As a result, the two female officers and the sergeant that spoke out
against Sergeant Virgadamo were all listed as subjects of an internal investigation while
Sergeant Virgadamo was not.

Detective in his closing remarks, said that other law enforcement agencies were not
disciplining officers for private, sidebar conversations recorded on body cameras; including
comments about the command staff. After ascertaining they had nothing further to add, I
concluded our interview at 4:09 PM.

Interview of Officer

On January 22, 2018, at approximately 7:12 PM, I met with Buckeye Reserve Officer
at the City of Buckeye’s Human Resources office, to interview him
reference this investigation. Present during this interview was his representative, Kathryn
Baillie, an attorney with the Law Offices of Napier, Coury and Baillie, P.C. Prior to the
interview, Reserve Officer was served a NOI that described the allegations and
identified his role as a witness in this investigation. This NOI provided Officer with
notification of his Garrity rights as well as the requirements that he be honest and maintain

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I then asked Officer if he had knowledge that Chief Hall allowed or encouraged
subordinates to falsify crime stats to lower the crime rate. Officer said that he was
not aware of Chief Hall doing so, but knew his direct supervisors, including Sergeant
Virgadamo, had falsified stats from his reports. He said he had brought this issue forward to
the union. He said he did not have the report numbers immediately available but, said in
2015 and 2016 he had several reports changed.

Officer said one such report was an Aggravated Assault in which a subject at a party
had become upset and tried to run over the victims. He said this was witnessed by several
people who had seen the vehicle jump a curve and drive toward the victims. He said he
titled his report Aggravated Assault and completed a Victim’s Rights form with that same
information. Officer said that the victims did not desire prosecution. He said when
his supervisor, Sergeant Virgadamo reviewed the report, he changed the crime to Disorderly
Conduct. Officer said he was quite vocal in his disagreement, telling Sergeant
Virgadamo that just because prosecution was not desired the victims and witnesses had
clearly described an aggravated assault. He said Sergeant Virgadamo had asked him, “You
don’t want us to look bad, do you?” Officer said he told him that the report should
remain an aggravated assault as UCR reporting should be accurate because it goes to the
FBI.

Officer said when his report was not changed back to an Aggravated Assault he
took his concerns to Lieutenant Arlak who was Sergeant Virgadamo’s supervisor. He said
Lieutenant Arlak told him, “Oh you know how Jimmy is. I’ll talk to him.” When I asked if
he could narrow down the time frame, Officer suggested I check the Spillman
system by his badge number, . He said he knew this occurred in 2015 as this was when
he stood up in a union meeting, told everyone that crime statistics were being falsified and
the public was being misled, and suggested they go to the media. Officer said he
was retaliated against afterwards. He said he had other examples of this falsification of
reports, and I asked him to continue.

Officer said he had also had an armed robbery report changed to a juvenile
problem. He said this incident occurred in Beat 1, at Sierra and Highland. He said I could
check Spillman by his badge number and the beat number to locate the report he is referring
to. He said in this incident a juvenile suspect went up to two females in a park, displayed an
edged weapon, and told them, “Give me your fucking purses or I’m going to cut you.”
Officer said they turned over their purses and cell phones to the suspect, who took
off running. He said officers got on scene and circulated the area but could not locate the
suspect. Officer said if this suspect ever was identified he would like to charge him
with aggravated assault, but when the report was reviewed by Sergeant Virgadamo it was
changed to a juvenile problem. Officer said that when this report is reviewed in
Spillman, the Victim’s Right that is included as an attachment, will clearly show in his
handwriting that he had investigated the incident as an aggravated assault.

Officer said that another incident occurred while he was the field training officer for
Officer He said that they had investigated a homicide involving suspect

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. Officer said that the report was submitted as a homicide but,
repeatedly changed to a dead body by Sergeant Virgadamo, even after the medical examiner
had ruled it a homicide. He said that Officer had contacted him directly and
asked what she should do as the report kept being changed to a dead body. Officer
said he encouraged her to be vocal about it and to report it up the chain of command if it
continued to be changed from homicide.

Officer said he would continually have burglaries changed to missing property. He


said that in one such incident he had taken a burglary report after someone had unlawfully
entered a garage through an unsecured side door and some very expensive tools were taken,
possibly including a drill press. He said the report was changed by Sergeant Virgadamo to
missing property. Officer said when confronted, Sergeant Virgadamo told him,
“You don’t know if it was stolen. He could have just misplaced it and that’s where it’s at.”
Officer said he told Sergeant Virgadamo that the victim had said it was stolen, there
was a spot on the work bench where the tool should have been, and it was gone, and the
side door was open. Officer said there had been unlawful entry, and he was going
to investigate it as a burglary. He said Sergeant Virgadamo told him, “We’re not going to
make the City look bad because this guy can’t find his property.” Officer said
Sergeant Virgadamo just “shrugged it off.”

Officer said he had worked for Sergeant Virgadamo for approximately two to three
years and his reports were constantly changed. He said there was also constant pressure to
do more; he said one month he did 32 traffic stops and Sergeant Virgadamo berated him and
asked why he had only written two citations. Officer said he told him that those
were the only two he felt were egregious enough to warrant a ticket. Officer said
that due to the current strain across the country between police and the community he felt it
was better to attempt to educate drivers rather than just citing them.

Officer said that Sergeant Virgadamo then instituted performance goals and used
them to “target” officers. Officer said he was told by Sergeant Virgadamo, “If I
don’t put this performance review in here how do I get rid of these malcontents? How do I
get rid of the ? The ? The ?” Officer
said he believed it was “wrong” that Sergeant Virgadamo gave him names of officers he was
targeting with his performance goals.

Officer said he had also seen others open multiple calls for one incident to appear
more proactive. He said for example if on a DUI traffic stop, drugs are found, a second
report number is pulled, making it look like two separate incidents. He said it was his
opinion that Sergeant Virgadamo encouraged this, so he would be able to “brag” to others
about how hard his squad had worked. He thought that was also part of the motivation of
changing criminal reports, so Sergeant Virgadamo could brag that these things hadn’t
happened on his “watch.” Officer said that by falsely representing criminal
statistics, it made the City look good. He said the City was growing and building permits
were being issued. He said the Chief of Police was on the news saying that even though
Buckeye is the 7th fasting growing city in the country, the crime rate is going down. He said

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that in the meantime he and other officers including Officer , and Officer
were continually having their reports changed and he believed it was because
they were trying to misrepresent their crime rate to the public. Officer said that
while he does not know if Chief Hall was aware this was occurring, he does know that both
Sergeant Virgadamo and Lieutenant Arlak are very close to the Chief. Previously they have
discussed playing poker together on the weekends and he knew that Sergeant Virgadamo
and Chief Hall worked together, “… back in the day.” He said that Lieutenant Arlak is the
Spillman administrator and prepared the crime reports for CompStat. Officer said
that he knows Lieutenant Arlak had knowledge that criminal stats were being altered.
Officer explained that on several occasions he had gone to Lieutenant Arlak and
told him that Sergeant Virgadamo had changed the nature of the crime in a report.
Lieutenant Arlak always told him he would investigate, but Officer said he would
check the report a few weeks later and nothing had changed.

I advised Officer that there was an allegation that Chief Hall and Lieutenant
McGeough were partners in a security business that represented a possible conflict of
interest. I asked him if he had ever worked for any security firm owned or managed by the
two, including the Blue Knights or Orion. He said he had not. He said he had learned they
owned a business together through media reports and other Department employees had
discussed whether this off-duty work had been approved by the City, but he had no direct
knowledge of it.

When asked if he was aware of or involved in any incidents that indicated Chief Hall had
failed to act on or covered up misconduct by Lieutenant McGeough, Officer
replied, “Not Lieutenant McGeough, but other people.” When asked to elaborate Officer
said there is a group of people referred to alternatively as The New York Crew, The
New York Club, or The New York Mafia. He said this group includes Larry Hall, James
Virgadamo, Charles Arlak, Gary McGeough, and a few others. Officer said he
knows “for a fact” that some members of this group have received preferential treatment.

Officer said another member of this group whom had been “very much protected”
is Officer who is related by marriage to Lieutenant Arlak. Officer
said that he was present when Officer engaged in an out of policy pursuit. He
said he was at Fire Station 2, fueling his vehicle, when he heard Officer broadcast
on the radio that he was trying to stop a vehicle travelling on Miller Road at a high rate of
speed. He said a few seconds later Officer broadcast that he was going down
Broadway towards Watson Road and he requested additional units. Officer said he
responded and as he turned westbound onto Broadway Road he could see that ahead of him
Officer had his lights and sirens on and was going around traffic chasing this
motorcycle although he said he wasn’t in pursuit. He said Officer had passed
Officer Darren Smith. Officer said Officer Luis Gastelum, who was on the side of
the road on a traffic stop at Watson and Southern Road, could also see Officer
approaching. Officer said that as he turned onto Watson Rd from Broadway the
motorcyclist turned on to Roeser Road; he said he then heard Officer
“frantically” broadcast that the motorcyclist had crashed. Officer said he was the

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said he did not and did not know of any employee that had worked for either Blue Knight
Security or Orion.

Officer said that he was not aware of or involved in any incidents that indicated
Chief Hall had failed to act on or covered up misconduct by Lieutenant McGeough or
interfered with a PSU investigation involving a sergeant having sex on duty. Officer
clarified that he had heard rumors about such allegations but, had no direct knowledge.
Officer also said he had no knowledge of Lieutenant McGeough covering up
misconduct for his subordinates. He said he had reported to Lieutenant McGeough for
.

I asked Officer if he was aware of an incident where Officer was allegedly


involved in an out of policy pursuit that resulted in a motorcyclist losing his leg. Officer
indicated he was not involved in this incident. He also had no direct knowledge
although he had heard of an incident involving Officer Hoffmeister failing to properly
impound evidence and Sergeant Root possibly covering up this misconduct. He also said he
was not part of the incident involving Officer and the autistic 14-year-old
although he had heard of it. Officer had no information about Lieutenant Arlak
covering up misconduct for Officer or Chief Hall covering up misconduct for
Sergeant Virgadamo or Lieutenant McGeough. He had no direct knowledge of Chief Hall
operating a City vehicle while intoxicated or being disorderly at the Phoenix Open.

Officer said he had heard about the double homicide committed by suspect
although he was not part of the incident. He said he knew that after the fact there
were issues between then Sergeant McGeough and responding Officer .

As I started to wind up the interview Officer asked if he could add information. He


then started to address information contained in the NOI, but first asked for a break. After
a short break we continued the interview. Officer then referred to bullets at the end
of the NOI that followed the statement, “These alleged actions are in violation of Buckeye
Police Department Police [sic] A340.” I explained that the bullets refer to the specific
policies that the above described incidents violated. Officer said that answered his
questions and he had nothing further to add. Our interview was concluded.

Interview of Sergeant

On January 22, 2018, I met with Buckeye Sergeant at the City of Buckeye’s
Human Resources office, to interview him reference this investigation. Present during our
interview was his employee representative, Jason Woliver. Prior to the interview, Sergeant
was served a NOI that described the allegations and identified his role as a witness in
this investigation. This NOI provided Sergeant with notification of his Garrity rights
as well as the requirements that he be honest and maintain investigation confidentiality.
Sergeant advised he understood his rights and responsibilities and signed the NOI
indicating the same. Our interview began at 9:08 PM. This interview was recorded with

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Sergeant knowledge. For full details of this interview refer to the digital recording;
as follows is a summary.

Sergeant advised that he has been employed with the Buckeye Police Department
I explained I was looking for direct knowledge of the allegations
under investigation whether it was his own or someone else’s. Specifically, if another person
told him something and that person had direct knowledge of information that was relevant
to the investigation, I wanted to tell me about it.
began by telling me that he filed an eight-page grievance with the City of Buckeye,
and I told him I had reviewed it [Exhibit 11].

I first asked Sergeant if he had any direct knowledge that Chief Hall allowed or
encouraged subordinates to falsify crime stats to lower the crime rate, and replied he
did not have direct knowledge that Chief Hall was engaged in this conduct. I then asked
to explain his knowledge of Uniform Crime Reporting. He explained that when
completing reports, officers have a long list of codes to choose from. He gave an example
of a burglary with forced entry versus a burglary with no signs of forced entry. He said it is
the responsibility of the sergeant to ensure that the correct code is selected in “each and
every report we that we approve.” Sergeant further stated that he does not know
where the information goes after a supervisor’s approval.

I asked Sergeant if he had knowledge of Sergeant Virgadamo changing crime statistics


to artificially lower the crime rate in the City of Buckeye. He replied, “I do.” I asked him if
he could provide me examples and he said he could provide actual police report numbers as
well as email exchanges with Sergeant Virgadamo “condoning that behavior.”

Sergeant said that his first example involved a memo he had authored on March 7,
2015, and addressed to his direct supervisor at the time, Lieutenant . I was
provided a copy of this memo. This memo and the below named reports are all included in
Exhibit 32. The subject of the memorandum was “Nature of DR’s Changed.” He read
from the memo which opened with, “I would like to address the ongoing issue with
changing the nature of police reports.” Sergeant then noted in the memo that thefts
had been changed to lost property and burglaries to criminal damage and/or thefts.

Sergeant said he could not remember exactly how he had searched Spillman for the
information, but in his memo, he cited seven examples. He said he had approximately five
more he had found after authoring the memo. He later clarified that in each of the
incidents described in the memo, Sergeant Virgadamo was the approving supervisor and the
reports were taken by his subordinates.

In reviewing the memo, Sergeant noted the first report, DR140805072 involved a
phone initially reported and approved as a theft. When the phone was recovered and
returned to the victim, she refused to aid in prosecution. Sergeant said this report
should have remained a theft for reporting purposes but, instead was changed to lost
property.

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I told Sergeant that it had been alleged that Chief Hall and Lieutenant McGeough
were partners in a security business that posed a conflict of interest. I asked if he had ever
worked for this business or one referred to as Orion Security. Sergeant said he had
not, and he had no knowledge of their business relationship until the recent news release
made it public.

Sergeant confirmed he had no direct knowledge that Chief Hall had failed to act on
major policy violations committed by Lieutenant McGeough. I also asked if he was aware of
an incident in which it was alleged Chief Hall interfered in a PSU investigation involving a
sergeant having sex on duty. Sergeant said that he had heard rumors about it but, had
no direct knowledge.

I asked Sergeant if he was aware of any incidents in which Lieutenant McGeough had
failed to supervise his subordinates or had covered up major policy violations committed by
them. Sergeant said he was aware of such an incident involving Officer Hoffmeister,
who reported to Lieutenant McGeough’s subordinate, Sergeant . Sergeant
explained that there was an incident in which Officer Hoffmeister failed to enter paperwork
or documents into evidence as required. He said it was approximately two weeks later when
the evidence “magically appeared” in the evidence room. Sergeant said he didn’t
know if it had any bearing on this incident but, he believes that Officer Hoffmeister and
Lieutenant McGeough have a personal friendship outside of the Department. Sergeant
said at the time of this incident he was working graveyards. He said that Sergeant
was the dayshift sergeant who relieved him and had told him that staff was looking
into Officer Hoffmeister not entering evidence per policy. Sergeant said he then
mentioned this to Officer Hoffmeister’s direct supervisor, Sergeant , who said he had
no knowledge of the incident or alleged investigation, which he should have.

I asked Sergeant if he any knowledge of the alleged pursuit of a motorcyclist by


Officer that culminated in an accident where the suspect lost his leg. Sergeant
said he had talked to several officers on duty at the time of the incident who said that
based on the radio traffic they believed Officer to be in pursuit. He said
Sergeants and Virgadamo responded to the scene, and he believed it was Detective
who had interviewed the motorcyclist. Sergeant then said of Officer
“I’ve never seen an officer come across so many accidents that had just
occurred.”

When asked, Sergeant said he was not involved in, or knowledge of, the use of force
incident involving Officer and the autistic child.

I asked Sergeant if he was aware of a double homicide that occurred when Lieutenant
McGeough was a sergeant and had directed the scene. Sergeant said he was not
involved but had learned that officers had responded twice to the scene. He said the male
suspect who ultimately killed both his parents, had an active warrant for his arrest at the time
officers first contacted him, but they had not acted on it. Because of amount of time that

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Interview of Officer

On January 11, 2018, I met with Buckeye Officer at the City of Buckeye’s
Human Resources office, to interview him reference this investigation. He elected not to
have an employee representative present for our interview. Prior to the interview, Officer
was served a NOI that described the allegations and identified his role as a witness in
this investigation. This NOI provided Officer with notification of his Garrity rights as
well as the requirements that he be honest and maintain investigation confidentiality.
Officer advised he understood his rights and responsibilities and signed the NOI
indicating the same. Our interview began at 1:08 PM. This interview was recorded with
Officer Haley’s knowledge.

At the initiation of our interview Officer told me that he had submitted “harassment
paperwork” through the City of Buckeye’s Human Resource Department. He wanted me to
know about it as he did not have a copy of it and would be providing details such as dates
from his memory. He said he had filed this complaint on November 16, 2017 and did not
have a copy available. He said it would be helpful to have that paperwork, so he could
provide specific details. He said his complaint was primarily directed at Lieutenant
McGeough and Sergeant Virgadamo but also included Lieutenant Arlak and Chief Hall.
Officer wanted to make it clear that while his complaint appeared to be related to the
anonymous letter that had triggered my investigation, he was not responsible for that letter.

Officer said he filed his complaint in November 2017 because he felt he was being
targeted and he feared further retaliation as all the people listed above are connected. He
said that he knew that Sergeant Virgadamo and Chief Hall had worked together at the
NYPD because they would discuss this fact in briefings. Officer said he was
concerned that I had those same connections with the subjects of his complaint. I explained
my law enforcement background and assured him that not only had I never met any of the
individuals he had told me were listed in his complaint, but I also had limited interaction
with any member of the Buckeye Police Department during my law enforcement career or
since. I told him that I had been hired to independently investigate and had been given the
latitude to do so. I apologized for being unaware of his complaint. Officer expressed
surprise at this and said he had previous conversations with the Buckeye Human Resource
manager who had told him his grievance would be addressed in this investigation. He again
said that his concerns of harassment were connected to the allegations outlined in the
anonymous complaint, verifying he had only read the redacted version published in the
media.

After further discussion with Officer I advised it would be best to reschedule the
interview, allowing me an opportunity to obtain a copy of his “lengthy” complaint and
review it. Officer agreed, and our interview was discontinued.

On January 25, 2018, at about 1:00 PM, I again met with Officer at the City of
Buckeye’s Human Resources office, to interview him reference this investigation. Present

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said the officer preparing an offense report is also required to cite a UCR code. He said the
UCR code he entered on this report was also Burglary. Officer said a few days after
entering the report he was preparing to turn in the physical paperwork associated with the
call. He said at that time, he checked Spillman to assure that the supervisor had not routed
the report back to him for corrections or any other reason. When he viewed his report, he
noticed that both the nature of the crime and the UCR code had been changed to theft.
Officer said he knew that to be inaccurate and he informed Sergeant of his
concern. Officer said when he checked Spillman a couple weeks later he saw that his
report was still inaccurate.

Officer said he wanted to take this to Sergeant supervisor but at that time it was
acting Lieutenant Virgadamo. Officer said since he knew it was Lieutenant Virgadamo
that had changed his report, as he could view the updates to his report in Spillman, he took
it to Patrol Assistant Chief Mann, who directed him to prepare a memo. Officer said
the memo he prepared was included with the complaint he submitted to Human Resources
[Note: The memo was reviewed; while it is dated June 24, 2016 that appears to be incorrect
as the burglary discussed was not reported until July 9, 2016 (report number 160709017) and
in the memo Officer writes that as of August 11, 2016, he had not gotten a response
from his supervisor].

Officer said a couple weeks after submitting the memo there was a BPA [Buckeye
Police Association] meeting. He said since he had not heard anything from Assistant Chief
Mann, and as far as he could determine nothing had been addressed with then acting
Lieutenant Virgadamo, he brought his concerns up in this BPA meeting which was attended
by several members. When asked, Officer said at that time the president of BPA was
Bill Crotteau and the Vice-President was Vince Butler. After expressing his concern about
the changing of his report, Officer said Vince Butler told him that they had to
determine if Virgadamo had done this intentionally and if so what was his motivation.
Officer said Lieutenant Arlak, who oversees Spillman and crime reporting, was in the
room and Sergeant asked him if there was anything wrong with Virgadamo’s actions.
Officer said that Lieutenant Arlak then asked him what had been changed and he told
him both the nature and the UCR code. Lieutenant Arlak told him that the nature of the
crime can be changed to “pretty much what you want” as it makes no difference, but the
UCR codes should be accurate as they are reported to the FBI. Officer said that was
the extent of Lieutenant Arlak’s comments; there was no indication given that he was going
to investigate the allegations further and in fact he saw that nothing had happened to
Sergeant Virgadamo, but in the meantime Assistant Chief Mann, whom he had entrusted to
investigate his concern, was placed on administrative leave. When asked, Officer said
he had no other information about Lieutenant Arlak changing offense codes or reports.

I advised Officer that there was an allegation that Chief Hall and Lieutenant
McGeough were partners in a security business that represented a possible conflict of
interest. I asked him if he had ever worked for any security firm owned or managed by the
two, including the Blue Knights or Orion. He said he had not.

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decision. He said the parents did not want arrested and there had been no
crime committed by him. He said the only thing they could have done differently was
transport him themselves for a mental health evaluation but, he believes would have
resisted and fought them. Officer said had told him that then Sergeant
McGeough was blaming him for making a bad decision not to arrest

Officer had no information about Lieutenant Arlak covering up major policy


violations committed by Officer but added that with many of the things Officer
had done and the lack of discipline he had received, “…it would appear that he is
not disciplined to the same level as other people.” When asked for examples he said Officer
was involved in a pursuit in an unmarked vehicle in El Mirage that, because it was
not high speed, it was not considered a pursuit. He said Sergeant and Sergeant
were involved in this and said it occurred during a DUI task force.

Officer said he had no direct knowledge of Chief Hall targeting supervisors to protect
either Sergeant Virgadamo or Lieutenant McGeough. He also had no direct knowledge of
Chief Hall operating a City vehicle after consuming alcohol or being disorderly at the
Phoenix Open.

After ascertaining that Officer had nothing further to add and our interview was
concluded at 5:21 PM.

Interview of Officer

On January 25, 2018, at approximately 2:56 PM, I met with Buckeye Police Department
Officer at the City of Buckeye’s Human Resources office, to interview him
reference this investigation. Present during our interview was his employee representative,
Jason Woliver. Prior to the interview, Officer was served a NOI that described
the allegations and identified his role as a witness in this investigation. This NOI provided
Officer with notification of his Garrity rights as well as the requirements that he
be honest and maintain investigation confidentiality. Officer said he understood
his rights and responsibilities and signed the NOI indicating the same. This interview was
recorded with Officer Buchanan’s knowledge. For full details of this interview refer to the
digital recording; as follows is a summary.

I told Officer that I would be asking him a series of questions and if he did not
have knowledge of the information he should not feel compelled to provide a response. I
explained that he was being interviewed because over the course of the investigation,
information was provided to me that indicated he might have some knowledge about the
allegations being investigated.

When asked, Officer stated that he did not have any direct knowledge of Chief
Hall, Lieutenant Arlak, or Sergeant Virgadamo changing crime statistics to lower the crime
picture in Buckeye. said that he had only heard rumors of this happening but had
no direct knowledge. Officer said in the past, he had noted that the nature of the

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complex ones it could take 30 minutes to an hour to review. I asked Sergeant if he
could review 5 or 6 reports and determine the UCR codes needed to be changed to
Unfounded or Information Only in less than 5 minutes. He replied, “No I couldn’t. No-
because I read my officers’ reports.” He said it would be possible to do so if you read only
the CAD comments, not the full report, and changed the UCR code based only on those
comments.

I asked Sergeant about the allegation that Chief Hall and Lieutenant McGeough are
partners in a security firm. Sergeant said he had heard about this allegation but had
never worked for either Chief Hall or Lieutenant McGeough off duty in any capacity. He
also had no knowledge of Chief Hall being aware of and failing to act on policy violations
committed by Lieutenant McGeough.

I told Sergeant there was an allegation that Chief Hall had interfered with a PSU
investigation concerning a sergeant having sex on duty. Sergeant said he was familiar
with this investigation as he had read the PSU report. He explained that he was newly
assigned as the Professional Standards Unit Sergeant and Sergeant the previous
PSU supervisor, had told him to read completed PSU investigations so that he was aware of
what was going on and so he could see how the reports were structured. He said as he was
reviewing these investigations he read the one in question and said he thought to himself,
“wow.” Sergeant said he had never seen an investigation before where the
Professional Standards Unit investigator was not allowed to interview the “principal” in the
investigation. He said instead Larry Hall, an assistant chief at the time, had conducted that
interview. Sergeant said their policy at that time had specifically stated that any
supervisor could interview the principal in an IA investigation.

I clarified with Sergeant that this allegation involved Sergeant Root and had been
made by who brought the allegation forward when she was interviewed as the
subject of an investigation. He agreed and said to the best of his recollection there was not a
separate report made for the allegations against Sergeant Root, but rather they were
incorporated into the investigation. I asked him if he had read the disposition of the
allegations against Sergeant Root and what his thoughts were on it. He asked me, “Did
something happen?” When I confirmed this he replied, “To be honest with you sir, I
couldn’t possibly tell because of the way the questions were structured.” He said as he
recalled, it was a “very short interview, a very direct interview and that was it.”

I asked Sergeant if he had any knowledge of Lieutenant McGeough failing to


supervise his subordinates or covering up major policy violations by his peers. He replied,
“Covering up-no.” I then asked him if he had any involvement in the alleged pursuit
involving Officer and a motorcyclist that crashed and lost his leg. He said he had
as he was the supervisor on duty during the incident. He recalled that he had been having a
conversation with Sergeant Virgadamo, who at that time had just been made an acting
lieutenant and heard Officer call in a traffic stop and then say the vehicle was
travelling at a high rate of speed. He said that he then heard Officer Darren Smith ask on
the radio, “Is he in pursuit?” Sergeant said he then heard Officer say first

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the union wasn’t going to do anything about it maybe the West Valley View, a local
newspaper, would be interested. Sergeant said Virgadamo called him at home, upset
with Officer and saying, “Who the fuck does he think he is?” He said that
Virgadamo told him in this conversation that he was going to confront Officer
Sergeant said he told Virgadamo that was not a good idea and he should “leave it
alone.”

Sergeant said the Monday following this conversation, during a briefing attended by
his squad, then Acting Lieutenant Virgadamo had come in, sat right next to Officer
stared at him throughout the briefing “with an intimidation factor type look,” and made
short comments during the briefing to the effect of, “Changing the stats?” Sergeant
said this disrupted the briefing and, “we pretty much had to end a little early.” Sergeant
said that Virgadamo was trying to intimidate Officer and it made him
uncomfortable.

I then asked Sergeant about the meeting following this briefing. He told me that
Officer had come to him upset and wanted to speak with acting Lieutenant
Virgadamo about what had taken place during the briefing. Sergeant said he did go
with Officer to speak with Virgadamo and while he could not remember the full
content of the conversation he did not believe that Virgadamo was “berating” Officer
. He said that Acting Lieutenant Virgadamo was bringing up some points about
Officer work product and his “directness.” Sergeant described Officer
as being very direct and sometimes having an “…it’s his way or the highway type
personality.” Sergeant did not remember Lieutenant Virgadamo telling Officer
that he was “just a piss ant cop” or saying, “remember who you work for.”

Sergeant said he did remember during this meeting that there was discussion about
the performance measures instituted by Lieutenant Virgadamo. He said he recalled
Virgadamo telling Officer if they didn’t meet the standards it could affect their
performance evaluations. He did not remember him saying it would affect them financially,
but Sergeant s said it could have that effect because if an officer received a below
standards evaluation they would not get their annual step increase.

I then read to Sergeant a quote that Officer attributed to Lieutenant


Virgadamo which included a statement, “I don’t want them on my Department if they can’t
get their dicks up because I ask them to do two traffic stops.” Sergeant said that
Officer was leaving out a few key points in that conversation. He said that Officer
had told Lieutenant Virgadamo that some officers were so stressed out about these
performance requirements they were having psychological issues including not being able to
sleep or get erections and have sex with their wives. Sergeant said that Lieutenant
Virgadamo is “ex NYPD” and a “cop’s cop” and can be blunt. He said that was the context
in which Lieutenant Virgadamo made the comment about “not getting their dicks’ up.”

I asked Sergeant if he had knowledge of an incident in which Officer Hoffmeister


circumvented the chain of command. He said he had been involved in such an incident. He

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Sergeant said a short time after this incident, possibly the first or second week of July,
Assistant Chief Sanders asked to speak with him. Sergeant said they met and he
explained about the conversation with Sergeant and the fact that he was not trying
to spread rumors but rather help a friend when he told Sergeant about the conversation
and that it was up to Sergeant what he did with the information. He said that during
that conversation he also told Assistant Chief Sanders that he did not appreciate the
comments Lieutenant McGeough had made. He said that Assistant Chief Sanders’ only
response was to say they all needed to learn how to get along. I asked Sergeant if
Officer had made a complaint about the comments and he told me he did not
think so but, believed Assistant Chief Sanders had taken it upon himself to investigate the
comments.

After ascertaining that Sergeant had nothing further to add, I ended our interview at
3:00 PM.

Interview of Officer

On February 13, 2018, I met with Buckeye Police Detective at the City of
Buckeye’s Human Resources office, to interview her reference this investigation. Present
during our interview was her employee representative, Jason Woliver. Prior to the interview,
Detective was served a NOI that described the allegations and identified her role as a
witness in this investigation. This NOI provided Detective with notification of her
Garrity rights as well as the requirements that she be honest and maintain investigation
confidentiality. Detective advised she understood her rights and responsibilities, had
no questions, and signed the NOI indicating the same. Our interview began at
approximately 12:10 PM. This interview was recorded with the knowledge of Detective
For full details of this interview refer to the digital recording; as follows is a
summary.

I explained to Detective that I would be asking her questions, some that were very
broad in nature as that was how they had been reported in the anonymous letter. I further
explained that if she had no direct knowledge that was understandable, and she should not
hesitate to tell me. I further explained that many questioned had asked how they had been
identified to be interviewed. I told her that she was being interviewed because someone had
indicated she might have knowledge of the allegations under investigation. She indicated
that she understood.

