UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

PETER J. LIMONE, et al., )

Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civ. Action No. 02cv10890-NG
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Defendant. )

TABLE OF CONTENTS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: BENCH TRIAL
July 26, 2007

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -1-

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -10-

III. FACT FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -15-

A. The FBI Program to "Get" La Cosa Nostra . . . . . -20-
1. Patriarca Wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -21-
2. "Top Echelon Criminal Informant Program" . . -22-
3. Significance of (1) and (2) . . . . . . . . -24-
B. The Boston FBI, the Flemmi Brothers and Barboza . -25-
1. Agents Rico and Condon . . . . . . . . . . . -25-
2. The Flemmi Brothers . . . . . . . . . . . . -27-
a. Jimmy Flemmi . . . . . . . . . . . . . -28-
b. Stephen Flemmi . . . . . . . . . . . . -31-
3. Using the Flemmi Brothers to Turn Barboza into a
Witness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -34-
4. Rico and Condon Meet with Barboza . . . . . -35-
a. Meetings Before September 1967 . . . . -37-
(1) March 8, 1967 . . . . . . . . . . -37-
(2) March 21, 1967 . . . . . . . . . . -38-
(3) April 11, 1967 . . . . . . . . . . -40-
(4) April 27, 1967 . . . . . . . . . . -41-
(5) May 22, 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . -41-
(6) Summer of 1967 . . . . . . . . . . -42-
b. Barboza Mentions the Plaintiffs for the First
Time on September 8, 1967 . . . . . . . -45-
(1) What the FBI Knew about the Deegan
Murder Before The Murder . . . . . -46-
(2) What the FBI Knew after the Murder
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -49-

-i-
 (3) What the Local Authorities Knew about
the Deegan Murder . . . . . . . . -56-
c. The September 8 Interview and the
Indictment . . . . . . . . . -58-
C. The Deegan Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -63-
1. Trial Preparation: An Allegedly "Independent
Investigation" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -63-
2. The Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -70-
3. The Verdict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -79-
D. Between the Deegan Murder Trial and the Nolle
Prosequi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -80-
1. Praises for Rico and Condon . . . . . . . . -80-
2. The Involvement of the FBI Hierarchy . . . . -82-
3. Protecting and Providing for Barboza . . . . -84-
4. 1970 Rico Admission . . . . . . . . . . . . -85-
5. Barboza Attempts to Recant . . . . . . . . . -86-
6. Barboza Murders Clay Wilson and Brags about His
False Testimony in the Deegan Trial . . . . -91-
7. Rico’s Methods Are Exposed - Still Nothing is Done
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -97-
8. The FBI and Stephen Flemmi in the 1980s . . -99-
9. Deegan Defendants’ Efforts Post-Conviction . -101-
a. Salvati Commutation Petitions . . . . . -103-
b. Limone Commutation Petitions . . . . . -104-
c. Tameleo Commutation Petitions . . . . . -106-
d. Greco Commutation Petitions . . . . . . -106-
10. The Conspiracy of Silence . . . . . . . . . -107-

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -109-

A. Prior Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -110-
1. Discretionary Function Exception . . . . . . -110-
2. The FTCA’s Exception for Malicious Prosecution Claims
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -113-
B. Malicious Prosecution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -114-
1. Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -120-
a. The FBI’s Role in Bringing about the
Prosecution of the Plaintiffs: More than a
Host . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -123-
b. The Information Provided by Barboza Was False
or Misleading -- and the FBI Knew it . -128-
c. There Was No Independent Investigation: There
Could Not Be . . . . . . . . . . . . . -130-
d. The FBI’s Efforts Continued over Thirty Years
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -132-
2. Lack of Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . -134-
a. Information Available to the FBI at the Time
-135-

-ii-
 (1) Barboza’s Credibility . . . . . . -135-
(2) Limone and Tameleo . . . . . . . . -136-
(3) Greco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -136-
(4) Salvati . . . . . . . . . . . . . -137-
b. Conviction is Not Conclusive Proof of
Probable Cause on these Facts . . . . . -138-
(1) Subornation . . . . . . . . . . . -140-
(2) Due Process . . . . . . . . . . . -144-
(3) FBI’s Misconduct/Barboza’s Testimony -
The Sole Foundation . . . . . . . -146-
(a) The Fitzgerald Bribe Testimony
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . -146-
(b) The Stathopolous Identification
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . -147-
c. No Other Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . -148-
3. Malice and Termination . . . . . . . . . . . -149-
4. Not a "Failure to Disclose" Claim . . . . . -151-
5. Massachusetts Survival Statute . . . . . . . -154-
C. Civil Conspiracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -155-
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress . . -162-
1. Deegan Defendants’ Claims . . . . . . . . . -162-
2. Family Members’ Claims . . . . . . . . . . . -165-
a. Substantially Contemporaneous Knowledge
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -166-
b. Severe Emotional Response . . . . . . . -168-
E. Negligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -169-
1. The Government Was Directly Negligent . . . -169-
2. Negligent Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . -175-

V. DAMAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -180-
A. Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -181-
1. Limone Plaintiffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . -181-
a. Peter Limone Sr. . . . . . . . . . . . -181-
b. The Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -184-
2. Salvati Plaintiffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . -188-
a. Joseph Salvati . . . . . . . . . . . . -188-
b. The Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -189-
3. Tameleo Plaintiffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . -192-
a. Henry Tameleo . . . . . . . . . . . . . -192-
b. The Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -193-
4. Greco and Werner Plaintiffs . . . . . . . . -194-
a. Louis Greco Sr. . . . . . . . . . . . -194-
b. The Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -197-
(1) The Children . . . . . . . . . . . -197-
(2) The Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . -200-
B. Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -202-

-iii-
 1. Damages for the Deegan Defendants: Limone,
Tameleo, Greco and Salvati . . . . . . . . . -202-
2. Damages for Family Members . . . . . . . . . -207-
a. Loss of Consortium . . . . . . . . . . -207-
(1) Spouses . . . . . . . . . . . . . -210-
(2) Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . -213-
b. Bystander Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -215-
(1) The General Case . . . . . . . . . -215-
(2) Young Children . . . . . . . . . . -217-

VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -218-

-iv-
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

PETER J. LIMONE, et al., )

Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civ. Action No. 02cv10890-NG
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Defendant. )
GERTNER, D.J.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: BENCH TRIAL

July 26, 2007

I. INTRODUCTION

Peter Limone ("Limone"), Enrico "Henry" Tameleo ("Tameleo"),

Louis Greco ("Greco"),1 and Joseph Salvati ("Salvati"), made

extraordinary and troubling accusations in this case. They

claimed that thirty-nine years ago, virtually to the date of this

decision, on July 31, 1968, they were convicted of a crime which

they did not commit -- the murder of Edward "Teddy" Deegan

("Deegan"). Limone, Tameleo, and Greco were sentenced to die in

the electric chair, a sentence reduced to life imprisonment when

the death penalty was vacated. They accused the United States,

specifically, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") of

framing them for Deegan’s murder, and then, by covering up FBI

misconduct, ensuring their imprisonment over the next three

decades.

1
In many of the early documents, including the Deegan trial transcripts
themselves, Louis Greco’s name is spelled "Lewis Grieco." I use that
alternate spelling only when quoting from those documents.
 This trial, however, was not about securing the plaintiffs’

release. Salvati was freed in 1997; Limone in 2001. Tameleo and

Greco died tragically as prisoners -- Tameleo in 1985, Greco in

1995.

Rather, the plaintiffs sought a different form of redress,

which the law allows -- damages for their loss of liberty, for

their pain, and the pain of their loved ones. They brought this

lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §

2671, et seq., on a number of grounds, including malicious

prosecution.

The bench trial was lengthy. It took twenty-two days and

involved hundreds of exhibits, thousands of pages. There were

comparatively few live witnesses; this story had to be

painstakingly pieced together through documents, many of them

heavily redacted, particularly at the outset of the proceedings.

Despite the complexity of the record, this decision is far,

far, longer than I would have wished. It has taken much more

time to complete than I had predicted. But there was no other

alternative. The conclusions that the plaintiffs have asked me

to draw -- that government agents suborned perjury, framed four

innocent men, conspired to keep them in jail for three decades --

are so shocking that I felt obliged to analyze this complex

record with special care in order that the public, and especially

the parties, could be fully confident of my conclusions.

-2-
 I have concluded that the plaintiffs’ accusations that the

United States government violated the law are proved. In the

pages that follow, I will describe why in detail. This

introduction summarizes some of those findings.

The plaintiffs were convicted of Deegan’s murder based on

the perjured testimony of Joseph "The Animal" Barboza

("Barboza").2 The FBI agents "handling" Barboza, Dennis Condon

("Condon") and H. Paul Rico ("Rico"), and their superiors -- all

the way up to the FBI Director -- knew that Barboza would perjure

himself. They knew this because Barboza, a killer many times

over, had told them so -- directly and indirectly. Barboza’s

testimony about the plaintiffs contradicted every shred of

evidence in the FBI’s possession at the time -- and the FBI had

extraordinary information. Barboza's testimony contradicted

evidence from an illegal wiretap that had intercepted stunning

plans for the Deegan murder before it had taken place, plans that

never included the plaintiffs. It contradicted multiple reports

from informants, including the very killers who were the FBI’s

"Top Echelon" informants.

And even though the FBI knew Barboza’s story was false, they

encouraged him to testify in the Deegan murder trial. They never

bothered to tell the truth to the Suffolk County District

2
Barboza went by several aliases, including Joseph Baron and Joseph
Bentley. I refer to him as "Barboza" unless I am quoting from a document
where a different moniker was used.

-3-
Attorney’s Office. Worse yet, they assured the District Attorney

that Barboza's story "checked out."

The FBI knew Barboza’s testimony was perjured because they

suborned that perjury. They met with Barboza long before the

state authorities ever did. They coddled him, nurtured him,

debriefed him, protected him, and rewarded him -- no matter how

much he lied. When Barboza told them he would not accuse the man

they knew to be one of Deegan's killers, his friend and FBI

informant, Jimmy Flemmi, they urged Barboza to testify

nonetheless. And when he announced that he would accuse four men

who had never been linked to this murder, they were undaunted.

They continued to press for his testimony. Indeed, they took

steps to make certain that Barboza's false story would withstand

cross-examination, and even be corroborated by other witnesses.

In word and in deed, the FBI condoned Barboza's lies. FBI

agent Dennis Condon even told the Deegan jury that he was "always

concerned with the purity of testimony on the part of" his

witnesses, referring to Barboza, the perjurer. When Tameleo,

Greco, and Limone were sentenced to death, Salvati to life

imprisonment, the FBI did not stand silently; they congratulated

the agents for a job well done.

Nor did the FBI’s misconduct stop after the plaintiffs were

convicted. The plaintiffs appealed, filed motions for a new

trial, one even took and passed a polygraph test on public

-4-
television -- over and over again protesting their innocence.

They sought commutations, appeared before parole boards, seeking

clemency from the governor, even appealing to the press. On each

occasion, when asked about the plaintiffs, on each occasion when

the FBI could have disclosed the truth -- the perfidy of Barboza

and their complicity in it -- they did not. This was so even as

more and more evidence surfaced casting more and more doubt on

these convictions. In the 1970s, for example, Barboza tried to

recant his testimony, not in all cases in which he had

participated, but only as to the plaintiffs in this case -- the

very men the FBI knew to be innocent. In the 1980s, Agent Rico

was found by a court to have suborned the perjury of another

witness under similar circumstances. Yet, there was still no FBI

investigation, no searching inquiry to see if an injustice had

been done in this case.

Rather, while Salvati and Limone languished in jail for

thirty-odd years, and Greco and Tameleo died in prison, Barboza

and his FBI handlers flourished. The FBI agents were given

raises and promotions precisely for their extraordinary role in

procuring the Deegan convictions. Even when Barboza, the "poster

boy" for the new federal witness protection program, committed

yet another murder, three federal officials testified -- now for

the second time -- on his behalf. FBI officials up the line

allowed their employees to break laws, violate rules and ruin

lives, interrupted only with the occasional burst of applause.

-5-
 The FBI knew Barboza’s testimony was false, that the

plaintiffs’ convictions had been procured by perjury, that

critical exculpatory information had been withheld -- but they

did not flinch. After all, the killers they protected -- Jimmy

Flemmi, along with Barboza, and Jimmy’s brother, Stephen -- were

providing valued information in the "war" against the Italian

Mafia, La Cosa Nostra ("LCN").3 The pieties the FBI offered to

justify their actions are the usual ones: The benefits

outweighed the costs. Put otherwise, in terms that are more

recently familiar, these four men were "collateral damage" in the

LCN war. To the FBI, the plaintiffs' lives, and those of their

families, just did not matter. As Agent Rico put it in his

testimony before the United States House of Representatives

Committee on Government Reform, when asked if he had any remorse

that four innocent men went to prison, he replied: "Would you

like tears or something?" Exh. 170 at 186.

Now is the time to say and say without equivocation: This

"cost" -- to the liberty of four men, to our system of justice --

is not remotely acceptable. No man’s liberty is dispensable. No

human being may be traded for another. Our system cherishes each

individual. We have fought wars over this principle. We are

still fighting those wars.

3
La Cosa Nostra, or LCN, is the way the FBI refers to the Mafia or
"Italian organized crime syndicate." See McIntyre v. United States, 447 F.
Supp. 2d 54, 58 (D. Mass. 2006). Other monikers include "The Office," the
"Italian Element," and "the Mob."

-6-
 Sadly, when law enforcement perverts its mission, the

criminal justice system does not easily self-correct. We

understand that our system makes mistakes; we have appeals to

address them. But this case goes beyond mistakes, beyond the

unavoidable errors of a fallible system. This case is about

intentional misconduct, subornation of perjury, conspiracy, the

framing of innocent men. While judges are scrutinized -- our

decisions made in public and appealed -- law enforcement

decisions like these rarely see the light of day. The public

necessarily relies on the integrity and professionalism of its

officials.

It took nearly thirty years to uncover this injustice. It

took the extraordinary efforts of a judge,4 a lawyer,5 even a

reporter,6 to finally bring out the facts. Proof of innocence in

this democracy should not depend upon efforts as gargantuan as

these.

The claims of the plaintiffs or their estates7 fit into four

categories: malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, intentional

4
Judge Mark Wolf in United States v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D.
Mass. 1999), rev'd in part by 225 F. 3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub
nom.; Flemmi v. United States, 531 U.S. 1170 (2001).
5
Victor Garo, Joseph Salvati’s attorney. Salvati was the first to be
freed by dint of Garo's efforts in 1997.
6
Dan Rea, reporter for CBS4 Television Stations, relentlessly pursued
the cause of Salvati's innocence.
7
Roberta Werner, Greco’s ex-wife, is Administratrix of the Estate of
Louis Greco; Saverio Tameleo, Tameleo’s son, is Administrator of the Estate of
Henry Tameleo.

-7-
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent selection,

supervision, and retention. Their spouses and children have each

brought loss of consortium and bystander intentional infliction

of emotional distress claims as well.8

The federal government has fought hard. The legal doctrines

on which it has relied are important ones. They are doctrines

designed to give law enforcement room to make critical policy

decisions. They are intended to insulate those who bring

information in good faith to the authorities, even if the

information is later disproved. All the FBI did, the government

argued, was exercise their discretion about whom to offer deals,

and how to conduct an investigation. All they did was to present

their cooperating witness to the state authorities who

independently prosecuted the crime. In effect, what they are

saying is that it was the state’s fault -- not theirs -- for not

doing a better job. If the FBI erred at all, it was in not

turning over information exculpatory to the defense -- nothing

more -- and that violation is not actionable under this statute,

the FTCA.

The government’s position is, in a word, absurd. The law

they cite does not apply to the extraordinary facts of this case.

8
The family members who have filed claims are: Olympia Limone, Peter
J. Limone, Jr., Paul Limone, Carolyn Limone Zenga, Janine Limone Arria,
Saverio Tameleo (on his own behalf and as Administrator of the Estate of
Jeannette Tameleo), Marie Salvati, Maria Sidman, Gail Orenberg, Sharon
Salvati, Anthony Salvati, Roberta Werner (on her own behalf and as
Administratrix of the Estate of Louis Greco Jr.), and Edward Greco. See infra
note 193 (discussing the family member claims).

-8-
The issue here is not discretion but abuse, not independent

charging decisions but the framing of four innocent men, not the

failure to produce exculpatory evidence but procuring convictions

by misrepresentation, not letting perjured testimony proceed

uncorrected but facilitating it.

The FBI, and not the state, developed Barboza as a witness,

knowing that his false testimony would be used to prosecute the

plaintiffs for a crime they did not commit. They, and not the

state, kept their conduct from being discovered by failing to

disclose exculpatory evidence, before, during, and after the

trial. They, and not the state, vouched for Barboza to law

enforcement and to the very jury hearing the murder case, even

when all the information they had flatly contradicted his

account.

I begin with the procedural background of the case, which

also serves as a chronology within which to frame my specific

findings. Thereafter, I proceed to the fact findings and the

legal analysis. The evidentiary issues that were reserved during

the course of the bench trial are noted as the evidence is

considered or rejected, as the case may be. Finally, I address

the damages.

In the end I conclude that the defendant is liable to these

men and their families. As to damages, plaintiffs’ loss of

liberty, and, in effect, a lifetime of experiences, is obviously

not compensable. To the extent that damages can approach this

-9-
task, my total award is One Hundred One Million, Seven Hundred

Fifty Thousand, And 00/100 ($101,750,000.00) Dollars. (I address

the individual awards in later sections.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 12, 1965, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Teddy Deegan

was murdered. He was found with six gunshot wounds from at least

three different weapons. See Exhibit ("Exh.") 2070 at 3; Exh. 57

at 26. On October 25, 1967, more than two years later, six men -

- Peter Limone, Henry Tameleo, Joseph Salvati, Louis Greco,

Ronald Cassesso,9 and Roy French -- were indicted for his

murder.10 The ensuing trial -- in which Barboza was the star --

began on May 27, 1968. All the defendants, including the four

plaintiffs before me, were convicted.11 On July 31, 1968, the

death penalty was imposed for Limone, Tameleo, and Greco, but was

9
Ronald Cassesso is also called "Ronald Cassessa" in some of the
documents. I refer to him as Cassesso unless quoting a source that provides
otherwise. See Trial Transcript ("Tr.") vol. 6, 32.
10
Each man faced slightly different charges. French and Greco were
indicted for the murder of Deegan, conspiracy to murder Deegan, and conspiracy
to murder Anthony Stathopoulos Jr., Deegan’s associate. Limone, Tameleo,
Cassesso, and Salvati were indicted as accessories before the fact to the
murder of Deegan, conspiracy to murder Deegan, and conspiracy to murder
Stathopoulos. Barboza was indicted only on the two conspiracy counts. See
Exh. 338, ¶¶ 46-48
11
Greco was found guilty of murder in the first degree, and Limone,
Tameleo and Cassesso were found guilty as accessories before the fact. All
four were also found guilty of conspiracy to murder Deegan and Stathopoulos.
Salvati was found guilty of being an accessory after the fact. French was
found guilty of first degree murder. See Exh. 338 at ¶¶ 50-51.

-10-
subsequently vacated four years later.12 Salvati was sentenced

to life in prison.

Between 1970 and 2001, plaintiffs filed more than a dozen

motions for a new trial. Each time they were denied relief.

They filed a total of seventeen commutation petitions. The first

sixteen were denied. See Exh. 340. Tameleo died in prison in

1985, after serving nearly eighteen years. A decade later, in

1995, Greco died after serving twenty-eight years.

In 1995, certain information about the relationship between

the Boston office of the FBI and two of the most notorious

criminals in Boston history, James J. "Whitey" Bulger and Stephen

J. "The Rifleman" Flemmi, surfaced during proceedings in United

States v. Salemme before now-Chief Judge Mark Wolf.13 On July 3,

1997, as a result of the Salemme disclosures, the deputy attorney

general ordered that attorneys from the Department of Justice’s

Public Integrity Section and Office of Professional

Responsibility, in conjunction with FBI agents, conduct an

12
See Commonwealth v. French, 259 N.E.2d 195 (Mass. 1970), judgments
vacated as to death penalty sub nom., Limone v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 936
(1972).
13
See supra note 4. Stephen Flemmi was a defendant in the Salemme
case. He was accused of racketeering and extortion, among other crimes.
Beginning in 1965, Flemmi served as a very "valuable and valued confidential
informant for the FBI" and was, in return, protected by the FBI in many ways.
Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 148-9. He claimed that his FBI "handlers" had
authorized him to engage in the criminal conduct alleged in Salemme. The
judge, after extensive hearings, and voluminous submissions, concluded that he
was not. However, the hearings, on that issue and others, disclosed the
relationships between killers Stephen Flemmi, James Bulger and the FBI over an
extended period.

-11-
investigation into alleged misconduct in the Boston office of the

FBI. See Exh. 166 at 3 ("Obstruction of Justice Report").

In December of 2000, that investigative effort focused on

Limone’s request for documents pertaining to his case. Special

Assistant U.S. Attorney, John Durham ("Durham") responded with

five FBI memoranda from the 1960s (the "Durham documents").

Durham made clear that the Department of Justice, the United

States Attorney’s Office, the Boston FBI office and FBI

headquarters, "understand the potential significance of the

enclosures" and provided them with the "concurrence and

encouragement of the Boston FBI and FBI headquarters." Exh. 4 at

3.

The best measure of the importance of the Durham documents

was the firestorm they created. The Suffolk County District

Attorney’s office immediately filed a motion to vacate Limone’s

conviction, to grant Limone a new trial, and admit him to bail.

Judge Margaret Hinkle of Suffolk Superior Court ruled that the

Durham documents were material, exculpatory, and cast "real

doubt" on the justice of Limone’s convictions. See Exh. 2 at 16.

The documents had been wrongly kept from the Suffolk County

District Attorney’s Office and obviously, the plaintiffs.

Indeed, Judge Hinkle noted,

[T]he court system responsible for the Deegan

trial now recognize[d] that evidence in the
hands of federal officials was indispensable
to the administration of justice in the
Deegan murder prosecution.

-12-
Exh. 195 at 3-4. In granting a new trial, Judge Hinkle concluded

that there was a substantial likelihood that the jury would have

reached a different conclusion had this evidence been available

at trial.

The Suffolk County District Attorney’s office immediately

agreed and filed nolle prosequis for both Limone and Salvati, the

only plaintiffs still alive.14 It concluded that "it does not

now have a good faith basis -- legally or ethically -- to proceed

with any further prosecution of the defendant." Exh. 3B; Exh.

3D; Exh. 3E.15

In 2001, the United States House of Representatives

Committee on Government Reform ("House Committee") began a

lengthy investigation into FBI misconduct in the Deegan case

resulting in a report titled: "Everything Secret Degenerates:

The FBI’s Use of Murderers as Informants." Exhs. 195-195T.16

14
The cases of Greco and Tameleo were posthumously nolle prossed by the
state several years later. See Exh. 3G; Exh. 3H.
15
Salvati’s sentence had been commuted earlier by Governor William Weld
(February 5, 1997), after he had served twenty-nine years in jail. See Exh.
340, ¶¶ 19-20.
16
The government contested both the admissibility and the weight to be
given to this report. The plaintiffs’ sought to admit it in connection with
the public records exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(8), Fed. R. Evid.,
and on the authority of Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 167-68
(1988)(conclusions of JAG report about the causes of Navy airplane accident
were properly admitted). I admitted the evidence as a public record, see,
e.g., Tr. vol. 3, 72-73, leaving open the question of the weight to be given
it in my final opinion.

I have found that the House Report proceedings were, in some respects,
duplicative of the proceedings before me -- similar evidence, similar
witnesses, similar questions -- but surely not subject to the same evidentiary

-13-
The report was a stinging rebuke of federal law enforcement

officials for tolerating and encouraging false testimony, for

taking "affirmative steps" to ensure that the individuals

convicted would not obtain post-conviction relief and would die

in prison. The Report also concluded that the FBI -- including

"senior staff close to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover" were in

possession of information that "could have led them to the

conclusion that Barboza was committing perjury" and did not

disclose it. Exh. 195 at 4.

On May 16, 2001, Louis J. Freeh, then-Director of the FBI,

said that the Salvati case was

a great travesty, a great failure,

disgraceful to the fact that my agency, or
any other law enforcement agency, contributed
to that. . . . [N]othing worse that can
happen under a system of law is that an
innocent person is either charged, or in this
case punished, for that period of time. It
is a travesty, a disgrace, it shouldn’t
happen. . . .

Exh. 171.

The Limone, Tameleo, and Greco/Werner plaintiffs brought the

instant litigation in May of 2002. Edward Greco followed suit in

rules and standards as is this Court. Indeed, the record I reviewed was
considerably more complete than the record before the House Committee. By the
time of this bench trial, the government had agreed to lift many of the
redactions to the documents.

As such, while I have admitted the Report, and have reviewed it, I have
not adopted its conclusions as my own. To the extent that evidence before the
House -- e.g. sworn testimony of government agents -- was independently
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, I have considered it.

-14-
April of 2003,17 and the Salvati plaintiffs filed their case that

July. All the cases were consolidated before me.18

This case has been litigated for five years and resulted in

two published opinions on motions to dismiss, and an opinion by

the First Circuit Court of Appeals.19

III. FACT FINDINGS

Section A deals with the FBI’s efforts to prosecute La Cosa

Nostra. It sets the stage for the Deegan trial and the instant

accusations in the following ways: The FBI gave extraordinary

priority to infiltrating and prosecuting members of the LCN. So

important was the task that the FBI was willing to enlist killers

to be informants on an ongoing basis, to keep the program so

secret that not only state law enforcement but also other

divisions within the FBI would not have access to it, and to

17
Roberta Werner, as Administratrix of the Estates of Louis Greco and
Louis Greco Jr. filed separately from her son Edward Greco.
18
See docket entries ## 151, 216.
19
Defendant filed two motions to dismiss, resolved in Limone v. United
States ("Limone I"), 271 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D. Mass. 2003) aff’d sub nom.,
Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2004), and Limone v. United States
("Limone II"), 336 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D. Mass. 2004), and a motion for summary
judgment, resolved in open court and through Electronic Orders dated Aug. 18,
2006 and Sept. 11, 2006. Several amended complaints have been filed by the
various plaintiffs. I held that I would allow motions to conform the
pleadings to the evidence at the close of the trial, meaning that I will treat
similarly-situated plaintiffs as bringing uniform claims.

Originally, the plaintiffs sued several federal and state law

enforcement officials in addition to the United States: former FBI agents H.
Paul Rico, Dennis Condon, John Morris, John Connolly, and James Handley,
former Assistant U.S. Attorney and current federal district court judge Edward
F. Harrington; former Boston police officer Frank L. Walsh; and former Chelsea
police officer Robert Renfrew. Those claims are no longer part of this
litigation.

-15-
allow four innocent men to be convicted. Through its illegal

wiretap of Raymond L.S. Patriarca, Sr. ("Patriarca"), the top LCN

boss, and its "Top Echelon Criminal Informant Program" the FBI

received information not only about crimes that had taken place

but those that were about to take place. Indeed, when Barboza

testified at odds with that information in the Deegan case --

notably, inculpating the plaintiffs -- the FBI was no bystander.

It knew that the testimony was false. Its fingerprints were

everywhere.

Section B deals with the period before the Deegan trial --

the role of FBI agents H. Paul Rico and Dennis Condon in the

investigation and their relationship to two "Top Echelon"

informants20 and to Barboza. The agents used the Flemmi brothers

to manipulate Barboza into testifying in the Deegan murder case,

passing information to them for transmission to Barboza. They

even used their conduits to get information from the defense camp

about trial tactics and strategy. When Barboza made it clear

that he would lie about Jimmy Flemmi's involvement in Deegan’s

murder, it did not matter to the FBI. They pressed him to

testify nonetheless.

20
Vincent James "Jimmy" Flemmi ("Jimmy Flemmi") and his brother Stephen
Flemmi ("Stephen Flemmi"). Flemmi has been referred to as "Stephen Flemmi" in
the Salemme case and McIntyre v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D. Mass
2006). The parties refer to him as "Stevie." I will adopt the approach of
the other cases and refer to him as "Stephen Flemmi."

-16-
 Barboza was Rico’s most important witness -- indeed a

nationally renowned witness against the LCN.21 He was the

"poster boy" for the FBI’s new witness protection program, the

linchpin for the Bureau’s and the Boston office’s most important

initiative. Since there was no direct federal jurisdiction over

murder, state prosecutions were an essential part of the FBI’s

agenda. And though Barboza was technically a witness for the

state, the FBI was in complete control of him. They had

constant, direct access -- meeting with him before his grand jury

testimony, between that appearance and the Deegan trial, and

during the Deegan trial -- most of the time with no state

representative present.

From March of 1967 to September of 1967, the FBI debriefed

Barboza about a number of murders, including the Deegan murder.

Not once did he implicate the plaintiffs. Indeed, every piece of

evidence in the FBI's files from the Patriarca wire, through the

information from Top Echelon informants, confirmed the killers as

Barboza, Flemmi, and three others -- not the plaintiffs.

Given the extraordinary information Rico, Condon, and the

FBI hierarchy had, there is no doubt they knew on September 8,

1967, when Barboza excluded Jimmy Flemmi and suddenly included

the plaintiffs in the murder, that he was lying. They knew that

Limone had been overheard warning Deegan that Flemmi wanted to

21
See Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 180.

-17-
kill him. They knew that they had never even heard of Salvati

before Barboza uttered his name. They knew that Greco and

Tameleo had never been linked to this murder.

Still, the FBI persisted, encouraging Barboza to testify,

rewarding him for his efforts. And they vouched for him to the

state authorities, telling them his story "checked out," which

was blatantly false. Without the FBI information, the state

investigation was a charade. In so may words, the FBI said "just

trust us" to the state, and then vouched for a perjurer.

Section C deals with the Deegan murder trial itself. The

state investigation of the Deegan case had stalled. Without

Barboza there was no case. Without the FBI there was no Barboza.

While the state authorities could corroborate information about

the murder -- how it happened, where and when -- Barboza’s

testimony was the only link to the plaintiffs. And his testimony

about the plaintiffs could not be corroborated because it was

false. Only the FBI had the means to prove Barboza's falsity,

and they were not talking. Even when Barboza testified that "the

FBI never promised [him] anything," they stood mute.

The FBI's role at trial went far beyond the failure to share

evidence in their files. They were a formidable presence through

the trial both directly and indirectly. They cultivated,

debriefed and prepared Barboza. They corrected his testimony

only when it was inconsistent with reports the defense was likely

to have or when it made him vulnerable on cross-examination.

-18-
Condon even testified on Barboza's behalf attesting to the

"purity" of Barboza's false testimony. They conferred with and

controlled major prosecution witnesses before they testified

(Anthony Stathopoulos and John Fitzgerald). They advised Suffolk

County Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") Jack Zalkind

("Zalkind") and his staff behind the scenes.

Section D deals with the aftermath -- between the conviction

and the nolle prosequi of the charges. As time passed, the

government should have become more and more concerned about

Barboza’s testimony and his actions afterwards. His threatened

recantation in the Deegan case, the clear evidence that he had

lied about Jimmy Flemmi, his demands upon the government, not to

mention the fact that he murdered again -- this time in

California -- after he was released from prison, should have rung

alarm bells. Instead of investigating Barboza, the government

continued to placate him with money, jobs, and in the most

extraordinary gesture of all, the FBI imprimatur again, this time

testifying on his behalf when he was accused of murdering Clay

Wilson. Rico and Condon, together with Assistant United States

Attorney Edward F. Harrington ("Harrington"), went to California

to vouch for him, just as Condon had done in the Deegan trial --

rather than investigate accusations that he had threatened he

could get "anyone" imprisoned for "anything." And by the 1980s,

the FBI had yet another reason to suspect perjury -- Rico had

-19-
been cited for suborning perjury in state court under

circumstances similar to the Deegan murder trial.

At the same time the FBI was protecting Barboza, ignoring

the warning signs, continuing to protect its Top Echelon

informants, they stood silent as the plaintiffs filed motion

after motion for a new trial, commutation petition after

commutation petition. Worse yet, the FBI hinted -- without basis

-- at Greco’s continued involvement in organized crime, or

Salvati’s fraternization with an offender.

Over thirty years after their conviction, Salvati and Limone

were finally freed, the charges against them nolle prossed,

thanks to the information disclosed in Salemme and the

investigations it generated. Tameleo and Greco were not so

fortunate.

A. The FBI Program to "Get" La Cosa Nostra

In the early 1960s, the FBI focused its energy on

prosecuting organized crime in the United States. See Exh. 7;

Exh. 8B; Exh. 9. That focus meant zeroing in on Raymond

Patriarca, the reputed head of organized crime in New England.22

22
In February 1961, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy sent a list of
top echelon racketeers to the Commissioner of the IRS for targeting.
Patriarca was the only individual on the list with his base of operations in
New England. See Exh. 7. The FBI Director wrote to the Special Agent in
Charge ("SAC") of the Boston office on March 12, 1962, emphasizing the
priority of the program -- "[t]his case is to continue to receive full time
attention and every effort must be made on a daily basis to develop any
criminal violation which Patriarca is committing or has committed with [sic[
any relevant statute of limitations period." Exh. 10.

-20-
 Two critical parts of the program were an illegal wiretap at

Patriarca’s office and the so-called Top Echelon Criminal

Informant Program.

1. Patriarca Wire

On March 6, 1962, the FBI installed electronic surveillance

without a warrant at Patriarca’s office in Providence, Rhode

Island. FBI agents monitored the Patriarca wiretap, transcribing

conversations, typing up any important information, and creating

highlighted summaries that were transmitted regularly to

Washington via "airtels."23 Each day, Special Agents at the

Providence and Boston offices would send the tape recording from

the wire, along with the log created by the agents, to Special

Agent ("SA") John J. Kehoe Jr. ("Kehoe") in Boston.

Kehoe was the Supervisor of the Organized Crime Squad in the

Boston office from 1962 to 1971. See Exh. 193A at 29; Exh. 341.24

Boston agents could access the airtel information by requesting

it from Kehoe. And, given their significant roles in the effort

against the LCN, Condon and Rico had regular access.

23
An airtel is an inter-FBI teletype sent by air mail between local FBI
offices and headquarters in Washington, D.C. See United States v.
Taglianetti, 274 F. Supp. 220, 223 (D.R.I. 1967) (describing the history of
that surveillance); Exh. 339.
24
During the relevant period, Rico and Condon were special agents in
the Boston office, assigned to the Organized Crime Squad. Kehoe was their
immediate supervisor (Supervisory Special Agent) from 1962 to 1971. James L.
Handley ("Handley") was the Special Agent in Charge ("SAC") of the Boston
office from 1964 to 1973. See Exh. 341.

-21-
 The FBI made every effort to keep the fact of the wire

confidential, even within the agency. The Patriarca wiretap was

given the informant identification number BS 837 C*. See Exh.

12; Exh. 13; Exh. 339. FBI reports describing conversations

heard on the wire referred to it as if it were a human source, an

informant just like any other.

As described infra, in the course of their monitoring, the

FBI overheard information about the Deegan murder on this wire

before its commission -- confirmed by Top Echelon informant

reports after its commission -- information which flatly

contradicted Barboza’s account at the Deegan trial.

2. "Top Echelon Criminal Informant Program"

In addition to the Patriarca wire, the FBI’s heightened

efforts to penetrate and dismantle organized crime included the

development of the Top Echelon Criminal Informant Program,

officially inaugurated by J. Edgar Hoover on June 21, 1961.25

Three aspects of the program are significant: First, the

informants involved were to be important enough organized crime

25
Hoover described the program in a signed memorandum: "To insure that
the Bureau meets its responsibilities in connection with the Criminal
Intelligence Program, it is mandatory that the development of quality criminal
informants be emphasized and the existing program be implemented and greatly
expanded." Exh. 8B at 3.

The Boston office was not among the eleven offices originally required
to participate in the program as of June 1961. See Exh. 8B. However, Hoover
also stated, "[e]very office is being advised of this program since in the
future it may be appropriate to expand it to include additional offices."
Exh. 8B at 8. Massachusetts soon became part of that expansion. SA Rico was
assigned exclusively to the development of the Top Echelon Informant Program.
Condon was his partner. See supra Section III.B.1.

-22-
figures that they would be able to provide high-level information

on a major scale. See Exh. 193 at 56. (The corollary --

apparently acceptable to the FBI -- was that these informants

might well continue to commit serious crimes.) Second, these

were not merely witnesses getting deals for episodic appearances

in court. Their relationship with the FBI was supposed to be a

lasting one, providing information on a continuing, long-range

basis.26 Third, the program was strictly confidential -- which

not only meant that its existence would be kept secret from the

general public and other divisions within the federal government,

but also from state law enforcement agencies.27 Even when

disseminating particular facts to other agencies, as they did

from time to time, agents were to take special care to paraphrase

the information so that the informants’ identities would not be

disclosed. See Exh. 11.28

26
"Informants of this type should be developed not only to obtain new
cases for prosecution but for utilization on a long range basis in order to
provide continuous intelligence information concerning organized crime." Exh.
8A.
27
No dissemination of information could be made unless the informant
was "fully protected." See Exh. 8B at 8.
28
Exhibit 11, a letter from Washington to the FBI SACs, dated April 10,
1962, noted:

It is mandatory that our highly confidential

informants and techniques are afforded complete
protection at all times. . . . It is of paramount
importance in preparing material which is disseminated
to other agencies that meticulous care be taken to
afford these informants maximum protection by
appropriately paraphrasing the material contained
therein.

Indeed, that policy continued to the present, and affected the very

-23-
 3. Significance of (1) and (2)

The Top Echelon Criminal Informant Program, together with

the Patriarca wire, gave the agency extraordinary information.

This was not just any old tip related by unnamed informants on an

ad hoc basis. This was information heard or overheard from the

horse’s mouth.29 As such, the FBI's intelligence about the Deegan

murder -- both before and after it occurred -- was unusually

good.

The risks, however, were obvious. Since there was no

federal jurisdiction over murder, no federal racketeering

statute,30 the FBI was obliged to work through local law

enforcement, with whom it could not -- or would not -- share

critical information, lest the information disclose its unique

sources and jeopardize their programs. The result should have

been predictable: A state prosecution based on the testimony of

a witness that was plainly contradicted by the secret information

in the FBI’s files.

trial of this case. The attorneys representing the government were not
permitted access to unredacted documents even though they were obliged to
certify that all relevant information had been turned over under Rule 26, Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. That charade ended when I ordered that lawyers with an
appearance in this case had to have access to all of the information in
unredacted form. See Tr. vol. 5, 11.
29
Condon described it as the "most informative microphone coverage . .
. up to that date, and not only on a local basis, but on a national basis."
Exh. 193A at 19.
30
The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")
was not passed until 1970. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (Oct. 1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.).

-24-
 B. The Boston FBI, the Flemmi Brothers and Barboza

1. Agents Rico and Condon

Rico was in the FBI from February 26, 1951, to May 27, 1975.

He worked in the Boston office from 1962 until he was transferred

to Miami, Florida, in April of 1970, partly as a reward for his

work on the Deegan prosecution. In 1963, Rico was assigned

exclusively to the development of Top Echelon informants.

See Exh. 51C. He clearly had access to the files generated by

both initiatives. Reviewing those files was part of his job.

Condon was in the FBI from January 29, 1951, to May 20,

1977. He was assigned to the Boston office on April 26, 1952,

and to the Organized Crime Squad in 1962. As such, he too had

access to the case files in the Boston FBI office relating to

organized crime, including the Patriarca wire and the Top Echelon

Informant Program. See Exh. 193A at 28, 30-31.

Agents Rico and Condon worked closely together from 1966 to

Rico’s transfer in 1970. They were "partners," staying in touch

even after Rico moved to Miami. See Exh. 170 at 205; Exh. 192 at

176.

By the time of the instant trial, Rico had died; Condon was

unable to appear. Nevertheless, plaintiffs introduced Rico's and

Condon’s testimony before the House Committee, Rico’s testimony

-25-
before Judge Wolf in Salemme, and Condon’s deposition.31 While I

31
The government objected to the admission of this testimony as
hearsay, arguing that, since Rico and Condon were no longer agents of the
government at the time of their testimony, their statements were not
admissions under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D)

In fact, these statements are admissible under multiple theories.

Rico’s testimony in the Salemme trial is admissible under Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(1), which excepts former trial testimony from the hearsay rule as long
as the party against which it is offered had the opportunity and motive to
cross-examine the declarant at the time of the testimony. The government was
a party in Salemme. Rico’s testimony exposed the government to liability; the
government’s motive and opportunity to cross-examine then and in the instant
case are similar, if not identical.

With respect to the House Committee testimony, the agents’ employment

status at the time of testimony is irrelevant because I do not admit them as
vicarious admissions, but as first-hand party admissions under Rule
801(d)(2)(A). Were it not for the operation of the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2679(b)(1), which converts suits against individual agents into suits against
the United States, Rico and Condon themselves would be the defendants; their
testimony would clearly be admissible as admissions. The FTCA puts the
government in the shoes of the agent. See Landham v. Taylor, 68 Fed. Appx.
608, 609-10 (6th Cir. 2003); Knowles v. United States, 91 F.3d 1147, 1150 (8th
Cir. 1996). This must be so not only for liability purposes but evidentiary
purposes as well. The Westfall Act was to "avoid[] 'exposure' to 'personal
liability' in order to 'prevent a substantial diminution in the vigor of
Federal law enforcement and implementation,'" Wood v. United States, 995 F.2d
1122, 1126 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
3, as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5947), not to privilege otherwise-
admissible evidence. To be sure, defendant protests that this subjects the
government to the admissions of former employees decades after the end of any
government service. But it is the Westfall Act itself that creates this bond,
and is the reason the government stands before this Court, despite the fact
that these individual tortfeasors ended their employment decades ago.

Further, I find that the testimony is admissible under the residual

hearsay exception, Fed. R. Evid. 807, which provides for the admissibility of
hearsay that is not covered under Rules 803 or 804 but has "equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." The statements have been
offered for their truth, they are more probative on the point for which they
are offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts, and that admission is in keeping with the purposes of the
rules of evidence. While it is undisputed that defendant was given notice in
advance of the trial that plaintiffs intended to offer the testimony into
evidence, as required under Rule 807, defendant objects because it was not
told that the evidence would be offered under an 807 theory per se. Parties
are entitled only to notice that evidence will be offered; they do not need to
be told all of the possible theories that the evidence may be admitted under.
See Piva v. Xerox Corp., 654 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 489 (5th Cir. 1978).

To the extent that Rico’s and Condon’s statements are used not to
establish the truth of their statements, but to show their knowledge of or
belief in what they testified to, they are obviously not hearsay at all. Fed.

