Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                

4 Workover and Potential Hazards

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 24
At a glance
Powered by AI
The document discusses workovers, which are operations conducted on oil and gas wells after initial completion. Workovers are needed due to equipment failures or changes in well performance. Safety is important when conducting workovers.

Workovers are conducted due to equipment failures in the completion string or to change the completion due to well performance problems or reservoir management needs.

Potential equipment failures discussed include tubing failures, packer failures, failures of flow control devices, Christmas tree or tubing hanger failures, and downhole pump failures.

WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

CONTENTS

1. WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS 1


1.1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.2 REASONS FOR WORKOVER 1
1.2.1 Equipment Failure 1
1.2.2 Well Performance Problems 2
1.2.3 General 2
1.3 WELL WORKOVER 3
1.3.1 Workover Planning 3
1.3.2 Workover Programs 4
1.3.3 Well Control Problems During Workover 5
1.4 WORKOVER EXAMPLE 6

i
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

1. WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS


1.1 INTRODUCTION
Once a well has been drilled and completed it will be utilised to produce from or inject fluid
into the formation. Workover is the term that is commonly used to describe the process
anytime the well is entered after it is completed. This normally involves a process to stop the
well producing hydrocarbons, so that the purpose for which it has been entered may be
carried out in a safe and controlled manner.

1.2 REASONS FOR WORKOVER


Problems associated with well completions account for the majority of workovers conducted
on oil and gas wells. The necessity to perform a workover may be due to a problem in one of
two categories:
1. Equipment failure
2. The need to replace/change the completion string due to well performance problems or
other reservoir management needs.

1.2.1 Equipment Failure


A typical completion string has many components and sometimes is designed with an
incomplete knowledge of the likely conditions for the full life of the well. Equipment may fail
for a number of reasons including:
 Effects of pressure
 Effects of thermal stress
 Applied and induced mechanical loading
 Corrosion failure (O2, CO2, H2S, Acids)
 Erosion.
It is also important to distinguish two types of failure, namely:
1. Catastrophic failure implying a safety concern e.g. tubing leak.
2. Inability to function with no immediate significant safety concerns e.g. gas lift valve
failure.
Failure of equipment may dictate two courses of action:
1. Repair or removal and replacement.
2. Abandon the well in cases where due to safety implications the well is not salvageable.

1
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Typical component failures include:


 Tubing failure
 Packer failure
 Failure of a flow control device (e.g. SCSSV, SSD)
 Xmas Tree, tubing hanger failure or leakage
 Failure of gas lift valve and/or SPM
 Downhole pump failure.
The consequences of a component failure depends upon its integration with the completion
string and its replacement may require:
 Removal and replacement by means of wireline or coiled tubing without having to
kill the well.
 Removal and replacement of the Xmas Tree.
 Partial or full removal and replacement of the completion string.
 Other remedial work.

1.2.2 Well Performance Problems


Workovers designed to improve the vertical lift performance of wells are very common.
Workovers conducted in this way can be directed at:
 The improvement or restoration of the performance of the well under natural lift.
 The installation or replacement of artificial lift equipment.
The two major factors affecting well performance are reservoir pressure and water cut, and
changes in completion design have to be made accordingly.

1.2.3 General
It may not always be possible, or desirable, to perform a workover immediately, if for
example, the means are not readily available. In this case the well may be:
 Shut-in, if there is no safety problem, e.g. this may be the case of high water cut.
 Temporarily suspended, if there is a safety problem, such as a tubing leak. This
involves installing the required number of mechanical and fluid barriers so that
the well is rendered safe.
 Abandoned, if the problem is so severe that it is not safe or economical to
perform a workover. This may occur if there are major well performance
problems or irretrievable junk in the well. In this case, permanent barriers such as
cement plugs will be placed in the well, perhaps along with other requirements
such as removing the Xmas Tree.
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

1.3 WELL WORKOVER


The following methods can be used to workover a well:
 Drilling/Workover rig
 Wireline Intervention System
 Coiled Tubing Intervention System
 Hydraulic Workover System (Snubbing).
It will be clear that the hazards associated with workover operations must be identified and
procedures put in place to minimise or eradicate the hazard. This is clearly tied in to planning
and programming the workover for the rig or whatever the type of workover unit is used. The
following information is provided with the rig workover in mind.

1.3.1 Workover Planning


Clearly, well control is the key safety element in any workover plan and must be reflected in
the workover program.
Workover planning and the subsequent production of workover programs is ‘second nature’
to those engineers who are continually involve in that process - this is not necessarily true of
all of those involved in the chain of communication from planning to the execution of the
workover. Individuals preparing/updating the safety and management system (SMS) will have
involved the well operations group so that the documentation used in the planning and
execution of workovers is an integral part of the SMS.
It would be useful for well operations groups to highlight the mechanism for supervisors in
charge of well operations at the site to communicate proposed changes in the workover
program to the onshore co-ordinator, and the method of responding to the proposed changes.
This may seem unnecessary to those continually involved in that process, but if there is a
change out of personnel, illness or vacation the ‘norm’ could become the abnormal and
problems could ensue that may affect safety and costs.
Most well operations groups include well diagrams showing barriers and containment devices
in the well before, during and after the workover and well files are updated accordingly. There
is normally feedback to adjust procedures, where necessary, after a post workover review and
this may include changes in barrier philosophy.