I first asked Detective if she had any knowledge of members of the Buckeye Police
Department altering or lowering crime statistics to artificially lower the crime rate. She
advised that she had worked a patrol squad under the
supervision of Sergeant Jimmy Virgadamo. She said that she and other officers on her squad
would regularly discuss that the nature of crimes in their offense reports had been changed
by Sergeant Virgadamo. She gave the example that officers would complain that something
they knew was a burglary had been changed to a theft. She said she had noticed that the

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I then asked Detective about a vehicular accident that had occurred on approximately
February 18, 2015, in the area of Victory and Indian School Rd. I told her that this had
occurred near Chief Hall’s residence and involved a nude driver. She said she remembered
this incident. She explained it came out as an accident call and Officer was the
first officer on scene. Detective said the driver appeared to have ran a stop sign and
had gone down “pretty far into” a rocky ravine. She said that Officer had voiced
over the radio that the driver was naked. She said that she was the second officer on scene.
She added, “At this point we’re just trying to kind of get this guy to come up. Fire had kind
of got there about the same time.” She confirmed this occurred near Chief Hall’s residence
and he had arrived on scene shortly after she had. She said that she did not recall Chief Hall
making any comments about the subject although he may have, but she did remember him
taking at least one picture with his cell phone. Officer later added that Chief Hall
was off duty but arrived at the scene in his assigned white Tahoe. She said she remembered
standing near Chief Hall and did not recall smelling alcohol or noticing any signs of
impairment on his part.

When asked, Detective recalled being at the Association meeting when Officer
brought up the topic of crime statistics being changed. She does not recall anyone
berating him and specifically does not remember Lieutenant Virgadamo berating him about
his comments during a patrol briefing sometime after this meeting. Detective said
she does remember Officer being “called out” by other supervisors but not about
this topic.

I told Detective I had no further questions and asked if she had anything she wanted
to add. She said that she had some information involving another incident in which Officer
Hoffmeister failed to log evidence. I asked her to elaborate and she explained that she was
assigned a trespass investigation, which was connected to two other burglary investigations.
All three cases involved homes under construction. She said that Officer Hoffmeister took
the original reports by phone and then sent an officer to the scene to dust for fingerprints.
She said that she got a hit on a print lifted from a stove in one of the residences. Detective
said she called the complainant and learned that the prints belonged to an employee,
so it had little evidentiary value. She said the complainant then asked her about a phone he
had collected and given to an officer. She said the complainant was concerned not just
because it possibly belonged to a suspect but, also because he had observed what appeared
to be child pornography on the phone. Detective said she “played dumb” and told
the complainant she would investigate it.

Detective said she reviewed all the associated reports and saw nothing about a cell
phone. She said that she then reached out by email to Officer Hoffmeister; she said she
copied this email to her sergeant as well as his. She said she sent this message on a
Wednesday and, even though Officer Hoffmeister worked Thursday through Sunday, she
did not receive a reply from him until Sunday. In his reply he told her that he had an officer
collect the phone and that officer gave it to him but, he had inadvertently left it on a counter
at a northern fire station they use as a substation. Detective said she had them
“dump” the phone and while it contained a nude photo of a vagina there was no way to

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ascertain the age of the female. She said she also believed that they had identified a possible
suspect from this phone. Detective said she knew Officer Hoffmeister copied his
reply to Sergeant and Sergeant . Detective
said she believed this occurred between September and November 2017.

With nothing further to add, our interview concluded at 12:37 PM.

Follow-up Interview of Detective

After the interview of Chief Hall, it was felt a follow up interview was needed with Detective
I was attempting to conclude this
investigation she agreed to a phone interview. On Tuesday, May 8, 2018, at approximately
11:30 AM, I spoke by phone with Detective Our conversation was recorded. I told
her that I wanted to clarify with her some information about the accident scene that she had
responded to involving the nude driver. When asked, she said she could not recall who Chief
Hall first approached when he arrived on scene but knows he did approach her at one point
when she was down in the ravine near the accident scene. I asked if she could remember her
conversation with the Chief at that time and she said she could not. I asked her if there was
a conversation about the accident and Detective said while she could not recall for
certain she said she likely would have explained to him the call, what they knew, etc.

Detective said that she did not know how close Chief Hall had gotten to the vehicle
but, said she knew he was far down into the ravine as that was where she was when he
approached her. She said at that point they had backed off as fire was on scene and doing
their thing. I asked her if the driver was out of the car when Chief Hall arrived on scene.
Detective again said she was not certain if he was in or out of the car when Chief
Hall arrived on scene and added, “I do believe at one point when Chief was on scene the
driver did get out…himself but I don’t know if he was still in the car when Chief arrived and
then got out or if he was already out. I don’t recall that.” Detective said she also
could not recall if the driver was being treated by fire when the Chief arrived on scene.
When asked, Detective said she couldn’t recall if she had told the Chief about the
driver being naked but, it would have been apparent to him when he came down into the
ravine and saw him as the man was “obviously naked.” She said that Officer had
also broadcast it over the radio and Chief Hall may have heard that.

I reminded Detective that she had previously told me that Chief Hall had taken at
least one picture and asked her if she could describe how she had known he had taken a
picture. Detective replied, “I don’t know if I saw him taking the picture. I know that
he had made a comment about it, after the fact, that he going to delete the picture because it
was on his- I believe he uses his business phone for also his personal phone- but he made a
comment that he was going to delete it.” She said that she did not remember seeing him
take the picture but remembered there was conversation about it. I asked her where she was
when the Chief had taken the picture. She said that she would have been down in the ravine
on the perimeter of the scene providing security as it was call. She said she did
not know where the Chief or the driver was when the picture was taken.

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He said he asked his sergeant why another sergeant was reviewing his reports. Sergeant
said that he believed it was Officer that told him about a burglary report that
Sergeant Virgadamo had changed to a theft or lost property. He said someone had gone
into fenced commercial lot which by statute is a burglary but, Sergeant Virgadamo changed it
to either theft or trespassing because he said the fence wasn’t sturdy enough. Sergeant
said he had reported these concerns to Lieutenant

Our interview was concluded at 1:35 PM.

Interview of Former Lieutenant

On, Tuesday, February 27, 2018, at 7:00 PM, I met with retired Buckeye Lieutenant
at a restaurant in Peoria, Arizona. I had previously ascertained that he was aware of
the anonymous letter sent to Buckeye city officials and subsequently released to the media.
Mr. had agreed to our interview and I explained that I obviously could not compel
him to speak with me, so he should tell me if there was any question he did not wish to
answer. He indicated that he understood. This interview was recorded with the knowledge
of Mr. For full details of this interview refer to the digital recording; as follows is a
summary.

I told Mr. that the first area of questions I wanted to ask him about dealt with the
alleged falsification of crime statistics. I asked him if he knew anything about the allegation
that crime natures or UCR codes had been changed or lowered to make it appear that the
City of Buckeye had a lower crime rate than they actually did. He said he did and went on to
explain that in the past, sergeants had come to him and told him they were concerned as
Virgadamo had been changing the natures of crime. He gave an example that Virgadamo
would change a burglary report to a lost property report. I asked him if he had specific
examples and he said that the best way to determine this would be to ask Spillman to
conduct an audit of reports. I asked him if he believed that Chief Hall had knowledge of
this or condoned it. He said that he knows these allegations were raised in command staff
meetings when all of command staff were present; he is sure that Chief Hall was aware of
the allegations. He also said that Lieutenant Arlak vehemently denied this and he was the
one that reported crime statistics to the FBI. Mr. said that this had come up in
command staff meetings three to four times over the past three years.

I then asked Mr. if he had any knowledge of or had worked for an off-duty business
ran by Chief Hall. He said he had never worked off duty for Chief Hall but, was aware that
he and Gary McGeough were listed as principals in Blue Knights Security. He said he had
never worked for this business. He was unfamiliar with Orion Security and when asked
about jewelry security jobs filled by Chief Hall, Mr. said that he knew Hall and
McGeough would work a lot of these security details in Las Vegas.

I explained to Mr. that many of the allegations in the anonymous letters had dealt
with disparate or preferential treatment. I asked him if he was aware of Chief Hall knowing
about, yet failing to act on, major policy violations committed by McGeough. He said he did

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not and said that most of the conflicts arose because Sergeant Virgadamo had created a
hostile work environment for his fellow sergeants.

I asked Mr. if McGeough had acted on these complaints concerning Sergeant


Virgadamo and he recounted a situation that occurred about a month before he retired. He
said there had been a sergeants’ meeting in which several comments were made that Sergeant
Virgadamo had taken exception to. After the meeting, Sergeant Virgadamo had sent a
message to his fellow sergeants and copied it to he and Lieutenant McGeough. In this email,
Sergeant Virgadamo had said he was upset about comments made by one sergeant, which he
identified in the email. This email led to the mention that other agencies were hiring; job
applications for these agencies were subsequently left on a printer. Sergeant Virgadamo’s
email had a “ripple effect” with other Sergeants upset about the comments and sending each
other emails that were not professional. Mr. said after these initial emails he told all
the sergeants, in an email that was copied to Lieutenant McGeough that these emails and
comments needed to stop. It appeared to stop for a short time but about 3 hours after his
email, Sergeant Virgadamo began texting Sergeant . Mr. said at this point he
had lost his patience with this and wrote up a memo, requesting an internal investigation on
Sergeant Virgadamo. He said he had no idea if this was ever investigated. He added that he
still had a copy of the memo he had prepared, and he would provide it for me [This memo
was never provided to the investigator]. He said he had announced in a command staff
meeting that he had submitted this memo

Mr. said a short time later, he was called into a private meeting with Chief Hall and
Assistant Chief Sanders who told him that they had a body cam recording of a private
conversation between he and Sergeant . Mr. explained that this conversation
and the body cam recording took place a short time after the email exchanges referenced
above; he estimated it might have been a week later. He said all the comments made on the
recording were accurate except for his mention of Assistant Chief Mann being on leave for a
year. He also said he had made a request for the recording of this body cam video, but it was
ignored. He said he had gone to Sergeant , the body cam sergeant, to have that
portion of the recording redacted as it was not relevant to the domestic violence situation
that the recording was stored for. Instead “someone” provided it to Chief Hall and
Assistant Chief Sanders and he ultimately received an official written reprimand. He said
they took exception to his comments on the body cam recording and he was given a written
reprimand for violation of Department policy, conduct unbecoming, and failure to
supervise. Mr. said he didn’t dispute the written reprimand as he knew he probably
should not have said what he did. He said shortly after receiving the written reprimand he
was removed from SWAT and transferred to records where he was given a “tabletop desk”
to work at. He said he has a photograph of this “desk.”

Mr. said prior to his transfer, Records was just one of the responsibilities of the
assigned lieutenant but, it was given to him as his sole responsibility. He said the day after
learning of this transfer he decided he was “done with the Buckeye Police Department” and
he submitted his letter of retirement. Shortly after he submitted his retirement papers he
made a request to the HR Director, Nancy Love, to rescind it. She said she would have to

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When asked, Detective said he had no knowledge of a possible security business
operated by Chief Hall and Lieutenant McGeough and had never worked off duty for those
individuals. I said that running through the anonymous complaint letters were also
allegations of preferential and disparate treatment. I asked Detective if he had
knowledge of Chief Hall failing to act on policy violations committed by Lieutenant
McGeough. He said he had no information as it pertained to Lieutenant McGeough, but he
does have knowledge of Chief Hall failing to act on violations committed by Sergeant
. I told Detective I would address that further with him but first wanted to
address some other issues. I asked him if he had any information pertaining to Chief Hall
interfering in a PSU investigation involving sex on duty and he said he did not. He also had
no knowledge of Lieutenant McGeough failing to supervise his subordinates or covering up
their misconduct.

Detective said he was aware of the incident with Officer and the
motorcyclist who crashed and lost a leg. He said he was listening to the radio traffic and
from the transmissions, Officer voice, and the sirens in the background there
was no doubt in his mind that the “dude was in pursuit.”

When asked, Detective said he was not familiar with the incident in which Officer
Hoffmeister was alleged to have failed to log evidence. He also had no direct knowledge of
the situation involving Officer and the autistic teenager. Detective said
he was unaware of any instances of Lieutenant Arlak covering up misconduct of his brother-
in-law, Officer

I asked Detective if he had any examples of Chief Hall targeting supervisors to


cover up misconduct by Lieutenant McGeough or Officer He paused for a
moment and then said that he works with , who at one time was an acting
supervisor. He said that , who had been first on scene of an incident involving Officer
thought that the incident had been handled incorrectly. thought it
should have been handled with an IA investigation and thought it was “swayed” from the
start because of the officer involved. Detective pointed out that was
not a supervisor now.

Detective had no knowledge of either Chief Hall operating a City vehicle after
consuming alcohol or any misconduct on his part at the Phoenix Open.

We then returned to the subject of Sergeant . I told Detective that I


understood he had some information that involved Sergeant and a traffic stop on a
suspected drug trafficker. He indicated that he knew the situation I was referring to and
asked if he could look at his computer as he had made some notes. I told him that he could.
He explained that much of this information was “ingrained in his brain” as it made him “not
want to be a police officer anymore.” Detective said he didn’t have exact dates, but
he believed this occurred in October or November of 2016. He said that Assistant Chief
Mann had investigated this incident, so it was all documented and I should be able to get

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said this is a huge issue in the police department and if it doesn’t get resolved by
this investigation he is considering leaving. He added that there was so much of the
preferential treatment going on that it was making him, “rethink this whole profession.”

I asked Detective if he had anything he wanted to add. He reminded me that this


incident was documented, and Assistant Chief Mann has the paperwork. With nothing
further to add, our interview was concluded at 10:41.

Interview of Detective

On February 28, 2018, at approximately 10:51 AM, I met with Buckeye Detective
at the City of Buckeye’s Human Resources office, to interview him reference this
investigation. Present during our interview was his employee representative, Jason Woliver.
I explained to Detective that I would be asking him a series of questions related to
allegations that came up in the anonymous letter. I said it was understandable if he did not
know anything about the events in question, and he should not feel obligated to answer.

Prior to the interview, Detective was served a NOI that described the allegations
and identified his role as a witness in this investigation. This NOI provided Detective
with notification of his Garrity rights as well as the requirements that he be honest
and maintain investigation confidentiality. Detective advised he understood his
rights and responsibilities and signed the NOI indicating the same. This interview was
recorded with Detective knowledge. For full details of this interview refer to the
digital recording; as follows is a summary.

I then advised Detective that I would first be addressing allegations dealing with the
falsification of crime statistics. I asked him if he had knowledge of any member of the
Buckeye Police altering UCR or crime codes to a lesser offense with the intent of lowering
the perceived crime rate in the City of Buckeye. Detective said he did not know
what his intent was but, he was aware of Sergeant Jimmy Virgadamo changing criminal
codes. He explained that he was on Sergeant Virgadamo’s squad and there were times he
would submit reports and Sergeant Virgadamo would challenge him and change the crime
codes. He said that he could remember burglary reports with no evidence or suspects that
Sergeant Virgadamo would change to lost property. He said Sergeant Virgadamo would ask
when the last time was the victim saw the property and how did he know it wasn’t lost. He
said then it would be changed from a burglary to a lost property. Detective said he
only recall one or two times this happened to his reports and it would have been in
approximately 2014. He said he had worked for the Buckeye Police Department for
Detective said that he did not
know if Chief Hall or Lieutenant Arlak were aware that Sergeant Virgadamo was changing
statistics.

When asked, Detective said he had no knowledge of a possible security business


operated by Chief Hall and Lieutenant McGeough and had never worked off duty for these
individuals. He also had no knowledge of Chief Hall failing to act on policy violations

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I asked Detective if, to his knowledge, there had been any attempt to try to charge
these drivers with facilitation since they were assisting in drug trafficking. Detective
said he knew in the past that some detectives had done RICO seizures of vehicles that they
determined were doing food runs but didn’t know of anyone that was criminally charged.
He said the county attorney wouldn’t file on those charges just as they wouldn’t charge for
the money laundering.

Detective said sometime after this stop Chief Hall was at a meeting with some
Border Patrol supervisors who asked him if he had any guys working I-85. When Chief Hall
told them he did, the agents told him that these officers had “outed” a confidential
informant to his brother and had given the brother the agent’s name. He said Chief Hall
gave it to Assistant Chief Mann to investigate. Detective said Chief Mann had he
and Detective come talk to him. He said he knew Assistant Chief Mann had talked
to the Border Patrol agents and assumed he also talked to Sergeant . Detective
said he and Detective were not served Notices of Investigation.

Detective then said he had forgot a detail of the stop. He said the driver was
“pissed off” because they had searched his car after he told them they couldn’t. He agreed
that both he and Detective did not believe this was a consent search as the driver
had withdrawn consent and that the search was based on probable cause. He said that
Detective tried to calm the driver down telling him he didn’t want to get him or his
brother in trouble. He said the driver was pretty upset and Detective had tried to
calm him down. He assured the driver they weren’t taking the car and he was free to go.
Detective said a day or two after that stop Sergeant went out with he and
Detective on a different traffic stop. He said Sergeant told Detective
that the driver had complained to either the Border Patrol or someone that he was
“pissed off” because he had searched the car without PC. Sergeant said he had talked
to CID Lieutenant who said it was not a big deal and he should just give Detective
a blue team entry. When Detective argued that he was just doing as
directed, Sergeant then told him that the complaint was because Detective
had told the driver not to make a complaint because it would be bad for him and his
brother.

Detective said that Assistant Chief Mann continued with his investigation. He said
that Assistant Chief Mann wanted to take Sergeant out of Special Investigations
because he felt that his actions had damaged Buckeye PD’s reputation. Detective
said at that point they had been pulled off the road and weren’t allowed to work interdiction.
He said they had heard that DPS was not allowed to work with them unless it was an
emergency because their officers had been pulled into an IA over this. Detective
said that they had a meeting with Border Patrol, trying to hash out what had happened and
why. He said the Border Patrol Agent/handler was concerned for his safety and they were
worried about their confidential informant. Detective said he believed the Border
Patrol was just looking for an apology and even though they weren’t the ones that had given
the information out, he and Detective apologized for what had happened. He said
Sergeant remained defiant throughout the meeting, alleging he didn’t remember giving

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quality control. said the Lieutenant Arlak tells her when he has completed his
quality control checks so that can then query the records management system to
get numbers needed to complete her presentation.

Ms. was asked if in her prior employment as a crime analyst if she had worked
with UCR reporting, and she said that she did. Ms. said that Lieutenant Arlak
told her that he looks at every report daily to ensure that they are coded correctly. Ms.
said to her knowledge, the numbers are correct. She does not make
determinations about crime codes, she simply runs a computer check when told. When
asked, Ms. said that the numbers used for both UCR reporting and CompStat are
taken from the Spillman records management system.

Ms. was asked if she was aware of any other employees that also had the
responsibility to perform quality control checks with the UCR reporting codes. She said that
she believed that it was just Lieutenant Arlak that performed this function.

Ms. was then given a copy of a Buckeye Police Department report and asked if
she could explain her understanding of the “nature” of the call category as compared to the
“observed” category. She said the she believed that the “nature” category related to how the
call was reported to dispatch center and the “observed” category was a determination made
by the investigating officer.

Ms. was asked if an effort was made to ensure that the numbers she used for the
CompStat report were the same as the numbers that were reported to the Department of
Public Safety. said that she routinely checks with Lieutenant Arlak before pulling
numbers from the computer for the CompStat presentation to ensure that he has completed
his reviews. was asked when she conducted her computer queries for the
CompStat presentation. She said that the CompStat meetings occur on the second Thursday
of each month. Because of this, Ms. said that the Monday before the second
Thursday of each month is the deadline to have all the quality control work completed. This
provides her with at least a few days to complete her presentation.

Ms. was asked about her knowledge of report codes used by the Spillman records
management system. She said that Spillman had multiple codes for the same UCR reporting
categories. The category for burglaries was given as an example because Spillman has several
different report codes for situations involving a burglary. Ms. said that she uses a
template created by Spillman and simply runs the beginning and ending dates for the
numbers that she needs. She further stated that Spillman provides “canned reports” that
allow the user to put in the dates for the desired search and the program creates the report.
It was further clarified that these “canned reports” collect information from all categories of
crimes such burglaries and thefts and put them into the appropriate Part 1 category.

Ms. was then asked what purpose would be served by going back and changing a
UCR code months or years after it was created. Ms. then began to explain what
she does when she prepares CompStat presentation. She said the she would take the March

155
2018 stats and compare them against the February 2018 stats, and then she would show the
year to date totals for the current and the previous year. Ms. further stated that
she must rerun the numbers for the month before the reporting month because they are
sometimes different. She said the numbers may be off by “one or two.” She said this is
because the status of a few of the reports may have been changed due to new information.

Ms. was then presented with a hypothetical situation where Part 1 crime codes
were changed to non-reportable codes to lower the number of offenses for the UCR report,
and then these non-reportable codes were changed back to Part 1 crime codes months later.
Given this scenario, Ms. acknowledged that an inquiry for the entire year would
have a greater number of Part 1 offenses than the sum of the individual monthly queries.
Ms. said the she did not do a specific report for the entire year, but she does year
to date inquires monthly. Because of this, she believes that if non-reportable codes were
changed back to Part 1 codes, it would eventually be noticed, and she has not seen this. Ms.
then said in theory the numbers should be consistent but because of new
developments, some reports change, and it is a best practice to rerun the numbers each time
she prepares a report. Ms. was then asked if she had ever added up the month to
month totals and compared them against a year to date total to see if they were consistent,
and she said that she had not.

Ms. then again spoke about her understanding of Lieutenant Arlak’s


responsibilities for the quality control of the crime reporting. When asked, she said that she
has nothing to do with the decisions about correct codes for crime reports. She further said
that she does not even read the reports. Ms. was asked if she knew if there was
anyone else in the Department that worked with the UCR reporting. She said that she
believed that Lieutenant Arlak was the only person, but she had heard rumors that some of
the sergeants had the ability to recode reports, but she was not certain. The interview was
concluded at 3:30 p.m.

Interview with Lieutenant Bruce Root

On March 28, 2018, at approximately 4:45 p.m., I met with Buckeye Police Department
Lieutenant Bruce at the City of Buckeye’s Human Resources office, to interview him
reference this investigation. Present during our interview was his employee representative,
Jason Woliver. I explained to Lieutenant Root that I would be asking him a series of
questions related to allegations that came up in the anonymous letter.

Prior to the interview, Lieutenant Root was served a NOI that described the allegations and
identified his role as a subject in this investigation. This NOI provided Lieutenant Root
with notification of his Garrity rights as well as the requirements that he be honest and
maintain investigation confidentiality. Lieutenant Root said he understood his rights and
responsibilities and signed the NOI indicating the same. This interview was recorded with
Lieutenant Root’s knowledge. For full details of this interview refer to the digital recording;
as follows is a summary.

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Lieutenant Root was asked how for how long he had been employed by the Buckeye Police
Department, and he said the he began in March of 2011. Lieutenant Root was asked if he
had other law enforcement experience, and he said that he worked for the Mesa Police
Department for about three years before coming to the City of Buckeye. Lieutenant Root
also pointed out that there was no lapse in service between his employment with the City of
Mesa and Buckeye. I asked Lieutenant Root if he worked with Chief Hall at the City of
Mesa, and he said that he did not, but he knew of Chief Hall while in Mesa.

I asked Lieutenant Root if he was familiar with the content of the anonymous letter that is
the focus of this investigation. He said that he had limited knowledge of letter and did not
know who wrote it. Lieutenant Root was told that an allegation was made in the letter that
Chief Hall was aware that subordinates were falsifying crime statistics for the UCR reporting
and was asked if he knew anything about this claim. Lieutenant Root said that officers will
sometimes incorrectly code a report due to inexperience or lack of training. Lieutenant Root
then provided an example where an officer went to house with an open door. The officer
could incorrectly assume that a burglary took place when it fact it could be just an unsecured
premise. He further explained that it is common practice to leave a business card and
attempt to contact the occupant of the house to determine if a burglary had in fact occurred.
If no contact is made, then the incident would not be labeled a burglary. Lieutenant Root
then provided a similar example involving unsecured vehicles. Lieutenant Root was asked if
he had any knowledge about Sergeant Virgadamo or Lieutenant Arlak changing UCR crime
codes, and he said that he did not. Lieutenant Root was asked if he had ever been made
aware that Sergeant Virgadamo had been given the responsibility of performing quality
control for the UCR report, and he said that he had not.

Lieutenant Root was asked about his knowledge of Chief Hall and Lieutenant McGeough’s
security business. He said that he knew that they had worked together but did not know that
they were partners in a licensed business until the release of the anonymous letter. I asked
Lieutenant Root if he knew the nature of this business and he said that it was jewelry security
and transportation. Root was asked if he had ever worked for either Hall or McGeough
doing this type of security. He said that when he worked for the Mesa Police Department
he worked security at a large jewelry show in Las Vegas. He said that he worked security for
this show as part of a group of about 10 or 12 Mesa Police officers, and he was employed by
a company called Malca-Amit. Lieutenant Root said that this was the only time that he did
this type of security work.

Lieutenant Root was then told that there was an allegation in the anonymous letter that dealt
with a Professional Standards investigation from about five years ago where Root
. I explained to Lieutenant Root that I was not re-
investigating this complaint, and I was only focused on determining why, then Assistant
Chief Larry Hall, intervened in the investigation and interviewed Root, instead of allowing
the assigned PSU investigator, Sergeant Joe Robinson to conduct the interview. Lieutenant
Root said that he was asked only one question by then Assistant Chief Hall about the PSU
investigation. He said he did not know why Assistant Chief Hall chose to conduct the
interview instead of Sergeant Robinson.

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Lieutenant Root was then asked if he was aware of an alleged pursuit involving Officer
in which the motorcyclist crashed and suffered severe injuries. Lieutenant Root
said he was aware of the incident but was not involved. Lieutenant Root said the only
involvement was when discussion took place about a former lieutenant who had not
followed through with his obligation to investigate the matter.

Lieutenant Root was then told that an allegation in the anonymous letter stated that Officer
Hoffmeister failed to properly submit evidence from an investigation involving the alleged
theft of a large sum of money. According to this allegation, Hoffmeister and, then Sergeant
Root, conspired to sneak the evidence into the Property and Evidence Section. Root denied
this charge and said that he was not even Hoffmeister’s immediate supervisor at the time.
Lieutenant Root further stated that he remembered this investigation because it was very
distinct. Lieutenant Root said that he was the Criminal Investigation sergeant at the time,
and he simply instructed Detective to take the evidence and proceed with the
investigation. This was the extent of his involvement in this matter.

Lieutenant Root was then asked if he was involved with the situation when Officer
encountered an Autistic child in park in Verrado. He said that he was not except
for discussion that took place at a community meeting when questions were asked about this
matter. Lieutenant Root was asked if he was part of the decision-making process that led to
the Department’s response to this incident. Root said that at the time, he was assigned to
Criminal Investigations and neither nor his immediate supervisor were in Root’s
chain of command.

Lieutenant Root was also asked if he was familiar with the double homicide
investigation, and he said that he was familiar with this case. Root was told that an
allegation had been made that Lieutenant McGeough told people that he was misinformed
by Officer , and if he (McGeough) had known all the facts, his actions would have
been different. Lieutenant Root said that he had never heard remarks like this from
McGeough.

Lieutenant Root was asked if he had ever directly supervised Officer Root said
that to the best of his recollection, he had not. He further clarified this response by saying
he had many different assignments with the Department. I asked Lieutenant Root if there
was ever an occasion where he observed misconduct by attempted to act, and
was prevented from addressing the situation. Lieutenant Root said this had never happened.
I asked him if he had ever witnessed a situation where Chief Hall targeted supervisors to
prevent them from acting against Lieutenant McGeough or Officer for policy
violations, and he said that he had not.

Lieutenant Root was asked and did not have any information about Chief Hall operating a
city vehicle after consuming alcohol, and he did not know anything about the allegation that
Hall was caught trying to sneak someone into the Phoenix Open golf tournament.

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On May 7, 2018, I spoke to on the telephone to ask some further questions
about the Spillman system UCR reporting program. I asked her how the Spillman UCR
reporting program accounted for multiple victims (and thus multiple offenses) of aggravated
assaults or similar crimes for the same report. said that with multiple victims the
officer would have to list each victim in an involvement screen with a criminal offense for
each victim.

I also asked about a scenario where a person left their cell phone on a table or
counter, unattended for some amount of time and discovered that it was missing when they
returned. was asked if it should be coded as a theft or a lost property, and she
said it should be coded as a theft. said an exception would be if a reporting
party told police that they lost it between WalMart and Walgreens, it would be considered
lost property. said that if a person finds a phone and refuses it to return it to the
owner, then this would also be considered a theft.

was asked about packages delivered by courier services to a front door but never
received by the resident. said that notification by Fed Ex or UPS that a package
was in fact delivered is sufficient to determine that a theft occurred and should be reported
as such.

Interview of Lieutenant Gary McGeough

On April 5, 2018, I met with Buckeye Lieutenant Gary McGeough, at the City of Buckeye’s
Human Resources office, to interview him reference this investigation. Present during our
interview was Lieutenant McGeough’s employee representative, Neil Landeen, an attorney
with the Law Offices of Yen, Pilch, and Landeen, P.C. Lieutenant McGeough had been
served a NOI that described the allegations and identified his role as a subject in this
investigation. This NOI provided Lieutenant McGeough with notification of his Garrity
rights as well as the requirements that he be honest and maintain investigation
confidentiality. Prior to the interview, I reviewed the NOI with Lieutenant McGeough. He
advised he understood his rights and responsibilities and signed the NOI indicating the
same. Our interview began at 2:44 PM. This interview was recorded with Lieutenant
McGeough’s knowledge. For full details of this interview refer to the digital recording; as
follows is a summary.

Lieutenant McGeough advised that he had started his law enforcement career at the city of
New York Police Department (NYPD) in 1992. He said after he had “vested” at NYPD in
2002 he retired and joined a private business doing courier work for a logistics company. He
said he left this company in approximately 2008 or 2009. He said he took a year off and
moved his family to Arizona. He later clarified he came to Arizona in December of 2009.
He said he first applied as a reserve officer with the city of Buckeye, but before he started he
was hired as a regular officer in January 2010. He said that he was promoted to sergeant in
mid-2012 and then to Lieutenant in October 2016. When asked about the different
assignments he had worked, Lieutenant McGeough first stated “community policing” then

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said he had worked a Streets Narcotic Unit, a ceremonial unit, regular patrol, as a special
detail liaison, and in the highway patrol unit. After leaving NYPD he worked for a logistics
company, moving diamonds and gold all over the world. He said he left there as Vice
President of North American Operations. Since he joined the Buckeye Police Department
McGeough said he had worked patrol, and as an accident investigator and a traffic TLO. He
said that he was promoted to sergeant and worked in the Professional Standards Unit a
couple of years.