-26-
was not able to see these witnesses, I was able to evaluate their

testimony in the light of the documents they generated or other

documents to which they had access.

As described below, Rico's and Condon’s accounts of what

they knew and when they knew it are resoundingly contradicted by

the record, a fact which has had a serious impact on the

government’s defenses. I find that both men lied in fundamental

ways about their relationships with the Flemmi brothers and

Barboza, about the information they had concerning the Deegan

murder at the time of the trial, and their actions afterwards.

2. The Flemmi Brothers

Jimmy and Stephen Flemmi were career criminals who served as

Top Echelon informants. Both continued to commit crimes well

after they became informants. In fact, Jimmy Flemmi was one of

the Deegan co-conspirators, as the FBI well knew.

Stephen Flemmi was close to his brother Jimmy; Jimmy, in

turn, was close to Barboza. The FBI used the relationships among

the three to get Barboza to testify, and turned a blind eye when

Barboza covered up Jimmy Flemmi's participation in the Deegan

murder. Indeed, the agents were praised and promoted for their

"ingenuity" in manipulating these men. See infra Section

III.D.1.

a. Jimmy Flemmi

R. Evid. 801(c); see, e.g., Ramirez Rodriguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms.,

Inc., 425 F.3d 67, 76-77 (1st Cir. 2005).

-27-
 Before designating Jimmy Flemmi as a Top Echelon informant,

see Exh. 19A, the FBI -- and in particular, agent Condon -- had

collected extensive information about his criminal activities,

which included a series of murders. See Exh. 38. From the

Patriarca wire, they even had information that he was about to

participate in the Deegan murder.32

Despite the information about Jimmy Flemmi’s murderous

activities, the FBI targeted him for the Top Echelon program

three days before the Deegan murder. Indeed, on the very day of

the Deegan murder, March 12, 1965, Jimmy Flemmi was assigned to

32
For example, the following facts were reported to the FBI:

May 22, 1964: Condon learned from an informant that Jimmy Flemmi told
him "all [Flemmi] wants to do is kill people, and that it is better than
hitting banks." That same month a letter from the Boston office to the
Director indicated that an informant reported Jimmy Flemmi would probably
become the "contract man" in the Boston area.

June 1964: A confidential informant told Condon that Flemmi had

volunteered to help with any "hits" the informant wanted to make.

August 1964: An informant reported to Condon a conversation he had had

with Barboza. Barboza told him he had heard that Flemmi had killed a man and
cut off his head; when Barboza approached Flemmi with the information, Flemmi
replied that he had heard the same about Barboza.

October 1964: An informant reported that Jimmy Flemmi wanted to be the

"best hit man" and had committed several murders. Indeed, Jimmy Flemmi was a
suspect in a December 1964 murder.

February 23, 1965: An informant reported to Condon that Flemmi had

killed several people.

This information was included in memoranda written by Condon prior to

Jimmy Flemmi’s designation and in the correlator report on Jimmy Flemmi
generated on April 22, 1965. See Exh. 38.

A "correlator report" is an FBI report prepared by a "correlator" who

reviews all of the files in the Boston office, retrieves the information
concerning a certain subject, and places it into a single document -- the
correlator report. See Exh. 339, ¶ A2.

-28-
Agent Rico as a Top Echelon informant. See Exh. 19A; Exh. 19B;

Exh. 44. Even after designating Jimmy Flemmi for participation

in the initiative, the FBI continued to receive information about

his penchant for killing.33

Flemmi’s designation as an informant was reviewed at the

highest level of the FBI. On June 4, 1965, the FBI Director

asked the Boston SAC for information on the status of Flemmi's

designation in the program. See Exh. 41. The Boston SAC’s

response was telling: He noted that Rico, based on information

from other informants and sources, believed Jimmy Flemmi had

murdered six named individuals, including Edward "Teddy" Deegan.34

The memorandum added that "from all indications, he is going to

continue to commit murder." Exh. 43 at 3. The SAC nevertheless

recommended Flemmi’s continued use by the FBI.

Jimmy Flemmi's victims did not matter to the FBI. All that

mattered was that Flemmi "has been in contact with RAYMOND L.S.

PATRIARCA and other members of La Cosa Nostra" and therefore

"potentially could be an excellent informant." The SAC concluded

33
A March 10, 1965, airtel sent to the Director indicated that Gennaro
Angiulo, known to be a high ranking member of the LCN, told Patriarca that
Flemmi and Barboza had killed Jackie Francione. Angiulo told Flemmi that
Patriarca did not think Flemmi used "sufficient common sense when it came to
killing people." Exh. 20 at 5; Exh. 38 at 8; Exh. 4 at 17. A March 19, 1965,
memorandum from the Boston SAC to the Director reflected an informant’s
account that Barboza and Flemmi had gotten the "ok" from Frank Smith to kill
Francione. See Exh. 31 at 2; Exh. 4 at 8. On May 10, 1965, Flemmi told Rico
that he had been in a shootout with Jimmy O’Toole and Stevie Hughes. See Exh.
40C.
34
The list also included Frank Benjamin, John Murray, George Ashe,
Joseph Francione, "Iggy" Lowry, and a fellow inmate at MCI Walpole.

-29-
that Flemmi’s "potential outweighed the risks involved." Exh. 43

at 3.

On September 16, 1965, Jimmy Flemmi was "closed" as a Top

Echelon informant because he had become a fugitive, and as such,

"any contacts with him might prove to be difficult and

embarrassing." Exh. 49. Jimmy Flemmi died on October 16, 1979.

See Exh. 338, ¶ 55.

Information about Jimmy Flemmi’s relationship with the FBI

did not surface until the Durham documents were disclosed.

Indeed, the stonewalling continued in this litigation: Rico,

whose name and signatures are all over the Jimmy Flemmi

documents, see, e.g., Exh. 38, Exh. 19A, Exh. 19B, Exh. 44, lied

about his relationship with Flemmi. He denied working with, much

less opening, Jimmy Flemmi as an informant. See Exh. 170 at 169,

221. Condon, he insisted, may have been the one to open Jimmy

Flemmi. See Exh. 170 at 159. Condon, however, denied any

relationship with Jimmy Flemmi as well. See Exh. 193B at 26.

b. Stephen Flemmi

On November 3, 1965, the Boston SAC sent a report (drafted

by Rico) to the Director targeting Stephen Flemmi as a Top

Echelon informant -- two months after his brother was closed.

See Exh. 50B.35 Stephen Flemmi was assigned to Rico, see Exh. 166

at 17, with Condon as his alternate handler (in accordance with

35
His final designation as a Top Echelon informant was made in a report
from Boston to the Director on February 8, 1967. See Exh. 61B.

-30-
FBI policy that two agents be in a position to contact each

criminal informant). See Exh. 304; Exh. 192 at 176; Exh. 177 at

49; Exh. 188 at 17.36

Rico vouched for Stephen Flemmi’s information to his

superiors because Stephen Flemmi had direct access to Patriarca,

as well as LCN bosses Gennaro "Jerry" Angiulo ("Angiulo") and

Larry Baione ("Baione").37 See Exh. 167A at 44-45, 50-54, 72;

Exh. 167B at 67-68. As with Jimmy, those contacts trumped

Stephen Flemmi’s illegal and even murderous activities --

bookmaking, shylocking, robberies and "possibly" gangland

slayings. See Exh. 61B.38

Again, secrecy was preeminent: Flemmi "was to provide

information only to this Bureau. . . ." Exh. 304. He was not

even available "to other field divisions." Exh. 61B. Nor was

Rico to ever disclose Stephen Flemmi’s crimes to any state

prosecutors. See Exh. 192 at 165.

Stephen Flemmi was rewarded not only with money, see Exh.

67, but, according to Flemmi, agent Rico and others39 promised him

36
Stephen Flemmi was given the informant symbol number "B-955-C-TE."
See Tr. vol. 8, 87.
37
Baione was also known as Illario Zannino. See Salemme, 191 F. Supp.
2d at 141.
38
Stephen Flemmi was reported to be the "leader of the group formerly
headed by EDWARD "WIMPY" BENNETT, who, according to informants, had been
murdered and buried around 1/19/67." Exh. 61B.
39
John Connolly ("Connolly"), John Morris ("Morris"), and James Ring
("Ring"). Connolly was Stephen Flemmi’s handler from 1980 to 1990. See Exh.
166 at 14-15. Morris was the supervisor of the Boston Organized Crime Squad

-31-
that he would be protected from prosecution for his crimes. See

Exh. 189 at 62-63; Exh. 192 at 157.40 Flemmi testified (in the

McIntyre case) that in 1969 Rico tipped him off that he was about

to be indicted for the attempted murder of Barboza’s attorney,

John Fitzgerald ("Fitzgerald"),41 and the murders of two others,

giving Flemmi a chance to flee before the indictments came down.

See Exh. 189 at 71-72. Flemmi further testified that even while

he was "on the lam," he was in regular contact with Rico, who

advised him not to return until 1974. Flemmi returned, was

arrested, and released on bail approximately one week later,

notwithstanding the fact that he had been a fugitive. Within six

months, all charges were dropped. See Exh. 189 at 75-76, 78.

While Rico denied Flemmi’s accusations,42 I (like the other

judges before me) wholly reject Rico’s account as not credible.43

from December 1977 to January 1983 and served as Flemmi’s alternate handler.
See Exh. 188 at 15, 16, 17, 22. Ring was supervisor of the squad after Morris
from 1983 to 1989. See Exh. 188 at 40-41.
40
This allegation was critical to the hearings before Judge Wolf in the
Salemme case and Judge Lindsay in the McIntyre case. See infra notes 4, 13.

41
See infra note 109.
42
See Exh. 167B at 97-99. Nevertheless, Judge Lindsay credited
Flemmi’s testimony to this effect, based on Flemmi’s testimony and on the
parties' agreed statement of facts, filed in United States v. Flemmi, CR.
99-10371 (Oct. 14, 2003), Exh. 182-3. The statement noted, "This corruption
[of federal, state and local law enforcement officers]. . . allowed [Stephen
Flemmi and other members of the Winter Hill Gang] to evade detection and avoid
prosecution for decades. See McIntyre v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 2d 54,
62 n. 9, 66. See also Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 111, 112 n. 30 ("The
government does not dispute the court’s findings that Rico told Flemmi of the
forthcoming indictments so that he could flee."), 121.
43
I also find Condon’s testimony concerning Stephen Flemmi to be wholly
incredible. He testified that he was not aware in November 1965 that Stephen
Flemmi was an FBI informant. See Exh. 193A at 72, Exh. 304. Nor did he know

-32-
Flemmi did in fact escape prosecution for these charges under

circumstances that can only be explained by his extraordinary

access to FBI agents, and in particular to Rico. See Exh. 192 at

157.44

3. Using the Flemmi Brothers to Turn Barboza into a

Witness

In November of 1966, Rico focused on turning career criminal

Joseph Barboza into a cooperating witness against the LCN.

See Exh. 167A at 50-51, 72-73.45 Indeed, Barboza was the most

important witness Rico had ever developed, see Exh. 167A at 87,

one for whom he and Condon would receive praise, promotions, and

raises. See infra Section III.D.1. Barboza’s unquestioned

that Stephen Flemmi was approved as a Top Echelon informant. See Exh. 193A at
77. He claimed that he did not learn of Stephen Flemmi’s status until the
Salemme hearings. See Exh. 193 at 77.

Condon was Stephen Flemmi’s alternate handler. Condon’s denial that he

knew of Stephen Flemmi’s status and that Rico, his partner, never shared
information about Flemmi, see Exh. 193B at 79-80, rings hollow. Moreover,
both Rico and Condon were given high praise precisely for their role in
developing Stephen Flemmi as an informant, see Exh. 51C at 2-3, and for using
Flemmi to develop Barboza as a cooperating witness. See Exh. 51D at 1-2;
infra Section III.D.1.
44
Flemmi’s relationship with his FBI handlers in fact continued until
1990. While Stephen Flemmi was terminated as a Top Echelon informant on
September 15, 1969, when indictments were pending against him, see Exh. 166 at
14, Exh. 192 at 86, he was reopened in 1980. His new handler was Agent John
Connolly. See Exh. 166 at 14. In fact, Exhibit 166, the inquiry conducted by
the Office of Professional Responsibility of the DOJ described above, reports
that Stephen Flemmi’s status as an informant was reopened on September 12,
1980, closed again on September 23, 1982, because of investigations into two
murders, reopened on July 10, 1986, and finally closed on December 3, 1990,
because of Connolly’s retirement. See Exh. 166 at 14-15.
45
In effect, the only reason why Barboza was not a "Top Echelon
informant" was because he had limited ability to access other LCN members. He
was imprisoned on one charge, awaiting trial on two others. See Exh. 72. He
was considered for designation years later when he was released from prison.
See Exh. 114.

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importance to Rico makes especially suspect Rico’s statements --

before the House Committee and before Judge Wolf -- in which he

claimed not to remember critical details of reports he authored,

initialed, or to which he had access. See Exh. 170 at 169, 188.

Based on information Rico had received from Stephen Flemmi -

- namely, that the LCN had murdered several of Barboza’s

associates, and was threatening to kill more -- Rico believed he

had leverage to get Barboza to cooperate against Patriarca.46 See

Exh. 59. Over the next year, Rico and Condon worked relentlessly

to turn Barboza into a witness in several cases, Deegan among

them. See Exh. 59, Exh. 167A at 72-75, Exh. 51C at 2-3; Exh.

51D.

Stephen Flemmi was in close contact with his brother who,

for a time, was in the same prison as Barboza.47 Rico thus had a

conduit through which to send information to Barboza and receive

information on Barboza’s activities. In effect, it enabled the

46
In his testimony before Judge Wolf, Rico agreed that he used the
information from sources to persuade Barboza to be a witness but denied that
he told Barboza that Patriarca was going to "take out" his compatriots. See
Exh. 167A at 78. His statement contradicts the record. Rico agreed that he
received information from Stephen Flemmi about threats to Barboza’s crew from
Patriarca, see Exh. 59, and that as a result of receiving that information, he
became interested in converting Barboza as a witness. See Exh. 167A at 50-52,
72. Rico also admitted that he would meet with Stephen Flemmi one day, Flemmi
would visit his brother Jimmy, and the next day the agents "received
information from Mr. Barboza about the very topic that you were discussing
with (Stephen) Flemmi." Exh. 167B at 79, 83; see also, Exh. 76 (FBI telling
Stephen Flemmi to see his brother and report on the "Italian element"
threats).
47
The FBI knew Stephen Flemmi was close to his brother, see Exh. 282 at
2, Exh. 86, Exh. 38 at 4, Exh. 37, and as such, would work hard to make
certain that Barboza would never implicate Jimmy in the Deegan murder. See
Exh. 86. Their efforts worked.

-34-
FBI to affect Barboza’s testimony long before they ever met

directly with him. See Exh. 167B at 79-81, 83.

Stephen Flemmi was a significant source of information about

his brother, the LCN, and Barboza. The state authorities

prosecuting the Deegan murder knew nothing about the Flemmi

brothers’ relationship to the FBI.

4. Rico and Condon Meet with Barboza

The FBI meetings with Barboza beginning in March of 1967

must be put in context.

First, the sheer number: Rico and Condon met with Barboza

more than thirty times between March of 1967 and his grand jury

testimony on October 25, 1967, and then another twenty-six times

before the start of Barboza’s testimony in the Deegan trial.48 At

most of those meetings, no Suffolk County officials were present.

The FBI met virtually weekly with Barboza, sometimes debriefing

him, sometimes "just checking in." See, e.g., Exh. 71A; Exh.

71B-28; Exh. 71B-31. State debriefings of Barboza were attached

to FBI memoranda from September 1967 through the trial. See,

e.g., Exh. 71A-1; Exh. 71B-54.

Second, the content: Between March 1967 and September 1967,

Barboza never mentioned the plaintiffs as having participated in

48
This figure is based on the recorded meetings entered into evidence.
There may well have been more in connection with meetings with other
witnesses. See infra, Section III.C.2 (FBI arranging meetings between Barboza
and other prosecution witnesses). The FBI also continued to meet with Barboza
during the course of the trial. See, e.g., Exh. 71B-57; Exh. 71B-58.

-35-
the Deegan murder. Indeed, the plaintiffs had never been

mentioned in any of the documents Rico and Condon had about the

crime. It is fair to say that every piece of evidence in the

FBI’s considerable files on Deegan pointed to other perpetrators.

The meetings between Rico, Condon and Barboza described

below, are divided between those before September 1967 when he

first mentioned plaintiffs, and those afterwards (and before the

Deegan trial).

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 a. Meetings Before September 1967

(1) March 8, 1967

Rico and Condon interviewed Barboza for the first time on

March 8, 1967.49 They assured him that what he divulged would

remain in confidence. Barboza’s value as a witness was obvious

from the outset. Rico and Condon reported to their supervisors

that Barboza said he "knows what has happened in practically

every [Gangland] murder that has been committed in this area."

Exh. 71B-1.

And from the outset, Barboza imposed an extraordinary

condition on the content of his testimony: "He said that he

would never provide information that would allow JAMES VINCENT

FLEMMI to ‘fry’ but that he will consider furnishing information

on these murders." Exh. 71B-1.50 By "fry," Condon understood

49
This was documented in a March 10, 1967, FBI 302, Exh. 71B-1. A 302
is an FBI form used for reporting an interview with a potential witness or
suspect or to record other actions taken by or observations of an agent. See
Exh. 339, ¶ 4. Exhibit 71B includes notes from a series of FBI interviews
with Barboza from March 8, 1967, to October 14, 1968.
50
The defense seeks to introduce this statement by Barboza for the
truth of the matter stated -- as a statement of Barboza’s state of mind and
admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(3), and Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892). This Rule establishes a hearsay exception for
statements of the declarant’s "then existing state of mind, emotion,
sensation, or physical condition," as well as statements about conditions such
as the declarant’s "intent, plan . . . design." 5-803 Jack Weinstein,
Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 803.05 (2d ed. 1987). The question in Hillmon
was the identification of a dead body as belonging to the insured, Hillmon.
The insurance companies maintained that the body was not Hillmon, but a man
named Walters who had disappeared at the same time. They offered in evidence
letters from Walters indicating that he intended to leave with "a certain Mr.
Hillmon." The Court held that the letters should have been admitted to show
that before Walters left, he had the intention of going with Hillmon, which
made it more probable that he indeed did go with Hillmon.

In the instant case, I agree that Barboza’s statement of intent is

-37-
that Barboza would not implicate Jimmy Flemmi in any capital

crimes. See Exh. 193A at 54. Rico had a broader interpretation,

understanding Barboza to mean that he would not say anything

"harmful" to Jimmy Flemmi. See Exh. 170 at 220.

Significantly, the agents knew that Flemmi had been involved

in multiple murders, including the Deegan murder, see Exh. 38,

but asked no follow-up questions. See Exh. 193A at 54-56; Exh.

193B at 95, Exh. 229.51 There is no question that they and their

superiors fully understood that Barboza would be supplying at

best, incomplete, and at worst, false information. They neverthe-

less pressured him to become a witness for the government.

(2) March 21, 1967

Before their second meeting, Rico requested that a new

Barboza Correlator Report be generated, and he reviewed the old

one. The reports revealed what Rico likely already knew -- that

the wire had captured Barboza and Jimmy Flemmi seeking

admissible, that it is relevant, and indeed, that it is worth considerable

weight. Evidence before and after the Deegan murder pointed to Jimmy Flemmi’s
participation, yet Barboza -- true to his statement of intention -- refused to
testify against his friend.

Whether or not this statement is admitted for the truth of the matter --
that Barboza in fact intended not to incriminate Flemmi -- it is clear that
the agents had notice of it (a non-hearsay purpose) at the time when all
evidence pointed to Jimmy Flemmi’s participation. The agents clearly
understood that Barboza’s comments meant that he would not implicate Jimmy
Flemmi.
51
When asked by the House Committee why he did not ask Barboza if
Flemmi was involved, Rico responded: "Well, he'd already said he will not tell
us right? . . . He already said that he would not give us anything that would
be harmful to Jimmy Flemmi." Exh. 170 at 220.

-38-
Patriarca's permission to murder Teddy Deegan on March 9, 1965.

See Exh. 45 at 3.52

At the March 21, 1967, meeting with Rico and Condon, Barboza

acknowledged colluding with Jimmy Flemmi, telling him about the

FBI’s overtures and even discussing who might testify about what.

See Exh. 72 at 2.53 While Barboza was not ready to testify,54 he

was more eager to provide information to the FBI than he had been

before. He was now convinced that the "Italian Organization" was

their common enemy. See Exh. 72 at 2. The agents’ plan was

working. Barboza was parroting to them the information they had

planted with Stephen Flemmi for transmittal to his brother and

then Barboza. See Exh. 167B at 79-81, 83.

Barboza furnished information about various crimes including

the Deegan murder, and as promised, never mentioned Jimmy Flemmi:

The supposed motive for Deegan's murder was that he had been

causing problems at the Ebb Tide nightclub in Revere,

Massachusetts, and that Deegan was looking for an excuse to kill

52
The March 20, 1967 Barboza Correlator Report compiled all FBI reports
and information on Barboza gathered since the last correlator was generated on
June 14, 1965. See Exh. 73. Rico reviewed them both. See Exh. 45 (Rico’s
signature appears on the lower right-hand corner of the first page, indicating
that he received the report on March 20, 1967). See supra note 32 for the
definition of "Correlator Report."
53
The two talked about Barboza's plan to get the co-defendant in his
pending gun charge to testify in two murders. Jimmy Flemmi approved. See
Exh. 72 at 2.
54
"If I ever testified, you people would have to find me an island and
make a fortress out of it." Exh. 71B-2 at 12. As it turned out, the FBI was
up for the challenge. See infra, Sections III.D.3, III.D.6.

-39-
Bobby Donati, a friend of Rico Sacrimone.55 See Exh. 71B-2 at 8;

Exh. 72 at 4. The target of the "hit" was not only Deegan, but

also Anthony Stathopoulos Jr. ("Stathopoulos"), a friend of

Deegan’s. One of the men responsible approached Stathopoulos

carrying "a .375 magnum and wearing a bullet-proof vest, but

STATHOPOULOS was able to take off and get out of the area." Exh.

72 at 4. Barboza did not tell Rico and Condon who that was, and

true to form, the agents did not ask. See Exh. 193A at 86.

The Director's interest in Barboza was so great, the Boston

office sent a teletype to Washington at 11:04 p.m. advising him

of Barboza’s interview and their as yet unsuccessful efforts to

obtain his testimony. See Exh. 74.56

(3) April 11, 1967

On April 11, 1967, Rico instructed Stephen Flemmi to

reiterate the "Italian element’s" threats to Barboza at his visit

with his brother the next day.57 Two days later, Barboza repeated

55
Sacrimone and Donati were two other organized crime figures.
56
The interview on March 21, 1967, began at 7:30 a.m. and ended at 3:30
p.m. Barboza was put in front of the grand jury between 2:00 p.m. and 2:15
p.m. and invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. An
airtel was sent on March 28, 1967, with a detailed description of the March 21
interview. See Exh. 72. In that airtel, Rico and Condon detail Barboza’s
conversation with Jimmy Flemmi about Barboza’s possible cooperation with the
FBI. See Exh. 72. The agents did not record that information in the 302
documenting that same interview. See Exh. 71B-2.
57
Rico instructed Stephen Flemmi to "tell JIMMY that the Italian
element is still trying to work against JOE BARBOZA and JERRY ANGIULO is
trying to use his connections to see that BARBOZA gets ‘buried through the
Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office.’" Exh. 76 at 1-2. See also Exh.
167B at 79-81.

-40-
what he had been fed by the Flemmi brothers to Rico and Condon.

See Exh. 76.58

(4) April 27, 1967

On April 27, Barboza talked about the Deegan murder again,

indicating that he had "heard" a police officer had left the door

open to a building in Chelsea, and that Deegan believed he was

going to be involved in a burglary. See Exh. 71B-4 at 2.

(5) May 22, 1967

By May 22, 1967, Barboza sent word through his attorney,

John Fitzgerald, to individuals he identified as LCN members59

that he was cooperating with the FBI. See Exh. 71B-12. He did

not discuss the Deegan murder further until the end of July 1967,

but offered the FBI information about other crimes. See Exhs.

71B-5 - 71B-17.60

58
During this interview, he also discussed the attempted murder of
Willie Marfeo ("Marfeo").
59
Barboza mentioned Patriarca, Henry Tameleo, Gennaro Angiulo, Peter
Limone, and Larry Baione, among others.
60
Barboza would ultimately testify in two other cases -- one state, one
federal -- in addition to the Deegan trial. The first, a state case, involved
the murder of prizefighter Rocco DiSiglio ("DiSiglio trial"). Gennaro Angiulo
and three others were acquitted. The second, United States v. Patriarca,
("federal Marfeo trial" or "Marfeo case") involved conspiracy to murder Marfeo
and unlawful gambling, resulted in the conviction of Patriarca, Tameleo and
Cassesso. They were sentenced to five years. Exh. 2338 at 105. The Deegan
trial was the last of the three.

In August 1967, after Rico testified before a Suffolk County grand jury
about his conversations with Barboza concerning the DiSiglio murder, the
Boston SAC sent an urgent teletype to the Director at 1:03 a.m. As with the
Deegan case, see infra Section III.D.1, the FBI’s responsibility for this
prosecution was clear: The SAC noted that Suffolk County District Attorney
Garret Byrne commented that this "TREMENDOUS PENETRATION INTO THE LCN AND THE
HOODLUM ELEMNET [sic] WAS EFFECTED THROUGH THE OUTSTANDING INVESTIGATIVE
EFFORTS OF THE FBI AND HIS OFFICE." Exh. 91. The SAC added, "THIS ENTIRE

-41-
 As with the Flemmis, Barboza’s importance as a witness

eclipsed the fact that he was a "professional assassin" and was

"acknowledged by all professional law enforcement representatives

in this area to be the most dangerous individual known." Exh.

51C at 2.61

(6) Summer of 1967

After the FBI turned Barboza into a cooperating witness,

pumping him for information for over four months, communicating

threats to him by the "Italian element," ingratiating themselves

to him, expressing their concerns for his welfare and that of his

wife, negotiating for his information and ultimately his

testimony, then and only then did they invite Suffolk County

investigators in. As Rico put it, disingenuously, to say the

least, "[Barboza] was put in a position where he decided he

wanted to testify. So we let him testify." Exh. 170 at 189

(italics supplied).

CASE WHICH WAS PRESENTED TO THE GRAND JURY BY DA BYRNE WAS DEVELOPED THROUGH
THE EFFORTS AND THE ABLE HANDLING OF BARBOZA BY SA H. PAUL RICO AND DENNIS M.
CONDON . . . . I KNOW THAT THIS INDICTMENT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE IN
ANY SENSE OF THE WORD IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE EFFORTS OF THESE AGENTS AND THE
FBI AT BOSTON." Id. Accordingly, the SAC recommended commendations for Rico
and Condon, as well as a commendation for Kehoe "WHO SUPERVISED THIS ENTIRE
PROGRAM AND WAS INVOLVED DEEPLY IN THE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE PLANNING RELATIVE
TO BARBOZA AND THE MATTERS ATTENDANT TO THIS INDICTMENT." Id.
61
See also Exh. 45 at 7-8 (Boston airtel reporting that Barboza was
heard on the wire asking Patriarca for permission to kill a man by setting his
house on fire, despite the fact that the man’s mother lived there as well);
Exh. 170 at 189. (Rico noted: "I'm not a big supporter of Barboza." He was a
"stone killer" but the "instrument that we had.").

-42-
 On June 30, 1967, and July 31, 1967, Barboza met with Rico,

Condon, and Suffolk County investigator Joseph Fallon ("Fallon").

See Exh. 71B-16; Exh. 71B-17. Barboza listed the murders he

could "talk" on, including the Deegan murder. See Exh. 71B-17;

Exh. 89.62 But still he would not testify.

On August 1, 1967, Rico and Condon met with Boston SAC

Handley, Organized Crime Squad Supervisor Kehoe, U.S. Attorney

Paul Markham ("Markham"), Suffolk County D.A. Garret Byrne

("Byrne"), and Fallon to discuss Barboza’s testimony in the

Deegan trial and related immunity issues.63 On August 28, 1967,

Rico and Condon, now joined by Suffolk County Detectives John

Doyle ("Doyle") and Frank Walsh ("Walsh") interviewed Barboza.

Doyle asked point blank whether Barboza would furnish information

on the Deegan murder. See Exh. 71B-22. While state law

enforcement had some evidence regarding the crime, there is no

question that the case was weak; no charges were forthcoming.

See infra Section III.B.4.b.3. It was only after Rico and Condon

62
The Deegan murder had a special importance since, of the murders
Barboza could testify about, it stood out by virtue of its many participants.
In the others, either Barboza was the only assailant or the crime was
committed with Jimmy Flemmi, whom Barboza would not implicate. For example,
the FBI had information that: Eaton was murdered by Barboza, see Exh. 57 at
15; Francione was murdered by Barboza, see Exh. 57 at 24; DiStasio and O'Neil
were murdered by Barboza, accompanied by Jimmy Flemmi, see Exh. 57 at 37-38.
Exhibit 57 is a January 1966 FBI report entitled, "Boston Gangland Murders:
Criminal Intelligence Program," which contains ample information on many of
the Gangland murders.
63
The meeting was documented in an airtel from the SAC to the Director.
See Exh. 89.

-43-
offered Barboza to them that there was any chance of a successful

prosecution.

Whatever the significance of the Deegan prosecution to the

state, there is no doubt that the FBI was also extraordinarily

interested. The federal authorities had to use the state

apparatus to prosecute murder cases. See supra Section III.A.3.

Once it was clear that Barboza was to be the star in three

prosecutions (two state, one federal), see supra note 60, his

credibility was essential. The FBI was not about to let him out

of their sight -- monitoring his debriefings with state law

enforcement, participating directly and indirectly in the trial

itself, communicating all major developments to FBI Headquarters.

Still not ready to testify in the Deegan murder, on August

28, 1967, Barboza offered more information about Deegan’s murder,

beyond the "trouble at the Ebb-Tide" refrain: That Deegan had

robbed Carmen Puopolo (a bookmaker in Everett), that Deegan had

in fact murdered Anthony Sacrimone (and not just Sacrimone’s

friend), and that he was affiliated with the McLaughlin faction

in the McLaughlin-McLean Gang war.64 See Exh. 71B-22.

64
According to the FBI, the McLaughlin-McLean feud was responsible for
"many" of the "prominent" Gangland murders in Boston. The origins of the feud
are summarized in the FBI’s 1966 Gangland Murders Report. See supra note 62.
"A review of the files of the Boston Office reflect that the feud originally
started over a fight that took place in a cottage in Salisbury Beach,
Massachusetts, approximately three years ago. In attendance at the party was
GEORGE MC LAUGHLIN who made a pass and used very vulgar language to the wife
of one of the other individuals at the party. As a result of this, a fight
ensued." Exh. 57 at 4. According to FBI documents, Barboza and the Flemmi
brothers were aligned with the McLean faction. See, e.g., Exh. 50A. The LCN,
however, was not involved. A November 11, 1965, FBI memorandum reporting a

-44-
 Finally, Rico and Condon’s efforts bore fruit -- Barboza

agreed to testify. But just because he was to be Suffolk

County’s star witness clearly did not mean that Rico and Condon

would have no further contact. Rico, Condon, and Barboza

continued to meet before, during, and after the Deegan trial --

with state officials present or without.

b. Barboza Mentions the Plaintiffs for the First

Time on September 8, 1967

Barboza implicated the plaintiffs in the Deegan murder for

the very first time on September 8, 1967. But before that

statement is described, it must be put into context: Barboza’s

account was totally inconsistent with the list of participants

that both federal and state law enforcement had from their

informants. But for the FBI, the contradiction -- and the

impropriety -- went far, far deeper. They had better -- even

conclusive -- information which categorically contradicted

Barboza, which implicated Jimmy Flemmi, Patriarca, and Barboza,

and exonerated the plaintiffs. The minute Barboza’s mouth

identified the plaintiffs, Rico and Condon had to have known he

was lying.

contact with an especially valued and reliable Top Echelon informant states
that at that time, "the LCN in this area has not actively taken part in this
gang war," although there was concern they might become involved in the
future. Exh. 50A at 1. If anything, the concern at the end of 1965 --
several months after the Deegan murder -- was that the LCN would intervene on
the McLaughlin side.

Thus, when Barboza asserted that the motive behind the Deegan killing
was Deegan’s affiliation with the McLaughlins, and that the LCN therefore
wanted him "rubbed out," the FBI plainly knew that this was likely false.

-45-
 I describe first, what the FBI knew about the Deegan murder

by September of 1967 and then, what the state authorities knew.

(1) What the FBI Knew about the Deegan

Murder Before The Murder

(a) October 17, 1964 (five months before the murder):

Jimmy Flemmi told an FBI informant that he wanted to kill Deegan

because Deegan owed his brother money.65 While the FBI informed

the Everett Police Department that Deegan was suspected of

killing Anthony Sacrimone (which was also included in the

informant’s account), they declined to tell them about the threat

to Deegan. See Exh. 14 at 2.

(b) October 20, 1964 (five months before the murder): The

agents learned from the Patriarca wire that Limone, rather than

orchestrating Deegan's murder as Barboza would later claim, had

warned Deegan that Flemmi was out to kill him.66

(c) March 4, 1965 (eight days before the murder):

Patriarca was overheard on the wire telling Angiulo that Jimmy

65
This information was available to the FBI in three forms: an October
19, 1964, memorandum by Rico, an October 19, 1964, airtel to the Director, and
the April 22, 1965, Flemmi Correlator. See Exh. 14 at 1; Exh. 4 at LIM010-
0247; Exh. 38 at 2-3.
66
This information was documented in an airtel from the SAC Boston to
the Director dated October 23, 1964, written by Kehoe on October 20, and
initialed as read by Rico, among others, see Exh. 15A, as well as in the April
1965 Flemmi Correlator, see Exh. 38 at 1-2, Exh. 4 at LIM010-0240.

-46-
Flemmi had gone to Providence to seek permission to murder

Deegan.67

(d) March 9, 1965 (three days before the murder): Flemmi

and Barboza were overheard asking for the "ok" to hit Deegan.

Flemmi called Deegan "an arrogant, nasty sneak" who "should be

killed." Patriarca told them to collect more information on

Deegan and then to contact Angiulo who would give them a final

answer.68

(e) March 10, 1965 (two days before the murder): A Top

Echelon informant reported that Jimmy Flemmi said Patriarca had

given the "ok" to hit Deegan and a "dry run" had already been

made. The informant said that Flemmi suggested he have an alibi

for "the next few evenings," in case he was suspected of the

67
This was documented in an airtel to the Director on March 10 which
was written by Kehoe and initialed as read by Rico, among others. See Exh.
20. It was also documented in the April 1965 Jimmy Flemmi Correlator. See
Exh. 38 at 1, 8-9; Exh. 4 at 10, 17-18.
68
This was documented as information collected from the wire in a March
12, 1965, airtel drafted by Kehoe and sent by the Boston SAC to the Director
and the SACs at Albany, Buffalo, and Miami. The airtel was initialed as read
by the SAC, the ASAC, and Agents Finnegan, Brady, Murphy, Reppucci, Lardner,
Dunn and Opley. See Exh. 18B; Exh. 18C; Exh. 18D. It was also documented in
the April 1965 Jimmy Flemmi Correlator, see Exh. 4 at 17-18; Exh. 38 at 9, and
the June 1965 Barboza Correlator, see Exh. 45 at 3.

-47-
murder. See Exh. 4 at 4; Exh. 26; Exh. 29.69 The Deegan murder

appeared imminent; the FBI did nothing to stop it.70

69
This information -- though not from the wire -- was especially
reliable. It was reported by one of the FBI’s most valued Top Echelon
informants. Although his identity was not disclosed, the record reflects he
was developed by Rico, used by Rico to develop Stephen Flemmi, and credited by
the FBI with providing them with "a wealth of information regarding high-level
organized crime," Exh. 51I, and "accurate and authentic data regarding
gangland strife." Exh. 51D. See also Exh. 348 (listing the FBI documents for
which this informant was the source).

At the close of the bench trial, I ruled that the parties would be
allowed to reopen the evidence with respect to a narrow set of issues --
namely, to allow the plaintiffs to introduce less-redacted versions of the
trial exhibits, as well as new exhibits, the relevance of which only became
apparent in light of other lifted redactions, which had been the subject of a
long standing discovery dispute. Plaintiffs have filed sealed motion [docket
entry #558] to reopen the evidence and offer sealed Exhibit 348 as a party
admission. That motion was granted, and Exhibit 348 admitted. See Electronic
Order dated July 25, 2007. Plaintiffs also filed a motion [docket entry #551]
to admit a series of less-redacted substitute exhibits, as well as three
documents -- proposed Exhibits 344, 346, and 347 -- not previously marked as
exhibits. The plaintiffs submitted a list of the government's objections and
their responses. The plaintiffs' motion was also granted, over those
objections. See Id.

Lastly, there were several evidentiary issues left unadjudicated. See

docket entry #553. Exhibits 175A and 175B, are now admitted, but I do not
rely on them at all. Exhibit 182 is also admitted, discussed infra note 148.
With respect to the following exhibits, I had reserved on some aspect of the
purpose for which they were to be admitted: Exhibits 121A and 121B are
admissions by the government and come in for their truth. See infra Section
III.D.5. Exhibits 26, 29, and 101 remain admitted for their original
purposes. Exhibit 71B-1 is discussed supra note 50.
70
This information was documented in a memorandum written by Rico dated
March 15, 1965, see Exh. 26, and initialed as read by Special Agent Charles
Reppucci from the Providence office, see Exh. 29, and Kehoe, see Exh. 26.
Exhibits 26 and 29 are the same document with different recipient information
on the bottom right hand corner. See also Exh. 4 at 4; Exh. 36 at 7-8. The
government has submitted a copy of Exhibit 26 as Exhibit 2348. The
government’s submission, however, contains a second page indicating that the
information was also disseminated by SA Donald V. Shannon to Captain Robert
Renfrew of the Chelsea Police.

Plaintiffs contend that the second page was not originally part of the
March 15 memorandum. That second page is identical to the second page of
Exhibit 28, which is a different March 15 memorandum authored by Rico,
reflecting an informant conversation the day after the murder, March 13.
Plaintiffs point to the fact that Exhibit 28 was comprised of two pages when
submitted to the plaintiffs as part of the Durham documents, Exhibit 4 and as
Exhibit 77 to the House Committee on Government Reform, whereas Exhibit 26 was
always comprised of just the one page -- when produced as part of the Durham

-48-
 (2) What the FBI Knew after the Murder

(a) March 13, 1965 (the day after the murder): One of

Rico’s most valued Top Echelon informants, see supra note 69,

reported that Jimmy Flemmi confessed that he had participated in

Deegan’s murder along with Roy French ("French"), Joseph Romeo

Martin ("Martin"), Ronnie Cassesso ("Cassesso"), and Barboza --

with no mention of the plaintiffs. That account would be

repeated over and over with minor variations in every single

document the FBI had before Barboza’s September 8 tale. And at

least as to Patriarca, Flemmi and Barboza, it was confirmed by

the wire. See Exh. 24; Exh. 4 at 5. In broad outlines, the

informant related the following:

The plan was for Barboza, Jimmy Flemmi, Cassesso, Martin and

French to kill Deegan and Stathopoulos when the latter two were

robbing a finance company in Chelsea, Massachusetts. Patriarca

had approved the "hit," and a dry run had been taken. French,

Deegan’s confederate, was the traitor, letting Barboza and his

group know when and where the Deegan robbery would occur. With

Deegan and French in the alley outside the finance company, and

documents and as Exhibit 72 to the House Committee. That the second page of
Exhibit 2348 actually belongs to Exhibit 28 and not Exhibit 26 is further
confirmed by Agent Kehoe’s statement to the Justice Task Force. See Exh. 36
at 9.

I find, therefore, that the information contained in Exhibit 26 -- that

Deegan was about to be murdered -- was not shared with Captain Renfrew. As
plaintiffs point out, there is no reason why the FBI would have known to send
the information to Chelsea rather than to Revere or Everett or Dorchester.
See Exh. 33.

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Stathopolous watching in their getaway car, Cassesso and Martin

were supposed to shoot Deegan. Barboza and Flemmi would then

shoot Stathopoulos. In fact, the Stathopolous part of the plan

went awry when Chelsea Police Captain Kozlowski, in plain

clothes, appeared at Barboza’s car. Barboza and Flemmi fled.

Jimmy Flemmi reportedly told the informant that the reason

Cassesso and Martin did the shooting was that they wanted to

prove to Patriarca that they were capable individuals. Flemmi

indicated that they did an "awful sloppy job." Exh. 28. See

also Exh. 4 at 5.

While the March 13, 1965, memorandum indicates that

information was disseminated by SA Donald Shannon to Captain

Renfrew of the Chelsea Police, it was communicated without any

indication that it came from a highly trusted source, or that the

participation of Flemmi, Patriarca, and Barboza had been fully

corroborated by the FBI's illegal wire.

(b) March 13, 1965: An informant, reporting to Rico,

confirmed the earlier report.71

(c) March 19, 1965: Kehoe sent an airtel to the Director

summarizing the prior information. He reiterated the five

participants -- French, Cassesso, and Martin as the Deegan

shooters, Flemmi and Barboza as the proposed shooters of

Stathopoulos. See Exh. 31. Meanwhile, the Chelsea police had

71
Rico documented this information in a March 15, 1965, memorandum,
which was read by Kehoe. See Exh. 27.

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confirmed that French, Barboza, Flemmi, Cassesso and Martin were

together at the Ebb Tide restaurant, leaving at "approximately 9

o’clock and return[ing] 45 minutes later." Exh. 31.

(d) March 23, 1965: A potential criminal informant

("PCI"), whose information was rated "very good," reported that

Barboza confessed that he had shot Deegan with a .45 caliber gun.

The informant also stated that "JIMMY FLEMMA [sic]" had gone to

Providence to see Patriarca just before Deegan was killed, and

that Barboza and "FLEMMA [sic]" were very friendly. See Exh.

34.72

(e) March 24, 1965: Kehoe sent an airtel to the Director,

signed by Boston SAC Handley. The Director instructed Boston to

"advise the appropriate authorities" of the possible perpetrators

of the Sacrimone and Deegan murders. He instructed Boston only

to do so, however, while maintaining "full security to BS 837-

C*," the Patriarca wire. See Exh. 30A; Exh. 30B.

