International Journal of Water Resources Development

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State, market or community failure? Untangling

the determinants of groundwater depletion in
Copiapó (Chile)

Jean-Daniel Rinaudo & Guillermo Donoso

To cite this article: Jean-Daniel Rinaudo & Guillermo Donoso (2019) State, market or community
failure? Untangling the determinants of groundwater depletion in Copiapó (Chile), International
Journal of Water Resources Development, 35:2, 283-304, DOI: 10.1080/07900627.2017.1417116

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2017.1417116

Published online: 15 Jan 2018.

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InternatIonal Journal of Water resources Development
2019, Vol. 35, No. 2, 283–303
https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2017.1417116

State, market or community failure? Untangling the

determinants of groundwater depletion in Copiapó (Chile)
Jean-Daniel Rinaudoa and Guillermo Donosob
a
BRGM, Montpellier University, France; bDepartment of Agricultural Economics, Pontificia Universidad Católica
de Chile, Santiago

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This article analyzes the factors that explain why groundwater can Received 20 June 2017
be over-exploited despite the existence of sophisticated water Accepted 7 December 2017
laws, institutions and effective state agencies responsible for water
KEYWORDS
management. The analysis is based on a case study conducted in the Chile; collective
Copiapó Valley in northern Chile. Based on an analysis of water use management; governance;
data, policy documents and interviews with a variety of stakeholders, groundwater depletion;
the article highlights the state’s failure to perform some of its key water policy
missions and the ineffectiveness of groundwater users’ associations
in water management despite a very supportive legal framework. The
article concludes with some recommendations on how ensure long-
term sustainable groundwater use.

Introduction
Since the 1980s, irrigated agriculture has significantly expanded with the increasing use of
groundwater. This trend, observed in both developed and emerging countries, has given
rise to many cases of groundwater overdraft (Giordano & Villholth, 2007; Mays, 2013; Shah,
2005; Wada et al., 2010). In certain cases, this has led groundwater-dependent economies
to the verge of collapse (Petit et al., 2017). Examples of such trajectories have been reported
from settings as diverse as Australia (Nevill, 2009), southern European countries (De Stefano,
Fornés, López-Geta, & Villarroya, 2015), western American states (Scanlon et al., 2012), Central
and South America (Bitran, Rivera, & Villena, 2014; Scott & Shah, 2004), the Indian subconti-
nent (Watto & Mugera, 2016), the Middle East and North Africa (Al-Sakkaf, Zhou, & Hall, 1999;
Closas & Molle, 2016; Kuper et al., 2016).
This threat is a matter of increasing concern to states that have invested in agricultural
development policies via subsidies and infrastructure development. Indeed, they now realize
that groundwater overdraft could render their investments worthless and create poverty in
regions where there was once economic expansion (Faysse, Errahj, Imache, Kemmoun, &
Labbaci, 2014). Policy makers are increasingly aware of the urgent need for policies that are
designed to ensure that groundwater exploitation is sustainable in the long term (McKay,
2012). In this regard, a number of international experts and institutions recommend adjusting
the existing groundwater allocation regimes by tightening the conditions for the allocation

CONTACT  Jean-Daniel Rinaudo  Jd.rinaudo@brgm.fr

© 2018 BRGM and Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
284 J.-D. RINAUDO AND G. DONOSO

of water licences, reducing total abstraction and aligning it with available resources in the
long run. This management model, which is also applied to other natural resources, such as
fisheries, assigns a major role to the state. It assumes that the state has the capacity to per-
form five tasks. The first consists of calculating and imposing a sustainable abstraction limit,
which is designed to guarantee the continuity of use for future generations (offtake should
not exceed long-term recharge) and to ensure that groundwater-dependent ecosystems,
such as streams and wetlands, fulfil their ecological function properly. The second task con-
sists of sharing the resource governed by the sustainable abstraction limit among the various
users. This can take the form of individual use rights (permits, concessions or full property
rights), which define the terms of use by volume or discharge, the location and, possibly,
the type of use associated with the withdrawal. Various principles of efficiency or social
justice may underlie this initial allocation (Rinaudo, Moreau, & Garin, 2016). Mechanisms
enabling the reallocation of rights among users should also be laid down by the state (Task
3). The state may make use of administrative procedures (waiting list), the market (if water
use rights are made tradable) or other negotiated rules defined by the users themselves
(decentralized management). The purpose is to adapt the initial allocation of rights to the
changing economic or demographic conditions or to the exit or entry of users, with the
primary objective being economic efficiency. Then the state should set out the rules to be
applied when it comes to adjusting the volume of rights granted (Task 4) in the event of a
reduction in the available resource (across-the-board reduction of all rights, or expropriation
with compensation), by considering the trade-off between efficiency and equity (Iftekhar
& Fogarty, 2017). This management model only works if users comply with the limits set for
the rights of use. Thus, an efficient enforcement strategy is required to ensure that the users
abide by the rules (Task 5).
This policy model based on the allocation of water rights (WR) has gradually been imple-
mented in developed countries where public administrations have the human, technical
and financial resources to carry out the tasks described above. Australia (Grafton, Horne, &
Wheeler, 2016), Spain (De Stefano et al., 2015) and Chile (Bauer, 2004; Donoso, Melo, & Jordan,
2014a) are frequently cited to illustrate this model. European countries are now working on
setting up a similar model, in line with the Water Framework Directive (European Commission,
2000). This raises several questions. What is the reality of the situation? Have all the requisite
conditions for the successful operation of this type of management been met? This policy
model assumes that the state will carry out its sovereign duties unfailingly and implement
the five tasks described above. This article demonstrates that this is easier said than done,
even in countries with a long water management tradition, sophisticated water laws and
well-organized state agencies responsible for water management. This article investigates
the issue through historical analysis of the Copiapó Valley, which is located in an arid region
of northern Chile.
The article begins by presenting the regulatory framework for water management in
Chile. It then describes the history of the case-study area and the resulting overdraft situation.
The fourth section then attempts to identify all the causal factors behind the overdraft
between 1985 and 2010. The analysis reveals a number of state failures. The fifth section lays
out the new approach that has been implemented during the past decade, based on the
creation of user associations. One of the associations, established in 2005, is described in
detail before presenting the challenges that it will face in the coming years. The article
concludes with a discussion of the difficulty of balancing the roles of the state, collective
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 285

