KST SafeOperation 36 en

KST System Technology
KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
For KUKA System Software 8.7
Assembly and Operating Instructions
Issued: 10.10.2022
KST SafeOperation 3.6 V3
KUKA Deutschland GmbH
© Copyright 2022
KUKA Deutschland GmbH
Zugspitzstraße 140
D-86165 Augsburg
Germany
This documentation or excerpts therefrom may not be reproduced or disclosed to third parties
without the express permission of KUKA Deutschland GmbH.
Other functions not described in this documentation may be operable in the controller. The user
has no claims to these functions, however, in the case of a replacement or service work.
We have checked the content of this documentation for conformity with the hardware and soft-
ware described. Nevertheless, discrepancies cannot be precluded, for which reason we are not
able to guarantee total conformity. The information in this documentation is checked on a regu-
lar basis, however, and necessary corrections will be incorporated in the subsequent edition.
Subject to technical alterations without an effect on the function.
KIM-PS5-DOC
Translation of the original documentation
Publication: Pub KST SafeOperation 3.6 (PDF) en

PB14570
Book structure: KST SafeOperation 3.6 V3.1

BS13138
Version: KST SafeOperation 3.6 V3
2/304 | www.kuka.com KST SafeOperation 3.6 V3 | Issued: 10.10.2022

Contents
1 Introduction.............................................................................................. 9
1.1 Target group.......................................................................................................... 9
1.2 Industrial robot documentation.............................................................................. 9
1.3 Representation of warnings and notes................................................................. 9
1.4 Trademarks............................................................................................................ 10
1.5 Terms used............................................................................................................ 10
1.6 Licenses................................................................................................................. 12
2 Product description................................................................................. 13
2.1 Product description................................................................................................ 13
2.2 Functional description............................................................................................ 13
2.3 Safety interfaces.................................................................................................... 15
2.4 Hardware components.......................................................................................... 16
2.4.1 Reference switch module (optional)..................................................................... 16
2.4.2 Connecting cables................................................................................................. 17
2.5 Monitoring spaces................................................................................................. 18
2.5.1 Stop reactions without “Braking before restricted areas”..................................... 19
2.5.2 Stop reactions with “Braking before restricted areas”.......................................... 20
2.5.3 Cell area................................................................................................................ 20
2.5.4 Cartesian workspaces........................................................................................... 22
2.5.5 Cartesian protected spaces.................................................................................. 23
2.5.6 Axis-specific workspaces....................................................................................... 25
2.5.7 Axis-specific protected spaces.............................................................................. 26
2.5.8 Braking before restricted areas............................................................................. 28
2.5.9 Space-specific velocity.......................................................................................... 30
2.5.10 Reference stop...................................................................................................... 30
2.6 Safety-oriented tools.............................................................................................. 31
2.7 Velocity monitoring functions................................................................................. 32
2.8 Safe operational stop for axis groups.................................................................. 33
3 Safety......................................................................................................... 35
3.1 General.................................................................................................................. 35
3.1.1 Disclaimer.............................................................................................................. 35
3.1.2 EC declaration of conformity and declaration of incorporation............................ 35
3.1.3 Terms in the “Safety” chapter............................................................................... 36
3.2 Personnel............................................................................................................... 39
3.3 Workspace, safety zone and danger zone........................................................... 40
3.3.1 Determining stopping distances............................................................................ 40
3.4 Triggers for stop reactions: KSS........................................................................... 41
3.5 Triggers for stop reactions: VSS........................................................................... 41
3.6 Safety functions..................................................................................................... 42
3.6.1 Overview of the safety functions.......................................................................... 42
3.6.2 Safety controller..................................................................................................... 43
3.6.3 “Operator safety” signal: KSS............................................................................... 43
3.6.4 “Operator safety” signal: VSS............................................................................... 44
3.6.5 EMERGENCY STOP device................................................................................. 44
3.6.6 Logging off from the higher-level safety controller............................................... 45
KST SafeOperation 3.6 V3 | Issued: 10.10.2022 www.kuka.com | 3/304

3.6.7 External EMERGENCY STOP device.................................................................. 46

3.6.8 Enabling device..................................................................................................... 46
3.6.9 External enabling device....................................................................................... 47
3.6.10 Velocity monitoring in T1....................................................................................... 47
3.7 Additional protective equipment............................................................................ 48
3.7.1 Jog mode............................................................................................................... 48
3.7.2 Software limit switches.......................................................................................... 48
3.7.3 Mechanical end stops........................................................................................... 48
3.7.4 Mechanical axis limitation (optional)..................................................................... 49
3.7.5 Options for moving the manipulator without drive energy................................... 49
3.7.6 Labeling on the industrial robot............................................................................ 50
3.7.7 External safeguards............................................................................................... 50
3.7.8 “Drives ready” lamp............................................................................................... 51
3.8 Operating mode selection: KSS............................................................................ 51
3.9 Overview of operating modes and safety functions: KSS................................... 52
3.10 Operating mode selection: VSS............................................................................ 52
3.11 Overview of operating modes and safety functions: VSS................................... 54
3.12 Safety measures.................................................................................................... 54
3.12.1 General safety measures...................................................................................... 54
3.12.2 IT security.............................................................................................................. 56
3.12.3 Transportation........................................................................................................ 56
3.12.4 Start-up and recommissioning: KSS/VSS............................................................. 57
3.12.4.1 Checking machine data and safety configuration................................................ 59
3.12.4.2 Start-up mode........................................................................................................ 62
3.12.5 Manual mode......................................................................................................... 63
3.12.6 Simulation.............................................................................................................. 64
3.12.7 Automatic mode..................................................................................................... 64
3.12.8 Maintenance and repair........................................................................................ 64
3.12.9 Decommissioning, storage and disposal.............................................................. 66
3.12.10 Safety measures for single point of control......................................................... 66
4 Technical data.......................................................................................... 69
4.1 Service life............................................................................................................. 69
4.2 Reference switch................................................................................................... 69
4.3 Reference cable XG42 - XS Ref.......................................................................... 71
4.4 Circuit diagram of reference switch XS Ref......................................................... 72
4.5 Hole pattern for actuating plate............................................................................ 73
5 Installation................................................................................................ 75
5.1 System requirements............................................................................................. 75
5.2 Installing via WorkVisual....................................................................................... 75
5.2.1 Installing or updating KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6................................................... 75
5.2.2 Uninstalling KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6................................................................... 76
5.3 Installing via smartHMI.......................................................................................... 77
5.3.1 Installing or updating KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6................................................... 77
5.3.2 Uninstalling KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6................................................................... 78
6 Operation.................................................................................................. 81
6.1 User groups........................................................................................................... 81
6.2 Displaying user rights............................................................................................ 82

6.3 Opening the safety configuration.......................................................................... 82

6.4 Overview of buttons.............................................................................................. 82
6.5 Displaying information about the safety configuration......................................... 83
6.6 Displaying the revision log.................................................................................... 84
6.7 Displaying machine data....................................................................................... 84
6.8 Importing the safety configuration (XML import).................................................. 84
6.9 Exporting the safety configuration (XML export).................................................. 87
6.10 Safe robot retraction in case of space violation.................................................. 87
7 Start-up and configuration..................................................................... 89

7.1 System safety instructions.................................................................................... 89
7.2 Jogging the robot without a higher-level safety controller................................... 90
7.3 Overview: start-up and configuration.................................................................... 91
7.4 Information about the safety configuration........................................................... 92
7.4.1 Safe definition of Cartesian protected spaces..................................................... 93
7.4.2 Safe definition of Cartesian protected spaces for BBRA..................................... 95
7.4.3 Unexpected protected space violation at space corners..................................... 96
7.5 Configuring safety monitoring functions................................................................ 97
7.5.1 Activating safe monitoring..................................................................................... 97
7.5.2 Configuring global parameters.............................................................................. 97
7.5.2.1 Switching safe Cartesian monitoring on/off.......................................................... 99
7.5.3 Configuring a safety-oriented tool......................................................................... 101
7.5.4 Configuring a cell area.......................................................................................... 105
7.5.5 Configuring a Cartesian monitoring space........................................................... 107
7.5.6 Configuring an axis-specific monitoring space..................................................... 111
7.5.7 Configuring axis-specific velocity monitoring functions and braking time............ 115
7.5.7.1 Parameter: Braking time....................................................................................... 119
7.5.7.2 Parameter: Maximum velocity T1......................................................................... 121
7.5.8 Configuring safe operational stop for axis groups............................................... 122
7.5.9 Activating “Braking before restricted areas”......................................................... 124
7.5.10 Configuring the reference position and reference group..................................... 128
7.5.11 Saving the safety configuration............................................................................. 131
7.6 Editing the local safety configuration in WorkVisual............................................ 131
7.7 Mastering test........................................................................................................ 132
7.7.1 Mastering test via reference switch...................................................................... 133
7.7.1.1 Programs for the mastering test........................................................................... 135
7.7.1.2 Selecting a reference position.............................................................................. 135
7.7.1.3 Installing the reference switch and actuating plate.............................................. 137
7.7.1.4 Connecting the reference switch.......................................................................... 138
7.7.1.5 Configuring the reference groups to be checked in file....................................... 139
7.7.1.6 Teaching positions for the mastering test............................................................. 140
7.7.1.7 Checking the reference position (actuation with tool).......................................... 142
7.7.1.8 Performing a mastering test manually.................................................................. 143
7.7.2 System variables for mastering test..................................................................... 144
7.7.2.1 $MASTERINGTEST_ACTIVE............................................................................... 144
7.7.2.2 $MASTERINGTEST_GROUP............................................................................... 144
7.7.2.3 $MASTERINGTEST_REQ_INT............................................................................. 145
7.7.2.4 $MASTERINGTEST_REQ_EXT............................................................................ 145
7.7.2.5 $MASTERINGTEST_SWITCH_OK....................................................................... 146

7.7.3 Mastering test with external mastering confirmation............................................ 147

7.7.3.1 Signal diagram: external mastering confirmation................................................. 148
7.7.3.2 Safety acceptance: checking the external mastering confirmation...................... 149
7.8 Brake test.............................................................................................................. 149
7.8.1 Overview of the brake test.................................................................................... 149
7.8.2 Sequence when testing a brake........................................................................... 151
7.8.3 Programs for the brake test.................................................................................. 151
7.8.4 Overview of the brake test setup......................................................................... 152
7.8.4.1 Activating the brake test, defining the cycle time and axes................................ 153
7.8.4.2 “Brake test configuration” window......................................................................... 154
7.8.4.3 Configuring input and output signals for the brake test...................................... 155
7.8.4.4 Signal diagram of the brake test – examples...................................................... 158
7.8.4.5 Teaching positions for the brake test................................................................... 159
7.8.4.6 Testing the sequence in the case of defective brakes........................................ 160
7.8.5 Performing a brake test........................................................................................ 161
7.8.5.1 Performing a brake test for requested axes (cyclically via program).................. 161
7.8.5.2 Performing a brake test for active axes (manually)............................................. 163
7.8.5.3 Performing a brake test for further axes (e.g. couplable axes)........................... 165
7.8.6 Automatic brake check.......................................................................................... 166
7.8.7 System functions for the brake test...................................................................... 167
7.8.7.1 GET_AXESMASK: requesting information about the axes for the brake test.... 167
7.8.7.2 GET_BRAKETEST_TIME: requesting time values for brake test....................... 168
7.9 Override reduction................................................................................................. 169
7.9.1 $SR_VEL_RED...................................................................................................... 170
7.9.2 $SR_OV_RED....................................................................................................... 171
7.9.3 $SR_WORKSPACE_RED..................................................................................... 172
7.9.4 Override reduction before space limits without BBRA......................................... 172
7.9.5 Override reduction before space limits with BBRA.............................................. 174
7.9.6 Changing workspace: override reduction for velocity limits (example without
BBRA).................................................................................................................... 176
7.10 Safety acceptance overview................................................................................. 177
7.11 Checking the safety functions for correct operation............................................ 178
7.11.1 Checking a safety-oriented tool............................................................................ 178
7.11.2 Checking a cell area............................................................................................. 179
7.11.3 Checking Cartesian monitoring spaces................................................................ 180
7.11.4 Checking axis-specific monitoring spaces............................................................ 181
7.11.5 Checking the space-specific velocity.................................................................... 182
7.11.6 Checking Cartesian velocity limits........................................................................ 183
7.11.7 Checking axis-specific velocity limits.................................................................... 184
7.11.8 Checking the safe operational stop for axis groups............................................ 186
7.11.9 Checking the values for the maximum braking ramp.......................................... 187
7.12 Checking the values for the safe axis monitoring functions................................ 190
7.13 Activating the safety configuration........................................................................ 191
7.14 Deactivating safe monitoring................................................................................. 192
8 Interfaces to the higher-level controller............................................... 193

8.1 Safety functions via Ethernet safety interface (optional)..................................... 193
8.1.1 KUKA.SafeOperation via Ethernet safety interface.............................................. 197
8.1.2 Diagnostic signals via Ethernet interface............................................................. 201

8.2 KUKA.SafeOperation via interface XG13............................................................. 205

8.3 Mastering test via interface XG42........................................................................ 208
9 Diagnosis.................................................................................................. 209
9.1 Displaying the diagnostic data with the diagnostic monitor................................. 209
9.2 Displaying the diagnostic data for the safety interface........................................ 209
9.3 System variables for diagnosis of the safety monitoring functions..................... 209
9.3.1 $SR_ACTIVETOOL............................................................................................... 209
9.3.2 $SR_AXISSPEED_OK.......................................................................................... 210
9.3.3 $SR_CARTSPEED_OK......................................................................................... 210
9.3.4 $SR_DRIVES_ENABLE........................................................................................ 211
9.3.5 $SR_MOVE_ENABLE........................................................................................... 211
9.3.6 $SR_RANGE_ACTIVE.......................................................................................... 211
9.3.7 $SR_RANGE_OK.................................................................................................. 212
9.3.8 $SR_SAFEMON_ACTIVE..................................................................................... 213
9.3.9 $SR_SAFEOPSTOP_ACTIVE............................................................................... 213
9.3.10 $SR_SAFEOPSTOP_OK...................................................................................... 214
9.3.11 $SR_SAFEREDSPEED_ACTIVE.......................................................................... 214
9.4 Outputs for space monitoring................................................................................ 214
10 Messages.................................................................................................. 217
10.1 Information about the messages.......................................................................... 217
10.2 System messages from module: CrossMeld (KSS)............................................. 217
10.2.1 KSS15016.............................................................................................................. 217
10.2.2 KSS15017.............................................................................................................. 217
10.2.3 KSS15018.............................................................................................................. 218
10.2.4 KSS15019.............................................................................................................. 221
10.2.5 KSS15033.............................................................................................................. 225
10.2.6 KSS15034.............................................................................................................. 225
10.2.7 KSS15035.............................................................................................................. 226
10.2.8 KSS15036.............................................................................................................. 227
10.2.9 KSS15037.............................................................................................................. 227
10.2.10 KSS15039.............................................................................................................. 228
10.2.11 KSS15040.............................................................................................................. 230
10.2.12 KSS15041.............................................................................................................. 231
10.2.13 KSS15042.............................................................................................................. 233
10.2.14 KSS15043.............................................................................................................. 234
10.2.15 KSS15044.............................................................................................................. 236
10.2.16 KSS15045.............................................................................................................. 237
10.2.17 KSS15046.............................................................................................................. 241
10.2.18 KSS15047.............................................................................................................. 241
10.2.19 KSS15048.............................................................................................................. 242
10.2.20 KSS15049.............................................................................................................. 242
10.2.21 KSS15050.............................................................................................................. 243
10.2.22 KSS15051.............................................................................................................. 244
10.2.23 KSS15052.............................................................................................................. 245
10.2.24 KSS15053.............................................................................................................. 247
10.2.25 KSS15054.............................................................................................................. 248
10.2.26 KSS15065.............................................................................................................. 249

10.2.27 KSS15066.............................................................................................................. 249

10.2.28 KSS15079.............................................................................................................. 254
10.2.29 KSS15081.............................................................................................................. 255
10.2.30 KSS15083.............................................................................................................. 256
10.2.31 KSS15107.............................................................................................................. 256
10.2.32 KSS15108.............................................................................................................. 258
10.2.33 KSS15109.............................................................................................................. 259
10.2.34 KSS15110.............................................................................................................. 261
10.2.35 KSS15111.............................................................................................................. 261
10.2.36 KSS15112.............................................................................................................. 262
10.2.37 KSS15113.............................................................................................................. 263
10.2.38 KSS15114.............................................................................................................. 265
10.2.39 KSS15127.............................................................................................................. 265
10.2.40 KSS15134.............................................................................................................. 267
10.2.41 KSS15135.............................................................................................................. 267
11 Appendix................................................................................................... 269
11.1 Checklists for safety acceptance.......................................................................... 269
11.1.1 Precondition for safety acceptance based on the checklists............................... 269
11.1.2 Checklist: Robot and system................................................................................ 269
11.1.3 Checklist: Safety functions.................................................................................... 270
11.1.4 Checklist: Safety-oriented tools............................................................................. 275
11.1.5 Checklist: Cell area............................................................................................... 280
11.1.6 Checklist: Cartesian monitoring spaces................................................................ 282
11.1.7 Checklist: Axis-specific monitoring spaces........................................................... 284
11.1.8 Checklist: Cartesian velocity monitoring functions............................................... 288
11.1.9 Checklist: axis-specific velocity monitoring functions........................................... 290
11.1.10 Checklist: Safe operational stop for axis groups................................................. 293
11.1.11 Checklist: Braking before restricted areas............................................................ 295
11.2 Applied standards and regulations....................................................................... 297
12 KUKA Service........................................................................................... 299

12.1 Requesting support............................................................................................... 299
12.2 KUKA Customer Support...................................................................................... 299
Index 301

Introduction
1 Introduction
1.1 Target group
This documentation is aimed at users with the following knowledge and

skills:
• Advanced knowledge of the robot controller system

• Advanced KRL programming skills
For optimal use of KUKA products, we recommend the training courses

offered by KUKA College. Information about the training program can be
found at www.kuka.com or can be obtained directly from our subsidia-
ries.
1.2 Industrial robot documentation
The industrial robot documentation consists of the following parts:
• Documentation for the robot arm

• Documentation for the robot controller
• Documentation for the smartPAD-2 or smartPAD pro (if used)
• Operating and programming instructions for the System Software
• Instructions for options and accessories
• Spare parts overview in KUKA Xpert
Each set of instructions is a separate document.
1.3 Representation of warnings and notes
Safety
These warnings are provided for safety purposes and must be observed.
DANGER
These warnings mean that it is certain or highly probable that death or
severe injuries will occur, if no precautions are taken.
WARNING
These warnings mean that death or severe injuries may occur, if no
precautions are taken.
CAUTION
These warnings mean that minor injuries may occur, if no precautions
are taken.
NOTICE
These warnings mean that damage to property may occur, if no precau-
tions are taken.
These warnings contain references to safety-relevant information or gen-

eral safety measures.
These warnings do not refer to individual hazards or individual precau-
tionary measures.