I find that to the extent that the FBI "shared" any

information with local authorities before offering up Barboza as

a witness, it was very general information already in the

possession of the state.73 The FBI could not disclose information

72
This information was documented in a April 6, 1965, memorandum to the
SAC Boston, read by Charles Reppucci, see Exh. 34, the April 1965 Jimmy Flemmi
Correlator Report, see Exh. 38 at 1, 24; Exh. 4 at 10, 25, and the June 1965
Barboza Correlator, see Exh. 45 at 1, 10.
73
The government points to language in a March 24, 1965, memorandum,
Exh. 33, to argue that local authorities effectively knew what the FBI knew.
Exhibit 33 notes that the FBI provided Captain Renfrew of the Chelsea Police

-51-
that they had before the killing -- that it was Flemmi and

Barboza who sought permission from Patriarca to kill Deegan, that

Limone warned Deegan -- or its source -- without compromising the

wire. Nor would they identify their Top Echelon informants and

why they found their information so extraordinarily reliable.

(f) June 1965 and July 1965: The critical Patriarca wire

information was repeated in reports over and over again. And in

each case, the account of the Deegan murder there mirrors all of

the earlier ones.74

with "the same information, as furnished by" the Top Echelon informant
described in footnote 69. It goes on to say, "[t]his informant also furnished
basically the same information as did BS 837-C* relative to the murder of
EDWARD DEEGAN on 10/17/64. This information was furnished to Inspector HENRY
DOHERTY of the Everett, Mass. PD on 10/18/64." Exh. 33.

The plaintiffs’ position is that this makes no sense. The information

provided to Doherty in October 1964 predated the Deegan murder. It concerned
the Sacrimone murder, identifying Deegan as the perpetrator. A handwritten
note on the Director’s request continues the error. It reads: "Already
disseminated. Sacrimone 10/18/64 - Doherty, Everett PD. Deegan 3/15/65 -
Renfrew Chelsea PD." Exh. 30B. The FBI’s October 19, 1964, airtel indicated
that even if Doherty was given information about Deegan as the possible
perpetrator of the Sacrimone murder, there is no indication that the FBI told
him about the threat made on Deegan’s life by Jimmy Flemmi, which was
documented in the same FBI memorandum. See Exh. 14.

The March 24 airtel response also summarized information that had been
collected by the Chelsea Police. It noted that Chelsea’s investigation
"reflected" that Stathopoulos was at the scene but left because he thought the
Chelsea police were about to arrest Deegan and French attempting to commit a
burglary. Stathopoulos called attorney Al Farese who called the Chelsea
Police Department to bail out Deegan and French. But Deegan and French had
not been arrested. When the Chelsea police found Deegan's body, they
immediately looked for French. French reported that he was at the Ebb Tide
all night, but their investigation indicated that after French got a call at
8:45 p.m., he left the Ebb Tide with Barboza, Flemmi, Cassesso, Martin, and
Imbruglia - returning about 45 minutes later. A Chelsea Police officer
identified Martin’s car as being parked at the scene with two men inside.
See Exh. 33.
74
See (I) the June 14, 1965 Barboza Correlator, Exh. 45 at 7, a report
initialed as read by D.V. Shannon, and signed by Rico as retrieved and read on
March 20, 1967 (the day before Rico and Condon’s second meeting with Barboza),

-52-
 I find that Rico, Condon, and the FBI hierarchy were well

aware of these documents and their implications for the

plaintiffs, notwithstanding their subsequent denials. Indeed,

the conclusion is inescapable: Rico and Condon lied about what

they knew on September 8, 1967, just as they lied concerning

their relationship to the Flemmi brothers. See supra Section

III.B.2.75

Although Rico claimed that he was not aware of the pre-

September 8 information when Barboza was spewing his lies, see

Exh. 170 at 198, he either authored the documents described above

or initialed them as read. Barboza was his singular achievement,

dealing with the LCN his principle responsibility. It is

inconceivable that any detail of Barboza’s accounts of gangland

murders escaped Rico's attention.76 By the second day of the

Exh. 45 at 1; (ii) a June 6, 1967, prosecution memorandum in United States v.

Patriarca, written by Walter Barnes and Edward Harrington, Exh. 81 at 1, 18;
(iii) a July 18, 1967, report on Barboza from Boston to headquarters, prepared
by Agent Thomas H. Sullivan, Exh. 68; (iv) a July 20, 1965 report prepared by
Charles Reppucci, a Boston agent, sent from Headquarters to the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in Providence, the FBI offices in Boston and New York, and
the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Organized Crime and
Racketeering Section, and approved by SAC Handley, Exh. 46; (iv) the Boston
Gangland Murders report of January 1966, Exh. 57.
75
At one point in his testimony Rico denied even knowing about the
Patriarca wire, a preposterous claim given its importance to his job, see Exh.
170 at 188. When asked if he knew about Jimmy Flemmi’s involvement in the
Deegan murder before the killing, he equivocated saying, "it’s possible that I
had information that he might have been involved or going to be involved . .
." Id. at 161. After being confronted with documents with his name on them
he conceded, "evidently, I did [know that Deegan was to be killed]," and that
Jimmy Flemmi was involved. Id. at 189.
76
Indeed, in one of the most troubling parts of his already troubling
testimony before the House Committee, Rico conceded "now that everything is
said and done it appears that [Barboza] didn’t tell the whole truth." Exh.
170 at 187. Further, asked specifically about Salvati, he acknowledged that

-53-
House Committee hearing, Rico stopped testifying entirely on

Fifth Amendment grounds. See Exh. 170 at 107.77

Condon was likewise privy to the documents described above,

after he heard all of the facts at the House hearing, he believed Salvati was
not guilty. See Exh. 170 at 157-158. In fact, his testimony could not be
more disingenuous. The information before the House Committee comprised the
memoranda Rico generated, initialed or about which he had to have been
familiar. Whatever Rico learned at the House Committee hearing was hardly new
to him; he had to have known that Barboza’s account of the plaintiffs’
complicity in the Deegan murder contradicted all of the FBI’s intelligence.
As for Salvati, he conceded that he had had no information, much less
derogatory information, before Barboza mentioned his name. See Exh. 170 at
189, 193, 211.
77
There is some question as to whether an adverse inference may be
drawn against the defendant from Rico’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment
right. Were Rico the defendant here, there would be no question that his
silence could support such an inference. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,
318 (1976); Brink's, Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 709 (2d Cir.
1983). As discussed in supra note 31, defendant here is not only Rico’s
employer; it stands in his shoes under the FTCA.

Adverse inferences may also be drawn against the government in its role
as Rico’s former employer. It is true that the existence of the employment
relationship without more does not subject an employer to adverse inferences
based on its employees’ silence. See Veranda Beach Club Ltd. v. Western Sur.
Co., 936 F.2d 1364, 1374 (1st Cir. 1991)(declarant invoking the Fifth
Amendment did so in relation to wrongdoing in which his employer had little,
if any, involvement); cf. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825
F. Supp. 340 (D. Mass. 1993) (evidence suggesting that the employer had
benefitted from and tacitly approved the wrongdoing of the employee). Here, it
is reasonable to infer that Rico invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to
questions about Flemmi, Barboza and the Deegan murder trial, to protect not
only himself but the government as well. His wrongdoing was done with the full
knowledge and approval of his superiors, and redounded to their benefit.

There is also precedent for imputing silence of an employee to his

employer under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), even that of a former employee. See RAD
Servs., Inc. v. Aetna, 808 F.2d 271, 275 (3d Cir. 1986); Brink's Inc., 717
F.2d at 700; Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc., 733 F.2d 509. 521-22
(8th Cir. 1984); Lentz v. Metropolitan, 768 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Mass. 2002);
F.D.I.C. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 45 F.3d 969, 977-79 (5th Cir.
1995); LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1997). The
approach is case by case, considering, for example, whether the "non-party
witness is pragmatically a non-captioned party in interest and whether the
assertion of the privilege advances the interests of both the non-party
witness and the affected party in the outcome of the litigation," LiButti v.
United States, 107 F.3d at 123.

As described above, there is ample evidence to support wrongdoing on the

part of Rico, attributable to the United States, with or without drawing an
adverse inference from Rico’s asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege.

-54-
given his role as Rico’s partner, and his position in the

Organized Crime Squad, see supra Section III.B.1., yet he too

lied.78 For example, he denied ever seeing a copy of Kehoe’s

January 14, 1966, "Boston Gangland Murders" report, Exh. 57,79

which repeated who the five perpetrators of the Deegan murder

were (Barboza, Flemmi, Cassesso, Martin and French). See Exh.

193B at 21, 57. This was so even though he admitted his initials

were on the cover of the Kehoe report, signifying that he had

viewed it. See Exh. 324 at 1, 6.80 He went so far as to deny

that Rico shared any information with him about Deegan’s death,

see Exh. 193B at 21, or that he knew what the wire disclosed

about Flemmi, Barboza and Patriarca, see Exh. 193B at 228.

In short, I do not find the accounts of either agent --

concerning what they knew when Barboza pointed the finger at

plaintiffs -- to be remotely credible. They had every reason to

believe that the men Barboza identified, Limone, Tameleo, Greco

78
See supra Sections III.B.2.a. and III.B.2.b.
79
The Kehoe report was very similar to documents that Condon himself
had generated about Barboza and the Deegan murders, see, e.g., Exh. 87 (Crime
Conditions in Boston report) which likely reiterated the same information.
Agent Sullivan, the author of that report, indicated that the information in
it "was obtained from the review of the files of the Boston Office by DENNIS
M. CONDON" including the Deegan file. See Exh. 87 at 4.
80
Exhibit 324 was admitted as a prior inconsistent statement, namely, a
statement that was inconsistent with that which Condon had given at his
deposition. See Tr. vol. 19, 16-17. In fact, it is entitled to substantive
treatment. Assuming Exhibit 324 was a business record of the FBI, as the
parties conceded, a hearsay statement within it is admissible if there is an
independent grounds for its admissibility. Here the statements of Condon are
admissible as statements of a party under Fed. R. Evid. R. 801(d)(2). See
also Fed. R. Evid. 805.

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and Salvati, had absolutely no involvement in the Deegan murder,

while the man he left out, Jimmy Flemmi, did.

(3) What the Local Authorities Knew about

the Deegan Murder

Following the Deegan murder, the local police (Chelsea and

Boston Police Departments as well as the Massachusetts State

Police) had some information implicating the same five

individuals as did the FBI.81 What they did not know was how

accurate that information was -- i.e. the extent to which the

information had been fully confirmed by an illegal wiretap, and

the FBI’s multiple, and ostensibly very reliable, informants.

This was critical: It is one thing for state authorities to

believe that an informant said thus-and-so. It is another to

know that the information came from a valued informant with whom

the FBI had a long-standing, committed relationship. And still

another to understand that the plot in question was actually

overheard before it was executed.

Shortly preceding the murders, Captain Joseph Kozlowski

("Kozlowski") of the Chelsea Police saw a red car with the rear

licence plate folded over near the crime scene. He saw two men

inside -- the man in the back seat had dark hair with a bald spot

on the center of his head. See Exh. 21. Lieutenant Thomas Evans

("Evans") reported that he followed up on Kozlowski’s lead. He

81
There is absolutely no doubt that they did not have access to the
Durham documents, and surely, not to the broader record developed in this
case. See supra Part II.

-56-
went to the Ebb Tide with Captain Renfrew and Detective Moore,

where they saw a red car with the rear license plate creased down

the middle, belonging to Romeo Martin. The police brought Martin

and Imbruglia to the police station for questioning. Kozlowski

said the car looked like the one he had seen earlier, but did not

recognize either man. See Exh. 22 at 2

Lieutenant Evans' report also recounts information derived

from Captain Renfrew’s informant: French had received a phone

call around 9:00 p.m., shortly after which he left the Ebb Tide

with Barboza, Cassesso, Jimmy Flemmi, Romeo Martin, and two

others, returning by 11:00 p.m. At that point Martin allegedly

said to French, "We nailed him."82 Id. at 3.

But local authorities did not have enough evidence to

proceed against any of the individuals known to be at the Ebb

Tide. See Exh. 57 at 27 ("[A]s yet, [the police] have not

obtained sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution against any

of the above individuals.").83

82
A City of Boston informant report put Barboza, French, Cassesso and
Stathopolous together on the night of the murder -- but not Jimmy Flemmi. See
Exh. 24. A certain "Officer Robson" reported that Stathopolous said "he saw
Cassesso with a gun in his hand that night." Exh. 25. The government points
to two other local police reports -- the "Cass Report," Exh. 2047 and the
"Stuart Report," Exh. 2050. The Cass Report restates the information in the
Evans Report. Detective Lieutenant Inspector Richard Cass was sent by the
Massachusetts State Police to aid in the investigation on March 13, 1965.
This document is a report to his supervisor summarizing what the Chelsea
Police had learned. (Exhibit 2050 is the same document as Exhibit 24.)
83
Moreover, the state authorities had no witness who placed Jimmy
Flemmi at the murder scene. See Exh. 21; Exh. 22; Exh. 23; Exh. 24; Exh. 57
at 26-27.

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 After a few weeks, the Chelsea investigation of the Deegan

murder effectively ended.84 New life was breathed into it when

the FBI persuaded Joseph Barboza to turn state’s evidence two

years later.

c. The September 8 Interview and the Indictment

On September 8, 1967, Rico and Condon met with Barboza,

joined by Doyle and Walsh, and for the first time Barboza named

the plaintiffs as among the participants in the Deegan murder

(along with French and Cassesso). It should have been a stunning

moment for the FBI, one that cast profound doubt on Barboza, his

credibility, and his use as a witness in a capital case. The FBI

agents listening to him, and the agents overseeing them, plainly

knew that this account was false insofar as it implicated the

plaintiffs.

Barboza identified Tameleo and Limone as the instigators:

(a) Limone, rather than trying to protect Deegan as the

wire indicated, approached Barboza to have Deegan killed for

$7,500, and then threw in an additional $2,500 for Stathopoulos.

(b) The motive was the fact that Deegan had robbed an

Angiulo-affiliated bookmaker.

84
Exhibit 2060 is an August 10, 1965 letter from Massachusetts State
Police Lieutenant John Colling to New Hampshire State Police Detective William
Smith. The letter explains that on March 17, 1965 (the week of the murder), a
New Hampshire officer responded to Evans’ inquiry regarding local gun
merchants. Colling instructed the New Hampshire police not to look into the
matter further; Evans would take it up when he returned from vacation. The
letter is the only indication that any investigative effort was made after the
few days following the murder.

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 (c) Barboza asked Tameleo -- not Patriarca as the wire

indicated -- for permission to do the hit; Tameleo replied,

"[Deegan] has to go."

(d) Barboza met Greco in the "early part of March" in

Florida and enlisted his help; Barboza returned to Boston "around

the eighth of March." Exh. 71A-1 at LIM012-2144.

And as to the night of the killing, Barboza wove Salvati and

Greco into the story:

(a) Greco was at the Ebb Tide before the murder and left

with Martin.

(b) "Joe the Horse" (i.e. Joe Salvati), Barboza and

Cassesso were in Martin’s car.

(c) Barboza was carrying a .357 Magnum, while Salvati had a

.38 Smith and Wesson. See Exh. 71A-1.85

So important was Barboza’s information that on the next day,

September 9, 1967 (even before Doyle’s report was prepared),86 the

Boston FBI office sent an "urgent" teletype to the Director,

informing him that Barboza had agreed to testify in the Deegan

murder. The teletype listed those whom Barboza had implicated,

including the plaintiffs and excluding Flemmi. See Exh. 310.87

85
The FBI 302 documenting this interview includes state investigator
Doyle’s September 11, 1967 write-up, without comment by Rico or Condon

86
Doyle’s report was dated September 11, 1967.
87
Another teletype sent later that day reiterated Barboza’s story, and
promised to keep headquarters apprised. See Exh. 92.

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No one pointed out the blatant contradictions between this

account and every single one that preceded it.

Barboza met twice more with Suffolk County investigators

Walsh and Doyle in the days leading up to the indictments, always

with the FBI present.88 By the second meeting, Barboza’s tale

grew more elaborate:

(a) Limone’s motive was that Deegan, accompanied by

Attorney John Fitzgerald, had "got $1,000.00 off of Peter Limone

for George McLaughlin."

(b) Tameleo approved Limone’s directive to "hit Stath."

(c) Greco drew a map of the area for Barboza, left the Ebb

Tide before Barboza, wore a brown topcoat, and shot Deegan with a

.45.

And, significantly, Barboza added (d) that Salvati wore a

bald wig. See Exh. 71A-3.

The "wig" detail was telling. Chelsea Captain Kozlowski had

reported that the man in the back seat of Martin’s car had a bald

spot -- and Jimmy Flemmi fit the bill, as Rico knew. See Exh.

170 at 220. Salvati, by contrast, had a full head of hair.

Although Kozlowski had been in plain clothes on the evening of

the murder, Barboza’s September 8, 1967 statement referred to him

as a "Chelsea Police Captain." Exh. 71A-1. Barboza clearly had

been told about Kozlowski’s report.

88
On September 12, 1967, the investigators were joined by both Rico and
Condon, and on October 16, 1967 by Rico. See Exh. 71A-2; Exh. 71A-3.

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 By October 16, there was another new detail: Barboza

reversed himself -- Greco had not been at the Ebb Tide with the

rest of the men; Martin had gone to pick him up. Barboza had

obviously been told about the witness accounts in the Chelsea

reports excluding Greco from the group at the Ebb Tide. Nor

could Barboza recall what Greco was wearing. By the time of the

Deegan trial, there would be even more "corrections" enabling

Barboza to account for any reports the defense had.

Indeed, I reject Barboza’s (as well as Rico’s and Condon’s)

repeated, even indignant, denials that the FBI showed Barboza

such reports or told him about them so that he could adapt his

testimony.89 Someone in law enforcement had to have done so,

either the FBI directly or state law enforcement in the FBI’s

presence.

Not only did Rico and Condon shore up Barboza’s testimony

with information from their files, and even information from the

defense,90 they went so far as to tell ADA Zalkind that Barboza’s

89
Condon denied to the House Committee that Barboza was ever shown any
report to help him with his testimony. See Exh. 193B at 8. In fact, he
testified at the Deegan trial that he took pains not to "impart any
information that I might have concerning the circumstances surrounding the
case." Exh. 105C at 5813. Barboza was positively indignant at the suggestion
during his Deegan trial testimony. See Exh. 105A at 4489. Later he conceded
that he had been shown an airline ticket by U.S. Attorney Markham, and that
Zalkind may have read from transcripts but did not let him look at them. Id.
at 4660.
90
The FBI not only had direct access to Barboza before and during the
Deegan trial, they also had indirect access through the Flemmi brothers. Rico
used that access to keep abreast not only of the prosecution’s case, but also
the defense’s. See Exh. 167B at 83. Stephen Flemmi told Rico that Jimmy’s
lawyer, Joseph Balliro, was trying to turn Jimmy against Barboza. See Exh.
167B at 82; Exh. 86 (Rico FBI memo in which Stephen Flemmi reports that

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story "checked out" -- an astonishing comment given what they

knew. Tr. vol. 7, 102.91

Balliro was trying to get Jimmy to destroy Barboza’s credibility. Rico used
the interview as yet another occasion to shore up the loyalty of the Flemmi
brothers, suggesting that "the organization" was behind this, and that they
would "use anyone to save their own skin.") Flemmi also reported concerning
defense efforts to discredit Barboza because of his mental condition, see Exh.
97, and to line up prisoner witnesses against Barboza. See Exh. 100.
91
The record is not clear as to why Barboza singled out these men.
Clearly the FBI was interested in prosecuting Tameleo and Limone. Even if
Rico did not suggest the names to Barboza, the FBI was clearly thrilled when
he implicated them. See Exh. 92 (reporting that Barboza had fingered Limone
and that he, like Angiulo, would likely be held without bail); Exh. 106
(reporting that Tameleo and Limone were prominent members of the Patriarca
family and that Tameleo was a "capo."); supra note 60 (Tameleo was also named
in the Marfeo case.) The only explanation for why Barboza would not
implicate Patriarca would be the FBI’s concern about deriving the prosecution
from the illegal wire.

As to Salvati and Greco, the evidence suggests Barboza simply had

disputes with them. Greco had angered Barboza by interceding in a 1965
dispute between a certain Marvin Karger ("Karger") and Barboza, and the FBI
knew it. Karger reported to Agents John F. Sweeney and Raymond F. Ball about
it. Karger supposedly owed Barboza money. Barboza approached Karger outside
of Arthur Farms in Revere, held his hand in his pocket as if holding a knife,
and told Karger he was going to "stick him." According to Karger, Greco then
got in between the two men and told Barboza "before you touch him, you have to
touch me." Exh. 283. Several days after Sweeney and Ball filed their report
of the interview, Rico and Condon met with Barboza, along with Doyle and
Walsh. See Exh. 71B-43. Barboza told a different story, that Greco asked him
to slap Marvin Karger in the face. See Exh. 210.

Salvati testified in the bench trial that he barely knew Barboza; their
only connection was $400 that Salvati had borrowed from Barboza, which Salvati
refused to pay back, despite a series of threats. See Tr. vol. 16, 78-83.
His testimony was buttressed by the affidavit of Roxsan Ambrosini -- quoting
Barboza saying that Salvati had "burned" him out of $400 and that because of
revenge he got back at Salvati by falsely testifying about his being involved
in the Deegan murder. See Exh. 297; infra Section III.D.6.

F. Lee Bailey ("Bailey") testified that Barboza told him he had gotten
in touch with Rico because he wanted to make a deal with the feds after "two
of his lieutenants were murdered and his bail money was stolen." Tr. vol. 8,
28. Rico told him he would have to finger "somebody pretty big because he,
Barboza, was pretty big." Tr. vol. 8, 28. Barboza told Bailey that several
names were suggested to him, including Limone and Tameleo. Further, he was
told that if he named two people the FBI wanted, Barboza could name two of his
own. Barboza told Bailey he chose Greco and Salvati because Greco had either
beaten him up or embarrassed him at a night club, and Salvati owed money. See
Tr. vol 8, 28-30.

Plaintiffs initially offered these statements as statements against

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 On October 25, 1967, French and Greco were indicted for the

murder of Deegan, conspiracy to murder Deegan, and conspiracy to

murder Stathopoulos. See Exh. 338, ¶ 45. Limone, Tameleo,

Cassesso, and Salvati were indicted as accessories before the

fact in Deegan’s murder, conspiracy to murder Deegan, and

conspiracy to murder Stathopoulos. Id., ¶ 46. Barboza was

indicted on two conspiracy counts. Id. ¶ 48.92

That afternoon the Boston office sent an "urgent" teletype

to the Director reporting this information. See Exh. 94B.

C. The Deegan Trial

1. Trial Preparation: An Allegedly "Independent

Investigation"

The prosecutor assigned to the Deegan trial, Jack Zalkind,

could not have been more junior. This was his first murder case.

See Tr. vol. 7, 26. Despite his testimony that the FBI "really

had nothing to do with the preparation of the Deegan case for

trial," Tr. vol. 7, 101, that he conducted an investigation

independent of the FBI, his claim is completely belied by the

record. To all intents and purposes, his "independent

investigation" involved little more than running in place.

penal interest. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3); Tr. vol. 8, 26-27. In their
post-trial briefing, however, the plaintiffs indicated that they did not wish
to rely upon them as such, and were not offering them for the truth. See
Docket Entry #535 at 17. Under the circumstances, however, I fail to see how
these statements -- Bailey's report of what Barboza said to him -- are
admissible at all unless it comprised information communicated to the federal
government (like letters sent to the authorities, the proposed lawsuit dealing
with the Barboza's polygraph, etc.)
92
Romeo Martin was deceased. See Exh. 57 at 31.

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 Zalkind did not interview Barboza until after indictments

had been returned.93 Indeed, Zalkind had serious concerns about

Barboza’s reliability -- as well he should -- concerns which were

allayed by the assurances of Rico and Condon. See Tr. vol. 7,

104.

The FBI, however, had no compunction about meeting with

Barboza at just about any time. The FBI agents were his

consistent interrogators from March 1967 on, joined by the state

authorities only in the late summer of 1967. Barboza was

transferred from the Barnstable House of Correction to federal

custody on September 18, 1967. He remained there until after the

Deegan trial. See Exh. 71B-24; Exh. 71B-60.

Zalkind had no idea of the extent of Rico and Condon’s role

in producing Barboza’s testimony -- how many times they met with

him, see Tr. vol. 7, 108, what they said to him both before

Suffolk County had any access to him, and after. See Tr.7, vol.

79. He did not know that Rico and Condon were present at every

single interview even when state authorities were preparing

"their" witness, see Tr. vol. 7, 108-109, recording information

about his debriefings, passing it on to their superiors.94

93
Barboza, he remarked, "was such an unreliable person that he might
accuse me if he ever decided to become an alien witness that he might accuse
me of having shaped his testimony so I didn’t want that to be a factor." Tr.
vol. 6, 22.
94
Nor did Zalkind even have any role in the "deal" Barboza was offered
for his testimony. See Tr. vol. 6, 10. Barboza was facing a habitual
criminal charge in connection with a stabbing. He was facing a sentence of
more than 80 years. See Tr. vol. 6 at 8-9; Exh. 105B at 5902. That charge

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 In fact, Zalkind ultimately conceded that decisions about

his three major witnesses -- Barboza, Fitzgerald (who testified

about an LCN attempt to bribe Barboza, see infra Section III.C.2)

and Condon -- were made after consulting with the FBI. See,

e.g., Tr. vol. 7, 103. Given Barboza’s significance in the LCN

"war," it is inconceivable that the FBI would have taken a back

seat. See supra Section III.B.3. Rico agreed that he and Condon

were "on top of the [Deegan] case right from the start," Exh.

118; that he worked closely with the state authorities,95

providing them with information, helping them develop their

prosecutions. See Exh. 167A at 49.96

Apart from Barboza, Zalkind agreed that John Fitzgerald, a

critical witness for the prosecution, was the FBI’s "boy." Tr.

vol. 7, 120. It was up to Rico and Condon to "tak[e] care" of

Fitzgerald, "right up until the point where Fitzgerald testified

in Deegan and afterwards." Id. As with Barboza, Rico and Condon

was later dropped.

95
Again, Rico’s testimony before the House Committee was pure
sophistry: "We were not involved in the - to my knowledge, in the preparation
of the trial," he said. But when reminded that Agent Condon had testified he
stated: "Well, it depends on what you’re talking about preparation. I think
that we made Barboza available at a time when they came to interview him, we
would be there, but it wasn’t as if we’re directing the investigation." Exh.
170 at 196. Condon denied even knowing what Barboza would testify to, see Exh.
193B at 86, which I find wholly improbable.
96
When pressed, Zalkind conceded that while he conferred with "his"
people, Doyle and Walsh, see Tr. vol. 7, 103, they were regularly conferring
with the FBI. See Tr. vol. 7, 104. Doyle was present with the FBI when
Barboza was interviewed long before Zalkind ever talked to him. Walsh met
with another witness, John Fitzgerald, along with Condon. See Tr. vol. 7,
121-22.

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had contact with Fitzgerald long before Zalkind ever did. See

Tr. vol. 7, 123. And, as with Barboza, Zalkind did not know what

Rico and Condon said to him. See Tr. vol. 6, 27.

Zalkind even called Condon to the stand to "impress upon the

jury that Barboza had not been coached or had been given any of

the facts of this case by the FBI." Tr. vol. 6, 16. Of course,

Zalkind had absolutely no idea whether this was true. Given the

way Barboza’s story changed in critical ways having to do with

the plaintiffs, given what the FBI knew, as described above, I

believe that it was not.

To be sure, Zalkind testified that no FBI agents put

pressure on him to use Barboza as a witness. See Tr. vol. 6, 21.

They did not have to. The FBI offered Suffolk law enforcement a

witness to an unsolved murder in which the state investigation

had stalled. More significantly, this was a witness for whom the

FBI was vouching and Zalkind relied on that. See Tr. vol. 7,

104-05.

While Zalkind insisted that he prepared for the Deegan trial

as any good trial lawyer would do, that preparation could not

have been more limited. He could confirm Barboza’s testimony but

only to the extent it conformed with the previous local reports.

See Exh. 22; Exh. 2167.97 But when Barboza extended the circle

97
The documents that were shown to Zalkind to buttress the government’s
position that Zalkind did an "independent" investigation could not be weaker.
For the most part, they supported the view that without Barboza, the state
authorities had little or no evidence on which to base a prosecution. See

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of participants to include the four plaintiffs, Zalkind had

absolutely no way of corroborating that information. Barboza was

his only source. For example:

(1) When Barboza told Zalkind that one motive for Deegan’s

murder was to retaliate for Deegan’s killing of Sacrimone, he

could check that Deegan was suspected of Sacrimone’s murder, see

Tr. vol. 7, 40, but he had to rely on Barboza for the link

between that murder and these plaintiffs.98

(2) He could corroborate Barboza’s account that three guns

had been used, but he had to rely on Barboza for who had wielded

the weapons. See Tr. vol. 7, 82, 84.

Exh. 2167. For example, French was initially in the sights of state law
enforcement when attorney Alfred Farese received a call from a client that
Deegan and Roy French were arrested while doing a "B & E." Farese called the
Chelsea police and was told that Deegan had been killed. See Exh. 22. His
call inadvertently focused police attention on French who was then arrested
but released.

French explained the blood stains on his sleeve by referring to a fight

at the Ebb Tide. Joseph Errico of the Revere Police confirmed that there had
been a fight at the Ebb Tide, in which a man was bleeding, supporting French’s
explanation. Captain Kozlowski, who had happened on the crime scene at 10:00
p.m. could not identify the men. See Exh. 22.
98
That was the pattern: Barboza would say something; Zalkind would
corroborate it -- at the periphery. Barboza said that Peter Limone did not
like Deegan, an Irish kid "shaking up" Italian boys, that Limone once gave
Deegan $1,000 for someone’s defense and now Deegan was just shaking him down
for the money. Fitzgerald confirmed only that Limone had given him $1,000.
See Tr. vol. 7, 42. Barboza said that the reason he was testifying was that
he was supposed to borrow money from Ralph Lamatino, that "Lamatino" then
killed someone who was to give him bail money, that that was an "office" [LCN]
hit. Tr. vol. 7, 49. Zalkind confirmed that Lamatino was murdered, but not
the Lamatino-Barboza connection. See Tr. vol. 7, 44. Barboza said that
Deegan was killed because he had robbed Puopolo. See Tr. vol. 7, 53. Zalkind
confirmed that Puopolo had been robbed. See Tr. vol. 7, 49, 95. And when
Greco’s alibi involved his wife, Zalkind could corroborate that a divorce
proceeding had been pending. See Exh. 2023.

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 (3) He had general information that some of the plaintiffs

associated with individuals that had been linked to LCN. He

could confirm innocuous facts on the periphery of Barboza’s

testimony -- that Barboza and Louis Greco hung out at a coffee

shop or a donut shop in Revere. See Exh. 2106; Exh. 2176; Tr.

vol. 7, 17. He knew that each of the plaintiffs, except for

Salvati, had "pretty good criminal records." Tr. vol. 7, 63.

Far, far more significant than the information Zalkind had

-- both from his own investigation and from the FBI -- was the

information the FBI kept from him.99 Zalkind did not know the

extent of the FBI’s relationship with Barboza, the FBI’s

relationship with the Flemmi brothers, the Top Echelon informant

Program, or the Patriarca wire. See Tr. vol. 7, 94. He did not

have any FBI reports on anything, see Tr. vol. 7, 121, 123, much

less those which confirmed Barboza was lying when he excluded

Jimmy Flemmi from the offense, or when he included the plaintiffs

who had never been linked to this offense. See Tr. vol. 7, 101-

02.100

99
He vaguely remembered seeing something about Fitzgerald, where he was
staying or something like that, but it had no real consequence to the trial
itself or to the evidence. See Tr. vol. 6, 12. In any event, as with Barboza,
Zalkind agreed that Fitzgerald’s handlers, the people that had the most
contact with him, were Condon and Rico. See Tr. vol. 6, 12, 13.
100
Zalkind did not know that no report mentioned that Limone had called
for or offered to pay for the murder of Edward Deegan. See Tr. vol. 7, 110.
Nor did he know the reports documented just the opposite -- that Limone tried
to warn Deegan. There was nothing remotely suggesting that Tameleo had
approved the hit for Barboza, that Limone offered an additional $2,500 for the
murder of Stathopoulos; no one put Greco in the alley at the time of the
Deegan murder, see Tr. vol. 7, 111; nothing in the reports corroborated

-68-
 Zalkind surely did not know what the FBI had overheard on the

Patriarca wire, including Patriarca’s approval of the Barboza-

Jimmy Flemmi hit, Limone’s efforts to warn Deegan, the fact that

Greco, Salvati, and Tameleo had not been mentioned at all in

connection with the Deegan murder. See Tr. vol. 6, 14, 25; Tr.

vol. 7, 102.101 Zalkind testified that he first heard about the

federal wiretap either during Judge Wolf’s hearing in Salemme, or

the House Committee proceedings.102 But he surely had never seen

the wiretap summaries that Rico and Condon had before the Deegan

murder -- implicating Patriarca, Jimmy Flemmi and Barboza. See

Exh. 38 at 9. Nor did Zalkind know that in the raft of

information the FBI had -- extraordinary information from

Barboza’s claim that Salvati was sitting in the back of the car in a bald wig.
Zalkind did not even know that Jimmy Flemmi was bald. See Tr. vol. 7, 88. He
did not know that the only incident confirmed at the Ebb Tide did not concern
Deegan pulling a gun on someone, but concerned Barboza doing so. See Tr. vol.
7, 99.
101
He did not know that three days before the murder Jimmy Flemmi had
been overheard on an illegal wiretap in the company of Joseph Barboza saying
that Deegan was an arrogant nasty sneak, see Tr. vol. 7, 102, or that Limone
had been overheard saying that Jimmy Flemmi was out of control and about to
murder Deegan. Id.
102
By late summer 1971, the existence of the illegal wiretap had been
made public -- featured in an article in The Boston Globe article. See Exh.
135A (an FBI memorandum explains that The Globe had first acquired copies of
the logs during the Marfeo trial in 1968). Indeed, following the article,
local law enforcement -- including Boston Police Commissioner Edmund McNamara
and Suffolk County DA Garrett Byrne -- requested access to the information
gathered over the wire. They were flatly denied, due to the need for "strict
adherence" to the "Department’s long-standing policy of non-disclosure of
sensitive intelligence information." See Exh. 135A; Exh. 135B; Exh. 135C;
Exh. 135D; Exh. 135E; Exh. 135F. That is to say, it is likely that Zalkind
knew about the existence of the wire some time before the Salemme hearings or
the House Committee proceedings, but after the Deegan trial. He surely did
not know the information that had been gleaned from the wire and its
significance.

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extraordinary sources -- nothing, absolutely nothing corroborated

Barboza’s account of the plaintiffs’ role.

Had Zalkind known:

• that Jimmy Flemmi was opened as an informant on the day

that Deegan was murdered, he testified that he would be "duty

bound" to disclose that to the defense, and that they would have

moved for the dismissal of the case;

• that Jimmy Flemmi was involved in the murder, he

testified that "the case would have been dismissed or I would have

moved to . . . amend the indictment . . . ." Tr. vol. 7, 133. As

to any further impact, he added, "I can’t answer that question."

And finally, when asked: "Do you believe the defendants in

the Deegan case received a fair trial," his answer was

unequivocal: "No, because there was exculpatory evidence that

should have been given to me." Tr. vol 7, 133.

2. The Trial

The Deegan murder trial started on May 27, 1968, and was

completed on July 31, 1968. See Exh. 338 ¶ 49. The FBI was a

formidable presence throughout, both directly and indirectly --

through the witness they cultivated, debriefed, and prepared

(Barboza), through the witnesses they conferred with before

testifying and effectively controlled (Stathopoulos and

Fitzgerald), through the extraordinary testimony of Agent Condon

buttressing Barboza’s account, which he knew was false, through

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the strings they pulled behind the scenes advising Zalkind and his

staff, and finally, through the exculpatory information from their

illegal wire and Top Echelon informants, which they hid from the

defense and the prosecution alike.103

Barboza testified about the Deegan murder, substituting the

plaintiffs in critical places, as he had the first time he

mentioned their names on September 8, 1967. He falsely

substituted Limone and Tameleo for Patriarca as approving and/or

initiating the "hit," Salvati for Flemmi (in the car with Barboza

and Cassesso), and Greco for Cassesso (as Deegan’s actual shooter,

along with French) in the alleyway with Martin.

Barboza also elaborated on Greco’s role in planning the

murder, see Exh. 105A at 3280, 3288-89, and Limone and Tameleo's

role in the distribution of the money, see id. at 3225-28.

103
Condon testified that he was in court only on the day he testified at
the Deegan trial, because of a witness sequestration order. See Exh. 2338 at
13. He did not need to be physically in Barboza’s presence every day of the
trial to exercise control over him. He had clearly helped to prepare
Barboza’s testimony before the trial. See Exh. 71A-5 (discussing some "points
of information" concerning the Deegan murder with Walsh, Rico and Condon). He
had monitored Zalkind’s encounters with Barboza. See Exh. 71A-6 (statements
made by [Barboza] to Zalkind, Rico and Walsh on February 21, 1968). He had
monitored the discussions of another Assistant District Attorney in Zalkind’s
office. See Exh. 71B-32 (telling Barboza to be "polite and responsive"); Exh.
71A-7 (more discussion of the case with Zalkind, Walsh, Rico and Condon on
March 29, 1968); Exh. 71A-8 (same, 4/10/68). He had even dealt with Barboza’s
complaints about Zalkind on the eve of trial, see Exh. 71B-52 (Barboza
complaining that Zalkind did not spend enough time with him preparing for the
case (5/29/68), and during the trial, see Exh. 71B-54 (same, 6/12/68). And
while reports during the trial are few and far between, and do not say much
(to record conversations about Barboza’s testimony during the trial would have
been to violate the sequestration order), FBI reports confirm that Condon met
with Barboza regularly, even during this period of time. See Exh. 71B-58
(7/5/68); Exh. 71B-61 (meetings during July, 1968 while awaiting the
"finishing of testimony").

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 And as to his "deal," Barboza testified that the FBI promised

that he would not get indicted "on a case," and that they would

bring his cooperation to the attention of the judge. Id. at 4458-

60, 4620. He agreed that while in federal custody he had been

receiving money from loan sharking. Id. at 3587.104 While Barboza

testified that he was hoping for some consideration in the latter,

as far as the FBI was concerned, they "never promised me

anything." Id. at 4654. The latter comment was simply stunning.

Barboza’s lies were flatly contradicted by documents in the

hands of the FBI, documents which were never revealed to Zalkind

or the defense counsel. For example: the FBI knew that the "bald

man" Captain Kowzlowki had seen was Flemmi. They allowed Barboza

to testify that Salvati wore a "bald wig." They knew that Limone

had tried to warn Deegan about Barboza’s and Flemmi’s intentions.

They allowed Barboza to testify that Limone had ordered the "hit."

United States Attorney Markham even "correct[ed]" Barboza when he

got certain dates wrong.105 They knew that Greco had never been

mentioned in connection with the murder. They allowed Barboza’s

104
He also acknowledged that he had only been indicted for a misdemeanor
in connection with his role in the Deegan murder, see Exh. 105A at 3806, 3835,
while the others were indicted for capital murder, and that he was serving a
four to five year concurrent sentence at Walpole for possession of a firearm,
and was facing a "habitual criminal" charge, which could mean more than 80
years. See id. at 3806, 3834, 4039, 4667; see also, M.G.L. c. 279 § 25.
105
Barboza told Rico and Condon that he had met Limone the first week in
February 1965 to arrange the deal, see Exh. 71A-l. At trial, he changed that
to mid January, see Exh. 105A at 3206, after he was shown an airline voucher
by USA Markham, placing him in Florida on the original date. See Exh. 105A at
3583-3586, 3597, 3668-70. Barboza also testified that Walsh had shown him the
ticket. See Exh. 105A at 3584, 4676-77.

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testimony about Greco meeting the others at the Ebb Tide to be

"corrected" when no witness put Greco there on the evening in

question. Exh. 105A at 3306; Exh. 27. They knew that informant

reports made Barboza, Martin or French the Deegan shooters, not

Greco. They allowed Barboza to testify as to a motive for the

Deegan murder -- part of the McLaughlin-McLean dispute -- when

they knew that the LCN was not involved at all in those battles.

See supra note 64.

As for the claim that "the FBI never promised [him]

anything," the FBI knew that to be completely false. For example,

the FBI did not disclose the extent to which Barboza and his

family would be protected under the nascent federal witness

protection program, see Exh. 71B-7, Exh. 71B-14, Exh. 71B-17, or

affirmatively supported with jobs and money, see Exh. 71B-2.106

106
On money: AUSAs Barnes and Harrington acknowledged in a letter dated
February 12, 1970 to Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division Henry E. Petersen, "I think it fair to state that it was agreed by
all in the Department of Justice that at the time [Barboza] was released from
Government protection every effort would be made to provide him with a job and
an unspecified sum of money." Exh. 117A at 2. Henry Petersen indeed recalled
that Barboza "expected a $10,000 payment at the time his testimony was
concluded." Exh. 117B.

On immunity: There was an oral promise "at the very beginning" that the
authorities would bring the extent of his cooperation to the attention of any
sentencing court. Exh. 2341 at 42-44. The Justice Department determined that
even Barboza’s future crime -- his 1970 murder of Clay Wilson -- came under
that promise. Id.; see also infra Section III.D.6.

On protection: Harrington testified that, in addition to their promise,

the Justice Department thought it was important to support Barboza as the
"poster boy" for the witness protection program. "[T]he Federal Government
made the judgment that in committing ourselves to supporting him to the extent
of his cooperation, the sentencing authority would send the signal to other
individuals, who might be looking to see whether the Government would live up
to its commitments." See Exh. 2341 at 45. He added, "he was singular, he was
an original accomplice witness, or one of the first, and he was the poster boy

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Nor did the FBI disclose perhaps the most extraordinary part of

Barboza’s deal -- that he would be allowed to lie about his buddy

Jimmy Flemmi.

If Barboza’s false testimony were not sufficient to convict

the plaintiffs, Condon’s testimony was the coup de grace. Condon

testified that he was "always concerned about the purity of

testimony on the part of any witness involving any matter that I

am concerned with." Exh. 105C at 5812. His statement was a

blatant endorsement of Barboza’s perjury.