management and market mechanisms when it comes to establishing long-term sustainable

groundwater management.

The regulatory framework for water management in Chile

Defining and applying WR is a basic element of water management in Chile (Bauer, 2004;
Donoso, 2015). Since the colonial period, WR have largely involved sharing out the water
distributed by collective hydraulic infrastructure systems (Vergara, 1992; Vergara, Arévalo,
Muñoz, Rivera, & Vergara, 2011). This is the case in a number of countries in North Africa, the
Middle East and the Indian sub-continent (Giordano & Villholth, 2007). In the 1980s and
1990s, given the allocation and use of most surface water resources, there was an increase
in groundwater withdrawals.
However, the Chilean Water Code of 1981 (WC81) (Gobierno de Chile, 1981) was designed
essentially to regulate surface water. Consequently, it barely mentions groundwater (Rivera,
2015). In response to the need to regulate groundwater exploration and pumping and pro-
vide a legal framework and technical instruments to achieve sustainable groundwater man-
agement, the General Directorate of Water (DGA) promulgated Resolution 207-1983, which
was revised in Decree 203-2013 (Gobierno de Chile, 2013). This applied the same system of
rights to groundwater management: the water resource was seen as a national good for
public use, and the state granted withdrawal authorizations on request, free of charge.
Authorizations were specified in terms of flow (not volume), as was traditionally the case in
hydraulic systems; since 2005, authorizations specify both a maximum instantaneous pump-
ing flow and an annual volume. While water resources remained in the public domain, under
the neoliberal ideology of the ruling elite (influenced by Milton Friedman’s ‘Chicago boys’),
the deed giving the right to use them was considered a private good, with the same level
of guarantee as land ownership (Bauer, 2004). Thus, WR were administered according to the
same principles as real estate.
The WC81 stipulates that the state will cease awarding new rights if users can demonstrate
(before a court) that their rights are threatened by newcomers. In addition, the state can
close access to aquifers by declaring them prohibition zones. It can also declare restriction
zones, where only provisional WR can be allocated, if there is uncertainty with regard to the
available groundwater resources. The law also provides for an overdraft situation, which
involves the uniform reduction of the flow associated with each water use right to re-estab-
lish hydrogeological balance.
Users are required to monitor their usage and send the data to the relevant water-policing
office (the DGA). In restriction and prohibition zones, users are also required to form ground-
water user associations (GWAs), which are in charge of ensuring that users comply with their
rights. The DGA can legally cancel WR and expropriate users (with compensation), if it is
justifiable in terms of the public interest with regard to protecting the environment or third
parties. However, this has not yet been applied since the promulgation of the WC81 (Donoso
& Vicuña, 2016). There are two main reasons. First, the cost of expropriation is burdensome
for the government, especially in arid and semi-arid basins, where the value of WR is very
high on average; in the northern arid regions, the value fluctuates between USD 130,000
(Cristi, Melo, & Donoso, 2014) and USD 500,000 per litre per second (EMG Consultores
S.A., 2011). Second, its application would lead to significant social and political conflict, due
to the transfer of wealth to the WR holder, who received the rights free of charge.
286 J.-D. RINAUDO AND G. DONOSO

In sum, the legislative and regulatory framework seems to be perfectly adapted for imple-
menting the management model described in the introduction to this article. Let us now
consider the current situation in the Copiapó Valley to determine whether what happens in
practice actually corresponds to the theory.

The groundwater crisis in the Copiapó Valley

Copiapó, an economic boom in the middle of the desert
The Copiapó Valley is in the Atacama semi-desert region of northern Chile (Figure 1). The
watershed covers 18,000 km2, extending from the Andean summits to the ocean over a
distance of 160 km. The groundwater resource is located in the valley bottom. It ranges from
1 to 5 km wide and constitutes a major quaternary alluvial aquifer. It is 100 m thick on average
and divided into six large sectors (Figure 1). Some sub-sectors have greater reserves because
the alluvial formation is thicker, with a depth of up to 200 metres (Figure 2). The resource is
largely derived from melting snow and ice in the Andes and, to a lesser extent, from precip-
itation, which ranges between 20 and 50 mm per year in the Copiapó Valley. Average surface
water flows are 2.4 m3/s. Flow is regulated by the Lautaro Reservoir, located at the head of
the river, which has an intra-annual water regulation capacity of 25.4 million m3. This reservoir
is one of the aquifer’s major recharge sources.
Since 1990, mining activities have intensified with the arrival of major foreign investors,
who have opened very high capacity copper mines, mainly in Sector 4 (Sernageomin, 2017).