3
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

1.3.2 Workover Programs


Having established the objective for a workover, a program is produced. The following is an
example of the main headings of the contents of a typical program for a producing well.
1. Well history
2. Current status of the well
3. Proposed completion details
4. Proposed deviation from standard procedures (if any)
5. Procedures for.
 Well kill
 Plugging
 Removal of Xmas Tree
 Installation of BOP
 Cleaning out the well
 Running the completion
 Removing the BOP
 Re-installing the Xmas Tree.
From a well control perspective we would want to have specific information on:
 Pore pressure of exposed formations Kill fluid requirements
 Fracture pressure of exposed formations Bullheading requirements
 Permeability of exposed formations Kill fluid specifications
 Accessibility to tailpipe nipples Barrier considerations
 Integrity of packer and tubing hanger Procedures to control the well
 Current wellhead annuli info on pressures Procedures to control the well
 Hydrate formation Procedures to control the well
From an operational point of point of view the following should be considered:
 Disposal of contaminants
 Personnel protection
 Prevalence/likelihood of hydrogen sulphide (H2S) and low specific activity (LSA)
scale radioactivity.
As discussed earlier, careful considerations should be given to the BOP configuration,
particularly with respect to the workover objective and anticipated problems.
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

The following considerations also apply:


All pressure control equipment, ie. BOPs, risers, lubricators should:
 Be rated to at least the maximum anticipated surface pressure
 Be suited to the working environment allowing for:
Temperature e.g. BOP elastomeric components
Corrosive effects e.g. CO2, H2S, and brines
 Allow passage of all toolstring components.
Allowance should be made for the possibility of operations such as bullheading.

NOTE: Typically the pressure rating of BOPs will be the same as that for the
Xmas Tree, unless there has been considerable reservoir pressure
depletion during the life of the well.

1.3.3 Well Control Problems During Workover


The following are typical causes of well control problems during workover:
1. Different workover philosophies within the same company for different fields can lead
to subtle changes in procedures which in turn can lead to errors.
2. In some cases there is no test of mechanical barriers from below the barrier.
3. Attempting to remove a toolstring from a well having insufficient length of riser to
isolate the formation and isolate to depressurise the toolstring
4. Brine densities can be considerably affected by downhole pressures and temperatures.
This is particularly hazardous where a low overbalance margin exists.
In many cases the procedures initially proposed will fail because they may have to be modified
in the light of new facts uncovered during the process of the workover operation. Many
aspects must be considered before developing procedures.

5
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

1.4 WORKOVER EXAMPLE


The objective of this workover is to remove a permanent packer from a production well with
a surface Xmas Tree (Refer to Figure 1 - Figure 4). In this case the well must be killed, the
tubing pulled from the well, the packer milled, and a new packer installed. The following is a
general list to consider:

1. Permit to work
Well handover certificate sharing status of the well. heavy lift.
Isolation and de-pressurisation of wellhead prior to plugging well.
Close liaison with production and clear lines of communication.
2. COSHH
Safe handling of corrosive brines.
Protection against biocides and other additives.
3. Well control
Kill procedures either by bullheading and reverse circulation; communicate via sliding
side door or punch holes in the tubing.
Displace tubing contents to test separator for disposal.
At this stage, the well may be secured by installing plugs which fit specific landing
nipples or bridge plugs which can straddle the hole and secure it at any depth in the
tubing. To install plugs, a wireline well intervention method will be necessary.
4. Pressure test wireline intervention equipment
Cordon off wireline work area between wireline unit and the wellhead.
Tool string picked up by air tuggers. Ensure appropriate signalling system being used to
aid those positioning tool string on Xmas Tree.
No barriers are in place in the tool string but we do have several containment devices if
for any reason the well starts to flow:
Stuffing box Containment device
Safety check union Containment device
Lubricator Functional device
Tool trap Functional device
Wireline BOP Containment device
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Leaks/containment problems may be as follows:


 Major Leaks
Due to main sealing device failure
Due to freezing rendering sealing devices inoperative
Due to absence of cable
Due to elastomer failure
Due to riser/lubricator failure.
 Minor Leaks
In gas well
In sour wells
Through closed BOPs.
 Operating problems leading to leaks
Fragile cable breaking/stranding
Air/grease supply failure.
 Well kill situation
Tubing blocked
Secondary well control device failure. (e.g. BOPs)

NOTE: Three plugs have been installed i.e. In tailpipe, in SCSSV profile, and in
tubing hanger profile (BPV).

Procedures are also required for:


 Depressurising lubricator
 Rigging down equipment
 Heavy lift - remove Xmas Tree
 Heavy lift - replace rig BOPs.
The details of how further operations are carried out will not be discussed here, but the
available barriers have been indicated. As stated previously, procedures for all steps outlined in
workover will be necessary until the well is handed back to production.
A workover to remove a permanent packer from a production well with a Sub-sea Xmas Tree
is shown in Figure 4 and Figure 8

7
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 1 - Well Closed In Prior To Well Kill


WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 2 - Well Killed And Barrier In Place For Tree Removal

9
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 3 - BOP Removed And Tree Replaced After Workover


WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 4 - Sub-sea Well - BOP Installed - Tubing Hanger Running Tool In Place - Prepare To
Rig Up Wireline

11
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 5 - Sub-sea Well - Prepare To Pull Tubing


WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 6 - Sub-sea Well - Tubing Removed - Wear Bushing Installed

13
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 7 - Sub-sea Well - Milling The Packer


WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 8 - Sub-sea Well - Running New Tubing

15
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 9 - Sub-sea Well - Plugs Removed - Prepare To Pull Tubing On Tubing Hanger
Running And Orientation Tool
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 10 - Sub-sea Well - Tubing Removed

17
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 11 - Sub-sea Well - Milling The Packer


WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 12 - Sub-sea Well - New Tubing Run On Tubing Hanger Running And Orientation
Tool

19
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 13 - Sub-sea Well - Plugs Run Prior To Nipple Down BOP


WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Figure 14 - Sub-sea Well - BOP And Drilling Riser Pulled Tree Run On Workover Package

21
WORKOVER AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS

You might also like