I told Lieutenant McGeough that I understood that a copy of the anonymous letter that had
initiated this investigation had been given to Chief Hall. I asked him if he had the
opportunity to read it and he said he had. I reminded him that a common theme running
through this letter was the alleged preferential treatment given to a group of individuals
referred to as the “New York Mafia” due to their association with NYPD. I asked if he had
known Chief Hall before being hired with Buckeye. Lieutenant McGeough said that when
he had worked for New York PD he came out to Arizona. He explained he had been hired
by Mesa Police Department and while going through the academy he broke his tibia. He
said he worked for Mesa about 10 months before returning to New York. He said that
while at the Mesa Police Department he met Chief Hall. He said he had also worked in the
same unit at NYPD with Chief Hall’s brother. Lieutenant McGeough said after coming to
Arizona in December 2009, and prior to being hired by Buckeye PD, he and his wife went
out to dinner with Larry Hall, who was a lieutenant at the time. He said that was the only
time he had ever socialized off duty with Hall. Lieutenant McGeough said he did not know
Sergeant James Virgadamo, a former NYPD officer, until he came to Arizona. He also did
not know Lieutenant Bruce Root, a former Mesa PD officer, prior to joining Buckeye PD.

I told Lieutenant McGeough another concern expressed in the anonymous letter was the
changing of UCR codes. I asked him to explain his knowledge of Uniform Crime Reporting
in the City of Buckeye. He said that when an officer completed a report they would select
both a crime nature and a UCR code. He said for whatever crime nature they select there
should be a corresponding UCR code. Lieutenant McGeough gave the example of a report
on a traffic stop. He said the nature would be changed to traffic offense and under UCR
codes they could select among several including traffic- criminal or traffic-civil. He said
when data gets pulled from Spillman it pulls from these UCR codes.

I asked Lieutenant McGeough if a person reported a crime but, did not desire prosecution
would it still be reported as a crime. I gave the example of if a phone was stolen, but the
victim did not want prosecution, would this still be reported as a theft. He said it would be.
I then asked about an apparent crime discovered by an officer; if an automobile was found
with its doors open and it was apparent it had been rummaged through how this would be
recorded. Lieutenant McGeough said there had been no consistency among officers about
this; some would report it as suspicious activity, some a trespass, and some as a burglary
vehicle. I asked him how, for UCR purposes, should this be reported. Lieutenant
McGeough said if nothing had been taken “most of the time” it should be reported as a
trespass.

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I then asked Lieutenant McGeough who would be in the best position to determine the
appropriate UCR code for a crime; would it be the reporting officer. He said it would be the
supervisor who was responsible for quality control when reviewing the officer’s report. I
asked him if there would be a reason for a report to be changed after a supervisor had
reviewed it. Lieutenant McGeough said yes; he said Lieutenant Arlak was the Spillman
administrator and had the final responsibility of quality control review of reports. I asked
him if an officer would be notified of any changes to their report. He said no, not for a UCR
code. I asked him if it would be a good idea in order to correct mistakes. Lieutenant
McGeough agreed and said, “It would be a better practice.” I asked him if he had ever been
told by anyone in authority that Virgadamo had been given the authority to do quality
control of reports. Lieutenant McGeough said of Virgadamo, “…when he was acting
lieutenant, from my understanding, Assistant Chief Mann gave him authority to do quality
control.” He said that this authority was not rescinded when Virgadamo went back to his
sergeant position. Lieutenant McGeough said that he had never seen this directive in writing
and he does not know if this authority had been communicated to the patrol officers and
sergeants. When asked, he said that he had no knowledge of any member of the Buckeye
police department changing UCR codes to lessen an offense when the change was not
justified. I asked if anyone had reported such behavior to him and he said no.

I then reminded Lieutenant McGeough that the anonymous letter had talked about the
perception of preferential treatment, particularly as it related to discipline. I asked
Lieutenant McGeough to explain a supervisory inquiry. He said if a supervisor received a
citizen complaint from the outside it would be logged as a “citizen complaint.” He said if a
supervisor received an internal complaint or discovered an employee had violated policy it
would be logged as a “supervisory inquiry.” He said it gets created in the system and from
there it gets “work flowed” through the chain. He explained that work flow is an internal
tracking method. He said it was almost like emailing something to a person but, the system
only allowed a sergeant to work flow a report to their immediate supervisor.

I asked Lieutenant McGeough who decided if something would be handled as an inquiry as


opposed to a formal PSU investigation. He said according to policy only the Chief can
initiate a PSU investigation. I asked him approximately how many investigations were
handled by PSU in an average year. He said in the Buckeye Police Department they
averaged approximately 5 to 8 PSU investigations in a year.

I asked Lieutenant McGeough what investigations go to the Discipline Review Board. He


again said that was up to the Chief. He said based on the final findings of a PSU
investigation the Chief will determine rather the investigation will go to a Disciplinary
Review Board. He said in that situation the investigator determines whether the allegations
are sustained or not and the board can accept or disagree with the investigator’s findings. I
asked Lieutenant McGeough who made up the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB). He said a
Lieutenant usually chairs the DRB and is a non-voting member. He said a sergeant is also
chosen along with two association members and a civilian, usually from Human Resources.
He said along with determining the findings, the DRB makes recommendations on discipline
to the Chief. Lieutenant McGeough could not tell me how many PSU investigations had

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gone to a DRB, even for the two years he was in PSU from approximately October 2014 to
December 2016. He said after he was promoted to Lieutenant he stayed in PSU for a few
months to transition duties to the new PSU sergeant.

I then told Lieutenant McGeough I wanted to discuss with him a complaint made against
Officer by two females who were alleged to have stolen pallets from a construction
site. He said he was familiar with this situation and confirmed it was initiated after the
women involved complained to a supervisor. I asked Lieutenant McGeough what exactly
the women’s complaints were. I asked if their complaint had been excessive force; that
holding them at gunpoint had been unreasonable. Lieutenant McGeough said he was not
sure and he would be “speculating” if he answered. I asked Lieutenant McGeough if it was
possible if a complaint of excessive force could end in serious discipline; could the officer be
suspended or terminated if the complaint was sustained. He again said he would be
“speculating.” He said, “…maybe in other agencies” and added that he had not yet seen that
happen at Buckeye PD. I asked Lieutenant McGeough if Officer had been served an
NOI when he was called in and spoken to about this complaint. He said it was the
immediate supervisor who initially spoke to Officer and Lieutenant McGeough did
not believe this supervisor served him a NOI as he was still in the “fact finding stage.” He
said he was unsure if the supervisor allowed Officer to view his body camera video
that documented this incident. Lieutenant McGeough did not believe this investigation was
sent to PSU.

I discussed briefly with Lieutenant McGeough use of force investigations. I asked him if
there was a board that reviewed them. Lieutenant McGeough said there had been a board
and then it changed and Assistant Chief Mann was the only one that reviewed the use of
force incidents. Lieutenant McGeough said now they are in the process of changing the
review process back to a board.

I then returned to the incident and asked Lieutenant McGeough if he had directed the
sergeant to review Officer s body camera footage of other citizen contacts he had
engaged in. He said he had and when asked why Lieutenant McGeough said he had spoken
with his direct supervisor, Assistant Chief Sanders, about this situation. Lieutenant
McGeough said that according to their policy they can do a “audit trail” to assure there were
no other areas of concern. He said he believed in this situation they only went back 30 days
and the sergeant found other issues. I asked him if this was something he did regularly or
had done before. He replied, “There’s just an audit trail…” I interrupted him and asked him
what he meant by audit trail. He explained, “we kinda go in and look at quality control. We
don’t always look at videos. We look at if they are categorized right. We send that report out
once a month.”

I told Lieutenant McGeough that it had been alleged that supervisors were viewing the body
cam footage of officers who had spoken out against them to find information and retaliate.
I asked him if Buckeye’s policy allowed a sergeant to go in and view any officer’s body cam
footage. Lieutenant McGeough said he believed policy used to allow that but it is now
restricted to just the sergeant’s own subordinates. He said he believed that policy changed

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I then discussed with Lieutenant McGeough an “email spat” that involved Sergeant
Virgadamo and Lieutenant after a sergeants meeting. He said that he was familiar
with the incident. He did not remember much about the sergeants meeting but said that
after the meeting Sergeant Virgadamo sent an email saying that some sergeants wanted more
career opportunities, so Phoenix was hiring. I asked if he thought that was appropriate and
he said, “I gave him a letter of reprimand for it.” He said it was done as a supervisor inquiry.
I then asked him about the homicide in which had murdered his parents. I
told him I was not questioning the handling of the incident but, I did want to ask him if he
believed that Officer had given him all the information he needed to make an
informed decision. He told me no and said that Officer had not told him that the
parents had attempted to take in for a psych evaluation earlier that day and
had changed their minds and come home. He said that if he had known that he probably
would have had an officer go with the father when he transported the son to the hospital.
He said that when they left the scene the father was driving his son to get help. They later
learned that before they got to the mental health facility the son again convinced his father
to turn around and go back home. I asked Lieutenant McGeough if he had ever told anyone
else that he believed Officer had withheld needed information from him and he told
me no.

I then discussed with Lieutenant McGeough the allegation that there was a business
relationship between he and Chief Hall that was a conflict of interest. I told him I had
located on the Arizona Corporation Commission’s website the information for Blue Knights
Securities LLC. I said that this shows that both he and Chief Hall had an involvement in it
and I asked him if that was correct. He said, “At that time-yes.” Lieutenant McGeough said
that Blue Knights LLC was formed as business that would do courier work with a jeweler
back in New York that he had previously done business with. He said that it was formed in
2013 when he was a sergeant and Larry Hall was the assistant chief. He said that in 2013
Chief Hall was a silent partner. He said in 2014, Chief Hall “basically had no involvement”
and in 2015 he was not even part of the filing of taxes for Blue Knights. Lieutenant
McGeough said he also was no longer involved in Blue Knights. He said that he believed
that when they formed the business he did the paperwork through DPS for the security
portion and that he used Legal Zoom for the business paperwork which cost him
approximately $500.00 to $600.00.

I asked Lieutenant McGeough if the business had been formed for tax purposes. He told
me that it was originally formed with the idea that in the future they would expand and have
a security company working underneath it, but it never came to fruition. I asked him if they
had done business under Blue Knights and he said they had for one client out of New York,
Ferrari Express. I told him that it appeared from emails that both he and Chief Hall had, at
some time, been working or coordinating armed security escorts. I asked him if he was still
involved in that and he said, “No.” I asked him when the last time was he had done this,
and he asked me, “With Chief Hall you mean?” He started to answer, but then told me,
“And I wasn’t armed. It’s not considered armed.” Lieutenant McGeough told me that it
was not armed security work. He explained that he had checked with DPS and they had told
him, “It doesn’t fall under security, even though we registered with them-and that it was a

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courier-based company and so we followed their direction when I spoke with DPS… Not
everyone had to be armed when we were doing the courier work.” He told me that if they
did require someone to be armed it would usually be him. I asked Lieutenant McGeough if
he had hired off duty officers to work these escorts and he told me he would occasionally do
so if they needed to “backfill.” I asked if these officers were required to be armed. He said if
they were doing the escort by themselves they might need to be but, some clients did not
want them to be armed. It depended on the request by the client and the value of the items.
I asked him when he had last worked for Ferrari Express. Lieutenant McGeough said that
he was doing their contract work while working under Blue Knights. He said that he
continued afterwards working directly for Ferrari Express and was 10-99’d by their business.
He said he last did work for Ferrari Express in approximately June 2017. He said he
stopped and he became too busy. He said they would still ask him to
work but, he just does not have the time. Lieutenant McGeough, when asked to clarify his
duties and responsibilities while working for Ferrari, explained that they did not include
escorting people but rather, they would deliver packages. He said, “Think of UPS-same
idea.” He said they picked up the package from UPS and delivered it to the client, whether it
was to their home or a business.

I told Lieutenant McGeough that there had been discussion about a week-long jewelry show
in Las Vegas. He said that it was “part of the business on that side;” every year in May and
June there were jewelry shows. Lieutenant McGeough said he was paid as a coordinator for
Ferrari Express for the jewelry shows as they required bringing off duty officers in from
around the country. He said other than that he was paid only for the jobs he worked. He
estimated he was paid $1000.00 to coordinate and assure staffing for these shows on top of
whatever wages he was paid for working. Lieutenant McGeough did not recall being paid
as a coordinator for any other work he did with Ferrari. He said that “normal jobs” with
Ferrari paid $30.00 an hour and there was either a 3 or 4 hour minimum for each job.

I asked Lieutenant McGeough if Chief Hall had ever worked for him when he was
coordinating jobs for Ferrari. He replied, “I would say he probably did a handful.” He
explained further, “…He was involved. He was a partner at that time.” I asked him how
many years he had worked the Las Vegas jewelry shows while he was with the City of
Buckeye. He said that he believed the first time was in 2011 or 2012 and then “each year
after that.” He said he also worked these shows in 2013 and 2014 and then estimated that
he worked them 4 or 5 years while working for the Buckeye Police Department. I asked him
if he had coordinated jobs for Ferrari since he had become a lieutenant. He said that he
wasn’t sure what I meant by “coordinate.” I explained that I had located emails, particularly
involving Chief Hall, in which a client would indicate they needed two people and then he
would locate individuals to work. I said that some of the emails had indicated that he was the
coordinator. Lieutenant McGeough replied, “For Ferrari. He [Hall] was doing some other
work with somebody else that had nothing to do with me.” I asked him if this work of
Chief Hall’s was part of Blue Knight. Lieutenant McGeough replied, “Some of the other
stuff that he did had no involvement with Blue Knights. I don’t remember the name of the
company-I think it was Orion-was some of the work that he was involved with that had
nothing to do with me.” I asked Lieutenant McGeough if he had ever worked for Orion.

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McGeough said that he was very familiar with operations of Orion and Malca Amit and
would sometimes help if needed.

I then asked Lieutenant McGeough what steps he would take to ensure that the off-duty
work did not conflict with his primary duties. He said that they were done on his days off.
He further clarified that he may have taken leave time to work some details or worked details
that occurred outside of his regular scheduled worktime. When asked, Lieutenant
McGeough said he would use his personal phone and email to schedule jobs.

Lieutenant McGeough was asked if he completed the necessary outside work permits for the
City of Buckeye, and he said that he did, and they were turned into Assistant Chief Mann.
Lieutenant McGeough was asked if he turned in new paperwork every year. He said that he
was not sure what the policy said back then, but he discussed it with Mann and believed that
he did what was required. Lieutenant McGeough was asked if he believed that he had ever
had a business relationship with Larry Hall as defined by Buckeye Police Department policy.
He said he would not call it a relationship, but it was a partnership in a business. He further
stated that Hall had little involvement with except for occasionally looking for help filling
jobs on the eastside of town. Lieutenant McGeough was asked if he was familiar with the
Department’s definition of a business relationship, and he said that he was not. Lieutenant
McGeough was then given a copy of Buckeye Police Department #1050, entitled
“Nepotism and Conflicting Relationships,” and he was asked to read the definition of a
“Business Relationship.” He was then asked if a business relationship existed with he and
Hall. He responded by saying that this policy was not in effect at the time they started Blue
Knights. He further stated that he filled out memos and turned them into his supervisor
prior to starting the business. Lieutenant McGeough agreed that using the current
definition, there was a business relationship between he and Hall. Lieutenant McGeough
was asked if the current definition was also in the previous policy, was he aware of it, and he
said that he was not.

Lieutenant McGeough was then asked if he was familiar with the allegation of Chief Hall
attending the Phoenix Open with passes obtained from a construction company. He said
that he was not, and he has never attended the Phoenix Open either by himself or with
anyone from the Department.

I then told Lieutenant McGeough that I did not have any further questions and asked him if
he had anything to add. Lieutenant McGeough said there was only one person knew about
his partnership with Hall and that was Mark Mann. He further stated that the partnership
only lasted a little over a year and he was on his own after that. He said that he talked to
Mann and assumed that everything was ok. Lieutenant McGeough then talked about the
investigation mentioned in the anonymous letter and said that only people that
could have known was retired Lieutenant Sergeant and Sergeant
At this point it appeared to me that Lieutenant McGeough was trying to identify the person
or persons that wrote the anonymous letter. I explained to Lieutenant McGeough that I had
not attempted to identify who wrote the letter because I did not want to be perceived as
retaliating against the author of the letter. Lieutenant McGeough said that he felt that hard-

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working people were being retaliated against by people who did not like being held
accountable.

I then concluded the interview at 4:01 p.m.

Interview of Lieutenant Charles Arlak

On April 11, 2018, I met with Buckeye Lieutenant Charles Arlak, at the City of Buckeye’s
Human Resources office, to interview him reference this investigation. Lieutenant Arlak
chose not to have an employee representative present for this interview. Lieutenant Arlak
had been served a NOI that described the allegations and identified his role as a subject of
this investigation. This NOI provided Lieutenant Arlak with notification of his Garrity
rights as well as the requirements that he be honest and maintain investigation
confidentiality. Prior to the interview, Lieutenant Arlak reviewed the NOI. He advised he
understood his rights and responsibilities and signed the NOI indicating the same. Our
interview began at 2:03 PM. This interview was recorded with Lieutenant Arlak’s
knowledge. For full details of this interview refer to the digital recording; as follows is a
summary.

I began the interview by asking Lieutenant Arlak to provide details about his law
enforcement career. He stated that he started with the Arizona State University Police
Department in 1995 and came to work for the Buckeye Police Department in 1996. He
stated that he had been assigned to many different positions within the Buckeye Police
Department, noting that he had done about everything except “handle a dog.” Lieutenant
Arlak said he had worked patrol and had been a patrol sergeant. He had also been the
Criminal Investigation Division sergeant and lieutenant, and the records unit and dispatch
manager. He said that at one point their Chief had left suddenly, and he was one of a group
of three people that acted as the interim chief of police for approximately 7 months until a
new Chief was appointed. Lieutenant Arlak said for the past two years he had been the
Criminal Investigations Division (CID) Lieutenant where he supervises all the CID functions
including the persons and property crimes units and a specialty unit known as Bandit. He is
also the SWAT commander, honor guard supervisor, and the system administrator of their
records management system.

Lieutenant Arlak was asked if he had seen the anonymous letter that resulted in this
investigation. He said that he was familiar with the content and had read the letter twice.
The last time that he read the letter was in late October of 2017. I asked Lieutenant Arlak
about the “New York Mafia” referred to in the letter and asked him about his thoughts on
being included in this group. He said that he thought it was “silly” and he had been hearing
about this alleged group for over ten years. Lieutenant Arlak explained the “New York
Mafia” label has been used both negatively as well as in a light-hearted manner over the
years. Lieutenant Arlak was asked about his relationship with Chief Hall. He described
them as friends and said that in past years he socialized with the chief while off-duty much
more than he does now. He further stated he has not socialized with the chief outside of
work for over a year. I also asked him about his relationship with Lieutenant McGeough,

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and he said that he socialized with McGeough at barbeques and other group functions, but
they are not close friends. He said that this also applied to his relationship with Sergeant
Virgadamo. Lieutenant Arlak said he was friends with Mark Mann and since Mann and Hall
had a falling out it made it more difficult to spend time with both.

I then explained to Lieutenant Arlak that claims of unequal treatment among employees,
particularly as it relates to the disciplinary process, had been raised throughout the
investigation. I asked Lieutenant Arlak about his experience with internal investigations and
if he had ever held a position in the Professional Standards Unit. He said that he had not but
had conducted an internal investigation in 2001 at the direction of the chief. I asked
Lieutenant Arlak about the disciplinary process at the police department. I gave Lieutenant
Arlak a hypothetical situation involving a supervisor that discovered misconduct on the part
of a subordinate. I asked Lieutenant Arlak to explain the process of initiating an internal
investigation. Lieutenant Arlak said that the supervisor would gather all the facts by talking
to the subordinate and would then determine whether it could be handled at the supervisor’s
level based on the department’s discipline matrix. If not, the supervisor would then move
up the chain of command to their immediate supervisor. This process would continue and
ultimately, the chief would decide if an investigation was warranted. The chief would also
decide how the investigation would be conducted. The options for this would be a Blue
Team entry, a Supervisory Inquiry, or a Professional Standard Unit investigation. When
asked, Lieutenant Arlak said that this process was the same for complaints that were initiated
within the department as well as from outside of the department.

I asked Lieutenant Arlak to provide his insight as to how the chief would make the decision
about how an investigation would be handled. Lieutenant Arlak said that he believed that it
would be based largely on the discipline matrix and the employee’s history. Lieutenant Arlak
was asked if he could determine some commonalities with the investigations that are
forwarded to the Professional Standards Unit. He said that he could not because he was not
privileged to what investigations were handled by PSU. Lieutenant Arlak was asked if he
knew what cases were forwarded to the Disciplinary Review Board (“DRB”) and which
investigations were decided by the chief. Lieutenant Arlak said that investigations that were
conducted by PSU, when discipline was contemplated, would be sent to the review board.
Lieutenant Arlak also said that an employee had the option of waiving the review board and
could have the matter decided by the chief. The DRB makes recommendations to the Chief
who has the final say in whatever discipline is decided.

Lieutenant Arlak was asked if the department had a procedure for reporting a use of force or
response to resistance issues. Lieutenant Arlak said forms had to be completed and
forwarded through the chain of command to the Response to Resistance Review Board.
Lieutenant Arlak also stated that recommendation about the incident are made at each level
of supervision and the Assistant Chief makes the final determination about the
reasonableness of the conduct of the officer.

I asked Lieutenant Arlak if the department had policies that restricted a supervisor’s ability
to view body cam footage. Lieutenant Arlak said he believed Sergeant the PSU

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sergeant who is also in charge of the body cam program, had placed some restrictions that
allowed only certain people to view body camera footage, but he was unsure what those
restrictions were. Lieutenant Arlak was asked what would prevent a supervisor from viewing
an officer’s body camera footage to look for policy violations to retaliate against the officer
for speaking out against the supervisor. Lieutenant Arlak replied supervisors have more
rights to view body camera footage than officers and he was not aware of anything that
could prevent this from happening. Lieutenant Arlak was asked if he was aware of any
supervisors engaging in this type of retaliatory behavior, and he said he was not and had
never done so himself. Lieutenant Arlak further stated that he had viewed other officers’
body camera footage but only for official purposes.

Lieutenant Arlak was asked if he knew Chief Hall and Lieutenant McGeough were business
partners in a business named Blue Knight Security. He said that he became aware of this
after reading the letter. Lieutenant Arlak said he believed that this business was involved in
security for jewelry dealers, but he knew nothing else, and he had never worked off duty for
either McGeough or Hall. He said he knew of nothing that indicated this off-duty work
was sanctioned or approved. Lieutenant Arlak was asked if he had heard of companies
known as Malca Amit, Ferrari Express, or Orion, and he said that he was not familiar with
any of these businesses. Lieutenant Arlak was asked if he knew of any Buckeye Police
officers that had worked for Hall or McGeough. He said that he believed, but was not
certain, that John Larson worked off-duty for either Hall or McGeough.

I then told Lieutenant Arlak that another allegation in the letter was that he was covering up
policy violations for his brother-in-law, Officer and was attempting to help
get a medical retirement that was questionable in nature. Lieutenant Arlak was
asked if he had ever interceded on behalf to avoid investigations of policy
violations, and Lieutenant Arlak replied “Absolutely not.” Lieutenant Arlak was asked why
people would be suspicious about his relationship with He pointed out that the
allegations in the letter state that had not been disciplined appropriately for policy
violations. He said because they are related, others must assume that he (Arlak) was
responsible for the alleged failure to hold accountable. Lieutenant Arlak was
asked if he had ever been in chain of command. Lieutenant Arlak said that at
one point, there was a sergeant between them. When asked, Lieutenant Arlak denied
helping obtain a medical retirement.

When asked, Lieutenant Arlak said he was familiar with the allegation that Chief Hall
attended the Phoenix Open and attempted to sneak another person into a secured area using
his wrist band. Lieutenant Arlak said that he had attended the Phoenix Open with Chief
Hall in the past but had never witnessed the conduct described in this allegation. Lieutenant
Arlak was asked if he had seen Chief Hall intoxicated at the Phoenix Open, and he said that
he could not speculate. Lieutenant Arlak was asked if he was aware of anyone from the
police department being given complimentary or free tickets to the Bird’s Nest or other
similar venue. Lieutenant Arlak said that he had not received free tickets but believed that
this could have happened. He said that it was possible as all military, police, and fire get a

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“badge” if they show their ID at the gate which might get them privileges. When asked,
Lieutenant Arlak said that he had never seen Chief Hall operate a city vehicle after drinking.
I then began to ask Lieutenant Arlak questions related to the Spillman records management
system. Lieutenant Arlak confirmed that he is the systems manager, and he said that his
training for this position was provide by Spillman. As the administrator, Lieutenant Arlak
said that he has considerable authority in areas of setting up the program and giving
administrative privileges. Specifically, administrative privileges determine the level and the
number of functions a user can perform within the system. Lieutenant Arlak said that the
police department had used the Spillman system since 2001, and he has been the system
administrator since 2011. Lieutenant Arlak was asked how Buckeye collected Uniform
Crime Reporting information prior to having the Spillman system, and he said they used a
system called Leads. He further stated the UCR information was likely captured by hand.
I asked Lieutenant Arlak if he was the person responsible for reporting UCR statistics to the
Arizona Department of Public Safety, and he confirmed that was one of his responsibilities.
Lieutenant Arlak said that he was given this function about the time that he was made the
Spillman systems administrator. When asked, he said that DPS provided him with training
on how to complete the reports.

I began to ask Lieutenant Arlak a series of questions to understand his level of knowledge
about UCR reporting guidelines. I then asked Lieutenant Arlak to explain the Hierarchy
Rule. He said that this pertained to the fact that within UCR reporting, when multiple
criminal offenses occur during the same incident, only the most serious crime is reported.
He further explained that there are exceptions to this rule, such as vehicle theft and arson.
Lieutenant Arlak was asked to explain how the scoring is different for Part 1 person’s crimes
as compared to Part 1 property crimes. Lieutenant Arlak said that property crimes are scored
lower than persons crimes.

Lieutenant Arlak was asked how he determined what administrative rights or privileges a
user is granted. He said these decisions were made depending on what the individual user
needed to function. Lieutenant Arlak was asked to describe the different levels of access to
the system, and he said the Spillman system divided users into groups such as their rank or
the area that they work in. The needs for each group are determined and appropriate access
is granted. Lieutenant Arlak further stated that he can adjust the level of access up or down
for individual users within the group based on need.

Lieutenant Arlak was asked if as the administrator he could track when a report is modified,
and he said that he could. He further explained that he was certain that changes to the
narrative could be tracked but was not sure if boxes with drop down menus could be
tracked. Lieutenant Arlak was then asked if he was familiar with the Sylog search, and he
said yes. When asked to explain, Lieutenant Arlak said that it tracks an individual’s activity;
specifically changes made and reports viewed by that person. Lieutenant Arlak was asked if,
when other users went into the system, could they tell if a report had been modified, and he
said that they could not. Lieutenant Arlak was asked if the Sylog could be modified to
restrict tracking, and he believed that it would always track activity and could not be
changed. Lieutenant Arlak was then asked if a supervisor could go into a report and tell if it

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had been changed after he had approved it. Lieutenant Arlak believed that once a supervisor
approved a report it would be locked down and could not be changed. Lieutenant Arlak
said that he had the ability to change a report, but beyond this, there should not be
modifications. Lieutenant Arlak was asked if supervisors had the ability to do quality control
of their subordinates reports and make changes, and he said that they do. When asked who
else has this ability, he said that he does. He further stated that he believes that patrol
lieutenants also have this ability, but he seemed uncertain.

Lieutenant Arlak was asked if there was a specialized module or program used to extract
UCR and Compstat data, and he said yes. He further stated the UCR module is
preprogramed by Spillman to comply with UCR guidelines and cannot be changed by him.
Lieutenant Arlak was asked if through his Spillman training and experience with the
program, could he tell which codes would be reported to UCR as a Part 1 or a Part 2
offense, and he said that for most of the codes he would be able to distinguish how the
offense would be reported.

Lieutenant Arlak was asked if he submitted monthly UCR reports to DPS, and he said that
he does not regularly report on a specific date, but the reporting is done monthly as opposed
to quarterly or annually. He further explained that he might wait 60 to 90 days to submit a
monthly report to avoid having to go back and make changes to a report already submitted.
Lieutenant Arlak said in the past he would report his stats a few days after the month ended,
and then the status of a report would change. The example he provided was a dead body
that was later ruled a homicide. This would force him to complete the difficult process of
making the change with DPS to capture additional information to make the UCR report
accurate. Lieutenant Arlak was then asked about preparation for the CompStat reports, and
he said that he had to do his quality control checks for the reports a few days after the end
of the month because the CompStat meetings occur on the second Thursday of every
month. Lieutenant Arlak was then asked if the numbers used in the CompStat presentation
were consistent with what was reported for UCR, and he said that they are the same and
they come from the same system. Lieutenant Arlak clarified that the numbers for UCR and
CompStat may be a little different, dependent upon when they are pulled, due to changes in
the status of a report that may have occurred over time.

Lieutenant Arlak was asked about the procedure for documenting a vehicle that was stolen
and later recovered in the City of Buckeye. He was asked and agreed that there should be
two reports taken; the theft report and the recovery report. He was then asked if it was
correct to go into the original theft report and change the UCR code from stolen vehicle to
recovered stolen vehicle after the vehicle was found. He agreed that if this were done, it
would likely erase the stolen vehicle entry and it would not be reported to UCR. Lieutenant
Arlak was asked why someone might do this, and he replied it could be “stupidity,” but he
was not sure.

After a brief conversation about the Arizona Department of Public Safety transition to the
Spillman records management system, Lieutenant Arlak was shown the face sheet from a
Buckeye Police report. He was asked if the Spillman code that is listed in the first position in

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the Offense Code section is the one that gets reported for UCR purposes. He said only if
that is the highest crime based on the hierarchy rule. He said the system will automatically
choose the highest ranked code even if it was listed as an additional offense instead of the
primary offense. He said the observed box is designed by Spillman for the officer to report
what they observed on scene. I showed him a face sheet of an offense report. The “nature”
of the crime was listed as burglary and under “offenses,” the UCR codes indicated criminal
damage and theft. I asked Lieutenant Arlak which offense code would be reported for UCR
purposes. He said it would be reported as a theft, as the nature of a crime is not considered
when determining UCR. He said Spillman does recommend that the first offense code
utilized be that which is highest in the UCR hierarchy, but that does not always happen.