Figure 1.  Location of the Copiapó Valley and division of the alluvial aquifer into hydrogeological
management sectors.
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 287

Figure 2. Longitudinal section of the aquifer showing the various sectors (adapted from Hidromás CEF
limitada, 2013).

Mining companies have been granted new rights from the state, and they purchased others
from farmers who owned more WR than they required for their own operations (Donoso,
Blanco, Vergara, & Rivera, 2014b).
Agriculture has also developed since the construction of the Lautaro Dam in the 1930s, which
provided a regular supply of water via a network of existing gravity-fed canals. The liberal policy
adopted in the 1980s boosted the growth of intensive export-based agricultural production
(Oyarzún, Arumí, Alvarez, & Rivera, 2008). At the time, the Copiapó Basin specialized in the pro-
duction of table grapes, which were the first to reach the US market during the Christmas season.
This period saw the development of large firms in the valley, managed by big landowners or
held by foreign investors. As a result of the land reforms in the 1960s, peasant farmers coexisted
alongside this capital-intensive agriculture. They specialized in truck farming for regional and
national markets. Olive growing was also developed downstream, generally on a large scale,
where the water is of poorer quality. The state supported these developments mainly via policies
to promote exports and, to a lesser extent, by providing subsidies for modernizing irrigation
(drip irrigation, canal lining, and shifting from gravity to pressurized irrigation systems). The public
policy set out to encourage competition, without providing direct support to companies.
Cultivated areas expanded from 3,400 ha in the 1960s to 7,000 ha in the 1990s and
15,000 ha in 2015. Fruit production represents 87% of the cultivated area; 79% of the irrigated
land for fruit is used for table grape production and 17% for olives (Partarrieu et al., 2009).
Surface irrigation systems were modernized (with widespread use of drip irrigation and
cementing of the canals), which made it possible to increase production using the same
amount of water. At present, drip or microjet technologies are employed on approximately
88% of the total irrigated area (Partarrieu et al., 2009). However, agricultural development
was also permitted by an increase in groundwater withdrawals, which rose from 10 million
m3 in the 1960s to more than 140 million m3 in the mid-1990s. It is important to note that
10 years ago, it was estimated that 78% of all recharge to the aquifer came from the riverbed
and irrigation canals, with a further 17% from drainage below the irrigated crops (Golder
Associates, 2006). In recent years, the very high water use efficiency of drip irrigation systems,
combined with the low river flows since 1998, has reduced recharge to the aquifer.
288 J.-D. RINAUDO AND G. DONOSO

The combination of economic and demographic growth which accompanied the mining
and agricultural boom also led to one of the highest population growth rates in the country
(INE, 2012). This trend is expected to continue, given that the state has approved foreign
investment in new and expanding mining projects (Comisión Chilena del Cobre, 2013). Thus,
there has also been a significant rise in drinking water demand, which also was met from
groundwater (Empresa Concesionaria de Servicios Sanitarios [ECONSSA], 2014). The private
company which manages drinking water supply (under a concession arrangement) has also
obtained WR from the state and bought others from farmers (Donoso et al., 2014b; ECONSSA,
2014). By the end of the 2000s, agricultural use accounted for 75% of groundwater with-
drawals, while mining and industrial activities accounted for 15%, and drinking water supply,
10% (Donoso et al., 2014b).

Collapse of the water table

Since the 1980s, a number of studies (e.g. Alamos & Peralta, 1987; Dictuc, 2010; Hammer &
Asociados, 1980; Hidromás CEF limitada, 2013; Troncoso et al., 2012) have shown that with-
drawals far exceed the average recharge of the alluvial aquifer, which is estimated at 4 m3
per second (Troncoso et al., 2012). This is confirmed by the rapid fall in piezometric levels,
which first appeared in the 1990s (the 1980s recorded above-average rainfall). In upstream
Sectors 1 and 2, the local groundwater balance is not critical and the aquifer recovers every
year, as supplies from melting snow more than compensate for pumping. The deficit is
growing in Sectors 3 and 4, and the levels measured fell from 10 to 150 metres (on average)
between 1998 and 2015. This is the area with the greatest concentration of high-capacity
pumping wells, which are mainly used for drinking water and mining purposes. Initially,
Sectors 5 and 6 were spared because they benefited from recharge from lateral basins.
Overall, the hydrogeological balance has been increasingly negative since the late 1990s
(Figure 3): the total available water reserve fell by about 38 million m3 per year between
1990 and 2012. The shortfall then accelerated sharply between 2005 and 2012 to 55 million
m3 per year (Hidromás CEF limitada, 2013). In this 22-year period, the reserve lost an esti-
mated 830 million m3, the equivalent of 6.5 years of average recharge. Figure 4 shows that
the water reserve will continue to decline if the rate of groundwater pumping remains at its

Figure 3. Change in the total volume stored in the Copiapó Aquifer between 1974 and 2007 (adapted
from Hidromás CEF limitada, 2013).
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 289

Figure 4. Modelled changes in aquifer volume between La Puerta and Angostura after 2012 (adapted
from McFarlane and Norgate 2012).

