6 Salvador V Mapa

2/15/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 539
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Salvador vs. Mapa, Jr.
*
G.R. No. 135080. November 28, 2007.
ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, for and in behalf of the

Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans, petitioner, vs. PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., RAFAEL A.
SISON, ROLANDO M. ZOSA, CESAR C. ZALAMEA,
BENJAMIN BAROT, CASIMIRO TANEDO, J.V. DE
OCAMPO, ALICIA L. REYES, BIENVENIDO R.
TANTOCO, JR., BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, SR.,
FRANCIS B. BANES, ERNESTO M. CARINGAL, ROMEO
V. JACINTO, and MANUEL D. TAN-GLAO, respondents.
Ombudsman; Appeals; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice;

The remedy from the adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.—What was filed before this Court is a
petition captioned as Petition for Review on Certiorari. We have
ruled, time and again, that a petition for review on certiorari is
not the proper mode by which resolutions of the Ombudsman in
preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reviewed by this
Court. The remedy from the adverse resolution of the
Ombudsman is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Same; Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The

averments in the complaint, not the nomenclature given by the
parties, determine the nature of the action—the Supreme Court
may differently label actions as special civil actions for certiorari
under Rule 65 for reasons such as justice, equity, and fair play.—
Though captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari, we will
treat this petition as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its
contents reveals that petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion
to the Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint. The averments
in the complaint, not the nomenclature given by the parties,
determine the nature of the action. In previous rulings, we have
treated differently labeled actions as special civil actions for
certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such as justice, equity, and
fair play.
_______________
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000177a540d5ccdae5a574003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
* THIRD DIVISION.
35
VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 35
Behest Loans; Prescription; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

Act (R.A. No. 3019); The prescriptive period for the offenses
punishable by R.A. No. 3019 and subject of the behest loans should
be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not
from the day of such commission.—The issue of prescription has
long been settled by this Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 317 SCRA 272
(1999), thus: [I]t is wellnigh impossible for the State, the
aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at
the time the questioned transactions were made because, as
alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with
the “beneficiaries of the loans.” Thus, we agree with the
COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with
which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be
computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not
from the day of such commission.
Same; Same; Statutes; Administrative Order No. 13;

Memorandum Order No. 61; Judicial Review; To justify
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication;
a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt; The Ombudsman
had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality
of a law.—The constitu-tionality of laws is presumed. To justify
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication;
a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption is
always in favor of constitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. Even
this Court does not decide a question of constitutional dimension,
unless that question is properly raised and presented in an
appropriate case and is necessary to a determination of the case,
i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented.Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada, 492 SCRA 652
(2006), where the petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 6770 in his motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s decision, we had occasion to state that the
Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the
constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted in
excess of its jurisdiction in declaring unconstitutional the subject
administrative and memorandum orders.
36
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Laws; Words

and Phrases; “Ex Post Facto Laws,” Explained.—An ex post facto
law has been defined as one—(a) which makes an action done
before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done
criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a
crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c)
which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d)
which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. This
Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which
assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was
lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;

Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations, or those that
define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment; An Administrative Order creating an Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and providing for its
composition and functions, and a Memorandum Order merely
providing a frame of reference for determining behest loans, cannot
be characterized as ex post facto laws.—The constitutional
doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the
retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the
legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for
their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature,
and provide for their punishment. The subject administrative and
memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of
this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,
and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete
out penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum
Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining
behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13
and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex
post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman
to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders
are ex post facto.
37
VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 37

PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolution and

order of the Ombudsman.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Errol Wilfredo J. Zshornack for Placido L. Mapa, Jr.
De Castro & Cagampang Law Offices for Cesar C.
Zalamea.
Roberto Budlong Romanillos for Ernesto M. Caringal.
Dominador R. Santiago for Bienvenido R. Tantoco,
Jr.
Trio & Regalado Law Offices for Alicia Ll. Reyes.
NACHURA, J.:
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on

Behest Loans, (the Committee), through Atty. Orlando L.
Salvador (Atty. Salvador), filed this Petition for Review on1
Certiorari seeking to nullify the October 9, 1997 Resolution
of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-96-2428,
dismissing the criminal complaint against respondents on2
ground of prescription, and the July 27, 1998 Order
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans, which reads:
“WHEREAS, Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides

that “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest”;
WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that “The right of the state to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
from their
_______________
1 Annex “A,” Rollo, pp. 46-54.