This warning draws attention to procedures which serve to prevent or rem-

Introduction
edy emergencies or malfunctions:

SAFETY INSTRUCTION
The following procedure must be followed exactly!
Procedures marked with this warning must be followed exactly.
Notices
These notices serve to make your work easier or contain references to

further information.
Tip to make your work easier or reference to further information.
1.4 Trademarks
CIP Safety® is a trademark of ODVA.
EtherCAT® is a registered trademark and patented technolo-

gy, licensed by Beckhoff Automation GmbH, Germany.
PROFINET is a trademark of the PROFIBUS users’ organization.
1.5 Terms used
Term Description
Workspace Monitoring space that the defined axes or the safety-oriented tool
are not allowed to leave. The axes or the safety-oriented tool must
always move within the limits of the workspace.
BBRA Braking before restricted areas

BBRA is an optionally selectable safety function that changes the
way the robot behaves at the limits of monitoring spaces:
• With this function, the fictitious STOP 1 - DRS end position

based on the actual position is monitored in addition to the ac-
tual position.
• If the end point of this precalculated stop threatens to violate a
monitoring space, a drive ramp stop with stop category 1 is trig-
gered.
CIP Safety Common Industrial Protocol Safety

CIP Safety is an Ethernet/IP-based safety interface for connecting a
safety PLC to the robot controller (PLC = master, robot controller =
slave).
CK Customer-built Kinematics
DRS Drive Ramp Stop

Synchronous stop at drive level (also: maximum braking)
EtherCAT Ethernet for Control Automation Technology

Ethernet-based field bus that is suitable for real-time requirements
(Ethernet interface).

Introduction
EtherNet/IP Ethernet Industrial Protocol
EtherNet/IP is an Ethernet-based field bus (Ethernet interface).
Fictitious STOP 1 - End position of a drive ramp stop calculated from the current robot
DRS end position state.
FSoE FailSafe over EtherCAT

Protocol for transferring safety-relevant data via EtherCAT. An FSoE
master and an FSoE slave are used for this.
IFBSafeExt Interface Board Safe Extended

Interface Board with the safety-oriented I/Os for implementation of
the discrete safety interface XG13
Mastering test A mastering test checks at a suitable reference position whether

the saved reference position of the motor of an axis corresponds to
the actual mechanical position of the axis.
KL KUKA linear unit
KR C KUKA Robot Control

Robot controller
Alarm space An alarm space signals a workspace violation by setting an output.

The alarm spaces are permanently assigned to the configurable
outputs of the safety interface used.
Monitoring time Time interval beginning with the request for a mastering test or
brake test
The monitoring time is 2 hours. The mastering test or brake test is
to be carried out within this time. The robot then stops and can no
longer be moved without a mastering test or brake test.
Polygon, convex Polygon consisting of at least 3 different corners, e.g. triangle, rec-
tangle, etc.
PROFINET Ethernet-based field bus (Ethernet interface)
PROFIsafe PROFINET-based safety interface for connecting a safety PLC to

the robot controller (PLC = master, robot controller = slave)
Reference group A reference group contains the axes of a kinematic system that are
required for moving to a reference position and are to be subjected
to safety-oriented monitoring.
Reference position Cartesian position to which the robot moves during the mastering
test
Reference switch Sensor that is used for the mastering test and detects when an ax-
is has reached the saved reference position
Reference stop Safety stop that is triggered if the mastering test is missing. The
reference stop can be activated for monitoring spaces.
Protected space Monitoring space into which the defined axes or the safety-oriented
tool are not allowed to intrude. The axes or the safety-oriented tool
must always move outside the limits of the protected space.

Introduction KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
Safety-oriented tool A safety-oriented tool can be modeled using up to 12 configurable

spheres. These spheres are monitored against the limits of the Car-
tesian monitoring spaces. Each safety-oriented tool has a safety-ori-
ented TCP against which the configured velocity limits are moni-
tored.
Monitoring space A monitoring space can be defined as a Cartesian cuboid or by

means of individual axis ranges. Each monitoring space can be set
as a workspace or protected space.
Cell area Cartesian workspace that forms a convex polygon with 3 … 10 ver-
tices (corners) and is limited in ±Z direction. The cell area is the
maximum permitted working range of the robot.
1.6 Licenses
The KUKA license conditions and the license conditions of the open-
source software used can be found in the following folders:
• Under .\LICENSE on the data storage medium with the installation
files of the KUKA software
• On the KUKA smartHMI, in the main menu under Help > Info, tab Li-
censes
• Under D:\KUKA_OPT\Option package name\LICENSE on the robot
controller
• In the license folder under the name of the option package in the Op-
tions catalog in WorkVisual
Further information about open-source licenses can be requested from

the following address: opensource@kuka.com

Product description
2 Product description
2.1 Product description
Description
KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6 is a safety option that can be used to implement

safety-oriented monitoring functions. Areas of application include HRC ap-
plications or the replacement of conventional workspace monitoring func-
tions.
Functions
• Safety-oriented monitoring of up to 16 user-defined, axis-specific or

Cartesian monitoring spaces
• Safety-oriented monitoring of a user-defined cell area
• Braking before restricted areas (BBRA)
• Safety-oriented monitoring of the axis-specific, Cartesian and space-
specific velocities
• Modeling of up to 16 safety-oriented tools with safety-oriented TCP
• Safe stop via safety controller
• Safe operational stop of up to 6 axis groups (maximum of 8 axes in
each axis group)
• Connection to a higher-level controller, e.g. to a safety PLC
• Safety-oriented inputs for activation of the monitoring functions
• Safety-oriented outputs for status messages of the monitoring func-
tions
• Creation and editing of the safety configuration on the robot controller
and in WorkVisual.
• Configurable motion to verify position mastering:
‒ Mastering test via KUKA reference switch
‒ Mastering test via external system with external mastering confir-
mation
2.2 Functional description
Description
The industrial robot moves within the limits that have been configured and
activated. The actual positions are continuously calculated and monitored
against the safety parameters that have been set.
If the “Braking before restricted areas” function is active, the fictitious
STOP 1 - DRS end position based on the actual position is monitored in
addition to the actual position.
The safety controller monitors the industrial robot by means of the safety
parameters that have been set. If a monitoring limit is violated, the robot
and external axes stop.

Product description KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
Fig. 2-1: Example of a cell with SafeOperation
1 Reference switch 5 System control panel

2 Robot 6 Robot controller
3 Loading station 7 Bending machine
4 Safety mat
Areas of application
• Human-robot cooperation
• Direct loading of workpieces without an intermediate support
• Replacement of conventional axis range monitoring systems
Supported kinematic systems
The following KUKA kinematic systems support KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6:

Kinematic type Description
6-axis robot Robots with 6 serial rotational axes, e.g. KR AGILUS, KR
QUANTEC or TITAN
5-axis palletizing robots Palletizing robots with 5 serial rotational axes
4-axis palletizing robots Palletizing robots with 4 serial rotational axes
Axis 5 is moved by a coupling rod.
Palletizing robots with 4 rotational axes and main axis cou-
pling
Axes 3 and 5 are moved by a coupling rod.
4-axis robots Robots with 4 serial rotational axes (without complete wrist)
JET robots on JET TRACK Robots with 5 serial rotational axes mounted on a JET
TRACK
A JET TRACK is a linear axis module. The carriage consti-
tutes axis 1 of the robot.

Product description
Kinematic type Description
Robots on ROBROOT kine- Robots mounted on a ROBROOT kinematic system
matic system
ROBROOT kinematic systems can consist of any combination
of up to 3 serial axes (linear or rotational).
3-axis linear gantry without Robots with up to 3 serial linear main axes
wrist axes
3-axis linear gantry with wrist Robots with up to 3 serial linear main axes and up to 3 serial
axes rotational wrist axes
Restrictions
• Some robot models are not available with KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6

due to their dynamic properties.
• Whether a KUKA kinematic system supports BBRA is stored in the
machine data.
• KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6 cannot and must not be used in conjunction
with a CK.
• In the case of couplable external axes, safe position sensing is not
possible, as the safety controller does not evaluate any mastering in-
formation for these axes and the machine data change during the run-
time of the controller.
On account of this restriction, only the following safety functions are
available for couplable external axes:
‒ Monitoring of the maximum axis velocity in T1
‒ Braking ramp monitoring
‒ Standstill monitoring
Safety configuration in WorkVisual
The safety configuration can be created and edited either on the robot
controller or in WorkVisual.
(>>> 7.6 "Editing the local safety configuration in WorkVisual" Page 131)
Brake test
The brake test serves as a diagnostic measure for the robot axis and ex-
ternal axis brakes. The brakes are activated for the stop reactions safety
stop 0 and safety stop 1.
If a safety option is installed and the safe monitoring is active, the brake
test is automatically active.
2.3 Safety interfaces
The following safety interfaces are available for connection to a higher-lev-

el controller. The safety-oriented I/Os of these interfaces can be used, for
example, to signal a violation of safety monitoring functions.
• Ethernet safety interfaces:
‒ EtherCAT/FSoE
‒ EtherNet/IP/CIP Safety
‒ PROFINET/PROFIsafe
• Discrete safety interface for safety options:
‒ XG13 via IFBSafeExt

The safety-oriented I/Os of the discrete safety interface only offer a

Product description
reduced range of signals.

KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6 can be used without the aforementioned safety
interfaces.
• Precondition:
‒ Discrete mastering test input available
• Reduced range of functions, as no safety-oriented I/Os available:
‒ Only static safety monitoring functions possible
‒ No safe operational stop available for axis groups
‒ No alarm spaces available
2.4 Hardware components
2.4.1 Reference switch module (optional)
Description
A reference switch module is optionally available for the mastering test via
KUKA reference switch.
The reference switch module consists of the following components:
• Inductive reference switch
• Straight or angled actuating plate
• Reference cable XG42 - XS Ref
Fig. 2-2: Reference switch with straight actuating plate
1 Inductive reference switch

2 Straight actuating plate
Cable lengths
In combination with a straight or angled actuating plate, reference switch

modules are available with various cable lengths.
Length Actuating plate
7 m Straight or angled
15 m
25 m
40 m

Product description
2.4.2 Connecting cables
Description
The diagram (>>> Fig. 2-3) shows an example of the connecting cables of
the industrial robot with connected KUKA reference switch. The reference
switch is connected to the robot controller via the reference cable. The
maximum cable length is 40 m.
NOTICE
Only the reference cable supplied by KUKA may be used.
Only 1 reference switch can be connected directly to the robot control-

ler. If multiple reference groups are required, the reference switches can
be connected to the safety PLC and activated via the bus interface that
is in use. The safety PLC must evaluate the reference switches and set
the Mastering test input accordingly.
Ensure 2-channel referencing with external activation of the refer-

ence switch
If the reference switch is activated via the bus interface, 1-channel refer-
encing must be prevented.
• The safety PLC may only set the Mastering test signal to LOW if
both input channels have a low level.
Fig. 2-3: Connecting cables
1 Robot controller
2 Robot
3 Reference switch
4 Reference cable XG42 - XS Ref
5 Data cable XF21
Bending radius
The following bending radii must be observed when installing the refer-
ence cable:

• Fixed installation: At least 5 x cable diameter

• Cable carrier installation: At least 10 x cable diameter
2.5 Monitoring spaces
Description
A maximum of 16 monitoring spaces can be configured. A cell area must

also be configured.
A monitoring space can be defined as a Cartesian cuboid or by means of
individual axis ranges. Each monitoring space can be set as a workspace
or protected space.
(>>> 2.5.4 "Cartesian workspaces" Page 22)
(>>> 2.5.5 "Cartesian protected spaces" Page 23)
(>>> 2.5.6 "Axis-specific workspaces" Page 25)
(>>> 2.5.7 "Axis-specific protected spaces" Page 26)
For every monitoring space, a space-specific Cartesian velocity can be de-
fined inside or outside the monitoring space.
(>>> 2.5.9 "Space-specific velocity" Page 30)
For each monitoring space, a reference stop can be set that stops the ro-
bot if no mastering test has been carried out.
(>>> 2.5.10 "Reference stop" Page 30)
Monitoring can be activated and deactivated for each individual monitoring
space, or activated by means of safety-oriented inputs.
Safety-oriented outputs are permanently assigned to the monitoring
spaces. The safety-oriented outputs are set if a monitoring space is viola-
ted.
It is possible to configure the system in such a way that a safety stop is
triggered when the monitoring space is violated (“Stop at boundaries”
function). The type of safety stop and the time when the stop is triggered
depend on whether the “Braking before restricted areas” function has
been activated:
• Without “Braking before restricted areas”: safety stop 0 is triggered at
the space limit.
• With “Braking before restricted areas”: safety stop 1 is triggered before
the space limit.
(>>> 2.5.8 "Braking before restricted areas" Page 28)
Cell area
The cell area is a Cartesian workspace in the form of a convex polygon

with 3 to 10 vertices (corners) and is limited in the ±Z direction.
(>>> 2.5.3 "Cell area" Page 20)
The cell area is permanently monitored and always active. The corners
can be configured, activated and deactivated individually.
If the cell area is violated, a safety stop is triggered.
The type of safety stop and the time when the stop is triggered depend
on whether the “Braking before restricted areas” function has been activa-
ted:
• Without “Braking before restricted areas”: Safety stop 0 is triggered at
the space limit.
• With “Braking before restricted areas”: Safety stop 1 is triggered be-
fore the space limit.

Product description
Stopping distance
If the robot is stopped by a monitoring function, it requires a certain stop-

ping distance before coming to a standstill.
The stopping distance depends primarily on the following factors:
• Robot type
• Velocity of the robot
• Position of the robot axes
• Payload
• Category and type of stop (STOP 0 or STOP 1)
Including stopping distances in the risk assessment

The stopping distance when a safety function is triggered varies accord-
ing to the specific robot type. Failure to take this into consideration
when parameterizing the safety functions may result in death, severe in-
juries or damage to property.
• The system integrator must include the stopping distances in the
risk assessment and parameterize the safety functions accordingly.
Further information about the stopping distances and stopping times can
be found in the assembly instructions of the relevant robot.
Stop reactions
The stop reactions depend on whether the “Braking before restricted

areas” function has been activated.
(>>> 2.5.1 "Stop reactions without “Braking before restricted areas”"
Page 19)
(>>> 2.5.2 "Stop reactions with “Braking before restricted areas”"
Page 20)
2.5.1 Stop reactions without “Braking before restricted areas”
Reaction Description Example

Safety stop 0 The stop is triggered in T2, AUT or Robot exceeds the limit of an acti-
AUT EXT mode if the robot vated workspace in Automatic
exceeds a monitoring space limit. mode.
Safety stop 1 The stop is triggered in T1 mode if Robot exceeds the limit of an acti-
the robot exceeds a monitoring vated workspace in T1 mode.
space limit.
The stop is triggered if a monitoring A protected space in which the ro-
function is just being activated and bot is currently situated is activated
the robot has already exceeded the by a safety mat.
monitoring space limit.
The stop is triggered in T2, AUT or After a restart of the robot
AUT EXT mode if a reference stop controller, the safety controller re-
is enabled for an activated monitor- quests a mastering test. This stops
ing space and a mastering test is the robot.
requested internally.

2.5.2 Stop reactions with “Braking before restricted areas”
Reaction Description Example

Safety stop 0 A stop is triggered if a safety stop 1 The robot cannot execute the con-
is not performed as expected, i.e. trolled safety stop 1 (drive ramp
the monitoring of safety stop 1 is stop) due to overload, power failure
violated. or hardware defect.
Safety The stop is triggered in T2, AUT or Robot approaches a space limit in
stop 1 DRS AUT EXT mode if there is an immi- T2 mode. The robot is stopped as
nent space violation by the robot soon as the fictitious STOP 1 - DRS
(fictitious STOP 1 - DRS end posi- end position exceeds the monitoring
tion exceeds monitoring space limit) space limit.
or if the robot exceeds a monitoring
space limit.
Safety stop 1 The stop is triggered in T1 mode if The robot exceeds the limit of an
the robot threatens to violate the activated workspace in T1 mode or
space (fictitious STOP 1 - DRS tar- the fictitious STOP 1 - DRS target
get position exceeds monitoring position exceeds the limit of an acti-
space limit) or if the robot exceeds vated workspace.
a monitoring space limit.
The stop is triggered if a monitoring A protected space in which the ro-
function is just being activated and bot or the fictitious STOP 1 - DRS
the robot has already exceeded the end position is currently located is
monitoring space limit or the ficti- activated by a safety mat.
tious STOP 1 - DRS target position
is in the activated monitoring space.
The stop is triggered in T2, AUT or After a restart of the robot
AUT EXT mode if a reference stop controller, the safety controller re-
for an activated monitoring space is quests a mastering test. This brings
active and a mastering test is re- the robot to a standstill.
quested internally.
2.5.3 Cell area
Description
The cell area is a Cartesian monitoring space that is limited in the ±Z di-
rection. The cell area is permanently monitored and always active.
The safety-oriented tool on the mounting flange of the robot is modeled
using up to 12 configurable spheres; when the robot moves, these
spheres move with it. These spheres are monitored against the cell area
and must only move within this cell area.
If a sphere violates the limits of the cell area, the robot stops with a safety
stop 0 as long as the “Braking before restricted areas” function is not acti-
vated. Otherwise, a safety stop 1 is triggered before the space limit.

Product description
WARNING
Risk of fatal injury due to unmonitored robot components
Cartesian monitoring spaces are only monitored against the spheres
used to model the active safety-oriented tool. Robot components situ-
ated outside the tool spheres are not monitored and a space violation
by these components is not detected.
Death, injuries or damage to property may result.
• Design and configure Cartesian monitoring spaces and tool spheres
in such a manner that the unmonitored robot components do not
pose any threat.
The cell area is configured in the WORLD coordinate system as a convex

polygon with 3 ... 10 corners.
A convex polygon is a polygon consisting of at least 3 different corners.
The line segments between any 2 corners must not be outside the poly-
gon. Triangles and squares are examples of convex polygons.
Fig. 2-4: Example of convex polygon
1 Convex polygon with 6 corners

2 Non-convex polygon with 6 corners
Example
The diagram shows an example of a configured cell area.

Fig. 2-5: Example of a cell area
1 Cell area
2 Spheres on safety-oriented tool
3 Robot
2.5.4 Cartesian workspaces
Description

spheres move with it. These spheres are simultaneously monitored
against the activated Cartesian workspaces and must move within the
workspaces.
If the “Braking before restricted areas” function is active, the spheres are
additionally monitored at the fictitious STOP 1 - DRS end position. At this
fictitious end position, they must move within the workspaces.
If a sphere violates the limit of a workspace at the actual position, e.g.
when the monitoring space is activated via an input, the following reac-
tions are triggered:
• A safety-oriented output is reset (state: “logic 0”).
The safety-oriented outputs are set if a monitoring space is not viola-
ted (state: “logic 1”).
If interface XG13 is used, safety-oriented outputs are only available for
monitoring spaces 1 … 6.
• The robot is stopped (precondition: parameter Stop at boundaries is
activated for the space).
• Monitoring of the space-specific velocity is activated (precondition:
Space violated is set for the space at parameter Vmax valid if).
If a sphere violates the limit of a workspace at the fictitious STOP 1 -
DRS end position, the following reactions are triggered:

Product description
WARNING
pose any threat.
Example
The diagram shows an example of a Cartesian workspace.
Fig. 2-6: Example of a Cartesian workspace
1 Workspace
3 Robot
2.5.5 Cartesian protected spaces
Description

spheres move with it. These spheres are simultaneously monitored
against the activated Cartesian protected spaces and must move outside
the protected spaces.