current level (McFarlane & Norgate, 2012), unless average rainfall increases to the amounts
recorded in the 1980s.
In Sectors 3 and 4, mining companies were increasingly concerned by the declining
productivity of the wells and the risk that some of them would dry-up in a near future. As a
response, they started to purchase WR from farmers in Sector 5 where groundwater levels
were not yet declining (McFarlane & Norgate, 2012). This appropriation, while perfectly legal,
generated widespread hostility in the agricultural community towards the mining sector.
For example, farmers expressed concern about the fact that the mining companies could
afford to pay more for WR than the farmers themselves; in fact, when a WR transaction was
between a mining company and an agricultural producer, the price was, on average, 48%
higher than a WR transaction only between farmers (Donoso et al., 2014b). They feared that
this would be detrimental to regional agricultural activities (Red Agrícola, 2016). This, com-
bined with the 2007 water shortage, led the major mining firms to invest in desalination
plants and reduce their groundwater use. Mining companies reduced their water extraction
by 238 L/s (14%) between 2009 and 2013, increasing their desalinated water consumption
by 248 L/s in the same period (Comisión Chilena del Cobre, 2013). In 2013, the boreholes at
the Candelaria Mine were replaced by desalinated water, which was transported over a
distance of 80 km to an elevation of 1000 m, at a total cost of about USD 4/m3. A second
large mining firm (CAP) adopted the same strategy in 2014. The groundwater boreholes and
the corresponding water use rights were kept as an emergency back-up supply. However,
the reduction in withdrawals was not enough to curb the continuing fall in the piezometric
levels. This reflects the fact that agriculture is the principal water user.
The company Aguas Chañar, which operates the drinking water service concession, now
finds itself in the same situation. Their total extraction flows in Sector 4 fell significantly
(Figure 5); as Table 1 indicates, the majority of its wells in Sector 4 yielded only a small volume
of water because of the fall in the piezometric level (ECONSSA, 2014, 2015). So far, there is
no indication of a reversal of this trend (Figure 4). Under an emergency procedure the DGA
authorized Aguas Chañar to drill new wells in Sector 5 to replace the dry wells in Sector 4
(Donoso & Vicuña, 2016). The new wells, with a total capacity of 540 L/s, were regularized
by purchasing or leasing rights from farmers. In turn, the higher volume drawn has led to a
290 J.-D. RINAUDO AND G. DONOSO

Figure 5. Evolution of Aguas Chañar extraction flows for drinking water supply (adapted from Hidromás
CEF limitada, 2013).

Table 1. Aguas Cañar’s operating wells and average extraction flows.

Wells in operation Average extraction flow (L/s)
Sectors Sectors
Year 3 4 5 Total 3 4 5 Total
2007 0 22 0 22 0 616 0 616
2008 0 27 0 27 0 606 0 608
2009 0 29 0 29 0 559 0 559
2010 0 16 1 17 0 599 12 611
2011 2 14 4 20 38 493 83 614
2012 3 13 5 21 108 232 313 654
2013 3 8 5 16 96 187 382 666
Source: Hidromás CEF limitada (2013).

fall in the piezometric level in Sector 5 at a rate of approximately 2–6 m/y, depending on the
location. According to the firm’s technical manager, this sector of the aquifer is being emptied
‘like a flush toilet’ (Barros, personal communication, 8 April 2015).
Aguas Chañar therefore proposed the construction of a seawater desalination plant to
replace the groundwater supply. However, despite the regional public subsidies to help
finance the investment, operational costs would significantly increase household potable
water bills. Some estimates suggest that bills would double, making water unaffordable for
some domestic users (ECONSSA, 2014). The project is at the environmental impact assess-
ment stage, and it is projected that its initial phase will be operational in 2020.
A census conducted by the authors shows that an increasing number of boreholes for
agricultural use are also drying up. In some cases, replacement wells have been constructed
and the water use rights have been transferred from the initial wells to replacement wells.
However, a number of WR attached to dry wells remain unused. In Sectors 5 and 6, we iden-
tified 42 wells which are currently dry (Table 2). These wells could be replaced by deeper
ones (average depth of 140 metres compared to 65 metres for the dry wells) for an estimated
total cost of € 2.65 million. The deep semi-confined layers of the aquifer, which are currently
being tapped, are poorly replenished, and therefore the new wells are not very productive.
Some farmers who drilled wells 110 m deep have watched their new well dry up in less than
two years. We are witnessing the first bankruptcies among agricultural firms. This crash is
only partially cushioned by the sale of WR, because the water market plummeted in 2008.
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 291

Table 2. Estimated replacement cost of dry wells in Sectors 5 and 6 in the Copiapó Valley.
Average initial Replacement well Replacement well
Number of wells depth depth cost (€)*
Shallow wells 3 23 m 106 m 109.000
(20–25 m)
Intermediate wells 25 58 m 129 m 1,214,500
(50–60 m)
Deep wells (80–110 m) 14 87 m 145 m 1,326,500
All wells (total) 42 65 m 140 m 2,650,000
*The replacement cost includes the cost of drilling a new well at a depth which ensures access to groundwater and the cost
of a new pump. Costs are estimated assuming that the new well has the same technical characteristics as the dry one
(diameter); the assumed new depth is such that the pump can be set 20 metres below current static groundwater level.

So far, there is no indication to suggest any reversal of this trend. For example, a new
mining company (Caserones) will soon commence operations upstream of the basin (Sector
1). It is likely to make intensive use of WR purchased from farmers, which the latter were not
using (equivalent to 1,095 L/s). According to their environmental impact assessment, certain
areas of Sectors 3, 4 and 5 will probably dry up in the near future (Minera Lumina Copper
Chile, 2008).