I asked Lieutenant Arlak how you could tell what UCR code had been reported to DPS
when a report had been changed multiple times over a period of months. He could not
answer that question. When asked, Lieutenant Arlak stated that an assault/ aggravated
circumstances would be reported as a simple assault for UCR purposes. He said frauds were
not reported as thefts for UCR purposes. He said attempts to commit theft or burglary are
reported as a theft or burglary for UCR purposes. Lieutenant Arlak agreed that if there were
two individuals claiming to have been assaulted and you could not tell who the primary
aggressor was that two assaults should be reported for UCR purposes. He said while often
the officers might arrest both parties for disorderly conduct the proper way to report this for
UCR purposes was as two assaults.

I asked Lieutenant Arlak why a UCR code on an offense report would be changed months
or even years after the offense occurred. He first replied, “I don’t know.” He then said,
“Well, to get it right would be the right thing to do.” I asked him if a code was changed,
particularly so long after, would a supplemental report be prepared documenting the
changes. He replied, “In theory it would.” He said this does not always happen. He then
gave an example of a dead body being declared a homicide 5 years later. He said that they
would want to report that homicide to DPS. I pointed out that a supplemental report would
be prepared in that instance. I asked him if he would consider it unusual for a report to be
changed several years later. He said he would think so and then again cited the example he
had just provided.

I then asked Lieutenant Arlak, hypothetically, why a would a person change a theft to a
criminal damage and back to a theft within a few minutes. Lieutenant Arlak said that he did
not know why this would be done, and he needed to know the circumstances of case to
make a guess as to why the report would be changed.

Lieutenant Arlak was then asked about delayed reporting of crimes, such as a person being
assaulted in 2017 and dying from their injuries in 2018. Lieutenant Arlak knew that he
would have to notify DPS of the change but was not certain how the homicide would be
reported for UCR purposes.

Lieutenant Arlak and I had a brief discussion about the Spillman program and how it sorted
different crimes into the appropriate Part 1 Crime reporting areas for UCR reporting. I then

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shifted the questioning to discuss the allegation in the anonymous letter of altering crime
statistics. Lieutenant Arlak was asked if he had any knowledge of any member of the
Buckeye Police Department changing UCR codes to a lesser offense when the change was
not justified, and Lieutenant Arlak said that he did not. Lieutenant Arlak was asked if
Sergeant Virgadamo had greater administrative privileges than any other sergeant, and he
said that he did not. Lieutenant Arlak was then asked if Virgadamo was ever given the
responsibility by Lieutenant Arlak or anyone else in the Department to do quality control for
UCR reporting. Lieutenant Arlak said that Virgadamo was given this responsibility, “but not
in an official way.” Lieutenant Arlak said that he worked with Virgadamo to teach him
about UCR reporting. Lieutenant Arlak further stated that Virgadamo attended some
Spillman training in Utah within the last five years and seemed to have a greater
understanding of the system than other sergeants. Lieutenant Arlak added that because of
this his quality control is a benefit to the Department.

I then explained to Lieutenant Arlak that I obtained a computer printout from the I.T.
department that lists all the changes made to UCR codes by Sergeant Virgadamo. I further
explained that throughout the course of my investigation it had become apparent to me that
many people believed that Virgadamo was trying to alter crime stats by changing UCR codes.
I explained to Lieutenant Arlak that this report from I.T. shows that Virgadamo made over
eleven hundred changes in a sixteen-month period. I told Lieutenant Arlak that I hoped that
he could help me understand some of the changes that Virgadamo made to reports over that
sixteen-month period, and he said that he would. I then showed Lieutenant Arlak three
different spreadsheets. On the first spreadsheet it revealed on August 11, 2017, Virgadamo
changed a total of 43 reports in just over 34 minutes. The remaining spreadsheets were
dated July 21, 2017 and December 3, 2017. On the second and third spreadsheets there
were several changes that were also made just minutes or sometimes just seconds apart. It
was further explained to Lieutenant Arlak that some of the reports on the spreadsheet had
been changed multiple times over a period of several years. Lieutenant Arlak said “for this
to happen all in one day, I don’t understand it.”

Lieutenant Arlak continued to review the spreadsheets until I explained to him that there
were two different types of patterns that I have seen with Virgadamo’s changes that cause
me concern. The first pattern was that there were several reports where Virgadamo changed
codes from one code to another and then back again to the previous code. This
leapfrogging pattern persists over a period of months and sometimes years with some of
these changing occurring just seconds apart. It was further explained to Lieutenant Arlak
that these changes made resulted in changing the UCR code from a reportable Part 1 offense
to a lesser non-reportable offense.

I then told Lieutenant Arlak that I could not understand why Sergeant Virgadamo would do
this, particularly considering the allegations made against him by co-workers that he was
altering the crime statistics. Lieutenant Arlak replied, “…I can’t give you an explanation why
he would do that; especially knowing that these allegations are out there, why he would do
that.” I then explained to Lieutenant Arlak that the concerns I had with the second pattern
revolved around that fact that many of these changes to the UCR codes were made seconds

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apart. I then asked Lieutenant Arlak to think back to when he was a sergeant with the
responsibility to do quality control checks on his officers’ reports. I asked Lieutenant Arlak
how long it would take him to review a report and determine if the UCR coding was correct.
He said that it should take about five minutes, and I told him that answer was consistent
with how other Buckeye Police Department sergeants answered that same question.
Lieutenant Arlak further said that he could review a simple report with a very short narrative
and an obvious coding error in thirty seconds, but he did understand my concerns with this
pattern and could not provide a definitive explanation.

I then asked Lieutenant Arlak if this was something that he had trained Virgadamo to do. I
was referring to the two suspicious patterns of report changes mentioned above, and
Lieutenant Arlak said that he did not. Lieutenant Arlak further explained that he trained
Virgadamo in UCR reporting just as he had trained other sergeants to ensure that their
officers’ reports were correctly coded. Lieutenant Arlak then apologized for not being able
to explain Virgadamo’s actions and said that it seemed “odd.” Lieutenant Arlak said that
without reading the individual reports, he could not provide an explanation. I further
explained to Lieutenant Arlak that I had reviewed several the reports and found that codes
were used that did not seem to have anything to do with the facts of the investigation. I told
Lieutenant Arlak that not all the 1,120 changes were wrong, and on occasions, Virgadamo
was clearly making changes that were warranted. Lieutenant Arlak replied to this statement
by saying “no doubt, no doubt.”

I then asked Lieutenant Arlak if there was a rash of trash cans thefts in the city, and he
replied that he did not think of it as a rash, but they have occurred. Lieutenant Arlak was
asked if someone’s trash can was stolen and that person called the city, would they be
informed if the city had taken the can; if the City had not taken the trash can, would the city
expect this person to contact the police department to make a theft report. Lieutenant Arlak
was not sure about the process but said that this scenario was likely. I told Lieutenant Arlak
that it seemed like there were a significant number of these thefts, and I asked if it was every
brought up in the CompStat meetings. He said that it had been discussed in meetings, but
never in CompStat.

I asked Lieutenant Arlak if the issue of Virgadamo or anyone else in the department
changing crimes stats was ever brought up in a command staff meeting over the past four
years, and Lieutenant Arlak said that he could not recall. I told Lieutenant Arlak that in my
interview with retired Lieutenant I was told that this issue was brought up several
times in command staff meetings. Lieutenant Arlak replied, “I don’t remember, and God
bless .” I then asked Lieutenant Arlak if anyone had ever brought this allegation to him.
He said that someone had and then began to talk about the incident listed in the anonymous
letter where he allegedly yelled at an officer at a Buckeye Police Association meeting for
bringing up the topic. At this point, Lieutenant Arlak asked to take a break and he left the
room.

About seven minutes later, the interview continued. I told Lieutenant Arlak about a
situation that came up in an interview with where it was alleged that

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I then discussed with Lieutenant Arlak how Sergeant Virgadamo became involved with
quality control for the UCR reporting. I asked Lieutenant Arlak if he had told me earlier that
Virgadamo was given informal authority to perform these tasks, and he said “yeah, he would
help.” I asked Lieutenant Arlak if he gave Virgadamo this “informal authority.” Lieutenant
Arlak said that Virgadamo was an acting Lieutenant and began doing quality control because
he was now a peer of Lieutenant Arlak’s, and he was performing these functions based on
what he (Virgadamo) had learned from Lieutenant Arlak.

Lieutenant Arlak was asked if there was ever a time that a meeting of minds occurred with
the command staff and it was decided that they would intentionally lower the crime stats by
altering the actual numbers. Lieutenant Arlak vehemently denied this and said that such a
conversation never took place.

Lieutenant Arlak was asked if other sergeants were ever told that Sergeant Virgadamo would
be performing quality control on their reports, and he said that he (Arlak) had told them.
Lieutenant Arlak further stated that some of the sergeants don’t like Sergeant Virgadamo.
He clarified this by saying that Sergeant Virgadamo was from a different generation than
most of the other sergeants and they were not happy about him changing UCR codes.
Lieutenant Arlak then spoke about situations when Sergeant Virgadamo routinely
volunteered to do sergeants’ paperwork if it got backlogged because the sergeant was off
duty for an extended period. Lieutenant Arlak offered this situation as a time when Sergeant
Virgadamo was acting under Lieutenant Arlak’s authority, and Virgadamo may have had to
make changes to the report because of this. Lieutenant Arlak then asked me if this
explanation answered my question.

I asked Lieutenant Arlak if there was anything in writing given to the sergeants explaining
Sergeant Virgadamo’s additional responsibilities and his reply was that it was very informal.
I then asked Lieutenant Arlak how he coordinated this quality control with Sergeant
Virgadamo. He said that he does not review reports every day, but he does review reports as
the CID Lieutenant to determine which reports should be assigned to his people.
Lieutenant Arlak further stated that he was not concerned with UCR codes when this
happened, but he will correct obvious mistakes. Lieutenant Arlak further stated that he is
only concerned about the UCR code when the investigation is completed, and he agreed that
he had to trust the first line supervisors to make sure that the reporting is correct.

Lieutenant Arlak was asked if he would notify the sergeant or the officer if he changed a
UCR code. He said that he would not unless it was part of a pattern of miscoding. He
further said that if an officer took a hundred reports in a month and only got one wrong, it
would just be easier to make the change and not notify the officer of the mistake.
Lieutenant Arlak was asked if the Department should create a policy that would require
notification to either a sergeant or officer when a UCR code is changed. He initially said
that he would support this but later expressed concern that this would be too cumbersome.

I then said to Lieutenant Arlak that it appeared to me that the allegation of crime stat
tampering has plagued the Department for several years. I then asked him if he was aware

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of any effort by him, Chief Hall, or any member of the command staff to publicly address
this allegation and put this to an end. He responded by saying, “You’re not going to end
personality conflicts.” He further stated that this allegation should have ended when “certain
sergeants” attended CompStat meetings and saw that the numbers of offenses reported was
correct. Lieutenant Arlak said that since taking the responsibility for UCR and Spillman, he
had tried to do his best to correct them, “…to either give us more thefts and take away more
burglaries.” Lieutenant Arlak said that he told people that it does not matter whether it is a
theft or a burglary, it is still a Part 1 crime. Lieutenant Arlak was asked if changing burglaries
to thefts would change the scoring, and he said that it would not because they were property
crimes, not persons crimes. I clarified and asked Lieutenant Arlak if more burglaries would
make Buckeye a less desirable place to live. He responded by saying that he really did not
know because he does not “run in those circles” as he does not care. Lieutenant Arlak did
acknowledge that a higher burglary rate could have a negative impact on the city, but he
personally did not care and had never been told to alter the stats.

Lieutenant Arlak was asked if he would be concerned if someone changed a theft report,
which is a reportable Part 1 offense, to an information only report, which is not reportable.
Lieutenant Arlak responded by saying that would be wrong and he discouraged the use of
codes such as Information Only and Agency Assist because they provide no useful
information to the Department.

Lieutenant Arlak was then handed Buckeye Police report # 171122026 [Exhibit 57]. This
was a report about a theft from a home under construction and was originally coded as a
burglary by the officer that conducted the investigation. Lieutenant Arlak changed the UCR
code from a burglary to a theft on December 7, 2017. After reviewing the report, Arlak said
the reason he made the change was because the house was not a complete structure.
Lieutenant Arlak was then asked to reviewed Buckeye Police report #171108012 [Exhibit
58]. This was a situation where a person was struck in the face with a tire iron and the
attacker was arrested and charged with aggravated assault by the investigating officer. Arlak
changed the UCR code from Aggravated Assault, a Part 1 reportable offense, to Assault
Aggravated Crime Circumstances, a Part 2 reportable offense. After reviewing the report,
Arlak said that he could not remember for certain, but he believes that he made the changes
to a lower offense because the injuries were not severe enough. Lieutenant Arlak was then
shown Buckeye Police report #171101105 [Exhibit 49]. This situation involved a female
pizza delivery person that was called to a vacant house. Shortly after arriving, a man walked
out of the desert, confronted the delivery girl and demanded that she give the pizzas to him.
He took the pizzas and fled on foot, and no arrest was made. Arlak changed the UCR code
from Robbery to Theft on December 7, 2017. It should be noted that Robbery is
considered a more serious offense than Theft for UCR reporting purposes. Arlak said that
he did not think that it fit the definition of a robbery, and he believes to be accurate because
of conversations that he has had with other people. The last report Arlak that was shown
was #170315070 [Exhibit 48]. This situation involved a suspect that went to a home
improvement store, stole several items, and swung garden shears at employees that
attempted to stop him. Arlak changed the UCR code from Robbery to Aggravated Assault

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on June 20, 2017. Arlak said that it did not meet the UCR definition of a robbery, and
therefore the change was made.

Lieutenant Arlak was then asked how many times that he had supervised Sergeant
Virgadamo. Arlak said that he has supervised Virgadamo for a total of five years. I then
explained to Arlak that I have reviewed numerous emails written by Sergeant Virgadamo to
other sergeants where was disrespectful and condescending to his peers. I asked Arlak if he
had problems with Virgadamo not getting along with other sergeants, and he said “oh, sure.”
Arlak further explained that Virgadamo is older than the other sergeants and can be grumpy
and very direct. He also described him as very black and white. Arlak said Virgadamo had
produced a lot of good officers and sergeants by training them, “but sure has he gotten a
little rough, no doubt.” I then asked Arlak if had ever addressed the issue of Virgadamo
being disrespectful to other sergeants, and he said that he had. Arlak further stated that at
times, both parties were at fault.

The interview was concluded at 4:30 p.m.

Interview of Spillman Technologies Representative

On Monday April 16, 2018 at about 9:30 a.m., I conducted a telephonic interview with a
representative from Spillman Technologies. Also present was , and the
interview was conducted in his office. The purpose of the interview was to gather
information about the Spillman records management system used by the Buckeye Police
Department. I was not given the name of the representative, but I was provided with an
email certificate with a confirmation number [Exhibit 59].

The representative was first asked about the types of inquiry reports used in the Spillman
system by law enforcement agencies to prepare monthly UCR reports. The representative
said that there were several different types of reports that were used for UCR reporting. He
also said that these reports were static and could not be changed. The reports were designed
to comply with FBI reporting standards. The representative was asked if there was a way to
tell which Spillman offense codes were reported to which UCR Part 1 crimes. He said that
this information was contained within a table in the system and could be retrieved.

The representative was asked which Spillman offense codes on the face sheet of a report was
reported for UCR reporting purposes. The representative explained that the offense code
listed in the “Observed” box should be the offense that would be included in a UCR report.
He further explained that the offense code listed in the “Reported” box was based on how
the incident was reported to the agency, and “Observed “category was the code used after
the investigation had been conducted. The representative was asked if the Spillman system
recognized the UCR Hierarchy Rule, and he said that it did. Essentially, this means that the
Spillman system will query every offense code listed in the offense report, and the most
serious crime will be counted on the UCR report. This also includes the “Additional
Offenses” category.

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The representative was asked if he could explain what the UCR Circumstance Code referred
to, and he said that it was agency specific and he did not know how it related to the UCR
report. The representative was asked about the use of the “Unfounded” disposition code.
He said that if an offense is reported, it would have to be counted, but if it was later
determined to be unfounded, it would be deducted from the total number of offenses report
for each Part 1 offense. If the offense was discovered to be unfounded in a month outside
of when it occurred, it would be deducted from the current months totals. The Spillman
representative was asked how the system accounted for multiple victims in a single report.
Specifically, he was asked if there were five assault victims in a single incident how should
this be documented so that all five would be counted for the UCR report. The
representative said that the officer would have to list five counts of assault on the report so
that all were counted instead of just one assault.

The representative was asked if UCR data could be changed after initial entry and how
would this affect the report. The representative said when a UCR report is run in Spillman it
is a snapshot of the data as it exists at that time. If it is later changed, then a subsequent
UCR report would reflect the changes made.

The representative was asked about stolen vehicle reporting within the Spillman system.
Specifically, the representative was asked if a vehicle was stolen in the City of Buckeye and a
report was made, and the UCR code for this report was later changed to “Recovered Stolen
Vehicle,” would this prevent the stolen vehicle from being included in the UCR report. The
representative said that as long as both codes remained on the report, the theft would be
counted on the next UCR report.

The representative was then asked if the canned reports used by the City of Buckeye for
UCR reporting had been changed, he said that he did not think so. He further stated that
the only changes made to state specific reports were done in Texas. To further clarify, the
representative said the City of Buckeye is using the same report as most of the other
agencies in the country. The representative said the Spillman system provides UCR reports
in different formats, but the numbers would be the same in all versions of the reports.

The telephonic interview was concluded at about 10:00 a.m.

Interview of Sergeant James Virgadamo

On April 19, 2018 at 4:00 PM, I met with Buckeye Police Sergeant James Virgadamo, at the
City of Buckeye’s Human Resources office, to interview him reference this investigation.
Sergeant Virgadamo chose not to have an employee representative present for this interview.
Sergeant Virgadamo was served a NOI that described the allegations and identified his role
as a subject of this investigation. This NOI provided Sergeant Virgadamo with notification
of his Garrity rights as well as the requirements that he be honest and maintain investigation
confidentiality. Prior to the interview, Sergeant Virgadamo reviewed the NOI. He stated he
understood his rights and responsibilities and signed the NOI indicating the same. Our

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interview began at 2:03 PM. This interview was recorded with Sergeant Virgadamo’s
knowledge. For full details of this interview refer to the digital recording; as follows is a
summary.

Sergeant Virgadamo was asked to provide some background information about his law
enforcement career. He said he began his law enforcement career in 1986 with the New
York City Police Department where he spent about six years in patrol and was later
transferred to a street crimes unit. In 2000, he became a detective where he worked until his
retirement in 2006. He said that during his time as a detective he conducted homicide,
robbery and general investigations. He said that after his retirement, he moved to Buckeye
and was hired by the police department in June of 2006. Virgadamo said that he was in
patrol until 2009 when he was promoted to the rank of Sergeant. He further stated he was
made an acting lieutenant in 2015 for about a year until he voluntarily returned to the rank of
sergeant.

I informed Sergeant Virgadamo this investigation began because an anonymous letter was
sent to the City Manager. I asked Virgadamo if he had seen this letter and he said that he
had. Sergeant Virgadamo was asked about the “New York Mafia” referred to in the letter.
He said that he had previously heard the phrase used by former Chief Mark Mann in a
joking manner. I then asked Sergeant Virgadamo about his relationship with Chief Hall. He
said that he had worked with Chief Hall while both were officers for the New York City
Police Department. Sergeant Virgadamo said that Chief Hall was responsible for recruiting
him to the Buckeye Police Department but, he had only socialized with him off duty on one
or two occasions since being employed with the city.

I then discussed with Sergeant Virgadamo the allegation in the letter that dealt with
tampering with crime statistics. I told him that based on my investigation, many people
believed that he was responsible for this. Sergeant Virgadamo agreed that this was a widely
held belief. I said that it appeared that this allegation went back to 2014 and I asked him if
Chief Hall had ever addressed this issue publicly. Sergeant Virgadamo said in 2012 he was
sent to a one-week Spillman training class. He said after he was promoted to Sergeant, he
was given the responsibility of supervising all the officers-in-training because they wanted to
bring consistency to the training program. He said one of his responsibilities was to do
quality control of their reports. He said that if he found a UCR code that did not appear to
be accurate, even after being approved by a sergeant, he would send it back to the officer
and request that changes be made. This caused some hard feelings with other sergeants, and
Sergeant Virgadamo said that he was then instructed to let Lieutenant Arlak make the
needed changes. He said these events occurred in 2013 or 2014 and he had not heard
anything else about him changing UCR codes after that.

Virgadamo said that in 2015, he was promoted to acting lieutenant and he was asked to deal
with an officer that was not turning in reports. Virgadamo said during this time, former
Assistant Chief Mann asked Virgadamo to start reviewing reports again daily. He was
particularly focused on high liability areas. Virgadamo said he told Assistant Chief Mann
that the last time that he was reviewing reports, he was accused of falsifying the reports.

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I then redirected Sergeant Virgadamo’s attention back to the issue of UCR reporting. I
asked him if he was aware that the state statute definition of a crime may not be consistent
with how that crime is reported for UCR purposes. Sergeant Virgadamo said that he was,
and he gave an example that a vehicle burglary was a theft for UCR reporting. Sergeant
Virgadamo then showed me some documents that he had prepared showing his efforts to
address crime problems. This paperwork included a CompStat report that he had prepared
for his beat and memos sent out describing crime trends and patterns [Exhibit 87]. Sergeant
Virgadamo was then asked to list the UCR Part 1 crimes which he was able to do except for
Human Trafficking. I asked if he had a copy of the UCR reporting manual and he said that
he did not. I asked Sergeant Virgadamo if Lieutenant Arlak had a copy and he said that he
believed that he did adding that Lieutenant Arlak was the person that trained him on UCR
reporting. I asked Sergeant Virgadamo to explain the Hierarchy Rule as it applied to UCR
reporting, and he said that he did not know what that was and asked me to explain it. I then
offered to send Sergeant Virgadamo an electronic copy of the UCR manual. He said he
would appreciate that but added he no longer reviews UCR codes.

I then showed Sergeant Virgadamo a copy of a Buckeye Police report face sheet and asked
him which offense would be reported for UCR purposes. He pointed to the Offense Code
box in the upper left area of the sheet and correctly pointed out the it should be an
aggravated assault. I then asked him about the box entitled “Observed” and he said that he
did not pay much attention to that box. He further stated that he did not believe that it had
any statistical value and did not know what purpose it served.

I then gave Sergeant Virgadamo a copy of Buckeye Police Department report #161104002
[Exhibit 60] and told him that he made a change to this report and I wanted him to explain
to me why it was done. This report documented a situation where a husband used his
vehicle to ram a car that his wife was in. The suspect then fled from Buckeye officers and
rammed a police vehicle. The investigating officers coded this as an Aggravated Assault and
yet he had changed it to an Assault, Aggravated Circumstances. I asked Virgadamo if the
category, Assault Aggravated Circumstances was reported, for UCR purposes, as an
Aggravated Assault or a Simple Assault. Virgadamo said that he thought that Assault
Aggravated Circumstances was reported as an Aggravated Assault, a Part 1 offense. I
informed him that was incorrect, and that Assault Aggravated Circumstances was reported
as a simple assault, which is a lesser Part 2 offense. I then explained to Sergeant Virgadamo
that a Spillman records checks revealed that on November 4, 2016, an officer with the serial
number 4180 coded the above listed report as an aggravated assault at about 3:00 a.m., and
later that day at 4:25 p.m., he (Virgadamo) changed the code to Assault Aggravated
Circumstances, effectively lowering it to a Part 2 offense. I then asked him why he made
this change. He said he made this change because he incorrectly believed that the code
Assault Aggravated Circumstance was still an Aggravated Assault. He said he was not aware
that the change would cause the incident to be under reported. I then discussed another
change made by Sergeant Virgadamo to this report and attempted to ask him if he
understood that for UCR reporting purposes if there are multiple aggravated assault victims,
then the agency should report a part 1 offense for each victim. Sergeant Virgadamo said that

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he made the second change to this report because he thought that it might have been a
duplicate. He did not respond to the rest of this question.

I next provided Sergeant Virgadamo with a copy of Buckeye Police report 161231033
[Exhibit 16] prepared by Officer . I explained to Virgadamo that I had read
this report and it appeared to be an attempted burglary. The report documented damage to
the outside of a residence that indicated someone had attempted to break into the residence.
The report was originally coded by the responding officer as a Burglary Residence Attempt
Forced Entry. I asked Sergeant Virgadamo why he had later changed this to a criminal
damage. He said that he was told these types of incidents where there was only damage to
the outside of the house should be coded as criminal damage. He said that he had done
some training with Maricopa County and was told that this was the proper way to charge
these incidents. I then asked Sergeant Virgadamo if, for UCR reporting purposes, he was
aware that decisions about criminal prosecution by prosecutors did not affect how a crime
should be reported. He again repeated that he was trained that if there was damage to the
outside of a residence such as a mark to a door then it should be coded as a criminal damage.
He further stated that “most of us have been doing that for years.” I then told Sergeant
Virgadamo that by changing this incident from an attempted burglary to a criminal damage a
Part 1 crime was not reported. I asked Virgadamo if, based on his training, he believed the
change he made was correct. He told me yes and said other sergeants have made the same
mistake. He also stated that “most of us have been doing that for years.” Virgadamo further
stated that the County Attorney’s office would only charge a person with a burglary if they
were caught trying to take something. I then read Virgadamo a section from the UCR
reporting Manual Version 1.0 dated June 20, 2013, page 45 as follows:

“The entry of a structure in a Burglary—Unlawful Entry—No Force (5b)


situation is achieved by use of an unlocked door or window. The element of
trespass to the structure is essential in this category, which includes thefts
from open garages, open warehouses, open or unlocked dwellings.”

I asked Virgadamo if he was aware that attempted burglaries had to be reported for UCR
reporting purposes as burglaries, and he said that he did not know that. Page 45 of the UCR
reporting manual reads as follows:

“ Burglary—Attempted Forcible Entry (5c): This category includes those


situations where a forcible entry burglary is attempted but unlawful entry is
not achieved. Once the thief is inside a locked structure, the offense becomes
a Burglary—Forcible Entry (5a). Agencies classify attempts to enter an
unlocked structure as well as actual trespass to an unlocked structure as
Burglary—Unlawful Entry—No Force (5b). Only situations in which a thief
has attempted to break into a locked structure are classified as Burglary—
Attempted Forcible Entry (5c).”

I asked Virgadamo if he was aware that for UCR purposes, the lack of desire for prosecution
by either the victim or the prosecutor does not change how a crime should be reported. He

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said that he was aware of this fact and agreed with this practice. He then discussed a report
in which a retailer’s decision not to prosecute juvenile shoplifters led officers to under report
the incident by changing the UCR code to Information Only. He said that he had worked to
correct this mistake.

Sergeant Virgadamo was then given a copy of Buckeye Police Report 150831049 [Exhibit
61]. I explained to Sergeant Virgadamo that I reviewed electronic logs kept by the Spillman
Records Management system that tracked all changes to a report. This report documented
an incident on August 31, 2015, in which a bank teller had left her phone near her work
station. She had gone into the bank vault with another bank employee and when she came
back to her work station her cell phone was gone. It was originally coded by the
investigating officer as a Theft. On September 3, 2015, Virgadamo had changed this offense
code to Lost Property. An investigation was conducted, and video images of the theft were
recovered by the bank and charges were filed for theft on October 12, 2015. I asked
Virgadamo for an explanation for the change and he said that the victim left the phone on
the counter unattended. He further stated people frequently leave their phones unattended
and believe that they have been stolen. I explained to Sergeant Virgadamo that if a phone is
left in a location and later disappears, it was likely stolen. He responded by saying that many
times the victims find out the phone was just misplaced. I told Virgadamo I was confused
because in addition to the first change, the electronic log shows that two years after the
incident occurred, on December 3, 2017, he changed the UCR code back to Theft and
added a Found Property entry. He said the reason he made the changes two years later is
because he went back and reread the report. I explained to Virgadamo that when he
changed the code from Theft to Lost Property and left it that way for two years, it did not
get reported to UCR. He said that he believed that these situations should be reported as
lost property, and this was confirmed by conversation he had with Lieutenant Arlak. He
said that lost phones were common, and it was possible that they are sometimes turned in to
businesses without the victim’s knowledge. He further stated that an officer would
practically need a confession to act against someone for stealing a phone. With those
comments, it appeared to me that Virgadamo was again referring to the decision by a
prosecutor to charge an individual with a crime and not using the correct UCR reporting
code.

I then showed Sergeant Virgadamo a copy of a spreadsheet worksheet listing UCR code
changes that he made. I explained to Virgadamo some of the changes were made just
seconds apart. One of the spreadsheets given to Virgadamo listed twenty-one changes made
on December 3, 2017, including the theft of the cell phone described above [Exhibit 62]. Of
the twenty-one reports listed, seventeen were reports from 2015, three were from 2016, and
one was from 2017. Virgadamo said that he remembered a point, “especially after this letter
came out,” when he went back and reviewed changes that he made in the past. I believed
that Virgadamo was referring to the anonymous letter that led to this investigation, so I
asked him if the changes were made because he was concerned about allegations of him
lowering crime stats. He replied he was concerned and he wanted to make sure the changes
were accurate and any mistakes he had made were corrected. I explained to Sergeant
Virgadamo that I had concerns because it appeared to me that he was pulling up reports

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from a list and making changes before moving on to the next report just seconds later. I
told him that I asked several other sergeants how long it took them to review a report and
was told it was between five and ten minutes. He said he was mostly reviewing CAD logs to
determine the changes. I then told Virgadamo that I did not believe that he could effectively
bring up a report, review it, and make a change in only 30 to 45 seconds. He replied that he
could click fast. He further stated that he was already familiar with many of the reports that
he changed. I then explained to Sergeant Virgadamo that I had prepared a spreadsheet
listing changes that he made and some of the reports were changed between five and six
times. I told him that this particularly applied to trash can thefts. He said that Chief Hall
told him they would no longer take the alleged trash can disappearances as Thefts because
the cans sometimes fall into the truck while being emptied or they might have been
repossessed. He further said that he was told by his boss that trash can disappearances were
supposed to be taken as Information Only reports but, officers and dispatchers were
continuing to take them as thefts and this is what prompted changes by him. Virgadamo
further stated that he had concerns about taking the reports as thefts because victims’ rights
notifications needed to be given and he feared that this was not being done. He again said
that dispatch was inconsistently reporting the trash can thefts and he was just trying to be
consistent. Because of these inconsistencies he decided to start changing them to thefts. He
then said that he later decided to start changing the disposition code to “Unfounded.” I
then asked if they were thefts or not, and he said that they were not thefts. He also said that
he believed that Lieutenant Arlak had been changing these reports for the last few months
and not him.