In addition, Condon falsely denied that he and Rico were

"major figures" with regard to the investigation surrounding the

information furnished by Barboza. Perhaps even more significant,

Condon refused to produce the memoranda of his meetings with

Barboza citing "a federal Executive Order," Exh. 105C at 5811,

5831-5832.107

When Condon testified that, in all the meetings he had had

with Barboza, he had never shown Barboza any reports or told him

the facts and circumstances surrounding Deegan’s death, see Exh.

105C at 5803-04, see also supra note 89, the comment strained

credulity. Barboza's testimony was "corrected" to make it conform

to reports the defense had or were likely to get. In fact, to the

for the Witness Protection Program, and for that reason, judgments were made
because of his singular status." Id.
107
That same rationale obviously applied to the Durham documents as
well.

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extent it was true at all, it was profoundly disingenuous: When

it came to the four plaintiffs, there were no reports to show

Barboza.

Finally, two other significant witnesses testified --

attorney John Fitzgerald,108 who reported a bribe that Tameleo and

Greco allegedly offered to influence Barboza’s testimony, and

Stathopoulos, the other intended victim of the Deegan killers.

Both agreed that they had met with the FBI before their testimony,

and had even conferred with Barboza, meetings necessarily arranged

by the FBI.

Fitzgerald, whom Zalkind described as the FBI’s "boy," Tr.

vol. 7, 120, met with the FBI fifteen to twenty times beginning in

May of 1967. See Exh. 2312 at 5833.109 He testified that Tameleo

and Greco had offered Barboza a bribe in July of 1967 to keep him

from testifying in the Deegan case.110 The FBI well knew that the

108
He represented Stathopolous, Deegan, and Barboza at various times.
See Exh. 2312 at 4882, 5168-69.
109
On January 30, 1968, John Fitzgerald was critically wounded when his
car exploded as he attempted to start the ignition. His right leg had to be
amputated. See Exh. 291. An FBI teletype sent to the Director that same day
reported that Stephen Flemmi had previously advised that Patriarca was
"incensed" at Fitzgerald, and that he was on the "hit parade." Id. In
addition to serving as an important witness in the Deegan trial, Fitzgerald
was also a key witness in the government’s case against Patriarca. It is
believed that the "hit" was orchestrated to prevent him from testifying. He
was in federal protective custody.

Stephen Flemmi was eventually indicted for Fitzgerald’s attempted

murder, but fled the jurisdiction before he could be arrested. Several years
later the charge was dropped. See supra Section III.B.2.b.
110
Robert Glavin also testified that Cassesso had offered him a bribe to
"cop" to Deegan. See Exh. 2312 at 5581-82. He acknowledged that he too met
with Condon and Rico, id. at 5419, 5579, in a motel room to which he had been

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bribe offer predated any mention by Barboza of the plaintiffs as

participants in the Deegan murder,111 but never provided Zalkind

with reports or information about Fitzgerald’s conflicting

statements. Condon even denied having any "personal knowledge" of

meetings between Barboza and Fitzgerald, see Exh. 105C at 5822,

5835-36, although FBI reports he authored show otherwise. See

Exh. 89.

Stathopoulos described what occurred on the evening of March

12, 1965, and was asked to identify the man he saw coming out of

the alleyway where Deegan was killed. He saw French and a second

person, and heard a voice he did not recognize say, "Get him too."

Exh. 105F at 4962-64. While Stathopoulos never knew Greco before,

had never been able to identify anyone from a photo array, see

Exh. 2351, and indeed, in earlier reports, had noted that it was

Cassesso and Martin he had seen, see Exh. 25, at trial, he pointed

at Greco. He "looks like the man," Exh. 105F at 4961,

Stathopoulos said -- although he could not be sure. Id. at 4961,

5027-28.

The defense obviously knew something of the FBI’s involvement

with Stathopoulos and Fitzgerald. See, e.g., Exh. 105A at 3717,

taken while in jail on state charges. Id. at 5892-5905.

111
Information with respect to the bribe was uncovered by the FBI in
July of 1967. Documents generated at the time suggest that the bribe involved
the Marfeo prosecution and Barboza’s testimony against Patriarca and Tameleo.
See Exh. 287. The plaintiffs were not even mentioned by Barboza in connection
with the Deegan murder until September 8, 1967. Indeed, in the FBI’s
memoranda, it is clear that the alleged bribers did not care if Barboza
testified in other Boston cases. See Exh. 287; Exh. 288; Exh. 71B-64; 71B-19.

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3723. But what the defense did not know was that these federal

witnesses were corroborating a story that the FBI knew was false.

Despite defense requests for information, for copies of FBI

memoranda or reports associated with the Deegan murder, no reports

or memoranda were provided. See Tr. vol. 6, 37; Tr. vol. 9, 9.112

To be sure, there was evidence that two of the defense

lawyers had relevant information from sources other than

government discovery in the Deegan case. Attorney Chisholm

(representing Cassesso), and Attorney Balliro (representing

Tameleo), participated in the federal Marfeo conspiracy case. See

infra note 60. As a result of that representation, they knew

about the existence of the illegal Patriarca wire, see Tr. vol. 9,

39, and were given access to some airtels.113 However, counsel

denied receiving any information about the Deegan murder in these

airtels. Nothing in the record suggests otherwise. See Tr. vol. 9

112
Joseph Balliro ("Balliro"), who represented Tameleo, testified that
he had never seen documents indicating: that Patriarca had authorized Deegan’s
murder, see Tr. vol. 9, 10, Exh. 26, that Jimmy Flemmi admitted to an FBI
informant that he was involved in killing Deegan, along with French, Martin
and Cassesso, see Tr. vol. 9, 11-12, Exh. 28, that the FBI had multiple
informants who reported to them that these individuals were responsible for
the Deegan murder, see Tr. vol. 9, 13, Exh. 31, that Limone warned Deegan
about Jimmy Flemmi and that Flemmi had gone to Providence to get permission to
kill Deegan, see Tr. vol. 9, 17, 19, Exh. 38. The defense was not aware that
Jimmy Flemmi and Stephen Flemmi were informants, see Tr. vol. 9, 24, Exh. 34,
or that Barboza told agents that he was one of the shooters, see Tr. vol. 9,
26. Nor did they know that the FBI used Stephen Flemmi and Jimmy Flemmi to
monitor defense preparation in the Deegan murder trial. See Exh. 86; Exh. 97;
Exh. 100. See supra note 90. Balliro testified that he had no idea that
whatever communications he had with Jimmy Flemmi were relayed to Stephen
Flemmi and then to Rico and Condon. See Exh. 27; Exh. 86; Exh. 89; Exh. 97;
Tr. vol. 9, 25.
113
See Order of the Court, dated September 18, 1967, Exh. 2014. The
order refers to "transcripts of logs." However, only summary "airtels" were
produced.

-77-
at 58.114 The government jealously guarded information about the

wire; it would be unlikely that they would have disclosed any more

information in the federal prosecution than they had to. Indeed,

the FBI plainly took advantage of the fact that in a state

prosecution they could claim a privilege with respect to federal

memos, as Condon had done in his testimony.

Balliro also had information by virtue of his representation

of Jimmy Flemmi. He testified that if he had known that Rico had

turned Jimmy Flemmi as an informant on March 12, 1965, he would

have withdrawn from the Deegan case. See Tr. vol. 9, 28-29. In

fact, Balliro had a serious conflict of interest even without that

information. Jimmy Flemmi had admitted that he was the "bald man"

in the back of Barboza’s car on March 12, 1965. See Tr. vol. 9,

30. Balliro acknowledged that he had not cross-examined Barboza

about whether the man in the car was Jimmy Flemmi rather than

Salvati, see Tr. vol. 9, 52, because ethical rules prohibited him

from disclosing Flemmi’s confession. See Tr. vol. 9, 56.115 It

was only with Judge Hinkle’s order that Balliro revealed what

Flemmi had told him. But whether or not Balliro ought to have

recused himself from the representation of Tameleo by dint of

114
The parties agreed that Exhibits 306 and 307, for example, were
included in the federal production in the Marfeo case. Although Balliro
remembered nothing about the content of the materials he had been shown in the
earlier case, I admitted these documents for the limited purpose of showing
what some of the airtels in the Marfeo case consisted of.
115
He did not have information from any other witnesses that Jimmy
Flemmi had been a participant in the Deegan murder. See Tr. vol. 9, 57.

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Jimmy Flemmi’s confession is irrelevant to the government’s

obligations in this case.

3. The Verdict

On July 31, 1968, Peter J. Limone, Henry Tameleo, Louis

Greco, and Joseph Salvati were found guilty.116 Limone, Tameleo,

and Greco were sentenced to death; Salvati was sentenced to life

imprisonment. See Exh. 338, ¶ 39.

Joseph Barboza pled guilty to the Deegan conspiracy charges.

The habitual criminal indictment was dismissed.117 Barboza was

sentenced to one year and a day to be served concurrently with the

four to five year term he was serving on other charges. See Exh.

294 at 6.

D. Between the Deegan Murder Trial and the Nolle Prosequi

1. Praises for Rico and Condon

Perhaps the best measure of the FBI’s responsibility for the

Deegan verdict was its behavior afterwards. The FBI took credit

for Barboza’s testimony from the very start. See, e.g., Exh. 111

at 5. The day that Barboza testified before the Deegan grand jury

and indictments were returned, the Boston office sent a teletype

116
Greco was found guilty of murder in the first degree, and Limone and
Tameleo (along with Cassesso) were found guilty as accessories before the
fact. All four of these men were also found guilty of conspiracy to murder
Deegan and Stathopoulos. Salvati was found guilty of being an accessory after
the fact. French was found guilty of first degree murder. See Exh. 338, ¶¶
50-51.
117
USA Markham was present at the plea. Zalkind represented that
Barboza’s cooperation had been essential in the federal prosecution of
Patriarca, Tameleo and Cassesso, as well as the Deegan trial. See Exh. 294 at
6.

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to the Director noting that Barboza was "originally developed by

the agents of the Boston office." Exh. 94A.118 When the Deegan

defendants were convicted and sentenced, the SAC Boston sent a

teletype to the Director, reporting Suffolk County DA Garret

Byrne’s statement that the prosecution was a "direct result of FBI

investigation and particularly noted development of principal

government witnesses Joseph Baron, aka Barboza, and Robert

Glavin," and that Agent Condon’s testimony was "most effective."

Exh. 106 (italics supplied). The SAC added that Rico and Condon

were responsible for Barboza’s and Glavin’s development as

witnesses, and that Rico was responsible for the development of

Fitzgerald. The SAC recommended letters of commendation for Rico

and Condon, as well as incentive awards. See Exh. 106; Exh.

51G.119

Developing Barboza was a major step in Rico’s and Condon’s

careers. As noted above, Barboza was Rico’s greatest achievement.

Both Rico and Condon were recommended for quality salary increases

as a result. See Exh. 51C; Exh. 51G; Exh. 193A at 126-28. In

particular, SAC Handley praised their deft handling of Stephen

Flemmi to turn Barboza in language worth quoting:

118
Likewise, at the time of the indictment, Suffolk DA Byrne commented
that the "entire case" was "developed through the efforts and able handling of
Barboza" by Rico and Condon. Indeed, he added, "this indictment would not
have been possible" but for their efforts. Exh. 91.
119
Agent William T. Boland was also cited for his testimony undermining
the alibi testimony of Greco’s wife. See Exh. 106.

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 [Stephen Flemmi]120 was developed by these
agents and via imaginative direction and
professional ingenuity utilized said source in
connections with interviews of JOSEPH BARON
[Barboza], a professional assassin responsible
for numerous homicides and acknowledged by all
professional law enforcement representatives
in this area to be the most dangerous
individual known. SAS RICO and CONDON
contacted BARON in an effort to convince him
he should testify against the LCN. BARON
initially declined to testify but through
utilization of [Stephen Flemmi], the agents
were able to convey to Baron that his present
incarceration and potential for continued
incarceration for the rest of his life, was
wholly attributable to LCN efforts directed by
GENNARO J. ANGIULO, LCN Boston head. As a
result of this information received by Baron
from [Stephen Flemmi], said individual said he
would testify against the LCN members.

Exh. 51C at 2-3 (italics supplied).121 See also Exh. 51F

(recommending Rico for another quality salary increase in March

1968 for his work developing Barboza); Exh. 193A at 133 (Condon

received a quality pay increase in March 1968 for developing

Barboza). Rico and Condon also received "incentive awards" for

their efforts. See Exh. 51D (recommending Rico and Condon for

incentive awards for using Stephen Flemmi in the development of

Barboza); Exh. 51E (informing Rico that he has been given an

120
In the memorandum, Stephen Flemmi is referred to by his informant
symbol number - BS 955 C-TE. See Tr. vol. 2, 87.
121
At this point, Barboza had not yet agreed to testify in the Deegan
matter. SAC Handley’s recommendation memo refers to the indictments against
Patriarca, Tameleo, and Cassesso in the Marfeo case. Barboza told Agents
Condon and Rico that he could testify in the Deegan matter on July 31, 1967.

-81-
incentive award); Exh. 53D (informing Rico that he has been given

an incentive award).

After the plaintiffs were sentenced, FBI Director J. Edgar

Hoover sent letters of thanks and commendation to the two agents,

lauding their "highly instrumental" role in the Deegan

investigation, and noting that the effective prosecution was a

"direct result" of their efforts. Exh. 51G. (as to Rico); Exh.

53F (as to Condon).

2. The Involvement of the FBI Hierarchy

The entire FBI hierarchy was implicated in supporting

Barboza’s perjury. Rico and Condon reported to their supervisors.

The Boston office, in turn, kept Headquarters informed of Barboza

developments every step of the way.

After each meeting with Barboza, Rico and Condon would sit

with a stenographer and dictate the results of the interview.122

See Exh. 193A at 183; Exh. 71B. The reports were then sent to

Kehoe, as supervisor of the Organized Crime Squad,123 and later to

FBI Headquarters and the United States Attorney’s Office. See

Exh. 193A at 74, 99, 230-33. Boston SAC Handley had custody of

the reports documenting Rico and Condon’s interviews with Barboza.

See Exh. 105C at 5850. In addition to the reports, Rico and

122
These reports are referred to as "302s." Exh. 339, ¶ A4.
123
Condon testified that it was likely that Kehoe read the reports. See
Exh. 193A at 153.

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Condon were in regular contact with Kehoe about their progress

with Barboza. See Exh. 193A at 99-100.

Airtels and memoranda were sent from the Boston office to

Headquarters, starting with the details of the Deegan murder, see

supra Section III.B.4.b., continuing through Rico and Condon’s

development of Barboza as a witness in the federal Marfeo and

state Deegan trial, see supra Sections III.B. and III.C., and all

the way through the defendants’ motions for new trials and parole

board hearings, discussed in Section III.D.124 The Boston office

would update Headquarters on developments as soon as they

happened. See Exh. 311; Exh. 106; Exh. 104.

Barboza's development and testimony, in short, was not the

work of two renegade agents. It was known to, supported by,

encouraged, and facilitated by the FBI hierarchy all the way to

the FBI Director.

3. Protecting and Providing for Barboza

Barboza became the first participant in the informal witness

protection program. In fact, he has been referred to as "the

poster boy" for the nascent program. See Exh. 2341 at 44. When

Barboza was released on parole a year after the plaintiffs'

convictions in the Deegan case, the federal authorities set up a

124
For example, the Boston office and Headquarters continued to keep
tabs on the Deegan prosecution long after the trial ended. On November 23,
1970, the Boston SAC sent an airtel to the Director alerting him that the
defendants’ motions for a new trial had been denied. The airtel indicated
that additional motions were expected to be filed and the "Bureau will be kept
advised." Exh. 133.

-83-
life for him in Santa Rosa, California. See, e.g., Exh. 121A. On

February 12, 1970, AUSA Walter Barnes and Deputy Chief Edward

Harrington125 wrote to Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the

Criminal Division, Henry E. Petersen, requesting further funds for

Barboza. Barnes and Harrington explained that Barboza’s

"testimony and his example as an individual who the Government was

able to protect against the violent Boston underworld, has been

the single most important factor in the successful fight on

organized crime in New England in the last 50 years." Exh. 117A.

Moreover, Barnes and Harrington warned that Barboza indicated that

unless he was given money for living expenses, he would "publicly

retract his testimony given in the aforesaid cases126 and will make

known to the press that the Government did not give him a fair

chance to go ‘straight.’" Exh. 117A.

In addition to keeping Barboza safe and cared for, the FBI

also viewed him as a continuing asset in their LCN investigations.

Notwithstanding all the government knew about this "professional

assassin," on April 14, 1969, Barboza was even designated as a

target for the Top Echelon Criminal Informant Program. A

memorandum to the Director noted that as Barboza "becomes

125
Edward Harrington was an Assistant United States Attorney in the
District of Massachusetts until he became Deputy Chief of the United States
Organized Crime Strike Force in May of 1969, and Chief in October 1970. He
left the government on March 31, 1973, to go into private practice. See Exh.
2341 at 7-8. He returned to serve as the United States Attorney for the
District of Massachusetts from 1977-1981. He currently serves as a Senior
Judge on the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
126
The Deegan murder was one of the cases mentioned.

-84-
acquainted in the San Francisco area, he will undoubtedly be in a

position to furnish worthwhile information concerning criminal

activities." Exh. 114.

4. 1970 Rico Admission

While Barboza was being paid and protected, Rico admitted in

a 1970 interview conducted by Suffolk County investigators that

Jimmy Flemmi was probably involved in the Deegan murder: "[I]f

the truth were known there were probably more involved than were

convicted, namely Flemmi." Exh. 118.127 In fact, even before the

Deegan defendants were indicted, Rico "believed" that Jimmy Flemmi

had been one of the Deegan murderers. See Exh. 43 at 3.128

Just like Zalkind's supposedly independent investigation pre-

trial, this investigation foundered because the FBI refused to

disclose anything that cast doubt on Barboza's testimony.

5. Barboza Attempts to Recant

At roughly the same time, during the summer of 1970, Boston

Herald reporter James Southwood contacted DA Byrne. He reported

that several months earlier Barboza had admitted that Greco was

127
The interview was apparently conducted in response to accusations
made by Boston City Police Officer William Stuart. William Stuart filed an
affidavit, Exh. 2049, reporting that he had informed Detective Doyle of his
belief, based on his informants, that Greco, Limone, Salvati and Tameleo were
innocent. The government sought the affidavit's admission as proof of yet
another Suffolk County independent investigation. While there is no
indication that the FBI had this report, Rico plainly knew why he was being
interviewed, namely that informant information in the possession of the state
authorities was at war with Barboza’s testimony.
128
In more recent testimony, Rico confirmed that given all the
information he had about the Deegan murder, it was "logical" that Jimmy Flemmi
was involved. See Exh. 170 at 193.

-85-
not in the alley on the night of the Deegan murder. Suffolk

County contacted AUSA Harrington who then reported to the FBI that

Barboza denied having made the statement to Southwood.129

On July 17, 1970, after returning to Massachusetts from

California without telling the federal authorities, Barboza was

arrested in New Bedford on assault and weapons charges. Boston

sent an immediate teletype to the Director. See Exh. 121A. Three

days later the charges against him were nolle prossed, but his

parole was revoked and he was returned to Walpole. A July 22,

1970, memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General130 noted

that Justice Department Organized Crime Strike Force attorneys and

the Suffolk County District Attorney’s office were attempting to

get Barboza transferred out of Walpole because of the danger to

him there. See Exh. 121C; see also Exh. 121B (a July 21, 1970

memorandum from Boston to the Director conveying the same

information).

By the summer of 1970, the news about Barboza was worse. The

FBI learned that Barboza's threats to recant the Deegan trial

testimony could well become a reality. Barboza had arranged for

Attorney F. Lee Bailey to represent him. The two first spoke

shortly before Barboza was arrested on the assault charges.

129
All this was recorded in a June 22, 1970, FBI airtel from SAC Boston
to the Director, noting that the Bureau would be kept advised of all future
developments. See Exh. 119.
130
The memorandum was copied to five other individuals in the FBI --
Sullivan, Bishop, Gale, Staffeld, and Benjamin -- as well as the Deputy
Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division.

-86-
Bailey then visited him at a local jail, and four times at

Walpole. Bailey characterized his representation of Barboza as

being engaged "[t]o aid in the overturning of certain of the

convictions in what was styled Commonwealth v. French." Tr. vol.

8, 22. Barboza even signed an affidavit on July 28, 1970 stating

that "I wish to recant certain portions of my testimony during the

course of the [Deegan] trial insofar as my testimony concerned the

involvement of Henry Tameleo, Peter J. Limone, Joseph L. Salvati

and Lewis Grieco in the killing of Teddy Deegan." Exh. 123.

On August 11, 1970, Bailey requested permission from the

Superintendent at Walpole to conduct a polygraph. The letter

received by the Department of Corrections included a handwritten

note indicating that Doyle from the Suffolk County DA’s office

called on August 17, 1970, to report that polygraph evidence was

inadmissible and there was no "valid reason" why they should allow

the test. See Exh. 124A.

Given how closely the FBI was monitoring Barboza, given

Harrington's fears that he could well recant, and Doyle's

relationship with the FBI, I have no doubt that the FBI was aware

of these activities. Indeed, an FBI airtel from the Boston SAC to

the Director reported that Bailey went so far as to file a

petition on August 19, 1970 to enjoin the DA’s office from

interfering with the examination, and further, that "[t]he Bureau

will be kept advised of all developments." See Exh. 124B. Bailey

-87-
testified that the parties came to an agreement that the polygraph

could go forward and the case was dismissed.

But no polygraph was ever done. On August 28, shortly before

it was scheduled, Barnes and Harrington paid Barboza a visit.131

According to an "urgent" teletype from Boston to the Director,

Barboza told them that he was still on the government’s side, and

only signed the affidavit because the LCN paid him to. He agreed

not to take the polygraph. See Exh. 126; Exh. 2341 at 19-20.132

According to Harrington, Barboza even claimed Bailey was the

conduit for the LCN bribe. See Exh. 2341 at 25.133 Significantly,

the FBI never bothered to pursue the allegation. On September 4,

1970, Bailey filed a motion to withdraw his representation of

Barboza.134

Harrington insisted that there was nothing he or Barnes said

that could have been interpreted by Barboza as pressure to go back

to his original story. See Exh. 2341 at 30. The facts suggest

otherwise. Barboza was at Walpole because of a probation

131
Harrington testified at his deposition that Barboza had originally
requested to meet with Barnes and Condon, but Condon was unavailable so
Harrington went in his stead. See Ex. 2341 at 19-20.
132
Barboza also requested that his wife be relocated and that he be
taken into federal custody at Fort Knox. See Exh. 126.
133
Plaintiffs object to Barboza’s statements being offered for truth.
See Exh. 2341A. The government responds that they offered it for the non-
hearsay purpose of simple notice to the government of that charge, and I
agree.
134
Bailey testified that he became aware of the Harrington and Barnes
meeting with "his" client some time before September 4; plainly, that meeting
was the basis for his withdrawal. See Tr. vol. 8, 17.

-88-
revocation warrant brought by the Suffolk D.A. The FBI plainly was

in a position to "influence" the prosecution of that warrant, just

as they had influenced the Deegan trial. Indeed, in the FBI

documents dealing with the proposed recantation, the pendency of

the warrant and its impact on Barboza is a consistent theme. In

the airtel (reporting Bailey's lawsuit), the FBI could not have

been more clear. It noted that "[i]n view of" Bailey's motions,

the DA's office is going to move to revoke Barboza's probation."135

Exh. 124B. At the August 28 visit with Barnes and Harrington,

Barboza told them how "disturbed" he was about the probation

revocation warrant, and how much he wanted the DA to withdraw it.

The memorandum noted that the FBI had decided not to do anything

to help. In fact, a subsequent airtel reported that even though

Barboza's "parole violation time" was about to run out, the "DA's

office" planned to continue his probation hearings, ostensibly to

ensure his presence in the area. See Exh. 127. It also had the

effect of keeping Barboza in custody until after the motions for

new trial in the Deegan case were resolved. Barboza plainly got

the message.

Seven days later, Barboza wrote a letter to Harrington. In

the letter, Barboza referred to Bailey and the polygraph.

Ted, when you Walter [sic] came down to see

me, you & Walter asked me not to do something
& I didn’t. How long can the little money I

135
The memo, Exhibit 124B, says "invoke" instead of "revoke." In
context, this is clearly an error.

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 bled out of those creeps last, what will
happen to my wife & babies then? Bailey, said
I’ll come running to him in the end, I never
will!! . . . . I feel Bailey is going to
shaft me so more just like his promise that
him & [illegible] could get me indicted when I
refused to take the polygraph test. I’ll
never take it. . . . Please Ted in some way
give me some sign of hope to give me the
strength to endure this threat of Bailey’s.
Because all I can think of is that insidious
bastard plotting different ways to bury me
deeper in the can . . . .

Exh. 129 (emphasis in original).

The letter is ambiguous. It surely suggests that Barboza

refused to take the polygraph because Harrington asked him not to.

It also betrays Barboza’s fear of Bailey, who was threatening him

with a perjury prosecution. Either way, by 1970 the FBI’s

confidence in Barboza’s testimony -- if they ever had any --

should have been waning.

To be sure, the FBI knew that the LCN was not above bribing

or threatening Barboza. There had been a bribe attempt with

respect to Barboza's testimony in the Marfeo case; there had been

an attempt on the life of Fitzgerald, Barboza's former counsel,

ostensibly for his failure stop Barboza's testimony. See supra

note 109.

At the same time -- and this should have been significant --

Barboza was only proposing to recant his testimony with respect to

these plaintiffs, not his testimony regarding the other Deegan

defendants nor his testimony in the Marfeo case. This position

-90-
was entirely consistent with everything that the FBI had in their

files before September 8, 1967.136 In effect, Barboza was saying

as of 1970 precisely what the FBI informants and wire had

disclosed before that date.

6. Barboza Murders Clay Wilson and Brags about His

False Testimony in the Deegan Trial

When Barboza was originally released on parole in 1969, the

FBI sent him to Santa Rosa, California where they "cared for" him.

Exh. 186 at 10-11.137 But their "caring for" him did not stop him

from committing crimes -- even murder -- again.

Under the alias "Joseph Bentley," Barboza met Clay Wilson and

his wife Roxsan Ambrosini. Barboza made a deal with Wilson to

cash millions of dollars worth of negotiable bonds that Wilson had

stolen. See Exh. 184 at 8, 11.138 Barboza threatened Clay and

Ambrosini lest they interfere with his plans. The content of his

threats was significant.

Barboza revealed himself as "Joseph Barboza" and as a

participant in the witness protection program. See Exh. 184 at

14-15. He bragged that he "had put this man, Joseph Salvati, in

136
Harrington indicated that he believed this was a false recantation
because Barboza's trial testimony in the federal prosecution of Patriarca had
been consistent with the wire information. But he acknowledged that he knew
nothing about the Deegan case. Nor did he check to see if the wire had
confirmed the Deegan testimony. See Exh. 2314 at 26-27. If he had, he would
have learned that it did not.
137
Deposition of Tim Brown, Detective Sergeant in the Sonoma County
Sheriff’s Department.
138
Deposition of Roxsan Ambrosini.

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the penitentiary, and that he could do anything he wanted like

that." Exh. 184 at 24. He warned them that no one "burned" him

and got away with it. Id. He told them "that Salvati 'burned' him

out of $400 and that because of revenge he got back at Salvati by

falsely testifying about his being involved in the Deegan murder."

Id. He then told them that Salvati "was never going to get out of

prison because he received a life sentence." Exh. 184 at 24; Exh.

297.139

Barboza told Ambrosini and Wilson that he

had the government wrapped around his little

finger, and he could manipulate them any time
he wished. He informed us that he could do
this anytime he was in trouble because all he
would have to say to them was that he was
going to change his testimony in prior trials.
To him, this was merely a game of chess and he
would always counteract the government’s
future moves on him. He said that he could
continue his violent lifestyle and get away
with it.

Exh. 297; see also Exh. 184.

Threats turned to reality when Barboza murdered Clay Wilson

in front of his wife, shooting him in the head. See Exh. 184 at

121. Barboza was not apprehended for Wilson’s murder until a

Walpole inmate named William Geraway ("Geraway") wrote a letter to

139
Wilson and Ambrosini took it as a threat -- "if he did that to
Salvati because of $400, what do you think he would do to Clay if [he] got
burned for a million -- for millions of dollars." Exh. 184 at 25 (quoting
from Exh. 297). Barboza also showed Ambrosini "papers and news clippings and
pictures of this man lying in a pool of blood and things like that." Exh. 184
at 28. According to Ambrosini, Barboza kept a closet in his house full of
"artifacts" - scrapbooks, papers - from the "Deegan/Salvati thing." Exh. 184
at 31-32.

-92-
the Sonoma County, California Sheriff’s office identifying Barboza

as Wilson’s killer. See Exh. 186 at 13-23. Detective Sergeant

Brown of Sonoma County, conducted an investigation to confirm

Geraway’s report. In February 1971, Barboza was returned to

California to stand trial for Wilson’s murder. See Exh. 186 at

56.

As with everything having to do with Barboza, the FBI took a

great interest in the Wilson case. On October 13, 1970, the San

Francisco FBI office sent an urgent teletype to the Director and

to Boston letting them know that eyewitness Paulette Ramos told

Santa Rosa police that Barboza killed Clay Wilson. See Exh.

131.140 Both San Francisco and Boston continued to track the

Wilson investigation. See Exh. 132.141

In fact, Rico, Condon, and Harrington went to California to

testify on Barboza’s behalf. See Exh. 138. It was an

extraordinary gesture, handled in an extraordinary fashion.

Detective Sergeant Brown learned from the press that two agents

from the FBI were to be called as witnesses for Barboza. See Exh.

136; Exh. 186 at 51. The District Attorney of Sonoma County

immediately complained to Hoover, expressing how "disconcerting"

140
The document indicates it was read by Clyde Tolson and Sullivan of
the FBI.
141
October 15, 1970 memorandum from Boston to San Francisco and Director
regarding developments in the Wilson case.

-93-
this was for the prosecution, because "it presents a picture of a

house divided against itself." Exh. 136.142

Shortly after the District Attorney’s letter, Harrington

explicitly requested permission for federal officials to testify

on Barboza’s behalf in response to a subpoena. See Exh. 137A.

Harrington wrote that "it is essential that the government should

fulfill its commitment to Baron [Barboza] to do all within its

power to insure that he suffers no harm as a result of his

cooperation with the federal government." Exh. 137A (italics

supplied). See also Exh. 137C (Harrington requesting permission

to expand the scope of Condon and Rico’s testimony). The

statement is curious. Whatever harm that would be visited on

Barboza in the Clay Wilson matter came not as a result of his

cooperation, but as a result of his crime. On December 2, 1971,

the Attorney General granted them limited permission to testify.

See Exh. 137D.

In effect, what Condon, Rico, and Harrington were seeking to

do in the Wilson trial was precisely what Condon had done in the

Deegan trial: vouch for Barboza. They planned to describe

Barboza’s contributions to the prosecution of the LCN and put the

Clay Wilson allegations in the context of reports that two LCN hit

men had traveled to Santa Rosa to kill Barboza. And they sought

142
He added, "[w]hen and if F.B.I. agents testify as defense witnesses,
it would be appreciated that they do me the courtesy of contacting me first
and allowing me to interview them concerning their possible testimony." Id.

-94-
to undermine the testimony of Geraway, the inmate who had

identified Barboza as Wilson’s killer, by testifying to his

reputation as a "congenital liar." Exh. 137C. As Brown reported,

"when those fellows finished their testimony, Mr. Barbosa [sic]

was a national hero." Exh. 186 at 27.143

After their testimony, the DA allowed Barboza to plead down

from first to second degree murder. See Exh. 186 at 71-72; Exh.

139A. The San Francisco office immediately notified both the

Director and Boston. See Exh. 139B.

Harrington maintained an ongoing relationship with Barboza.

Barboza wrote to Harrington on August 22, 1972, asking for help

overturning the Wilson conviction. See Exh. 134E.144 Harrington

replied that he should consult with his attorney about filing a

motion for a new trial, but that Barboza’s "cooperation with the

143
Brown testified that he "believed" that the federal authorities
testified because they feared Barboza would recant his prior testimony. He
based his belief on a statement from Agent Ahlstrom, a California FBI agent.
See Exh. 186 at 55. I have no other details about the Ahlstrom statement --
who he was, when it was made, etc. -- and therefore cannot consider it.

However, the reported statement is in fact consistent with the evidence.

Harrington had been concerned about Barboza's possible recantation in February
of 1970, even before Barboza consulted F. Lee. Bailey. See Section III.D.3.
The fact that the government was prepared to vouch for Barboza, apparently
without a full investigation, attests to his singular role in the Patriarca
prosecutions. The last thing the Bureau wanted was for the edifice built by
Barboza to come tumbling down.

The Barboza statements recounted above by Ambrosini were introduced as

statements against penal interest under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). There is no
indication that Rico, Condon or Harrington had talked to her before they
testified.
144
Exhibits 134A-134G are admitted only as evidence of an ongoing
relationship between Barboza and Harrington - not for the truth of the
statements contained in the letters.

-95-
federal government will be brought to the attention of California

Parole Authorities." Exh. 134D. Sometime after March 31, 1973,

Harrington appeared before a Montana parole board on Barboza’s

behalf. See Exh. 2341 at 57.145

Barboza was released on parole on October 30, 1975, after

serving less than five years. See Exh. 144A. He died several

months later, on February 11, 1976. See Exh. 338, ¶ 54.

7. Rico’s Methods Are Exposed - Still Nothing is Done

By 1988, the FBI should have had even greater concerns about

its LCN initiative and the methods employed. That year, the

Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Lerner v. Moran, 542 A.2d 1089

(R.I. 1988), Exh. 301, found, among other things, that Rico had

urged one of his informants to lie under oath, in part to mask

145
Harrington testified that he had appeared before the parole board
after he returned to private practice on March 31, 1973, see Exh. 2341 at 8,
and was given a special designation by the Department of Justice to do so.
Id. at 57-58. In fact, Harrington recalls that he was "almost explicitly, if
not explicitly" asked to testify before the Board by the Attorney General.
Id. at 57. (I find this testimony responsive, over plaintiffs’ objection.
See Exh. 2341A.)

Harrington also helped Barboza with personal matters, including

facilitating a book deal for him. In May 1972, Harrington wrote Barboza that
he would be "very happy" to speak with the author of Barboza’s book, and that
he "hope[s] the book has a financial success." Exh. 134A. In 1973,
Harrington again corresponded with Barboza regarding the book, sending him a
copy of the government’s brief from the Patriarca trial and a list of gangland
murders. See Exh. 134F. The following year, an unnamed individual wrote to
Harrington on Barboza’s behalf, informing him that Barboza was dedicating the
book to him. See Exh. 134G (The name of the author has been redacted from the
exhibit submitted to the Court. The letter was written with familiarity,
referring to Harrington as "Ted," and wishing him a happy new year - "Hope
this year will be a good one for all of us, but I’m not sure.").

Although the series of 134 exhibits were not admitted for their truth,
Harrington’s statements made before he left government practice at the end of
March 1973 may be taken for their truth as admissions of a party under Fed. R.
Evid. Rule 801 (d)(2).

-96-
another Rico informant's role in a murder. Lerner, 542 A.2d at

1090. The Court found that in the trial of Patriarca Family

member Luigi Manocchio, Rico's informant John Kelley admitted that

in a related case (a case against Maurice Lerner) he had testified

falsely -- at Rico's direction.

The pattern revealed was chillingly like that in the Deegan

case. During Lerner's trial, Kelley testified that he had

personally "cut down" the shotgun used in the murders. However,

during the Manocchio trial, Kelley stated that his armorer had

actually "cut down" the shotgun. Kelley said that Rico had

directed him not to mention the armorer's role in the murders

because the armorer was a valuable FBI informant that Rico wanted

to keep on the streets. Id.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court credited Kelley's testimony.

Id. at 1090-91. The court also found that Rico had caused Kelley

to lie about the promises that Rico had made to obtain his

cooperation. Id. at 1091. In addition, it stated that, "Kelley's

[perjurous] testimony [at the Lerner trial] was then corroborated

in all material aspects by Special Agent Rico." Id. The Court

also noted Kelley's explanation of why he had lied under oath:

"Agent Rico told me . . . that I should just do as he said, and

everything would come out all right." Id.

Rico’s modus operandi with respect to Kelley was identical to

that with respect to the Flemmi brothers and Barboza. Rico

-97-
vouched for Kelley on the stand, just as Condon had vouched for

Barboza. Kelley perjured himself at Rico's direction to protect

and facilitate the FBI’s informant program, just as Barboza had.146

Despite these extraordinary revelations, the record discloses

no investigation into Barboza’s testimony or into any other Rico-

developed witnesses.147

8. The FBI and Stephen Flemmi in the 1980s

Stephen Flemmi was officially closed in 1969 when he became a

fugitive with respect to the attempted murder of Fitzgerald, but

was officially reopened in 1980, with Agent Connolly as his

handler. See supra note 39. (Flemmi testified, however, that as

far as he knew, he remained open the entire time -- as he was in

constant contact with the FBI, in particular Agent Rico. See Exh.

189.)

Stephen Flemmi, along with James Bulger, was the leader of

the so-called "Winter Hill Gang," a prominent Boston organized

crime group, from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. "[T]he long

term survival of the organization was attributable, in part, to

the ability of members of this group to corrupt federal, state and

146
The Rhode Island revelation puts Rico’s 1970 comments into context.
Rico told the Suffolk investigators he believed "that the case, Deegan, was
accurate as could possibly be, that unless perjury were committed there was no
way to free the three men [Detective] Stuart claims were the wrong guys.
Limone, Greico, Tameleo." Exh. 118. He was correct - the only way to free
the wrongfully convicted plaintiffs was for the FBI’s secret information,
showing that Barboza had committed perjury, to come out.
147
The Rhode Island decision, Exhibit 301, is admitted as notice to the
FBI.

-98-
local law enforcement officers. This corruption guaranteed a flow

of information from law enforcement to the organization which

allowed its members to evade detection and avoid prosecution for

decades." Exh. 182 at 3.

During his tenure as an informant, Flemmi "self-reported"

criminal activity to Agent Connolly, including gambling, loan

sharking, and book-making. In addition, there were over one

hundred reports mentioning Flemmi's illegal activities; the DOJ

Office of Professional Responsibility concluded that "it is

virtually certain" that Connolly and/or Morris and Ring received

at least some of this information. See Exh. 166 at 5. The record

before me compels the same inference. The Bureau did not abide by

policies requiring a written inquiry into whether his continued

use was justified, see Exh. 166 at 5, Flemmi's value as a source

of information on the LCN remained paramount.

Indeed, in 1981, Flemmi participated in the murder of Roger

Wheeler. See Exh. 182 at 9-10. Flemmi was closed again on

September 23, 1982 due to investigations into that murder. See

Exh. 166 at 14-15. Nonetheless, on May 3, 1984, Connolly sent a

request to Ring, asking to reopen Flemmi, as he'd been an

"extremely valuable" Top Echelon informant, providing sensitive

information used to obtain Title III coverage of the LCN. Exh.

158B. In 1986, Boston forwarded that request to the Director,

noting that Flemmi "REMAINS IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE VALUABLE

-99-
INFORMATION AT THE POLICY MAKING LEVEL OF THE LCN." Exh. 158C.

On July 10, 1986, Flemmi was reopened as a confidential informant;

his status was upgraded to Top Echelon that December. See Exh.

166; Exh. 158D.

From the beginning, Flemmi's knowledge of LCN goings on was

more important to the FBI than any of the crimes they knew him to

be committing. See supra Section III.B.2.b. As time went on, the

FBI only became more and more embroiled with Flemmi and his

crimes; with each passing year, the stench of their relationship

intensified, heightening the FBI's interest in keeping it from

public view.148

9. Deegan Defendants’ Efforts Post-Conviction

148
Some of the findings here rely on Exhibit 182, the parties agreed-
upon statement of facts in United States v. Flemmi, submitted in connection
with Stephen Flemmi's plea agreement in that case. Initially, I admitted it
as an admission by the government. See Tr. vol. 4, 117. Alternatively, it is
admissible under the residual hearsay exception, Fed. R. Evid. 807, which
allows for hearsay that is not covered under Rules 803 or 804 but has
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." The statement of
facts was agreed upon by both Flemmi and the United States. There is no
reason to question its credibility. Rule 807 requires that the government be
given notice in advance of trial that the exhibit was to be offered. They
were. See docket entry #448, plaintiff's preliminary exhibit list (Trial
Exhibit 182 was Exhibit 1591 on the initial list). Parties are entitled only
to notice that evidence will be offered; they do not need to be told all of
the possible theories that the evidence may be admitted under. See Piva v.
Xerox Corp., 654 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Evans, 572
F.2d 455, 489 (5th Cir. 1978).

The plaintiffs wish me to make further findings regarding Rico's

involvement in the Wheeler murder. I decline. While there is evidence in the
record indicating that Stephen Flemmi and Rico were both involved in that
crime, see Exh. 182 at 8-10, Rico was no longer employed by the federal
government. Moreover, those findings are not necessary -- there is ample
proof that Flemmi and the FBI remained embroiled in a symbiotic, putrid
relationship well into the period in which the plaintiffs were pursuing
commutations.

-100-
 From the moment of their convictions, the Deegan defendants

tried to clear their names, first through motions for new trial,

and then through a series of commutation petitions.149 Those

efforts should be evaluated in the context of the ongoing

incestuous relationships between the FBI, Stephen Flemmi and

Barboza.

For a prisoner convicted of first degree murder to become

eligible for parole, he had to receive a commutation from the

Governor with advice and consent from the Governor’s Council. The

process began when an inmate petitioned the Massachusetts Parole

Board, sitting as the Advisory Board of Pardons ("Advisory

Board"). If the Advisory Board granted a hearing, it would

consider all evidence for and against the petition at a public

hearing. If the Advisory Board voted in favor of the petition, it

would be sent to the Governor, along with all the evidence

submitted. The Governor reviewed the petition and decided whether

or not to grant it. Once approved, the petition would be referred

to the Governor’s Council, and finally, the Parole Board. See Tr.

vol. 10, 22-23.

It was the Advisory Board’s policy to send requests to law

enforcement agencies -- including the FBI -- for information

relevant to the Board’s evaluation of a petition. See Tr. vol.

10, 24. The FBI never provided the Advisory Board with any of the

149
Under Massachusetts law, inmates could seek commutation of their
sentences and release on parole. See Tr. vol. 10, 21.

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information it had concerning the innocence of Limone, Tameleo,

Greco, and Salvati. See Tr. vol. 10, 26, 29, 31-34. To the

extent it provided any information, it was the opposite --

information that cast aspersions on them.