2 Annex “B,” id., at pp. 55-66.
38

nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,

laches or estoppel”;
WHEREAS, there have been allegations of loans, guarantees,
and other forms of financial accommodations granted, directly or
indirectly, by government-owned and controlled bank or financial
institutions, at the behest, command, or urging by previous
government officials to the disadvantage and detriment of the
Philippines government and the Filipino people;
ACCORDINGLY, an “Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING COMMITTEE
ON BEHEST LOANS” is hereby created to be composed of the
following:
Chairman of the Presidential

Commission on Good Government — Chairman
The Solicitor General — Vice-Chairman
Representative from the
Office of the Executive Secretary — Member
Department of Finance — Member
Department of Justice — Member
Development Bank of the Philippines — Member
Philippine National Bank — Member
Asset Privatization Trust — Member
Government Corporate Counsel — Member
Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation — Member
The Ad Hoc Committee shall perform the following functions:
1. Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and

borrowers, including the principal officers and
stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the persons
responsible for granting the loans or who influenced the
grant thereof;
39
VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 39

2. Identify the borrowers who were granted “friendly

waivers,” as well as the government officials who granted
these waivers; determine the validity of these waivers;
3. Determine the courses of action that the government

should take to recover those loans, and to recommend
appropriate actions to the Office of the President within
sixty (60) days from the date hereof.
The Committee is hereby empowered to call upon any

department, bureau, office, agency, instrumentality or corporation
of the government, or any officer or employee thereof, for 3
such
assistance as it may need in the discharge of its functions.”
By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992,

the functions of the Committee were subsequently
expanded, viz.:
“WHEREAS, among the underlying purposes for the creation of

the Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans is to
facilitate the collection and recovery of defaulted loans owing
govern-ment-owned and controlled banking and/or financing
institutions;
WHEREAS, this end may be better served by broadening the
scope of the fact-finding mission of the Committee to include all
non-performing loans which shall embrace behest and non-behest
loans;
NOW THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the power vested in me by
law, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. The Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
shall include in its investigation, inventory, and study, all non-
performing loans which shall embrace both behest and non-behest
loans:
The following criteria may be utilized as a frame of reference in
determining a behest loan:
1. It is under-collateralized;
2. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
3. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government
officials like presence of marginal notes;
_______________
3 Annex “C,” id., at pp. 67-68.
40

4. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower

corporation are identified as cronies;
5. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose
intended;
6. Use of corporate layering;

7. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being
sought; and
8. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.
Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest

loan in that while both may involve civil liability for non-payment
or non-recovery,
4
the former may likewise entail criminal
liability.”
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for

investigation, including the loan transactions between
Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle
Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP).
After examining and studying the documents relative to
the loan transactions, the Committee determined that they
bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under
Memorandum Order No. 61 because the stockholders and
officers of PEMI were known cronies of then President
Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and
PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the loan was
granted.
Specifically, the investigation revealed that in 1978,
PEMI applied for a foreign currency loan and bank
investment on its preferred shares with DBP. The loan
application was approved on April 25, 1979 per Board
Resolution (B/R) No. 1297, but the loan was never released
because PEMI failed to comply with the conditions imposed
by DBP. To accommodate PEMI, DBP subsequently
adopted B/R No. 2315 dated June 1980, amending B/R No.
1297, authorizing the release of PEMI’s foreign currency
loan proceeds, and even increasing
_______________
4 Annex “D,” id., at pp. 69-70.
41
VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 41

the same. Per B/R No. 95 dated October 16, 1980, PEMI
was granted a foreign currency loan of $19,680,267.00 or
P146,601,979.00, and it was released despite non-
compliance with the conditions imposed by DBP. The
Committee claimed that the loan had no sufficient
collaterals and PEMI had no sufficient capital at that time
because its acquired assets were only valued at
P72,045,700.00, and its paid up capital was only