I then began to discuss with Sergeant Virgadamo a second worksheet which documented
changes made by him on August 11, 2017 [Exhibit 36]. I showed him he had made a total of
43 changes in just 34 minutes. He said that those were probably trash can thefts, and I told
him that many were but not all. I told him that I was perplexed about how he could make
changes so rapidly. His response was “oh, I couldn’t tell you.” He continued to look at the
spreadsheet. He mentioned that the Department received many reports concerning homes
under construction and UCR reporting is inconsistent. It should be noted that although not
specifically mentioned, I believed that he was referring to thefts and burglaries from new
homes. Virgadamo then described a situation where a home under construction was left
unlocked. I asked Virgadamo how he would code an incident involving a home under
construction, and he said the it should be Theft Property from Building. I asked him if it
should be burglary, and he said, “no it is not.” I reminded Sergeant Virgadamo of the
paragraph that I read to him from page 45 of the UCR manual addressing unlocked
dwellings, and he said “Obviously, I am wrong.” He further stated that he was given bad
information and he regularly spoke with Lieutenant Arlak about these types of situations.
Virgadamo continued to discuss this situation and said that with multiple contractors in and
out of a house under construction and no facts to support forced entry it should be a theft.
I again reminded Virgadamo about the passage from the UCR manual, and he said, “I don’t
dispute that, I have read the book.”

I again asked Sergeant Virgadamo how he was able to change 43 reports in 34 minutes, and
he said that many of the reports he was already familiar with and he was only looking for a

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better way to code them. I then asked Virgadamo if he was familiar with the method used
by his Department to report UCR information to the Arizona Department of Public Safety.
He said he was not as that was handled by Lieutenant Arlak. I asked Sergeant Virgadamo if
he ever had discussions with Lieutenant Arlak about when UCR information is reported to
DPS. He said that he believed it was monthly but was not familiar with what day they were
sent. I told Sergeant Virgadamo that Lieutenant Arlak told me in his interview that he
reported to DPS infrequently; sometimes every 30 or 60 or 90 days. Virgadamo agreed and
said that he had discussed this with former Assistant Chief Mann. This led Mann to tell him
that due to Lieutenant Arlak’s demanding responsibilities in CID he wanted Virgadamo to
do quality control of the UCR crime codes daily if possible. I told Sergeant Virgadamo that
in the report I had ran on all UCR code changes, he had made considerably more changes
than Arlak. I told him that some of the changes were made several years after the original
date of the incident. I asked him if he was getting new information that would warrant the
changes, and he said “no, sometimes I learn better ways of coding them.” I then explained
to Virgadamo that some of the incidents went from reportable offenses to non-reportable
offenses and back again. I told him that I did not understand this. Virgadamo said that
without a specific report he could not answer the question. I then said that many of these
cases were similar in nature, so he should be able to provide a general explanation. I asked
him to think of a scenario where he would change a report multiple times and he spoke
about thefts of trash cans. He said that he was trying to be consistent and I reminded him
that many of them had been changed multiple times. He said, “I admit, I probably changed
them too many times.” He further stated that he was trying to be uniform without making
them thefts because he was told not to. He said that he opted to use the unfounded
disposition code and change them back to thefts. I asked Virgadamo if he understood how
the unfounded code affects UCR reporting, and he said that he understood that the offense
would not be counted. I explained to Virgadamo that the total number of unfounded reports
was deducted from the month that the unfounded reports are listed.

I then asked Virgadamo if he ever had conversations with Lieutenant Arlak about when
Arlak was sending UCR reports to DPS and he said that he had not. When asked directly,
Virgadamo denied that anyone had ever told him to change UCR codes before a UCR report
was submitted. Sergeant Virgadamo further stated that he was told to use his discretion
based on the facts listed in the report and that is what he did. He also said that he regrets
not having access to a UCR manual.

I then handed Virgadamo a copy of an email dated Saturday July 8, 2017 that he sent to
Sergeants and [Exhibit 19]. This email addressed a rash of vehicle burglaries
that occurred in the West Park, Vista De Montana and the Rancho Vista areas over the
previous few days. The emails document that Sergeant Virgadamo was embroiled in a
dispute with the other two sergeants about the proper UCR coding for these incidents. In
the first paragraph of this email, Virgadamo suggested to the sergeants that many of the
vehicle burglary reports taken should have different UCR codes. Specifically, he writes “I
could see MAYBE leaving the nature as Vehicle Burglary for our own tracking and
knowledge, but the offense code should be changed to trespassing or suspicious activity.

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The rationale that Sergeant Virgadamo provided in his email was that many of the victims
were not immediately identified and some did not want to prosecute.

Another statement in this email read “We all know what these suspects were doing and what
their intent was but do we really need to paper bomb ourselves when it isn’t needed or
wanted?” I asked Virgadamo what he meant by this statement. He then began to talk about
a citizen that called into the Department a day after this rash of vehicle burglaries. The
citizen had just moved into the neighborhood and was concerned about the crime. Sergeant
Virgadamo said these vehicle burglaries were due to a group of gang members who came
from Phoenix; he said many vehicles were rummaged through and some property was taken.
He said the officers were doing the right thing by checking other vehicles in the neighbor to
see if they had been hit. He said that the officers had found vehicles with doors open, dome
lights on, and they appeared to have had property moved around. Virgadamo said the
officers would immediately begin a vehicle burglary report before they had contact with
anyone and before they had verified if anything was stolen. Sergeant Virgadamo further
stated most of the people that were contacted did not desire prosecution. Sergeant
Virgadamo said the way it should have been handled was to leave a business card and not
start a vehicle burglary report unless they were contacted by a victim. I then asked Sergeant
Virgadamo if he thought that these incidents were attempted vehicle burglaries and he said it
was “common sense” that they were attempts. He further stated that in the past, vehicle
burglaries where no property is taken have always been handled as trespassing. He said that
he is not sure when or who started taking these types of incidents as vehicles burglaries. He
also said that if they were going to take them as vehicle burglaries, they should be
fingerprinting and photographing the vehicles. He believes that the officers and sergeant are
just generating unnecessary reports. He further said that a better way would be to start a
report but code it as a suspicious activity or trespassing until speaking with the owner of the
vehicles.

I then asked Sergeant Virgadamo if he agreed that based on what was discussed about the
UCR manual today, does he think his way of handling these situations are correct. I pointed
out that he agreed, as noted in the email, that these situations were attempted vehicle
burglaries. I reminded him that per the UCR Manual, attempts had to be reported the same
as actual occurrences. I then pointed out that he was encouraging the sergeants to
improperly report these incidents, and he said that he did not know that until today.
Sergeant Virgadamo continued to discuss the methods for handling similar situation in the
past, but ultimately agreed that the incidents listed above should have been handled as
vehicle burglaries.

I then directed Sergeant Virgadamo’s attention back to the previously discussed email. I
pointed out the portion of this email that read; “I care because I live here and don’t want my
home town or our dept to be perceived as the arm pit of the West Valley because of an
inflated crime rate that is beyond our control and the result of careless people who don’t
know how to lock their cars.” I then said to Sergeant Virgadamo that with perception from
officers and sergeants that he is altering the UCR codes, this statement could be very

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I explained to Sergeant Virgadamo that during my investigation several other sergeants
expressed concern with him interfering with their squads. I asked him if he was aware of
this and he said, “those things were very minor.” Virgadamo was asked if he would
routinely notify sergeants when his actions involved officers from other squads. He said that
if it was very minor, he would just address it with officer but if it continued, he would go
that officer’s supervisor to address the problem.

I then asked Sergeant Virgadamo about a situation that the occurred at Verrado Elementary
on December 31, 2016 (report #161231033) [Exhibit 33]. This was an incident involving
damage done to a classroom at the school. Sergeants and Virgadamo exchanged emails
where they disagreed on the proper UCR code for the incident. Sergeant believed that
it should be coded as a burglary, and Sergeant Virgadamo believed that it was criminal
damage. I asked Virgadamo if he changed the UCR code on this incident and he said he did
not remember. Sergeant Virgadamo said that he had personal knowledge that the school
allowed after hours use of the property and he felt like the damage could have been caused
by someone that was lawfully present. Virgadamo then stated that someone was later
arrested and charged with a burglary for this incident.

I then asked Virgadamo if it was common practice for him to use the lowest UCR code
possible and make a change to the UCR code if a suspect was later arrested. The purpose of
this question was to determine of Sergeant Virgadamo had coded certain incidents with
lesser non-reportable offenses and then waited to see if an arrest was made before changing
it to a higher reportable Part 1 or Part 2 offense. Sergeant Virgadamo replied, “Yes. This is
what I believe, and we can change it to a burglary and that is what ended up happening.”
Virgadamo said he thought that was right, but maybe the UCR manual said something
different. I responded by telling him that the decision of which UCR code to use is not
based on whether an arrest was made or not made.

I asked Sergeant Virgadamo if he recalled telling officers during a briefing that property
taken from an open garage should be reported as a theft and not a burglary. He immediately
said yes. I informed him that per the UCR manual that was incorrect. He said that he was
told that when something is taken from an open garage it could be coded as a theft.

I then asked Sergeant Virgadamo if he remembered the homicide and


he said that he was unsure. I explained to him that an allegation in the letter claimed that
Virgadamo changed the UCR code from Homicide to Dead Body several times. Virgadamo
said that he did not clearly remember this incident but said that he was always told that when
a body is discovered, it should be coded as a Dead Body until a determination is made by the
Medical Examiner’s Office. He provided another example that fires should be coded as Fire
until a determination of Arson was made by investigators. I then asked Sergeant Virgadamo
about his use of the phrase “we were always told.” I wanted to know if that went back all
the way back to when he was trained, and he said yes.

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reporting and hoped that he could get more training in the future. Virgadamo also said that
Lieutenant Arlak came to him about a month or two ago and told him to “stop doing
things.” I clarified with him that he had stopped making changes to reports through the
Spillman system and he said that was correct. I then told Virgadamo that during my
interview with Arlak, he could not understand how Virgadamo could make changes so
quickly to reports. Virgadamo “I don’t know, I don’t see how I could either. I guess if the
computer says I did, I did.” Virgadamo said that he did not remember going that fast and
said if you touch one of those boxes, it goes down as a modification. I then told him that
the system distinguishes between viewing and modifying or changing a report. Virgadamo
said that since he began working for the Department he would go into a report and click on
the narrative to view a report. He said that Arlak told him that when that is done, it goes
down as a modification. I clarified with him that was not what was happening with the
reports I reviewed because I could see the four letter UCR codes being changed by him.
Virgadamo then asked me about the changes he made on August 11, 2017, and I told him
that he made a total of 43 changes in just 34 minutes. Virgadamo relied “that’s pretty fast.”
He said that the only thing he could assume is that those were the garbage can thefts that he
had already read. I told him that some were, and some were not trash can thefts.

The interview was then concluded at 6:16 P.M.

Interview of Chief Larry Hall

On April 24, 2018, at approximately 2:30 PM, I met with Buckeye Chief Larry Hall at the
City of Buckeye’s Human Resources office. I explained to him that I had been hired by the
City of Buckeye to investigate allegations of misconduct that had been contained in an
anonymous letter, dated September 18, 2017, which had been sent to the Buckeye City
Manager. Present during our interview was his employee representative, Assistant Chief Bob
Sanders. Prior to the interview, Chief Hall was served a NOI describing the allegations and
identifying his role as a subject in this investigation. This NOI provided Chief Hall with
notification of his Garrity rights as well as the requirements that he be honest and maintain
investigation confidentiality. After he had reviewed this NOI I asked him if he had any
questions. He then directed my attention to an area of the NOI describing the allegations
that he felt was not as specific. I explained that this area described the possible policies that
were violated based on the allegations described. Chief Hall had no further questions and
initialed and signed this NOI indicating the same. This interview was recorded with the
knowledge of Chief Hall. For full details of this interview refer to the digital recording; as
follows is a summary.

I first asked Chief Hall to describe his law enforcement background. He told me he started
his career with the New York City Police Department in approximately 1990 or 1991 when
he was 20 years old. He said after completing the academy he was first deployed to the
Crown Heights section of Brooklyn. His other NYPD assignments included the Community
Police officer program and the anti-crime unit, a plain clothes assignment. He then joined
the Mesa Police Department and worked in their gang unit before being promoted to
sergeant. Hall said he had worked patrol and hiring before joining the Buckeye Police

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I then told Chief Hall that I had been told that he had been given a copy of the anonymous
letter that initiated this complaint. He said that no one in the City of Buckeye had given him
a copy of the letter although the city manager had read it to him. Chief Hall said that a week
or two later he received a copy of the letter from the Buckeye Police Association President
Vince Butler.

I then asked Chief Hall about the “New York Mafia” referred to in the letter. He said he
wasn’t sure of the source but, “full disclosure” he had known Sergeant Virgadamo and
Lieutenant McGeough prior to coming to Buckeye PD. He said he and Virgadamo were
partners at NYPD where they both worked in the anti-crime unit. He described Sergeant
Virgadamo as an “outstanding police officer.” He said that when he left NYPD he and
Virgadamo initially lost touch, but years later they reestablished contact. Chief Hall said in
2006, Sergeant Virgadamo called him and told him that he had his 20 years in with NYPD,
could retire, was thinking about moving to Arizona, and wanted to know if Mesa PD was
hiring. Chief Hall said he discouraged Virgadamo from testing for Mesa as they were having
a lot of internal friction. He explained Mesa PD had several officer-involved shootings,
including one he was involved in, and the officers felt they had not been supported. He said
he felt he was treated as a criminal. He said that morale was low, and several officers left
Mesa PD. He said that many of them went to DPS and he and two other officers went to
Buckeye PD.

Chief Hall said that when Virgadamo had called him to discuss relocating he was working on
contract for Buckeye PD, assisting with hiring. He said that he and other Mesa officers
would come to Buckeye on Saturdays and help with the different portions of the hiring
process including the fitness testing, as Buckeye PD was trying to hire 20-30 officers. Chief
Hall said that while assisting with the hiring processes they also pointed out to Buckeye PD
command staff other things that needed correction and then helped them institute positive
changes. He said the Buckeye PD command staff was appreciative and encouraged him to
come work at Buckeye PD. He resisted at first as he lived in Gilbert but, ultimately, he did
join Buckeye PD. He said when Virgadamo called him, he encouraged him to test for
Buckeye PD. Chief Hall said he was not certain but, he believes that Virgadamo may have
been hired by Buckeye PD before he was; he said they were hired generally at about the
same time. He said it had been a challenge but, Buckeye PD had come a long way since
2006. Hall said when Virgadamo was testing for Buckeye PD he (Hall) was also competing
for a sergeant position, so he could no longer be involved in the testing process. Hall said
he had tested for the Buckeye PD sergeant position in either January or February of 2006
and was not hired until May of 2006.

Chief Hall said that while he and Virgadamo were hired at about the same time, they did not
socialize off duty, adding that Virgadamo works weekends. He said they have “hung out”
outside of work hours possibly 2 or 3 times. Chief Hall said as it pertains to Lieutenant
McGeough he first met him when he moved to Mesa and they were both living in the same
apartment complex. Chief Hall said at that time he was going through the Mesa PD police
academy. He said McGeough had been in a class before him in the Mesa PD academy but
had to be recycled due to an injury. After being injured again, McGeough opted to return to

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had. Chief Hall said the topic came up in a CompStat meeting about a year and a half ago
but could not remember it being discussed at any command staff meeting.

Chief Hall was asked a clarifying question about his conversation with Assistant Chief Mann
about crime stat changing. Hall said he had asked Assistant Chief Mann if they were doing
sufficient quality control checks on their reports, and Mann had said, “Yeah, we’re good.
Charlie’s doing a good job.” I asked Chief Hall if this was an immediate response from
Mann or if he had directed Mann to check further into it. Chief Hall said it was an
immediate response which led him to believe that Mann was already aware of the concern
and may have previously had conversations with Arlak or Virgadamo about this issue. I then
told Chief Hall that it appeared he was unsure what level of investigation went into Assistant
Chief Mann’s statement. Chief Hall said that he did not think there was any investigation.

Chief Hall was asked if he was aware that Sergeant Virgadamo was doing quality control on
reports and changing UCR codes, and he said that he was not. Hall said he was aware the
officers would put in a UCR code and it would later be checked by the sergeant and
ultimately, “at the end of the day, the end of the line” Lieutenant Arlak would review the
report as part of the quality control process. Chief Hall further said he believed that
Sergeant Virgadamo would only make changes to his assigned officer’s paperwork or officers
from other squads that Virgadamo was covering for in the absence of their regular
supervisor.

Chief Hall was asked if he had ever spoken directly to Lieutenant Arlak about the topic of
crime stat alterations. Chief Hall said that he knew toward the end of each year, Lieutenant
Arlak would perform quality control on all crimes reported to the FBI for UCR purposes
and he would keep Chief Hall apprised when this was happening. Hall said his involvement
with the “crime stats” was limited to once a month when he saw them in CompStat
presentations.

I again asked Chief Hall if he had heard about the UCR crime stat altering allegations before
the anonymous letter arrived, and he said he had only heard about it one time which was at
the “union” meeting where “Lieutenant Arlak kind of shut down.” I again asked if he
was aware that Sergeant Virgadamo had a role in doing quality control on reports and he said
that he did not. Chief Hall then asked, “Do we know who provided him with that role? Was
it Mann…?” I told Hall it was still unclear who provided Virgadamo with that responsibility.
I asked Chief Hall if a sergeant had approved a report and a change needed to be made to
the narrative, would he expect that the sergeant would be notified so that mistake would not
be duplicated in the future. Chief Hall replied, “Absolutely.” He then said that they had
obtained a report writing manual from the City of Peoria that should help the officers and
sergeant understand what was needed in a report. Chief Hall was asked if he would be
surprised to know that reports had been changed without the knowledge or consent of the
officers or their supervisors, and he said “Yeah, that’s not good.” Chief Hall and I then
discussed the fact that some of the sergeants had reports from their officers changed by
Sergeant Virgadamo without their knowledge and consent. Chief Hall agreed that this could
be a source of frustration and aggravation for the involved supervisors and officers.

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I then discussed with Chief Hall another allegation from the anonymous letter which
concerned perceived preferential treatment, particularly pertaining to discipline. I asked
Chief Hall who was responsible for deciding which allegations of misconduct resulted in a
complete Professional Standards Investigation as opposed to a supervisory inquiry. Chief
Hall said that he believed the alleged misconduct must be of a certain serious nature-
possibly a Level 5 or above- and that ultimately, he makes the final decision. I told him that
based on what I had learned so far that it appeared he made the determination as to whether
a matter was investigated, what method of investigation was warranted, and in the end, what
discipline was administered. Chief Hall agreed with this statement and said that occasionally
they would utilize a DRB- a Disciplinary Review Board. He said these boards were in place
before he was chief as Chief Mann had wanted to get a greater perspective from others
about an incident. Chief Hall said he believed that the DRB helped to control rumors and
provided him with an unbiased opinion. He explained that he can and had accepted their
decision in some instances and rejected their decision in others. He stated ultimately, he
made the final decision. I asked Chief Hall if the DRB made recommendations about the
disposition of an allegation, the disciplinary action, or both. Chief Hall said the process had
changed. He said previously the Professional Standards Unit decided about whether to
sustain or not and provided input about discipline. He said this created some challenges in a
recent investigation and so “going forward” they will be changing the process they use.
Going forward, the PSU investigator will just complete the investigation as an unbiased
finder of fact, and the DRB will decide on the disposition of the investigation. Chief Hall
stated that this decision resulted from a recent investigation where the victims requested a
complete PSU investigation and he granted their request. Chief Hall was asked roughly how
many investigations are referred to PSU each year, and he estimated six or seven.

I explained to Chief Hall that I had reviewed several PSU files and it appears that many of
them were handled as Supervisory Inquiries. Chief Hall was asked how he was able to assure
that the officers were given their rights under the Police Officers Bill of Rights such as being
served a notice of investigation and being allowed to have a representative present when
interviewed. I said this is particularly important as the statute addresses whether the officer
“reasonably” believes the investigation could end in serious discipline. Chief Hall asked for
a specific incident and I told him that we would soon be discussing specific investigations.
Chief Hall was then asked if his sergeants, lieutenant, and assistant chiefs had been trained to
know when questioning went beyond preliminary fact finding and rights should be given.
Hall hesitated and said there had been no formal training but some of them had practical
experience working in the Professional Standards Unit and could complete the necessary
documents.

I told Chief Hall that I had reviewed an investigation completed by Arizona Investigations
and Professional Consultants concerning an allegation of a hostile work environment made
by Sergeant against former Assistant Chief Chief Hall was asked if he was
familiar with this investigation and he said that he was aware of matter. Chief Hall was told
that one of the recommendations made in this report was the disciplinary process needed to
be consistent, and Chief Hall agreed with this statement. Chief Hall was told that the report
stated that there was pattern of inconsistencies within the Department in deciding whether

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to conduct a PSU investigation or handle an allegation of misconduct as a supervisory
inquiry process. This created a concern that officers may not be provided privileges given to
them under the Peace Officer’s Bill of Rights. I then offered Chief Hall a copy of this
document for his review. After a discussion, it was agreed that this investigation was
completed roughly two years ago. I then read a statement from the investigation as follows:

“…it was observed that supervisors and managers in the Department were
dealing with these matters in several informal ways that did not include
assigned PSU or, if applicable, NOI level investigations. It is suggested this
policy be changed to require that all Department supervisors must enter any
received complaint into the IA PRO PSU process and receive an assigned case
number. Managerial review of these complaints may, of course, result in the
individual investigations being assigned to a specific supervisor and not all
matters need be assigned to PSU for actual investigation but all of them must
be submitted at the level of quality and confidentially of a formal and
numbered PSU investigation.”

Chief Hall then asked if they had suggested that every investigation be submitted for a
formal PSU investigation. I told Chief Hall that it seemed the intent of the statement was to
suggest that every investigation of alleged misconduct should be documented and submitted
to their tracking system and monitored just as a formal PSU investigation would be tracked.
I said it appeared that a few investigations seem to have fallen through the cracks. Chief
Hall said they are now making sure each investigation is given a number and tracked. He
said they are attempting to comply with suggestions made in the investigation.
One step taken was to ensure that if a citizen made a complaint about an officer’s conduct,
they must now draw a PSU number. Chief Hall noted that this practice has been in place for
the past year to a year and a half.

I then explained to Chief Hall that I wanted to discuss previous investigations that may be
contributing to the perception of preferential treatment for some individuals. I began by
speaking about the situation involving Officer detaining an autistic teenage boy
and a situation involving Officer detaining two female suspects at gunpoint.
Both incidents occurred a few weeks apart, and Chief Hall agreed that both officers had
complaints of excessive force filed against them. Chief Hall was asked if he had heard
grumblings about these two incidents being treated differently. Chief Hall said that he had
not but had heard Officer question why he was put on administrative leave after an
incident where he used force against a citizen at a Walmart and Officer was not in
this incident.

Chief Hall said that he was out of town when this incident involving Officer
occurred. He said Chief Sanders had investigated this use of force. He said the stop of the
teenage was determined to be constitutional. Chief Hall said the Officer
contacted the teen and believed that he might be sniffing something. The teen then tried to
run from the officer and fell to the ground in the process of trying to escape. Chief Hall said
after restraining the teen, Officer began to immediately realize he might have a

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Hall said he is willing to risk having lower level discipline overturned by not conducting
more lengthy investigations. I explained to Hall that if a complaint is handled by the
supervisor, and the supervisor only interviews the accused officer and not the complainant
and witnesses, it could lead to a lack of transparency and allegations of cover ups. When
asked, Chief Hall agreed that a complainant needs to know that their voice was heard, and he
said that if the supervisors are not doing this, it will be corrected through training.

I asked Chief Hall if he was familiar with a situation that occurred last summer when a series
of emails were exchanged between Sergeant Virgadamo and other supervisors after a heated
sergeant’s meeting. Chief Hall remembered some of the details about this incident. Chief
Hall was asked if he ever reviewed the supervisory inquiry that led to Virgadamo being given
a letter of reprimand and he said that he had not. I explained to Hall that the inquiry only
focused on a portion of Sergeant Virgadamo’s conduct. I told Chief Hall that I was certain
that the other sergeants involved in this incident did not know that Sergeant Virgadamo was
disciplined as a result and this furthered the perception that Sergeant Virgadamo was
receiving preferential treatment. Chief Hall then told me that he had recently had to disclose
at an Association meeting that Sergeant Virgadamo was served with discipline from another
investigation.

I then asked Chief Hall about an allegation that was listed in the anonymous letter
concerning his intervention in an investigation involving a sergeant that was having sex while
on duty. This allegation arose during an investigation involving a female employee
While being interviewed, the female employee accused then
Sergeant Bruce Root of coming to her home and having sex with her while he was on duty.
I explained to Chief Hall that I knew it had been determined that Root had not committed
any policy violations and did not have sex on duty as alleged. I asked Chief Hall, who was
the Assistant Chief at the time, why he had conducted the interview of Sergeant Root and
not the PSU investigator, Sergeant Joe Robinson. Chief Hall said that he was ordered to by
Chief Mann. Chief Hall said he had met with Sergeant Root, provided him with an NOI,
and recorded the interview. I told Chief Hall that the anonymous letter accused him of
“railroading” the investigation. Chief Hall said that he did not think that it was logical to
assume that he would have the ability to come in and “take over” the investigation. I told
Chief Hall that it seemed unusual to have him conduct the interview, and I asked Hall if he
had any insight as to why Chief Mann had made that decision. Chief Hall said he believe
that he wanted to keep the two allegations separate.

Chief Hall was then asked about an investigation that involved the Border Patrol, Sergeant
Detective and Detective . I asked Chief Hall if he was the first
Buckeye PD official notified, and he said that he was notified through an email that Border
Patrol was trying to reach a high-ranking member of the Buckeye Police Department. Chief
Hall said he spoke to Assistant Chief Mann and explained to him the complaint possibly
concerned an informant from Border Patrol being exposed by Buckeye Police undercover
officers. Chief Hall said that Assistant Chief Mann agreed to investigate the matter. Chief
Hall said that Assistant Mann then spoke to the Buckeye officers and the Border Patrol
agents before setting up a meeting with all the involved parties. Chief Hall said that this

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participation. Chief Hall was asked why the company was formed and he said it was to be a
contractor for Ferrari Express. Chief Hall explained his involvement with Blue Knight
Security began when McGeough came by his house and asked him to be a part of the
company. Chief Hall said that it never occurred to him that he was involved in a legal
business with Lieutenant McGeough until the McKnight investigation. He said during that
investigation he started receiving anonymous letters at the City “saying I’m do this- I’m
doing that.” He said a different city manager “wouldn’t investigate that stuff” which
included allegations of drinking on duty. Chief Hall said his work for Blue Knight Security
was limited, and he only earned a total of about fifteen hundred dollars. I asked Hall what
type of work he did for Blue Knight Security. He said that he was a courier that picked up
packages at the airport and delivered them to Scottsdale Mall.

Chief Hall said he told McGeough he was unable to keep up with the demands of Blue
Knight, so another retired police officer was hired to handle the courier jobs. He added, “I
could occasionally fill in now and then- which is what I do for another company. I
occasionally fill in with courier work or occasionally following a salesman from point A to
point B.” He said that company was Orion. I said I assumed when he did that type of work
he was armed, and Chief Hall replied, “Yeah.” I then asked Chief Hall how many jobs he
had worked for Ferrari. He said that he worked about ten jobs in 2013 and no jobs since.
Chief Hall was asked about compensation, and he said he was paid by check and he received
about $120.00 per trip.

Chief Hall was asked if he had ever worked the annual Las Vegas show for Ferrari. Chief
Hall said he had only worked one year, 2013. in an unarmed capacity as Nevada had strict
laws governing armed security. Chief Hall was asked what his duties were, and he said that
he packed airport containers with bags. When asked, he said he was unarmed and did not
function as a courier at this event. I then showed Chief Hall a copy of an email dated
February 12, 2014, addressed to unknown subjects named Dan and Shane. I read aloud to
Chief Hall an email that began, “Hey guys! The dates for Vegas are approx…May 27th to
June 3rd…” [Exhibit 63]. Chief Hall was asked if he went on this trip and he asked to see
the email. After looking at it he said, “Yeah, I guess it was ‘14 then.” I asked Chief Hall if
he was armed for this trip, and he said no. I then referred Chief Hall to a line in the email
that read “It’s armed manual labor, but easy stuff.” Hall immediately said “no, I wasn’t
armed.” Chief Hall further stated that to work that detail in Las Vegas, you had to qualify.
He said he had not qualified although he doesn’t know if the individuals the email was
addressed to had qualified. Chief Hall said that he believed a group of people went and got
qualified. Chief Hall further said that it was a time-consuming process to be qualified to
work the Las Vegas show while armed. He said in 2003 or 2004, he worked for Malca-Amit
at the Las Vegas show and had to go to the Las Vegas Metro police department to be
photographed and fingerprinted. Chief Hall said, “I’m pretty sure I wasn’t armed- I
guarantee I wasn’t armed” when he worked at the Las Vegas show in 2014. I asked Chief
Hall that if he had worked while armed would he not be breaking the law and he said that
was correct. He also said that there was a security group at the show that checked for
proper certification.

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Chief Hall was asked how many times he had worked the Las Vegas show. He said that this
was the JCK show and while he had worked numerous shows in Las Vegas and Tucson in
years past, 2014 was the last time he worked. Chief Hall was asked since becoming the Chief
in 2014 had he approved other Buckeye Police officers to work for the jewelry shows in Las
Vegas. He replied, “Not that I know of- not that I can recall.” He then added McGeough
had worked but that had been approved by Mann. He does not recall approving any other
Buckeye officer to work. Chief Hall was asked if he would be the person to sign paperwork
allowing a Buckeye officer to work the Las Vegas show, and he said, “to the best of my
knowledge yeah.” He said that he signs a lot of paperwork and he does not remember
signing anything authorizing this in the past five years. Chief Hall was asked if he knew if
McGeough or any Buckeye officers worked the 2016 Las Vegas jewelry show and he said
that he did not.

I asked Chief Hall if he would authorize one of his officers to work the Las Vegas Show and
he said he would if they were unarmed. He was asked if he would authorize an officer to
work the show armed and he said, “I don’t know.” He said there was “a lot of liability
there.” He said he would have “needed a little convincing” to sign off on such a request. I
asked Chief Hall if an officer working a show had to act, did he think that officers were
acting as a police officer or a private citizen. He said, “That’s the question.” He said he was
not certain if they are taking police action or acting on behalf of Ferrari. This was an issue
that Hall was not certain about and it concerned him. I asked Chief Hall if an officer would
be covered by the city’s workman’s compensation insurance if needed. Chief Hall said they
would not unless the officer was involved in a situation like the Las Vegas mass shooting or
there was a violent robbery. I then asked if Buckeye PD officers had to qualify with any
weapon they carried off duty and he said they did.