By continuing to withhold the exonerating information, the

FBI hamstrung the Advisory Board and the Governor just as it had

hamstrung Zalkind in 1967 and 1968. Without the FBI’s secret

information, there was no way that the Advisory Board could

conduct an independent investigation as to commutations. This was

all the more true after Barboza’s demise in 1976. The key to the

plaintiffs’ freedom remained in the FBI’s closed hands.

a. Salvati Commutation Petitions

Joseph Salvati filed six commutation petitions, five of which

were denied without a hearing. See Exh. 340 at ¶¶ 14-19.150

Salvati’s sixth petition, filed on October 25, 1988, see Exh.

263A, eventually led to his release.

The Advisory Board contacted the FBI at least four times in

relation to Salvati’s petitions, requesting information on his

involvement in the Deegan murder. Each time the FBI refused to

disclose the exculpatory information they had suggesting Salvati’s

innocence. On February 4, 1986, Chairman of the Massachusetts

150
His first was filed in November 1975 and denied on March 10, 1976;
the second was filed in March 1976 and denied on March 2, 1977; the third was
filed on February 5, 1979 and denied on February 23, 1979; the fourth was
filed in July 1980 and denied on November 11, 1980; the fifth was filed on
November 13, 1985 and although the Board initially voted to grant a hearing,
the petition was denied without one. See Exh. 258; Exh. 259; Exh. 260; Exh.
261; Exh. 262A; Tr. vol. 10, 24.

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Parole Board, John Curran ("Curran"), requested information from

the FBI. See Exh. 262C. The FBI responded only by informing the

Board that Salvati had been seen with a certain individual at the

Museum of Fine Arts, an individual apparently known to the

Massachusetts State Police. See Exh. 262D.151

Two years later, on August 8, 1988, Curran requested

information from the FBI again. See Exh. 262F. On June 7, 1989,

the DA’s office also wrote to the FBI requesting "any information

that your office has with regard to Mr. SALVATI’S involvement with

the Deegan murder" so that they could respond to the Parole

Board’s inquiries. Exh. 335.152 A handwritten note on the FBI’s

copy of the document indicates that "[John] Ford [of the DA’s

office] was advised that [the] info [was] previously submitted to

[the] Board of Pardons" by SA Ring. Exh. 335. The FBI provided no

further information. See Tr. vol. 10, 27. Not deterred, Curran

once more requested information regarding Salvati from the FBI on

November 30, 1989. See Exh. 263C. The FBI responded by

referencing its March 24, 1986 response -- Exhibit 262D.

On April 29, 1991 the Advisory Board recommended approval of

Salvati’s sixth commutation petition. The Governor’s Council

voted favorably on February 5, 1997 -- almost six years later --

151
The letter indicated that the Massachusetts State Police had already
forwarded information concerning that individual to the Parole Board. No
further information was provided in the record before me.
152
"As in the cases of Peter LIMONE and Louis GRECO, we are preparing a
response concerning [Salvati’s] petition for executive clemency." Exh. 335.

-103-
and the Parole Board granted Salvati parole on February 26, 1997.

Salvati was released on March 20, 1997, having served 29 years,

four months, and 23 days in prison. See Exh. 267A; Exh. 266A.

b. Limone Commutation Petitions

Limone also filed six petitions for commutation, all of which

were denied. See Exh. 340, ¶¶ 6-12. As with Salvati, the

Advisory Board requested the Boston FBI office provide information

concerning Limone’s involvement in the Deegan murder, and on each

such occasion the FBI failed to produce the exculpatory

information contained in its files. See Tr. vol. 10, 28, 31.

During the Advisory Board’s consideration of Limone’s 1983

commutation petition, FBI agents John Connolly and John Morris

made an unannounced visit to Parole Board member Michael Albano’s

office. At no time during this visit did they provide him with

any documents similar to or the same as the Durham documents. See

Tr. vol. 10, 29-30.

The record does not disclose what they said, but it is

reasonable to assume it was not remotely favorable to Limone.153

They volunteered written information sure to keep Limone in

prison. In response to an inquiry from the Parole Board, SA Ring

wrote that Limone was convicted based on the testimony of Barboza.

153
No further information was provided to me on the content of that
visit. However, when coupled with the FBI's refusal to provide exonerating
information, then-U.S. Attorney Weld's letter to Governor Dukakis "strong[ly]"
recommending that Limone's petition be denied, and Connolly and Morris's
evident interest in protecting Stephen Flemmi and his secret status, see supra
Section III.D.8, it is clear as day that the agents went to Albano to get him
to deny Limone's petition.

-104-
He then suggested that Limone had been involved in commissioning

Barboza’s murder,154 concluding by stating that "[c]urrent law

enforcement intelligence reflects that Peter Limone continues to

be considered an important cog in the Boston Organized Crime

element. Should he be released, he would enjoy a position of

elevated status within the Boston Organized Crime Structure."

Exh. 277C. Then-U.S. Attorney William Weld also chimed in,

writing a letter to Governor Dukakis in which he stated that it

was the "strong recommendation of this office that the petition

for commutation of Peter Limone’s sentence be denied." Exh.

277F.155 The FBI was copied on the letter.

c. Tameleo Commutation Petitions

Tameleo filed two unsuccessful petitions with the Advisory

Board. See Exh. 340, ¶¶ 3, 4. He died in prison in 1985 without

ever having attained post-conviction relief. Id. at ¶5.

d. Greco Commutation Petitions

In December of 1983, Louis Greco filed a petition for

commutation with the Advisory Board. See Exh. 340, ¶ 22; Tr. vol.

154
"On February 11, 1976, Joseph Barboza Baron was executed in gangland
fashion . . . . This murder continues to be actively investigated by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the New England Organized Crime Strike Force,
and the San Francisco Authorities." Exh. 277C. The very next sentence
reported that Limone was an important organized crime figure still.
155
"Confirming our conversation of earlier today, it is the understanding
of this office and of the Boston Organized Crime Strike Force that top-level
members of organized crime in Boston desire to have Peter Limone assume charge
of the day-to-day operations of organized crime in this area, if Mr. Limone is
released from prison and if these top-level members should become involved in
litigation with the Government." Exh. 277F.

-105-
10, 32. Two subsequent petitions were filed by Greco with the

Advisory Board. See Exh. 340, ¶¶ 24, 26; Tr. vol. 10, 32-33.

Again, the Board sought information from the FBI, See Tr. vol. 10,

32-33; Exh. 225F; again nothing exculpatory was forthcoming, see

Tr. vol. 10, 32-34.

On December 16, 1987, SAC Ahearn responded to the Advisory

Board’s request for information, stating: "Grieco [sic] is

considered, upon review of available intelligence, to be a member

of the Patriarca La Cosa Nostra Family." Exh. 225H, ¶ 1. During

discovery in this trial, however, the defendant could find no

documents describing such "available intelligence." Exh. 243 at

4, 5.

Greco was granted a hearing on his first petition for

commutation, after which a majority of the Advisory Board voted in

favor of commutation on January 10, 1985. See Exh. 340, ¶ 22.

Governor Michael Dukakis denied that commutation in March of 1986.

Greco was then granted a hearing on his second petition for

commutation, and again a majority of the Advisory Board voted in

favor of commutation on January 15, 1988. See Exh. 340, ¶ 24.

Governor William Weld, however, denied Greco’s second petition on

January 19, 1993. His third petition, filed on November 21, 1995,

See Exh. 340, ¶26, became moot. Greco died in prison on December

30, 1995. Id., ¶ 27. On January 3, 1996, Greco’s third and last

petition was closed administratively, due to his death.

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 10. The Conspiracy of Silence

The findings in Section III.D. -- about the efforts to

provide for Barboza, testifying on Barboza’s behalf in the Wilson

trial and before the parole board, the refusal to investigate

Rico’s conduct when exposed by the Kelley incident, the continued

non-disclosure of the Durham documents despite the Advisory

Board’s (and the Suffolk DA’s office’s) repeated requests, the

FBI's continued relationship with Stephen Flemmi -- share a single

motivation: The FBI wanted to maintain the secrecy of their Top

Echelon informant program and keep their LCN prosecutions,

including Deegan, from being undermined.

Pulling just one thread threatened to unravel the entire

skein: Had the FBI come forward about Barboza’s perjury in the

Deegan case, his credibility would have been shattered in the

Marfeo case -- a case that Harrington noted had been described by

many as "the single most important prosecution of the [last 50

years]." Exh. 117A. Had the FBI come forward with their secret

documents in response to the Advisory Board’s requests, the Top

Echelon informant program and its members would have been exposed,

as would the contents of the Patriarca wire. The documents

pointing to the plaintiffs’ innocence included reports from Top

Echelon informants, Flemmi’s status and his relationship to

Barboza would be at risk of disclosure. And, if the FBI’s

dealings with Stephen Flemmi had come to light, their efforts to

-107-
protect him from prosecution after prosecution would have been

extinguished.

In short, the FBI was intent on keeping the lid on the very

scandal that came to light during the 1995 Salemme proceedings.

Maintaining their conspiracy of silence in connection with the

four plaintiffs here was part and parcel of that effort.

-108-
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs bring six claims against the United States under

the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 and 2671-

2680: malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, bystander intentional infliction

of emotional distress, negligent selection, supervision, and

retention, and loss of consortium. I ruled on several of these

legal issues in previous opinions dealing with defendant's motions

to dismiss. See Limone v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D.

Mass. 2003) ("Limone I"), aff'd Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39 (1st

Cir. 2004); and Limone v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.

Mass. 2004) ("Limone II"). Those decisions turned on the factual

allegations in the complaint. Given the facts as alleged, I found

-- and the First Circuit agreed -- that plaintiffs’ claims could

proceed. Now that they have proceeded through trial, the question

before me is whether the facts as alleged have been proved.

I find that they have been proved. The FBI was responsible

for the framing of four innocent men. They suborned perjury and

suppressed exculpatory evidence at trial and thereafter for the

next thirty years.

I will not repeat my earlier legal findings in any detail.

To the extent that they address issues reiterated by the

-109-
government (albeit indirectly) at trial, I will summarize and

refer to them here.156

A. Prior Issues

1. Discretionary Function Exception

The government claimed pre-trial that it was immune from

plaintiffs’ FTCA claims because its conduct involved

"discretionary functions," namely, decisions about how to conduct

investigations, whom to prosecute, whether to disclose exculpatory

evidence, and how to manage informants.157 (The government

reiterated these objections in their post-trial findings of fact

and conclusions of law, specifically with regard to claims of

negligent supervision. See infra Section IV.E.) The

"discretionary function exception" contained in 28 U.S.C. §

2680(a) preserves the government’s sovereign immunity from claims

"based upon the exercise . . . or the failure to exercise . . . a

discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or

an employee of the government, whether or not the discretion

156
The government addressed only a limited number of issues in its final
briefing, noting that it continued to stand on all defenses it had raised
previously. See United States' Proposed Report - Trial Findings of Fact and
Rulings of Law, docket entry # 544 at 42 n. 27. Defenses raised perfunctorily
may not be considered on appeal. See Muniz v. Rovira, 373 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2004) ("It is a bedrock appellate rule that issues raised perfunctorily,
without developed argumentation, will not be considered on appeal.").
157
Specifically, defendant targeted plaintiffs’ claims 1) for negligent
supervision, 2) based on the decisions to use Barboza and Flemmi as
cooperating witnesses/informants, 3) based on failure to investigate or
prosecute Flemmi’s criminal activity, and 4) based on failure to disclose
exculpatory information to the Deegan defendants or state agencies.

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involved be abused." Congress’ purpose in carving out this

exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity was "to

prevent judicial second guessing of legislative and administrative

decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy

through the medium of an action in tort.'" Coyne v. United

States, 270 F. Supp. 2d 104, 112 (D. Mass. 2003) (quoting

Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988)).

Because "the party who sues the United States bears the

burden of pointing to . . . an unequivocal waiver of immunity,"

plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the discretionary

function exception to the FTCA’s broad waiver of immunity does not

apply here. Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir.

1995); see also Hydrogen Technology Corp. v. United States, 831

F.2d 1155, 1162 n.6 (1st Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs have carried this

burden by showing that government agents strayed outside of the

bounds set on their discretion by statute, constitution, and their

own rules and regulations.

As my findings of fact make clear, I do not find defendant

liable under any claim based solely on the decisions to recruit

Barboza and Flemmi, or solely on the failure to disclose

exculpatory information. My findings are based on the totality of

the FBI’s conduct, of which those claims are only a part. That

totality cannot remotely fit within the discretionary function

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exception without doing violence to everything for which our

country stands.

As its title implies, the discretionary function exception

immunizes only the conduct of agents exercising judgment within

their lawful discretion. No government actor has "discretion" to

violate the Constitution, statutes, regulations or rules that bind

them. See Muniz-Rivera v. United States, 326 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir.

2003).158 Where government agents took illegal actions, as when

they suborned perjury, see infra Section IV.B.2.b.1, they acted

outside their discretion. Where their actions violated their

constitutional obligations, see infra Section IV.E.1, as when they

framed innocent men, they acted outside of their discretion.159

Where their actions were in violation of FBI or Department of

Justice ("DOJ") rules and regulations, they acted outside of their

discretion.160 Some truths, as they say, are self-evident:

158
The Court must ask "whether the challenged acts . . . are of the
nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from tort liability."
United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984).
159
This is not to say that defendant’s violation of plaintiffs’ due
process rights is per se actionable under the FTCA. The conduct alleged must
still fulfill the elements of a tort as to which Congress has waived
government immunity. For the purposes of the FTCA, that such conduct is
unconstitutional means only that it can never be protected as a "discretionary
function."
160
FBI rules provide that "no employee shall engage in criminal,
infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct or other
conduct prejudicial to the Government." Exh. 178 at LIM007-1521, FBI Manual
of Rules and Regulations ("MRR"), Part I, Section 1(D)(18). In addition, the
FBI’s Manual of Instructions ("MOI") states that "[w]hile it is proper for the
FBI to use informants in appropriate investigations, it is imperative that
special care be taken not only to minimize their use but also to ensure that
individual rights are not infringed and that the government itself does not
become a violator of the law." Exh. 177 at LIM007-1256, MOI Section 108(IV).

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 If any concept is fundamental to our American
system of justice, it is that those charged
with upholding the law are prohibited from
deliberately fabricating evidence and framing
individuals for crimes they did not commit.

Limone v. Condon, 372 F. 3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2004).

As I discuss in the sections that follow, the FBI’s conduct

fits into each of these categories -- illegal, unconstitutional,

and in violation of their own rules.

2. The FTCA’s Exception for Malicious Prosecution

Claims

Prior to 1974, the FTCA barred claims for certain intentional

torts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). In 1974, Congress amended the

statute to allow for claims based on intentional torts committed

by law enforcement officials. Id. as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-

253, § 2, 88 Stat 50 (1970). The government argued that the

intentional tort exception barred plaintiffs’ malicious

prosecution claims because those claims arose from conduct

occurring before 1974. As I held in Limone II, 336 F. Supp. 2d at

29-30, this is an erroneous construction of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).

Beginning in 1977, FBI rules provided that "under no circumstances shall

the FBI take any action to conceal a crime by one of its informants." FBI
Manual of Instructions ("MOI") Section 108(IV)(C)(1); Limone II, 336 F. Supp.
2d at 41 (D. Mass. 2004). (This rule does not appear to have been a part of
the MOI excerpts submitted by plaintiffs as part of the trial record.
However, the existence of agency rules is a matter of law, not fact. See
infra Section I.C.1.b. After 1977, whenever the government acted to cover up
this broad pattern of crime, it violated its own rule and acted outside of its
discretion. Where it wronged these plaintiffs in the course of such action,
the discretionary function exception cannot protect it.

There were also extensive FBI rules and regulations regarding sharing of
information with state law enforcement agencies.

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Claims for intentional torts are barred only when the claims

accrued before 1974, not when the underlying conduct occurred

before 1974.

I concluded in Limone II, as a matter of law, that the

plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims did not "arise" until

their cases were favorably terminated -- sadly, many, many years

after 1974. Moreover, I found that even if the government’s

crabbed reading of the FTCA were correct, defendant's alleged

post-1974 misconduct brings its acts within the ambit of the FTCA.

See Limone II, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 30-37.

Accordingly, based on my finding that there was a favorable

termination of plaintiffs' claims in the 2000's as well as post-

1974 misconduct, I reject the government’s argument that § 2680(h)

bars this claim.

B. Malicious Prosecution

Under the FTCA, the United States may be sued for torts

arising out of the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its

employees or agents. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et

seq.161 The FTCA operates as a waiver of the United States’

161
Before the FTCA was enacted, the common law immunized the federal
government from liability to a person injured by the negligence of an
employee. Compensation for government negligence required private bills, a
substantial burden to Congress. 92 Cong. Rec. 6370 (1946) (remarks of Sen. La
Follette). The FTCA was enacted in 1946 to provide a better procedure to deal
with such claims. Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,
Pub.L. 601, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812, 842 (1946).

Until the 1974 amendments, the FTCA waived the government’s sovereign
immunity only for negligent actions of government agents acting within the
scope of their employment -- not for intentional torts. That changed on March

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sovereign immunity for such claims, but with some limitations. In

order to be attributed to the United States, the act or omission

must be one for which a private person could be sued under "the

law of the place where the act or omission occurred," and must

have been committed within the scope of the actor’s employment.162

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

Plaintiffs here bring claims under the state tort of

malicious prosecution. The common law of Massachusetts serves as

"the law of the place" for FTCA purposes. To prove a claim for

malicious prosecution in Massachusetts, plaintiffs must show that

defendant (1) instituted criminal proceedings (2) with malice, (3)

without probable cause, and (4) that those proceedings terminated

in plaintiffs’ favor. See Limone II, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 36-37;

16, 1974 after a series of highly publicized and plainly illegal home raids by
federal agents in Collinsville, Illinois, see 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2791
(1973). As a result, Congress amended the FTCA by allowing a lawsuit for
certain intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement agents, notably
including malicious prosecution.

Individual government officials stand in a different position.

Constitutional claims may be brought against individual federal employees, see
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1972). All such individual claims were dropped in this litigation.
162
This does not mean, however, that the United States cannot be held
liable for the actions of government employees performing uniquely government
functions. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955). Such
liability is assessed by identifying an analogous private claim, looking at
"like circumstances" under state law as applied to private, as opposed to
public, entities. "Like circumstances" does not mean the "same circumstances"
and courts are required to "look further afield" to find appropriate
analogies. United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 43 (2005) (remanding for
lower courts to find appropriate state tort doctrine covering safety
inspections by private persons analogous to duties of federal mine
inspectors).

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Correllas v. Viveiros, 572 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Mass. 1991); Miller v.

City of Boston, 297 F. Supp. 2d 361, 366 (D. Mass. 2003).

The government contests the claims on several levels. First,

it argues that it did not initiate the Deegan prosecution at all.

As Rico noted, and as has been repeated as a mantra throughout

these proceedings, "all" that the federal authorities did was

"suppl[y] a witness" to the local police and the Suffolk County

District Attorney’s Office. The local authorities were "supposed

to be able to handle the case from there on," Exh. 170 at 186,

conduct their own investigation, and exercise independent

judgment. If Barboza, unprompted by the FBI or other United

States officials, decided to frame Limone, Tameleo, Greco, and

Salvati, and the state authorities missed it, the federal

defendant is not responsible.

Second, if I conclude that the defendant initiated the

prosecution, the government asserts that it had probable cause to

do so. A conviction is generally "conclusive proof" of probable

cause as a matter of law. Della Jacova v. Widett, 244 N.E.2d 580,

582 (Mass. 1969).

Since the government claimed it did not initiate this

prosecution, and that there was probable cause if it did, it does

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not address factors three and four -- malice and termination in

favor of the accused.163

I find against the government on all fronts. As it has done

from the outset, the government relies on legal categories which

have no application to the extraordinary facts at bar.

On initiation: The case law immunizes those who provide

information in good faith to law enforcement officers, who, in

turn, make an independent decision about whether to bring charges.

If the charges turn out to be unfounded, the information-givers

are protected. But the FBI was more -- far more -- than an

ordinary information-giver. They were in de facto and active

control of this prosecution. The same FBI that praised Rico and

Condon for their roles in the Deegan convictions admitted as much;

the "successful prosecution" of the local murder case was a

"direct result" of their "noteworthy development of a pertinent

163
In Limone I, I addressed the government's argument that the Greco and
Tameleo plaintiffs had not met the favorable termination prong because they
died in prison before their convictions could be officially reversed. I
determined that position to be absurd and fundamentally unjust. "First,
government wrongdoing that effectively denied access to post-conviction
remedies would excuse the failure to show favorable termination. Second, in
the unique factual circumstances of this case, I find that Greco and Tameleo
have satisfied the ‘favorable termination’ requirement under a theory of
constructive reversal. The reasoning behind the court decision vacating
Limone's conviction and the nolle prosequi formally issued in favor of Limone
apply in at least equal measure to them." Limone I, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 361.
Since that decision on July 17, 2003, Suffolk County has entered nolle
prosequis for both Greco (September 23, 2004) and Tameleo (January 25, 2007).
See Exh. 3G; Exh. 3H.

Prior to trial, the government pressed a different argument, albeit with

the same effect. It argued that the Greco and Tameleo plaintiffs' malicious
prosecution claims do not survive the death of the victim pursuant to the
Massachusetts Survival Statute, G.L. c. 228 § 1. I addressed the issue in my
electronic order denying the United States' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
September 11, 2006. I reiterate that ruling in Section IV.B.5.

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witness." Exh. 51G. And apart from encomiums heaped on the two,

the facts establish the FBI’s substantial and ongoing influence.

Without Barboza, the state prosecution was going nowhere. And

without the federal government, their threats, their inducements,

their protection, and their preparation, there was no Barboza.

See infra Section IV.B.1.a.

Even if the FBI were not in de facto control of the Deegan

prosecution, they must nevertheless be held responsible for it.

They were not remotely good faith providers of information. On

the contrary, the information they provided was false and

misleading; critical exculpatory information was withheld, and

they knew it. See infra Section IV.B.1.b. Without this

information, which was effectively locked away in the FBI’s files,

there could be no independent state investigation. In so many

words, the FBI said "just trust us" to the state, and then vouched

for a perjurer. See infra Section IV.B.1.c.

Finally, the FBI’s "initiation" goes beyond the 1968 Deegan

trial. It continued to suppress exculpatory facts over the next

thirty years, all the while supporting Barboza until his death,

ensuring that he would never recant. Plaintiffs’ counsel, who

filed motion after motion for a new trial, the courts that

considered them, the parole boards that reviewed successive

commutation petitions, and the governors who evaluated them could

hardly act independently when they lacked an accurate picture of

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what had happened, who Barboza was, or how false his testimony had

been. See infra Section IV.B.1.d.

On probable cause: Probable cause requires an analysis of the

information available to the FBI at the time it initiated this

prosecution. See infra Section IV.B.2. Those facts include not

only what Barboza said to the state authorities, but what the FBI

knew to be the case from all of its other sources -- information

that did not amount to probable cause to believe that these men

had been involved in the Deegan murder. On the contrary, the FBI

had proof -- substantial proof -- that they had not been involved.

See infra Section IV.B.2.a.

While a conviction is ordinarily conclusive proof of probable

cause, it is not so here. See infra Section IV.B.2.b. It cannot

be so when it is "impeached on some ground recognized by law, such

as fraud, conspiracy, perjury or subornation of perjury," and when

those factors are the "sole foundation" of the conviction. Della

Jacova v. Widett, 244 N.E.2d at 582.

• This verdict was impeached by Barboza’s perjury, in

which the FBI was fully complicit. Not only did the FBI

know Barboza was lying when he implicated the

plaintiffs, they a) rewarded him, b) buttressed his

testimony to account for potential cross-examination, c)

vouched for him, and d) even testified on his behalf.

Indeed, the conclusion is inescapable and I draw it:

The FBI suborned his perjury as a matter of law, even if

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 they did not say to him, in so many words, "make up a

case against Limone, Salvati, Greco and Tameleo" -- even

if those names were Barboza’s idea rather than the FBI’s

directive. See infra Section IV.B.2.b.1.

• This verdict was impeached by the FBI’s failure to

disclose the exculpatory Durham documents which, as the

Suffolk District Attorney himself acknowledged,

"undermine[d] material aspects of the testimony that was

given at trial" by Barboza. Exh. 1 at 8. In fact, this

verdict was impeached because plaintiffs were framed.

Their constitutional rights to a fair trial, to minimal

due process, were wholly undermined. See infra Section

IV.B.2.b.2.

Finally, the FBI’s misconduct was the sole cause of this

conviction. The government's claim that the state had the

relevant information in its files is absurd. The state itself, in

its comments before the Massachusetts Superior Court, said

otherwise, as did former ADA Zalkind; moreover the record in the

case makes it clear. Nor was there any other intervening cause --

no counsel impropriety, conflict of interest, or ineffective

assistance -- which was responsible for the result. See infra

Section IV.B.2.b.3.

1. Initiation

The FBI maintains that the plaintiffs were convicted as a

result of the acts of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s

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Office, for whom they are not responsible. Jack Zalkind, the ADA,

and his staff did an independent investigation and determined on

their own to initiate the prosecution. All that the FBI did was

provide Zalkind with a witness -- Barboza. In effect, the FBI was

no more than Barboza’s hosts, making him "available" to the state.

These protestations by the FBI ring hollow, a dodge to escape

responsibility.

Initiation law developed as a compromise between the "right

of the individual to be free from arrest or prosecution upon a

charge of which he is innocent and the right of the community to

be protected from crime." Burnham v. Collateral Loan Co., 60 N.E.

617, 617 (Mass. 1901). On the one hand, the community’s interest

is to encourage citizens and officers to come forward with

evidence of crime without fear that they will be sued if the

defendant is subsequently exonerated. On the other hand, the

individual’s interest is to hold accountable those responsible for

a wrongful prosecution and conviction. Della Jacova v. Widett,

144 N.E.2d at 582.

The results of this compromise are pragmatic standards: The

issue is not who formally started the prosecution, signed the

papers, swore out the complaint, etc. The case law requires that

"the defendant must have, in some sense, initiated the

prosecution." Correlas, 572 N.E.2d at 10 (italics supplied)

(holding that Massachusetts malicious prosecution law does not

require the defendant to have sworn out the criminal complaint to

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be held liable).164 In earlier decisions, this Court held that a

party may "initiate" a prosecution not only by conducting the

prosecution him or herself, but also by "tak[ing] an active part

in continuing or procuring the continuation of criminal

proceedings initiated . . . by another . . . ." Limone I, 271 F.

Supp. 2d at 358 (citing Mitchell v. City of Boston, 130 F. Supp.

2d at 215).

However "initiation" is defined, the premise on which any

protection for the information-giver is based is that the

information be truthful:

[I]f a person discloses fairly and truthfully

to the officer, whose duty it is to detect
crime, all matters within his knowledge which,
as a man of ordinary intelligence, he is bound
to suppose would have a material bearing upon
the question of the innocence or guilt of the
person suspected, and leaves it to the officer
to act entirely upon his own judgment and
responsibility as a public officer, as to
whether or not there shall be a criminal
prosecution, and does no more, he cannot be
held answerable in an action for malicious
prosecution, even if the officer comes to the
wrong conclusion and prosecutes when he ought
not to do so.

Burnham, 60 N.E. at 617 (italics supplied).

The truthfulness requirement is essential. If the

information given to law enforcement is false, misleading, or

incomplete (and the information-giver knows it), the receiving

164
Indeed, the case law even recognizes the law of inducement. Where
one party, for example, acts to induce a police officer to bring charges, that
party may well be responsible for the initiation. Tangney v. Sullivan, 39
N.E. 799, 799-800 (Mass. 1895).

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officials can hardly exercise their discretion in an intelligent

manner. An independent investigation is all but impossible. See

Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F. 2d 985, 994 (7th Cir. 1988) (A

prosecutor’s decision to charge, a grand jury’s decision to

indict, a prosecutor’s decision not to drop charges but to proceed

to trial -- "none of these decisions will shield a police officer

who deliberately supplied misleading information that influenced

the decision."). As this Court noted in Limone I, citing to

Jones, police officers cannot hide behind the officials whom they

have defrauded. See Limone I, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 358. Where the

deceit continues, where the officers are instrumental in the

continued confinement of the plaintiffs, the liability likewise

continues. See Jones, 856 F. 2d at 994.

I apply these principles to the case at bar.

a. The FBI’s Role in Bringing about the

Prosecution of the Plaintiffs: More than a
Host

Undermining organized crime was a priority of the FBI

nationwide, as well as in the Boston Office. It was the special

responsibility of Rico and Condon -- under the watchful eye of

their Boston supervisors, and supervisors up the line, to and

including the FBI Director. Barboza, as well as the Flemmi

brothers (Top Echelon informants), were critical figures. Rico

admitted that Barboza was "the most important witness" he had ever

developed at that time. In fact, Barboza inaugurated the witness

protection plan, a program that was tremendously significant to

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the FBI. Since Barboza was Rico’s most important witness, in the

Boston FBI’s most important program, Rico and Condon were not

about to yield any control over him. And they did not. They were

his constant interrogators, even companions -- before, during, and

after the Deegan trial -- with the state authorities or without.

By the FBI’s own admission, the state authorities did not

have a prosecutable case until they had Barboza. See supra

Section III.B.4.b.3. It was only after the FBI had met with

Barboza myriad times, pumped him for information over five months

about the murders he knew of, communicated threats to him by the

"Italian element," ingratiated themselves to him by promising

protection to him and his family, and made decisions about the

prosecutions they wanted to initiate, that the FBI invited the

state authorities to meet with him.

Nevertheless, the government argues that the FBI did not

initiate the Deegan prosecution because it did not furnish Barboza

to Suffolk County for the purpose of testifying in the Deegan

matter. Nor did they "manufacture a story on the Deegan murder,

pressure Barboza to recite it to the state, [give] Barboza to the

Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office and pressure and induce

the state authorities to pursue claims against Limone, Tameleo,

Greco and Salvati." United States' Proposed Post-Trial Findings

of Fact and Rulings of Law, docket entry # 544 at 23. Barboza

cooked up the story about the plaintiffs entirely on his own. In

fact, in their most recent submissions, the government suggests

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that the reason why this was a Suffolk County-initiated

prosecution is that the Deegan case was not particularly important

to the FBI. It paled in comparison to the federal Marfeo case

(United States v. Patriarca), in which Barboza was to testify

against Patriarca, Tameleo, and Cassesso. See supra note 60.

Since the Deegan case was not particularly important, so the

argument goes, it made sense that Rico and Condon did no more than

simply make Barboza available to the state authorities. Likewise,

given the case's lack of significance, Rico’s and Condon’s

testimony that they just did not remember seeing information that

contradicted Barboza’s account, made sense and should be found

credible by the Court.165 Suffolk makes its own decisions, they

argue, apparently because the FBI was not especially interested.

In support of this "Deegan didn't matter" argument, the

government reiterates the number of times that other murders were

mentioned in the Condon-Rico-Barboza meetings. And they emphasize

language in FBI memoranda from the summer of 1967, after the FBI

had debriefed Barboza multiple times: In June, Exh. 71B-15, and

July, Exh. 71B-16, Barboza listed a number of murders he could

"talk" on, including the Deegan murder. See Exh. 71B-17; Exh. 89.

Then, on August 28, 1967, "Detective John Doyle mentioned to Baron

[Barboza] the possibility of Baron furnishing information relative

to the murder of Edward Deegan." Exh. 71B-22. This supports the

165
Harrington said as much several years later. He believed in
Barboza’s veracity because what he said in the Marfeo case checked out with
the Patriarca wire. See Exh. 2341 at 26.

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view that Deegan was a state-initiated prosecution: Doyle, not

Rico or Condon, popped the question.

The notion that the FBI was just a bystander in the meetings

before the Deegan indictment is not supported in the record.

After numerous meetings with only federal authorities, Barboza

offered information about a number of murders, a menu if you will,

including the Deegan murder. The FBI had first pick. See supra

Section III.B.4.a.1-6. The FBI chose the Marfeo prosecution

(conspiracy to murder Marfeo and illegal gambling), see supra note

60, arguably because of the involvement of Patriarca, Tameleo, and

Cassesso. But that choice does not suggest that the two state

cases, DiSiglio and Deegan, were insignificant.

DiSiglio involved Angiulo.166 Deegan involved Tameleo and

Cassesso, as well as Limone, in whom the FBI was interested.167

The Deegan prosecution offered the possibility of a more

substantial punishment, the death penalty, than had the federal

Marfeo prosecution. See supra Section III.B.4. In any event, the

FBI had to have cared about Barboza's credibility in all the

166
See supra note 35. Indeed, the DiSiglio indictment in August of
1967, which was based on Rico’s account of Barboza’s testimony, resulted in a
flurry of congratulatory messages noting that this "tremendous penetration
into the LCN and the Hoodlum Elemnet [sic] was effected through the
outstanding investigative efforts of the FBI and this office." Exh. 91. See
supra note 60.
167
See supra note 91. The FBI’s interest in Limone is suggested by a
teletype singling him out and indicating that he "like Angiulo, when indicted,
will be detained indefinitely awaiting trial and bail will not be granted to
him." Exh. 92.

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proceedings; if he were not credible in the Deegan case, it would

cast doubt on the Marfeo convictions as well.

However one characterizes the Deegan prosecution -- very

important as plaintiffs suggest, or not, as defendant contends --

and whoever first "popped" the question of testimony in the Deegan

case, the conclusion is the same: The FBI agents were in complete

control. (Indeed, the government’s argument better explains the

utter callousness with which the FBI dealt with the plaintiffs.

They were indifferent to the fact that four innocent men would be

convicted.) Nor does it matter to the question of initiation

whether the FBI suggested the names of the plaintiffs, or whether

Barboza did so on his own. The FBI knew Barboza was lying on

September 8, 1967, but nonetheless vouched for him to the DA and

the jury, rewarded and supported him, helped him withstand cross-

examination at trial, and, thus, as I find in the following

section, suborned his perjured trial testimony.

The Deegan case was the functional equivalent of a federal

prosecution, or at the least, a joint federal-state effort -- the

FBI’s star witness, the FBI’s testimony, the FBI’s investigative

effort. And significantly, when it was all over, the FBI took

credit, not simply for Marfeo, but for Deegan. See supra Section

III.D.1. Unlike the paradigmatic innocent, well meaning, citizen

described in the case law, the FBI did not merely provide a

witness and stand back, letting local law enforcement do the rest.

They were not remotely bystanders, much less innocent "hosts."

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 b. The Information Provided by Barboza Was False
or Misleading -- and the FBI Knew it

In fact, the FBI was not innocent at all. Whatever immunity

is offered to the ordinary provider of information to law

enforcement plainly does not apply here.

The federal government knew Barboza was lying about these

plaintiffs and said nothing. Every piece of information they had

contradicted his account. And it was not just "ordinary"

information, the ramblings of this or that informant -- this was

high quality information from the Top Echelon Criminal Informant

Program, from the Patriarca Wire. See supra Section III.B.4.b.3.

To the extent that Rico and Condon denied knowing about the

contradictory evidence at the time Barboza implicated the

plaintiffs, or fully understanding its significance, I find their

account wholly and completely incredible. The evidence in

question had been relayed to Rico by one of his top informants,

and by the Patriarca wire; it implicated another of his top

informants (Jimmy Flemmi); it was summarized in reports he himself

authored or reviewed. Equally preposterous is the claim that his

partner Condon and the FBI hierarchy -- through Kehoe, the head of

the Organized Crime Squad, the SAC, or even the Director -- never

saw the information at all. See supra Section III.B.4.b.1.

Finally, as I describe below, the government did more than

just remain silent in the face of Barboza’s perjury and fail to

disclose information contradicting it. They assisted him,

-128-
suborning his perjury -- a finding which, on its own, makes them

initiators for the purposes of malicious prosecution law. In

Manning v. United States, 2006 WL 3240112 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28,

2006), for example, the court held that where FBI agents had

"assisted in the creating of false evidence upon which prosecutors

relied in causing or continuing the prosecution," such conduct

plainly satisfied the malicious prosecution initiation prong.

Manning, 2006 WL 3240112 at *31. Nor is there any question that

intentional omissions or the conveyance of half truths to the

prosecuting authority constitute initiation under Massachusetts

law as well. Cf. Mason v. Jacot, 127 N.E. 331, 332 (Mass. 1920)

with Burhnam, 60 N.E. at 617.168

168
The cases the government relies on are unavailing. Interpreting
Puerto Rican law, the First Circuit concluded in Negron-Rivera v. Rivera-
Claudio, 204 F.3d 287 (1st Cir. 2000), that just reporting a crime to the
police and cooperating with the ensuing investigation is not enough to meet
the initiation element. See Negron-Rivera, 204 F.3d at 290. But the Court
added a caveat: "It is conceivable, in a different case, that a defendant
could ‘instigate’ an otherwise independent prosecution." Id. at n.1 (internal
citations omitted) (italics supplied). Nor is Senra v. Cunningham, 9 F.3d 168
(1st Cir. 1993), supportive of the government’s argument. Interpreting Rhode
Island law, the First Circuit held that "[t]he chain of causation is broken if
the filing of the information [criminal complaint] by the attorney at the
state Attorney General’s office was free of pressure or influence exerted by
the police officers or knowing misstatements made by the officers to the
Attorney General’s office." Senra, 9 F.3d at 174 (italics supplied).

-129-
 c. There Was No Independent Investigation: There
Could Not Be

The government argues that the state authorities conducted

two "independent" investigations: the first over the night and

weeks following the murder, and the second conducted by Doyle and

Walsh two years later. The first investigation was a dud; it left

the state without a prosecutable case. The second investigation

was illegitimate from the start. It was premised on Barboza’s

story -- a story that the FBI knew to be false. Since the proof

of its falsity was in the FBI’s files, Zalkind could hardly

confirm it. As the fact findings show, the most Zalkind could do

was confirm Barboza’s story on the periphery; the key allegations

depended entirely on Barboza’s say-so.

There could not be anything remotely resembling an

"independent" investigation in which the state authorities

exercised meaningful discretion about whom to prosecute and how.

Zalkind admitted as much: What he was not told was far more

critical than the information he had.169 If he had had the

information the FBI had, he would have done what the present

Suffolk County prosecutors did -- stop this prosecution. And if

he had shared that information with the defense, the judge in the

169
To be sure, the FBI now argues that it disseminated "the essence" of
its information to the local police during the initial 1965 investigation.
This was not the case. Again, the best proof is what the state authorities
said in their submissions to the Suffolk Superior Court and former ADA
Zalkind's comments in the case at bar.

-130-
Deegan trial might well have done what Judge Hinkle did - put an

end to the tragedy. See infra Section III.C.1.

Indeed, the government implies that Zalkind somehow did not

need the information that the FBI was withholding. The argument

offends logic, not to mention constitutional law. If the FBI had

concealed only their special relationship with Barboza and the

inducements offered to him, that alone would have been enough to

hamstring Zalkind.

The principle that a State may not knowingly

use false evidence, including false testimony,
to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in
any concept of ordered liberty, does not cease
to apply merely because the false testimony
goes only to the credibility of the witness.
The jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and
reliability of a given witness may well be
determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is
upon such subtle factors as the possible
interest of the witness in testifying falsely
that a defendant’s life or liberty may depend.

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). If the jury could

not have fully evaluated Barboza without this information, Zalkind

surely could not.

But the FBI’s withholding went much further. They withheld

the Durham documents, including exonerating information about the

plaintiffs on the Patriarca wire, as well as information garnered

from the Flemmi brothers. It is clear that if Zalkind had had

this information he would have had to do what the current Suffolk

-131-
County authorities did -- acknowledge that his ethical and legal

obligations precluded prosecution.170

d. The FBI’s Efforts Continued over Thirty Years

As the record reflects, the FBI’s efforts did not stop with

the conviction. Over the next thirty years, by protecting Barboza

in extraordinary ways, by not disclosing the exculpatory

information they had, by jealously guarding the only means for

discovering the injustice, the information in their files, and by

alternately coddling and pressuring the perjurer, the FBI was

responsible for keeping these innocent men in jail. See supra

Section III.D.; infra Section IV.C. A person "who takes an active

part in continuing or procuring the continuation of criminal

proceedings initiated . . . by another is subject to the same

liability for malicious prosecution as if he had then initiated

the proceedings." Mitchell, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 215 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jones, 856 F.2d at 993

("[D]efendants systematically concealed from the prosecutors, and

misrepresented to them, facts highly material to - that is, facts

likely to influence - the decision whether to prosecute . . . and

whether (that decision having been made) to continue prosecuting .

. . right up to and into the trial.").

170
This situation is not remotely analogous to that in Correllas v.
Viveiros, where the information-giver was herself involved in the crime.
Viveiros was a suspect in the very same theft and the police knew that.
Whatever information the police could glean from her implicating another was
information that they could independently evaluate based on their knowledge of
her bias. See 572 N.E.2d at 10.

-132-
 Consider what would have happened if there had been full

disclosure: (1) If Suffolk County officials had had the

exonerating information from the Patriarca wire and the informant

reports, they would have concluded that there was substance to

Barboza’s recantation in 1970. Instead, they credited AUSA

Harrington who claimed it was nothing more than a mob attempt to

get Barboza to withdraw truthful testimony. (2) If the

information had been disclosed at the time of Barboza's trial for

the murder of Clay Wilson, Barboza's comments to Ambrosini (about

framing Salvati) would have been investigated. Instead, Condon,

Rico, and Harrington vouched for Barboza again, telling the jury

what he had done to help the FBI and how threatened he was. (3)

If the information had been disclosed at the time of the state

Stuart investigation, see supra note 127, it would have revealed

Barboza's perjury with respect to all four plaintiffs, and not

just Rico's belief that Jimmy Flemmi "probably" was involved. (4)

If the information had accompanied the plaintiffs' myriad motions

for a new trial, they might well have been successful. The

evidence the state courts labeled "cumulative," combined with the

Durham documents, would have been dispositive evidence of

plaintiffs' innocence. (5) And finally, if the FBI had shared the

exculpatory information with the parole authorities, and the

Governors of Massachusetts, the plaintiffs' sentences might well

have been commuted far earlier.

-133-
 But apart from speculating about outcomes, one thing is

certain. None of these entities could conduct an independent

investigation; they did just what Zalkind, state law enforcement,

and the parole authorities did: Ask the FBI. And the FBI was not

talking.

2. Lack of Probable Cause

Under Massachusetts law, "probable cause is such a state of

facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a man of

ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest

and strong suspicion, that the person arrested is guilty." Lincoln

v. Shea, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1972) (internal quotations omitted).

The burden of proving lack of probable cause rests on plaintiffs.

Lincoln, 277 N.E.2d at 700.