The origins of the crisis

How did this level of over-exploitation occur when the state theoretically has the regulatory
tools to avoid this kind of situation? Was sufficient information available with regard to the
status of the aquifer? If so, why did the state continue granting new permits? Is the state
capable of determining the amounts of water that are actually being drawn off? To answer
these questions, we reviewed 12 studies on the Copiapó Aquifer conducted in the last
25 years (Alamos & Peralta, 1987; Bitran et al., 2014; Dictuc, 2010; Donoso et al., 2014b; Golder
Associates, 2006; Hammer & Asociados, 1980), Hidromás CEF limitada, 2013; McFarlane &
Norgate, 2012; McFarlane et al., 2012; Minera Luminar Copper Chile, 2008; Partarrieu et al.,
2009; Troncoso et al., 2012). We also used primary data, such as the WR registry and market
trading data, which can be requested from Comunidad de Aguas Subterráneas Copiapó –
Piedra Colgada; Piedra Colgada – Desembocadura (CASUB). We also conducted a series of
semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and experts, including farmers and mem-
bers of GWAs and government agencies. We used a predominantly qualitative approach to
outline the factual developments in Copiapó’s groundwater management. Interviewees were
selected on the basis of their involvement in water management activities and expertise.

Limited knowledge of groundwater

The basin has been the subject of a number of major studies, which have alerted the author-
ities to the danger of over-exploitation (Alamos & Peralta, 1987; Dictuc, 2010; Hidromás CEF
limitada, 2013; Troncoso et al., 2012). However, these successive studies conveyed different
messages as to the consequences of over-exploitation. The first study (Hammer & Asociados,
1980) estimated the extracted volume to be 23–25 million m3. The authors also found that
usage already exceeded recharge by 18%, which reduced the groundwater reserve by 59
million m3 between 1970 and 1979. This conclusion was contradicted by Alamos and Peralta
(1987), who stated that ‘the Copiapó Valley has a vast underground reservoir with a capacity
292 J.-D. RINAUDO AND G. DONOSO

for regulation, and that it can be exploited for the next 50 years, including during droughts,
without a significant fall in piezometric levels’. This optimistic conclusion was influenced by
a series of wet years, which affected the hydrological statistics, and by a failure to anticipate
the dramatic increase in demand for groundwater that was to occur in the following decades.
In the wake of this study, users seeking to expand their economic activity could argue in
court against the administration, if the latter refused to grant them new permits, since prior
to the 2005 WC81 reform, the DGA could not refuse to grant new WR without infringing a
constitutional guarantee, provided there was technical evidence of the availability of water
resources and that the new use would not harm existing rights holders. At the time, the
central government was investigating the issues surrounding the opening of several major
mines. On the basis of the report, it argued in favour of the projects with the potential to
generate growth and substantial tax revenues. Thus, the lack of reliable technical information
on the characteristics of the Copiapó Aquifer – recharge and sustainable yields – is one of
the factors that led to over-allocation and the late establishment of abstraction limits.

Legal complexity and political pressure

When the fall in the piezometric levels in Sectors 3 and 4 was acknowledged, the DGA finally
classified the Copiapó Basin as a prohibition area in 1993 (Resolución 193; Gobierno de Chile,
1993). The DGA can declare an aquifer or the hydrogeological sector of an aquifer under
prohibition if there is clear evidence of a risk of resource depletion due to over-extraction
and at least one WR holder requests it. Thus, no new pumping permits could be granted.
However, in 1994, DGA passed Resolution 232 (Gobierno de Chile, 1994), which lifted the
prohibition in areas more than 35 km from the river. As a result, a number of mining projects
were revived after being granted new WR. However, this reduced groundwater recharge
(DICTUC, 2010). More surprising still, numerous permits were granted after the prohibition
had been declared (Figure 6). In fact, the total authorized pumping flow rose from about
14,500 L/s in 1993 to 18,500 L/s in 2001, an increase of nearly 30%. Why did the state continue
to issue permits? First, users who had submitted their permit applications before the

Figure 6. History of the granting of groundwater permits in the Copiapó Valley (adapted from Donoso
et al., 2014b).
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 293

publication of the prohibition went to court and obtained a legal decision requiring the
state to process their applications. Also, many users anticipated the prohibition and requested
the regularization of their customary WR (historic usages), according to the transitory second
article of the WC81. The state controller ruled that the DGA was obliged to process these
petitions under the prohibition. A few applications to regularize were old wells submitted
to the DGA on the basis of false declarations (age of boreholes). This was also reported in
the Ligua Petorca basin by a different author (Budds, 2009). Finally, a number of accounts
suggest that the local authority may have been under pressure from influential users, who
had relations with the central government and Santiago’s political circles. By 2012, the DGA
had granted water pumping rights allowing a total extraction of 20,000 L/s, five times the
average recharge rate (Donoso et al., 2014b).
In 2001, with the agreement of the National Agricultural Development Agency of the
Ministry of Agriculture (INDAP), the DGA passed Resolution 232 (Gobierno de Chile, 1994),
which lifted the prohibition for the downstream portion of the basin and classified it as a
restricted zone. This status allowed provisional permits to be granted and regularized after
five years, if no negative impact was demonstrated. Accordingly, new permits were dis-
tributed, particularly, though not exclusively, to small farmers (a widely publicized social
goal). As a result, mining companies were able to move from Sectors 3 and 4, which were
drying up, to Sector 5, where the largest reserves were located. Did this decision reflect
state arbitrage in terms of its dual objectives of economic growth and sustainability? Does
it reflect the influence of big companies in the mining sector? These theories are difficult
to prove.