If the “Braking before restricted areas” function is active, the spheres are
Product description
additionally monitored at the fictitious STOP 1 - DRS end position. At this

fictitious end position, they must move outside the protected spaces.
The length, width and height of a protected space must not fall below the
predefined minimum value. This value depends on the global maximum
Cartesian velocity and the radius of the smallest sphere of the safety-ori-
ented tool.
(>>> "Minimum protected space dimensions" Page 93)
If a sphere violates the limit of a protected space at the actual position,
e.g. when the monitoring space is activated via an input, the following re-
actions are triggered:
If a sphere violates the limit of a protected space at the fictitious
STOP 1 - DRS end position, the following reactions are triggered:
WARNING
pose any threat.
Example
The diagram shows an example of a Cartesian protected space.

Product description
Fig. 2-7: Example of a Cartesian protected space
1 Protected space
3 Robot
2.5.6 Axis-specific workspaces
Description
The axis limits can be set and monitored individually for each axis via the
software. The resulting axis range is the permissible range of an axis with-
in which the robot may move. The individual axis ranges together make
up the overall workspace, which may consist of up to 8 axis ranges.
A maximum of 8 axes or, in the case of kinematic systems with master/
slave axes, a maximum of 8 drives can be configured for each monitor-
ing space.
If the “Braking before restricted areas” function is active, an additional

check is carried out to ascertain whether the axis position at the fictitious
STOP 1 - DRS end position is inside the permissible range.
If the robot violates an axis limit with the actual position, e.g. when the
monitoring space is activated via an input, the following reactions are trig-
gered:


If the robot violates an axis limit with the fictitious STOP 1 - DRS end po-
sition, the following reactions are triggered:
Example
The diagram shows an example of an axis-specific workspace. The work-

space of axis 1 is configured from -110° to +130° and corresponds to the
permissible motion range of the robot.
Fig. 2-8: Example of an axis-specific workspace
1 Workspace 3 Stopping distance

2 Robot 4 Protected space
2.5.7 Axis-specific protected spaces
Description
The axis limits can be set and monitored individually for each axis via the
software. The resulting axis range is the protected range of an axis within
which the robot may not move. The individual axis ranges together make
up the overall protected space, which may consist of up to 8 axis ranges.
ing space.
If the “Braking before restricted areas” function is active, an additional

check is performed to establish whether the axis position at the fictitious
STOP 1 - DRS end position is outside the protected area.
If the robot violates an axis limit with the actual position, e.g. when the
monitoring space is activated via an input, the following reactions are trig-
gered:

Product description
If the robot violates an axis limit with the fictitious STOP 1 - DRS end po-
sition, the following reactions are triggered:
WARNING
Risk of fatal injury due to axes that can rotate more than 360°
In the case of axes that can rotate more than 360°, the configured axis
ranges refer to the position of the axis (including sign) and not to the
sector of a circle. This means that they can pass through the protected
space. Death, severe injuries or damage to property may result.
• Do not configure protected spaces for axes that can rotate more
than 360°. Instead, configure a suitable workspace.
If, for example, a protected space of +90° to +270° is configured for
axis A1, the robot can move through the protected space in the oth-
er direction from -90° to -185°. In this case, it is advisable to config-
ure a workspace from -90° to +90°.
Fig. 2-9: Example of a protected space through which the robot can
move
1 Workspace 3 Protected space

2 Robot 4 Protected space through
which the robot can move

Example
The diagram shows an example of an axis-specific protected space. The

safeguarded space and the stopping distances correspond to the config-
ured protected space. The motion range of axis 1 is limited to -185° ...
+185° by means of software limit switches. The protected space is config-
ured from -110° ... 10°. This results in 2 permissible motion ranges for the
robot, separated by the configured protected space.
Fig. 2-10: Example of an axis-specific protected space
1 Permissible range 1 4 Protected space

2 Robot 5 Permissible range 2
3 Stopping distance
2.5.8 Braking before restricted areas
Description
The “Braking before restricted areas” function changes the way the robot
behaves at the limits of the monitoring spaces and of the cell area.
With the “Braking before restricted areas” function, the fictitious STOP 1 -
DRS end position based on the actual position is monitored in addition to
the actual position. If this end point violates a monitoring space, this indi-
cates an impending violation of this monitoring space by the robot.
In this case, a safety stop 1 DRS is triggered, bringing the robot to a
standstill at the precalculated end point. Due to the small safety margin in
the precalculation, the robot can generally be stopped before the monitor-
ing space.

Product description
A safety stop 1 DRS is a safely monitored drive ramp stop. This usually
deviates from the programmed path.
If the safety controller detects a violation of the monitored braking ramp,
a safety stop 0 is triggered. As the stopping distance of the robot devi-
ates significantly from the stopping distance of the drive ramp stop in
this instance, this case must be taken into consideration in the risk as-
sessment of the cell.
Possible reasons for an escalation of this nature are, for example:
• Power failure
• Controller fault
• Operation outside of the specification limits
• Hardware fault at the time the drive ramp stop is executed
Example
The figures show the behavior of the robot at the limits of a Cartesian and
axis-specific monitoring space when “Braking before restricted areas” is
activated.
Fig. 2-11: Braking before Cartesian space limit
1 Anticipated stop position of current position

2 Anticipated stop position of current position with safety margin
3 Actual stop with end point before monitoring space
Fig. 2-12: Braking before axis-specific space limit


2.5.9 Space-specific velocity
Description
For Cartesian and axis-specific monitoring spaces, a Cartesian velocity

can be defined which is monitored if the space is violated or not violated.
A safety-oriented TCP is defined for every safety-oriented tool. This safe-
ty-oriented TCP is monitored against a configured velocity limit. If the
safety-oriented TCP exceeds the velocity limit, the robot is stopped safely.
Example
The diagram shows an example of a Cartesian workspace. If the safety-

oriented TCP on the safety-oriented tool exceeds the velocity limit inside
the workspace, the robot is stopped with a safety stop 0.
Fig. 2-13: Example of a Cartesian protected space
1 Workspace
3 Robot
2.5.10 Reference stop
A reference stop can be activated for monitoring spaces. (= function Stop

if mastering test not yet done)
If the reference stop is activated and the following conditions are met, the
robot can only be moved in T1 mode:
• Monitoring space is activated.
• Mastering test requested internally.
If the reference stop is activated and the following preconditions are met,
the robot stops with a safety stop 1:
• Monitoring space is activated.

Product description
• Mastering test requested internally.
• Operating mode T2, AUT or AUT EXT
To be able to move the robot again in the stop-triggering operating
modes, the following possibilities are available:
• Perform mastering test in T1 mode.
• Deactivate monitoring spaces.
• Deactivate reference stop.
2.6 Safety-oriented tools
Description
Up to 16 safety-oriented tools can be defined. A safety-oriented TCP is

defined for each safety-oriented tool and monitored against the configured
velocity limits.
A safety-oriented tool can be modeled using up to 12 configurable
spheres. These spheres are monitored against the limits of the Cartesian
monitoring spaces. The number of configurable spheres is limited to 96.
For example, it is possible to have up to 8 safety-oriented tools with a
maximum number of 12 spheres per tool.
The sphere radius must not fall below the predefined minimum value. This
radius is dependent on the global maximum Cartesian velocity.
(>>> "Minimum sphere radius" Page 93)
The safety-oriented tools are activated using safety-oriented inputs. Only 1
safety-oriented tool may be active at any one time.
If discrete safety interface XG13 or none of the safety interfaces speci-
fied in (>>> 2.3 "Safety interfaces" Page 15) is used, tool 1 is always
active. The tool cannot be activated via a safety-oriented input. An auto-
mated, safely monitored tool change is thus not possible.
The safety-oriented TCP for the velocity monitoring can be freely config-
ured in the safety configuration. It is independent of the current TCP
that is set in the KUKA System Software with the variable $TOOL.
WARNING
pose any threat.
Example
The diagram shows an example of a safety-oriented tool. 2 spheres and a

safety-oriented TCP are defined on the safety-oriented tool of the robot by
means of the FLANGE coordinate system.

Fig. 2-14: Safety-oriented tool
2.7 Velocity monitoring functions
Axis velocities and Cartesian velocities can be subjected to safety-oriented

monitoring.
Axis velocity
The velocity of every axis is monitored against a limit value:
• Limit value for reduced axis velocity (optional)

• Limit value for maximum axis velocity for T1 mode
Monitoring of the maximum axis velocity in T1 mode is part of the
standard safety configuration and always active.
• Limit value for maximum axis velocity (valid globally for every axis)
Cartesian velocity
The Cartesian velocity at the safety-oriented TCP of the active safety-ori-

ented tool is monitored. The velocity monitoring is always relative to
$WORLD:
• Limit value for the reduced velocity at the safety-oriented TCP (option-
al)
• Limit value for the reduced velocity at the safety-oriented TCP for T1
mode
• Limit value for the global maximum velocity at the safety-oriented TCP
and at the sphere center points of the safety-oriented tool (not space-
dependent)
• Space-specific velocity
(>>> 2.5.9 "Space-specific velocity" Page 30)

Product description
Stop reactions
Stop reaction Description Example

Safety stop 0 The stop is triggered if a monitoring In automatic operation, the robot ex-
function is already activated and the ceeds the activated limit value for
robot then exceeds the monitoring reduced axis velocity.
limit.
Safety stop 1 The stop is triggered if a monitoring The safe reduced velocity, for which
function is just being activated and the limit value has already been ex-
the robot has already exceeded the ceeded by the robot, is activated by
monitoring limit. a safety mat.
2.8 Safe operational stop for axis groups
The global safe operational stop is one of the standard safety functions. If
this function is activated via the safety interface, the standstill of all axes
of the kinematic system is monitored. The axes may still move within the
configured axis angle or distance tolerances. The tolerances can be con-
figured individually for each axis.
With KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6, the safe operational stop can additionally
be configured for up to 6 axis groups. An axis group comprises the axes
that are to be monitored when the safe operational stop is activated for
this axis group. Before monitoring is activated, the corresponding axes
must be stopped under program control.
The safe operational stop for axis groups is activated via safety-oriented
inputs. If none of the safety interfaces specified in (>>> 2.3 "Safety inter-
faces" Page 15) is used, the safe operational stop for axis groups is not
available.
slave axes, a maximum of 8 drives can be configured for each axis
group.
If the safe operational stop is activated for an axis group, the standstill of
the axes for which it has been configured is monitored using safe technol-
ogy. The axes may still move within the configured axis angle or distance
tolerances.
If the safe operational stop is violated, i.e. if the position tolerance for an
axis is exceeded or the velocity of an axis exceeds the maximum permit-
ted level, a safety stop 0 is triggered in response. The safety stop 0 af-
fects all axes, not just those for which the operational stop is configured.
This means that an unintended motion of an axis which is relevant for the
safe operational stop causes the machine to stop.


Safety
3 Safety
3.1 General
3.1.1 Disclaimer
The device described in this document is either an industrial robot or a

component thereof.
Components of the industrial robot:
• Manipulator
• Robot controller
• Teach pendant
• Connecting cables
• External axes (optional)
e.g. linear unit, turn-tilt table, positioner
• Software
• Options, accessories
The industrial robot is built using state-of-the-art technology and in accord-
ance with the recognized safety rules. Nevertheless, misuse of the indus-
trial robot may constitute a risk to life and limb or cause damage to the
industrial robot and to other material property.
The industrial robot may only be used in perfect technical condition in ac-
cordance with its intended use and only by safety-conscious persons who
are fully aware of the risks involved in its operation. Use of the industrial
robot is subject to compliance with this document and with the declaration
of incorporation supplied together with the industrial robot. Any functional
disorders, especially those affecting safety, must be rectified immediately.
Safety information
Information about safety may not be construed against the manufacturer.

Even if all safety instructions are followed, this is not a guarantee that the
industrial robot will not cause personal injuries or material damage.
No modifications may be carried out to the industrial robot without the au-
thorization of the manufacturer. Unauthorized modifications will result in
the loss of warranty and liability claims.
Additional components (tools, software, etc.), not supplied by the manufac-
turer, may be integrated into the industrial robot. The user is liable for any
damage these components may cause to the industrial robot or to other
material property.
In addition to the Safety chapter, this document contains further safety in-
structions. These must also be observed.
3.1.2 EC declaration of conformity and declaration of incorporation
The industrial robot constitutes partly completed machinery as defined by

the EC Machinery Directive. The industrial robot may only be put into op-
eration if the following preconditions are met:

Safety KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
• The industrial robot is integrated into a complete system.

or: The industrial robot, together with other machinery, constitutes a
complete system.
or: All safety functions and safeguards required for operation in the
complete machine as defined by the EC Machinery Directive have
been added to the industrial robot.
• The complete system complies with the EC Machinery Directive. This
has been confirmed by means of a conformity assessment procedure.
EC declaration of conformity
The system integrator must issue an EC declaration of conformity for the

complete system in accordance with the Machinery Directive. The EC dec-
laration of conformity forms the basis for the CE mark for the system. The
industrial robot must always be operated in accordance with the applicable
national laws, regulations and standards.
The robot controller has a CE mark in accordance with the EMC Directive
and the Low Voltage Directive.
Declaration of incorporation
The partly completed machinery is supplied with a declaration of incorpo-

ration in accordance with Annex II B of the Machinery Directive
2006/42/EC. The assembly instructions and a list of essential require-
ments complied with in accordance with Annex I are integral parts of this
declaration of incorporation.
The declaration of incorporation declares that the start-up of the partly
completed machinery is not allowed until the partly completed machinery
has been incorporated into machinery, or has been assembled with other
parts to form machinery, and this machinery complies with the terms of
the EC Machinery Directive, and the EC declaration of conformity is
present in accordance with Annex II A.
3.1.3 Terms in the “Safety” chapter
STOP 0, STOP 1 and STOP 2 are the stop definitions according to

EN 60204-1:2018.
Term Description
Axis range Range within which the axis may move The axis range must be de-
fined for each axis.
Stopping distance Stopping distance = reaction distance + braking distance

The stopping distance is part of the danger zone.
Workspace Area within which the robot may move. The workspace is derived
from the individual axis ranges.
AUT Automatic mode

Operating mode for program execution. The robot moves at the
programmed velocity.
AUT EXT Automatic mode, external

Operating mode for program execution. The robot is moved at the
programmed velocity by a higher-level controller.

Safety
User The user of the industrial robot can be the management, employer
or delegated person responsible for use of the industrial robot.
Service life The service life of a safety-relevant component begins at the time
of delivery of the component to the customer.
The service life is not affected by whether the component is used
or not, as safety-relevant components are also subject to aging dur-
ing storage.
Danger zone The danger zone consists of the workspace and the stopping dis-
tances of the manipulator and external axes (optional).
KSS KUKA System Software
KUKA smartPAD see “smartPAD”
KUKA smartPAD-2 see “smartPAD”
Manipulator The robot arm and the associated electrical installations
Safety zone The safety zone is situated outside the danger zone.
Safe operational stop The safe operational stop is a standstill monitoring function. It does
not execute a stop, but rather monitors whether the axes are at a
standstill. If these are moved during the safe operational stop, a
safety STOP 0 is triggered.
The safe operational stop can also be triggered externally.
When a safe operational stop is triggered, the robot controller sets
an output to the field bus. The output is set even if not all the axes
were stationary at the time of triggering, thereby causing a safety
STOP 0 to be triggered.
Safety STOP 0 A stop that is triggered and executed by the safety controller. The
safety controller immediately switches off the drives and the power
supply to the brakes.
Note: This stop is called “safety stop 0” in this document.
Safety STOP 1 A stop that is triggered and monitored by the safety controller. The
braking operation is carried out by the non-safety-oriented section
of the robot controller and monitored by the safety controller.
• T1: The power supply to the brakes is switched off (SBC/Safe

Brake Control signal) as soon as all axes are at a standstill or
after 680 ms at the latest. 200 ms after SBC, the drives are
switched off.
• T2, AUT (KSS), AUT EXT (KSS), EXT (VSS):
The drives are switched off after the configured braking time
(default: 1.5 s). The power supply to the brakes is switched off
200 ms beforehand.
The safety STOP 1 can also be triggered externally.

Safety STOP 1 Only relevant for safety options with BBRA (braking before restric-
– Drive Ramp Stop ted areas):
A stop that is triggered and monitored by the safety controller. The
• The power supply to the brakes is switched off (SBC/Safe

Brake Control signal) as soon as the robot stops or, at the lat-
est, after the configured braking time (default: 1.5 s) plus an os-
cillation time of 500 ms.
200 ms after SBC, the drives are switched off.
Note: This stop is called “Safety stop 1 DRS” in this document.
Safety STOP 2 A stop that is triggered and monitored by the safety controller. The
• T1: Safe standstill monitoring is activated as soon as all axes

are at a standstill or after 680 ms at the latest.
• T2, AUT (KSS), AUT EXT (KSS), EXT (VSS):
After the configured braking time (default: 1.5 s), safe standstill
monitoring is activated for all axes.
The safety STOP 2 can also be triggered externally.
Safety options Generic term for options which make it possible to configure addi-
tional safe monitoring functions in addition to the standard safety
functions.
Example: SafeOperation
smartPAD Teach pendant for the robot controller

The smartPAD has all the operator control and display functions re-
quired for operating and programming the industrial robot.
For robot controllers of the KR C5 series with KUKA System Soft-
ware or VW System Software, the model KUKA smartPAD-2 is
used.
Stop category 0 The drives are deactivated immediately and the brakes are applied.
The manipulator and any external axes (optional) perform path-ori-
ented braking.
Note: This stop category is called “STOP 0” in this document.
Stop category 1 The manipulator and any external axes (optional) perform path-
maintaining braking. The drives are only disconnected once the ma-
chine has come to a standstill.
Stop category 1 – The manipulator and any external axes (optional) perform path-ori-
Drive Ramp Stop ented braking. The drives are only disconnected once the machine
has come to a standstill.
Note: This stop category is called “STOP 1 - DRS” in this docu-
ment.

Safety
Stop category 2 The drives are not deactivated and the brakes are not applied. The
manipulator and any external axes (optional) are braked with a
path-maintaining braking ramp.
System integrator The system integrator is responsible for safely integrating the indus-
(plant integrator) trial robot into a complete system and commissioning it.
T1 Test mode, Manual Reduced Velocity (<= 250 mm/s)
T2 Test mode, Manual High Velocity (> 250 mm/s permissible)
VSS VW System Software
External axis Motion axis which is not part of the manipulator but is controlled by
the robot controller, e.g. KUKA linear unit, turn-tilt table, positioner.
3.2 Personnel
The following persons or groups of persons are defined for the industrial
robot:
• User
• Personnel
Qualification of personnel
Work on the system must only be performed by personnel that is able
to assess the tasks to be carried out and detect potential hazards.
Death, severe injuries or damage to property may otherwise result. The
following qualifications are required:
• Adequate specialist training, knowledge and experience
• Knowledge of the relevant operating or assembly instructions, knowl-
edge of the relevant standards
• All persons working with the industrial robot must have read and un-
derstood the industrial robot documentation, including the safety
chapter.
User
The user must observe the labor laws and regulations. This includes e.g.:
• The user must comply with his monitoring obligations.