Chief Hall was asked if he was familiar with the companies Malca-Amit and Orion. Chief
Hall was familiar with these companies, and when asked he said these companies were like
Ferrari Express. Chief Hall said that he believed that Orion did not work with Malca-Amit
anymore because they lost the contract a few years ago. He said Orion still has contracts
where you escort a client carrying high dollar items like jewelry from point A to point B.
Chief Hall was asked if Orion marketed themselves as a company that hired off-duty law
enforcement officers throughout the country. Chief Hall said they did and have now also
gone international; they have thousands of employees that are off duty police officers. Chief
Hall was asked how Orion and Malca-Amit were different. Chief Hall then provided a
detailed explanation about procedures used to transport expensive jewelry. He explained that
jewelry over a certain value had to be delivered by armored vehicles for insurance purposes,
but for jewelry valued less than the threshold Malca-Amit would sub contract with Orion to
deliver the packages. He said Orion lost that contract and now their primary work is
escorting salesmen.

I explained to Chief Hall as part of my investigation I was given access to his emails. I told
him that while I was reviewing these emails, I discovered many emails written by him that
seem to indicate that he was working for Malca-Amit and Orion. I asked Chief Hall if he
was working for either company as a coordinator of off-duty jobs. Chief Hall said that he

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was not a paid coordinator and described himself as simply a “point of contact.” Chief Hall
said, “I don’t get compensated for that -I’m just the guy in Phoenix.” Chief Hall said the way
it worked was either Bill Schmidt, the owner of Orion, or someone else contacted him with
information for a job and Hall either took the job or “punts it to someone else.” When
asked, Chief Hall said he was only compensated for the jobs that he performed, not the ones
that he gave away.

I told Hall that seemed like a considerable amount of work for no pay, and he said that it
was “incredibly annoying.” Chief Hall was asked to explain his responsibilities as the point
of contact for Orion. Chief Hall said some time ago he had contacted Bill and told him that
he needed to find someone else to work these jobs as he was too busy. Bill agreed and hired
a retired person named Steven Raz. He said that Raz and Bill were like “water and oil” and
were not getting along. Chief Hall said that Bill Schmidt contacted him and asked him to be
a “go between” for he and Raz because the two were not getting along. Chief Hall said
Steven Raz was a retired police officer that he had supervised at Mesa PD and had found
extremely difficult to manage. He said after he agreed to act as the go between, Schmidt
would forward the job directly to Hall and Hall would in turn forward it to Raz. Hall said he
continued to act as the point of contact for Orion out of loyalty to a friend of over 20 years.
Hall said he occasionally took a paid job with Orion, but this only amounted to a couple of
thousand dollars a year. I asked Chief Hall how long he had been the point of contact for
Orion and he said, “Probably two years, maybe longer.”

I then explained to Chief Hall that through my investigation that I had found about 700
emails in his City of Buckeye Outlook account where he was corresponding with Orion. His
response was, “That many?” When I verified this he said, “Wow- I’m screwed.” I then told
Chief Hall that this seemed to be a lot of work to do for no compensation, and he again said,
“No I was not paid.” I also told Chief Hall that at one-point emails show that Orion asked
him to stop using his government email, and Chief Hall said, “Yeah we shut it down.” I
again said it seemed he was a coordinator for Orion. Hall then offered to provide contact
information for Bill Schmidt who could better explain his job and verify that he was not a
paid coordinator. I told him I would like that contact information and he agreed to provide
it. Chief Hall said, “To me- it’s an off-duty job.” Chief Hall said he has an off-duty
coordinator and Buckeye PD is contacted by LES (Law Enforcement Specialists) daily. He
said Weeks had just sent out an email saying they needed three officers for an off-duty
position. Chief Hall explained that his agency was a little different than DPS that has more
restrictions on off duty employment. Chief Hall said when he came to Buckeye PD the
agency was not well paid and had a culture where officers worked a lot of off duty work. He
said he only used LES as an example to show that emails come into the agency daily
requesting off duty law enforcement officers. He said that these emails go to everyone on
the off-duty list. Hall said that he had picked up a few jobs from Orion, but he believed that
would be no different than taking a job from LES.

I then allowed Chief Hall to review some tables created documenting his off-duty emails
broken down from 2014 through 2017. I told him that for some of these jobs he had
exchanged as many 27 emails. I then asked Chief Hall to specifically explain his function as

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the point of contact for Orion. Chief Hall said he would receive an email from Orion and it
would usually get forwarded to Steven Raz. Hall said that Raz usually took the job, but
occasionally he would work one. Once the job was filled, Chief Hall would send an email
back to Orion letting them know that the job was covered. He said they would rarely
communicate by phone. Chief Hall was asked if a new employee took a job, whose
responsibility would it be to make sure the paperwork was filled out. Hall said that it was
the employee’s. I asked him if he ever had a hand in getting the paperwork to the employee,
and he initially said no. I explained further about that I was referring to paperwork for new
employees working an Orion job and Chief Hall said that Bill might send the new employee
paperwork to him, and he would forward it to the new person. I then asked Chief Hall if
that was something that Bill would ask him to do as the point of contact. Chief Hall said
that he did not recall doing so, but he might have. I began to look for an email that
indicated that he did forward new employee paperwork to Officer on
February 4, 2016, when Chief Hall said, “If did it, I did it.” After reading the email, Chief
Hall said he remembered that he had helped get a job with Orion.

Chief Hall said that a lot of the work had dropped off after they lost the Malca-Amit
contract. He said he would still occasionally get a job although it is not a courier job but
rather one where he escorts a salesperson from mall to mall. I asked Chief Hall how often he
now received jobs, and he said once every two months.

I asked Chief Hall if it had been a frequent requirement that couriers call into Malca-Amit
while performing a job, and he said that was correct. When asked, he explained that POD
meant Proof of Delivery and that it was the responsibility of the person performing the job
to turn in the POD paperwork. I asked Chief Hall if he would be contacted if the POD
paperwork was not turned in, and he said the person just wouldn’t get paid. I asked Chief
Hall if he had been contacted when this happened, and he replied, “occasionally.” Chief
Hall was asked if something went wrong on a job, would they call the person working or
would they call him. Hall said they would probably try and call the person working the job
first, and if that was unsuccessful, he did not know who they would call adding, “I’m not his
boss.”

I asked Chief Hall if the Buckeye employees that he used for Orion jobs were
. After a brief discussion, Chief Hall agreed that
this was correct. He said he did not think that any of these officers worked more than a few
jobs with Orion.

I asked Chief Hall how he balanced his responsibilities as the Chief of Police with his
position as an unpaid “point of contact” for Orion. He started to answer and stuttered
repeating, “It did get a little- it did get…” He then stated that he would not describe his
work with Orion as anything but an “annoyance.” Chief Hall then emphasized that he
typically works 50 hours a week. He said that he is an exempt employee and he does not get
overtime. He also said that sending one or two emails does not take that much time, and he
could not explain why one job took 27 emails to complete. He said in that situation
something had probably went bad, maybe something didn’t get pick up and added, “that did

217
take a little bit of my time.” He further said that the one or two emails that he sends each
week did not really matter as he had to spend so much time at the police department. I then
asked Chief Hall if he had ever cleared this through the city manager, and Chief Hall said, “I
cleared it through my boss… at the time, Mark Mann.” I then asked Chief Hall that now
that he was the chief, had it been cleared through anyone, and he said that it had not been
cleared yet. I said to him that there were two different City Managers during his tenure as
chief and he said that was correct. Chief Hall was asked if he used his personal vehicle when
he worked those jobs and he said yes. I asked him about cell phone usage and he said he did
not have a cell phone through the city. I asked him about using the city computer and email
account, and he said he had used it. Chief Hall then added, “Again, I just want to make clear
that we do use city email for off duty things. We do respond to off duty companies. I do
have an off-duty coordinator.” I asked him if this work should have gone through that
coordinator. Chief Hall replied, “Well I have a lot of off duty work that goes through the
SROs.” He confirmed he was referring to School Resource Officer and said that there were
off duty jobs at the schools such as football games that they would take responsibility for
filling. Chief Hall said that this was an “arguable point.” He said that he will probably have
to have this conversation with his boss when the time comes and pointed out that Buckeye
does have officers on the Department that have their own off-duty jobs- which are within
policy- that are all over the valley. The chief said that there are Buckeye officers that work at
restaurants- although not bars as that was “probably” not within policy. He said there were
also Buckeye officers that worked as part of the coalition, working Arizona Cardinals games.
Hall said that if they have a job in town that has a requirement in their contract that they hire
Buckeye officers, those jobs would go through the coordinator. He said that there are still
plenty of officers that have “personally approved off duty” jobs that are within policy. Chief
Hall was asked how many of those Orion jobs that he was the “point of contact” for did he
work, and he said about 5%.

I asked Chief Hall what, based on the current Buckeye Police Department policy, would he
consider his jobs with Orion to be. He initially answered, “off duty employment.” I said
that their current policy defined two types of off duty employment; Regular Off Duty
Employment or Extra Duty Employment. I asked Chief Hall which of these would describe
his work with Orion. He first said these jobs could fit in to either category and then
admitted that he did not know the definitions. I explained that Regular Off Duty
employment is any employment that will not require the use or potential use of Law
Enforcement authority by the off -duty employee, and Extra Duty Employment is any
employment that is conditioned on the actual or potential use of police powers by the police
officer employee. I said that the jobs with Orion would have to be consider extra-duty
employment because he was hired due to his law enforcement status. Chief Hall pointed out
that Orion did use retired police officers. I said that Buckeye officers that are hired by
Orion are hired due to their law enforcement status and Chief Hall agreed with this
statement.

I asked Chief Hall again if he had any involvement with Blue Knight Security since the
beginning and he said that he could best be described as a silent partner. Chief Hall further
stated that he did not set up policies or procedures for the company. I asked Chief Hall what

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was Lieutenant McGeough trying to do with the business. He said that Lieutenant
McGeough was trying to grow the business so that if Chief Hall retired, then he (Chief Hall)
would run the company. I asked Chief Hall if he knew if McGeough intended to expand the
jewelry courier side of the business, and Chief Hall said he was unsure but knew that they
wanted the business to stay within the regulations set up by the Department of Public Safety.
Hall further said that the plan for the business was to eventually expand their security
services to other areas. Chief Hall said that back in 2001 or 2002, he was doing a lot of
security work-approved through the City of Mesa, and had developed a business plan, but he
had a child and was unable to move forward. When asked, Chief Hall said that all the
paperwork filings for the business were handled by McGeough. I told Chief Hall that
Lieutenant McGeough said in his interview that the corporation had been dissolved, and I
told Chief Hall the Corporation Commission website still listed his name. Hall said that he
spoke to McGeough and was told by McGeough that the partnership had been dissolved.
Chief Hall told him that he needed to formally dissolve it and McGeough told him that he
thought he had done that. Chief Hall could not provide an answer as to why is name is still
listed in the corporation filings.

Chief Hall was asked what his rank was in 2013, and he said that he was an Assistant Chief.
I asked Hall what areas he supervised at that time, and he said the entire Department. I
asked if he knew what Lieutenant McGeough’s rank and assignment were at the time, and
Hall said he was a sergeant in patrol. Chief Hall was asked when McGeough was assigned as
the PSU sergeant, and he said sometime in 2015. I asked Chief Hall if there was selection
process for the PSU position, and he said that nobody put in for the job. I told Chief Hall
although their policies have changed in the past few years, the City of Buckeye and the police
department policies on Nepotism and Conflicting Relationship’s, and specifically their
definition of a business relationship, had not. Chief Hall was asked if he was familiar with
this policy and he said that he was not. I then provided Chief Hall copies of the past three
versions of Buckeye Police Department policy #1050 dating back to July 9, 2013 and
directed him to the definition of a Business Relationship. After reading this, Chief Hall said,
“Yeah, on paper-I guess we still had a business relationship on paper but I wasn’t doing any
work for the company.”

I told Chief Hall that I was now going to address an allegation from the anonymous letter
concerning his attendance at the Phoenix Open golf tournament. Chief Hall was asked if he
had ever attended the Phoenix Open and he said that he had. I asked him if he remembered
what years he attended that tournament and he told me he did not. I asked him if he had
ever attempted to help another person gain access to a restricted area using his pass, and he
said no. Chief Hall further said, “You know we get in there free.” I said I was aware of this
but there are areas that have restricted access such as VIP areas. I told Chief Hall that it was
said during another interview that Core Construction provided tickets to the tournament to
the city and Chief Hall was given those tickets. Chief Hall responded to this by saying “I
wish Core Construction gave me some tickets to the Open.” Chief Hall denied trying to get
his brother into a restricted area at the tournament and said he had never been to the
tournament with his brother.

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Chief Hall was asked if he had ever operated a city vehicle after consuming alcohol and he
said no. Chief Hall was asked if was ever issued a blue Dodge Charger by the city, and he
said he had a gray Dodge Charger assigned to him when he was the Assistant Chief. Chief
Hall said his personal vehicle was a black Dodge Charger that was the same year as his City
vehicle and he owned it before he was assigned the Charger from the city.

I then discussed with Chief Hall a traffic accident that had occurred on February 15, 2015. I
explained to him that two officers had told me that he lived in the area and had showed up
at the scene of the accident at Verrado Way and W. Sage. Chief Hall corrected me and said
that it occurred at Indian School Rd. I said I had further learned that he arrived on scene in
his assigned city vehicle and noted that he was the chief at the time and was assigned a white
Tahoe. Hall responded to my statements by saying, “Right.” I confirmed with Hall this was
an accident involving a nude man and a “car crash in the desert” and asked him if he had
shown up at this scene and he replied, “I did.” I then noted, “Two officers, when asked,
confirmed that they saw you taking pictures of him with your cell phone.” He replied,
“Yes.” I asked, “You did?’ He again confirmed he had but immediately told me, “I’ll give
you the story.”

Chief Hall then told me that he was on the second story of his home and had looked
outside, saw all the police vehicles at the intersection, and had gone to the scene. I
confirmed this scene was “literally over your back fence.” He replied, “Yeah.” Chief Hall
continued and said he got out of his vehicle, asked what was going on, and then ran into
Officer who told him, “Yeah-there’s a guy at the bottom of the hill. You gotta see
this.” Hall then explained that Indian School comes to a t-intersection at Verrado Way and a
few feet beyond the road there is a wash. He said, “So this guy went straight through-
landed in a wash.” He said that the officers were “doing their thing” and he believed that
Officer was taking pictures. He said after a little while he decided to leave. He
said, “…As I’m on my way out- he was covered- at no point was this guy exposed. Matter
of fact I didn’t even get his… face in the picture. I took a picture of the car in the-in the
wash. Ok. And that was the extent of that. And when I got home my wife said what was
that all about? I showed her the-the pic of – from my personal phone- pic of the car in the
wash and then I deleted the pic.”

I asked Chief Hall, “So he wasn’t nude at the time?” He started to explain, “You couldn’t
see in the pic that he was…” I then asked him, “So you did not take a picture of a nude
man?” He replied, “No.” I asked him if he could explain why the officers thought he had
and if he had made comments that others would enjoy seeing the picture. He replied no and
said the officers had made comments towards him saying, “… that ‘hey he almost made it to
your house.” Hall further explained, “The way the pic was taken he was covered. He was in
the car and the only thing you could see of him was his leg hanging off the seat. It was a
pickup truck.”

Chief Hall further explained that the driver was alive, his door was ajar, his foot was hanging
out of the vehicle, and from where he was at you couldn’t, “…make out anything- you
couldn’t make out genitalia. You couldn’t make out his face. You couldn’t make out

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Scottsdale Police Department. Chief Hall said this message was from October 28, 2017, at
1550 hours. The voice on the recording identified herself as Lacy with the Scottsdale Police
Department. The female said the she was calling to tell Chief Hall that they had no record
of any contact between him and the Scottsdale Police. Chief Hall said he presented that
taped call because he did not know that the drunk and disorderly allegation involved a
security guard and not a police officer. He also provided a memo he had prepared reference
this contact [Exhibit 64].

Chief Hall then presented me with a memo that he said was the only documentation that he
had every received involving CompStat and it was written by Assistant Chief Mann. This
memo concerned how percentages or differences were being calculated for CompStat
purposes [Exhibit 65]. Chief Hall also handed me a large stack of papers that he said
included Lexipol policies that were in place at the time of the incident involving the accident
victim and the picture he had taken [Exhibit 66]. He also provided me a jump drive that he
said was from Chief Mann’s hard drive. He said that his off-duty work approval memo could
be on the drive. Chief Hall said the media had requested the memo approving his off-duty
work and he did not have a copy of it. Chief Hall further explained that during the time of
the media request, Mann was being released from employment. Chief Hall said he went into
Assistant Chief Mann’s office but did not go into his computer. I asked Chief Hall if one of
his employees had come before him for not filling out off duty paperwork, how serious of
an offense would he have considered it. He advised, “not very serious at all.”

Chief Hall said that he knew that he would have to answer for the picture that he took at the
accident scene. Chief Hall said that when the time comes to defend his actions, he might
have to “split hairs” to prove that taking the picture was not a policy violation. Chief Hall
further said that he might be able to make the argument that he was not employed at the
point when he went to the accident scene. I then asked him if he drove his city vehicle and
he said that he did. He said that he had mainly responded because he thought they might
need lights or additional traffic control.

Chief Hall said there was an allegation that he failed to discipline Lieutenant McGeough for
policy violations, and to this day he did not know what violations they were referring to. I
explained to Chief Hall that allegations in the letter were broad, which meant that some of
my questions asked of the witnesses were also broad. I further explained to him that I had
not asked him about that during his interview as nothing of substance was revealed during
the interviews.

Chief Hall then addressed the allegation that he had implemented CALEA because he
wanted to pad his resume and that it was a waste of money. Chief Hall said that was exactly
like something that Mark Mann would say because Mann has made similar comments as
made in the anonymous letter; he specifically referred to the term “self-serving.” Chief Hall
pointed out the CALEA process was started when Mann was the Chief. He said that it was
Mann who signed the agreement to implement CALEA. Chief Hall said some of the people
in the agency believed that Hall was responsible for the implementation of CALEA. I

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explained to Chief Hall that I was not investigating that allegation but appreciated that he
would like the opportunity to clear his name.

Chief Hall said that there was an allegation that he had tried to force Mark Mann out of the
organization and that he and other command staff members were friends of the
investigators. Chief Hall explained that one of those investigators, Ron Hergert, was a
former Lieutenant with the Phoenix Police Department and the El Mirage Police
Department. Hall said he met Hergert in 2010 at a meeting and Hergert was later hired to
help institute a case management system in the Criminal Investigations Division at Buckeye.
Hergert later retired and started a private investigations business with Jim Humphrey, a
former Phoenix Police Commander. Hall said he attempted to hire Hergert and Humphrey
in the past for a sexual harassment investigation but, quickly realized that it was a violation
of the Memorandum of Understanding they had with the Association, so they were unable
to complete the investigation. Chief Hall said he had crossed paths with the investigators
over the years until Hall needed to hire someone to conduct the Mann investigation. Chief
Hall further stated that he did not socialize with either of the investigators.

I then asked Chief Hall if he ever provided a letter for one of the investigators so that
someone could purchase a police package Chevrolet Tahoe. Chief Hall said that Ron
Hergert had wanted a Tahoe and needed a letter supporting the purchase. Chief Hall said he
did not know if the purchase ever took place. It should be noted that Ron Hergert sent an
email to Chief Hall dated December 30, 2016, asking Chief Hall to sign a letter addressed to
the Courtesy Automotive Group requesting that Attorney James Tinker be allowed to
purchase a police package Tahoe. The letter signed by Hall states that James Tinker is a
Judge Pro Tem for Municipal courts in Phoenix, Peoria, Glendale, and Buckeye. I asked
Chief Hall if he was a little uncomfortable with the request from Ron Hergert considering
that they were conducting the (Mann) investigation. Chief Hall answered by saying that he
was a little confused by the request and had forgotten all about it. Hall further said that he
knew that he was not going to try and make traffic stops with it, so he was ok with him
having a good quality vehicle. From this statement, it appeared that Hall believed that
Hergert was trying to buy the vehicle and not Tinker.

Chief Hall looked at the remaining documents he had and said, I am not going to touch on
the case. Chief Hall was referring to a double homicide that occurred in Buckeye in
2012 and was the focus of an allegation in the anonymous letter. I told Chief Hall that
through my investigation, I found nothing to support the allegation which he was why he
was not questioned on it. Chief Hall then told me he had wanted to send that situation to
PSU but was stopped by Chief Mann. He said he would have just have felt more
comfortable with knowing exactly what had happened out there. He said that years later
Mann had conceded that this should have been investigated by PSU.

Chief Hall then stated at no time did anyone from the Department ever receive directions
from him or Chief Sanders to change crime stats. I asked Chief Hall if he was at all
concerned about some of the things that he had heard from me concerning reporting of
crime stats, and he said absolutely. I explained to Chief Hall that I believed that crimes were

223
Mr. was again asked about having customers file police reports for stolen
trash cans. He said the city contracts with a private company, Republic Services, for trash
pickup and the trash cans belong to that company.

I asked Mr. if he had every discussed with the police department about the
police reports for the missing garbage cans. He said he was not certain whom he spoke to,
but he did have a discussion with a representative of the police department at least a year
and half ago. Mr. said his department began to require police reports and the
police department contacted them with concerns that not all the reported cases were thefts.
Mr. said in response to their concerns his department began to make a chart
listing every time that they took possession of a can and this was made available to the police
department’s dispatch to cross reference.

Mr. then said that in 2016, the contract pulled about fifteen cans from
customers that had more than one can and were not paying for them. He said the city only
received one complaint about the can being taken. Mr. further stated that the
people that had those extra cans did not request or pay for these cans. Because of this, he
was not certain where they got these additional cans and agreed they were likely stolen.

Mr. agreed to provide me with some of the documents discussed. I


requested that he not speak to anyone about our conversation due to confidential nature of
this investigation. The interview was concluded at 9:33 hours.

Complaint Dispositions
Complaint Dispositions- Lieutenant Root

Allegation I-Failure to Supervise/ Dishonesty- Unfounded


Allegation: After learning that Officer Dan Hoffmeister had failed to properly log evidence,
Bruce Root, who was a Detective Sergeant, had conspired with him to conceal this
misconduct by somehow “sneaking” the property into the evidence room. This allegation, if
proven to be factual, is a violation of the following policies:

Buckeye City Policy Section 610.11


Buckeye City Polic Section 630.1
Buckeye City Policy Section 910
Buckeye Police Department Policy 340.4.II
Buckeye Police Department Policy A-340-Appendix A

Finding: UNFOUNDED

Relevant Facts:

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Buckeye PD Policy 1050 Nepotism and Conflicting Relationships (Effective 5/3/2015)
Buckeye PD Policy 1041.Employee Arranged Off Duty Employment (Effective 7/9/2013)
Buckeye PD Policy 1040 Extra Duty, Police Secondary, and Regular Off Duty Employment
(Effective 3/2/2015)

Finding: SUSTAINED

Relevant Facts:

The anonymous complaint addressed the alleged conflict of interest created by the business
established and shared by Hall and McGeough. This business was easily verified by a check
of the Arizona Corporation Commission website which showed both Gary McGeough and
Lawrence Hall as Members of Blue Knights Securities Group LLC (“Blue Knights”), File
Number L18393865 [Exhibit 68]. Articles of Organization were filed for Blue Knights, a
perpetual domestic LLC, on 6/12/2013 and published on 6/24/2013 when McGeough was
a Buckeye PD sergeant and Hall was the Assistant Chief. On 4/12/2014, when a Statement
of Change of Statutory Agent was filed for Blue Knights, Hall was now the Buckeye Chief of
Police and McGeough was a Sergeant.

Buckeye Police Department Policy defines a business relationship as “serving as an


employee, independent contractor, compensated consultant, owner, board member,
shareholder or investor in an outside business, company, partnership, corporation, venture,
or other transaction where the Department employee’s annual interest, compensation,
investment, or obligation is greater than $250.00.” When interviewed for this investigation
both Hall and McGeough stated that they did not know how their agency defined a business
relationship and were unaware of the associated policies. Both also agreed, after reviewing
Buckeye PD Policy 1050, first adopted on July 9, 2013 [Exhibit 69], that by this definition
they did have a business relationship at the time the business was organized.

Both Hall and McGeough had argued that at the time they formed Blue Knights, Buckeye
PD policies did not address a business relationship and that Mark Mann, who was the
Buckeye Chief of Police at the time, had knowledge of this business and approved it.
McGeough went so far as to say that he submitted a memo to Chief Mann seeking his
approval. It is unknown why they would have sought approval from Chief Mann in April
2013 when there were no policies in place that addressed either a business relationship or off
duty employment. Since they were still unaware of these policies at the time of their
interview for this investigation it is not likely the publication of the related policies in July
2013 would have prompted them to prepare memos. While an interview with Mark Mann
may substantiate their claim that seems unlikely as on May 4, 2017, during Buckeye PD
internal investigation (IA 16-15) Mann submitted a memo to the investigator, Ron Hergert
Consulting, which included the Corporation Commission filing for Blue Knights. Mann had
requested that the City investigate if Hall and McGeough had followed proper policy when
establishing this business, if it created a conflict of interest, and if they had obtained
authorization from the City to work this outside employment [Exhibit 70]. With the conflict

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and turmoil surrounding Mann’s last years at Buckeye PD, it seems likely he would have
brought this information forward sooner if he had been aware of it.

Chief Hall said that Blue Knights was formed partially to do contract courier work for
Ferrari Express, the same company that coordinated security for the Las Vegas shows.
Chief Hall said he was not involved in Blue Knights from its inception and described himself
as only a silent partner. This is not supported by Chief Hall’s own contention that he made
approximately $1500.00 working for Ferrari in 2013. McGeough described Chief Hall as a
silent partner in Blue Knights in 2013, said he “basically had no involvement” in 2014, and
was not included in the taxes filed for the business by 2015. The City could verify these
claims by ordering the submittal of all tax returns for Blue Knights.

In January 2014, Hall was appointed as the Buckeye chief of police and he admitted that he
never informed his boss, the city manager (neither Cleveland nor Klingler), of his
involvement in Blue Knights and his business relationship with McGeough. He said he did
not even considered Blue Knights a business until anonymous complaints came in to the
City during the McKnight investigation, which was conducted in 2015. Despite these
complaints, Hall did nothing to legally dissolve Blue Knights Security and resolve the
perception of a conflict of interest. His obvious lack of knowledge of Buckeye PD’s policies
concerning business relationships, conflicts of interest, and secondary employment suggests
that these complaints did not even prompt him to consult policy to assure he was
complying. Despite, anonymous complaints and public records requests Chief Hall let these
perceptions of a business relationship fester, causing further discontent within the Buckeye
PD, with accusations of preferential treatment towards McGeough. This allegation is
SUSTAINED.

Allegation II- H omicide Scene; Dishonesty- Unfounded


On October 21, 2012, Gary McGeough, while a sergeant, had decided at the scene of a
domestic disturbance that ultimately resulted in the death of two innocent people, as
documented in Buckeye Police Department report #121021014. Sergeant McGeough later
lied about this decision and members of command staff, including then Assistant Chief Hall,
covered up his misconduct. This allegation, if proven factual, involves violations of the
following policies:

Buckeye City Policy Section 610.11


Buckeye City Policy Section 630.1
Buckeye City Policy Section 910
Buckeye Police Department Policy 340.4.II
Buckeye Police Department Policy A-340-Appendix A

Finding: UNFOUNDED

Relevant Facts:

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Buckeye PD Policy Section 340.4.II
Buckeye PD Policy A-340 – Appendix A

Finding: SUSTAINED

Relevant Facts:

The anonymous letters that initiated this investigation identified Lieutenant Arlak as the
administrator of the Buckeye Police Department’s automated record keeping system,
Spillman, and one of the individuals allegedly involved in under reporting the City of
Buckeye’s crime statistics. Lieutenant Arlak confirmed that since 2011 he had been the
systems manager for the Buckeye Police Department’s Spillman system and responsible for
reporting Buckeye’s UCR statistics to DPS. Lieutenant Arlak admitted that he was
responsible for the quality control of Buckeye PD’s offense reports to assure the appropriate
UCR codes were recorded and reported. Lieutenant Arlak said that Sergeant James
Virgadamo had not officially been given a quality control function, but that he had relied on
him for assistance in this role as he had a better understanding of UCR reporting
requirements than did most Buckeye Police Department sergeants. Lieutenant Arlak said he
had personally provided additional training to Sergeant Virgadamo, who had also attended a
Spillman training course sometime in the last five years.

When asked, Lieutenant Arlak displayed inadequate knowledge of UCR reporting guidelines.
He understood the Hierarchy rule for Part I crimes, but when asked how scoring differed for
persons versus property crimes he advised that property crimes were scored lower. This was
inaccurate as scoring about UCR codes, refers to counting the number of offenses after they
have been classified. He did not offer the fact that a “persons” crime is scored based on
victims while “property” crimes are scored based on incidents. This is critical as it directly
impacts the number of such offenses, including aggravated assaults, reported.

Lieutenant Arlak’s misconceptions about UCR reporting requirements is seen in the many
reports for which he had incorrectly modified or changed the UCR codes. A review of the
2017 simple assault reports that recorded a UCR Offense Code of ASSG, Assaulted,
Aggravated Circumstances, found 34 that should have been reported as aggravated assaults.
As the individual in charge of quality control, Lieutenant Arlak was responsible for reviewing
and assuring the accuracy of each of these reports. He admitted that he knew that the UCR
Offense Code ASSG would classify an assault as a Simple (Part II) Assault. Despite this, a
query conducted by Buckeye’s IT Department found that Lieutenant Arlak had knowingly
modified 16 of those 34 reports in some fashion. In some cases, he had added an Arizona
Revised Statute to the offense report that indicated the appropriate charge (i.e. ARS 13-
1204.A.1- Aggravated Assault- Serious Physical Injury or ARS 13-1204.A.2 Aggravated
Assault-Deadly Weapon or Dangerous Instrument) but, had not reported the appropriate
UCR Offense code so it could be captured for the UCR report. That the aggravated assault
was not reported was readily apparent, as there were so few aggravated assaults reported by
the Buckeye Police Department in 2017.

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In addition to the above aggravated assaults that were incorrectly reported as simple assaults,
there were approximately 9 other offense reports detailed in this investigation in which
Lieutenant Arlak was found to have incorrectly changed a UCR code, usually resulting in
changing the offense from a Part I offense to a Part II. It should be noted that this was only
a sampling of offenses incorrectly coded and a full audit is warranted to determine the extent
of this problem.