To determine whether probable cause was lacking, I look to

the information that the defendant had available at the time it

took the actions in question.171 A preliminary word about

Barboza’s information: Plaintiffs argue that I should exclude

Barboza’s information from the probable cause calculus because his

171
The government has introduced a number of exhibits dealing with
plaintiffs’ other alleged "bad acts." The parties hotly disputed the
admissibility and relevance of these exhibits at trial. I admitted them in an
effort to allow the government wide latitude to make its probable cause
defense. The government has not used any of these exhibits in its Proposed
Findings of Fact and Rulings of Law. Indeed, none of these exhibits, 2228-
2302, relate to the Deegan murder. None of them counter plaintiffs’ proof of
lack of probable cause. In fact, they prove the opposite. To the extent that
the FBI had derogatory information about the men, it had a motive to encourage
their prosecution regardless of how flimsy the basis. Relying on these "bad
acts" comes close to saying that it did not matter if these men were innocent
of this crime; they committed others, and that’s good enough. Our system does
not work that way.

-134-
testimony was perjured and the FBI suborned that perjury. I will

address that claim infra. At this stage of the analysis, however,

I consider all of the information available to the government,

including Barboza’s. See Carroll v. Gillespie, 436 N.E.2d 431,

436 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (whether information amounts to probable

cause includes the question of "whether it was reasonable for the

defendant to have relied upon that information, given its quality,

quantity, and the availability of additional information.").

a. Information Available to the FBI at the Time

(1) Barboza’s Credibility

As is usual, whenever law enforcement enlists a co-

conspirator to testify against his compatriots, officers are

supposed to be skeptical of the information they receive. This

was particularly the case with Barboza. As Rico described,

Barboza was a "stone killer" but the "instrument [they] had."

Exh. 170 at 189. They knew that he would lie about Jimmy Flemmi’s

participation in any murder, and in particular, the Deegan murder.

See supra Section III.B.4.a. They had extraordinarily reliable

information that Flemmi and Barboza were about to kill Deegan, see

supra Section III.B.b.1., and later that they had followed

through. See supra Sections III.B.4.b.2., III.B.4.c.

FBI concerns should have been heightened even further on

September 8, 1967. It was not only that Barboza mentioned the

plaintiffs’ names for the first time, contradicting every shred of

information that the FBI had from their extraordinary sources that

-135-
there were five participants: Barboza, Flemmi, Cassesso, French

and Martin. See supra Section III.B.4.b. It was also the way in

which Barboza’s testimony changed from debriefing to debriefing

that should have alerted them to his perjury (assuming that they

were not themselves responsible for it).172

(2) Limone and Tameleo

Suddenly, Barboza stated that Limone was the instigator of

the "hit" with Tameleo approving it, although the wire indicated

that Limone had expressly warned Deegan about the threats and it

was Patriarca who had approved the action. In fact, the FBI knew

precisely how the Deegan killing was commissioned; it had a

recording of it. Jimmy Flemmi and Barboza obtained permission

from Patriarca, who told them to get final approval from Angiulo.

The FBI had every reason to believe that Barboza had constructed

Limone’s and Tameleo’s participation out of whole cloth.

(3) Greco

Barboza indicated that Greco was a participant, joining the

group at the Ebb Tide before Deegan’s murder, wearing a brown

topcoat. The FBI knew none of the witnesses had seen Greco on the

scene or at the Ebb Tide. See e.g., Exh. 33. In short order,

then, Barboza’s story changed, taking Greco out of the group

meeting in the bar and, indicating that he could not remember what

172
Indeed, as I find in Section IV.B.2.b.1, the record suggests that the
FBI went further, supplying Barboza with reports and other information to
shore up what they knew to be false testimony. I want to make clear, however,
that even if Barboza had altered the story without their aid, the FBI had no
probable cause to pursue this prosecution.

-136-
he was wearing. Compare Exh. 71A-2 (dated September 12, 1967)

(Greco left the Ebb Tide at the same time as the others) and Exh.

71A-3, Exh. 95 (dated October 16, 1967) (Greco did not go to the

Ebb Tide that night).

When Barboza claimed that Greco was in the alleyway with

Deegan and shot him with a .45 caliber gun, the FBI had

information that Cassesso was with Martin in the alleyway, see

Exh. 28, and indeed, that Barboza had claimed that he had shot

Deegan with the only .45 on the scene. See Exh. 34; Exh. 68; see

also Exh. 57 at 26 (only one .45 caliber gun).

(4) Salvati

Barboza accused Salvati of being in the car with him,

prepared to kill Stathopoulos. The FBI had never heard of Salvati

at all when he was first mentioned -- not anywhere in the FBI’s

files, as Rico noted, no "derogatory information" whatsoever,

much less information linking him to a homicide. Rico and Condon

plainly knew that Barboza was lying. Barboza’s story --

especially as it concerned Salvati -- was preposterous.173

The FBI did not have probable cause to believe that the

plaintiffs had been involved in the Deegan murder. Indeed, they

had every reason to believe otherwise.

173
Barboza had specifically noted that the car he was in had been
approached by a "Chelsea Police Captain," information he could only have had
if law enforcement had told him about it. Kowzlowski had been off-duty on
that night, not in uniform. See Exh. 2312 at 4680. Captain Kowzlowski
reported the man in the car had a bald spot. Rico knew that that fit Flemmi’s
description, and Barboza would not implicate Flemmi. By his October 16, 1967
statement, Barboza explained that Salvati wore a bald wig.

-137-
 b. Conviction is Not Conclusive Proof of Probable
Cause on these Facts

The government argues that the plaintiffs’ convictions are

conclusive proof of probable cause, thereby barring their

malicious prosecution claims. See Della Jacova, 244 N.E.2d at 582

("The general rule in the Commonwealth is that conviction in the

tribunal to which complaint is made, although reversed . . . is

conclusive proof of probable cause.").

The conviction rule, like the initiation requirement, was

designed to insulate law enforcement from frivolous lawsuits. If

there was enough evidence for a conviction, surely there was

probable cause to initiate the prosecution. But there are

exceptions: A conviction does not establish probable cause where

the conviction "(1) was obtained solely by false testimony of the

defendant in the action for malicious prosecution, or (2) is

impeached on some ground recognized by the law, such as fraud,

conspiracy, perjury, or subornation of perjury as its sole

foundation." Della Jacova v. Widett, 244 N.E.2d at 582. See also

Ramos v. Gallo, 596 F. Supp. 833, 840 (D. Mass. 1984). Put

simply, the conviction rule was obviously not intended to permit

defendants to use their own misconduct as a shield. Two questions

must then be answered in evaluating the significance of these

convictions: Was there misconduct by the defendant and was that

misconduct the sole cause of the conviction?

-138-
 That the answer to both questions is "yes" is clear first

from the history of the Durham disclosure and its seismic impact

on these prosecutions. When, in 2000, Special Attorney Durham,

head of the DOJ’s Justice Task Force, sent the plaintiffs’ then-

attorneys and Suffolk ADA Mark Lee the five Durham documents, he

expressly acknowledged their significance in the plaintiffs’

efforts to secure their release. And he was right: In short

order, on January 5, 2001, at a hearing on Limone’s Motion for a

New Trial before Judge Hinkle, ADA Lee explained:

[t]hese reports had previously been

undisclosed to anyone concerned with this
litigation. And when these reports, Your
Honor, are read, particularly with an eye
towards comparing the reports to the existing
evidence which includes the trial testimony,
the trial transcripts which are part of the
record, the Commonwealth concludes that
clearly these FBI reports undermine material
aspects of the testimony that was given at
trial by the Commonwealth’s chief witness. In
addition, the FBI reports clearly undermine
the theory of the Commonwealth’s case with
respect to Mr. Limone.

Exh. 1 at 8 (italics supplied). The Commonwealth immediately

moved to vacate Limone’s conviction, grant him a new trial, and

admit him to bail. Judge Hinkle granted the motion for a new

trial "on the basis of . . . the FBI records, nothing more." Exh.

1 at 15 (italics supplied). Within a month, the Commonwealth

entered nolle prosequis in its case against Limone and Salvati,

concluding that it did not have a good faith basis "legally or

ethically" to proceed with the cases. See Exh. 3B; Exh. 3D.

-139-
Nolle prosequis were later entered posthumously as to Greco and

Tameleo. See Exh. 3G; Exh. 3H.

The FBI documents were disclosed. The plaintiffs’ cases were

nolle prossed. The FBI’s misconduct caused the plaintiffs’

convictions; its exposure nullified them. On this record it is

clear: plaintiffs’ convictions do not bar their malicious

prosecution claims.

In the instant bench trial, however, there was far, far more

evidence than simply the Durham documents -- evidence which makes

the FBI’s misconduct and its impact on these prosecutions even

more clear. The verdict in this case was impeached by the FBI’s

subornation of perjury and by fundamental violations of due

process.

(1) Subornation

The government argues that "even if" Agents Rico and Condon

knew that Barboza’s story was false -- and I find that they did --

plaintiffs have not established that the FBI suborned perjury.

"[M]ere knowing that the person has testified or would testify

unlawfully or commit perjury is not subornation of perjury."

Petite v. U.S., 262 F.2d 788, 796 (4th Cir. 1959). Subornation

requires more, namely that the putative suborner knew and

"willfully induced" or "procured" the witness to give the false

testimony. Id. at 794.

I agree. Massachusetts, as in Petite, defines subornation of

perjury as "procuring another person to commit perjury," M.G.L. c.

-140-
268 § 2, akin to an accessory before the fact to the crime of

perjury. See Commonwealth v. Fine, 73 N.E.2d 250, 252 (Mass.

1947). Procurement includes inciting, instigating, or persuading

the witness to commit the crime. See Commonwealth v. Borans, 393

N.E.2d 911, 925 (Mass. 1979).

Borans is illustrative. In Borans, the Supreme Judicial

Court found that the defendant’s course of action went beyond

simply "the suggestion of a course of perjury," which may or may

not be subornation, to the "inciting, instigating, or persuading"

realm. The witness had told one story and then offered a

different account before the grand jury. The defendant -- calling

it "counseling" -- told the witness that if he would "stick to the

story," meaning the second account, he would not be in trouble,

and said it repeatedly. In addition, the defendant told the

witness that another witness would corroborate the false

testimony. Borans, 393 N.E.2d at 926.

In effect, then, subornation of perjury can be found along a

spectrum of behavior -- with standing idly by, just knowing a

witness is lying at one end (which is not enough) to expressly

asking a witness to falsely implicate an innocent individual at

the other (which is). Instigation, incitement, solicitation, and

persuasion are points along the continuum, in which the suborner

is deemed more and more responsible for the ultimate act of

perjury, and the perjury is less and less a product of the

witness’ independent act. Thus, Rico and Condon need not have

-141-
pressured Barboza to craft a story implicating the plaintiffs.

Conduct short of that plainly qualifies as subornation of perjury.

When Barboza announced to Rico and Condon on March 8, 1967,

that he would never let Jimmy Flemmi "fry," the government went

beyond tacitly agreeing to Barboza’s terms. Knowing that he would

lie about Flemmi, they pressed him to move from being a source of

information to being a witness, even putting him before a grand

jury (on March 21, 1967), long before he had agreed to testify.

And beyond words, there were deeds -- negotiating immunity for

Barboza, protection for his wife and family, where he would be

incarcerated, rewards notwithstanding his announced intention to

lie.

In September, when Barboza pulled the plaintiffs’ names out

of thin air, the FBI did not contradict him, confront him,

question him about the change in his story, much less tell the

state authorities. Instead, they joined the state authorities as

Barboza’s Deegan testimony was prepared, continuing to reward him,

showing again by what they said and did that adding these names

was fine. They as much as told him to "stick to the September 8

story," as did the defendant in Borans.

Barboza was obviously not an ordinary witness. He was an

extraordinarily vulnerable witness, brought forward to testify

against the LCN, dependent upon the FBI for his physical

protection, not to mention immunity from prosecution.

-142-
Solicitation, instigation and even persuasion had a different

resonance with him than it might in the usual instance.

In any case, the record supports an even more proactive role

on the part of the FBI with regard to Barboza. The FBI clearly

prepared Barboza for cross-examination. They either showed or

told him about law enforcement reports to shore up his testimony,

or condoned the state authorities’ efforts to do so. As described

below, Barboza’s testimony managed to account for the facts that

would have been in state files and/or in the possession of defense

counsel: the "bald man" identification of Kowzlowki, which led to

testimony about Salvati and the bald wig; the fact that no

witnesses put Greco at the Ebb Tide, which led to a change in

Barboza's testimony; the efforts to shape his testimony with

regard to pre-murder meetings when Markham showed him his Florida

ticket; accounting for the Karger testimony, right after FBI

agents had visited Karger, and so on. See supra note 91. They

even leaked defense information that the FBI had garnered.

Moreover, the FBI went beyond what the defendant in Borans

had done -- telling the perjurer that other witnesses would

corroborate his account. The FBI actually provided corroborating

accounts -- Fitzgerald’s testimony about the bribe attempt (which

was not about the Deegan murder), Stathopoulos’ "identification"

of Greco (notwithstanding the FBI’s earlier reports) -- leading

finally to Condon’s own testimony, which expressly validated

Barboza’s perjury.

-143-
 In short, the record establishes that the FBI took actions

across the entire subornation spectrum: They stood by listening,

knowing that Barboza was lying; they stood by, knowing he was

lying and withholding the exonerating proof; they coached him in

his lying, shoring up the story they knew to be false, showing him

or telling him about police reports and defense tactics; they

rewarded him for his lies; they sought to corroborate his lies

with other witnesses whom they controlled; they did all this and

then vouched for the veracity of his lies -- to the DA and to the

jury.

(2) Due Process

While it enumerates several types of misconduct --

subornation, fraud, conspiracy -- the case law simply requires

that the conviction be "impeached on some ground recognized by the

law." Della Jacova, 244 N.E.2d at 582. The convictions,

therefore, are also overcome because they were procured through

the egregious violation of the plaintiffs’ due process rights. As

the First Circuit described it, "we are unsure what due process

entails if not protection against deliberate framing under color

of official sanction," Limone, 372 F.3d at 45, "turn[ing]

[Barboza] over to the Suffolk County district attorney, knowing

that [his] false testimony would be used to prosecute [the

plaintiffs] for a crime they did not commit," and "fail[ing] to

disclose exculpatory evidence before, during, and after the

-144-
trial." See Limone, 372 F.3d at 49.174 See also Mooney v.

Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (due process "is a requirement

that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing

if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a

trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a

defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and

jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured.").

Likewise, in Napue v. Illinois, the prosecution’s star

witness testified that he had not received any consideration from

the state for his testimony. The prosecutor knew this testimony

was false but did not correct it. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.

264, 265-66 (1959). The Supreme Court held that,

it is established that a conviction obtained

through use of false evidence, known to be
such by representatives of the State, must
fall under the Fourteenth Amendment. . . The
same result obtains when the State, although
not soliciting false evidence, allows it to
go uncorrected when it appears.

Napue, 360 U.S. at 269.

The constitutional duty to intervene to correct false

testimony by a government witness is not limited to the prosecutor

in a given case. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269 (attributing the duty

to "representatives of the State"); Pyle, 317 U.S. at 216

(attributing the duty to "state authorities"); Mooney, 294 U.S. at

174
The Court was addressing these issues in connection with the FBI’s
claim of qualified immunity. The analysis is similar: The allegations if
proved were so egregious that no reasonable officer could have believed his
conduct was immunized. I find that they have been proved.

-145-
112 (attributing the duty to "the State"); Smith v. Florida, 410

F.2d 1349, 1350-51 (5th Cir. 1969) (police officers violate this

duty if they suborn perjury even without the prosecutor's

knowledge); Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 1958)

(adopting Pyle, and finding that law enforcement officers violated

their constitutional duty by suborning perjury).

The FTCA, of course, does not hold the government liable for

constitutional torts. The issue here is the impact of these

constitutional defects on whether the plaintiffs’ convictions were

impeached and thus whether they are "conclusive proof" of probable

cause.

The plaintiffs’ convictions were the direct result of

constitutional violations laid at the doorstep of the FBI. As

such, they pose no obstacle to the plaintiffs’ showing of lack of

probable cause.

(3) FBI’s Misconduct/Barboza’s Testimony -

The Sole Foundation

Barboza’s testimony was the only trial evidence against two

of the plaintiffs, Limone and Salvati. See generally Exh. 2312.

Without it, there would have been no conviction. Indeed, there

would have been no charges.

There was some evidence against Tameleo and Greco, but upon

closer inspection it was inconsequential.

(a) The Fitzgerald Bribe Testimony

-146-
 John Fitzgerald, Barboza’s attorney, testified that Tameleo

and Greco attempted to bribe Barboza into not cooperating with the

authorities in the Deegan case.175 This was not independent

evidence that could have supported their convictions, however,

because the FBI knew this testimony to be false to the extent that

it implied that Barboza’s testimony in the Deegan case was

involved. The bribe offer predated any mention by Barboza of the

plaintiffs as participants in the Deegan murder.176 Indeed, the

purported bribers indicated that they did not care if Barboza

testified in other Boston cases. See Exh. 287; Exh. 288; Exh.

71B-64; Exh. 71B-19.

The FBI was responsible for developing Fitzgerald as a

witness and, again, did not disclose the FBI reports that

undermined his testimony. See Ex. 51G at 1 (recommending an

incentive award for Rico based in part on his "instrumental" work

in developing Fitzgerald for the Deegan matter). Fitzgerald’s

testimony therefore comes under the umbrella of FBI misconduct.

(b) The Stathopolous Identification

The other evidence implicating Greco was Stathopolous’s

purported "identification" of Greco as one of the shooters. All

Stathopolous said, however, was that Greco "look[ed] like" the man

175
See supra Section III.C.2.
176
Information with respect to the bribe was uncovered by the FBI in
July of 1967. Documents generated at the time suggest that the bribe involved
the Marfeo prosecution and Barboza’s testimony against Patriarca and Tameleo.
See Exh. 287.

-147-
he had seen in the alley. See Exh. 105F at 4961, 5027-28.

Resemblance identification alone cannot support a conviction. See

e.g., Commonwealth v. Bishop, 401 N.E.2d 895, 898 (Mass. App. Ct.

1980) (accepting the principle that resemblance identification is

insufficient without corroborating evidence). This is especially

so where it had been expressly contradicted by Stathopolous’ prior

statements, and where the witness was unable to identify the

defendant at any other time. See supra Section II.C.2.

c. No Other Evidence

The government attempts to throw up a smokescreen, suggesting

that the convictions came about not because of FBI misconduct, but

because of the failures of defense counsel, or their conflicts of

interest. The defense really had all the information it needed,

the government suggests, as did the state authorities. If there

was a conviction, it was their fault, not the FBI’s. The FBI's

defaults were not the "sole cause" of the conviction.

Every single witness denies ever seeing the Durham documents

before -- including the Deegan information on the Patriarca wire,

and the informant reports -- from the present Suffolk County ADA

who nolle prossed the charges against the plaintiffs, to the

former ADA Zalkind, to defense counsel who testified in the

instant trial, Attorneys Chisholm and Balliro. While the fact of

the Patriarca wire had become public in the Marfeo case, see supra

note 102, as had some of its content, there is no doubt that

nothing about the Deegan case was disclosed. Indeed, Condon was

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scrupulous about withholding any federal memos, notwithstanding

their relevance to his testimony (and to the plaintiffs'

innocence). Finally, whatever conflicts of interest Balliro had,

as counsel for both Tameleo and Jimmy Flemmi, they do not excuse

the government of responsibility for its misconduct.

3. Malice and Termination

Actions taken in good faith insulate the actor from malicious

prosecution liability. See Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 441 N.E.2d 1035,

1039 n. 9 (Mass. 1982).

[T]he malice necessary to be shown in order to

maintain this [malicious prosecution] action,
is not necessarily revenge or other base and
malignant passion. What ever is done wilfully
and purposely, if it be at the same time wrong
and unlawful, and that known to the party, is
in legal contemplation malicious. That which
is done contrary to one's own conviction of
duty, or with a wilful disregard of the rights
of others, whether it be to compass some
unlawful end, or some lawful end by unlawful
means, or, in the language of the charge, to
do a wrong and unlawful act knowing it to be
such, constitutes legal malice.

Wills v. Noyes, 12 Pick. 324, 328 (1832) (quoted in Beecy, 387

N.E.2d at 1039 n.9). See also Seelig v. Harvard Coop. Soc’y, 246

N.E.2d 642, 646 (Mass. 1969) (finding of want of probable cause is

a sufficient basis from which to infer malice).

Malice has plainly been shown in this record. The FBI wanted

LCN members taken down for Deegan’s murder; they congratulated

themselves when Limone and Tameleo were initially sent to their

deaths, with Greco and Salvati as collateral damage. And in the

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evidence introduced at this bench trial, Rico and Condon lied

about what they knew and when they knew it. They were indifferent

to the outcome of the Deegan case. Either way, they threw away

the liberty of these four men with wilful disregard for their

rights. Their actions were purposeful and unlawful. If anything

shocks the conscience, it is this behavior.

When asked by a member of the House Committee if he had any

remorse for the part he played in the Deegan affair, Rico

responded "Would you like tears or something?" Exh. 170 at 186.

That statement encapsulates the utter disregard the FBI displayed

for the lives and families they sacrificed at the alter of their

war against organized crime.177

Each of the plaintiffs’ prosecutions has been nolle prossed

by the State of Massachusetts: Peter Limone and Joseph Salvati’s

on January 30, 2001, Louis Greco and Henry Tameleo’s posthumously

on September 23, 2004 and January 25, 2007, respectively. See

Exh. 3B; Exh. 3D; Exh. 3G; Exh. 3H. See also Wynne v. Rosen, 494

N.E.2d 1348, 1351 (Mass. 1984) (holding that a nolle prosequi is

favorable termination where the circumstances "compel an inference

that there existed a lack of reasonable grounds to pursue the

prosecution"). The District Attorney’s office concluded in each

case that they could neither legally nor ethically pursue the

177
One Congressman asked how these men could have gone to death row on
the basis of Barboza's testimony, adding: "As an experienced law enforcement
officer, isn't that shaky, even by confidential informant standards?" Rico
answered, "Well, there isn't any good answer to that." Exh. 170 at 199.

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cases against plaintiffs in light of the Durham documents. See

Exh. 3B; Exh. 3D; Exh. 3G; Exh. 3H.

4. Not a "Failure to Disclose" Claim

In its concluding papers to this bench trial, just as it has

done throughout the litigation, the government again attempts to

reduce these allegations to the "failure to disclose exculpatory

evidence." Since FTCA liability can only be imposed in instances

where a private individual can be held liable under analogous

circumstances, and since the disclosure of exculpatory evidence

has no private analog, the government argues, plaintiffs have no

case. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674; Bolduc v. United States,

402 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Under the FTCA, the relevant

inquiry is not whether state law might assign a duty to a private

person in the same or similar circumstances, but, rather, whether

state law would impose liability on a private person in the same

or similar circumstances.") (italics supplied).

They remind the Court that constitutional tort claims cannot

be brought under the FTCA: In Bolduc, the First Circuit held that

jurisdiction under the FTCA cannot be premised on a Brady v.

Maryland claim; rather, it must be premised on a common law tort.

See Bolduc, 402 F.3d at 56; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963).178 The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s

178
In that case, plaintiffs brought a negligence claim against the
government (standing in the shoes of employee FBI agents) for the FBI’s
failure to turn over Brady documents. FBI Agents Craft and Craig investigated
a bank robbery at the Southgate mall in Wisconsin. The agents gathered
eyewitness and showed them photographs of potential perpetrators; the photos

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rejection of plaintiffs’ negligence and negligent supervision

claims. Plaintiffs argued that a negligence claim consists of a

duty of care, a breach of that duty, causation, and damage -- and

that the FBI breached its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.

The First Circuit described their argument as "unconvincing."

The appellants have not pointed to any

instance in which Wisconsin has imposed
private liability on a prosecutor or other
state agent for a failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence. That is a fatal flaw,
for the federal government does not yield its
immunity with respect to obligations that are
peculiar to governments or official-capacity
state actors and which have no private
counterpart in state law . . . Because
Wisconsin’s recognition of a governmental duty
to disclose exculpatory evidence does not
ground private liability under that state’s
law, it cannot serve as a hook on which to
hang federal jurisdiction here.

Bolduc, 402 F.3d at 57.179

did not include pictures of the men eventually prosecuted and convicted for
the crime. One 302 report, written by Craft, recorded that the witnesses
found two of the photos "similar" to the robbers. Another 302, written by
Craig, described the identification as "identical." See Bolduc, 402 F.3d at
52. Craft was responsible for reviewing the reports and correcting any
errors, after which he was to put them in the case file. Craft, however,
excluded the reports from the file. Later, two other men -- Bolduc and Larken
-- were arrested, charged, and convicted. The witnesses who had made the
prior "similar" or "identical" IDs, now fingered Bolduc and Larken for the
crime. The prosecution never mentioned the previous contradictory
identifications. Eventually, the exculpatory reports were made known, someone
else confessed to the crime, and Bolduc and Larken filed a suit under the
FTCA.
179
Of course, a plaintiff may bring a claim under the FTCA if the state
would impose tort liability on a private person in sufficiently similar
circumstances. Therefore, in Bolduc, the court next asked whether Wisconsin
would impose tort liability on "a person who comes into possession of
exculpatory evidence as part of an official investigation and carelessly fails
to disclose that evidence to prosecutors (and, ultimately, to the accused)."
Bolduc, 402 F.3d at 57. In a like case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
determined that where a doctor’s negligent performance of an autopsy resulted
in the plaintiff’s wrongful prosecution, "he is still not held liable to the
person who has been subjected to unjustifiable prosecution in the absence of

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 The case at bar is completely different. In Bolduc, the

plaintiffs were attempting to use Brady’s constitutional duty to

meet a legal requirement: negligence claims require a duty; the

duty in question was spelled out under Brady; defendants breached

that duty, therefore liability. By contrast, plaintiffs' claims

in the case at bar do not rest on violation of Brady as a legal

premise. The FBI’s non-disclosure of those documents is a factual

issue; it was part of a broader scheme to put Barboza forward as a

witness no matter the cost, even if it meant framing the

plaintiffs. A private citizen who framed another for murder would

be in the same position. The First Circuit said it best:

The [defendant’s] argument has an even deeper

flaw: it rests on a self-serving
mischaracterization of the factual allegations
set out in the amended complaints. The
plaintiffs have not pleaded a separate claim
that their rights were violated merely by the
appellants' failure to divulge some discrete
piece of Brady evidence. Rather, they have
eschewed such a course in favor of a more
sweeping accusation that the appellants
actively participated in a plot to secure and
sustain unjust convictions against innocent
men. Though this scheme includes
suballegations that occasionally involve Brady
violations (e.g., suppression of exculpatory
information), the overall charge cannot be
shoehorned into the relatively narrow confines
of the Brady rubric. As the district court
put it, the ‘individual allegations of
non-disclosure’ are not meant to be
self-sustaining, but, rather, ‘are an integral
part of the overall story.’

malice." Bolduc, 402 F.3d at 59 (quoting Bromund v. Holt, 129 N.W.2d 149, 153
(Wisc. 1964)). The First Circuit concluded that Wisconsin law would not
impose tort liability for the negligent failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence, and so the FTCA claim necessarily failed.

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Limone, 372 F.3d at 46-47.180

5. Massachusetts Survival Statute

The United States previously argued that the Greco and

Tameleo plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims must fail on the

ground that such claims do not survive the death of the victim,

pursuant to the Massachusetts Survival Statute, G.L. c. 228 §. 1.

The United States relies on an 1850 Massachusetts case, Nettleton

v. Dinehart, 59 Mass. 543 (1850). Nettleton was effectively

overruled by the SJC's decision in Harrison v. Loyal Protective

Life Ins. Co., 396 N.E.2d 987 (Mass. 1979). In Harrison, the

court rejected Nettleton's limitation of the Survival Statute's

language, "other damage to the person," as pertaining exclusively

to physical damage. The court held that the tort of intentional

infliction of emotional distress survived the death of the victim,

reasoning that "the statute is sufficiently dynamic to allow for a

change in judicial conceptions of what types of harm constitute

legally redressable 'damage to the person.'" Harrison 396 N.E.2d

at 989.181

180
The government also tries to use Bolduc to argue that because
plaintiffs have not cited a Massachusetts case imposing private tort liability
for "failure to disclose exculpatory evidence," the plaintiffs have no FTCA
standing. Again, the government misstates the plaintiffs’ claims, which sound
in malicious prosecution. There is ample Massachusetts precedent for imposing
liability on these facts, fully discussed in Section IV.B.1.
181
It is within my authority to predict the course of the Supreme
Judicial Court if "state law is sufficiently clear" to allow such a
prediction. See Hugel v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, LLP, 175
F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1999). See also Fischer v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust
Co., 857 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Michelin Tires, etc. v. First
National Bank of Boston, 666 F.2d 673, 682 (1st Cir. 1981)) (Even in the
absence of a "definitive ruling" by the highest state court, federal courts

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 C. Civil Conspiracy

Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim sounds in the coercion

theory of liability.182 This type of conspiracy, dubbed a "true

conspiracy ... occurs when the conspirators, acting in unison,

exercise a peculiar power of coercion over the plaintiff[s] that

they would not have had if they had acted alone." Robinson v.

Bodoff, 355 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 (D. Mass. 2005) (internal

quotations omitted); see also Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P & B

may draw on "analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any
other reliable data tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the
state would decide the issue at hand."). In fact, if I am able to predict
their course, I am bound to. See Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Bruce Miner
Co., 757 F.2d 440, 443 n.3 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Although Massachusetts allows
certification of difficult questions of state law to the Supreme Judicial
Court, it is inappropriate for a federal court to use such a procedure when
the course state courts would take is reasonably clear."). In this instance
it is clear. I conclude that in the case at bar, the SJC -- if presented with
the question of the survival of a malicious prosecution action -- would rule
as it did in Harrison, and find that the tort survives.
182
Plaintiffs also bring a claim for tort-based civil conspiracy, which
requires a predicate tort, and is essentially another vehicle for imposing
joint or vicarious liability. See Robinson v. Bodoff, 355 F. Supp. 2d 578,
585 ("ascrib[ing] liability to those who substantially assist or encourage
others to commit torts"); Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. 43 F.3d at 1564 (requiring "a
common design or agreement," express or implied, "and second, proof of some
tortious act done in furtherance of the agreement"); Stock v. Fife, 430 N.E.2d
845, 849 n. 10 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (referring to "a common plan to commit a
tortious act where the participants know of the plan and its purpose and take
affirmative steps to encourage the achievement of the result"); Zereski v.
American Postal Workers Union, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 507, 27-28 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 1998).

The predicate tort in this case could be either malicious prosecution or

intentional infliction of emotional distress -- I find for the plaintiffs on
each of those claims. This version of conspiracy, however, is superfluous. I
find the United States liable for those two claims -- both in that the
government is the defendant here and because Rico and Condon were not renegade
actors. Kehoe, Handley, and the entire FBI supervisory structure was in on
the wrongdoing. Because all of those actors played a part in the commission
of the underlying tortious conduct during the entire period challenged, the
conspiracy claim is redundant.

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Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546, 1564 (1st Cir. 1994).183 The salient

factors in this claim are the "peculiar power of coercion"

involved and relatedly, "that the conspiracy achieved what

individuals could not achieve." Kurker v. Hill, 689 N.E.2d 833,

836-37. It is most often used in connection with combinations of

employers or employees, working together in "concerted refusals to

deal." Mass. Labover's Health & Welfare Fund, 62 F. Supp. 2d 236,

244 (D. Mass. 1999).

There is no better example of the "peculiar power of

coercion" than the FBI’s actions here. Together with Barboza and

the Flemmi brothers, the FBI created a trap that was impossible

for the plaintiffs to escape. They used their law enforcement

powers -- to reward, protect, and immunize Barboza -- to keep him

from changing his story. They used their unique status as federal

officers, to keep federal memoranda from state authorities,

183
The FBI did not bother to argue this claim in their closing papers,
resting on the erroneous conclusion that it rises and falls on the fate of the
malicious prosecution claim.

In a true conspiracy, "coercion" substitutes for an underlying tort.

See Kurker v. Hill, 689 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) ("The element of
coercion has been required only if there was no independent basis for imposing
tort liability -- where the wrong was in the particular combination of the
defendants rather than in the tortious nature of the underlying conduct.");
Massachusetts Laborers’ Health and Welfare Fund v. Phillip Morris, 62 F. Supp.
2d 236, 244 (1999) ("The exercise of this ‘peculiar power of coercion’ is
itself the wrong, and no other tortious act need be shown."); Massachusetts
Laborers’ Health and Welfare Fund v. Phillip Morris, 62 F. Supp. 2d 236, 244
(1999); Wajda v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d 29, 37 (D. Mass.
2000).

In addition to coercion, the tort requires that the conspirators have

combined to accomplish an unlawful purpose or other purpose by unlawful means,
and that the plaintiff suffer damage. See Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1
(1870). "It is fundamental that a conspiracy may be unlawful in its purpose
or in the means employed to carry it on." Willet v. Herrick, 136 N.E. 366,
369 (Mass. 1922).

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memoranda which would have disclosed the truth. They created the

perfect lie -- not bothering to tell the state that it was an

unwitting pawn in their end game. Only the FBI and Barboza (and

the Flemmis) had the information to disprove Barboza’s perjured

testimony.

Courts deny coercion-based conspiracy claims when there is

nothing unusual about the power wielded by the defendants. See

Fleming v. Dane, 22 N.E.2d 609, 611.184 But unusual -- or rather,

substantial -- power was the order of the day here. Unseasoned

prosecutor that he was, Zalkind made efforts to corroborate

Barboza’s story; but he was only able to corroborate around the

edges -- to verify the parts that were not fabricated with the

FBI’s complicity. This pattern was repeated each time the

plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial or commutation petition.

The FBI’s stonewalling prevented each of those decision makers

from uncovering the truth.

It is also necessary to show that the conspiracy achieved

something different in kind, rather than merely degree, from what

184
In Fleming, the Court concluded that the exercise of normal business
prerogatives could not create the "coercion" necessary to cross the line into
tortious behavior. "That power consisted in nothing more than the power to
make decisions as to foreclosures by a bank (a power which must be exercised
by someone in behalf of every bank) and the power to exercise in some manner
not stated ‘a commanding influence’ in the decisions of the selectmen as to
granting permits. We see nothing in the exercise of these powers by Dane and
Cousens in association with each other and with the other defendants as
alleged which gives to their acts in combination any greater or different
tortious quality than would be ascribed to the same acts if performed by
separate individuals only." Fleming, 22 N.E.2d at 611-12. Compare Willett,
136 N.E. at 370 (holding that it is tortious for "a combination of bankers to
inflict injury upon the business or credit of an individual by acts which
become illegal because of the influence and power they wield").

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any individual could do.185 Plaintiffs have done so. Without

Barboza, Rico and Condon obviously could not have influenced the

outcome of the Deegan trial. Without Rico and Condon, Barboza

could not have been as effective. If they had not vouched for

him, if they had not coached him, if they had not shored up his

testimony -- there would have been no peculiar coercive effect.

Had they shared even some of their information with Suffolk

County, the prosecution would not have gone forward. Had their

supervisors -- Kehoe, Handley, FBI officials in Washington to whom

all the relevant information was being forwarded -- refused to be

complicit in the subornation and decades-long cover-up, had they

intervened to prevent the ongoing wrongdoing they knew was

occurring, the plaintiffs would have been spared this ordeal.

To be sure, coercion-based civil conspiracy is a rare tort;

in fact, it is specific to Massachusetts. The First Circuit has

described it as a "very limited" cause of action. Aetna, 43 F.3d

at 1563. For the most part, courts find that its elements are not

met. But see Aetna, 43 F.3d at 1564. For example, in Wajda v.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co, et al., a plaintiff brought suit against

tobacco companies, alleging that members of the industry conspired

to deceive "the public about the health risks of smoking." Wajda,

103 F. Supp. 2d at 32. In particular, the plaintiff claimed that

the defendants agreed to conceal accurate information about the

185
See, e.g., Kurker, 689 N.E.2d at 836 (wrong is in the particular
combination of defendants achieving what individuals could not).

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dangers of cigarettes, and suppress the development of safer

cigarettes. Wajda, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 37.

The Court, however, concluded that her complaint failed to

plead that she was "coerced" into accepting the tobacco industry's

propaganda. Wajda, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 37.186 By contrast, the

plaintiffs in the instant case clearly suffered the coercive power

of the defendant and its co-conspirators.

What is more, comparing the FBI's actions -- fully and

specifically proved -- to that of tobacco companies brings the

uniqueness of plaintiffs' claims into stark relief. Assuming that

the tobacco industry did collude to suppress the truth about the

ravages of smoking, they were not the only actors in possession of

accurate knowledge. They could not prevent other actors --

scientists, doctors, public health officials -- from exposing the

danger of their product.

186
The plaintiff in Wajda did allege that the defendants inflicted
nicotine addiction on her -- a claim which could be construed as coercive.
But the Court determined there was no peculiar power at play -- that each
tobacco company, acting alone, could have done just the same. Wajda, 103 F.
Supp. 2d at 37.

In related litigation, the Massachusetts Laborers' Health & Welfare Fund

claimed that the defendant tobacco manufacturers, trade associations, and
distributors, conspired to "manipulate their own scientific research, conceal
unfavorable facts, and disseminate their own disinformation about cigarettes."
Mass Laborers, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 244. The Court dismissed the Fund's claim,
holding that an allegation of "generally exerted and generally felt power of
coercion" was insufficient to make out the tort of coercive conspiracy,
construing the tort to require not only a peculiar power created by a
particular combination of actors, but also a particularized target. Mass
Laborers, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 245 ("complaint does not allege that the
defendants had any power of coercion peculiarly focused against the Fund").
Again, the targets in the instant case were certainly particular.

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 By contrast, the FBI and its co-conspirators had a complete

monopoly on the truth and the means to prove it. Their

concealment actively prevented others from uncovering their

secrets. Whenever Barboza's story was questioned -- by Zalkind

during the initial prosecution, by Suffolk investigators following

up on Detective Stuart's claims or Southwood's information, by

Barboza's attempted recantation, in all the various motions for

new trial and commutation petitions -- the FBI was the wall the

questioner would run into.

On these facts, malicious prosecution and coercive conspiracy

may appear to be two sides of the same coin, but the claims are

distinct. Malicious prosecution is grounded in the defendant's

manipulation of the prosecutorial process (which in this case

extended to all subsequent proceedings.) The coerciveness at play

in this civil conspiracy is rooted in defendant's monopoly on

information over a long span of time.

The "common designs" -- to use conspiracy parlance -- of the

defendant and its co-conspirators can be described on multiple

levels.187 The FBI, Barboza, and Flemmi conspired to suborn

Barboza’s perjury. The FBI, Barboza, and Flemmi conspired to put

four innocent men behind bars. The FBI, Barboza, and Flemmi

conspired to keep them there -- thwarting plaintiffs' attempts to

187
The plaintiffs characterize the conspiracy as a conspiracy "to
procure the testimony of Joseph Barboza in the Deegan murder case knowing that
Barboza would not truthfully relate the details of the Deegan murder to
Suffolk County investigators," Tr. vol. 22, 36-37, or as a conspiracy to
provide continued high quality LCN information to the FBI.

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win appeals and pardons. The FBI, Barboza, and Flemmi conspired

to take down La Cosa Nostra - by whatever unlawful means

necessary. The FBI, Barboza, and Flemmi conspired to keep their

web of underworld relationships a secret. On any of these

theories, the FBI is liable. In fact, their conspiracy consisted

of many acts over many decades, designed to accomplish each of

these goals, most importantly to keep their initiatives intact and

hidden from public view and scrutiny.

As described in Section III.D.10, the FBI needed to keep its

skein of lies from unraveling. That is, exposure of one piece

threatened to expose the entire enterprise. If Barboza came

forward about his Deegan testimony, he would undermine the LCN

prosecutions and expose the Top Echelon program and the wire. And

so the FBI protected him, supported him, intervened when he seemed

poised to recant, even intervened when the State of California

wished to punish him for Wilson’s murder. Had Stephen Flemmi come

forward, either about his role in the Deegan case, or his

relationship with the FBI in general, all the secrets would have

come spilling out, undermining his usefulness. And so the FBI

protected him as well. By the time the plaintiffs were filing

commutation petitions, the FBI was in so deep there was no way to

right the wrong without exposing themselves and the secret

initiatives they had worked so hard to build at risk. Barboza and

Flemmi, likewise, were obedient partners in the FBI’s programs.

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They continued to commit crimes, for sure, but they refrained from

exposing the FBI’s secrets.

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Limone, Greco, Tameleo and Salvati raise claims of

intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") by FBI

agents who were involved in the events leading up to their

convictions and who participated in efforts to prolong their

imprisonment by silencing Barboza and meddling in their

commutation petitions. Likewise, the family members of all four

men claim that those agents committed IIED against them as

bystanders. I find that the plaintiffs have proven the elements

of all of their IIED claims, both bystander and direct.

1. Deegan Defendants’ Claims

To make out a claim of IIED, plaintiffs must show

(1)that the defendant intended to inflict

emotional distress, or knew or should have
known that emotional distress was the likely
result of his conduct, but also (2) that the
defendant's conduct was extreme and
outrageous, beyond all possible bounds of
decency and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community, (3) the actions of the defendant
were the cause of the plaintiff's distress,
and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the
plaintiff was severe and of such a nature that
no reasonable person could be expected to
endure it.

Tetrault v. Mahoney, Hawkes & Goldings, 681 N.E.2d 1189, 1197

(Mass. 1997) (quoting Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 180

(Mass. 1982)).

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 Plaintiffs have met these standards. Framing innocent men

for a capital crime, prolonging their suffering for decades while

they made futile attempt after attempt to win their freedom,

thwarted at every turn -- these are acts beyond all bounds of

decency. Perverting the system of justice they had sworn to

uphold -- that has no place in a civilized community. The

plaintiffs -- who knew themselves to be innocent -- were

wrongfully convicted. Three were told that they were to be

executed, another that he would live the rest of his natural born

life behind bars.188 There is no way to describe that kind of

horror than as so severe and of such a nature that no reasonable

person could be expected to endure it. The FBI’s conduct was

intentional, it was outrageous, it caused plaintiffs immeasurable

and unbearable pain, and the FBI must be held accountable.

The government makes no argument on the elements of IIED.

Rather, they argue that plaintiffs’ IIED claims fail as a matter

of law because the IIED claims "arise out of" the same conduct as

the malicious prosecution claims, which the government argues are

barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). This argument is erroneous on

all fronts. First, I have found the government liable for

malicious prosecution. See supra Section IV.B.