• The user must carry out briefing at defined intervals.
• The user must comply with the regulations relating to personal protec-
tive equipment (PPE).
Personnel
Personnel must be instructed, before any work is commenced, in the type

of work involved and what exactly it entails as well as any hazards which
may exist. Instruction must be carried out regularly. Instruction is also re-
quired after particular incidents or technical modifications.
Personnel includes:
• System integrator
• Operators, subdivided into:
‒ Start-up, maintenance and service personnel

‒ Operating personnel
‒ Cleaning personnel
System integrator
The industrial robot is safely integrated into a complete system by the sys-
tem integrator.
The system integrator is responsible for the following tasks:
• Installing the industrial robot

• Connecting the industrial robot
• Performing the risk assessment
• Implementing the required safety functions and safeguards
• Issuing the EC declaration of conformity
• Affixing the CE mark
• Creating the operating instructions for the system
Operators
The operator must meet the following preconditions:

• The operator must be trained for the work to be carried out.
• Work on the system must only be carried out by qualified personnel.
These are people who, due to their specialist training, knowledge and
experience, and their familiarization with the relevant standards, are
able to assess the work to be carried out and detect any potential
hazards.
3.3 Workspace, safety zone and danger zone
Workspaces are to be restricted to the necessary minimum size.

The danger zone consists of the workspace and the stopping distances of
the manipulator and external axes (optional). The danger zone must be
protected by means of physical safeguards to prevent danger to persons
or the risk of material damage.
The safeguards (e.g. safety gate) must be located outside the danger
zone. In the case of a stop, the manipulator and external axes (optional)
are braked and come to a stop within the danger zone.
There must be no shearing or crushing hazards at the loading and trans-
fer areas.
If there are no physical safeguards present, the requirements for collabo-
rative operation in accordance with EN ISO 10218 must be met.
3.3.1 Determining stopping distances
The system integrator’s risk assessment may indicate that the stopping
distances must be determined for an application. In order to determine the
stopping distances, the system integrator must identify the safety-relevant
points on the programmed path.
When determining the stopping distances, the robot must be moved with
the tool and loads which are also used in the application. The robot must
be at operating temperature. This is the case after approx. 1 h in normal
operation.
During execution of the application, the robot must be stopped at the point
from which the stopping distance is to be calculated. This process must

be repeated several times with a safety stop 0 and a safety stop 1. The
Safety
least favorable stopping distance is decisive.
A safety stop 0 can be triggered by a safe operational stop via the safety
interface, for example. If a safety option is installed, it can be triggered,
for instance, by a space violation (e.g. the robot exceeds the limit of an
activated workspace in Automatic mode).
A safety stop 1 can be triggered by pressing the EMERGENCY STOP de-
vice on the smartPAD, for example.
3.4 Triggers for stop reactions: KSS
Stop reactions of the industrial robot are triggered in response to operator

actions or as a reaction to monitoring functions and error messages. The
following table shows the different stop reactions according to the operat-
ing mode that has been set.
Trigger T1, T2 AUT, AUT EXT
Start key released STOP 2 -
STOP key pressed STOP 2
Drives OFF STOP 1
$MOVE_ENABLE input drops out STOP 2
Power switched off via main switch or STOP 0
device switch
Or power failure
Internal error in non-safety-oriented part STOP 0 or STOP 1
of the robot controller
(dependent on the cause of the error)
Operating mode changed during opera- Safety stop 2
tion
Safety gate opened (operator safety) - Safety stop 1
Enabling switch released (internal or ex- Safety stop 2 -
ternal enabling)
Internal enabling switch pressed down Safety stop 1 -
fully or error
External enabling switch pressed down Safety stop 2 -
fully or error
E-STOP pressed Safety stop 1
Error in safety controller or periphery of Safety stop 0
the safety controller
* In the KR C5 series, the “pressed down fully” position is not communica-
ted to the robot controller as a specific “panic position” signal for external
enabling, but only as “enabling not present”. This triggers a safety stop 2.
3.5 Triggers for stop reactions: VSS
Stop reactions of the industrial robot are triggered in response to operator

actions or as a reaction to monitoring functions and error messages. The
following table shows the different stop reactions according to the operat-
ing mode that has been set.

Trigger T1, T2 EXT

Start key released STOP 2 -
STOP key pressed STOP 2
Drives OFF STOP 1
Power switched off via main switch or STOP 0
device switch
Or power failure
Internal error in non-safety-oriented part STOP 0 or STOP 1
of the robot controller
(dependent on the cause of the error)
Operating mode changed during opera- Safety stop 2
tion
Safety gate opened (operator safety) - Safety stop 1
Enabling switch released (internal or ex- Safety stop 2 -
ternal enabling)
Internal enabling switch pressed down Safety stop 1 -
fully or error
External enabling switch pressed down Safety stop 2 -
fully or error
E-STOP pressed Safety stop 1
Error in safety controller or periphery of Safety stop 0
the safety controller
* In the KR C5 series, the “pressed down fully” position is not communica-
ted to the robot controller as a specific “panic position” signal for external
enabling, but only as “enabling not present”. This triggers a safety stop 2.
3.6 Safety functions
3.6.1 Overview of the safety functions
The following safety functions are always present on the industrial robot:
• Operator safety (= connection for the monitoring of physical safe-
guards)
• EMERGENCY STOP device on the smartPAD
• External EMERGENCY STOP device
• Enabling device on the smartPAD
• External enabling device
• Velocity monitoring in T1
Depending on the hardware configuration, the following safety functions
are present on the industrial robot:
• External safety stop, STOP 1
• External safety stop, STOP 2
• External safe operational stop
• EMERGENCY STOP device (additional local device)
• Peripheral contactor US2
The safety functions of the industrial robot meet the following require-
ments:

Safety
• Category 3 and Performance Level d in accordance with EN ISO
13849-1
The requirements are only met on the following conditions, however:
• The EMERGENCY STOP device is pressed at least once every
12 months.
• The enabling device is checked at least once every 12 months.
(>>> "Function test" Page 47)
• Peripheral contactor US2 is checked at least once every 12 months (if
used).
• The testing of the safety functions is carried out in accordance with
the maintenance table. For maintenance table, see chapter “Mainte-
nance” in the documentation of the hardware components used.
DANGER
Risk of fatal injury due to non-operational safety functions or exter-
nal safeguards
In the absence of operational safety functions or safeguards, the indus-
trial robot can cause death, severe injuries or damage to property.
• If safety functions or safeguards are dismantled or deactivated, do
not operate the industrial robot.
Integrate industrial robot into safety system of the overall system

During system planning, the safety functions of the overall system must
be planned and designed. Death, severe injuries or damage to property
may otherwise result.
• The industrial robot must be integrated into the safety system of the
overall system.
3.6.2 Safety controller
The safety controller is a unit inside the control PC. It links safety-relevant
signals and safety-relevant monitoring functions.
Safety controller tasks:
• Switching off the drives; applying the brakes
• Monitoring the braking ramp
• Standstill monitoring (after the stop)
• Velocity monitoring in T1
• Evaluation of safety-relevant signals
• Setting of safety-oriented outputs
3.6.3 “Operator safety” signal: KSS
The “operator safety” signal is used for monitoring physical safeguards,

e.g. safety gates. Automatic operation is not possible without this signal.
In the event of a loss of signal during automatic operation (e.g. safety
gate is opened), the manipulator stops with a safety stop 1.
Operator safety is not active in modes T1 (Manual Reduced Velocity) and
T2 (Manual High Velocity).

WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to resumption of automatic operation
without adequate checking
Following loss of the “Operator safety” signal, it must not be possible to
restart automatic operation by merely closing the safeguard. Otherwise,
for example, the safety gate could close unintentionally, thereby causing
automatic operation to resume while there are persons in the danger
zone. Death, severe injuries or damage to property may result.
• Automatic operation must not be resumed until the safeguard has
been closed and the closing has been acknowledged.
• The acknowledgement must be designed in such a way that an ac-
tual check of the danger zone can be carried out first. Acknowledge-
ment that is automatically and directly triggered by closure of the
safeguard is not permitted.
• If closure is acknowledged by a device (e.g. by the PLC), the sys-
tem integrator must ensure that the acknowledgement is preceded
by an actual check of the danger zone.
3.6.4 “Operator safety” signal: VSS
The “Operator safety” signal is used for monitoring physical safeguards,

e.g. safety gates. Automatic operation is not possible without this signal.
In the event of a loss of signal during automatic operation (e.g. safety
gate is opened), the manipulator stops with a safety stop 1.
In Manual Reduced Velocity (T1) mode, operator safety can be overridden
with the E2/E22 key.
In Manual High Velocity (T2) mode, operator safety can be overridden
with the E2/E22+E7 key.
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to resumption of automatic operation
without adequate checking
Following loss of the “Operator safety” signal, it must not be possible to
restart automatic operation by merely closing the safeguard. Otherwise,
for example, the safety gate could close unintentionally, thereby causing
automatic operation to resume while there are persons in the danger
zone. Death, severe injuries or damage to property may result.
• Automatic operation must not be resumed until the safeguard has
been closed and the closing has been acknowledged.
• The acknowledgement must be designed in such a way that an ac-
tual check of the danger zone can be carried out first. Acknowledge-
ment that is automatically and directly triggered by closure of the
safeguard is not permitted.
• If closure is acknowledged by a device (e.g. by the PLC), the sys-
tem integrator must ensure that the acknowledgement is preceded
by an actual check of the danger zone.
3.6.5 EMERGENCY STOP device
The EMERGENCY STOP device for the industrial robot is the EMERGEN-
CY STOP device on the smartPAD. The device must be pressed in the
event of a hazardous situation or emergency.
Reactions of the industrial robot if the EMERGENCY STOP device is
pressed:

Safety
• The manipulator and any external axes (optional) are stopped with a
safety stop 1.
Before operation can be resumed, the EMERGENCY STOP device must
be turned to release it.
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to tools and equipment without EMER-
GENCY STOP
If tools and other equipment connected to the robot are not integrated
into the EMERGENCY STOP circuit, this can result in death, severe in-
• Integrate tools and other equipment into the EMERGENCY STOP
circuit if they could constitute a potential hazard.
There must always be at least one external EMERGENCY STOP device

installed. This ensures that an EMERGENCY STOP device is available
even when the smartPAD is disconnected.
3.6.6 Logging off from the higher-level safety controller
If the robot controller is connected to a higher-level safety controller, this

connection will inevitably be terminated in the following cases:
• Switching off the voltage via the main switch or device switch of the
robot controller
Or power failure
• Shutdown of the robot controller via the smartHMI
• Activation of a WorkVisual project in WorkVisual or directly on the ro-
bot controller
• Changes to Start-up > Network configuration
• Changes to Configuration > Safety configuration
• I/O drivers > Reconfigure
• Restoration of an archive
Effect of the interruption:
• If a discrete safety interface is used, this triggers an EMERGENCY
STOP for the overall system.
• If the Ethernet interface is used, the KUKA safety controller generates
a signal that prevents the higher-level controller from triggering an
EMERGENCY STOP for the overall system.
Take Ethernet safety interface into consideration in risk assess-

ment
Failure to take the Ethernet safety interface into consideration in the risk
assessment may result in death, severe injuries or damage to property.
• In his risk assessment, the system integrator must take into consid-
eration whether the fact that switching off the robot controller does
not trigger an EMERGENCY STOP of the overall system could con-
stitute a hazard and, if so, how this hazard can be countered.

WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to smartPAD on controller that has
been switched off
If a robot controller is switched off, the EMERGENCY STOP device on
the smartPAD is not operational. There is a risk of operational and non-
operational EMERGENCY STOP devices becoming interchanged.
Death, severe injuries or damage to property may result.
• Cover smartPADs on controllers that have been switched off or re-
move them from the system.
3.6.7 External EMERGENCY STOP device
Every operator station that can initiate a robot motion or other potentially
hazardous situation must be equipped with an EMERGENCY STOP de-
vice. The system integrator is responsible for ensuring this.
There must always be at least one external EMERGENCY STOP device
installed. This ensures that there is an EMERGENCY STOP device avail-
able, even if the smartPAD has been disconnected.
External EMERGENCY STOP devices are connected via the customer in-
terface.
3.6.8 Enabling device
The enabling devices of the industrial robot are the enabling switches on
the smartPAD.
For robot controllers of the KR C5 series, the model smartPAD-2 is used.
It has 4 enabling switches.
The enabling switches have 3 positions:
• Not pressed
• Center position
• Fully pressed (panic position)
In the test modes, the manipulator can only be moved if at least one of
the enabling switches is held in the center position.
It is possible to hold several enabling switches in the center position si-
multaneously. This makes it possible to adjust grip from one enabling
switch to another one.
In the test modes, the manipulator can be stopped in the following ways:
• Press at least one enabling switch down fully.
Pressing an enabling switch down fully triggers a safety stop 1.
• Or release all enabling switches.
Releasing all (!) enabling switches held in the center position triggers
a safety stop 2.
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to lack of reaction when an enabling
switch is released
Releasing one of multiple enabling switches held in the center position
does not trigger a stop reaction.
If multiple switches are held in the center position, the robot controller
cannot distinguish whether one of them was intentionally released or if it
was unintentionally released as the result of an accident.
• Create awareness for the hazard.

If an enabling switch malfunctions (e.g. jams in the center position), the
Safety
industrial robot can be stopped using one of the following methods:
• Press another enabling switch down fully.

• Actuate the EMERGENCY STOP device.
• Release the Start key.
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to manipulation of enabling switches
The enabling switches must not be held down by adhesive tape or other
means or tampered with in any other way. Death, severe injuries or
damage to property may result.
• Carry out a visual inspection of the enabling switches.
• Rectify tampering or remove any foreign bodies.
Function test
The function of the enabling switches must be tested in the following ca-
ses:
• Following initial start-up or recommissioning of the industrial robot
• After a software update
• After disconnecting and reconnecting a smartPAD (the same smart-
PAD or another one)
• The test must be carried out at least once every 12 months.
To test, perform the following steps separately for each enabling switch:
1. Move the manipulator in a test mode.
2. While the manipulator is moving, press the enabling switch down fully
and hold it down for 3 seconds.
The test is passed in the following case:
• The manipulator stops.
• And: No error message for the enabling device is displayed (Enabling
switch error or similar).
If the test has not been passed for one or more enabling switches, the
smartPAD must be exchanged and the test must be performed again.
3.6.9 External enabling device
External enabling devices are required if it is necessary for more than one
person to be in the danger zone of the industrial robot.
The function of the external enabling switches must be tested at least
once every 12 months.
Which interface can be used for connecting external enabling devices is
described in the “Planning” chapter of the robot controller operating in-
structions and assembly instructions.
3.6.10 Velocity monitoring in T1
The axis-specific velocity is safely monitored in T1 mode.

The Cartesian velocity is safely monitored in T1 if the associated setting is
activated in the safety configuration.

Axis-specific monitoring
If an axis exceeds its velocity limit, a safety stop 0 is triggered.

• Default limit value for rotational axes: 30°/s
• Default limit value for linear axes: 250 mm/s
The axis-specific monitoring can be configured via the parameter Maxi-

mum velocity T1. Further information about this can be found in the
Operating and Programming Instructions for System Integrators
documentation for the System Software.
Cartesian monitoring
The Cartesian monitoring refers to the velocity at the flange. If a limit val-
ue is exceeded, a safety stop 0 is triggered.
• Default limit value: 250 mm/s
If an additional safety option (e.g. SafeOperation) is used, the limit value
can be configured. It can be reduced, but not increased.
3.7 Additional protective equipment
3.7.1 Jog mode
In the operating modes T1 (Manual Reduced Velocity) and T2 (Manual

High Velocity), the robot controller can only execute programs in jog
mode. This means that it is necessary to hold down an enabling switch
and the Start key in order to execute a program.
• Releasing the enabling switch triggers a safety stop 2.
• Pressing the enabling switch down fully (panic position) triggers a
safety stop 1.
• Releasing the Start key triggers a STOP 2.
3.7.2 Software limit switches
The axis ranges of all manipulator and positioner axes are limited by
means of adjustable software limit switches. These software limit switches
only serve as machine protection and must be adjusted in such a way
that the manipulator/positioner cannot hit the mechanical end stops.
The software limit switches are set during commissioning of an industrial
robot.
Further information is contained in the operating and programming in-
structions.
3.7.3 Mechanical end stops
Depending on the robot variant, the axis ranges of the main and wrist ax-
es of the manipulator are partially limited by mechanical end stops.
Additional mechanical end stops can be installed on the external axes.

Safety
WARNING
Danger to life and limb following collision with obstacle
If the manipulator or an external axis hits an obstruction or a mechani-
cal end stop or mechanical axis limitation, the manipulator can no
longer be operated safely. Death, injuries or damage to property may re-
sult.
• Put manipulator out of operation.
• KUKA must be consulted before it is put back into operation.
3.7.4 Mechanical axis limitation (optional)
Some manipulators can be fitted with adjustable mechanical axis limitation

systems in axes A1 to A3. The axis limitation systems restrict the working
range to the required minimum. This increases personal safety and pro-
tection of the system.
In the case of manipulators that are not designed to be fitted with me-
chanical axis limitation, the workspace must be laid out in such a way that
there is no danger to persons or material property, even in the absence of
mechanical axis limitation.
If this is not possible, the workspace must be limited by means of photo-
electric barriers, photoelectric curtains or mechanical limitations on the
system side. There must be no shearing or crushing hazards at the load-
ing and transfer areas.
This option is not available for all robot models. Information on specific
robot models can be obtained from the manufacturer.
3.7.5 Options for moving the manipulator without drive energy
Qualification of personnel with regard to behavior in emergency

situations
In emergencies or other exceptional situations, it may be necessary to
move the manipulator without drive energy.
• Personnel must be trained in how to move the manipulator without
drive energy.
Description
The following options may be available for moving the manipulator without
drive energy after an accident or malfunction:
• Release device (optional)
The release device can be used for the main axis drive motors and,
depending on the robot variant, also for the wrist axis drive motors.
• Brake release device (option)
The brake release device is designed for robot variants whose motors
are not freely accessible.
• Moving the wrist axes directly by hand
There is no release device available for the wrist axes of variants in
the low payload category. This is not necessary because the wrist ax-
es can be moved directly by hand.
Information about the options available for the various robot models and
about how to use them can be found in the assembly and operating in-
structions for the robot or can be requested from the manufacturer.

NOTICE
Damage to property due to moving the manipulator without drive
energy
Moving the manipulator without drive energy can damage the motor
brakes of the axes concerned.
• Only move the manipulator without drive energy in emergencies,
e.g. for rescuing persons.
• Perform brake test.
• The motor must be replaced if the brake has been damaged.
3.7.6 Labeling on the industrial robot
All plates, labels, symbols and marks constitute safety-relevant parts of

the industrial robot. They must not be modified or removed.
Labeling on the industrial robot consists of:
• Identification plates
• Warning signs
• Safety symbols
• Designation labels
• Cable markings
• Rating plates
Further information is contained in the technical data of the operating in-

structions or assembly instructions of the components of the industrial
robot.
3.7.7 External safeguards
The access of persons to the danger zone of the industrial robot must be
prevented by means of safeguards. It is the responsibility of the system
integrator to ensure this.
If there are no physical safeguards present, the requirements for collabo-
rative operation in accordance with EN ISO 10218 must be met.
Physical safeguards must meet the following requirements:
• They meet the requirements of EN ISO 14120.