Ill-defined water permits

Granting rights on the basis of a foreseeable use factor is a third technical issue, which
could also account for the over-exploitation. During the 1990–2000 period, the DGA esti-
mated the number of permits that could be granted to beneficiaries by taking into account
their intended use. Thus, a water permit of 1 L/s theoretically gives the right to pump
31,500 m3/y, if the permit is used 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Since agricultural pro-
ducers only pump water between late spring and the end of summer, the DGA assumed
a 20% use factor. In theory, a water permit of 1 L/s for agricultural use is equivalent to a
total volume of 6,307 m3/y. The theoretical use factor was 75% for drinking water and the
mining industry.
Using data from the Water Right Registry (DGA, 2016), we estimated that, theoretically,
the total volume used was 239 million m3/y (Table 3). Due to improvements in water use
efficiency, the actual use factor is much higher. It is closer to 40% for agriculture and 100%
for mining and drinking water. Thus, the total volume actually extracted is estimated at 384
million m3/y. This simple calculation illustrates that the state significantly underestimated
groundwater abstraction when it granted the permits.
This underestimation was later accentuated by the emergence of a WR market. Between
1987 and 2013, the market transactions for water between agriculture on the one hand and
the mining and drinking water industries on the other hand led to an additional 10% increase
in actual WR use. Consequently, total abstraction reached 421 million m3/y. In this way, the
market exacerbated a problem that was originally due to an inadequate specification of
property rights.
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J.-D. RINAUDO AND G. DONOSO

Table 3. Theoretical and actual use factors and corresponding volumes used.
Use factor Water flow (L/s) Volume consumed (m3/y)
Final allocation con-
Final allocation con- sidering WR market
sidering WR market Initial allocation theo- Initial allocation actual transactions actual use
Economic sector Theoretical (%) Actual (%) Initial allocation transactions retical use factor use factor factor
Agriculture 20 40 15,757 13,825 100 199 175
Drinking water 75 100 1,417 2,248 34 45 71
Mines and industry 75 100 4,421 5,522 105 140 174
Total – – 21,595 21,595 239 384 420
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 295

Compliance and enforcement problems

A fourth explanatory factor is the problem of compliance and enforcement. GWAs are legally
responsible for monitoring use and enforcing compliance with the water extraction limit.
Given their failure to fulfil this obligation, the DGA stepped in as a substitute. However, the
latter suffered from a lack of human, technical and financial resources (World Bank, 2013).
To improve this situation, Decree 203-2013 (Gobierno de Chile, 2013) stated that all ground-
water users were obliged to install measuring equipment and inform the DGA of their water
extraction levels (although this provision was already included in the WC81). At present,
very few users have installed measuring equipment accredited by the DGA, and fewer still
inform the DGA of their extraction levels. In April 2016, the DGA started developing an
Internet platform so that users could declare their pumping online. In Copiapó, the DGA
conducted random checks, although this only led to seven official police reports in a 12-year
period. The stakeholders we encountered in the field perceive the cost of non-compliance
as being lower than compliance, which suggests that the level of fraud is probably quite
high. This situation generates a weak social norm: some farmers openly acknowledge that
they do not comply with the terms of their water use rights.

Inconsistency between the management of surface water and groundwater

Last but not least, policies rarely integrate surface and groundwater management, and those
that do are contradictory. For example, the National Irrigation Commission has heavily sub-
sidized the modernization of gravity-fed irrigation systems. The canals were lined, drip irri-
gation was developed, and the water savings enabled the owners of surface WR to increase
their irrigated areas. Moreover, the commission has made no secret of its goal to improve
and increase irrigation. Yet the modernization of irrigation reduces leaks and infiltration,
hindering artificial recharge of the aquifer, which accounts for nearly 60% of total recharge
(Alamos and Peralta, 1987). Also, because Aguas Chañar now sells treated water to a large
mining plant, their river discharge reduced groundwater recharge by 0.5 million m3 per year
(Hidromás CEF limitada, 2013).

The emergence of collective management

Solving the crisis by imposing collective management
In the mid-2000s, the DGA finally succeeded in stabilizing the number of WR by declaring
these sectors of the aquifer under restriction (DGA Resolution 232-1994; Gobierno de Chile,
1994). In accordance with Article 65 of the WC81, the DGA then required users to form GWAs
to take responsibility for resolving both issues. Under the Chilean legal system, the users
should take the necessary steps to defend their water use rights because they are a matter
of private property. In the absence of public interest, the state is not allowed to intervene
directly to restore the balance (and pay the associated costs), unless one or more WR holders
formally petition DGA to intervene. This approach is similar to the management of surface
irrigation systems (Rivera, 2015).
Despite the theory, when the basin was classified as a prohibited zone in 1993, the state
failed to impose collective management on users. The latter were more concerned with
short-term costs than with long-term benefits. In 2001, the DGA allowed provisional WR to
296 J.-D. RINAUDO AND G. DONOSO

be granted in Sections 5 and 6, on condition that a users’ association be set up. This motivated
a group of farmers (both large and small) to take the first steps. CASUB was finally judicially
constituted in 2004. In the other sectors of the aquifer, the GWAs were established judicially
in 2015.