P46,488,834.00.
Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of
the Fact-Finding Committee, and representing the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a
sworn complaint for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of
Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, against the respondents Placido I. Mapa, Jr.,
Rafael A. Sison; Rolando M. Zosa; Cesar C. Zalamea;
Benjamin Barot, Casimiro Tanedo, J.V. de Ocampo,
Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr., Francis B. Banes, Ernesto M.
Caringal, 5Romeo V. Jacinto, Manuel D. Tanglao and Alicia
Ll. Reyes.
After considering the Committee’s allegation, the6
Ombudsman handed down the assailed Resolution,
dismissing the complaint. The Ombudsman conceded that
there was ground to proceed with the conduct of
preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, it dismissed the
complaint holding that the offenses charged had already
prescribed, viz.:
“[W]hile apparently, PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the

subject loans were entered into; the financial accommodations
were undercollateralized at the time they were granted; the
stockholders and officers of the borrower corporation are
identified cronies of then President Marcos; and the release of the
said loans was made despite non-compliance by PEMI of the
conditions attached therewith, which consequently give a
semblance that the subject Foreign Currency Loans are indeed
Behest Loans, the prosecution of the
_______________
5 Annex “E,” id., at pp. 71-75.

6 Supra note 1.
42

offenses charged cannot, at this point, prosper on grounds of

prescription.
It bears to stress that Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as originally
enacted, provides that the prescriptive period for violations of the
said Act (R.A. 3019) is ten (10) years. Subsequently, BP 195,
enacted on March 16, 1982, amended the period of prescription
from ten (10) years to fifteen (15) years
Moreover as enunciated in [the] case of People vs. Sandiganba-
yan, 211 SCRA 241, the computation of the prescriptive period of
a crime violating a special law like R.A. 3019 is governed by Act

No. 3326 which provides, thus:
xxxx
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of the judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Corollary thereto, the Supreme Court in the case of People vs.

Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp., 50, ruled that when there is
nothing which was concealed or needed to be discovered because
the entire series of transactions were by public instruments, the
period of prescription commenced to run from the date the said
instrument were executed.
The aforesaid principle was further elucidated in the cases of
People vs. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241, 1992, and People vs.
Villalon, 192 SCRA 521, 1990, where the Supreme Court
pronounced that when the transactions are contained in public
documents and the execution thereof gave rise to unlawful acts,
the violation of the law commences therefrom. Thus, the
reckoning period for purposes of prescription shall begin to run
from the time the public instruments came into existence.
In the case at bar, the subject financial accommodations were
entered into by virtue of public documents (e.g., notarized
contracts, board resolutions, approved letter-request) during the
period of 1978 to 1981 and for purposes of computing the
prescriptive period, the
43
VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 43

aforementioned principles in the Dinsay, Villalon and

Sandiganbayan cases will apply. Records show that the complaint
was referred and filed with this Office on October 4, 1996 or after
the lapse of more than fifteen (15) years from the violation of the
law. [Deductibly] therefore, the offenses charged had already
prescribed or forever barred by Statute of Limitations.
It bears mention that the acts complained of were committed
before the issuance of BP 195 on March 2, 1982. Hence, the
prescriptive period in the instant case is ten (10) years as
provided in the (sic) Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.
Equally important to stress is that the subject financial
transactions between 1978 and 1981 transpired at the time when
there was yet no Presidential Order or Directive naming,
classifying or categorizing them as Behest or Non-Behest Loans.
To reiterate, the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest

Loans was created on October 8, 1992 under Administrative
Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated
November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized
as a frame of reference in determining behest loans. Accordingly,
if these Orders are to be considered the bases of charging
respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become ex post
facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution. The Supreme
Court in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing
Wilensky V. Fields, Fla, 267 So 2dl, 5, held that “an ex post facto
law is defined as a law which provides for infliction of punishment
upon a person
7
for an act done which when it was committed, was
innocent.”
Thus, the Ombudsman disposed:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby respectfully

recommended that the
8
instant case be DISMISSED.
SO RESOLVED.”
The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the

Ombudsman denied it on July 27, 1998.
Hence, this petition positing these issues:
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 51-52.

8 Id., at p. 53.
44

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME DEFINED BY

SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019 HAS ALREADY
PRESCRIBED AT THE TIME THE PETITIONER
FILED ITS COMPLAINT.
B. WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
NO. 13 AND MEMORANDUM9 ORDER NO. 61
ARE EX POST FACTO LAW[S].
The Court shall deal first with the procedural issue.