• They prevent access of persons to the danger zone and cannot be
easily circumvented.
• They are sufficiently fastened and can withstand all forces that are
likely to occur in the course of operation, whether from inside or out-
side the enclosure.
• They do not, themselves, represent a hazard or potential hazard.
• Prescribed clearances, e.g. to danger zones, are adhered to.
Safety gates (maintenance gates) must meet the following requirements:
• They are reduced to an absolute minimum.

• The interlocks (e.g. safety gate switches) are linked to the operator
safety input of the robot controller via safety gate switching devices or
safety PLC.
• Switching devices, switches and the type of switching conform to the
requirements of Performance Level d and category 3 according to
EN ISO 13849-1.

Safety
• Depending on the hazard situation: the safety gate is additionally safe-
guarded by means of a locking mechanism that only allows the gate
to be opened if the manipulator is safely at a standstill.
• The button for acknowledging the safety gate is located outside the
space limited by the safeguards.
Further information is contained in the corresponding standards and reg-

ulations. These also include EN ISO 14120.
Other safety equipment
Other safety equipment must be integrated into the system in accordance

with the corresponding standards and regulations.
3.7.8 “Drives ready” lamp
If the system is to comply with ANSI/UL 1740, the system integrator must
integrate a “Drives ready” lamp into the system. An interface is available
for the lamp connection.
The “Drives ready” lamp must always be functionally tested before enter-
ing the danger zone. If the test is not passed, the danger zone must not
be entered except to work on the lamp.
More information about the “Drives ready” lamp, the associated interface
and testing can be found in the assembly instructions for the robot con-
troller.
3.8 Operating mode selection: KSS
Operating modes
The industrial robot can be operated in the following modes:

• Manual Reduced Velocity (T1)
• Manual High Velocity (T2)
• Automatic (AUT)
• Automatic External (AUT EXT)
Do not change the operating mode while a program is running. If the

operating mode is changed during program execution, the industrial ro-
bot is stopped with a safety stop 2.
Operating
Use Velocities
mode
• Program verification:
Programmed velocity, maxi-
For test operation,
mum 250 mm/s
T1 programming and
teaching • Jog mode:
Jog velocity, maximum
250 mm/s
T2 For test operation Programmed velocity
• Jog mode: Not possible

Operating
Use Velocities
mode
For industrial robots • Program operation:

AUT without higher-level Programmed velocity
controllers • Jog mode: Not possible

AUT EXT with higher-level con- Programmed velocity
trollers, e.g. PLC • Jog mode: Not possible
Mode selector switch
The user can change the operating mode via the connection manager.
The connection manager is a view that is called by means of the mode
selector switch on the smartPAD.
The mode selector switch may be one of the following variants:
• With key
It is only possible to change operating mode if the key is inserted.
• Without key
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to mode selector switch without
access restriction
If the smartPAD is equipped with a mode selector switch without a key,
all persons can operate the mode selector switch, irrespective of their
field of activity or qualifications. Death, severe injuries or damage to
property may result.
• An additional device must be installed to ensure that the mode se-
lector switch can only be operated by a restricted group of people.
• The device itself must not trigger motions of the industrial robot or
other hazards.
3.9 Overview of operating modes and safety functions: KSS
The following table indicates the operating modes in which the safety
functions are active.
Safety functions T1 T2 AUT AUT EXT
Operator safety - - active active
EMERGENCY STOP device active active active active
Enabling device active active - -
Reduced velocity during
active - - -
program verification
Jog mode active active - -
Software limit switches active active active active
Interface for “Drives ready”
active active active active
lamp
3.10 Operating mode selection: VSS
Operating modes
The industrial robot can be operated in the following modes:

Safety
• Manual Reduced Velocity (T1)
• Manual High Velocity (T2)
• Automatic External (EXT)
Do not change the operating mode while a program is running. If the

operating mode is changed during program execution, the industrial ro-
bot is stopped with a safety stop 2.
Operating
Use Velocities
mode
Programmed velocity, maxi-
For test operation,
mum 250 mm/s
T1 programming and
teaching • Jog mode:
Jog velocity, maximum
250 mm/s
T2 For test operation Programmed velocity
• Jog mode: Not possible

EXT with higher-level con- Programmed velocity
trollers, e.g. PLC • Jog mode: Not possible
Mode selector switch
The user can change the operating mode via the connection manager.
The connection manager is a view that is called by means of the mode
selector switch on the smartPAD.
Bypassing
In order to be able to move the manipulator in operating mode T1 or T2

with the safety gate open, the following keys are available:
Active key Authorization
E2/E22 Authorization to move in T1 with the safety
gate open
E2/E22 and E7 Authorization to move in T2 with the safety
gate open
WARNING
Danger to life and limb of persons in danger zone in T2
In T2, the robot moves at the programmed velocity. Death, severe inju-
ries or damage to property may result.
• There must be no persons in the danger area.
Use E keys in a safety-conscious manner

Keys E2/E22 and E7 must be used in a safety-conscious manner.
Death, severe injuries or damage to property may otherwise result.
• It is the responsibility of the user or system integrator to determine
which key may be used and when. The applicable laws, regulations
and standards must be taken into consideration.
• The keys may only be used by qualified personnel.

Program execution
Jogging possible?
Active key Safety gate possible?
T1 T2 T1 T2
No key active Open No No No No
Closed Yes No Yes Yes
E2/E22 Open Yes No Yes No
Closed No No No No
E2/E22 and E7 Open Yes No No Yes
Closed No No No No
3.11 Overview of operating modes and safety functions: VSS
The following table indicates the operating modes in which the safety
functions are active.
Safety measures T1 T2 EXT
Operator safety Active * Active ** Active
EMERGENCY STOP device Active Active Active
Enabling device Active Active -
Reduced velocity during pro-
Active - -
gram verification
Jog mode Active Active -
Software limit switches Active Active Active
* In T1 mode, operator safety can be bypassed with the E2/E22 key.
** In T2 mode, operator safety can be bypassed with the E2/E22+E7 key.
3.12 Safety measures
3.12.1 General safety measures
The industrial robot may only be used in perfect technical condition in ac-
cordance with its intended use and only by safety-conscious persons. Op-
erator errors can result in personal injury and damage to property.
It is important to be prepared for possible movements of the industrial ro-
bot even after the robot controller has been switched off and locked out.
Incorrect installation (e.g. overload) or mechanical defects (e.g. brake de-
fect) can cause the manipulator or external axes to sag. If work is to be
carried out on a switched-off industrial robot, the manipulator and external
axes must first be moved into a position in which they are unable to move
on their own, whether the payload is mounted or not. If this is not possi-
ble, the manipulator and external axes must be secured by appropriate
means.
DANGER
Risk of fatal injury due to non-operational safety functions or exter-
nal safeguards
In the absence of operational safety functions or safeguards, the indus-
trial robot can cause death, severe injuries or damage to property.
• If safety functions or safeguards are dismantled or deactivated, do
not operate the industrial robot.

Safety
DANGER
Danger to life and limb of persons under the robot arm
Sagging or falling parts can cause death or serious injuries. This applies
at all times, e.g. also for assembly tasks or with the controller switched
off.
• Never loiter under the robot arm.
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to incorrect loads
Operating a robot with incorrect loads may result in death, severe inju-
ries or damage to property.
• Use correct load data.
• Use only loads for which the robot is suitable.
CAUTION
Risk of burns from hot motors
The motors reach temperatures during operation which can cause
burns.
• Avoid contact.
• Take appropriate safety precautions, e.g. wear protective gloves.
Implants
WARNING
Danger to life due to malfunction of implants caused by motors
and brakes
Electric motors and brakes generate electric and magnetic fields. The
fields can cause malfunctions in active implants, e.g. pacemakers.
• Affected persons must maintain a minimum distance of 300 mm
from motors and brakes. This applies to both energized and deener-
gized motors and brakes.
smartPAD
The user must ensure that the industrial robot is only operated with the
smartPAD by authorized persons.
If more than one smartPAD is used in the overall system, it must be en-
sured that it is clearly recognizable which smartPAD is connected to which
industrial robot. They must not be interchanged.
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to disconnected smartPAD
If a smartPAD is disconnected, its EMERGENCY STOP device is not
operational. There is a risk of connected and disconnected smartPADs
being interchanged. Death, injuries or damage to property may result.
• Remove the disconnected smartPAD from the system immediately.
• Store the disconnected smartPAD out of sight and reach of person-
nel working on the industrial robot.
The enabling switches on the smartPAD must be subjected to a function

test at least once every 12 months and in certain specific cases.
(>>> "Function test" Page 47)

Modifications
After modifications to the industrial robot, checks must be carried out to

ensure the required safety level. The valid national or regional work safety
regulations must be observed for this check. The correct functioning of all
safety functions must also be tested.
New or modified programs must always be tested first in Manual Reduced
Velocity mode (T1).
After modifications to the industrial robot, existing programs must always
be tested first in Manual Reduced Velocity mode (T1). This applies to all
components of the industrial robot and includes e.g. modifications of the
external axes or to the software and configuration settings.
Faults
In the case of faults on the industrial robot, the following safety measures
must be implemented immediately:
• Switch off the robot controller and secure it (e.g. with a padlock) to
prevent unauthorized persons from switching it on again.
• Indicate the fault by means of a label with a corresponding warning
(tagout).
• Keep a record of the faults.
Carry out a functional test after the fault has been rectified.
3.12.2 IT security
KUKA products must only be used in perfect technical condition in accord-

ance with their intended use and only by safety-conscious persons.
In particular, safety-conscious use includes being operated in an IT envi-
ronment which meets the current security-relevant standards and for
which there is an overall concept for IT security.
Take measures to ensure IT security
IT security involves not only aspects of information and data processing
as such, but also affects at least the following areas:
• Technology, organization, personnel, infrastructure
KUKA urgently recommends that users implement an information securi-
ty management system for their products which designs, coordinates
and monitors the tasks related to information security.
Sources for information about IT security for companies include:

• Independent consulting firms
• National cyber security authorities
National authorities often make their recommendations available on the In-
ternet. In addition to their official language, some national authorities pro-
vide their information in English.
3.12.3 Transportation
Manipulator
The prescribed transport position of the manipulator must be observed.

Transportation must be carried out in accordance with the operating in-
structions or assembly instructions of the robot.

Avoid vibrations and impacts during transportation in order to prevent
Safety
damage to the manipulator.
Robot controller
The prescribed transport position of the robot controller must be observed.

Transportation must be carried out in accordance with the operating in-
structions or assembly instructions of the robot controller.
Avoid vibrations and impacts during transportation in order to prevent
damage to the robot controller.
External axis (optional)
The prescribed transport position of the external axis (e.g. KUKA linear
unit, turn-tilt table, positioner) must be observed. Transportation must be
carried out in accordance with the operating instructions or assembly in-
structions of the external axis.
3.12.4 Start-up and recommissioning: KSS/VSS
KSS only:
Changing default passwords
The KUKA System Software is supplied with default passwords for the
user groups. If the passwords are not changed, this enables unauthor-
ized persons to log on.
• Before start-up, change the passwords for the user groups.
• Only communicate the passwords to authorized personnel.
KSS and VSS:

Before starting up systems and devices for the first time, a check must be
carried out to ensure that the systems and devices are complete and op-
erational, that they can be operated safely and that any damage is detec-
ted.
The valid national or regional work safety regulations must be observed
for this check. The correct functioning of all safety functions must also be
tested.
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to incorrectly assigned cables
The robot controller is preconfigured for the specific industrial robot. The
manipulator and other components can receive incorrect data if they are
connected to a different robot controller. Death, severe injuries or dam-
age to property may result.
• Only connect the manipulator to the corresponding robot controller.
WARNING
Risk of fatal injury due to non-configured external axes
The robot controller cannot detect an external axis that is physically
connected, but not configured correctly in the software. It cannot exert
any torque nor any holding torque on this external axis. If the brakes re-
lease, uncontrolled motion can occur at this external axis as a result.
Death, severe injuries or damage to property may result.
• Ensure that external axes are correctly configured before an ena-
bling switch is pressed and the brakes are thus released.

Do not impair safety functions

Additional components (e.g. cables and hoses) not supplied by KUKA
may be integrated into the industrial robot. If the safety functions are not
taken into consideration, this may result in death, severe injuries or
damage to property.
• Additional components must not impair or disable safety functions.
NOTICE
Damage to property due to condensation
If the internal cabinet temperature of the robot controller differs greatly
from the ambient temperature, condensation can form. This may result
in damage to property.
• Wait until the internal cabinet temperature has adapted to the ambi-
ent temperature in order to avoid condensation.
Function test
The following tests must be carried out before start-up and recommission-
ing:
General test:
It must be ensured that:
• The industrial robot is correctly installed and fastened in accordance

with the specifications in the documentation.
• There is no damage to the robot that could be attributed to external
forces.
WARNING
Danger to life and limb resulting from external forces
The external application of force, such as an impact or a collision,
can cause non-visible damage. For example, it can lead to a gradu-
al loss of drive power from the motor, resulting in unintended move-
ments of the manipulator.
Death, severe injuries or damage to property may result from non-
visible damage.
‒ Check the robot for damage that could have been caused by ex-
ternal forces, e.g. dents or abrasion of paintwork.
Check the motor and counterbalancing system particularly care-
fully.
(Motor inspection not relevant for robots with internal motors.)
‒ In the case of damage, the affected components must be ex-
changed.
• There are no foreign bodies or defective or loose parts on the industri-

al robot.
• All required safety equipment is correctly installed and operational.
• The power supply ratings of the industrial robot correspond to the
local supply voltage and mains type.
• The ground conductor and the equipotential bonding cable are suffi-
ciently rated and correctly connected.
• The connecting cables are correctly connected and the connectors are
locked.
Test of the safety functions:

A function test must be carried out for the following safety functions to en-
Safety
sure that they are functioning correctly:
• Local EMERGENCY STOP device

• External EMERGENCY STOP device (input and output)
• Enabling device (in the test modes)
• Operator safety
• All other safety-relevant inputs and outputs used
• Other external safety functions
3.12.4.1 Checking machine data and safety configuration
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to incorrect data
The industrial robot must not be moved if incorrect machine data or an
incorrect controller configuration are loaded. Unforeseeable reactions
may occur. Death, severe injuries or damage to property may result.
• Only operate industrial robots with correct data.
• Following the start-up procedure, the practical tests for the machine
data must be carried out. The tool must be calibrated (either via an
actual calibration or through numerical entry of the data).
• Following modifications to the machine data, the safety configuration
must be checked.
• After activation of a WorkVisual project on the robot controller, the
safety configuration must be checked.
• If machine data are adopted when checking the safety configuration
(regardless of the reason for the safety configuration check), the prac-
tical tests for the machine data must be carried out.
• If the activation code of the safety configuration has changed, the safe
axis monitoring functions must be checked.
Information about checking the safety configuration and the safe axis
monitoring functions is contained in the Operating and Programming In-
structions for System Integrators.
If the practical tests are not successfully completed in the initial start-up,
KUKA Deutschland GmbH must be contacted.
If the practical tests are not successfully completed during a different pro-
cedure, the machine data and the safety-relevant controller configuration
must be checked and corrected.
General practical test for 6-axis robots
If practical tests are required for the machine data, this test must always
be carried out.
The following methods are available for performing the practical test:
• TCP calibration with the XYZ 4-point method
The practical test is passed if the TCP has been successfully calibra-
ted.
Or:
1. Align the TCP with a freely selected point. The point serves as a ref-
erence point.
• The point must be located so that reorientation is possible.

• The point must not be located on the Z axis of the FLANGE coor-
dinate system.
2. Move the TCP manually at least 45° once in each of the A, B and C
directions.
The movements do not have to be accumulative, i.e. after motion in
one direction it is possible to return to the original position before mov-
ing in the next direction.
The practical test is passed if the TCP does not deviate from the ref-
erence point by more than 2 cm in total.
General practical test for palletizing robots
Palletizing robots, in this case, are either robots that can be used only as
palletizers from the start or robots operated in palletizing mode. The latter
must also be in palletizing mode during the practical test.
be carried out.
First part:
erence point.
• The point must not be located on the Z axis of the FLANGE coor-
dinate system.
2. Mark the starting position of the TCP.
Also read and note the starting position from the Actual position –
Cartesian display on the smartHMI.
3. Jog the TCP in the X direction. The distance must be at least 20% of
the robot’s maximum reach. Determine the exact length via the Actual
position display.
4. Measure the distance covered and compare it with the distance value
displayed on the smartHMI. The deviation must be < 5%.
5. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for the Y direction and Z direction.
The first part of the practical test is passed if the deviation is < 5% in ev-
ery direction.
Second part:
• Rotate the tool manually about A by 45°: once in the plus direction,
once in the minus direction. At the same time, observe the TCP.
The second part of the practical test is passed if the position of the TCP
in space is not altered during the rotations.
General practical test for SCARA robots
be carried out.
First part:
erence point.
• The point must not be on A4.
2. Mark the starting position of the TCP.
Also read and note the starting position from the Actual position –
Cartesian display on the smartHMI.

Safety
3. Jog the TCP in the Z direction. The distance must be at least 20% of
the maximum travel. Determine the exact length via the Actual posi-
tion display.
4. Measure the distance covered and compare it with the distance value
displayed on the smartHMI. The deviation must be < 5%.
The first part of the practical test is passed if the deviation is < 5%.
Second part:
• Rotate the tool manually by 45°: once in the plus direction, once in
the minus direction. At the same time, observe the TCP.
The second part of the practical test is passed if the position of the TCP
in space is not altered during the rotations.
Practical test for axes that are not mathematically coupled
If practical tests are required for the machine data, this test must be car-
ried out when axes are present that are not mathematically coupled.
1. Mark the starting position of the axis that is not mathematically cou-
pled.
Also read and note the start position from the Actual position display
on the smartHMI.
2. Move the axis manually by a freely selected path length. Determine
the path length from the Actual position display.
• Move linear axes a specific distance.
• Move rotational axes through a specific angle.
3. Measure the length of the path covered and compare it with the value
displayed on the smartHMI.
The practical test is passed if the values differ by no more than 5%.
4. Repeat the test for each axis that is not mathematically coupled.
Practical test for robot on ROBROOT kinematic system
ried out if the robot is mounted on a mathematically coupled ROBROOT
kinematic system, e.g. on a KL.
• Move the axes of the ROBROOT kinematic system manually in Carte-
sian mode, individually and one after the other.
The practical test is passed if the TCP does not move at the same
time.
Practical test for couplable axes
ried out when axes are present that can be physically coupled and uncou-
pled, e.g. a servo gun.
1. Physically uncouple the couplable axis.
2. Move all the remaining axes individually.
The practical test is passed if it has been possible to move all the re-
maining axes.

3.12.4.2 Start-up mode

Safety
Description
The industrial robot can be set to Start-up mode via the smartHMI user in-
terface. In this mode, the manipulator can be moved in T1 without the ex-
ternal safeguards being put into operation.
The safety interface used affects “Start-up” mode:
• Discrete safety interface
Start-up mode is always possible.
• Ethernet safety interface
The robot controller prevents or terminates Start-up mode if a connec-
tion to a higher-level safety system exists or is established.
Effect
When the Start-up mode is activated, all outputs are automatically set to
the state “logic zero”.
If the robot controller has a peripheral contactor (US2), and if the safety
configuration specifies for this to switch in accordance with the motion en-
able, then the same also applies in Start-up mode. This means that if mo-
tion enable is present, the US2 voltage is switched on – even in Start-up
mode.
The maximum number of switching cycles of the peripheral contactors is
175 per day.
Hazards
Possible hazards and risks involved in using Start-up mode:
• A person walks into the manipulator’s danger zone.