When interviewed, Lieutenant Arlak was asked specifically about 4 of these reports in which
he had “downgraded” a burglary to a theft (171122026), an aggravated assault to a simple
assault (171108012), a robbery to a theft (171101105), and another robbery to an aggravated
assault (170315070). The only explanation Arlak offered was that the UCR Code previously
used was incorrect. By simply referencing the UCR Manual Lieutenant Arlak would have
easily determined that his changes were inaccurate. For instance, an assault of an individual
struck in the face with a tire iron was downgraded to a simple assault as there were no
serious injuries even though UCR coding requirements specifically describe a tire iron as a
dangerous weapon and note that it is not necessary that injury result from an aggravated
assault when a gun, knife, or other weapon that could cause serious personal injury is used.

It was also found that over a period of 16 months there were almost 65 thefts of garbage
cans that were either changed by Lieutenant Arlak or Sergeant Virgadamo to an Information
Only report or were unfounded. While not a significant crime there is absolutely nothing to
indicate that these garbage cans were not stolen and the third party that provided these cans
to the City had not been victimized. In fact, in speaking with a City sanitation department
manager, he advised that theft is the only reasonable explanation for the loss of these can.
He said if a garbage can were to fall into the compacter, the driver would immediately
recognize this and would call for a replacement can before the homeowner even knew the
can was missing. He said this does not commonly happen and there is no disincentive for
the driver to report this occurrence. He said that the City rarely would “repossess” cans for
non-payment and in those instances the City would not have instructed the homeowner to
complete a theft report and would not have offered a replacement can as was done in each
of these theft cases. Finally, he said that there have been instances when the City has gone
and collected cans from homeowners who had an additional garbage can that they had not
paid for. He said that these cans could only have been obtained by taking (stealing) them
from another residence. The sanitation representative said that he had this same discussion
with a police department representative and he had agreed to report to the PD any
repossessions of cans either for non-payment or when additional cans are confiscated. He
said they never gave the police department any information that indicated they believed
these trash cans were not stolen. Despite this, Lieutenant Arlak unfounded all such reports
without explanation, leading to an underreporting of thefts. This also raised concerns that
other criminal reports could be unfounded to avoid UCR reporting and is another avenue
that a full audit should explore.

Most of the individuals interviewed did not directly accuse Lieutenant Arlak of falsifying
UCR codes, but, said as the person responsible for quality control of reports he did not
provide proper oversight to Sergeant Virgadamo. Most said that Arlak was well aware of

233
these accusations against Virgadamo and did nothing to investigate or correct them. These
allegations were brought up at least twice in a public forum (a BPA meeting), at least one of
which Arlak attended. Others, including Sergeant and Officer said they had
personally brought their concerns about Virgadamo to Lieutenant Arlak and he failed to
address it. Lieutenant Arlak acknowledged that he had received complaints about
Virgadamo’s actions. He attributed some of these complaints to “personality conflicts” and
said that officers complaining did not have a complete understanding of UCR reporting.
While Lieutenant Arlak offered several defenses he never advised that he had audited
Virgadamo’s changes for accuracy.

Lieutenant Arlak’s actions in changing UCR codes already deemed as correct by the
investigating officers and their sergeants, and his failure to correct UCR codes that were
misreported, contributed to an underreporting of criminal activity by the Buckeye Police
Department. His willingness to abdicate his responsibilities for quality control of criminal
reports to a subordinate, Sergeant James Virgadamo, without providing him the necessary
oversight not only created dissension within Buckeye PD’s ranks but also further negatively
impacted the accuracy of UCR reporting. While cautioning that it is only an estimate, when
extrapolating the findings of this investigation, it appears that UCR crimes, particularly Part I
crimes, have been significantly underreported by the Buckeye Police. It has cast doubts
and disparagement on the Buckeye Police Department. This allegation is SUSTAINED.

Complaint Dispositions-Sergeant Virgadamo

Allegation I- Workplace Bullying/Discourtesy- Sustained

Allegation: James Virgadamo engaged in a pattern of bullying and harassing behavior that
particularly targeted several of his fellow sergeants, created a toxic work environment and
disrupted the good order and efficiency of the Buckeye Police Department. If this allegation
is found to be factual it would be a violation of the following policies:

City of Buckeye Policy 610.1 Standards of Conduct


City of Buckeye Policy 311 Bullying
Buckeye Police Policy Manual Preface from Chief “Workplace Expectations”
Buckeye Police Department Police Policy 340

Finding: SUSTAINED

Relevant Facts:

In the second anonymous complaint, the unknown author(s) had written of Sergeant James
Virgadamo:

“Sergeant Virgadamo is the textbook definition of a “Bully”. There are


numerous officers who have been repeatedly threatened, harassed, ridiculed,

234
this lieutenant needed to “stay in his own lane.” That he copied his response to other
sergeants and his own Lieutenant is particularly disturbing and likely contributed to the
perception expressed during this investigation by some individuals that Sergeant Virgadamo
did not have the same level of accountability as other sergeants. These emails are particularly
ironic as earlier emails illustrate that Sergeant Virgadamo in the past has frequently
demanded respect due to his rank and tenure.

When interviewed, Sergeant Virgadamo initially acknowledged that some of his emails were
inappropriate and he had possibly created dissension when he interfered with other
sergeants’ squads. He then quickly diverted the attention away from his actions; providing a
list of reasons that other sergeants had resented him. He accepted no accountability for his
actions and did not seem to comprehend the division he had created by his words and
actions. In fact, he regularly complained or chastised others for not meeting with him “one
on one” or “man to man;” to air out their differences.

Lieutenant Arlak acknowledged that Sergeant Virgadamo had negative interactions with
other sergeants and explained them by stating that Virgadamo was older, could be “grumpy,”
and was not always at fault. Clearly, Lieutenant McGeough, Assistant Chief Sanders, and
Chief Hall were aware of some of Virgadamo’s unsettling behavior as they were copied on
several of his emails. While it is unknown their response to Sergeant Virgadamo or what they
had done to address his behavior, it appears inadequate. Even after receiving a letter of
reprimand for the original email sent in response to the question asked in a sergeant’s
meeting, Virgadamo accepted no responsibility and did not correct his behavior. In fact,
soon after being issued this generic letter of reprimand, Sergeant Virgadamo again found
himself in trouble due some insensitive comments made over the MDC during the Las
Vegas mass shooting. This resulted in a Professional Standards investigation, IA 2017-008
[Exhibit 71]. When interviewed during that investigation, Virgadamo again appeared to
accept no responsibility and seemed to attribute recent complaints and disciplinary
investigations to retaliation for his peripheral involvement in an action that caused an acting
supervisor to be demoted, as well as programs he attempted to institute as an Acting
Lieutenant. With this mentality, it is unlikely that Virgadamo’s recent suspension will serve
to correct his behavior.

This investigation found that any inquiry/investigation into Sergeant Virgadamo’s conduct
to date has only addressed an issue at the specific point in time and has not looked at, nor
done anything to address, his ongoing pattern of repeated, unreasonable treatment of a
subsection of his peers. His belittling, condescending, and abusive behavior has created a
division among his peers that threatens morale, productivity, and safety and should not be
ignored. That this behavior seems to have gone unnoticed by his supervisors may be as
much a testament to Virgadamo’s duplicity and manipulative behavior as it is to any failing
on the part of his supervisors. This allegation is SUSTAINED.

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is what gets uploaded to the public, not the nature.” Virgadamo further wrote the following
comment in this lengthy email:

“I know we had some legitimate vehicle burglaries the other night in West
park…and those officers did a great job documenting those reports. Why are
we letting or not stopping these officers from starting all these other vehicle
burglary DRs that were created for every car they found in the neighborhood
with an open door when nothing was taken, it was unknown if anything was
taken or the victim was unable to be contacted. I even saw one or two reports
where the victim was contacted and said no property was taken and the owner
didn’t even want to aid but they are still coded as Vehicle Burglaries. I could
see MAYBE leaving the nature a Vehicle Burglary for our own tracking and
knowledge, but the offense codes should be changed to trespassing or
suspicious activity.”

“We all know what these suspects were doing and what their intent was, but
do we really need to paper bomb ourselves when it isn’t needed or wanted?”

“I don’t expect the officers to be concerned about things like crime stats but
that’s what our job as Sergeants is when these things occur to keep things
down low or at the minimum not inflate things that don’t need inflating.
Would have appreciated a Sergeant on scene telling them “hey here is a better
way to handle this…” and we avoid pushing our crime rate up 60% in one
night for a bunch of open car doors. Lol”

“I care because I live here and don’t want my home town or our dept to be
perceived as the arm pit of the West Valley because of an inflated crime rate
that is beyond our control and the result of carless [sic] people who don’t
know how to lock their cars.”

Officer and Officer both had reported, and their statements were
corroborated, that they had brought up their concerns about Virgadamo’s actions in Buckeye
Police Association meetings. Officer raised his concerns at a BPA meeting in the
Fall of 2015. He said Sergeant Virgadamo’s only response was to attempt to bully and
intimidate him. This response was witnessed and corroborated by Sergeant Officer
said he brought up his concerns in a BPA meeting that was held sometime soon after
August of 2016. This BPA meeting was also attended by Chief Hall and Lieutenant Arlak.

A review of the report numbers either provided during interviews or found in emails or
grievances, along with an audit of changes Virgadamo made to reports in the past found a
pattern of these reports having incorrect UCR codes; the crime described did not best meet
the UCR code Virgadamo attributed it to. The full impact his misclassification of reports
has had on Buckeye’s UCR reporting and crime statistics has not yet been determined. What
has been found is that a review of a small sampling of simple assault reports revealed almost

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half should likely have been classified as aggravated assaults. It is easy to see how the impact
could be staggering.

When interviewed, Sergeant Virgadamo said it was in 2014 when he was first asked to review
all offense reports for quality control purposes. He said when other sergeants began to
complain about changes he had made, he was told by his supervisor to no longer do such
quality control. He said Assistant Chief Mann again gave him this responsibility when he
assumed an Acting Lieutenant Position in 2015, and he had continued to review all reports
until just recently when he was told he was to no longer make any changes. Virgadamo
claimed to have a better understanding of UCR reporting requirements than his fellow
sergeants but, when asked specific questions he conveyed a disturbing lack of knowledge of
this subject. For instance, Virgadamo claimed not to know what the Hierarchy rule was
when scoring Part I crimes and did not know that most attempts to commit an offense are
reported as an actual offense for UCR purposes. He acknowledged that, except for one
Spillman training course, the only training he received on this topic was provided by
Lieutenant Arlak.

Sergeant Virgadamo said he was aware that for UCR purposes the lack of a desire for
prosecution either by the victim or the prosecutor does not change how a crime should be
reported. Despite this, when asked about an attempted burglary he advised that it should be
reported as trespassing as the County Attorney would not file charges for attempted
burglary. He argues this same viewpoint in an email exchange with Sergeant on
December 31, 2016 [Exhibit 33] when he wrote:

“Without evidence of forced entry or unauthorized access we usually just


make these a criminal damage or theft report if something was taken.
Especially since it was over a two-month period”

“I know what the statute says you are correct but absent someone catching or
seeing someone entering unlawfully I’m not going assume it.”

Virgadamo also said a cell phone stolen after being left in a restaurant should be reported as
lost property as a confession would be needed to prosecute someone for such a theft. He
said that it was common practice for him to use the lowest UCR code on an offense report
and then change it later if an arrest was made. Even after being read passages from the UCR
manual, Virgadamo refused to concede he was incorrect on his handling of these crimes,
noting that was the way that he had been trained and the way most officers recorded similar
incidents.

Virgadamo could not explain those dates when he made several changes to reports in a short
period of time. He said that he likely didn’t read these reports as either he was already
familiar with them or he read only the CAD comments before making changes. What is clear
is by repeatedly changing the UCR codes in a report over a period of time it becomes very
difficult to determine if or when the crime was reported for UCR purposes. When asked
about those reports that were changed a year to two years after originally reported,

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Virgadamo said that he remembered a point, “especially after this letter came out,” when he
went back and reviewed changes that he made in the past. He confirmed he was referring to
the anonymous letter that led to this investigation and that he was concerned about the
allegations made against him of lowering crime statistics. He said he wanted to make sure
the changes were accurate and any mistakes he had made were corrected. With the large
number of changes made recently this would seem to confirm he found many such
“mistakes.”

In just the small number of reports reviewed for this investigation, Virgadamo was found to
have incorrectly coded several reports. Of concern is the number of thefts, assaults,
aggravated assaults and burglaries that were reported incorrectly or not at all. That he admits
to beginning to do quality control of reports in approximately 2014, and complaints on his
misclassifying of reports go back to 2014, both the same year that crime rates plunged in the
City of Buckeye, is of concern.

Virgadamo’s own words speak to his intent. When justifying his decision that a criminal
report was not necessary for a burglary from a vehicle that occurred when an unlocked
vehicle was unlawfully entered and ransacked but nothing was taken, Virgadamo wrote that
it was his “job” as a sergeant, “… when these things occur to keep things down low or at the
minimum not inflate things that don’t need inflating.” He further spoke of his personal
motivation in deflating crime statistics when he noted, “I care because I live here and don’t
want my home town or our dept to be perceived as the arm pit of the West Valley because
of an inflated crime rate that is beyond our control and the result of carless [sic] people who
don’t know how to lock their cars.”

Simply put, there was no true motivation for Virgadamo to assess his understanding and
adjust his actions. He faced no negative repercussions for his actions, even though their
correctness was repeatedly challenged by his peers and subordinates. He accepted personal
credit for the low crime reporting; when defending a program, he had instituted requiring
patrol officers to make a minimum number of citizen contacts per shift he pointed to crime
statistics as a measure of its success. He wrote in an email addressed to former Assistant
Chief Mark Mann, dated July 12, 2016 [Exhibit 74];

“If you compare the period of time we started doing this from January 1st till
the present and compare it to the same period last year when we didn’t have
these standards you will see arrests, 3511s, warrants, drugs, weapons and
stolen property recovered have all increased substantially. Crime is still down
or being maintained even though we have less officers on patrol than we had
at this time last year. The biggest decrease in crime has been violent crime,
residential burglary, and vehicle burglary. We have achieved these results
while our neighboring cities have experienced spikes and increases in these
same crimes. These crimes are now rarely occurring here because of the
proactive approaches by both patrol doing our part and CID doing their part
together.”

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Throughout the years, Virgadamo was repeatedly confronted by other sergeants about his
UCR reporting of crime. He had ample opportunity to review UCR reporting guidelines and
adjust his actions over the years. A simple google search would have found the UCR manual
on line and available for review. He demonstrated an extreme indifference to identifying and
correcting any problems. While it was the responsibility of his superior officers, particularly
Lieutenant Arlak, to correct his behavior, it does not alleviate Virgadamo from personal
accountability.

His actions in changing UCR codes already deemed as correct by the investigating officers
and their sergeants, and his failure to correct UCR codes that were misreported, attributed to
the underreporting of serious crimes by the Buckeye Police Department. It has cast doubts
and disparagement on the Buckeye Police Department and its executive staff. It is
impossible to measure what the cost in terms of resource allocation and planning has been
to the citizens of Buckeye as well as the law enforcement personnel that serve them. This
allegation is SUSTAINED.

Complaint Dispositions-Chief Hall

Allegation I- Blue Knights Security Conflict of Interest- Sustained

Chief Larry Hall and Lieutenant Gary McGeough established and maintained an off-duty
business relationship that presented a real or perceived conflict of interest and violated
established policies concerning secondary employment. This allegation, if proven factual, is
a violation of the following policies of the City of Buckeye and the Buckeye Police
Department:

Buckeye City Policy Section 610


Buckeye PD Policy 1050.2-1050.2.2 Nepotism and Conflicting Relationships (Effective
7/9/2013)
Buckeye PD Policy 1050 Nepotism and Conflicting Relationships (Effective 5/3/2015)
Buckeye PD Policy 1041.Employee Arranged Off Duty Employment (Effective 7/9/2013)
Buckeye PD Policy 1040 Extra Duty, Police Secondary, and Regular Off Duty Employment
(Effective 3/2/2015)

Finding: SUSTAINED

Relevant Facts:

The anonymous complaint addressed the alleged conflict of interest created by the business
established and shared by Hall and McGeough. This business was easily verified by a check
of the Arizona Corporation Commission website which showed both Gary McGeough and
Lawrence Hall as Members of Blue Knights Securities Group LLC (“Blue Knights”), File
Number L18393865 [Exhibit 68]. Articles of Organization were filed for Blue Knights, a
perpetual domestic LLC, on 6/12/2013 and published on 6/24/2013 when McGeough was

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a Buckeye PD sergeant and Hall was the Assistant Chief. On 4/12/2014, when a Statement
of Change of Statutory Agent was filed for Blue Knights, Hall was now the Buckeye Chief of
Police and McGeough was a sergeant.

Buckeye Police Department Policy defines a business relationship as “serving as an


employee, independent contractor, compensated consultant, owner, board member,
shareholder or investor in an outside business, company, partnership, corporation, venture,
or other transaction where the Department employee’s annual interest, compensation,
investment, or obligation is greater than $250.00.” When interviewed for this investigation
both Hall and McGeough stated that they did not know how their agency defined a business
relationship and were unaware of the associated policies. Both also agreed, after reviewing
Buckeye PD Policy 1050, first adopted on July 9, 2013 [Exhibit 69], that by this definition
they did have a business relationship at the time the business was organized.

Both Hall and McGeough had argued that at the time they formed Blue Knights, Buckeye
PD policies did not address a business relationship and that Mark Mann, who was the
Buckeye Chief of Police at the time, had knowledge of this business and approved it.
McGeough went so far as to say that he submitted a memo to Chief Mann and gotten his
approval. It is unknown why they would have sought approval from Chief Mann in April
2013 when there were no policies in place that addressed either a business relationship or off
duty employment. Since they were unaware of these policies at the time of their interview
for this investigation it is not likely the publication of the related policies in July 2013 would
have prompted them to prepare memos. While an interview with Mark Mann may
substantiate their claim that seems unlikely as on May 4, 2017, during Buckeye PD internal
investigation (IA 16-15) Mann submitted a memo to the investigator, Ron Hergert, and
included the Corporation Commission filing for Blue Knights. Mark Mann had requested
that the City investigate if Hall and McGeough had followed proper policy when establishing
this business, if it created a conflict of interest, and if they had obtained authorization from
the City to work this outside employment [Exhibit 70]. It seems unlikely, particularly due to
the turbulent relationship among command staff, that Mann would not have brought this
forward sooner if he had been aware of it.

McGeough said that Blue Knights was formed partially to do business for a New York
jewelry company, Ferrari Express, the same company that coordinated security for the Las
Vegas shows. McGeough described Chief Hall as a silent partner in Blue Knights in 2013,
said he “basically had no involvement” in 2014, and was not included in the taxes filed for
the business by 2015. The City could verify these claims a by ordering the submittal of all tax
returns for Blue Knights.

In 2015, public records requests were made for off duty approvals for business for Hall and
McGeough. Despite these requests, Hall did nothing to legally dissolve Blue Knights and
resolve the on-going perception of a conflict of interest. His obvious lack of knowledge of
Buckeye PD’s policies concerning business relationships, conflicts of interest, and secondary
employment suggests that these complaints did not even prompt him to consult policy to
assure he was complying. Despite, anonymous complaints and public records requests Larry

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Hall let these perceptions of a business relationship fester, causing further discontent within
the Buckeye PD, with accusations that he was showing him preferential treatment towards
Gary McGeough. This allegation is SUSTAINED.

Allegation II- Unbecoming Conduct at Accident Scene- Sustained


On February 18, 2015, at approximately 1916 hours, while at the scene of a single vehicle
accident and in the presence of his subordinate police officers, Chief Larry Hall displayed
disrespectful behavior and violated policy when he took at least one photo of the nude, male
driver, who was wearing high heels. The picture was not taken for a legitimate law
enforcement purpose and was shared with at least one individual outside of the police
department. This allegation, if proven factual, is a violation of the following policies:

340.3 CONDUCT THAT MAY RESULT IN DISCIPLINE

340.3.2 Conduct (Lexipol October 1, 2014 to April 18, 2015)

(n) Discourteous, disrespectful or discriminatory treatment of any member of the


public or any member of this department or the City. LEVEL 2

(ab) Any other on- or off-duty Conduct which any employee knows or reasonably
should know is Unbecoming a Member of the Department or which is contrary to
good order, efficiency or morale or which tends to reflect unfavorably upon the
Department or its members. LEVEL 5

340.3.5 Performance

(p) Criminal, dishonest, infamous or disgraceful conduct adversely affecting the


employee/ employer relationship, whether on- or off-duty. DISMISSAL

(ab) Any other on- or off-duty Conduct which any employee knows or reasonably
should know is Unbecoming a Member of the Department or which is contrary to
good order, efficiency or morale or which tends to reflect unfavorably upon the
Department or its members. LEVEL 5

702.5 Personal Communication Devices-Personally Owned PCD

Employees may carry a personally owned PCD while on-duty, subject to the following
conditions and limitations:

(f) The device shall not be utilized to record or disclose any business-related
information including photographs, video, or the recording or transmittal of any
information or material obtained or made accessible as a result of employment with
the Department, without the express authorization of the Chief of Police or the
authorized designee.

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I asked Detective if the Chief had given her any indication of what he had taken a
picture of when he told her he would be deleting it. She replied, “From my understanding it
was of the naked male and the reason for the picture was the male was wearing high heels;
the fact that he was naked, but he was somewhat dressed… as a female; he had the high
heels on, he actually had silicon breasts that had fallen off of him when we opened the door
to the car.” I then asked her if that is why she felt he had taken the picture. She said that
was her understanding although she did not know for certain. Detective said she and
the Chief were the only ones present during this conversation. She said that she “assumed”
the picture was taken of the nude man as that was what he had been joking about; the fact
that the man was nude, but he was wearing high heels and makeup and then the silicone
breasts that had fallen off was being “laughed about.”

Chief Hall also remembered this accident and said that from the second floor of his
residence he could see all the emergency vehicles over his back fence, so he decided to
respond to the scene. He confirmed that he had responded in his assigned city vehicle, a
white Tahoe and later stated that he thought he could assist with lighting or traffic control.
He said when he arrived on scene he ran into Officer who told him “there was a guy
at the bottom of the hill and you have to see this.” He said he stayed a short while, and then
decided to leave and on his way out he took a picture of the car. Hall said that man was
covered, and he did not even get his face in the picture. Hall said he went home, showed the
picture to his wife and deleted it. Chief Hall said he did not take a picture of a nude man
and had not made any comments to the effect that others would enjoy seeing the picture.
He said others at the scene had jokingly said to Hall “hey he almost made it to your house.”
Hall said that this could be considered unprofessional, “but we blew if off.” Hall further
explained that the accident victim was covered and the only part of him that was exposed in
the picture was his leg hanging out of the vehicle. Chief Hall denied that he had commented
on the sex toys in the vehicle. He said the photo was not taken as part of the official
investigation and that he had not submitted it as evidence as it would have been “worthless.”
When asked if he had taken the picture before the Fire Department had arrived he said he
did not know and explained that this had occurred about a year and half prior and it was a
“nothing incident.”

At the end of his interview reference this investigation, Chief Hall provided policies in effect
at the time of this accident that he believed might pertain to this allegation. Chief Hall then
said that he knew that he would have to answer for the picture that he took at the accident
scene and when the time came he might have to “split hairs” to prove that taking the picture
was not a policy violation. Chief Hall further said that he might be able to make the
argument that he was not employed at the point when he responded to the accident scene,
even though he was in his City vehicle and said he had responded to provide lights or traffic
control if needed. It is concerning that Chief Hall would try to defend his actions at all.
That he would think his official duty status would somehow mitigate his actions is alarming.
As a leader of the Buckeye Police Department he should exemplify behavior he wants
emulated in every interaction with the public and with his officers.

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In early March 2013, allegations of misconduct were sustained against . On March 4,
2013, Sergeant Root was interviewed by then Assistant Chief Larry Hall about the allegation
of sex on duty. Hall then completed a memorandum and determined that the allegations
against Root were unfounded. He based his conclusion on the fact that between July 2007
and January 2008, said Sergeant Root came over to her house between Midnight-1AM,
while still in uniform, and they would engage in sexual intercourse. She said this happened
about 6-7 times during that time . said she did not know if
Root was on-duty or off-duty when he came over but had reason to believe he was most
likely off-duty at the time because she noticed he had driven his personally owned vehicle
(POV) over to her house each time. She remembered seeing him driving a Corvette, Cadillac
or Mustang whenever he came over to her house. During his interview, Root told Hall that
he was not on duty when he went to house and did not have an assigned city vehicle
when the relationship occurred.

The interview was conducted by Assistant Chief Larry Hall and not by Professional
Standards Sergeant Joe Robinson who had conducted the investigation into the allegations
against . When the allegations against Root were brought forward by he
contacted Assistant Chief Hall. Sergeant Robinson said for an unknown reason Hall decided
to interview Root himself. Sergeant Robinson said as he recalled the interview was very
short and direct and Hall had not recorded it, so he asked him to -prepare a memo
documenting it. Robinson did not know why the chief had interceded and further stated that
it was something that he had not ever seen happen before or since. Root was interviewed
and did not know why Hall conducted the interview. He remembered the interview by
Assistant Chief Hall as basically consisting of 1 question. Chief Hall was interviewed and
said that he had conducted the interview at the direction of Chief Mann. He said he believed
that Mann directed him to do so as he wanted to keep the two allegations separate. Chief
Hall said that he had recorded the interview and prepared a memo.

Investigation of this allegation was never intended to investigate the findings of this 2013
investigation. Rather, it was an examination of the process and particularly Hall’s
involvement in the investigation. As was found repeatedly throughout this investigation,
deviation from-or failure to establish-a standard disciplinary process created suspicion of the
ultimate results of the investigation. The statements of were
considered, along with the memo prepared by Hall [Exhibit 76] documenting this interview,
which was found in his work documents. While Mark Mann is unavailable to interview, his
statement would only speak to the reason for Hall becoming involved. There is nothing to
suggest from these interviews and documents that Hall had done anything to cover up
wrong doing by Root and this allegation is UNFOUNDED.

Allegation IV- Failure to Supervise-McGeough H omicide Scene- Unfounded


Allegation: Larry Hall, at the time the Assistance Chief of Police for the Buckeye Police
Department, covered up misconduct committed by then Sergeant Gary McGeough
pertaining to homicide investigation 121021014. Sergeant McGeough allegedly lied about a
decision made at this homicide scene and members of command staff, including then

247
investigation but denied sharing it with anyone. In any event, it is a belief and does not
change the material facts of the case. All allegations related to this incident are
UNFOUNDED.

Allegation V- Secondary Employment- Sustained


Allegation: Chief Larry Hall utilized official Department email and City time to conduct off-
duty/secondary employment and violated established policies concerning secondary
employment. This allegation, if proven factual, is a violation of the following policies of the
City of Buckeye and the Buckeye Police Department:

Buckeye City Police Sections 322.1 Conflict of Interest


Buckeye City Policy Section 341.1 & 341.4 Off Duty Employment
Buckeye City Policy Sections 610.11 Code of Conduct
Buckeye City Policy Sections 630.1 Causes of Discipline or Dismissal
Buckeye PD Policy 1050.2-1050.2.2
Buckeye PD Policy 1041.Employee Arranged Off Duty Employment (Effective 7/9/2013)
Buckeye PD Policy 1040 Extra Duty, Police Secondary, and Regular Off Duty Employment
(Effective 3/2/2015)

Finding: SUSTAINED

Relevant Facts:

Chief Larry Hall’s City of Buckeye Outlook account and specifically his emails were
reviewed as part of this investigation. This included emails in the Inbox, Sent Items,
Deleted, and Permanently Deleted folders of his Outlook account. Located within these
emails were approximately 724 emails dealing with Chief Hall’s secondary employment.
These 724 emails were sent or received between February 12, 2014 and April 14, 2017, by
Chief Hall on his City of Buckeye email account.

Most of these emails strings were found in Chief Hall’s “Sent” folder and originated from
the email address of lhall@buckeyeaz.com. Emails sent by Chief Hall contained his standard
signature that included the following information:

Larry Hall Police Chief


Buckeye Police Department
200 North Apache Road
Buckeye, AZ 85326
623-349-6438-Desk Phone
LHALL@BUCKEYEAZ.GOV- Email

A review of these emails found that Chief Hall was associated primarily with three
companies; Ferrari Express, Malca-Amit, and Orion. Ferrari Express and Malca-Amit are
companies engaged in the transportation of jewelry and precious commodities. Orion

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verifying if the job had been scheduled. There are also multiple emails between Chief Hall
and Raz verifying instructions. In total, on February 26, 2014, there were approximately 27
emails [Exhibit 77] exchanged reference this single Orion job; the first of approximately 116
jobs.

In total, Hall’s emails showed that he coordinated or was the point of contact for 116 jobs
between February 27, 2014 and April 13, 2017. Fifty-one of those jobs were handled in
2015 and 49 were handled in 2016. For almost all those 116 jobs, as the coordinator or
“point of contact” Chief Hall would first receive an email requesting 1 or 2 “guards.” He
would then either work the job or locate someone to fill those guard positions. If this was
the first time the guard was working Chief Hall would send that individual a new employee
packet with instructions on whom to send the completed packet to. He would also
sometimes send them a copy of the operating procedures.

When Chief Hall had located someone to work he would email Orion/ Malca-Amit back
and tell them the job was scheduled and to send him the paperwork. After the paperwork
had been sent him, he would forward it to the individual(s) working. Many of these jobs
were scheduled for the same day or within days. In 2015, 43 of the 51 jobs Chief Hall
scheduled were sent to him either the day before or the same day as the job itself. For those
scheduled further out, Hall would get a reminder email that he would need to acknowledge.
Some of these jobs would be cancelled and rescheduled requiring Hall to notify the
individual working. During the actual job for Orion/ Malca-Amit, if there was a problem
with a guard not phoning as required they would contact Chief Hall who then contacted the
individual(s) working with instructions to call and update. At the end of the billing cycle, if
there were PODs missing Chief Hall would be contacted to determine who should have
submitted them.

It is obvious that these jobs required a substantial commitment from Chief Hall. When asked
about the impact of his responsibilities as the “point of contact” for Orion on his primary
duties as the Buckeye Chief of Police, Hall hesitated and then described his Orion duties as
an “annoyance.” He insisted it was an unpaid position that he did out of loyalty to his friend
of 20 years, the Orion owner, Bill Schmitt. Chief Hall minimized his involvement stating
that the most of these jobs were handled by Raz and he was just the liaison between Schmitt
and Raz. It was clear that Chief Hall had the responsibility for scheduling someone to work.
Chief Hall and Raz did work most of the jobs until 2016 when Chief Hall had to begin
locating other individuals to fill positions. While Raz and Hall continued to work Orion
jobs, Chief Hall had also utilized approximately 8 other individuals to work jobs including 3
Buckeye police officers . Chief Hall
denied that he would be contacted if there was a problem with or on a job done by Raz or
any of the other individuals he had scheduled. He said he did not know who would be
contacted but it would not be him because he was “not their boss.” Emails from 2015 and
2016 [Exhibit 78] dispute Chief Hall’s claim that he would not be contacted in the event of
problems.