The gradual development of CASUB

CASUB brings together all the holders of groundwater rights in the downstream area (Sectors
5 and 6). It comprises 204 holders in the agricultural sector, four mining companies and a
drinking water company, Aguas Chañar. The users operate 187 boreholes, with a total author-
ized pumping capacity of 5,500 L/s, of which only 1,000 L/s is actually used.
CASUB only became operational in 2008. However, the lack of clearly defined operational
rules has limited its management capabilities. Its rules of operation were recently approved
in 2013; however, they are still not fully known by all users. Furthermore, they have not yet
been implemented, since the DGA has not formally registered them, as a result of conflicting
administrative views of CASUB’s attributions, due to different interpretations of the WC81
(Vergara et al., 2013).
Nonetheless, CASUB has been able to implement some actions to move towards more
effective collective groundwater management. Its first achievement was to clearly delineate
its boundaries and identify its members, by establishing a detailed registry of water permits,
combined with a geographic information system referencing all the boreholes. The infor-
mation is updated regularly and the contents of the geographic information system are
gradually being augmented.
CASUB is also developing its capacity to support users (mainly farmers) in administra-
tive procedures for obtaining provisional permits or permission to change extraction
points. It also provides support to help users find public funding to deepen wells and
modernize irrigation systems. CASUB’s director, who has a thorough technical under-
standing of the aquifer dynamics, advises farmers on solving problems linked to operating
their facilities.
The range of services offered has recently been broadened. A website will soon enable
users to obtain information on the levels of the water table and their dynamic trends. It will
incorporate tools to help manage irrigation at the farm level, such as high-resolution aerial
photographs, which will allow individual farmers to locate faulty operations in their irrigation
systems. The community is financed by a fee that is proportional to the flow (L/s) specified
in the WR. The revenues generated by the fees are supplemented by public funds, which
may be granted to the association on the basis of its projects.
All these activities that support users help generate a sense of belonging to the commu-
nity. However, most members have yet to be convinced. The interviews we conducted in
2016 suggest that only a small group of members are now fully aware of the community’s
significance and are actively involved in the association. The majority constitutes both small
and large farmers. The former feel excluded (since decisions depend on the number of votes,
which are proportional to the discharge on the water permits), while the latter are pursuing
a free-rider strategy.
Thus, as Table 4 summarizes, CASUB does not fully satisfy Ostrom’s eight principles for
effective common pool groundwater management, which explains its limited collective
management capability (Ostrom, 1990).
Table 4. Evaluation of CASUB’s degree of satisfaction of Ostrom’s eight principles.
1.Define clear group boundaries Satisfied. The aquifer has been clearly delineated; access to the resource is defined by a system
of well-established official water rights (WR) which are registered
2.Match rules governing use of common goods to local needs and conditions Partly Satisfied. Use is mainly defined by the official system of WR. Rules of operation just
recently approved established the enforcement of this system of WR, including the use of
telemetry, possibility of entering private property to control pumping devices, and a system
of sanctions. However, these rules have not been implemented
3.Ensure that those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules Partially satisfied. The statutes of CASUB allow effective participation of all users in the
definition and the modification of the rules, in compliance with the WC81. However, since
votes are proportional to the size of water use rights, small users feel excluded from the
decision process (procedural justice concern)
4.Make sure the rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside authorities Partly Satisfied. CASUB’s recently approved rules have not yet been implemented because the
DGA has not formally registered them, as a result of conflicting administrative views on
CASUB’s attributions
5.Develop a system, carried out by community members, for monitoring members’ behaviour Not satisfied. In theory, CASUB monitors all wells through telemetry. In practice, however,
CASUB does not have the technical resources to analyze the huge amount of data generated
by the system. Also, data collected by CASUB are not shared among users. This results in a
lack of credibility in the monitoring system, which encourages violation of the rules
6.Use graduated sanctions for rule violators Not satisfied. CASUB’s rules of operation establish gradual sanctions: warning, fine, then
cancellation and auctioning of violators’ WR. In practice, however, no significant sanction has
ever been implemented, although many users have evidence of violation (over-abstraction).
The problem is that the sanctions would be contested in court, since their rules of operation
have not been registered by the DGA
7.Provide accessible, low-cost means for dispute resolution Partly satisfied. The board of directors theoretically arbitrates conflicts. However, the board is
mainly composed of large users whose judgment is not perceived as impartial by all users in
the community. Moreover, there are no clear procedures defined in the statutes related to
conflict resolution
8.Build responsibility for governing the common resource in nested tiers from the lowest level Not satisfied. CASUB manages groundwater use in the lower part of the river basin. However,
up to the entire interconnected system the available resource depends on use which takes place in upstream communities, and
there are no coordination mechanisms between communities in the basin. Users’ percep-
tions that upstream communities over-abstract also undermine the legibility of the rules
within CASUB
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
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298 J.-D. RINAUDO AND G. DONOSO

Nonetheless, after 11 years of existence, CASUB’s directors believe that it is sufficiently

well organized to take on the thorny issue of reducing groundwater extraction, the principal
reason for its creation. This could be achieved by applying a uniform reduction coefficient
to all WR. An alternative scenario is emerging. It involves a petition that has been submitted
to the DGA to replace the management of discharges by volume management. A reduction
in authorized volumes could be accompanied by technical and financial assistance to
improve the efficiency of irrigation. The detailed workings of this scenario will be developed
in participatory workshops held by CASUB, with support from the authors of this article.