• In a hazardous situation, a disabled external EMERGENCY STOP de-
vice is actuated and the manipulator is not shut down.
Additional measures for avoiding risks in Start-up mode:
• Cover disabled EMERGENCY STOP devices or attach a warning sign

indicating that the EMERGENCY STOP device is out of operation.
• If there is no safety fence, other measures must be taken to prevent
persons from entering the manipulator’s danger zone, e.g. use of
warning tape.
Use
Intended use of Start-up mode:

• Start-up in T1 mode when the external safeguards have not yet been
installed or put into operation. The danger zone must be delimited at
least by means of warning tape.
• Fault localization (periphery fault).
• Use of Start-up mode must be minimized as much as possible.
WARNING
Risk of fatal injury due to non-operational external safeguards
Use of Start-up mode disables all external safeguards. Death, severe in-
juries or damage to property may result.
• There must be no persons in the danger zone of the manipulator
while it is in Start-up mode.

Safety
Misuse
Any use or application deviating from the intended use is deemed to be

misuse and is not allowed. It will result in the loss of warranty and liability
claims. KUKA is not liable for any damage resulting from such misuse.
3.12.5 Manual mode
General
Manual mode is the mode for setup work. Setup work is all the tasks that
have to be carried out on the industrial robot to enable automatic opera-
tion. Setup work includes:
• Jog mode
• Teaching
• Programming
• Program verification
The following must be taken into consideration in manual mode:
• New or modified programs must always be tested first in Manual Re-
duced Velocity mode (T1).
• The manipulator, tooling or external axes (optional) must never touch
or project beyond the safety fence.
• Workpieces, tooling and other objects must not become jammed as a
result of the industrial robot motion, nor must they lead to
short-circuits or be liable to fall off.
• All setup work must be carried out, where possible, from outside the
safeguarded area.
Setup work in T1
If it can be avoided, there must be no persons inside the safeguarded

area.
If it is necessary to carry out setup work from inside the safeguarded
area, the following must be taken into consideration in the operating mode
Manual Reduced Velocity (T1):
• If it can be avoided, there must be no more than one person inside
the safeguarded area.
• If it is necessary for there to be several persons inside the safeguar-
ded area, the following must be observed:
‒ Each person must have an enabling device.
‒ All persons must have an unimpeded view of the industrial robot.
‒ Eye-contact between all persons must be possible at all times.
• The operator must be so positioned that he can see into the danger
zone and get out of harm’s way.
• Unexpected motions of the manipulator cannot be ruled out, e.g. in
the event of a fault. For this reason, an appropriate clearance must be
maintained between persons and the manipulator, including the tool.
Guide value: 50 cm.
The minimum clearance may vary depending on local circumstances,
the motion program and other factors. The minimum clearance that is
to apply for the specific application must be decided by the user on
the basis of a risk assessment.

Setup work in T2
If it is necessary to carry out setup work from inside the safeguarded

area, the following must be taken into consideration in the operating mode
Manual High Velocity (T2):
• This mode may only be used if the application requires a test at a ve-
locity higher than that possible in T1 mode.
• Teaching and programming are not permissible in this operating mode.
• Before commencing the test, the operator must ensure that the ena-
bling devices are operational.
• The operator must be positioned outside the danger zone.
• There must be no other persons inside the safeguarded area. It is the
responsibility of the operator to ensure this.
3.12.6 Simulation
Simulation programs do not correspond exactly to reality. Robot programs

created in simulation programs must be tested in the system in Manual
Reduced Velocity mode (T1). It may be necessary to modify the pro-
gram.
3.12.7 Automatic mode
Automatic mode is only permissible in compliance with the following safety

measures:
• All safety equipment and safeguards are present and operational.

• There are no persons in the system or the requirements for collabora-
tive operation in accordance with EN ISO 10218 have been met.
• The defined working procedures are adhered to.
If the manipulator or an external axis (optional) comes to a standstill for
no apparent reason, the danger zone must not be entered until an EMER-
GENCY STOP has been triggered.
3.12.8 Maintenance and repair
After maintenance and repair work, checks must be carried out to ensure
the required safety level. The valid national or regional work safety regula-
tions must be observed for this check. The correct functioning of all safety
functions must also be tested.
The purpose of maintenance and repair work is to ensure that the system
is kept operational or, in the event of a fault, to return the system to an
operational state. Repair work includes troubleshooting in addition to the
actual repair itself.
The following safety measures must be carried out when working on the
industrial robot:
• Carry out work outside the danger zone. If work inside the danger
zone is necessary, the user must define additional safety measures to
ensure the safe protection of personnel.
• Switch off the industrial robot and secure it (e.g. with a padlock) to
prevent it from being switched on again. If it is necessary to carry out
work with the robot controller switched on, the user must define addi-
tional safety measures to ensure the safe protection of personnel.

Safety
• If it is necessary to carry out work with the robot controller switched
on, this may only be done in operating mode T1.
• Label the system with a sign indicating that work is in progress. This
sign must remain in place, even during temporary interruptions to the
work.
• The EMERGENCY STOP devices must remain active. If safety func-
tions or safeguards are deactivated during maintenance or repair work,
they must be reactivated immediately after the work is completed.
DANGER
Danger to life and limb due to live parts
The robot system must be disconnected from the mains power supply
prior to work on live parts. It is not sufficient to trigger an EMERGENCY
STOP or safety stop, because parts remain live. Death or severe inju-
ries may result.
• Before commencing work on live parts, turn off the main switch and
secure it against being switched on again.
If the controller variant in question does not have a main switch
(e.g. KR C5 micro), turn off the device switch then disconnect the
power cable and secure it so it cannot be reconnected.
• Then check to ensure that the system is deenergized.
• Inform the individuals involved that the robot controller is switched
off. (e.g. by affixing a warning sign)
Faulty components must be replaced using new components with the

same article numbers or equivalent components approved by KUKA
Deutschland GmbH for this purpose.
Cleaning and preventive maintenance work is to be carried out in accord-
ance with the operating instructions.
Robot controller
Even when the robot controller is switched off, parts connected to periph-
eral devices may still carry voltage. The external power sources must
therefore be switched off if work is to be carried out on the robot control-
ler.
The ESD regulations must be adhered to when working on components in
the robot controller.
Voltages in excess of 50 V (up to 780 V) can be present in various com-
ponents for several minutes after the robot controller has been switched
off! To prevent life-threatening injuries, no work may be carried out on the
industrial robot in this time.
On robot controllers with transformers, the transformers must be discon-
nected before working on components in the robot controller.
Water and dust must be prevented from entering the robot controller.
Counterbalancing system
Some robot variants are equipped with a hydropneumatic, spring or gas

cylinder counterbalancing system.
• Counterbalancing system classified below category I: Is subject to
the Pressure Equipment Directive but exempt from application of the
Pressure Equipment Directive according to Art. 4, para. 3 and there-
fore not CE marked.
• Counterbalancing system classified as category I or higher: Is
subject to the Pressure Equipment Directive and CE marked as a
component (see rating plate of the counterbalancing system). The

pressure equipment is placed on the market in conjunction with partly

Safety
completed machinery. Conformity is expressed on the declaration of

incorporation according to the Machinery Directive.
The user must comply with the applicable national laws, regulations and
standards pertaining to pressure equipment.
• In Germany, the counterbalancing system is work equipment according
to the German Ordinance on Industrial Safety and Health (BetrSichV).
Inspection intervals in Germany in accordance with the Ordinance on
Industrial Safety and Health, Sections 14 and 15. Inspection by the
user before commissioning at the installation site.
• Inspection intervals in all other countries must be researched and ob-
served. As a rule, however, at least the maintenance intervals speci-
fied by KUKA must be observed. These must not be exceeded.
The following safety measures must be carried out when working on the
counterbalancing system:
• The assemblies supported by the counterbalancing systems must be
secured.
• Work on the counterbalancing systems must only be carried out by
qualified personnel.
Hazardous substances
The following safety measures must be carried out when handling hazard-
ous substances:
• Avoid prolonged and repeated intensive contact with the skin.
• Avoid breathing in oil spray or vapors.
• Clean skin and apply skin cream.
Use current safety data sheets

Knowledge of the safety data sheets of the substances and mixtures
used is a prerequisite for the safe use of KUKA products. Death,
injuries or damage to property may otherwise result.
• Request up-to-date safety data sheets from the manufacturers of
hazardous substances regularly.
3.12.9 Decommissioning, storage and disposal
The industrial robot must be decommissioned, stored and disposed of in

accordance with the applicable national laws, regulations and standards.
3.12.10 Safety measures for single point of control
Overview
If certain components are used on the industrial robot, safety measures

must be taken to ensure complete implementation of the principle of “sin-
gle point of control” (SPOC).
The relevant components are:
• Submit interpreter
• PLC
• OPC server
• Remote control tools
• Tools for configuration of bus systems with online functionality

Safety
• KUKA.RobotSensorInterface
• KUKA.DeviceConnector
(not KUKA.DeviceConnector pre-installed)
Since only the system integrator knows the safe states of actuators in the
periphery of the robot controller, it is his task to set these actuators to a
safe state, e.g. in the event of an EMERGENCY STOP.
Further safety measures for Single Point of Control
Depending on the specific application, further safety measures may be
required to ensure complete implementation of the principle of “single
point of control”. Failure to take this precaution into consideration may
result in death, injuries or damage to property.
• Check whether further safety measures are required; if so, imple-
ment them.
T1, T2
In modes T1 and T2, the components referred to above may only access
the industrial robot if the following signals have the following states:
Signal State required for SPOC
$USER_SAF TRUE
$SPOC_MOTION_ENABLE TRUE
Submit interpreter, PLC
If motions, (e.g. drives or grippers) are controlled with the submit interpret-
er or the PLC via the I/O system, and if they are not safeguarded by oth-
er means, then this control will take effect even in T1 and T2 modes or
while an EMERGENCY STOP is active.
If variables that affect the robot motion (e.g. override) are modified with
the submit interpreter or the PLC, this takes effect even in T1 and T2
modes or while an EMERGENCY STOP is active.
• In T1 and T2, the system variable $OV_PRO must not be written to
by the submit interpreter or the PLC.
OPC server, KUKA.DeviceConnector, remote control tools
These components can be used with write access to modify programs,

outputs or other parameters of the robot controller, without this being no-
ticed by any persons located inside the system.
Safety measure:
If these components are used, outputs that could cause a hazard must be
determined in a risk assessment. These outputs must be designed in such
a way that they cannot be set without being enabled. This can be done
using an external enabling device, for example.
Tools for configuration of bus systems
If these components have an online functionality, they can be used with

write access to modify programs, outputs or other parameters of the robot
controller, without this being noticed by any persons located inside the
system.
• WorkVisual from KUKA
• Tools from other manufacturers
Safety measure:

In the test modes, programs, outputs or other parameters of the robot

Safety
controller must not be modified using these components.

Technical data
4 Technical data
4.1 Service life
The maximum permissible service life of safety-relevant hardware compo-

nents is 20 years. Once this time has been reached, the safety-relevant
hardware components must be exchanged.
4.2 Reference switch
Basic data
Designation Values
Ambient temperature -25 °C … +70 °C
Switching function Break contact
DC operating voltage or HIGH level in the case 24 V
of pulsed operating voltage of the reference
switch
Permissible range for the DC operating voltage 20 … 33 V
or HIGH level UB(HIGH) for pulsed voltage
LOW level UB(LOW) for pulsed voltage 0 … 5 V
Required pulse duty factor T(HIGH):T(LOW) for Min. 4:1
pulsed voltage
Supported pulse duration T(LOW) for pulsed 0.1 … 20 ms
voltage
Protection rating IP67
Operating current (power consumption) without 5 mA
load
Permissible load current max. 250 mA
Permissible switching frequency max. 500 Hz
Permissible switching distance at the proximity 0 … 4 mm
switch surfaces
Short circuit and overload protection, pulsed Yes
Outputs • PNP
• LOW-active
• Dual-channel
LED function indicator Yes
Hysteresis when installed 0.2 … 1 mm
EMC conformity IEC 60947-5-2

Technical data KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
Pulse duty factor
Fig. 4-1: Pulse duty factor for pulsed voltage
Hole pattern
Fig. 4-2: Hole pattern, reference switch
1 Holes for fastening (2x Ø6.6 mm)

2 Holes for roll pins (2x Ø4 mm)

Technical data
4.3 Reference cable XG42 - XS Ref
Fig. 4-3: Connector pin allocation for reference cable XG42 - XS Ref
Fig. 4-4: Wiring diagram for reference cable XG42 - XS Ref

4.4 Circuit diagram of reference switch XS Ref
Fig. 4-5: Circuit digram of reference switch XS Ref
1 Switching element, channel A 2 Switching element, channel B

Technical data
4.5 Hole pattern for actuating plate
Actuating plate, straight
Fig. 4-6: Hole pattern for actuating plate, straight
1 Thread for fastening (2x M6)

2 Holes for fastening (2x Ø9 mm)

Actuating plate, angled
Fig. 4-7: Hole pattern for actuating plate, angled
1 Hole for fastening

Installation
5 Installation
The option package can either be installed on the robot controller via the
smartHMI or via WorkVisual.
5.1 System requirements
Hardware
• KR C5 robot controller
Software
Robot controller:
• KUKA System Software 8.7
• If the Ethernet safety interface EtherNet IP/CIP Safety is used:
‒ KUKA.EtherNet/IP M/S 5.1
• If the Ethernet safety interface PROFINET/PROFIsafe is used:
‒ KUKA.PROFINET M/S 6.0
Laptop/PC:
• WorkVisual 6.0
Compatibility
KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6 must not be installed on a robot controller to-

gether with the following safety options:
• KUKA.SafeRangeMonitoring 3.6
• KUKA.SafeVelocityMonitoring 3.6
• KUKA.SafeSingleBrake 3.6
5.2 Installing via WorkVisual
5.2.1 Installing or updating KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
Description
The option package is installed in WorkVisual and added to the project.

During project deployment, the option package is automatically installed
on the robot controller.
In the case of an update, the existing configuration is automatically
adopted. If this is not desired, the existing version must first be uninstal-
led.
It is advisable to archive all relevant data before updating a software

package.
Precondition
• User group “Expert” or higher

• T1 or T2 mode
• No program is selected.
• Network connection between PC and robot controller
• The option package is available as a KOP file.

Installation KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
Procedure
1. Install the KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6 option package in WorkVisual.

2. Load the active project from the robot controller.
3. Insert the KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6 option package into the project.
4. Configure the option package in WorkVisual as required.
(>>> 7.6 "Editing the local safety configuration in WorkVisual"
Page 131)
5. Deploy the project from WorkVisual to the robot controller and activate
it.
6. The request for confirmation Do you want to activate the project […]?
is displayed on the smartHMI. The active project is overwritten during
activation. If no relevant project will be overwritten: Answer the query
with Yes.
7. An overview with the changes and a request for confirmation are dis-
played on the smartHMI. Answer this with Yes.
The option package is installed and the message Reconfiguration in
progress ... is displayed. When the message disappears, reconfigura-
tion is completed.
Information about procedures in WorkVisual is contained in the

KUKA.WorkVisual documentation.
LOG file
A LOG file is created under C:\KRC\ROBOTER\LOG.
5.2.2 Uninstalling KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
Description
The option package can be uninstalled via WorkVisual.

It is advisable to archive all relevant data before uninstalling a software
package.
Preparation
• Deactivate safe monitoring.

If the safe monitoring is not deactivated on the robot controller, the config-
ured safety monitoring functions will remain active after the software has
been uninstalled.
Safe monitoring can only be deactivated by the user group “Safety main-
tenance” or higher.
(>>> 7.14 "Deactivating safe monitoring" Page 192)
Precondition
• User group “Expert” or higher

• T1 or T2 mode
• Safe monitoring has been deactivated.
• Network connection between PC and robot controller
Procedure
1. Load the project from the robot controller.

Installation
2. Remove the KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6 option package from the project.
A window with modifications is displayed.
3. Deploy the project from WorkVisual to the robot controller and activate
it.
with Yes.
The option package is uninstalled and the message Reconfiguration in
tion is completed.
Information about procedures in WorkVisual is contained in the

KUKA.WorkVisual documentation.
LOG file
5.3 Installing via smartHMI
5.3.1 Installing or updating KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
It is advisable to archive all relevant data before updating a software

package.
In the case of an update, the existing configuration is automatically

adopted. If this is not desired, the existing version must first be uninstal-
led.
Precondition
• User rights: Function group General configuration

But at least the user group “Expert”
• T1 or T2 mode
• USB stick with the option package (KOP file)
NOTICE
Data loss due to USB sticks from third-party manufacturers
Data may be lost if USB sticks from manufacturers other than KUKA
are used for activities on the robot controller.
• For activities on the robot controller requiring a USB stick, use a
KUKA stick.
The KUKA sticks are validated for use with the robot controller.
Procedure
1. Connect the USB stick to the robot controller or smartPAD.

2. In the main menu, select Start-up > Additional software.
3. Press New software: The entry KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6 must be dis-
played in the Name column and drive E:\ or K:\ in the Path column.
If not, press Refresh.

4. If the specified entries are now displayed, continue with step 5.

Otherwise, the path from which the software is to be installed must be
configured first:
a. Press the Configure button.
b. Select a line in the Installation paths for options area.
Note: If the line already contains a path, this path will be overwrit-
ten.
c. Press Path selection. The available drives are displayed.
d. If the stick is connected to the robot controller: Select E:\.
If the stick is connected to the smartPAD: K:\ instead of E:\
e. Press Save. The Installation paths for options area is displayed
again. It now contains the new path.
f. Mark the line with the new path and press Save again.
5. Activate the check mark at KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6 and press Install.
Confirm the installation query with OK.
with Yes.
tion is completed.
8. Remove the stick.
LOG file
5.3.2 Uninstalling KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
It is advisable to archive all relevant data before uninstalling a software

package.
Preparation
• Deactivate safe monitoring.

If the safe monitoring is not deactivated on the robot controller, the config-
ured safety monitoring functions will remain active after the software has
been uninstalled.
Safe monitoring can only be deactivated by the user group “Safety main-
tenance” or higher.
(>>> 7.14 "Deactivating safe monitoring" Page 192)
Precondition
• User rights: Function group General configuration

• T1 or T2 mode
• Safe monitoring has been deactivated.
Procedure
1. In the main menu, select Start-up > Additional software.

Installation
2. Activate the check mark at KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6 and press Unin-
stall. Answer the request for confirmation with Yes.
with Yes.
tion is completed.
LOG file


Operation
6 Operation
6.1 User groups
Description
The configuration of the safety functions of the System Software and the
installed safety option is assigned to defined user groups. Access cannot
be influenced via function groups.
The user rights of the safety recovery technician are restricted by the in-
stallation of a safety option.
• Safety recovery technician
The safety recovery technician can activate an existing safety configu-
ration of the robot using the corresponding activation code. He cannot
edit or modify the safety configuration.
• Safety maintenance technician
Like the administrator, the safety maintenance technician can perform
all functions including those of the safety systems. He can edit and
modify the safety configuration.
The safety maintenance technician must be specially trained in the
safety configuration.
• Administrator
Like the safety maintenance technician, the administrator can perform
all functions including those of the safety systems. He can edit and
modify the safety configuration.
The administrator must be specially trained in the safety configuration
if he wishes to edit and modify the safety configuration.
Additionally, in the rights management, the administrator can modify
which rights a user group has.
Safety configuration by qualified personnel only

The safety configuration may only be edited and modified by specially
trained personnel. Death, severe injuries or damage to property may
otherwise result.
We recommend training courses at KUKA College for training personnel.