188
Section V, Damages, describes the myriad of other emotional harms
inflicted on the plaintiffs by virtue of their wrongful imprisonment -- their
loss of years with their spouses, the loss of watching their children grow,
the heartbreak of watching the effects of suffering on their families.

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 Second, even had the malicious prosecution claims failed,

that would not bar the IIED claims. The government's reliance on

Metz v. United States, 788 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1986), is

misplaced. Metz held that "a cause of action which is distinct

from one of those excepted under § 2860(h) will nevertheless be

deemed to 'arise out of' an excepted cause of action when the

underlying governmental conduct which constitutes an excepted

cause of action is essential to the plaintiff's claim." 788 F.2d

at 1534 (emphasis in original). The Eleventh Circuit reasoned

that because the plaintiff's only injury in that case was his

false arrest, and false arrest was barred as a cause of action

under § 2860(h), his IIED claim was barred as well. See Metz, 788

F.2d at 1535. The government argues that I must conclude the same

here. But Metz is not the law of the First Circuit, which has in

fact taken the opposite position.

In Santiago-Ramirez v. Secretary of the Department of

Defense, 984 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1993), the First Circuit held

that, although the plaintiff's false imprisonment/arrest claims

were barred by § 2860(h), her complaint could still be read to

plead intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The Circuit reasoned that "although appellant's claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress may overlap with a

claim for false imprisonment, which is excepted, it does not

follow that the first claim is also excepted." Id. at 21 (citing

Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. 289, 298 (1983) ("the partial overlap

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between . . . two tort actions does not support the conclusion

that if one is excepted under the Tort Claims Act the other must

be as well")). The First Circuit grounded its reasoning in the

Supreme Court's admonition that the exemptions in the FTCA be

strictly construed. See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.

315 (1957).

The First Circuit in Santiago-Remirez, not the Eleventh

Circuit in Metz, controls my reading of § 2680(h). Accordingly, I

find that the overlap between plaintiffs' malicious prosecution

claims and their IIED claims is not fatal to their case.

2. Family Members’ Claims

Under certain circumstances, tortfeasors may be liable not

only for the emotional distress they intentionally inflict

directly on the immediate targets of their outrageous conduct, but

also for the resulting emotional distress of bystanders. "[E]very

injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the

waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit legal

consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree." Migliori v.

Airborne Freight Corp., 690 N.E.2d 413, 414 (Mass. 1998) (quoting

Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969). To curb the

ever expanding circle of liability, the Massachusetts SJC has

placed restrictions on which bystanders may claim intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Bystander plaintiffs must show

that they had "both (a) substantially contemporaneous knowledge of

the outrageous conduct and (b) a severe emotional response."

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Anthony H. v. John G., 612 N.E.2d 663, 665 (Mass. 1993).

Defendant argues that the family members have failed to show the

first element. I find otherwise.

a. Substantially Contemporaneous Knowledge

The central question is what the family members needed to

contemporaneously know. As I wrote previously, "[w]as it enough

to suffer distress because of the conviction itself, or did

[plaintiffs] need to know it was a wrongful conviction (because

[they] in fact knew [their fathers and husbands] to be innocent),

or a wrongful conviction for which the FBI was the likely culprit,

or did [they] need to know that it was a wrongful conviction

actually caused by FBI misconduct?" Limone II, 336 F. Supp. 2d at

44-45.

I previously held, and continue to hold, that the law does

not require that the family members had contemporaneous knowledge

of the FBI’s misconduct. See Limone II, 336 F. Supp. 2d 18.

Massachusetts case law, including those cases cited by defendant,

do not support such a high burden.189 See Nancy P. v. D'Amato, 517

N.E.2d 824 (Mass. 1988); Zachary v. Centrus Premier Home Care,

Inc., 10 Mass. L. Rep. 738 (Mass. Super. Oct. 15, 1999); Heinrich

ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D. Mass. 1999). In

those cases, courts concentrated on whether bystanders had

contemporaneous knowledge only of the harm suffered by the target

189
Defendant cites no case on this point in its final brief.

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of the defendants’s outrageous conduct. They dismissed bystander

IIED claims only where plaintiffs did not learn of the harm to the

outrageous conduct’s target until a substantial time after it

occurred

I find that the family member plaintiffs had substantially

contemporaneous knowledge of the harm caused to the targets of the

defendant’s outrageous conduct: the wrongful convictions of the

Deegan defendants.190

Even if plaintiffs had not shown that they had the required

knowledge -- which they have done many times over191 --I find that

the substantially contemporaneous knowledge requirement is waived

by the defendant’s misconduct. "The courts’ goal of limiting

fraudulent claims and an expansive plaintiff class does not

comport with denying rightful claims for outrageous behavior that

was concealed intentionally from the plaintiff." Limone II, 336

F. Supp. 2d at 45 n.39. See also Nancy P., 517 N.E.2d at 828

190
In Limone II, I made a separate ruling on an independent issue based
on plaintiffs’ knowledge. There, I held that the statute of limitations for
claims based on the FBI’s conduct during the Deegan trial was tolled because
plaintiffs could not have known of that conduct until years later. Limone II,
336 F. Supp. 2d at 46. As I wrote in that decision, "Greco's argument that he
knew enough to maintain his emotional distress claim and did not know enough
to bring suit" are not mutually exclusive. Id.

The statute of limitations was tolled because defendant's coverup

prevented plaintiffs from discovering the necessary facts to make out claims
that could have survived in court. But that does not mean that the family
members were not fully aware that something unjust was happening to their
husbands and fathers. Emotions do not wait on the same burdens of proof as
courts of law. Plaintiffs knew enough to suffer the mens’ wrongful
convictions, but not enough to compel a court to act -- which is exactly where
the defendant knew they would be and made sure to keep them.
191
Discussed more fully in Part V.

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(where the defendant, as part of the conduct at issue, acted to

keep the conduct secret from the plaintiff "we lay little stress

on the absence of substantially contemporaneous knowledge in

deciding this issue."); Quinn v. Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330, 333 (Mass.

App. Ct. 2000) (arguing, in dicta, that situations where "the

circumstances are such that the resulting damage is 'inherently

unknowable'" are excepted from the contemporaneous knowledge

requirement). The SJC, in creating the contemporaneous knowledge

requirement, never intended it to encourage and benefit the

concealment of wrongdoing, see Nancy P., 517 N.E.2d at 828, and I

will not pervert it so that defendant may continue to profit from

its coverup here.

b. Severe Emotional Response

As with the Deegan defendants themselves, there is no

question but that the emotional distress suffered by their family

members was severe and of a nature "that no reasonable [person]

could be expected to endure it." Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355

N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1976). To be told that a husband or father

will be executed or imprisoned for the rest of his -- and your --

life; to listen while the date of his death is set; to have him

publicly branded a murderer when you know that he is not -- the

feelings of this are beyond imagining. It is to defendant's

credit that it does not attempt to argue that such distress was

insufficiently severe.

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 In summary, I find that the defendant is liable to the Deegan

defendants and their family members for intentional infliction of

emotional distress.

E. Negligence

Even had plaintiffs failed to prove their claim of malicious

prosecution, the defendant would still be liable for negligence in

failing to intervene to prevent Barboza’s perjury at the Deegan

murder trial, failing to adequately supervise front-line FBI

agents, and continuing to sit on the truth for years after.

1. The Government Was Directly Negligent

In order to prove negligence under Massachusetts law,

plaintiffs must show (1) that defendant owed them a duty of care;

(2) that defendant breached that duty; (3) that plaintiffs

suffered damage; and (4) that defendant’s breach was the proximate

cause of plaintiffs’ damage. See Bennett v. Eagle Brook Country

Store, 557 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (Mass. 1990). Defendant contests the

first element, arguing, as has been its theme throughout this

case, that the FBI had no duty to intervene in a state

prosecution. The facts are otherwise.

a. The Government Owed a Duty of Care to

Plaintiffs

Though Barboza was not an agent or employee per se of the

FBI, their actions and relationship with him as a cooperating

witness created a duty on their part to take affirmative steps to

prevent his perjury. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 321(1)

-169-
(1965) provides that "if the actor does an act, and subsequently

realizes or should realize that it has created an unreasonable

risk of causing physical harm to another, he is under a duty to

exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking effect."

Section 321(1) was adopted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial

Court in substance in Commonwealth v. Levesque, 766 N.E.2d 50, 56-

57 (Mass. 2002).

It is true that, in general, one does not have

a duty to take affirmative action, however, a
duty to prevent harm to others arises when one
creates a dangerous situation, whether that
situation was created intentionally or
negligently.

Id. (citing State ex rel. Kuntz v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial

Dist. Court, 995 P.2d 951, 957 (Mont. 2000) (A person may be

criminally liable when he "places another in a position of danger,

and then fails to safeguard or rescue that person"). In Onofrio

v. Department of Mental Health, the SJC likewise held that where

one's actions create a life-threatening risk to another, there is

a duty to take reasonable steps to alleviate the risk. 562 N.E.2d

1341, 1344-45 (Mass. 1990) (defendants who placed client into

plaintiff’s rooming house and failed to warn plaintiff of client’s

mental health history were liable when client set fire to

plaintiff’s rooming house).

Striking even closer to the heart of this case, Judge Lindsay

recently held that § 321(1) and Levesque could apply to FBI agent

John Connolly Jr.’s handler/informant relationship with James

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("Whitey") Bulger and Stephen Flemmi. Estate of Davis v. United

States, 340 F. Supp. 2d 79, 90 (D. Mass. 2004). In denying the

government’s motion to dismiss in that case, Judge Lindsay held

that if Connolly contributed, with the FBI’s knowledge, to

Flemmi’s and Bulger’s intentions or ability to commit a murder,

then the government had a duty to intervene to prevent the murder.

Id. at 90-91.

b. Breach

Here, Rico and Condon set in motion Barboza’s testimony in

the Deegan murder trial. They used machinations and offers of

compensation to turn him into a cooperating witness and to push

him to testify in the Deegan murder trial. See supra Sections

III.B.3, III.B.4. By the time they introduced him to state

prosecutors in June 1967, they knew that they had on their hands a

star witness whose testimony would carry great weight in

prosecutors’ decisions, and who was likely to commit perjury. See

supra Section III.B.4.a.1. What is more, they knew that he was

likely to commit perjury in the Deegan case. See supra Section

III.B.4.b.1.e. They then sat by and watched the perjury duly

occur, just as they knew it would.

I emphasize that this is not liability based merely on

failure to act; it is affirmative action exacerbated by later

inaction. This is not "the situation of a mere passerby who

observes a fire and fails to alert authorities; the defendant

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started the fire and then increased the risk of harm from that

fire by allowing it to burn without taking adequate steps either

to control it or to report it to the proper authorities."

Levesque, 436 Mass. at 57. I reject defendant's argument that,

having labored so intensively to bring together spark and

kindling, it had no duty to intervene in the resulting fire.

Indeed, this fire, if the metaphor can be so extended, was to burn

for many years. Each time an imprisoned man petitioned for

commutation, the FBI did not merely fail to go to the authorities

with what they knew -- the state authorities came to them, and

they actively renewed their commitment to keeping the fire

burning. See supra Section III.D.9.

I emphasize again that the government’s course of conduct in

this case cannot be understood by atomizing it into separate

instances of failure to disclose. The FBI’s select withholding of

vital, relevant, and exculpatory evidence was not a separate act

from putting Barboza forward as a witness; it was the means by

which the government put him forward and supported him.

Nor do I mean to imply that law enforcement agents are

negligent every time they develop a cooperating witness who later

commits perjury. The FBI exposed the Deegan defendants to far

more than the ever-present risk that a witness will lie. Rico and

Condon did just the opposite of what a reasonable person would do:

They knew that Barboza planned to perjure himself, both because he

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had communicated it to them in their interviews, because they had

independent evidence contradicting his planned testimony, and

because they helped perfect his testimony. It was with reckless

disregard for the safety of the men he planned to testify against

that they turned him over anyway. That is why they are liable.192

c. Damage and Proximate Cause

As to the other elements of negligence, it is undisputed

that, at the minimum, defendant did not intervene to prevent

Barboza’s perjury. Insofar as it had a duty to do so, it breached

it, in fulfillment of the second element. (Indeed, elsewhere I

find that the defendant was proactive in securing that perjurous

testimony.)

Finally, as necessary under Massachusetts law, plaintiffs

have shown that defendant’s breach was the proximate cause of the

harm they suffered. Proximate cause is that cause which, "in

continuous sequence, unbroken by a new cause, produces an event,

and without which the event would not have occurred." Roberts v.

192
It is also important to distinguish the First Circuit’s rejection in
Bolduc of a claim based on the negligent failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence. See supra Section IV.B.4. First, that decision was based on
Wisconsin law, not Massachusetts law. Second, and more to the point, the
First Circuit in Bolduc was referring to the negligent failure of a private
person to realize that they were holding exculpatory evidence at all, which is
exactly the opposite of what the FBI did in this case. Specifically, the
First Circuit cited Bromund v. Holt, 129 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Wisc. 1964), in
which a private doctor negligently performed an autopsy, failing to notice
what should have been exculpatory physical evidence. The doctor in Bromund
did not know that he was withholding exculpatory evidence. In stark contrast,
Rico and Condon were scrupulous in their gathering and analysis of
information. Unlike the doctor in Bromund, they knew exactly what they had.
Their negligence was of an entirely different sort: recklessly putting Barboza
into position as a cooperating witness despite their knowledge.

-173-
Southwick, 614 N.E.2d 659, 663 (Mass. 1993). Had the FBI notified

the proper authorities of Barboza’s intent to commit perjury,

handed over the evidence it possessed indicating plaintiffs’

innocence of the Deegan murder, or withdrawn the deal it had

offered to Barboza in exchange for his cooperation, Barboza’s

perjury either would not have occurred or would not have been

credited.

The actions of the state prosecutor, the convicting jury, and

the parole board do not break the chain of causation here, because

those intervening events were foreseeable to the FBI supervisors

as a result of their failure to act.

Where . . . the original negligence of the

defendant is followed by the independent act
of third persons . . . the defendant's earlier
negligence may be found to be the direct and
proximate cause of [plaintiffs’ injuries] if
according to human experience and in the
natural and ordinary course of events the
defendant ought to have seen that the
intervening act was likely to happen.

Horan v. Watertown, 104 N.E. 464 (Mass. 1914). The FBI knew that

Zalkind intended to use Barboza’s testimony to prosecute

plaintiffs; they knew that his testimony would carry a great deal

of weight at trial. Defendant knew that its inaction would likely

lead, "in the natural and ordinary course of events," to

plaintiffs’ injury, and that its intervention could prevent that

injury. Its negligence was thus the proximate cause of

plaintiffs’ injuries, and it is liable for it.

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 2. Negligent Supervision

a. Discretionary Function Exception:

Considerations Unique to Negligent Supervision

In addition to the FBI rules and regulations violated by

agents in the course of committing malicious prosecution,

subornation of perjury, IIED, and direct negligence, see supra

Section IV.A.1, FBI supervisors broke additional rules and

exceeded their discretion when they failed to control or

discipline their employees as they were committing those torts.

These violations provide additional reasons why supervisory

negligence is not protected by the discretionary function

exception, even though supervisory decisions are ordinarily

considered to be at the heart of that exception. See, e.g., K.W.

Thompson Tool Co. v. United States, 836 F.2d 721 (1st Cir. 1988).

First, it is not within the discretion of government

supervisors to stand by and allow their employees to commit crimes

such as subornation of perjury. "Failure to act after notice of

illegal action does not represent a choice based on plausible

policy considerations." Tonelli v. United States, 60 F.3d 492,

496 (8th Cir. 1995).

Second, it is inaccurate to characterize what happened here

as an exercise of supervisory judgment at all. Rather, it was a

total abdication of the supervisory role. Ordinarily, it is

within the supervisor's discretion - barring the existence of

specific mandates - to decide how and when to respond to employee

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misconduct. Supervisors may decide to apply a soft touch or even

to overlook instances of misconduct in the interest of workplace

harmony or efficient allocation of their scarce managerial

attention. But to characterize FBI supervisors’ behavior as that

kind of supervisory judgment misses the point. In the face of

blatant, ongoing, horrific misconduct that crossed the line into

illegality, they did not merely take insufficient or incompetent

action; they did not take delayed or selective action; they did

not overlook particular instances of misconduct; they simply

walked away from their responsibilities altogether. No stretch of

supervisory discretion allows the complete abandonment of the

supervisory role.

Further, beginning in 1977, FBI rules mandated specific

disciplinary actions by supervisors in the event of "criminal,

dishonest, immoral, infamous or notoriously disgraceful conduct"

by agents. As discussed below, FBI agents continued their

misconduct in relation to plaintiffs’ post-conviction proceedings

well after 1977, and FBI supervisors, exceeding their limited

discretion under this rule, did nothing.

b. FBI Supervisors Were Negligent in Their

Supervision of Agents

In order to prove their claim of negligent supervision,

plaintiffs must show (1) that the persons whose actions form the

basis of the claim were agents and/or employees of the defendant

-176-
employer; (2) that the agents and employees came into contact with

members of the public in the course of their employer’s business;

(3) that the employer failed to use reasonable care in the

selection, supervision and retention of the agents and employees;

and (4) that the failure to use such reasonable care was the

proximate cause of harm to the plaintiffs. See Carson v. Canning,

62 N.E. 964, 964 (Mass. 1902); Foster v. The Loft, Inc., 526

N.E.2d 1309, 1310 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988). Plaintiffs have carried

this burden.

The first two elements are undisputed. Front-line FBI agents

are of course employees of the FBI who regularly come into contact

with members of the public as they do the FBI’s business. The

fourth element is likewise easily proven here. Any number of

actions by FBI supervisors -- reprimand or disciplinary actions,

orders to change course, transfer or removal of agents from duty -

could have prevented Rico and Condon from handing Barboza over to

commit perjury or compelled them to disclose the critical

information they possessed, preventing the harm that befell the

plaintiffs. The meat of this claim is the third element -- the

failure by supervisors to use reasonable care in their

supervision.

Complex as the FBI hierarchy and protocols may have been, the

facts here are relatively simple. The supervisors were completely

informed of their employees’ impending misconduct before and

during the Deegan trial, see supra Sections III.D.2, III.D.4,

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during post-trial efforts to keep Barboza quiet, see supra

Sections III.D.3, III.D.5. Despite this information, they did

absolutely nothing. Total inaction cannot be reasonable care in

the face of certain misconduct. Once an employer knows or should

know that an employee is committing torts against a third person,

the employer has a duty to take some action such as investigation,

discharge, or reassignment. See Foster, 526 N.E.2d at 1310.

As with the rest of the torts committed by defendant, its

negligent supervision continued for decades. FBI supervisors

preserved their perfect record of total inaction through the

entire period of imprisonment, post-conviction proceedings, and

attendant coverup by FBI agents. See supra Section III.D.3, 5, 7,

8, & 9. Even if the record did not conclusively establish that

FBI supervisors beyond the Boston office were aware of every

single action taken by agents to influence commutation petitions,

a lack of actual knowledge further supports a finding of

negligence. The supervisors knew of the agents’ prior misconduct.

See supra Section III.D, III.B.4.b.1; III.B.4.b.1; III.D.2. As

law-enforcement officers, they certainly knew that commutation

petitions would be an ordinary and foreseeable course for

prisoners serving life sentences, especially those who vigorously

and publicly challenged their convictions and maintained their

innocence. They knew that it was typical for state parole

authorities to request information from the FBI when considering

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petitions for commutation. See supra Section III.D.9; Exh. 178 at

LIM007-1567-68, MRR Part II, Section 5. A reasonable supervisor

would have come to the inevitable conclusion that his agents would

have further opportunities to continue their misconduct, and that,

given that opportunity, they would do so. Either FBI supervisors

knew of their agents’ misconduct with regard to the commutation

petitions, or they remained willfully, recklessly ignorant of

foreseeable events.

Further, FBI rules after 1963 required that, in addition to

taking disciplinary steps on their own, Special Agents in Charge

were required by FBI rules to "report immediately any improper

conduct of employees in their territory." Exh. 178 at LIM007-

1501, MRR Part I, Section 1.A.1. If the Boston SAC at any time

failed to report the misconduct of front-line agents under his

supervision to Washington, that would itself be an instance of

negligent supervision by the SAC.

It is difficult to imagine a more complete breakdown in

supervision. FBI higher-ups sat by and watched their employees

break laws, violate rules, and ruin lives, interrupting only with

the occasional burst of applause. They nurtured the situation in

which criminal agents were free to do as they pleased.

V. DAMAGES

The surviving plaintiffs, Limone and Salvati, and the estates

of the deceased plaintiffs, Greco and Tameleo, seek damages for

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their imprisonment. Their families seek damages for loss of

consortium, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.193

The FTCA allows a successful plaintiff to collect

compensatory damages as would be allowed against a private

defendant under the applicable state law.194 In the usual tort

case, damages are left to the considered judgment of a jury, the

representatives of the community. The jury arrives at a figure;

it does not have to explain its basis. With few exceptions, the

jury's decision is entitled to considerable deference.

Under the FTCA, I am the decisionmaker. And a judge, unlike

a jury, must not only determine the appropriate figure, I must

explain it.

There is no scientific formula or measuring device for

awarding damages for the incommensurable -- loss of liberty, loss

of consortium, emotional distress. See Muniz v. Rovira, 373 F.3d

1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004). The case law suggests that the amount

awarded must be the product of "a process of rational appraisal"

and based upon "the evidence adduced at trial." Ruiz v. Gonzalez

Caraballo, 929 F.2d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1991). Candidly, the task is

a staggering one.

193
The family member plaintiffs did not originally bring identical
claims, however, conforming the pleadings to the evidence, I treat them
uniformly. See supra note 19.
194
There is one exception: The United States may not be held liable for
punitive damages or pre- or post-judgment interest. See 28 U.S.C. § 2764;
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 14 (1962).

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 The government made no argument as to damages; the plaintiffs

provided detailed fact findings and benchmarks of damages in

ostensibly comparable cases.

I begin with a description of the facts on which these awards

are based,195 the framework for evaluating damages, and then the

award.

A. Facts

1. Limone Plaintiffs

a. Peter Limone Sr.

Limone felt "scared to death" when his sentence was handed

down, as any man would when told he was scheduled to be executed.

For five years he lived under the threat of the death penalty,

until it was abolished by the Supreme Judicial Court.196

On one level, prison is a place -- a physical space often

sparse, barely maintained, squalid. Death row conditions were

even more severe than those of the general population. Each cell

contained only a toilet, sink, steel slab for a mattress, and a

small table. See Exh. 308RRR; Exh. 308SSS. Inmates had to remain

in those cells twenty-three and a half hours a day; they left only

for thirty minutes to shower, mop their cell, or exercise in

twenty by ten foot pens referred to as "dog kennels." See Tr.

195
My findings are primarily drawn from the testimony of the surviving
plaintiffs and their families. See Tr. vol. 11 - Tr. vol. 17; Exh. 312 (video
deposition of Saverio Tameleo).
196
Limone v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 936 (1972).

-181-
vol. 15, 183. On the floor above death row was the segregation

block; the prisoners housed there would often protest by flooding

their toilets and sinks, which would flood the cells below.

Limone remembers the screams of prisoners being beaten by the

guards. He did not leave death row until November 1971.197

On another level, prison is also a way of living -- apart

from your loved ones, apart from your former existence as a

productive member of your community. At first, Limone’s children

were not able to visit him often because he did not want to expose

them to a place like death row. After he was moved to general

population, the children came more frequently. But all their

visits were framed by sadness. Prisoners were strip searched

afterwards, compounding Limone's distress over his family’s

departure with humiliation.

During his thirty-three years behind bars, Limone missed

almost every important event in his family’s lives -- birthdays,

first communions, confirmations, graduations, weddings, funerals,

births. But in the face of the considerable obstacles posed by

incarceration, the Limone family maintained some sense of

togetherness. Olympia had her daughters wear their communion

dresses to visit their father in prison to approximate the

experience. She would give Limone clippings from local newspapers

197
In November 1971, Limone was transferred to general population at
Walpole after another inmate won a lawsuit limiting stays on death row to the
period immediately proceeding executions.

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about his sons’ sporting events so he could talk knowledgeably

about them.

Limone tried to keep himself productive during his many years

in prison. He was a clerk to the prison priest. He learned

woodworking, beginning with dollhouses and eventually making

custom furniture. And he was a model prisoner. On March 6, 1974,

Limone disarmed an inmate who had shot two guards, ending a

dangerous standoff. He was commended by several corrections

officers and the governor. See Exh. 313D; Exh. 313H; Exh. 313I;

Exh. 313J; Exh. 313K. From 1977-1979 he worked with geriatric

patients at Medfield State Hospital. After he was transferred,

the hospital staff pleaded for his return, but all requests were

denied. See Exh. 314G; Exh. 314H; Exh. 314I; Exh. 314J; Exh.

314K. In 1986, Limone was put in charge of the vending machines

at Boston Pre-Release, where he had been housed since 1980.

Until early 1988,198 the pain of prison was mitigated to a

limited degree by the Massachusetts furlough program, a program

which enabled "lifers" to be released for a time. Limone

completed over 170 furloughs before the program was cancelled.

Coinciding with the end of the furlough program, and despite

his exemplary record, Limone was transferred to a high security

facility. A new and punitive policy was implemented requiring

that all inmates serving life sentences must be incarcerated at

198
Despite its initial success, the prisoner furlough program was
discontinued by the Massachusetts Legislature in April 1988.

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such facilities. Limone remained in high security facilities

until he was finally released in 2001, after serving 33 years.

b. The Family

Peter and Olympia Limone were married on October 27, 1957.

Together they had four children -- Peter Jr., Paul, Carolyn, and

Janine. Limone was overjoyed when his children were born; family

was at the center of their lives. The Limones had breakfast

together every morning and dinner together every night. On the

weekends Limone would watch the children, play with them in the

yard, and take them swimming. Birthdays were always a major

celebration. Limone would bring home large, fancy birthday cakes

and invite over all their extended family and friends.

When Peter Jr. was young, he was hospitalized for several

weeks due to kidney problems. His father visited him twice a day

without fail, and carried him everywhere he needed to go

throughout his recovery.

In addition to spending countless hours playing with and

caring for their children, the Limones also spent time alone as a

couple. They would go out on dates to dinner or to the Shubert

Theater. They had an active sex life.

On the Limones' tenth wedding anniversary, on October 27,

1967, everything changed. Olympia Limone waited for her husband.

They were scheduled to attend a parents’ meeting together at their

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sons' school. He never returned. Later, Limone's brother told

her he had been arrested.

Peter Limone and the other Deegan defendants were housed at

Charles Street Jail awaiting the outcome of their trial. Olympia

visited twice a week but aside from those visits rarely left the

house. She stopped being a Cub Scout den mother and stopped going

to church. She cried night and day, imagining what life would be

like without her husband. The children asked repeatedly why their

father could not come home; Olympia had no answer. The boys were

tormented at school by children calling their father a murderer.

When Olympia left for court on the morning the verdict was to

be announced, she told her son Peter Jr. that his father would be

coming home at the end of the day. When the death sentence was

announced, Olympia fainted. Limone heard a scream and knew it was

his wife. After she came to, Olympia was so distraught that she

needed help walking.

The children were eight, six, four, and one when their father

was convicted. When Limone was finally released, they were forty-

one, forty, thirty-seven and thirty-four with children of their

own.

Olympia told her children about their father's situation at

different times, given their different ages. She told Peter Jr.,

her oldest, first, before he went with her to visit Limone at

Charles Street Jail during the trial. She told Paul just before

the first time he went to visit his father at Walpole. Carolyn

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thought that her father was in the hospital until she was old

enough to read the signs on the front of the prison. And Janine,

the youngest, found out from a boy down the street who called her

father a murderer. But she did not know that he had been

sentenced to death until she researched her father’s case in

junior high school.

Olympia began visiting Limone on death row twice a week. At

first, the children did not visit their father often. Death row

was too frightening an experience. Later, Limone was able to

arrange for the children to visit in a room in the general

population area. The children would visit on school vacations,

near the holidays, and over the summer. Prison played an integral

part in their childhoods. They remember seeing their father

degraded by the guards, having to sit across from him, seeing how

thin he was becoming, and being frightened of the metal detector.

But these were the moments when the Limone children could have

"normal" parent-child conversations; the boys talked about their

sports games, Carolyn about her piano playing and dancing.

Some of Peter Jr., Paul, Carolyn, and Janine’s favorite

memories derive from their father’s furloughs. The family tried

as best they could to schedule the furloughs for holidays or other

family events; Carolyn and Janine took turns having their father

come home for their birthdays. Losing the furloughs suddenly in

1988 was a shock to the family.

-186-
 Each of the Limone children was dramatically affected in

different ways by their father’s incarceration. Peter Jr. was

plagued by nightmares of his father's electrocution. After the

death sentence was lifted, he continued to worry about his

father’s safety in prison. Peter Jr. longed for one-on-one time

with his father; he was not able to have those visits until he got

his driver’s license -- over seven years after his father was

incarcerated. Peter Jr. and Paul missed having their father at

their hockey games, and Paul at his basketball and baseball games.

What Carolyn remembers most is feeling alone at the holidays --

the only child without her father.

All of the children were taunted by the other kids in the

neighborhood and at school. It was worse each time Limone filed a

commutation petition or an appeal and the story was in the papers.

For Paul, these incidents often developed into physical fights.

For Janine, they shaped her sense of self worth; she felt as if

she had to overcome being labeled the daughter of a murderer. And

that label continued to affect her into her adult life, in

relationships with college professors and with a former fiancé.

Each time Limone filed a commutation petition, the family’s

hopes would be raised. Each time one was denied, they would be

dashed. When Tameleo and Greco died in prison, the family worried

that their father would suffer the same fate.

2. Salvati Plaintiffs

-187-
 a. Joseph Salvati

When Salvati was arrested for the murder of Teddy Deegan in

October 1967, he asked the officers "Who the heck is Teddy

Deegan?" Tr. vol. 16, 71. For weeks after the arrest, Salvati

had no lawyer until his friends ran a raffle to raise money for

his defense. According to Salvati, he did not even know exactly

what he was accused of doing until he heard Barboza’s testimony.

He was thirty-four when he entered prison, and sixty-four when he

was released.

On the day of the verdict, he was numb. He did not

understand what the Judge said when he imposed a life sentence

without parole. He was then shackled and driven to Walpole State

Prison with the other defendants. He spent the first night just

sitting there, "thinking of my children and my wife and what am I

going to tell [them]." Tr. vol. 16, 90. Even though no one was

executed during Salvati's stay at Walpole, when the electric chair

was tested the lights in the facility would dim, no one would

speak.

Salvati kept busy in prison by becoming a clerk for the

prison’s Catholic Chaplain. He also helped form a Christian

Action Group; he started a choir, suggested that the priest say

mass at a time when more prisoners could attend, and encouraged

the priest to bring younger clergy to work at the prison. He

-188-
worked in a print shop, as a cadre cook, and operated a

commissary.

Salvati received visits from his family approximately once a

week; he saw his children grow in weekly installments. But that

could hardly substitute for the daily joys of parenting. Salvati

felt he missed out on his children’s childhoods, not to mention

the critical events of the rest of his family. His father died

while he was in prison and his mother developed Alzheimer’s

Disease. He was finally freed in 1997, after serving twenty-nine

years.

b. The Family

Marie Salvati described the impact of Salvati's imprisonment

on their family: Salvati did the time on the inside, she and the

children on the outside.

Joseph and Marie Salvati met in their late teens and married

three years later on August 23, 1953. Together they had four

children: Maria, Sharon, Gail, and Anthony. According to Marie,

Salvati was a devoted husband and father. Salvati and Marie had a

close, intimate relationship as husband and wife. Most of their

time was spent with their children, but they managed to find time

alone when they could.

Salvati provided for the family both financially and

emotionally. The family had dinner together nightly. Salvati was

also very involved in his children’s education, seeing the kids

-189-
off to school in the mornings, making sure they did their

homework, and attending PTA meetings. On Sundays the extended

Salvati family would get together at Salvati’s parents’ house.

Each of the Salvati children -- now with children of their own --

testified to a close and loving relationship with their father.

Anthony, only five when his father was taken away, does not

remember much of the pre-incarceration years.

On October 25, 1967, their lives were torn apart. Marie

heard from someone on the street that Salvati had been arrested.

Gail, nine when her father was arrested, was told that her father

worked in jail which was why he was not home -- but even she knew

that something was wrong. Taunted and teased by the other

children in the neighborhood, Gail learned that her father had

been convicted of murder.

Over the next twenty-nine years, the family regularly visited

Salvati in prison. The prison trips were an ordeal for Marie and

her kids; prison was a terrifying place for adults, let alone

children, who were frisked and patted down by the guards each

time. Maria remembers that the first time she went to visit her

father in jail -- she was so scared that she vomited and cried.

Once she was a parent herself, the prison guards made her open her

daughter’s diaper before she could take her in to visit.

Degradation and humiliation were a regular part of the experience.

And each time Salvati was transferred to a different prison, the

family would have to learn a new routine.

-190-
 The furlough program was a blessing to the family; Salvati

completed over 150 furloughs over the duration of the program.

When the furlough program was cancelled for inmates serving life

terms, the family had to readjust suddenly to a relationship with

Salvati that could only take place within the prison walls.

Salvati and Marie kept their relationship going through cards

and letters. Marie poignantly described her life as existing in a

shoebox. Three generations of Salvati children visited Salvati in

jail; all the while he missed milestone after milestone --

weddings, births, christenings, graduations.199 The children were

thirteen, eleven, nine and five when he entered prison; forty-two,

forty, thirty-nine and thirty-five when he was released. Through

it all, the Salvatis maintained their belief in his innocence.

3. Tameleo Plaintiffs

a. Henry Tameleo

Henry Tameleo's age and poor health made prison --

particularly death row -- all the more difficult for him. (He was

sixty-six years old when he was imprisoned). On May 6, 1970, the

prison board determined that he was suitable to be transferred out

of Walpole due to his ailing health. "The atmosphere in Walpole

is causing him much physical pain and discomfort. The subject

cannot undergo another gas barrage." Exh. 197. But he was not

transferred. On September 9, 1973, a senior physician at Walpole

199
Eight grandchildren and one great-grandchild were born into the
Salvati family while Salvati was in prison.

-191-
pled his case, explaining that he needed to be transferred because

of his health. Dr. Pastorelli wrote that the rioting and

tumultuous conditions at Walpole, while difficult for all

defendants, was "serious and deleterious" for Tameleo, wreaking

"havoc" on his health. See Exh. 198. He was a "sick, lonely old

man" who was "depressed and discouraged," but remained a model

inmate. Id. Eventually he was transferred.

By 1979, Tameleo's wife died. Tameleo's own health continued

to worsen. He had three heart attacks, a prostatectomy, was

treated for a chronic vascular problem, and suffered other medical

problems such as cardiac abnormalities, diverticulosis, diabetes,

and bells palsy. See Exh. 199; Exh. 197; Exh. 200. On February

22, 1985, Dr. Baker concluded

His constellation of disease processes and his

constellation of symptomatology referrible
[sic.] to those underlying disease processes,
represent a life threatening situation. In my
medical opinion, the institutional setting in
which Mr. Tameleo exists is insufficient for
proper monitoring and care of an individual
with such severe life threatening underlying
disease processes.

Exh. 199. The doctor predicted that Tameleo had two to three

years left, and recommended that he be released from prison so

that he could be properly cared for. He was never released. He

died six months later, on August 18, 1985. His son Saverio, then

65, was by his side.

b. The Family

-192-
 Henry and Giovannina ("Jeannete") Tameleo were married on

October 21, 1919. See Exh. 326A. In October 1967, Tameleo was

indicted and arrested. Tameleo told his wife and his adult son

Saverio that he was innocent, and they believed him. In addition

to the obvious emotional consequences, this ordeal had serious

financial consequences for Saverio. He sold his house and used

most of his life savings to pay for his father’s legal costs.

The toll the conviction and incarceration took on Jeannette

was visible to Saverio, and grew each day. As her health

deteriorated, it became impossible for her to visit Henry in

prison. In 1973 she underwent open heart surgery, and two years

later she had another surgery for a blood clot. She died on May

22, 1979 of respiratory failure secondary to liver cancer. Her

husband was unable to be there to take care of her, ease her pain,

say goodbye.

4. Greco and Werner Plaintiffs

a. Louis Greco Sr.

Louis Greco surrendered to Agent Farrell of the Miami FBI on

December 29, 1967. Greco was extradited to Massachusetts in

February 1968. He spent twenty-eight years in prison, like

Tameleo and Limone, the first six under a death sentence.200 He

was fifty when he began serving his sentence and seventy-eight

when he died in prison.

200
His death sentence was vacated on May 20, 1975. See Exh. 218.

-193-
 A November 1971 prison psychiatric report describes Greco’s

mood as "that of a ‘wronged’ man, who had suffered much but wished

to carry on despite adversity." Exh. 216A. Another described him

as "very bitter, not at any of the personnel or inmates here, but

at being here on the word of one man and at the authorities on the

outside who he feels are responsible for his being here." Exh.

216B.

The prison conditions Greco endured were substantially

similar to those described by Peter Limone. The two were housed

together on death row at MCI Walpole, and then later at MCI

Norfolk, albeit in different units.201 Greco was transferred

throughout the prison system many times -- to Norfolk Pre-Release

Center, MCI Shirley, MCI Lancaster, MCI Concord, MCI Bridgewater.

He spent the last three years of his life being shuttled among

Baystate Correction Center, MCI Shirley, Lemuel Shattuck Hospital,

and outside hospitals in an effort to cope with his failing

health. See Exh. 226B.

Greco tried to maintain his sense of self by tending flowers

in the prison greenhouse, and rescuing and caring for an injured

cat. When Greco became too ill to be able to work in the gardens

that he had so dutifully tended, he taught younger inmates how to

garden.

201
It appears that starting in 1977 the two were in different prisons.
However, this Court is well aware of the conditions in the state prisons now
and in the last several decades.

-194-
 Greco’s health deteriorated significantly in prison. He

suffered from diabetes mellitus, artiosclerotic heart disease,

hypertension, degenerative arthritis, as well as the leg injury he

had sustained during World War II. In 1990 he had a total hip

replacement, and in 1991 he underwent bowel surgery to remove a

malignancy. Eventually, Greco was unable to walk, dress, or bathe

himself without assistance. See Exh. 220G. During the last three

months of his life, Joseph Salvati helped care for him, cleaning

him up after he could no longer control his bowels. Greco had his

right leg amputated below the knee due to gangrene in September

1995. See Exh. 220R.

Greco’s prison stay was undoubtedly made all the more

difficult by the knowledge that his family had fallen apart, as

described below, and that his children were abandoned and

suffering. His anguish is evidenced by a letter he wrote to the

Veteran’s Administration, pleading for them to send his benefits

check to his sister Marie so that his children could be cared for.

He explained that Roberta, his then-wife, just took off "and left

my boys like dogs in the street." Exh. 2030.

Throughout his incarceration, Greco never stopped trying to

prove his innocence. Michael Albano, a member of the

Massachusetts Parole Board from 1982-1994, recalls that Greco

would tell him on his visits to prison "that he was an innocent

man and that he wanted to live one day as a free man, just one

day." Tr. vol. 10, 36. He filed at least eight motions for a new

-195-
trial, three appeals, two pro se motions for a new trial, and a

writ of habeas corpus. Everything was denied. See Exh. 240.

Greco also took two lie detector tests -- one on July 1, 1978 that

he submitted to the Parole Board, and another in 1984 as part of

the short-lived television show Lie Detector. See Exh. 225A-1J;

Exh. 245. Greco filed three commutation petitions. The Parole

Board voted in favor of the first petition. It was denied by

Governor Dukakis. The Parole Board voted in favor of the second

petition. It was denied by Governor Weld. Greco filed his third

petition in November 1995; a month or so later it was

administratively closed due to his death. See Exh. 228B; Exh.

228C.

b. The Family

(1) The Children

By all indications, Edward ("Eddie") Greco, born May 15 1957,

and his brother Louis Jr., born January 25, 1955, had a happy,

"normal" childhood. Eddie remembers spending as much time with

his father as he could -- playing with him and their dog, helping

him with the chickens on their chicken farm, reading, and watching

TV. The boys played in a fort that their father built for them

and visited their Aunt Marie’s home with the entire family every

Sunday. Greco would take them to the movies, baseball games, and

on vacation. He also helped with the more routine fathering tasks

-- taking the boys to get their hair cut, to buy shoes, or to

-196-
dental appointments. When Eddie started school, his father helped

him with his homework. Eddie believed that he would someday go to

college to become a pharmacist.

When Eddie was ten, Greco was indicted and taken away.

Eddie’s mother told him that his father was in Florida when the

crime took place, that he was innocent, and that he would be

coming home soon. When he learned that his father had been

sentenced to death by electrocution, Eddie went into shock. He

became suicidal -- "I wanted to take a plastic bag and kill

myself. It was just a shock. I didn’t know what to do. You

know, I was banging my head against walls. I was putting plastic

bags around my head. I was beating myself with my fist, I did all

kinds of stupid things." Tr. vol. 13, 36-37.

After the conviction, Eddie and Louis Jr.’s home life

disintegrated. The family suffered financial hardship; their only

source of income was Greco's veteran disability checks.

Eventually they started to receive welfare. Their mother,

Roberta, started to drink more and more heavily. According to

Eddie, she stopped doing laundry or cooking food. Eddie took over

the household duties and cared for his older brother, who was a

troubled young man. Eddie ate other children’s leftovers at

school; any lunch money he had he would give to Louis Jr. Roberta

turned to physical violence, taking out her pain and frustrations

on Eddie. "She would have rings on her fingers, and she would

pound the hell out of me, and I would try to curl up in a ball to

-197-
protect myself, and then she would start kicking me viciously."

Tr. vol. 13, 41.

Louis Jr., already emotionally fragile, completely dissolved

after his father was incarcerated. Eddie did the best he could to

protect him, often getting into fights at school on his brother’s

behalf. Both of their grades dropped precipitously, Louis Jr.’s

more so.

In 1970, Roberta abandoned Eddie and Louis Jr. She left and

made no provisions for their care. The boys only discovered her

departure when Eddie returned home one day and the house was

empty. The boys went to live with their Aunt Marie and Uncle Sam,

Louis Sr.'s sister and brother-in-law. The boys had to pay

twenty-five dollars a week in rent, and his uncle resented their

presence in his home. Eddie was thirteen years old, Louis Jr.

fifteen. When Eddie was sixteen, Aunt Marie became critically ill

with kidney disease. She died in 1974, and Uncle Sam threw both

boys out of the house. Soon thereafter, Eddie was arrested on

drug charges and went to prison himself. The brothers lost touch.