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When Chief Hall was told of the 700+ emails found related to his secondary employment he
immediately responded, “That many? Wow- I’m screwed.” He then began to rationalize the
use of his City computer, City email account, and City time to assist with this private
business. He added that he is an exempt employee and he does not get overtime. He also
said that sending one or two emails does not take that much time, although he could not
explain why one job took 27 emails to complete.

Later in the interview he further rationalized his use of the City email system, by advising
that Buckeye PD had an off-duty coordinator and email requests to hire officers were
constantly sent to that coordinator from companies like Law Enforcement Specialists. He
said that he believed his usage of the email to schedule work for Orion, was no different
than that of the off-duty coordinator. Hall stated, “I just want to make clear that we do use
city email for off duty things. We do respond to off duty companies. I do have an off-duty
coordinator.” It should be noted that according to Lieutenant Kelly Angel the Department
has had an Off-Duty Coordinator since 2012 and since July of 2013 Buckeye PD policies
have required all secondary employment to be on specific forms that are submitted through
the Off-Duty Coordinator to the Chief for approval. When the Off-Duty Coordinator uses
Buckeye City Email to respond to off duty requests he is fulfilling the responsibilities of his
City of Buckeye position. When Chief Hall utilized the city email to schedule and coordinate
the jobs for Orion, he was not using it for official responsibilities and in fact was using it to
facilitate- and for the financial benefit of-a private business. Chief Hall’s explanation that he
received no compensation for facilitating these jobs and did it only as a favor for a friend, is
suspect. This friend he alleges to be helping is the owner of a company that provides off
duty law enforcement officers for private security; this is exactly the “favor” Chief Hall was
doing for his friend.

When asked if his work with Orion should have gone through the off-duty coordinator
Chief Hall said there was a lot of off duty work that does not go through the off -duty
coordinator. He used the school resource officers as an example. Chief Hall said that this
was an “arguable point.” He said that he will probably have to have this conversation with
his boss when the time comes and pointed out that Buckeye does have officers on the
Department that have their own off-duty jobs- which are within policy- that are all over the
valley. He said there were also Buckeye officers that worked as part of the coalition, working
Arizona Cardinals games. Hall said that there are still plenty of officers that have “personally
approved off duty” jobs that are within policy. Chief Hall’s assertion that a lot of off duty
work performed by Buckeye PD officers and employees does not go through the off-duty
coordinator is of grave concern. Current policy (1040.4.II Mandatory Approval) clearly
states that prior to commencing any secondary employment, including self-employment, all
employees must submit a written request and obtain written approval for such employment.
The prescribed Secondary Employment form states, “This work must be received in the
Off-Duty Work Coordinator office two weeks prior to starting/termination date.” Written
approval and centralized control of off duty work has been the policy of the Buckeye Police
Department since July 2013.

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Chief Hall was asked based on the current Buckeye Police Department policy what type of
secondary employment would he consider the jobs worked for Orion to be. He first
answered, “off duty employment.” Chief Hall was unfamiliar with the two types of
employment described in Buckeye PD policy 1040. Definitions were provided Chief Hall as
follows: Regular Off Duty Employment is any employment that will not require the use or
potential use of law enforcement authority while Extra Duty Employment is any
employment that is conditioned on the actual or potential use of police powers by the police
officer employee. Chief Hall was asked which of these would describe his work with Orion.
He said Orion does use retired police officers but agreed that Buckeye police officers
working for Orion are hired due to their law enforcement status.

Buckeye PD policy #1041, titled Employee Arranged Off-Duty Employment, was adopted
on July 9, 2013. This policy, along with Buckeye PD policy #1040, Department Arranged
Off-Duty Employment, appear to be the first policies developed to address off duty
employment. Among the “disapproved” off duty employment is, “private guard services.”
Such work would require approval of the Chief of Police. The policy also describes required
liability and insurance policies for employees working approved security. This policy was in
effect until July 2015, when policy 1040 and 1041 were combined. This new policy removed
“private guard services” as a category of disapproved off duty employment.

A few of the emails concerning secondary employment found in Chief Hall’s Sent emails
contained an attachment titled, “2pg contractor agreement.do [Exhibit 79]. One such
agreement was provided by Chief Hall to Buckeye Police Officer on
Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 1:11 PM. This Contractor/ Business Agreement
(“Agreement”) required the signer to acknowledge that they were sub-contracting with
Orion to, “perform security services as a fully authorized local and/or state security
contractor.” The signer must further acknowledge that they “waive and hold harmless
Orion Security Services from all circumstances…under the Worker’s Compensation Benefit
Laws and Unemployment Benefits.” It specifically states elsewhere in the Agreement that
subcontractors providing security services escorts for Orion do not fall under the protection
of any Orion insurance policies. On the second page of this Agreement at the bottom of the
page where it lists things to fax to the office along with the agreement, item #3 is listed as
“A copy of your law enforcement identification and/or state security guard or company
documents.” This is of concern as the policy adopted on July 9, 2013 and in effect until July
2015, noted that for Employee Arranged Off Duty work the Off Duty Coordinator must
have verified that the company has a liability insurance policy with $1,000,000 umbrella
coverage and the Town of Buckeye was named as “additionally assured.” Chief Hall did not
consider the liability to the City of Buckeye when he gave jobs to in 2014
and 2016 and recruited to work in 2016 [Exhibit 80].

When asked if he had cleared this off -duty work through anyone, Chief Hall said, “I cleared
it through my boss… at the time, Mark Mann.” Mark Mann has not been Hall’s boss since
January of 2014 when he was appointed as the Chief of Police. He said he had not informed
either of the city managers he had worked under nor had he gained their approval. Buckeye
PD Policy requires that the Chief of Police approve off duty work to assure it conforms with

254
policy and creates no conflict of interest. Since Larry Hall was the Chief he should have
complied with Buckeye City policy and obtained pre-approval from the City Manager to
assure there was no conflict of interest, but he did not. Even after public records requests
concerning his secondary employment were received in 2015, Chief Hall still did not notify
his employer.

Chief Hall was also asked about the jewelry shows held annually in Las Vegas that he and
other Buckeye PD employees had worked. In emails of February 2014, Chief Hall described
this work as “armed manual labor.” He later noted the work was for Ferrari Express, an
Italian company [emails Exhibit 81]. This company is responsible for providing secure
courier and guard work for jewelry companies. Chief Hall said he had only worked one year,
in an unarmed capacity. He initially believed it was in 2013 but after viewing the email he
said it was likely 2014. He said he guaranteed he wasn’t armed as Nevada had strict laws
governing armed security. He said others may have worked in an armed capacity, but he did
not. Research of the Nevada Private Licensing Site found Board minutes from 2014 and
other years where Ferrari representatives had requested and received approvals to use armed
off-duty Arizona police officers to work at these shows [Exhibit 82].

Chief Hall said he would have authorized his officers to work the Las Vegas Show if they
were unarmed. Chief Hall said he did not know if he would authorize an officer to work
armed off duty in Nevada. He acknowledged there was “a lot of liability there” and he
would have “needed a little convincing” to sign off on such a request. Chief Hall was asked
if an officer working a show had to act, did he think that officers would be acting as a police
officer or a private citizen. He said, “That’s the question.” He said he was not certain if
they would be taking police action or acting on behalf of Ferrari and this was a concern.
Chief Hall said they would not unless the officer was involved in a situation like the Las
Vegas mass shooting or there was a violent robbery.

Chief Hall does not recall approving other Buckeye Police officers to work for the jewelry
shows in Las Vegas since he became Chief in January of 2014. Chief Hall was asked if he
would be the person to sign paperwork allowing a Buckeye officer to work the Las Vegas
show, and he said, “to the best of my knowledge yeah.” He said that he signs a lot of
paperwork and he does not remember signing anything authorizing this in the past five
years. Chief Hall did volunteer that McGeough had worked the Las Vegas shows but
deferred responsibility for this decision to Mark Mann, the police chief prior to Hall’s
appointment. During this investigation, Chief Hall said he recognized there was a lot of
potential liability in having an armed Buckeye Police Officer working in Las Vegas and he
was still not sure he would approve anyone to work armed. Public documents show that in
May of 2014, after Larry Hall had been chief for 6 months, Gary McGeough applied for and
received a security guard license to work armed in Nevada [Exhibit 83]. Lieutenant
McGeough admitted to working this show and emails support that he was the coordinator
for Ferrari for the 2014 jewelry show in Las Vegas. As the Chief, Larry Hall was responsible
for protecting the City of Buckeye from liability and he allowed Gary McGeough to work
under conditions he was uncertain of.

255
The City of Buckeye has had policies in place concerning secondary employment since 2008.
In addition, the Buckeye Police Department has had strong policies concerning off duty
work in place since 2013. Best law enforcement practices dictate that police department
policies provide for centralized control and administration of secondary employment. As
would be expected of a CALEA certified agency, Buckeye PD’s policy concerning off duty
employment is in line with best practices. The Department obviously recognizes the
potential liability arising from such employment including fatigued officers, conflicts of
interest, work place inequities, legal status and exercise of authority issues, and corruption.
Unfortunately, Chief Hall does not seem to have that same concern for liability. He is either
unfamiliar with Buckeye PD off duty policies or choose to willfully disregard them. Chief
Larry Hall failed to inform his superiors of his secondary employment; this was particularly
important as in 2014 through mid-2015, working private security was a “disallowed” activity;
Buckeye Police Department policy did not allow officers to work for private security
companies. Chief Hall repeatedly misused City of Buckeye computer systems and continually
conducted business for Orion while on duty. His claim that his work for Orion was only an
“annoyance.” His cavalier attitude towards his position as Chief is reflected in an email of
January 20, 2015 when, in response to a request for a photo for a badge for Malca-Amit, he
provides a photo of himself in uniform [Exhibit 85] and in the fact that it was Orion that
eventually directed Chief Hall to no longer use a government email [Exhibit 86]. As the
Chief of Police, Larry Hall knowingly allowed a police officer to work in an armed capacity
in another state although during this investigation he expressed concern for the potential
liability such work created for the City of Buckeye. This allegation and associated policy
violations are SUSTAINED.

Allegation VI-Unbecoming Conduct- Not Sustained


Allegation: Chief Hall displayed unbecoming conduct and violated policy when he created a
disturbance at the Phoenix Open by trying to sneak a friend in without paying and when he
operated a City vehicle after consuming alcohol. These allegations, if proven to be factual,
would be a violation of the following policies:

Buckeye City Policy Section 610.11


Buckeye City Policy Section 630.1
Buckeye City Policy Section 910
Buckeye Police Department Policy 340.4.II
Buckeye Police Department Policy A-340-Appendix A

Finding: NOT SUSTAINED

Relevant facts:
There was not enough specificity to these allegations to fully address and investigate them.
Nobody interviewed had any direct knowledge of these allegations and Chief Hall adamantly
denied them. There were former employees identified in the complaint letters alleged to
have knowledge of these allegations that were not available to interview, otherwise this
complaint could have been put to rest.

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Supervisory Inquiries stating that it would cause wide spread dissention among the troops if
every situation was handled as a formal PSU investigation. Chief Hall further stated that he
was willing to have some lower levels of discipline overturned, and the greater good was
served by streamlining the process.

This was not the first time that Chief Hall has been made aware of similar problems with
this practice. Jim Norwood from Arizona Investigations and Professional Consultants LLC
wrote in an investigation that was completed in March of 2016:

“During this inquiry, it was observed that supervisors and managers in the
department were dealing with these matters in several informal ways that did
not include assigned PSU or, if applicable, NOI level investigations. Further,
the personal consequences of complaints handled without these assigned case
numbers were not always known to the employees as the less formal policies
for handling them did not necessarily require or include a conclusionary notice
or investigative disposition. It is suggested this policy be changed to require
that all department supervisors must enter any received complaint into the IA
PRO PSU process and receive an assigned case number within the PSU
management database for every complaint they receive or personnel
investigation they conduct.

Managerial review of these initial complaints may, of course, result in the


individual investigations being assigned to specific supervisors and not all
matters need be assigned to PSU for actual investigation. It would be
counterproductive to recommend that none of these types of complaint
investigations could be performed by the accused officer's supervisor.
However, all these investigations regardless of who they are assigned to must
be monitored and accounted by the PSU. Further, all of them must be
submitted at the level of quality and confidentially of a formal and numbered
PSU Investigation.”

It was very clear that this recommendation was not insisting that all investigations be
handled by PSU. What it did recommend is that all investigations be completed to the same
level of quality; that all witnesses, complainants and accused are formally interviewed, that all
appropriate documents gathered and reviewed, and that employee’s rights are protected. It
was noticed that several of these streamlined investigations did not include interviews with
all the witnesses or complainants. This led to the perception that misconduct was being
ignored by the command staff. This was evident with a recent investigation involving
Sergeant James Virgadamo. This Supervisory Inquiry consisted entirely of the questionable
email that had raised the concerns of several of Virgadamo’s peers. None of these sergeants,
including Virgadamo, were interviewed and the written reprimand consisted largely of an
acknowledgement that Sergeant Virgadamo had violated policy and consequences for similar
misconduct in the future. It was apparent through interviews that other supervisors,
particularly those identified as witnesses or victims, did not know that this investigation had

258
was soon discovered that they boy was autistic and was not under the influence of any
intoxicant. This situation garnered a considerable amount of attention from the local media.
Both incidents also garnered citizen complaints that required investigation by the PD but
were handled differently. Officer past interactions were reviewed while Officer
actions were sent to the legal advisor to gain a determination of the lawfulness
of his actions. No official investigation was conducted of either incident. As was suggested
previously, both investigations should have been submitted at the” level of quality and
confidentially of a formal and numbered PSU Investigation.” Incorporating a 30-day review
of past contacts for all allegations of excessive force would have avoided complaints of
preferential treatment.

The anonymous letter cited another example of preferential treatment for Officer
Officer was involved in an on-duty motorcycle accident in 2014. The
letter alleges that Lieutenant Arlak, who is Officer brother-in-a-law, was helping
to get a medical retirement that was not justified. This allegation results from the
fact that Officer made a workman’s compensation claim for a procedure that he
claimed was a result of the motorcycle accident. The claim was ultimately denied, and the
city conducted an internal investigation into this matter. A thorough investigation was
completed, and Officer was cleared of any misconduct.

Deviation from standard investigative processes raised concerns of preferential treatment in


other situations noted elsewhere in this investigation. One of these was an allegation that
was initiated but never investigated for several months involving Sergeant Root and Officer
Hoffmeister. Another situation involved Chief Hall’s interjection into a Professional
Standards Unit investigation.

As previously stated, the use of the disciplinary process has been a source of many of the
allegations of preferential treatment. The use of Supervisory Inquiry process, why useful for
the most insignificant performance issues such as tardiness, can have unintended and
unanticipated consequences when used inappropriately. If some of the witnesses or
complainants are not interviewed in the interest of expediency, it can lead to unwarranted
allegations of preferential treatment. This can lead to complainants feeling as though their
voices are not being heard and result in less transparency in the process.

While clearly there were some differences in the way the above incidents, particularly those
involving and were handled, they do not justify a finding of preferential or
disparate treatment. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that Chief Hall and members
of his command staff engaged in such preferential treatment. Chief Hall did state in his
interview that he intended to use the Disciplinary Review Board to a greater extent in the
future to help to control rumors and restore trust in the process. It is strongly suggested that
disciplinary investigations, including supervisory reviews, be formalized to assure all
complaints are handled consistently and appropriately. This allegation is not sustained.

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Allegation VIII-Failure to Supervise-Crime Statistics- Sustained
Allegation: Chief Hall ignored complaints and apparent warning signs and through his
neglect allowed crime statistics to be inaccurately reported. This allegation, if found to be
factual, would be a violation of the following policies:

Buckeye City Policy Sections 610.1, 610.3 and 610.11


Buckeye City Policy Section 910
Buckeye PD Policy Section 340.4.II
Buckeye PD Policy A-340 – Appendix A

Finding: SUSTAINED

Relevant facts:

This investigation revealed that Chief Hall was made aware of the allegations of crime stat
tampering on at least two occasions. This occurred in a Buckeye Police Officers Association
meeting and the second was at a CompStat meeting. Hall said after this meeting he met with
Assistant Chief Mann and asked him if we are “square” on this crime stats changing issue.
Hall said Mann told him that they were no problems. Chief Hall was asked a clarifying
question about his conversation with Assistant Chief Mann about crime stat changing. Hall
said he had asked Assistant Chief Mann if they were doing sufficient quality control checks
on their reports, and Mann had said, “Yeah, we’re good. Charlie’s (Arlak) doing a good
job.” I asked Chief Hall if this was an immediate response from Mann or if he had directed
Mann to check further into it. Chief Hall said it was an immediate response which led him
to believe that Mann was already aware of the concern and may have previously had
conversations with Arlak or Virgadamo about this issue. I then told Chief Hall that it
appeared he was unsure what level of investigation went into Assistant Chief Mann’s
response, Chief Hall said that he did not think there was any investigation.

Chief Hall also described an incident that occurred during a CompStat meeting where
someone joking said that the problem with vehicle burglaries could be solved with a few key
strokes. Hall replied to this by saying “No, we’re not doing that because that’s how police
chiefs go away.” This statement indicates that Chief Hall understands the magnitude of this
problem in contemporary law enforcement.

Despite clearly stating that he understood the seriousness of this issue, when confronted
with this allegation, the totality of Chief Hall’s investigation into this matter consisted of a
brief conversation with Assistant Chief Mann. Chief Hall was made aware of the fact that
Sergeant Virgadamo was doing UCR quality control but did not know who gave him this
authority. Hall stated that if he knew the scope of the problem, he certainly would have
“drilled down” to find out what was happening. Chief Hall told me, “Yeah. Getting ahead
of this would have been a good thing, but when it is unknown…” He added, “It doesn’t
matter at the end of the day, I still own it.”

261
A total of 18 current and 1 former City of Buckeye employees were asked during their
interviews if they were aware that crime stats were allegedly being altered. Fifteen of the 19
said that they either had direct knowledge or had heard about Sergeant Virgadamo altering
crime stats. Considering the fact that the Buckeye Police Department has about 100 sworn
police officers, it is fair to say that this allegation was widely known by members of the
police department. Even a cursory investigation into this matter would have revealed that
Sergeant Virgadamo was making a considering number of questionable changes without
proper training or resources. In Sergeant Virgadamo’s interview he acknowledged that he
did not have a UCR manual to verify if his changes were correct.

As the head of the Buckeye Police Department Chief Hall has an obligation to be aware of
issues that may create problems, and he is expected to address them. In this situation Chief
Hall was made aware of this problem on multiple occasions and failed to take reasonable
steps to confront this problem. Because of this, the Department has been subjected to
intense public scrutiny, and the reputation of the agency has suffered. This allegation is
sustained.

Recommendations
This investigation discovered concerns that lead to the recommendation that a full audit of
Buckeye police department reports, preferably for the past 3 to 5 years, be conducted. A
review of the crime trends observed in Buckeye’s annual statistical reports was the first
indication that a complete audit was warranted. For instance, since 2013 (through 2017)
aggravated assaults have decreased more than 77%, from 35 to 10. A similar downward
trend should have been seen with simple assaults. Instead, since 2013 simple assaults have
increased more than 22% from 380 to 465 percent; a possible indication of manipulation of
criminal stats. In addition, from 2013 to 2017 burglaries have decreased almost 55.7% from
334 to 168. This is a huge decrease; since burglaries are crimes that can be easily
manipulated, evaluating these reports, as well as trends in trespassing and theft reports, is
indicated. These concerns warrant a full audit of reports to include the following: a review
of thefts to assure they don’t meet UCR guidelines for burglary; a review of lost property
reports to assure they are not actually thefts; a review of juvenile problems, suspicious
person reports, and domestic arguments to assure a crime was not committed; and a
comprehensive review of all assault reports to assure they are properly categorized.

Another area of concern was the lack of knowledge of those responsible for auditing police
reports and their apparent disregard for the UCR definitions of Part I Crimes. This
information was readily available in an on-line UCR manual, but it appears it was not
consulted. In a recent media inquiry, and the Buckeye Police Department’s response to this
inquiry, illustrates this lack of knowledge.

For instance, the Department’s quality control team responded to the media and noted that
an aggravated assault was not reported as such for UCR purposes because the victim was a
firefighter (Juan Cadena, 170515138). Although Arizona statutes do dictate assaults on

262
firefighters as aggravated assaults simply by the victim’s status as a protected person that
does not alleviate the requirement of an agency to report these assaults if they meet UCR
reporting criteria. In this case, the firefighter suffered serious facial lacerations and multiple
broken facial bones; serious injuries which require the offense be reported as an aggravated
assault to DPS for UCR accounting purposes. The UCR Manual reads:

“The assault is aggravated if the personal injury is serious, for example, there
are broken bones, internal injuries, or stitches required.”

The UCR manual further defines severe or aggravated bodily injury as:

“…injury involving apparent broken bones, loss of teeth, possible internal


injury, severe laceration, or loss of consciousness.”

Arrests for aggravated assault on police officers (of which the media inquired about 7 such
arrests), health care workers (1 such arrest reported), and by an adult on a minor (5 such
arrests reported) cannot be dismissed by simply citing the Arizona specific statute. In fact,
the UCR Manual notes:

“Prosecutorial policy in a jurisdiction does not dictate an agency’s


classification of an assault. Reporting agencies examine and classify assaults
according to the standard UCR definitions, regardless of whether they are
termed misdemeanors or felonies by local definitions.”

Each of those 13 cases must be classified as an aggravated assault if the law enforcement
investigation found that a weapon was used in the assault, the assault resulted in serious
injury, or the assault was intended to cause serious physical injury or death. Specifically, the
UCR Manual offers the following assistance in classifying assaults:

Careful consideration of the following factors should assist reporting agencies in classifying
assaults:

1. The type of weapon employed or the use of an object as a weapon


2. The seriousness of the injury
3. The intent of the assailant to cause serious injury
Often, the weapon used, or the extent of the injury sustained will be the deciding factor in
distinguishing aggravated from simple assault. In only a limited number of instances should
it be necessary for the agency to examine the intent of the assailant.

The UCR manual offers as an example of an aggravated assault with a firearm the following
scenario involving a police officer:

“While an officer was attempting to serve a warrant, the individual ran from
her. The subject turned and fired on the officer, wounding her. LEOKA
forms are also submitted with this incident.”

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For police officers as a protected individual the Spillman report will automatically choose the
correct level of assault for UCR report simply by the agency utilizing one of the correct
codes as follows:

APFR Assault Police, Firearm


APKN Assault Police, Knife
APNA Assault Police, Aggravated Injury
APOW Assault Police, Other Weapon
APSM Assault Police, No Serious Injury

Similarly, in two of the cases the media requested further information on, the victim was
charged for aggravated assault under an Arizona statute that makes it a felony to impede
breathing during an assault (arrestee Michael Yeagley, 170517012 and arrestee Kenneth
Dumas, 170802072). Buckeye responded to the media inquiry by stating that these were
Arizona specific felonies and were not felonies per UCR. A review of the offense reports
though reveal that the victims in these reports both lost consciousness during their attacks,
which is defined under UCR reporting requirements as a serious injury meaning that the
assaults must be reported as aggravated assaults. Specifically, the UCR Manual when
defining a simple assault, also defines severe or aggravated bodily injury as follows:

“…severe or aggravated bodily injury involving apparent broken bones, loss


of teeth, possible internal injury, severe laceration, or loss of consciousness.”

All such reports where a victim is choked or strangled must be reviewed for serious injury or
the intent of the assailant to cause serious injury or death. Intent could be shown by an
assailant’s threats to kill the victim or the necessity of a third party intervening to stop the
attack.

In two other instances Buckeye responded that assaults with a weapon were not aggravated
assaults as the suspect did not hit anyone with the baton (arrestee Joshua McDonald,
171104098) or the firearm was fired into the ceiling, not at anyone (arrestee Jeannette
Estrada, 17-0727118). For UCR purposes, an assault involving the use of a weapon is an
aggravated assault. Additionally, in both reports, another person interfering with the assault,
by fighting for the weapon or restraining the suspect, is likely what prevented serious
injuries. Both aggravated assaults are required to be reported for UCR purposes. To
understand this allegation clearly it is important to understand that per the UCR Manual an
assault is defined as:

“An unlawful attack by one person upon another.”

Clearly, both these situations were attacks or attempted attacks on another person. Buckeye
PD’s argument the attack was not complete as the victim wasn’t struck with the baton or the
firearm was not fired directly at the victim does not change the fact that these were assaults.

264
And in both assaults a weapon was used, one of the 3 determinants that makes a simple
assault, an aggravated assault.

These concerns illustrate the importance of a complete audit, conducted by an independent


auditor with a full understanding of UCR reporting. Buckeye should also consider training
to educate police officers and command staff on how to report crimes and revise
Department quality control procedures to provide consistency and meaningful oversight in
reporting.

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Exhibit 16 Email exchange between Sergeants and Virgadamo; initiated December
31, 2016. Exhibit includes associated Buckeye PD report 161231033

Exhibit 17 Email exchange dated 4/24/2017

Exhibit 18 Copies of emails exchanges initiated 5/10/2017

Exhibit 19 Email sent 7/8/2017, from Sergeant Virgadamo to Sergeants and

Exhibit 20 All document related to parking violation

Exhibit 21 Email dated 8/25/2017, sent by Sergeant Virgadamo related to career


opportunities

Exhibit 22 Email response to Sergeant Virgadamo from Sergeant dated


8/29/2017

Exhibit 23 Email response from Acting Sergeant dated 8/28/2017

Exhibit 24 Email from Lieutenant to Sergeants dated 8/28/2017

Exhibit 25 Text message sent by Sergeant Virgadamo to Acting Sergeant dated


8/28/2017

Exhibit 26 Virgadamo response to 8/29/2017, 3:15PM

Exhibit 27 Email from Virgadamo to and McGeough dated 8/29/2017

Exhibit 28 DOJ/FBI 2013 Summary Report System user manual Version 1.0

Exhibit 29 Los Angeles Police Commission Report dated 12/2/2015

Exhibit 30 List of 2017 reports with UCR code “Assault, Aggravated Circumstances,”
and all corresponding reports

Exhibit 31 List of 2016 reports with UCR code “Assault, Aggravated Circumstances,”
and all corresponding reports

Exhibit 32 Memos and reports from Sergeant to Lieutenant dated


3/7/2017

Exhibit 33 Emails initiated on December 31, 2016 and report #161231033

Exhibit 34 Printout of query ran on 2/26/2018, of all UCR code changes by Sergeant
Virgadamo

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Exhibit 35 Worksheet with UCR code changes made by Virgadamo on 7/22/2017

Exhibit 36 Worksheet with UCR code changes made by Virgadamo on 8/11/2017

Exhibit 37 Worksheet with UCR code changes made by Virgadamo on 9/21/2017

Exhibit 38 Report 170202089

Exhibit 39 Report 170323073

Exhibit 40 Report 170623129

Exhibit 41 Report 170209128

Exhibit 42 Report 170323080

Exhibit 43 Report 170630047

Exhibit 44 Report 170317080

Exhibit 45 Report 171019107

Exhibit 46 Report 170306068

Exhibit 47 Query of Arlak’s UCR Code Changes; ran on 3/27/2018

Exhibit 48 Report 170315070

Exhibit 49 Report 171101105

Exhibit 50 Report 171224086

Exhibit 51 Report 180105136

Exhibit 52 Report 180129116

Exhibit 53 Emails related to Officer employment status

Exhibit 54 Copy of Grievance filed by Officer

Exhibit 55 Copy of memo prepared by Sergeant ; originally submitted to Lieutenant


and document evidence that was not logged in

Exhibit 56 Table documenting Annual Part 1 crimes; 2013 to 2016

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Exhibit 57 Report 171122026

Exhibit 58 Report 171108012

Exhibit 59 Spillman Certificate; confirmation of conversation

Exhibit 60 Report 161104002

Exhibit 61 Report 150831049 theft of phone from bank teller

Exhibit 62 Worksheet with UCR code changes made by Virgadamo on 12/03/2017

Exhibit 63 Emails documenting 2014 jewelry show and Ferrari/McGeough involvement-


initiated February 12, 2014

Exhibit 64 Memo prepared by Chief Hall documenting no contact with Scottsdale Police

Exhibit 65 Email exchange between Chief Hall and Assistant Chief Mann; provided by
Chief Hall to document only info received about crime stats

Exhibit 66 Lexipol policies provided by Chief Hall that he felt applicable to situation
involving photographing accident scene victim

Exhibit 67 PSU investigation and McGeough

Exhibit 68 Documents related to Blue Knight Securities LLC from AZ Corporation


Commission website

Exhibit 69 Conflict of Interest Policy implemented July 9, 2013

Exhibit 70 Memo dated May 4, 2017, prepared by Mark Mann for Ron Hergert

Exhibit 71 PSU investigation into Las Vegas shooting messages

Exhibit 72 Memo from dated 6/24/2016

Exhibit 73 Report 160709017

Exhibit 74 Email dated 7/12/2016 from Virgadamo to Mann

Exhibit 75 Accident report 150218054

Exhibit 76 Memo prepared by Chief Hall reference Root misconduct investigation

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Exhibit 77 Emails exchanged 2/26/2014, reference to Orion jobs

Exhibit 78 Emails from 2015 and 2016 documenting Hall assisting Orion subcontractors
while working

Exhibit 79 Email dated 2/4/2016; includes attachment of business/contractor agreement

Exhibit 80 Emails documenting employment of Buckeye employees

Exhibit 81 Emails concerning 2014 Las Vegas Jewelry Show

Exhibit 82 Nevada Private Investigators Board meeting minutes for 2012, 2014, 2016,
documenting employment of off duty Arizona police officers

Exhibit 83 Printout from Nevada Private Investigator Site showing Gary McGeough
licensed to carry armed in Nevada in 2014

Exhibit 84 Emails documenting problems with military surplus program

Exhibit 85 Email of January 20, 2015, with photo attachment of Larry Hall in uniform

Exhibit 86 Email of May 2016, Chief Hall acknowledging direction by Orion owner to
stop using government emails system

Exhibit 87 Comp Stat report prepared by Sergeant Virgadamo

270

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