Information about the training program can be found at www.kuka.com
or can be obtained directly from our subsidiaries.
Passwords
The user groups are protected by means of a password. The default

password for all groups is “kuka”.
Changing the default passwords before start-up
If the passwords are not changed, this enables unauthorized persons to
log on. In particular, the change of password must ensure that only au-
thorized and trained persons can modify the safety configuration.
• Before start-up, change the passwords for the user groups.
• Only communicate the passwords to authorized personnel.

Operation KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
6.2 Displaying user rights
Description
If tasks belonging to the standard functions of the system software are as-
signed to a function group, this is specified. In the case of tasks that are
not assigned to any function group, the permanently assigned, minimum
required user group is specified.
In the rights management, the user can view what user group is currently
assigned to what function group, i.e. the minimum user group required to
execute a function from a function group.
Procedure
1. In the main menu, select Start-up > Rights management.

The Rights management window opens.
2. Select the Function groups tab.
6.3 Opening the safety configuration
Description
On opening, the safety configuration checks whether there are any rele-
vant deviations between the data in the robot controller and those in the
safety controller.
• If there are no deviations, the safety configuration opens directly.
• If there are deviations, the troubleshooting wizard is opened. A de-
scription of the problem and a list of possible causes is displayed. The
user can select the applicable cause. The wizard then suggests a sol-
ution.
Further information about checking the safety configuration is contained

in the Operating and Programming Instructions for System Integrators.
Procedure
1. In the main menu, select Configuration > Safety configuration.

2. Only for the “Administrator” user group: Confirm the safety message
with OK.
6.4 Overview of buttons
The following buttons are available:

Button Description
Reset all to defaults Resets all parameters of the safety configuration to the de-
fault values.
Reset changes Resets all changes since the last time the configuration was
saved.
Revision log The log of changes to the safety configuration is displayed.
View The safety-relevant machine data are displayed.
Properties The properties of a monitoring space or safety-oriented tool
can be defined.
Export Parts of the safety configuration can be exported into an XML
file (XML export).

Operation
Button Description
Import Parts of the safety configuration can be imported as an XML
file (XML export).
Communication parameters The safety ID of the PROFINET device can be changed.
Note: Further information is contained in the Operating and
Programming Instructions for System Integrators.
Global parameters The global parameters of the safety configuration can be de-
fined.
Hardware options The hardware settings can be defined.
Note: Further information is contained in the Operating and
Programming Instructions for System Integrators.
Check machine data It is possible to check whether the machine data of the safety
configuration are up to date.
Safe operational stop The safe operational stop can be defined.
Save Saves and activates the safety configuration for the robot.
Touch-up Saves the current robot position as a corner of a cell area.
OR
Saves the current axis angle as the lower limit or upper limit
of the axis-specific monitoring space.
Touch-up reference position Saves the current robot flange position or the position of the
for group axes of a reference group as a reference position.
Cell configuration The cell area can be defined.
Back Back to the tab
6.5 Displaying information about the safety configuration
Procedure
• In the main menu, select Configuration > Safety configuration.
Description
The Common tab contains the following information:

Parameter Description
Robot Serial number of the robot
Safety controller • Installed safety option version
• Safety controller version (internal)
Parameter data set • Activation code of the safety configuration
• Time stamp of the safety configuration (date and time last
saved)
• Safety configuration version
Machine data Time stamp of the safety-relevant machine data (date and
time last saved)
Brake test State of the brake test
• Deactivated: No axis is tested.

• Activated: One or more axes are tested.

Current configuration • Name of the safety interface
• State of Cartesian monitoring (= velocity monitoring in T1)
‒ Activated, Deactivated
• State of safe monitoring
‒ Activated, Deactivated
• Number of velocity-monitored axes
• Number of monitoring spaces
• Number of protected spaces
• Number of safety-oriented tools
6.6 Displaying the revision log
Description
Every modification to the safety configuration and every saving operation

are automatically logged. The log can be displayed on the smartHMI.
Procedure

2. On the Common tab, press Revision log.
6.7 Displaying machine data
Description
The safety-relevant machine data can be displayed on the smartHMI.
Procedure

2. On the Common tab, press View.
6.8 Importing the safety configuration (XML import)
Description
Parts of the safety configuration can be imported as an XML file. The im-
portable parameters depend on the installed safety option:
SafeRange SafeVelocity SafeSingle
SafeOperation
Monitoring Monitoring Brake
Cell configuration
Cartesian monitoring
spaces
Axis-specific monitoring
spaces
Tools*
Global parameters

Operation
SafeRange SafeVelocity SafeSingle
SafeOperation
Monitoring Monitoring Brake
* If KUKA.SafeVelocityMonitoring is installed, only tool 1 is available.
The safety-oriented TCP of the tool can be configured.
In order to generate an XML file for importing, the user has the following
options:
• Export the current safety configuration of the robot controller to an
XML file and edit it. In this way it is possible to ensure that the format
of the XML file is correct for a subsequent import.
(>>> 6.9 "Exporting the safety configuration (XML export)" Page 87)
• Generate the XML file on the basis of the XML schema C:\KRC
\SmartHMI\Schemes\SafetyConfigImport.xsd, e.g. using a script pro-
grammed by the user.
The following points must be observed when editing the XML files:
• The XML schema defines the structure of the XML file for the import.
For individual parameters, the XML schema allows higher values than
the installed version of the safety option.
• The XML file to be imported should only contain parameters and val-
ues which are supported by the current safety option. If this is not the
case, it can prevent the XML import from occurring.
It is also possible to import safety configurations in WorkVisual. Further

information about the XML import can be found in the WorkVisual docu-
mentation.
The SCG format can be used for the complete import of the safety con-
figuration. Further information about the SCG import can be found in the
WorkVisual documentation.
Precondition
• Safety option is installed.

• User group “Safety maintenance” or higher
• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure

The Safety configuration window opens.
2. Press Import. The available drives are displayed.
3. Navigate to the directory where the XML file to be imported is located.
4. Select the XML file and press Next.
The parameters configured in the XML file are compared with the cur-
rent parameters of the safety configuration.
5. If notification, warning or error messages occur, these are displayed in
the Safety configuration window.
To continue with the XML import, press Next.
The Next button is deactivated in the event of error messages. Ana-
lyze errors and cancel the XML import.
• Rectify the error in the XML file and repeat the XML import.
• OR: Select the correct XML file and repeat the XML import.
6. A tree view provides an overview of the parameters to be imported.

(>>> "Parameter display" Page 86)

Operation
By default, only those nodes which contain changes to the current

safety configuration are expanded in the tree view. The parameters
which are changed by the XML import are displayed in blue text.
7. Check the parameters.
If not all of the required safety functions are configured correctly, or if
the wrong XML file was selected, cancel the XML import.
• Rectify the error in the XML file and repeat the XML import.
• OR: Select the correct XML file and repeat the XML import.
8. Press Import. The safety configuration is imported.
9. Save safety configuration.
(>>> 7.5.11 "Saving the safety configuration" Page 131)
10. If plausibility errors are detected while saving, the user is informed of
this by a dialog. Close the dialog with OK.
11. Rectify errors directly in the safety configuration and save the safety
configuration.
OR
Rectify the error in the XML file, repeat the XML import and save the
Following a change to the safety configuration, safety acceptance must

be carried out and documented by means of checklists.
Parameter display
The display with the overview of the parameters to be imported has the
following columns:
Column Description
Parameter name Name of the parameter in the Safety configu-
ration window
Result Value of the parameter following import of the
safety configuration
Current Value of the parameter in the current safety
configuration
Imported Value of the parameter in the XML file to be
imported
The column is hidden when the display opens.
The following buttons are available for changing the display:
Button Description
Display import col- Displays or hides the Imported column.
umn
Check box active: Column is displayed.
Check box not active: Column is hidden.
Collapse all All nodes in the tree view are collapsed.
Expand all All nodes in the tree view are expanded.
Expand changes Only those nodes which contain changes to the
current safety configuration are expanded in
the tree view.

Operation
6.9 Exporting the safety configuration (XML export)
Description
Parts of the safety configuration can be exported into an XML file:

• Cell configuration
• Monitoring spaces
• Tools
• Global parameters
The XML file always contains all the parameters which are contained in
the exported parts of the safety configuration.
Exporting is always possible, irrespective of whether a safety option is in-
stalled or not. However, an export only makes sense if a safety option is
installed.
The current safety configuration of the robot controller is exported. If the
safety configuration contains unsaved changes, these are also exported.
If invalid values are entered in the safety configuration, the export is abor-
ted with an error message (plausibility error).
It is also possible to export safety configurations in WorkVisual. Further
information about the XML export can be found in the WorkVisual docu-
mentation.
The SCG format can be used for the complete export of the safety con-
figuration. Further information about the SCG export can be found in the
WorkVisual documentation.
Procedure

2. Press Export. The available drives are displayed.
3. Select the desired file path and press Export.
The safety configuration is saved in an XML file. The file name is gen-
erated automatically.
6.10 Safe robot retraction in case of space violation
Description
If the robot has violated a monitoring space, it is stopped by the safety

controller (precondition: function Stop at boundaries is active). The robot
must be moved out of the violated space in T1 mode.
After a “Stop at boundaries”, the robot can only be moved in T1 mode.
No other operating mode can be set until the robot has left the violated
space.
If the space is violated in T2 or Automatic mode, only a status message

is displayed. The status message indicates which space has been viola-
ted.
If the space is violated in T1 mode, the acknowledgement message Ackn.:
Stop because workspace exceeded is additionally displayed.
Precondition
• Operating mode T1

Procedure
1. When the acknowledgement message is displayed, confirm it with OK.

2. Press and hold down the enabling switch.
3. Move the robot out of the violated space:
• Using the jog keys (manual mode)
• Using the Start and Start backwards keys (program mode)
The status message is cleared when the robot has left the violated space.

Start-up and configuration

7 Start-up and configuration
7.1 System safety instructions
During system planning, the safety functions must be planned. Required

safety functions that are not implemented with the SafeOperation safety
option must be implemented using different safety measures.
Including stopping distances in the risk assessment

The stopping distance when a safety function is triggered varies accord-
ing to the specific robot type. Failure to take this into consideration
when parameterizing the safety functions may result in death, severe in-
• The system integrator must include the stopping distances in the
risk assessment and parameterize the safety functions accordingly.
Further information about the stopping distances and stopping times can
be found in the assembly instructions of the relevant robot.
WARNING
Serious system errors, severe damage to the robot and injury or death
can result from not carrying out the risk analysis. Risk analysis must be
carried out before start-up and after any safety-relevant modification.
• Define axes that must be tested in the brake test.
• Determine brake test cycle time.
• Determine axis-specific and Cartesian limit values for the reduced
velocity.
• Define axis-specific and Cartesian monitoring spaces.
• Define axes that must be configured for a safe operational stop.
WARNING
Incorrect configuration of the safe monitoring functions may result in
death or severe injuries and major damage to property. Consequently,
safety options may not be operated until after safety acceptance has
been carried out in accordance with the checklists.
The checklists must be completed fully and confirmed in writing.
(>>> 11.1 "Checklists for safety acceptance" Page 269)
WARNING
If safe monitoring is deactivated, the configured safety monitoring func-
tions are inactive.
WARNING
Serious injury and severe damage to the robot can be caused by
changing the machine data. Modifying the machine data may deactivate
monitoring functions. Machine data may only be modified by authorized
personnel.

Start-up and configuration KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
7.2 Jogging the robot without a higher-level safety controller
Description
To jog the robot without a higher-level safety controller, Start-up mode

must first be activated. The robot can then be jogged in T1 mode.
Start-up mode has the following effect on the safety configuration:
• Tool 1 is always active in Start-up mode.
• In Start-up mode, all safety monitoring functions that can be activated
via safety-oriented inputs are deactivated.
(>>> 8.1.1 "KUKA.SafeOperation via Ethernet safety interface"
Page 197)
• The following safety monitoring functions remain active in Start-up
mode:
‒ Monitoring of the cell area
‒ Monitoring of global maximum Cartesian velocity
‒ Monitoring of global maximum axis velocity
‒ Workspace monitoring functions that are configured as always ac-
tive
‒ Monitoring of the workspace-specific velocity in workspaces that
are configured as always active
‒ Velocity monitoring in T1
Observe the safety instructions relating to Start-up mode.

External safeguards are disabled in Start-up mode.
• The safety instructions relating to Start-up mode must be observed.
(>>> 3.12.4.2 "Start-up mode" Page 62)
Precondition
• User rights: Function group Start-up mode

• If an Ethernet safety interface is used: No connection to a higher-level
safety controller
• T1 mode
Procedure
• In the main menu, select Start-up > Service > Start-up mode.
Menu Description
Start-up mode is active. Touching
the menu item deactivates the
mode.
Start-up mode is not active. Touch-
ing the menu item activates the
mode.


7.3 Overview: start-up and configuration
Step Description
1 Set up brake test.
(>>> 7.8 "Brake test" Page 149)
2 If a reference switch is being used for the mastering test:
1. Select reference position.

(>>> 7.7.1.2 "Selecting a reference position" Page 135)
2. Install reference switch and actuating plate.
(>>> 7.7.1.3 "Installing the reference switch and actuat-
ing plate" Page 137)
3. Connect reference switch.
(>>> 7.7.1.4 "Connecting the reference switch"
Page 138)
3 If a safety PLC is being used:
• Configure the communication via the interface to the

higher-level controller.
(>>> 8 "Interfaces to the higher-level controller" Page 193)
4 Master the robot.
Note: Further information about mastering is contained in
the operating and programming instructions for the System
Software.
5 Activate safe monitoring.
(>>> 7.5.1 "Activating safe monitoring" Page 97)
6 Configure global parameters:
• Mastering type
• Mastering test input
• Cartesian velocity monitoring functions
(>>> 7.5.2 "Configuring global parameters" Page 97)
7 Configure monitoring spaces.
(>>> 7.5.4 "Configuring a cell area" Page 105)
(>>> 7.5.5 "Configuring a Cartesian monitoring space"
Page 107)
(>>> 7.5.6 "Configuring an axis-specific monitoring space"
Page 111)
8 Configure axis monitoring.
(>>> 7.5.7 "Configuring axis-specific velocity monitoring
functions and braking time" Page 115)
(>>> 7.5.8 "Configuring safe operational stop for axis
groups" Page 122)
9 Configure safety-oriented tools.
(>>> 7.5.3 "Configuring a safety-oriented tool" Page 101)

Step Description
• Program a mastering test.

(>>> 7.7.1.6 "Teaching positions for the mastering test"
Page 140)
• Configure the reference position and reference groups.

(>>> 7.5.10 "Configuring the reference position and refer-
ence group" Page 128)
(>>> 7.7.1.5 "Configuring the reference groups to be
checked in file" Page 139)
12 If a reference switch is being used for the mastering test
and the reference switch is actuated by a ferromagnetic
part of the tool, or following a tool change or replacement:
• Check the correctness of the reference position.

(>>> 7.7.1.7 "Checking the reference position (actuation
with tool)" Page 142)
13 Save safety configuration.
(>>> 7.5.11 "Saving the safety configuration" Page 131)
14 Perform mastering test.
(>>> 7.7.1.8 "Performing a mastering test manually"
Page 143)
15 Carry out safety acceptance.
(>>> 7.10 "Safety acceptance overview" Page 177)
(>>> 7.11 "Checking the safety functions for correct opera-
tion" Page 178)
(>>> 7.12 "Checking the values for the safe axis monitoring
functions" Page 190)
16 If a new safety configuration is activated:
• Compare the activation code displayed when the safety

configuration is archived with the activation code docu-
mented in the checklist for safety functions.
(>>> 7.13 "Activating the safety configuration" Page 191)
7.4 Information about the safety configuration
WARNING
pose any threat.


Minimum sphere radius
The sphere radius must not fall below the predefined minimum value. This
radius is dependent on the global maximum Cartesian velocity.
The minimum sphere radius is calculated as follows:
• rmin [mm] >= 0.5 * (maximum Cartesian velocity [mm/s] * 0.012 s)
The smallest possible radius is 10 mm. A radius smaller than 10 mm can-
not be configured, even if the calculation gives a smaller value.
If values that are too small are configured, a message is displayed when
saving and the configuration is prevented from being saved.
Minimum protected space dimensions
The length, width and height of a protected space must not fall below the
predefined minimum value. This value depends on the global maximum
Cartesian velocity and the radius of the smallest sphere of the safety-ori-
ented tool.
The minimum space dimensions (= minimum length, width and height) are
calculated as follows:
• amin [mm] ≥ 0.018 s * maximum Cartesian velocity [mm/s] − 2 *
rsphere [mm]
A precondition for a correct result is that the sphere radius has been con-
figured correctly. (>>> "Minimum sphere radius" Page 93)
The smallest permissible length, width and height is 10 mm. Values small-
er than 10 mm cannot be configured, even if the calculation gives a small-
er value.
If values that are too small are configured, a message is displayed when
saving and the configuration is prevented from being saved.
7.4.1 Safe definition of Cartesian protected spaces
Here, different constellations are covered which can cause a protected

space violation to not be detected:
• Narrow protected spaces
• Motion across corners
Narrow protected spaces
With narrow protected spaces, there is a risk that the robot may be able
to move through the protected space without the space violation being de-
tected. The risk is partially reduced by the specified minimum value for
the sphere radius and space dimensions.
To further reduce the risk, the following rules must be observed in the
configuration of protected spaces:
• An area to be protected must always lie completely within a protected
space, i.e. be enclosed by the protected space.
• Shielding an area to be protected using a narrow protected space
(e.g. by replicating a light curtain) is not permitted.
• The stopping distances of the robot must also be taken into account
when defining a protected space. The protected space must overlap
with the area to be protected on all sides so that the robot can under
no circumstances enter the area to be protected.