Discussion and conclusion

Initially, Chile’s water legislation paid little attention to the sustainable management of ground-
water because it represented a marginal water source in the early 1980s. The need to improve
the regulation of groundwater management was acknowledged as a result of the increased
levels of groundwater pumping. The 2005 amendment of the WC81 introduced procedures
to achieve sustainable groundwater resource management. The effectiveness of this policy
model depends on the capacity of the state and the water users to impose a sustainable
abstraction limit, share the volume corresponding to the limit among the various users, enable
the reallocation of rights among users, set out the rules with regard to adjusting the volume
of the granted rights, implement an effective monitoring and performance strategy, and, lastly,
revise the limit periodically to account for changes in resource conditions and climate.
To improve groundwater management, GWAs have been set up in a few basins, mainly
as a result of state coercion. Several years on, a limited number of these associations have
started to play an active role in groundwater management. Their main challenge is to mobi-
lize their members and improve dialogue with state agencies. The GWAs were established
in a ‘weak governance context’ (Faysse et al., 2014), where interactions between users and
the actors in charge of groundwater resource management (GWA board members and state
agencies) were very limited and the (long-term) benefits of cooperation were not fully under-
stood. To change this situation and move towards co-management involving the state and
users, a mutual understanding of stakeholders’ interests, concerns and preferences is
required. This calls for dialogue and deliberation. It represents a key challenge in Copiapó
in the years to come.
Examination of the Copiapó Valley case has shown that even in a developed country like
Chile (Chile’s per capita income has passed the threshold defined by the World Bank for
high-income or developed economies), with highly sophisticated water legislation, the state
and water user associations were not in a position to apply an effective management model
based on the granting of individual permits.
We have identified the main determinants that explain Copiapó’s groundwater depletion.
First, the state closed the groundwater basin belatedly, partly due to inconsistent technical
information. Understanding groundwater dynamics is one of the key elements when it comes
to evaluating the present and long-term abstraction levels. Second, legal complexities and
political pressure led to the allocation of WR that exceeded the established abstraction limits.
Even under a prohibition decree, the state continued granting WR in response to an increased
number of petitions to regularize customary WR, as well as pressure from other state agencies
and economic sectors.
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 299

Poorly defined WR constitute a third factor. WR granted on the basis of theoretical use
factors led to increased volumetric water consumption over time, due to the adoption of
water conservation technology. The increased water consumption was later accentuated by
the existence of WR markets, which meant that WR could be transferred between sectors of
different water extraction intensities.
Fourth, compliance and enforcement problems explain the groundwater overdraft
through legal boreholes, as well as the existence of illegal boreholes. Water user associations
are responsible for monitoring and enforcement. However, the existing association did not
fulfil its role, and GWAs were nonexistent in the upper sections of the aquifer. Thus, the state
had to take on this responsibility, without the necessary adjustments in budget and
personnel.
The fifth and last factor is inconsistency between surface and groundwater manage-
ment. The lack of conjunctive surface and groundwater management is a major deter-
minant. However, deficient coordination between sectoral and resource policies has led
to contradictory policies. For example, the DGA implements policies to achieve sustain-
able groundwater abstraction, while the National Irrigation Commission subsidizes
the adoption of efficient irrigation technologies to increase the irrigated area (World
Bank, 2013).
It is likely that these factors are also important determinants of groundwater management
in other situations (Closas, Molle, & Hernandez-Mora, 2017). Therefore, we argue that the
over-allocation situation is inevitable. In general, the state only conducts studies to quantify
the sustainable abstraction limit when the groundwater levels begin to fall. Indeed, dimin-
ishing groundwater levels are symptomatic of over-allocation problems and may even indi-
cate illegal withdrawals. We offer three main recommendations that should be considered
in a new policy.
The first recommendation is to establish a precise definition of the authorized uses, in
terms of volume. Although management by discharge (inspired by the management of
canals) is easy to apply, it is not advisable for groundwater unless it is combined with volu-
metric management (compare the difficulties we have described in Copiapó).
The second recommendation is to clearly define the permits in proportion to an overall
resource, i.e. the availability (in volume), and to adjust the volume allocated annually for the
available resource. This principle is standard for hydraulic works, where user rights are defined
in relation to available supply (in a dam, for example). It is essential to introduce this idea
into groundwater management. It should be applied as soon as permits are established, to
avoid generating a feeling of individual ownership with regard to a nominal volume or
discharge.
The third recommendation is to set up a crisis management mechanism which can be
activated when management based on a system of permits becomes dysfunctional. For
example, this means defining piezometric trigger levels. When these levels are exceeded,
they trigger a restriction or temporary prohibition on use or automatically reduce the author-
ized volumes the following year. Although the Chilean WC81 entitles GWAs to implement
mechanisms of this kind, they have never actually been applied because there are no incen-
tives and it is difficult for users to reach a consensus. This raises questions about the role of
the state and the tools it should use (coercive versus incentive) when users fail to abide by
the existing regulatory framework.
300 J.-D. RINAUDO AND G. DONOSO

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Carlos Araya, director of CASUB in Copiapó, for his time and for sharing
his valuable insight with regard to the past, present and future groundwater management challenges
in Copiapó. Thanks also to Orlando Acosta Lancelotti, Carlos Ciappa, Jorge Marin and Nicolas Faysse for
their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. The authors also acknowledge the final sup-
port from ANR (French Research Agency), which funded this research through its Carnot programme.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding
This work was supported by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [grant number Programme Carnot
BRGM].

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