Louis Greco Sr. died in prison on December 30, 1995. His

friend Vincent Maria made the funeral arrangements because Louis

Jr. was too distraught. On December 27, 1997, Louis Jr. took his

own life by ingesting sodium hydroxide. See Exh. 231. Eddie

blamed himself, and went into another downward spiral, living on

the streets for a time. He subsequently obtained a job as a

handyman in New Orleans, but continued drug use led to another

-198-
conviction and one year of incarceration in Louisiana in 2003.

Eddie recently was diagnosed with cancer. He had surgery to

remove one lung and he is currently single, without work, and is

living in a nursing care facility in New Orleans. He never

married or had children.

-199-
 (2) The Marriage

Roberta and Louis Greco were married in 1955. The marriage

was a troubled one.

In the early 1960s, the Grecos moved to Florida and Greco

opened a bar. After that job failed, he worked at a state

hospital until he was terminated. Eventually, when Greco could

not find work in Florida, he returned to Massachusetts while his

family remained down south. The Grecos' marriage began to

deteriorate. Roberta hired a lawyer and filed for divorce in

January 1965. The divorce papers accused Louis Greco of extreme

cruelty toward Roberta. See Exh. 2023. Sometime after that,

Louis attempted to strangle his wife with a telephone cord.

According to Roberta, the couple quickly made amends, and

Louis moved back to Florida to live with his family in February

1965.202 Roberta and Louis had a second marriage ceremony in the

spring of 1965 in Florida. The family returned to Massachusetts

that summer.

Roberta testified at the Deegan trial that Greco was with her

at the time of the Deegan murder. She was vigorously cross-

examined; evidence of their domestic disputes were introduced

before the jury. Roberta blamed herself and the telephone cord

incident for Louis’s conviction. "I felt terrible. I felt so

202
The government points out that Louis Greco filed his answer to
Roberta’s divorce complaint on March 12, 1965 -- casting doubt on how
reconciled they really were.

-200-
terrible that I had called the police because they made such an

issue of that at the trial. I felt that I was to blame for his

conviction." Tr. vol. 11, 50. Roberta testified that after

Louis’s conviction, she stopped spending time with her neighbors

and with Louis’s family.

Roberta testified that Greco thought she and the boys should

move in with Marie, in the first year following the conviction.

She refused. According to Roberta, Greco also urged her to

divorce him but she again refused. In 1969 Greco requested that

his veteran benefits be sent to Marie instead of Roberta. Roberta

contacted the VA and had the checks rerouted back to her. Greco

was infuriated. Roberta stopped visiting Greco that summer.

The next summer -– 1970 –- Roberta ran off to Las Vegas

without ever warning her children. According to Eddie, she took

off with the money he had saved from his paper route. On November

9, 1970, she filed for divorce. Less than a year later Roberta

moved back to Massachusetts but had almost no contact with her

sons for at least six years.

In 1976, Roberta married Jerome Werner. Roberta testified

that she and Greco eventually reconciled and maintained a close

friendship. She and her new husband even visited Greco in 1980 or

1981. Shortly thereafter, Roberta reconnected with her sons. For

the next several years, Roberta sponsored Greco on his furloughs.

-201-
 B. Law

1. Damages for the Deegan Defendants: Limone, Tameleo,

Greco and Salvati

Peter Limone, Henry Tameleo, and Edward Greco were originally

sentenced to death by electrocution. Joseph Salvati was sentenced

to life in prison. And though two were finally released in recent

years, it is fair to say that all of them literally lost a

lifetime. I find that their losses were proximately caused by the

malicious prosecution, negligence, and conspiracies engaged in by

the government.

Losses of this magnitude are almost impossible to catalogue.

The loss of liberty. The loss of the enjoyment of their families.

The loss of the ability to care for and nurture their children.

The loss of intimacy and closeness with their spouses. Indeed,

the task of quantifying these losses -- which I am obliged to do -

- is among the most difficult this Court has ever had to

undertake.

Where triers of fact must assign values to the intangible and

invaluable, they may look to the values assigned by other

fact-finders in the past. I do not blindly follow other awards,

but I do look to them for perspective and as an indication of how

society has valued these harms. I note also that damage and

suffering do not accrue smoothly and proportionally on a monthly

or annual basis. Some injury occurs all in a rush at the start --

the shock and horror of arrest and conviction -- while other

-202-
injury only begins to compound after a significant period of time

has passed -- the setting in of despair, or the withering of

relationships. I consider the particular story of this case and

these plaintiffs' suffering.

In recent years both juries and courts sitting without juries

have found that wrongfully imprisoned plaintiffs were entitled to

compensation of at least $1 million per year of imprisonment.

See, e.g., Ramirez v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office,

2:04-cv-06102-GAF-FMO, 2006 WL 1428310 (C.D.Cal. Feb. 16, 2006)

($18 million in compensatory damages for malicious prosecution

that resulted in ten months’ incarceration); Mark Diaz Bravo v.

Giblin, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10494 at *74 (Cal. App. 2

Dist. 2002) ("$3,537,000 to compensate [plaintiff] for 1,179 days

of incarceration at the rate of $ 3,000 per day" or $1,095,000 per

year, in addition to $1 million for emotional damages suffered

prior to sentencing); Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir.

2003), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2621 (2003) ($15 million in

compensatory damages for malicious prosecution that resulted in 15

years’ imprisonment, or $1 million per year); Jones v. City of

Chicago, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10510 at *1 (N.D. Ill, Nov. 10,

1987) aff’d, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988) ("$71,100 for false

arrest; $71,100 for intentional infliction of emotional distress;

$355,500 for false imprisonment; and $213,300 for malicious

prosecution" resulting in one month’s imprisonment, or $8,532,000

per year); Pitt v. District of Columbia, 404 F. Supp.2d 351

-203-
(D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2005) ($100,000 in compensatory damages for

malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress suffered from six days’ imprisonment).203

One issue complicates calculating the damages for Tameleo and

Limone: both men were serving federal sentences coterminously with

their Deegan sentences. Tameleo was sentenced to three terms of

five years (to run concurrently) in United States v. Patriarca,

imposed on March 25, 1968.204 Limone was sentenced to 7 years for

aiding and abetting violation of 18 U.S.C. 2314 and 18 U.S.C. 2.

See Exh. 2334 (U.S. v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 990-991 (1st Cir.

1971) (affirming Limone's sentence)). The question is the impact,

if any, of these sentences on their damage awards.205

203
Wrongful death suits have also resulted in similarly large awards.
In 2004 a jury awarded a woman $122 million dollars (reduced to $70 million on
appeal) after she was paralyzed when the roof of her Ford Explorer collapsed
when the vehicle rolled over, leaving her paralyzed from the waist down.
Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. App. 4th 525 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
As have cases involving great injury, but not death. In Novak v. State of New
Jersey et al., No. BUR-L-10003-03 2006, Jury Verdicts and Settlements (Mealey)
2424, (N.J. Super., Burlington Co. Dec. 19, 2006), the Plaintiff, Taylor
Novak, was seriously injured from being aggressively shaken while in foster
care. Novak suffered brain damage, and as a result was rendered blind, was
unable to walk or speak, suffered periodic seizures, and suffered severe
cognitive impairment. Id. He was awarded $21 million as a result. Id.
Finally, in a case different from this one in claims and facts, but similar in
theme and outrage, Abner Louima received an $8.75 million settlement after
being brutalized by police officers. See Louima v. City of New York, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13707 (E.D.N.Y., 2004) (Louima originally sought $50 million
in compensatory damages for his own injuries and $5 million in loss of
services to his wife).
204
See Exh. 2133 (Feb. 6, 1972 letter from Tameleo to the Department of
Corrections, noting that his five year sentences had not been "activated" and
requesting that be corrected).
205
I understand that -- particularly at a time when sentences were
indeterminate, and parole and good time were readily available -- terms of
five years and seven years did not necessarily equate with imprisonment for
that period of time. Nevertheless, nothing in the record suggests what the

-204-
 The First Circuit addressed an analogous issue in Olsen v.

Correiro, 189 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 1999). Olsen was convicted of

first degree murder and sentenced to life without parole. Five

years later, his conviction was overturned based on police

misconduct. A new trial was ordered; Olsen entered a plea of nolo

contendere to manslaughter, and was sentenced to time served on

the original conviction, with the balance of a ten to fifteen year

manslaughter sentence suspended. See Olsen, 189 F.3d at 55. When

Olsen sued the city and officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the City

argued that the manslaughter sentence for "time served" barred

incarceration-based damages. The First Circuit agreed. See Olsen

189 F.3d at 55. The Court reasoned that both the limits of

§1983206 and the law of proximate cause (the valid plea was the

cause of his sentence) barred Olsen's damages claim entirely. See

Olsen, 189 F.3d at 67-68.

While it is true that had Tameleo and Limone not been serving

time for the Deegan murder, they still would have been imprisoned

at least for some period of time due to valid sentences on these

other offenses -- imprisonment not due to any FBI misconduct207 --

there are significant differences between the instant case and

actual term consisted of, as opposed to the formal sentence.

206
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) imposed, a limit on the
availability of 1983 actions by adopting a favorable termination requirement
similar to that found in the malicious prosecution context.
207
To be sure, whatever sentences they received may well have been more
harsh because of their conviction in the Deegan case.

-205-
Olsen. The time Olsen wrongly served on his murder conviction was

specifically attributed to his manslaughter conviction -- which

was a lesser included offense to murder. Moreover, by his plea,

Olsen did not contest the term of years on the manslaughter, and

the suspended sentence thereafter.

In the instant case, Tameleo's and Limone's sentences derived

from unrelated convictions, not inextricably intertwined with the

wrongful one. They have not only contested the validity of the

Deegan sentence; their challenge has been accepted by the state

courts. The wrongful conviction is responsible for the

overwhelming majority of Tameleo's and Limone's terms of

imprisonment, and the conditions under which they were served.

Removing the unconstitutional sentences from their punishment

dramatically changes the picture. While I can make an adjustment

to the damages for these concurrent sentences, they should not

significantly affect the totals. Death row is death row; Tameleo

and Limone served time there under far harsher conditions than

they would have for unlawful gambling or interstate transport of

stolen goods. Moreover, life imprisonment is life imprisonment --

not a term of years. Tameleo and Limone were subject to all the

restrictions that applied to "lifers." Despite being model

prisoners, they were constantly returned to maximum security

prisons. They lived every day of their sentences under the mental

-206-
and emotional anguish of believing that their imprisonment would

never end, that they would die without ever knowing freedom again.

Even with this adjustment, the instant case stands out from

the field of malicious prosecution and wrongful imprisonment cases

in the extremity of its suffering; few cases are directly

comparable. In fact, this Court surmises that Greco and Tameleo’s

lives could have been significantly prolonged had they not been

made to suffer their wrongful imprisonment. Nevertheless, I will

accept the $1 million dollar per year award subject to the

adjustments noted above. Accordingly, I award: $26 million for

Peter Limone, $29 million for Joseph Salvati, $28 million for the

estate of Louis Greco, and $13 million for the estate of Henry

Tameleo.208

2. Damages for Family Members

a. Loss of Consortium

Loss of consortium refers to both intangibles --

companionship, love and society -- and more measurable valuables -

- financial support, household and childcare services.

Massachusetts does not limit loss of consortium claims to

predicate torts involving physical injury. See Agis v. Howard

Johnson Company, 355 N.E.2d 315, 319-320 (Mass. 1976) (holding

that a loss of consortium claim can arise from a claim of

intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress). The

208
This award serves to compensate Limone, Salvati, Greco, and Tameleo
for their intentional infliction of emotional distress damages as well.

-207-
Supreme Judicial Court in Agis reasoned that "the underlying

purpose of such an action is to compensate for the loss of the

companionship, affection and sexual enjoyment of one's spouse, and

it is clear that these can be lost as a result of psychological or

emotional injury as well as from actual physical harm." Agis, 355

N.E.2d at 320.

Further, Massachusetts recognizes loss of consortium both

between spouses and between a parent and a dependent minor child.

See Limone II, 336 F. Supp.2d at 49-50; Agis, 355 N.E.2d 320;

Ferriter v. O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 696 (Mass.,

1980), superseded on other grounds as stated in Lijoi v.

Massachusetts Bay. Transp. Authority, 548 N.E.2d 893 (Mass. App.

Ct. Jan. 16, 1990). But because the child’s claim "is based upon

dependence on the injured parent for management of the child's

needs and for emotional guidance and support" a plaintiff cannot

recover for loss of consortium in a parent that occurred while the

plaintiff was an independent adult. See Barbosa v. Hopper Feeds,

Inc., 537 N.E.2d 99, 104 (Mass. 1989).

The spouses of the Deegan defendants are entitled to

compensation by the government for the loss of their husbands'

society, companionship, love and support which I find to have been

proximately caused by the acts of the defendant which violate the

FTCA. See Norman v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 529 N.E.2d

139, 140 (Mass. 1988). This includes the loss of sexual

relations. See Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555, 560

-208-
(Mass. 1973). It also includes the value of household services

that would have been performed by their husbands. See, e.g., Wood

v. Mobil Chem. Co., 365 N.E.2d 1087, 1097 (Ill.App. 1977).

The children are entitled to compensation for loss of their

fathers' society, affection, guidance and support, and impairment

of the fathers' ability to manage their needs, all of which

likewise was proximately caused by defendant's tortious conduct.

See Glicklich v. Spievack, 452 N.E.2d 287, 292, rev. den., 454

N.E.2d 1276 (Mass. 1983). "The loss of a parent's love, care,

companionship, and guidance can severely impact a child's

development and have a major influence on a child's welfare and

personality throughout life." Villareal v. Department of Transp.,

774 P.2d 213, 217 (Ariz. 1989).

In determining the value of the intangibles that make up loss

of consortium, the Court must rely on its own discretion. The

prior independent existence of marital discord or separation short

of divorce are important considerations, since they qualify the

nature of the society that has been lost. See, e.g., Planned

Parenthood of Northwest Ind., Inc. v. Vines, 543 N.E.2d 654, 657-

658 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). Compensation for intangible harm is

separate and cumulative for each plaintiff who suffers a loss;

even though they suffer the loss of the same person, each

plaintiff's loss is their own.

(1) Spouses

-209-
 The loss to Olympia Limone, Marie Salvati, and Jeannette

Tameleo could not have been more devastating. The marital

relationships they described were loving, supportive, and

invaluable.209 Their husbands are their partners -- in intimate

moments, in raising their children, in weathering life’s hardships

and experiencing its joys. The strength of those bonds is further

evidenced by the extraordinary lengths Olympia and Marie went to

in order to keep their families together, to ensure that their

husbands remained a part of their lives to the greatest extent

possible.

Roberta Werner’s relationship with her ex-husband, however,

was different in kind from the others. One of the factors I must

consider in a loss of consortium claims is the quality of the

relationship lost. To say that the Grecos had troubles would be

an understatement. Roberta Werner conceded that Louis tried to

kill her. Whereas Olympia Limone and Marie Salvati visited their

husbands regularly for thirty odd years, Roberta Werner ceased her

visits by the summer of 1969 -- a year after Louis Greco was

convicted. She abandoned her sons, causing them and Greco much

anguish. Moreover, by 1970 Louis and Roberta were no longer

married. I find against Roberta Werner on her loss of consortium

claim and therefore award her no damages on this score.

209
In the case of Jeannette Tameleo the power of their relationship is
inferred.

-210-
 Most wrongful imprisonment cases in which damages are awarded

for loss of consortium concern imprisonment for hours or days. In

addition to the consortium lost due to the imprisonment itself,

these awards often include loss of consortium due to the effect of

the victim’s emotional anguish on the marital relationship long

after release. See, e.g., Pitt v. District of Columbia, 404 F.

Supp. 2d 351, 353 (D.D.C. 2005), reviewed on other grounds, 2007

U.S. App. LEXIS 15178 (D.C. Cir.) ($50,000 for loss of consortium

to wife of plaintiff wrongfully imprisoned for six days); Arch v.

Schnur, No. 91-8091-CIV-Moreno (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 1992) ($200,000

to common-law wife of plaintiff under house-arrest for 6 months);

Forrest v. Northwest Airlines, MICV1995-01524 (Mass. Sup. Ct.

April 7, 2000) ($10,000 to wife of plaintiff imprisoned for 3

hours); Baeza v. Johnson, No. 89-CI-16815 (73rd Dist. Ct., Bexar

County, Tex. Feb. 18, 1991) ($34,000 to wife of plaintiff

imprisoned for unspecified period of time); Peaks v. Drug

Emporium, Inc., No. E41490 (Ga. Sup. Ct. June 14, 1996) ($7500 to

husband of plaintiff imprisoned for 14 hours); Sheets v. Reynolds,

No. 97CV-05450 (Ga. Cty. Ct. Fulton Cty. March 1, 1999) ($5,000 to

spouse for 8-10 hours’ incarceration and 45 days’ pending

prosecution).

Larger loss of consortium awards are common for the wrongful

death of a spouse, parent, or child. See, e.g., Frazier et al. v.

Honeywell International Inc., No. 05-cv-00548, 6-12 Prod. Liab.

and Risk (Mealey) 6, (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2007) (parents together

-211-
awarded $24 million in mental anguish and loss of consortium

(undifferentiated) after seat belt failure contributed to

daughter’s death in a car accident), reported in Dominguez et al.

v. City and County of San Francisco, (Super.Ct. San Francisco

County, 2005, No. 422963) (Calif. Super., San Francisco Co. Sept.

2, 2005) ($5.5 million to father and $15,033,546 to mother for

mental anguish and loss of consortium (undifferentiated) after

daughter killed in car accident); Thompson, et al. v. Alza Corp.,

et al., No. 2005-11685 (113th Dist.Ct., Harris County, Tex. July

7, 2006) ($772,500 to minor child for loss of consortium for death

of mother due to defective medication).

The loss in this case is greater than in the usual wrongful

imprisonment case. Plaintiffs were not deprived of their husbands

for hours or days. They lost a lifetime's companionship;

Jeannette Tameleo never saw her husband as a free man again.

Given all the above considerations I award: One Million And

00/100 ($1,000,000.) Dollars each to the spouses of Limone,

Salvati and Tameleo for their loss of consortium.

(2) Children

The Limone, Salvati, and Greco children were deprived of the

love, care, nurture, guidance, society, affection, and

companionship of their fathers. The Limone and Salvati children

managed to maintain relationships with their fathers to a degree,

but were robbed of the day to day nurturing of a parent. Eddie

-212-
and Louis Greco Jr. were never able to recover from their loss.

They never stopped loving their father, hoping he would come home

to them. But that never happened, and their lives were destroyed

by his absence.210

As no court has awarded damages to a child for loss of

consortium based on the wrongful imprisonment of a parent, it is

instructive to look at cases in which children were awarded

damages for the wrongful death or injury of a parent. This case

law is limited since, unlike Massachusetts, many states do not

recognize a child's claim for the loss of a parent's consortium.

In cases in which damages were awarded for loss of parental

consortium, courts have carefully considered the circumstances of

each parent-child relationship. For example, in Reeder v.

Allport, 218 S.W.3d 817, 822 (Tex. App. 2007), the Court of

Appeals upheld a jury award of $125,000 for loss of consortium for

the seventeen year old daughter of a man who was accidentally shot

and killed, and $175,000 for loss of consortium for the man's

ninth-grade son. In assessing the damages, the court considered

"the severity of the injury to the parents and its actual effect

upon the parent-child relationship ... the nature of the child's

relationship with the parent, the child's emotional and physical

characteristics, and whether other consortium-giving relationships

210
Because Saverio Tameleo was already living independently as an adult
when he lost his father, Massachusetts law does not allow him to recover for
loss of consortium. See Barbosa, 537 N.E.2d at 104.

-213-
are available to the child." Reeder, 218 S.W.3d at 819 (quoting

Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Tex. 1990)).

A similar assessment of damages was reached in Marin v. U.S.,

814 F.Supp. 1468 (E.D. Wash. 1992), in which the court

acknowledged that the parental loss suffered by the plaintiffs was

greater than average. There, a woman was murdered by an indicted

federal felon who was released from prison by the INS to serve as

an informant. See Marin, 815 F.Supp at 1476. The court awarded

$200,000 to each of a decedent's three children (ages nine,

eleven, and fourteen)-- not including loss of the mother's future

income. Id.

Significant damages have also been awarded to children in

cases of a parents' serious injury. For example, in Oberson v.

U.S., 311 F.Supp.2d 917 (D. Mont. 2004) the court awarded $600,000

to the daughter of a snowmobiler who was brain-damaged after being

struck by another snowmobiler on a trail maintained by the U.S.

Forest Service. Similarly, in General Motors Corp. v. Burry, 203

S.W.3d 514, 550-51 (Tex. App. 2006) a Texas appeals court upheld a

jury award of $1,010,000 each, for loss of parental consortium to

a woman's two daughters who were eleven and nine when their mother

suffered permanent brain damage in a car accident.

As in the above cases, where juries and judges have struggled

to quantify the unquantifiable, the loss suffered by the Limone,

Salvati and Greco children is immeasurable. The children here

were deprived of their fathers' love and support at a very early

-214-
age and some of them were never able to recover. In keeping with

the holdings of the other cases, I believe that a damage award of

$200,000 per child is warranted on these facts.

b. Bystander Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress

The plaintiffs claiming bystander intentional infliction of

emotional distress fall roughly into two categories: (1) family

members who experienced the trauma of the conviction and its

aftermath, and (2) children who were very young at the time of the

conviction.

(1) The General Case

These family members knew immediately of every proceeding

from the arrests through the indictments, trial, convictions,

sentencings, and denial of the appeals. Many were physically

present as events unfolded. Eddie Greco was present when the

police came to arrest his father at dinnertime. The entire Limone

family was present when the police surrounded their house looking

for Peter Limone. Olympia was a defense witness at the trial, and

was there at the moment when the verdict was handed down, at which

point she screamed and fainted. Saverio Tameleo was in the

courtroom when the verdict and sentence were pronounced.211

Moreover, I find that it is reasonable to infer from the

evidence that even those who were not physically present at the

211
This litany is not meant to be an exhaustive list of who was where
when; it is merely a sampling.

-215-
proceedings, with the exception of the youngest children, who are

discussed below, had contemporaneous knowledge of every subsequent

development. The trial was heavily reported on television and in

the newspapers. And family members and neighbors communicated

amongst themselves. For example, Maria Salvati Sidman was told by

a friend just as her father was arrested. On the day of his

conviction, her whole family was together and her mother told her

of the conviction and that her father was innocent. Olympia

Limone found out from her brother-in-law as Peter was being

arrested. She told Peter Jr. the verdict as soon as she returned

home from court after its pronouncement. Eddie Greco was told by

his mother as soon as the verdict and sentence were handed down,

and was inconsolable.

The severity of their emotional distress as they watched

events unfold is discussed at length above,212 and need not be

repeated here, except to note how it was renewed with each

agonizing step: arrest, indictment, trial, conviction, sentencing,

denial of appeal, commutation, etc.

(2) Young Children

Not all of the plaintiffs’ children were fully aware of what

was happening when their fathers were convicted. Neither Gail nor

212
Roberta Werner testified that when she heard the guilty verdict, she
felt "[l]ike my heart was ripped out of my body, I was in some kind of hole
and I couldn’t get out. It was horrible." Tr. vol. 11, 47. The measure of
her emotional response is best captured by her conduct after the conviction --
resorting to drinking, abandoning her children, and cutting off contact with
Greco. Accordingly, on this issue her damages are comparable to those of
other wives.

-216-
Anthony Salvati knew that Salvati was in prison at first -- Gail

was too young to be told, and Anthony was younger still. Carolyn

Limone was told that her father was in the hospital, and Janine

Limone was just a baby.

But this is not a case of a car accident or a shouting match;

the outrageous conduct here did not occur at only one hour of one

day. When the children eventually did learn the truth about where

their fathers were, they were not hearing about a long-past

horrifying event; they were being introduced to an ongoing saga

that would be a daily fact of their lives for decades. Nor was

this fact merely a lasting consequence of the FBI's outrageous

conduct in the late 1960s. Four commutation petitions brought by

Salvati from 1986 through 1991 were rejected because the FBI

concealed evidence. Each time, Salvati’s hopes, and those of his

family, for commutation were dashed. The FBI did the same for

Limone three times. Each time their fathers’ commutation

petitions were denied, it spurred a fresh round of despair, horror

and humiliation for the by-then fully aware and involved younger

children. Therefore, I award them damages for bystander

intentional infliction of emotional distress on the same terms as

their siblings.

Even in the case of death, bystander intentional infliction

of emotional distress awards tend to be smaller than awards for

wrongful imprisonment or loss of consortium. See, e.g., Blinzler

v. Marriott International, Inc, 81 F.3d 1148, 1150 (1st Cir. 1996)

-217-
($200,000 to wife who watched husband die of a heart attack while

waiting for an ambulance that took 30 minutes to arrive;

negligent, not intentional, infliction of emotional distress);

Stabenow v. Jacobsen, 610 N.W.2d 512 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) ($24,000

to two parents together who witnessed son’s death at hands of

drunk driver); Nichols v. Busse, 503 N.W.2d 173 (Neb. 1993)

($6,200 to mother who learned that defendant killed daughter in

car accident and hid the body).

I award $50,000 to each family member whose trauma was

proximately caused by the defendant's intentional infliction of

emotional distress.

VI. CONCLUSION

On one of the plaques in this building is a portion of a

quote from Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States,

277 U.S. 438 (1928). It is fitting to quote it here more

completely:

Decency, security and liberty alike demand

that government officials shall be subjected
to the same rules of conduct that are commands
to the citizen. In a government of laws,
existence of the government will be imperilled
if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that
in the administration of the criminal law the
end justifies the means -- to declare that the
Government may commit crimes in order to

-218-
 secure the conviction of a private criminal --
would bring terrible retribution. Against that
pernicious doctrine this Court should
resolutely set its face.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 485.

Judgment for the plaintiff; damages as follows:

I AWARD damages in the amounts of Twenty-Eight Million And

00/100 ($28,000,000.00) Dollars to the estate of Louis Greco, Sr.,

Twenty-Six Million And 00/100 ($26,000,000.00) Dollars to Peter

Limone, Sr., Twenty-Nine Million And 00/100 ($29,000,000.00)

Dollars to Joseph Salvati, and Thirteen Million And 00/100

($13,000,000.00) Dollars to the estate of Enrico (Henry) Tameleo.

To Olympia Limone, Marie Salvati, and the estate of

Giovannina (Jeannete) Tameleo, I AWARD damages in the amount of

One Million And 00/100 ($1,000,000.00) Dollars for loss of

consortium and Fifty Thousand And 00/100 ($50,000.00) Dollars for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, for a total award of

One Million, Fifty Thousand And 00/100 ($1,050,000.00) Dollars to

each of these plaintiffs separately.

To EACH of Peter Limone, Jr., Paul Limone, Carolyn Limone

Zenga, Janine Limone Arria, Maria Sidman, Sharon Salvati, Gail

Orenberg, Anthony Salvati, Edward Greco, and the estate of Louis

Greco, Jr., separately, I AWARD damages in the amount of Two

Hundred Thousand And 00/100 ($200,000.00) Dollars for loss of

consortium and Fifty Thousand And 00/100 ($50,000.00) Dollars for

-219-
intentional infliction of emotional distress, for a total of Two

Hundred, Fifty Thousand And 00/100 ($250,000.00) Dollars to each

of these plaintiffs separately.

To EACH of Roberta Werner and Saverio Tameleo separately, I

AWARD damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand And 00/100

($50,000.00) Dollars for intentional infliction of emotional

distress.

SO ORDERED.

Date: July 26, 2007 /s/Nancy Gertner

NANCY GERTNER, U.S.D.C.

-220-
 Publisher Information

Note* This page is not part of the opinion as entered by the court.

The docket information provided on this page is for the benefit

of publishers of these opinions.

1:02-cv-10890-NG Limone, et al v. United States of, et al

Nancy Gertner, presiding

Date filed: 05/15/2002 Date of last filing: 07/26/2007

Attorneys

Jonathan M. Albano Bingham McCutchen representi Globe Newspaper Co., Inc. (Intervenor)

LLP 150 Federal Street Boston, MA 02110 ng

617-951-8000 617-951-8736 (fax)

jonathan.albano@bingham.com Assigned:

02/21/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Michael Avery Suffolk University Law representi Carolyn Limone Zenga (Plaintiff)

School 120 Tremont Street Boston, MA ng

02108-4977 617-573-8551 617-305-3090

(fax) mavery@suffolk.edu Assigned:

05/15/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Janine Limone Arria (Plaintiff)
Olympia Limone (Plaintiff)
Paul Limone (Plaintiff)
Peter J. Limone (Plaintiff)
Peter J. Limone, Jr. (Plaintiff)
Saverio Tameleo (Plaintiff)
Roberta Werner (Plaintiff)
Juliane Balliro Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis- representi Carolyn Limone Zenga (Plaintiff)

Cohen LLP One Boston Place 40th Floor ng

-221-
Boston, MA 02108 617-226-4000 617-226-

4500 (fax) jballiro@wolfblock.com

Assigned: 05/15/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janine Limone Arria (Plaintiff)
Olympia Limone (Plaintiff)
Paul Limone (Plaintiff)
Peter J. Limone (Plaintiff)
Peter J. Limone, Jr. (Plaintiff)
Roberta Werner (Plaintiff)
Saverio Tameleo (Plaintiff)
Richard D. Bickelman Posternak representi Roberta Werner (Plaintiff)

Blankstein & Lund LLP The Prudential ng

Tower 800 Boylston Street Boston, MA

02199-8004 Suffo 617-973-6178 617-722-

4988 (fax) rbickelman@pbl.com Assigned:

09/09/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Roberta Werner (Plaintiff)
Jennifer L. Bills Law Offices of Howard representi Edward Greco (Consolidated Plaintiff)

Friedman, PC 5th Floor 90 Canal Street ng

Boston, MA 02114-2022 617-742-4100

617-742-5858 (fax) jbills@civil-rights-

law.com Assigned: 08/28/2006 LEAD

ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph B. Burns Hoberman, McGuigan, representi Anthony Salvati (Plaintiff)

Freidman, McNamara & Ruberto, P.C. One ng

State Street Hartford, CT 06103-3101

(203) 549-1000 jburns@rms-law.com

Assigned: 04/28/2004 LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gail Orenberg (Plaintiff)
Joseph Salvati (Plaintiff)
Maria Sidman (Plaintiff)

-222-
 Marie Salvati (Plaintiff)
Sharon Salvati (Plaintiff)
Katherine A. Carey Torts Branch, Civil representi United States of America (Defendant)

Division U.S. Department of Justice P.O. ng

Box 8888 Benjamin Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20004 202-616-4290

Katherine.carey@usdoj.gov Assigned:

07/31/2003 TERMINATED: 11/10/2003

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE

NOTICED
John Cavicchi Attorney John Cavicchi 25 representi Roberta Werner (Plaintiff)

Barnes Ave. E.Boston, MA 02128 617- ng

567-4697 jecavicchi@aol.com Assigned:

05/15/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Carolyn Limone Zenga (Plaintiff)
Janine Limone Arria (Plaintiff)
Olympia Limone (Plaintiff)
Paul Limone (Plaintiff)
Peter J. Limone (Plaintiff)
Peter J. Limone, Jr. (Plaintiff)
Saverio Tameleo (Plaintiff)
Roberta Werner (Plaintiff)
James M. Chernetsky City of Boston Law representi Frank L. Walsh (Defendant)

Department Boston City Hall Room 615 ng

Boston, MA 02201 617-635-4048 617-635-

3199 (fax) Assigned: 11/27/2002 LEAD

ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bridget Ciarlo Rome McGuigan, P.C. 13th representi Gail Orenberg (Plaintiff)

Floor One State Street Hartford, CT ng

06103-3101 860-549-1000 860-724-3921

(fax) Assigned: 08/04/2005 LEAD

ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph Salvati (Plaintiff)

-223-
 Maria Sidman (Plaintiff)
Marie Salvati (Plaintiff)
Sharon Salvati (Plaintiff)
Glenn E. Coe Rome McGuigan Sabanosh, representi Anthony Salvati (Plaintiff)

P.C. One State Street Hartford, CT 06103- ng

3101 860-549-1000 860-724-3921 (fax)

gcoe@rms-law.com Assigned: 04/22/2004

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE

NOTICED
Gail Orenberg (Plaintiff)
Joseph Salvati (Plaintiff)
Maria Sidman (Plaintiff)
Marie Salvati (Plaintiff)
Sharon Salvati (Plaintiff)
John M. Connolly Meyer, Connolly, Sloman representi Dennis Condon 12 Kingston Terrace Waltham,

& MacDonald, LLP 5th Floor 12 Post ng MA 02541 (Defendant) PRO SE

Office Square Boston, MA 02109 617-423-

2254 617-426-4687 (fax)

jconnolly@meyerconnolly.com Assigned:

10/01/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Daniel R. Deutsch Deutsch Williams representi Roberta Werner (Plaintiff)

Brooks DeRensis & Holland, P.C. 99 ng

Summer Street Boston, MA 02110 617-

951-2300 617-951-2323 (fax)

ddeutsch@dwboston.com Assigned:

09/07/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas R Donohue Brody, Hardoon, representi Frank L. Walsh (Defendant)

Perkins & Kesten One Exeter Plaza, 12th ng

floor Boston, MA 02116 617-880-7100

617-880-7171 (fax)

tdonohue@bhpklaw.com Assigned:

11/27/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

-224-
TO BE NOTICED
Edwin Durham Rachlis, Durham, Duff, representi Edward Greco (Consolidated Plaintiff)

Adler 542 South Dearborn Street 1310 ng

Chicago, IL 60605 312-733-3950 Assigned:

07/24/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
John C. Foskett Deutsch, Williams, Brooks, representi Roberta Werner (Plaintiff)

DeRensis & Holland, P.C. 99 Summer ng

Street Boston, MA 02110-1213 617-951-

2300 617-951-2323 (fax)

jfoskett@dwboston.com Assigned:

09/09/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Howard Friedman Law Offices of Howard representi Edward Greco (Consolidated Plaintiff)

Friedman, P.C. 90 Canal Street 5th Floor ng

Boston, MA 02114-2022 617-742-4100

617-742-5858 (fax) hfriedman@civil-rights-

law.com Assigned: 07/24/2003 LEAD

ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Victor J. Garo Law Offices of Victor J. Garorepresenti Anthony Salvati (Plaintiff)

10 High St. Suite 14 Medford, MA 02155 ng

781-391-1400 781-391-7377 (fax)

vkj10@aol.com Assigned: 11/02/2005

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE

NOTICED
Gail Orenberg (Plaintiff)
Joseph Salvati (Plaintiff)
Maria Sidman (Plaintiff)
Marie Salvati (Plaintiff)
Sharon Salvati (Plaintiff)
Christine Marie Griffin Wolf, Block, Schorr representi Carolyn Limone Zenga (Plaintiff)

& Solis-Cohen LLP One Boston Place ng

-225-
Boston, MA 02108 617-226-4000 617-226-

4500 (fax) cgriffin@wolfblock.com

Assigned: 08/09/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janine Limone Arria (Plaintiff)
Olympia Limone (Plaintiff)
Paul Limone (Plaintiff)
Peter J. Limone (Plaintiff)
Peter J. Limone, Jr. (Plaintiff)
Saverio Tameleo (Plaintiff)
Lawrence R. Holland Deutsch Williams representi Roberta Werner (Plaintiff)

Brooks DeRensis & Holland, P.C. 99 ng

Summer Street Boston, MA 02110

lholland@legalmgt.com Assigned:

09/09/2002 TERMINATED: 08/26/2005

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Roberta Werner (Plaintiff)
Myong J. Joun Law Offices of Howard representi Edward Greco (Consolidated Plaintiff)

Friedman, P.C. 90 Canal Street, 5th Floor ng

Boston, MA 02114-2022 617-742-4100

617-742-5858 (fax) mjjoun@civil-rights-

law.com Assigned: 07/24/2003 LEAD

ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William T. Koski Koski & Kearns LLP One representi Carolyn Limone Zenga (Plaintiff)

Bowdoin Square Suite 300 Boston, MA ng

02114 617-973-4525 617-973-4520 (fax)

wtkoski@koskikearnslaw.com Assigned:

05/15/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Janine Limone Arria (Plaintiff)
Olympia Limone (Plaintiff)
Paul Limone (Plaintiff)
Peter J. Limone (Plaintiff)
Peter J. Limone, Jr. (Plaintiff)
Saverio Tameleo (Plaintiff)

-226-
 Roberta Werner (Plaintiff)
Margaret Krawiec U.S. Department of representi United States of America at U.S. Postal Service

Justice Torts Branch, Civil Division P.O. ng (Consolidated Defendant)

Box 888 Benjamin Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044 202-616-4915

Assigned: 07/24/2003 TERMINATED:

07/29/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Allen L. Lanstra U.S. Department of Justice representi United States of America (Defendant)

Room 8018N 1331 Pennsylvania Ave., ng

N.W. Washington, DC 20004 202-616-

4272 202-616-5200 (fax) Assigned:

11/10/2003 TERMINATED: 07/02/2004

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE

NOTICED
Mary McElroy Leach Civil Division, US representi United States of America (Defendant)

Dept. of Justice FTCA Staff P.O. Box 888 ng

Benjamin Franklin Station Washington, DC

20044 202-616-4256 202-616-5200 (fax)

mary.leach@usdoj.gov Assigned:

07/31/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Keith H. Liddle Department of Justice Civil representi United States of America (Defendant)

Division, Torts Branch 1331 Pennsylvania ng

Ave., NW Washington, DC 20004 202-

616-4296 202-626-5200 (fax)

keith.liddle@usdoj.gov Assigned:

06/30/2004 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Bridget Bailey Lipscomb U.S. Department representi United States of America (Defendant)

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of Justice PO Box 888 Ben Franklin ng

Station Washington, DC 20044 202-616-

9356 202-616-5200 (fax)

Bridget.Lipscomb@usdoj.gov Assigned:

06/27/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Edward J. Lonergan 101 Merrimac Street representi John Connolly (Defendant)

Suite 800 Boston, MA 02114-9601 617- ng

371-0430 617-227-7177 (fax)

edwardlonergan@aol.com Assigned:

06/17/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Austin J. McGuigan Rome McGuigan representi Anthony Salvati (Plaintiff)

Sabanosh, P.C. One State Street 13th ng

Floor Hartford, CT 06103 860-246-5048

860-724-3921 (fax) amcguigan@rms-

law.com Assigned: 04/19/2004 ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Joseph Salvati (Plaintiff)
Maria Sidman (Plaintiff)
Marie Salvati (Plaintiff)
Sharon Salvati (Plaintiff)
Gail Orenberg (Plaintiff)
Michael B. Meyer Meyer, Connolly, Slomanrepresenti Dennis Condon 12 Kingston Terrace Waltham,

& MacDonald, LLP 5th Floor 12 Post ng MA 02541 (Defendant) PRO SE

Office Square Boston, MA 02109 617-423-

2254 617-426-4687 (fax)

mmeyer@meyerconnolly.com Assigned:

10/01/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Ian H. Moss Posternak, Blankstein & Lund representi All Plaintiffs (All Plaintiffs)

Prudential Tower 800 Boylston Street ng

Boston, MA 02199-8004 617-973-6146

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617-722-4989 (fax) imoss@pbl.com

Assigned: 09/06/2006 ATTORNEY TO BE

NOTICED
E. Peter Mullane Mullane, Michel & representi John Connolly (Defendant)

McInnes 132 Mount Auburn Steet ng

Cambridge, MA 02138-5736 617-661-9000

617-661-2915 (fax) peter@3mlaw.com

Assigned: 06/17/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
E. Peter Parker Law Office of E. Peter representi H. Paul Rico TERMINATED: 01/22/2004

Parker 151 Merrimac Street Boston, MA ng (Defendant)

02114 617-742-9099 617-742-9989 (fax)

peter@parkerslaw.com Assigned:

11/18/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
David Plotinsky Office of General Counsel representi Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House

U.S. House of Representatives 219 ng of Representatives (Intervenor)

Cannon House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515-6532 202-225-

9700 202-226-1360 (fax)

David.Plotinsky@mail.house.gov Assigned:

11/17/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY

TO BE NOTICED
Michael Rachlis Rachlis, Durham, Duff, representi Edward Greco (Consolidated Plaintiff)

Adler Suite 1310 542 South Dearborn ng

Street Chicago, IL 60605 312-733-3950

312-733-3952 (fax) mrachlis@rddlaw.net

Assigned: 07/24/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J. Lizette Richards Fierst, Pucci & Kane representi Edward Greco (Consolidated Plaintiff)

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LLP 64 Gothic Street Northampton, MA ng

01060-3042 413-584-8067 413-585-0787

(fax) richards@fierstpucci.com Assigned:

11/21/2003 TERMINATED: 10/29/2004

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE

NOTICED
Alan D. Rose, Jr. Rose, Chinitz & Rose 29 representi Edward F. Harrington TERMINATED:

Commonwealth Avenue Boston, MA 02216 ng 09/30/2002 (Defendant)

617-536-0040 617-536-4400 (fax)

adrjr@rose-law.net Assigned: 08/22/2002

TERMINATED: 09/30/2002 LEAD

ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan D. Rose, Sr. Rose, Chinitz & Rose 29 representi Edward F. Harrington TERMINATED:

Commonwealth Avenue Boston, MA 02216 ng 09/30/2002 (Defendant)

617-536-0040 617-536-4400 (fax)

adr@rose-law.net Assigned: 08/22/2002

TERMINATED: 09/30/2002 LEAD

ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald J. Snyder Perkins, Smith & Cohen, representi Carolyn Limone Zenga (Plaintiff)

LLP One Beacon Street, 30th Floor ng

Boston, MA 02108 617-854-4000 617-854-

4040 (fax) Assigned: 05/07/2004

TERMINATED: 08/09/2005 ATTORNEY TO

BE NOTICED
Janine Limone Arria (Plaintiff)
Olympia Limone (Plaintiff)
Paul Limone (Plaintiff)
Peter J. Limone, Jr. (Plaintiff)
Saverio Tameleo (Plaintiff)
Peter J. Limone (Plaintiff)
Wendy C. Weber Department of Correctionrepresenti Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of

Legal Division 70 Franklin Street Suite 600ng Corrections (Interested Party)

-230-
Boston, MA 02110 617-727-3300 x 189

617-727-7403 (fax) Assigned: 11/04/2005

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE

NOTICED

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