Commenting on the petition, Tantoco, Reyes, Mapa,
Zalamea and Caringal argued that the petition suffers from
a procedural infirmity which warrants its dismissal. They
claimed that the PCGG availed of the wrong remedy in
elevating the case to this Court.
Indeed, what was filed before this Court is a petition
captioned as Petition for Review on Certiorari. We have
ruled, time and again, that a petition for review on
certiorari is not the proper mode by which resolutions of
the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal

cases are reviewed by this Court. The remedy from the
adverse resolution of the10 Ombudsman is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
However, though captioned as a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, we will treat this petition as one filed under
Rule 65 since a reading of its contents reveals that
petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to the
Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint. The averments
in the complaint, not the nomenclature given 11
by the
parties, determine the nature of the action. In previous
rulings, we have treated differently labeled actions as
special civil actions for certiorari under
12
Rule 65 for reasons
such as justice, equity, and fair play.
_______________
9 Id., at p. 16.
10 Cabrera v. Lapid, G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 55,
64.
11 Partido ng Manggagawa v. Commission of Elections, G.R. No.
164702, March 15, 2006, 484 SCRA 671, 684-685.
12 Id., at p. 685.
45
VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 45

Having resolved the procedural issue, we proceed to the

merits of the case.
As the Committee puts it, the issues to be resolved are:
(i) whether or not the offenses subject of its criminal
complaint have prescribed, and (ii) whether Administrative
Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post
facto laws.
The issue of prescription has long been settled by this
Court in Presidential Ad13 Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto, thus:
“[I]t is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to

have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the
questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public
officials concerned connived or conspired with the “beneficiaries of
the loans.” Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the
prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in
OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the
discovery of the
14
commission thereof and not from the day of such
commission.”
The ruling was reiterated in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-

Finding 15Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman
Desierto, wherein the Court explained:
“In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to

the February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the
aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time
the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person
would have dared to question the legality of those transactions.
Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the
date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive
investigation
16
by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest
Loans.”
_______________
13 375 Phil. 697; 317 SCRA 272 (1999).

14 Id., at p. 724; pp. 296-297.
15 415 Phil. 723; 363 SCRA 489 (2001).
16 Id., at pp. 729-730; p. 494.
46

This is now a well-settled doctrine which the Court has

applied in subsequent
17
cases involving the PCGG and the
Ombudsman.
Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the
date of the discovery of the offenses, and since discovery
could not have been made earlier than October 8, 1992, the
date when the Committee was created, the criminal
offenses allegedly committed by the respondents had not
yet prescribed when the complaint was filed on October 4,
1996.
Even the Ombudsman,
18
in its Manifestation & Motion (In
Lieu of Comment), conceded that the prescriptive period
commenced from the date the Committee discovered the
crime, and not from the date the loan documents were
registered with the Register of Deeds. As a matter of fact, it
requested that the record of the case be referred back to the
Ombudsman for a proper evaluation of its merit.
Likewise, we cannot sustain the Ombudsman’s
declaration that Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 violate the prohibition against
ex post facto laws for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon
a person for an act done prior to their issuance and which
was innocent when done.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify

nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or
arguable implication; a
_______________
17 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.

Ombudsman, G.R. No. 138142, September 19, 2007, 533 SCRA 571;
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon.
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, G.R. No. 135687, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA
9; Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, G.R. No.
139675, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 112; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 135350, March 3,
2006, 484 SCRA 16; Atty. Salvador v. Hon. Desierto, 464 Phil. 988; 420
SCRA 76 (2004); PAFFC on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Desierto, 418
Phil. 715; 366 SCRA 428 (2001).
18 Rollo, pp. 209-212.
47
VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 47

law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with

the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. The
presumption is always 19
in favor of constitutionality. To
doubt is to sustain. Even this Court does not decide a
question of constitutional dimension, unless that question
is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case and
is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue
20
of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.
21
Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada, where the
petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 6770 in his motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s decision, we had occasion to state that the
Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on
the constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman, therefore,
acted in excess of its jurisdiction in declaring
unconstitutional the subject administrative and
memorandum orders.
In any event, we hold that Administrative Order No. 13
and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex post facto laws.
An ex post facto law has been defined as one—(a) which
makes an action done before the passing of the law and
which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such
action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater
than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which
alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the

commission22 of the offense in order to convict the
defendant. This Court added two (2) more to the list,
namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate
_______________
19 Virata v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86926 and 86949, October 15,

1991, 202 SCRA 680, 698-699.
20 Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, G.R. No. 77365, April 7,
1992, 207 SCRA 748, 751.
21 G.R. No. 159314, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 652, 665.
22 Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 534,
565.
48

civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a

penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was
lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
23
conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto
law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws.
Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit
certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or
those that define crimes,
24
treat of their nature, and provide
for their punishment. The subject administrative and
memorandum orders clearly do not come within the
shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13
creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and
functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of
granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely
provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans.
Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex
post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the
Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and
memorandum orders are ex post facto.
One final note. Respondents Mapa and Zalamea, in their
respective comments, moved for the dismissal of the case
against them. Mapa claims that he was granted 25
transactional immunity from all PCGG-initiated cases,
while Zalamea26 denied participation in the approval of the
subject loans. The arguments advanced by Mapa and
Zalamea are matters of defense which should be raised in
their respective counter-affidavits. Since the Ombudsman

erroneously dismissed the
_______________
23 Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, 361 Phil. 251, 275; 301 SCRA 298,
322 (1999).
24 Id.
25 Rollo, pp. 276-283.
26 Id., at pp. 334-338.
49
VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 49

complaint on ground of prescription, respondents’

respective defenses were never passed upon during the
preliminary investigation. Thus, the complaint should be
referred back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation of
its merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution and Order of the Office of Ombudsman in OMB-
0-96-2428, are SET ASIDE. The Office of the Ombudsman
is directed to conduct with dispatch an evaluation of the
merits of the complaint against the herein respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Actg. C.J., Chairperson), Austria-

Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, assailed resolution and order set aside.
Notes.—Where it was well-nigh impossible for the

State, the aggrieved party, to have known of the violations
of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions
were made because the public officials concerned connived
or conspired with the “beneficiaries of the loans,” the
prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery
of the commission thereof and not from the day of such
commission. (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, 317 SCRA 272 [1999])
The fact that the loan was processed in only twenty-
seven (27) days cannot be reasonably considered manifest
partiality or evident bad faith in granting the borrower’s
loan application as long as there was full compliance with
banking laws, practices and procedures. (Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto,
362 SCRA 721 [2001])
——o0o——
50
© Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

6 Salvador V Mapa

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

6 Salvador V Mapa

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

6 Salvador V Mapa

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

2/15/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 539

34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, for and in behalf of the

Ombudsman; Appeals; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice;

Same; Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The

VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 35

Salvador vs. Mapa, Jr.

Behest Loans; Prescription; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

Same; Same; Statutes; Administrative Order No. 13;

36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Salvador vs. Mapa, Jr.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Laws; Words

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;

VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 37

PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolution and

The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on

“WHEREAS, Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides

1 Annex “A,” Rollo, pp. 46-54.

38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,

Chairman of the Presidential

The Ad Hoc Committee shall perform the following functions:

1. Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and

VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 39

2. Identify the borrowers who were granted “friendly

3. Determine the courses of action that the government

The Committee is hereby empowered to call upon any

By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992,

“WHEREAS, among the underlying purposes for the creation of

3 Annex “C,” id., at pp. 67-68.

40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

4. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower

6. Use of corporate layering;

Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest

Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for

4 Annex “D,” id., at pp. 69-70.

VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 41

P72,045,700.00, and its paid up capital was only

“[W]hile apparently, PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the

5 Annex “E,” id., at pp. 71-75.

42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

offenses charged cannot, at this point, prosper on grounds of

a crime violating a special law like R.A. 3019 is governed by Act

Corollary thereto, the Supreme Court in the case of People vs.

VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 43

aforementioned principles in the Dinsay, Villalon and

To reiterate, the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest

Thus, the Ombudsman disposed:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby respectfully

The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the

7 Id., at pp. 51-52.

44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME DEFINED BY

The Court shall deal first with the procedural issue.

the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal

VOL. 539, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 45

Having resolved the procedural issue, we proceed to the

“[I]t is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to

The ruling was reiterated in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-