Fig. 7-1: Definition of protected space
1 Area to be protected
2 Protected space shields the area to be protected (not allowed)
3 Protected space encloses the entire area to be protected
Motion across corners
If a sphere is moved across the corner of a protected space at a high ve-

locity, there is a risk of the space violation not being detected.
To ensure that a signal is always reliably triggered on violation of an
alarm space, this space must be made large enough to ensure that its full
width, length or height is passed through.
Fig. 7-2: Protected space as an alarm space
1 Target area
2 Sphere moves across corner of protected space (signal not trig-
gered)
3 Protected space is passed through completely (signal reliably trig-
gered)


7.4.2 Safe definition of Cartesian protected spaces for BBRA
Description
When the “Braking before restricted areas” function is used, it must addi-
tionally be taken into account that it is only the start and end points of the
fictitious braking path that are checked and not the entire fictitious braking
path. In the event of an unfavorable combination of protected space con-
figuration and path, this can cause the protected space to be violated by
the actual position without prior detection of an impending violation via the
fictitious STOP 1 - DRS end position.
Example
In this example, the fictitious STOP 1 - DRS end position is situated out-
side the protected space. For this reason, the impending space violation
cannot be detected. The robot is stopped at the space limit due to the
monitoring of the actual position and executes a drive ramp stop in ac-
cordance with the precalculated path. The braking path passes through
the protected space and the robot comes to a standstill again outside the
protected space.
Fig. 7-3: Unfavorable combination of protected space configuration

and path
1 Protected space
2 Tool sphere path at actual position (orange)
3 Tool sphere path at fictitious STOP 1 - DRS end position (blue)

4 Drive ramp stop at space limit; braking path passes through protec-
ted space (green line)
7.4.3 Unexpected protected space violation at space corners
At the corners of a Cartesian protected space, unexpected space viola-

tions can occur even though the tool sphere is clearly outside the space
boundary.
The following figure (>>> Fig. 7-4) depicts the closest path along which a
tool sphere can theoretically move about a Cartesian protected space. It
can be moved along this closest path and reoriented without violating the
protected space.
Fig. 7-4: Path of a tool sphere along the space surface
1 Protected space 3 Tool spheres reoriented

2 Tool spheres
The monitoring responds earlier than expected at the corners because of
the virtually expanded space boundaries. Depending on the radius of the
tool sphere, the protected space is expanded virtually on all sides (X, Y,
Z) by precisely this radius.
In the figure (>>> Fig. 7-5), a simplified depiction is used. Only the space
expansion in the directions X and Y is shown.
As long as the tool sphere infringes the expanded space boundaries in
only one direction, the protected space is not violated. If, however, the ex-
panded protected space is infringed in 2 planes simultaneously, this is
evaluated as a space violation.


Fig. 7-5: Protected space violation at space corners
1 Protected space
2 Protected space expanded by the radius of the tool sphere
3 Space violation in the X direction
4 Space violation in the Y direction
7.5 Configuring safety monitoring functions
7.5.1 Activating safe monitoring
Configuration of the safety monitoring functions is only possible if safe

monitoring has been activated.
Precondition
• User group Safety Maintenance Technician or higher

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure
1. Open the safety configuration.

2. Press Global parameters.
3. Set the check mark at Safe monitoring.
4. Save the safety configuration or continue configuration.
7.5.2 Configuring global parameters
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
• Safety configuration is open.
• Safe monitoring is active.

Procedure
• Press Global parameters and set parameters.

1. If the mastering test is to be performed via an external system, se-
lect the mastering type External confirmation.
2. A safety notification is displayed. Confirm with OK.
The external mastering confirmation is activated and the Refer-
ence position tab is deactivated.
Once the external mastering confirmation has been activated, responsi-

bility for confirmation of the mastering lies outside the robot controller.
The safety maintenance technician must ensure that the mastering test
on the external system is correctly executed and confirmed.
Parameters
Fig. 7-6: Global parameters


Safe monitoring Check box active: Safe monitoring is activated.
Check box not active: Safe monitoring is not
activated.
Default: Safe monitoring not activated.
Mastering type Reference switch = mastering test is carried
out via KUKA reference switch.
External confirmation = mastering test is per-
formed via external system and with external
mastering confirmation.
Default: Reference switch
Mastering test input Mastering type Reference switch:
at cabinet = reference switch is connected via
interface XG42.
via bus interface = reference switch is con-
nected via Ethernet safety interface.
Default: at cabinet
Mastering type External confirmation:
at cabinet = mastering is confirmed via inter-
face XG42.
via bus interface = mastering is confirmed via
Ethernet safety interface.
Default: at cabinet
Maximum Cartesian Limit value for global maximum Cartesian ve-
velocity locity (not space-dependent)
• 0.5 … 30,000 mm/s

Default: 10,000 mm/s
Reduced Cartesian Limit value for safely reduced Cartesian veloci-
velocity ty
• 0.5 … 30,000 mm/s

Reduced Cartesian Limit value for safely reduced Cartesian veloci-
velocity T1 ty in T1 mode
• 0.5 … 250 mm/s

Default: 250 mm/s
Cartesian monitoring This parameter is always present, irrespective
of whether a safety option is used or not.
Default: active
(>>> 7.5.2.1 "Switching safe Cartesian monitor-
ing on/off" Page 99)
7.5.2.1 Switching safe Cartesian monitoring on/off
Description
Safe Cartesian monitoring refers to both KUKA kinematic systems as well

as customer kinematic systems (CKs).

As a rule, the settings for safe Cartesian monitoring must not be changed
on the controller. The reason is that WorkVisual projects almost always

have only one possible setting: either active or inactive. They can only be
transferred to the robot controller if the setting is correct.
The setting for safe Cartesian monitoring can, however, be changed on
the robot controller in the following cases:
• If simulated axes are used, active monitoring can be deactivated.
This is the only case in which the user can decide whether to operate
the kinematic system with or without monitoring.
• If the robot controller indicates via a message that monitoring is not
possible.
If simulated axes are used and monitoring is active in WorkVisual, it
can only first be determined during the test on the robot controller
whether the kinematic system can be moved. (It is not possible to de-
termine this before in WorkVisual.) If the kinematic system cannot be
moved, a message is generated which indicates that Cartesian moni-
toring is not possible.
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to missing risk assessment
To operate a kinematic system for which safe Cartesian monitoring is
not possible, this monitoring can be deactivated. Failure to identify risks
that may result from the deactivation may result in death or severe inju-
ries.
• Before deactivating the safe Cartesian monitoring, perform a risk as-
sessment.
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure

2. On the Common tab, press Global parameters.
3. Remove the check mark at Cartesian monitoring: and press Save.
4. Answer the request for confirmation with Yes. The controller is recon-
figured.
5. Once the reconfiguration has been completed, the following message
is displayed: The changes were saved successfully.
Confirm the message with OK.
The Cartesian monitoring: check box refers to all Cartesian safety

functions, including safe Cartesian monitoring in T1 mode. The check
box is always present, irrespective of whether a safety option is used or
not.
There is always a basic, non-safe limitation of the speed in T1 mode to
<= 250 mm/s as well as a safe monitoring of the axis-specific speed.
They are not influenced by the setting Cartesian monitoring:.


7.5.3 Configuring a safety-oriented tool
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure
1. Select the Tools tab and select a tool from the list.
The parameters of the safety-oriented tool are displayed.
2. Activate safety-oriented tool. To do so, set the check mark at Activa-
tion.
3. Enter a name for the tool (max. 24 characters).
4. Define the safety-oriented TCP of the tool.
5. Press Properties.
The Properties of {0} window opens.
6. Press the “plus” key of the external axis to configure a tool sphere.
The parameters of the sphere are displayed.
7. Monitoring of the first sphere of the first tool to be configured is activa-
ted as standard. Activate monitoring for all other spheres and tools. To
do so, set the check mark at Monitoring.
8. Enter the coordinates of the center of the sphere and the radius of the
sphere.
9. Repeat steps 6 to 8 to define additional spheres for the
safety-oriented tool.

Parameters
Fig. 7-7: Tool and TCP


Activation Activation of the safety-oriented tool
Check box active: Safety-oriented tool is activa-
ted.
Check box not active: Safety-oriented tool is
not activated.
Default tool 1: Activated
Default tool 2 … 16: Not activated
Note: If discrete safety interface XG13 or none
of the safety interfaces specified in the product
description is used, tool 1 is always active. The
tool cannot be activated via a safety-oriented
input. An automated, safely monitored tool
change is thus not possible.
(>>> 2.3 "Safety interfaces" Page 15)
TCP X, Y, Z X, Y and Z coordinates of the safety-oriented
TCP for velocity monitoring
• -10 000 mm … +10 000 mm

Default: 0 mm

Properties
Fig. 7-8: Tool properties
The following buttons are available:

Button Description
Plus key
Adds a tool sphere and displays its parameters.
Delete key
Deletes the selected tool sphere.
Monitoring Check box active: Sphere is monitored.
Check box not active: Sphere is not monitored.
X, Y, Z X, Y and Z coordinates of the sphere center
point relative to the FLANGE coordinate system
• -10,000 mm … +10,000 mm
Default: 0 mm


Radius Radius of the sphere on the safety-oriented
tool
• 0 … 10,000 mm
Default: 250 mm
The sphere radius must not fall below the pre-
defined minimum value. This radius is depend-
ent on the global maximum Cartesian velocity.
(>>> "Minimum sphere radius" Page 93)
7.5.4 Configuring a cell area
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure
1. Select the Monitoring spaces tab and press Cell configuration.

The Cell configuration window opens.
2. Enter the upper and lower bounds of the cell area.
3. Select a corner from the list.
The parameters of the corner are displayed.
4. Activate the corner of the cell area if necessary. Set the check mark
for the corner to do so.
Corners 1 to 4 are activated as standard.
5. Move the robot to one corner of the cell area.

6. Press Touch-up. The X and Y coordinates of the corner are saved.
The taught point refers to $WORLD and the tool $TOOL that is be-
ing used.
7. Repeat steps 3 to 6 to define further corners.

There must be at least 3 corners activated.

Parameters
Fig. 7-9: Cell area configuration
Reference system Reference coordinate system
• $WORLD
Z min Lower limit of the cell area
• -100,000 mm … +100,000 mm
Default: -30,000 mm
Z max Upper limit of the cell area
• -100,000 mm … +100,000 mm
Default: 30,000 mm


Activated Check box active: Corner of cell area is activa-
ted.
(corner)
Check box not active: Corner of cell area is not
activated.
Default corner 1 to 4: Activated
Default corner 5 to 10: Not activated
X, Y X, Y coordinate of corner 1 to 10 relative to the
WORLD coordinate system
(corner)
• -100,000 mm … +100,000 mm
Default corner 1 or 4: +100,000 mm
Default corner 2 or 3: -100,000 mm
Default corner 5 to 10: 0 mm
7.5.5 Configuring a Cartesian monitoring space
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure
1. Select the Monitoring spaces tab and select the monitoring space
from the list.
The parameters of the monitoring space are displayed.
2. Enter the name of the monitoring space (max. 24 characters).
3. Select the space type Cartesian space and set the parameters of the
monitoring space.
The Cartesian properties of {0} window is opened.
5. Select the reference coordinate system and enter Cartesian positions.
Parameters
Fig. 7-10: Cartesian space

Type Type of monitoring space
Workspace = The safety-oriented tool must
move within the configured limits of the moni-
toring space. (Space violation if the safety-ori-
ented tool leaves the monitoring space.)
Protected space = The safety-oriented tool
must move outside the configured limits of the
monitoring space. (Space violation if the safety-
oriented tool enters the monitoring space.)
Default: Workspace
Activation Activating the monitoring space
always off = monitoring space is not active.
always active = monitoring space is always
active.
by input = monitoring space is activated by a
safety-oriented input.
Note: If safety interface XG13 is used, safety-
oriented inputs are only available for monitoring
spaces 12 … 16.
(>>> 8.2 "KUKA.SafeOperation via inter-
face XG13" Page 205)
Note: If none of the safety interfaces specified
in the product description is used, the monitor-
ing spaces cannot be activated via an input
(only static spaces possible).
Default: always off
Space type Type of monitoring space
Cartesian space = Cartesian monitoring space
Axis space = axis-specific monitoring space
Default: Cartesian space
Stop at boundaries A stop is triggered if the space is violated.
Check box active: Robot stops if the monitoring
space limits are exceeded.
Check box not active: Robot does not stop if
the monitoring space limits are exceeded.
Default: Robot stops at boundaries.
V max Limit value of the space-specific velocity
• 0.5 … 30 000 mm/s

Default: 30 000 mm/s


Vmax valid if Validity of the space-specific velocity
not used = space-specific velocity is not moni-
tored.
Space not violated = space-specific velocity is
monitored if the monitoring space is not viola-
ted.
Space violated = space-specific velocity is
monitored if the monitoring space is violated.
Default: not used
Stop if mastering test Activating reference stop
not yet done
Check box active: Reference stop is activated
for the monitoring space.
Check box not active: Reference stop is not
activated for the monitoring space.
Default: Reference stop activated.
Properties
Fig. 7-11: Cartesian properties

Reference system Reference coordinate system
• $WORLD
• $ROBROOT
Default: $WORLD
Space dimensions Length, width and height of the monitoring space (display on-
ly)
The length, width and height of a protected space must not
fall below the predefined minimum value. This value depends
on the global maximum Cartesian velocity and the radius of
the smallest sphere of the safety-oriented tool.
(>>> "Minimum protected space dimensions" Page 93)
Origin X, Y, Z Offset of the origin of the Cartesian monitoring space in X, Y
and Z relative to the selected reference coordinate system.
• -100,000 mm … +100,000 mm
Default: 0 mm
Origin A, B, C Orientation in A, B and C at the origin of the Cartesian moni-
toring space relative to the selected reference coordinate sys-
tem.
Origin A, C:
• -180° … +180°
Origin B:
• -90° … +90°
Default: 0°
Distance to origin Minimum X, Y and Z coordinates of the Cartesian monitoring
space relative to the origin
XMin, YMin, ZMin
• -100,000 mm … +100,000 mm
Default: 0 mm
Distance to origin Maximum X, Y and Z coordinates of the Cartesian monitoring
space relative to the origin
XMax, YMax, ZMax
• -100,000 mm … +100,000 mm
Default: 0 mm
Example
The example shows a Cartesian monitoring space whose origin is offset in

the X, Y and Z directions (yellow arrow) relative to the $ROBROOT sys-
tem. The orientation A, B, C at the origin of the Cartesian monitoring
space is identical to the orientation at the origin of $ROBROOT.


Fig. 7-12: Example of a Cartesian monitoring space
7.5.6 Configuring an axis-specific monitoring space
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure
1. Select the Monitoring spaces tab and select the monitoring space
from the list.
The parameters of the monitoring space are displayed.
2. Enter the name of the monitoring space (max. 24 characters).
3. Select the space type Axis space and set the parameters of the mon-
itoring space.
The Axis-specific properties of {0} window opens.
5. Select axis from the list.
The axis-specific properties are displayed.
6. Activate the monitoring of axis limits by setting the check mark at
Monitoring.
7. Move the axis to the upper axis limit in axis-specific mode.
8. Press Touch-up to save the current axis position.
9. Move the axis to the lower axis limit in axis-specific mode.
10. Press Touch-up to save the current axis position.
11. Repeat steps 5 to 10 to define the axis limits for additional axis rang-
es.


ing space.
Parameters
Fig. 7-13: Axis space
Type Type of monitoring space
Workspace = The axes must move within the
configured limits of the monitoring space.
(Space violation if the axes leave the monitor-
ing space.)
Protected space = The axes must move out-
side the configured limits of the monitoring
space. (Space violation if the axes enter the
monitoring space.)
Default: Workspace
Activation Activating the monitoring space
inactive = monitoring space is not active.
always active = monitoring space is always
active.
by input = monitoring space is activated by a
safety-oriented input.
Note: If safety interface XG13 is used, safety-
oriented inputs are only available for monitoring
spaces 12 … 16.
(>>> 8.2 "KUKA.SafeOperation via inter-
face XG13" Page 205)
Note: If none of the safety interfaces specified
in the product description is used, the monitor-
ing spaces cannot be activated via an input
(only static spaces possible).
Default: always off
Space type Type of monitoring space
Cartesian space = Cartesian monitoring space
Axis space = axis-specific monitoring space
Default: Cartesian space


Stop at boundaries A stop is triggered if the space is violated.
Check box active: Robot stops if the monitoring
space limits are exceeded.
Check box not active: Robot does not stop if
the monitoring space limits are exceeded.
Default: Robot stops at boundaries.
V max Limit value of the space-specific velocity
• 0.5 … 30 000 mm/s

Default: 30 000 mm/s
Vmax valid if Validity of the space-specific velocity
not used = space-specific velocity is not moni-
tored.
Space not violated = space-specific velocity is
monitored if the monitoring space is not viola-
ted.
Space violated = space-specific velocity is
monitored if the monitoring space is violated.
Default: not used
Stop if mastering test Activating reference stop
not yet done
Check box active: Reference stop is activated
for the monitoring space.
Check box not active: Reference stop is not
activated for the monitoring space.
Default: Reference stop activated.

Properties
Fig. 7-14: Axis-specific properties
Monitoring Activation of monitoring
Check box active: Monitoring is activated.
Check box not active: Monitoring is not activated.
Default: Monitoring is not activated.
Lower limit Lower limit of the axis-specific monitoring space
(lower axis limit) • Rotational axes: -360° … +360°
Default: -360°
• Linear axes: -30,000 mm … +30,000 mm
Default: -30,000 mm
The lower limit of an axis-specific workspace must be at least
0.5° or 1.5 mm less than the upper limit.
(>>> "Minimum size of a protected space" Page 115)


Current position Axis-specific actual position (display only)
• Red: axis position not allowed, as monitoring space is vio-

lated
• Green: axis position allowed
Upper limit Upper limit of the axis-specific monitoring space
(upper axis limit) • Rotational axes: -360° … +360°
Default: 360°
• Linear axes: -30,000 mm … +30,000 mm
Default: 30,000 mm
The upper limit of an axis-specific workspace must be at least
0.5° or 1.5 mm greater than the lower limit.
(>>> "Minimum size of a protected space" Page 115)
Minimum size of a protected space
An axis-specific protected space must not fall below the predefined mini-
mum size. This is dependent on the maximum axis velocity.
The minimum size for the axis-specific protected space is equal to the dis-
tance that the relevant axis can travel at maximum axis velocity in an in-
terval of 18 ms.
If the minimum size of the configured axis limits is not reached, a mes-
sage is displayed when saving and the configuration is prevented from be-
ing saved.
Icons
Icon Description
Icon for rotational and infinitely rotating axes
Icon for linear axes
Icon for simulated axes

Icon for decouplable axes
7.5.7 Configuring axis-specific velocity monitoring functions and braking

time
Description
The axis velocity can be monitored against various different limit values:
• Limit value for the reduced axis velocity (activated by means of the
safety-oriented input VRED)
If none of the safety interfaces specified in the product description is
used, this monitoring function is dispensed with, as the input VRED is
not available.
• Limit value for maximum axis velocity in T1
• Limit value for maximum axis velocity (valid globally for every axis)
Furthermore, the braking ramp of an axis can be changed using the brak-
ing time parameter.

Monitoring of the braking ramp and the maximum axis velocity in T1 is

part of the standard safety configuration and always active. The parame-
ters can also be modified if safe monitoring is deactivated.
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
• To modify option-specific monitoring functions: Safe monitoring is ac-
tive.
Procedure
1. Select the Axis monitoring tab.

2. Edit the parameters of the standard safety configuration as required.
3. If necessary, activate monitoring of the safely reduced axis velocity for
one axis. To do so, select the desired axis and set the check mark at
Monitoring.
4. Change the limit value for the safely reduced axis velocity if necessa-
ry.
5. Modify the maximum velocity for rotational axes and linear axes (valid
globally for every axis).


Parameters
Fig. 7-15: Axis monitoring
Monitoring Activation of monitoring
Check box active: axis is monitored.
Check box not active: axis is not monitored.
Default: axis is not monitored.
Braking time Duration of the axis-specific braking ramp monitoring for safe-
ty stop 1 and safety stop 2
• 500 … 15,000 ms
Default: 1,500 ms
(>>> 7.5.7.1 "Parameter: Braking time" Page 119)

Maximum velocity T1 Maximum axis velocity in T1
• Rotational axes: 1.0 … 100.00°/s

Default: 30°/s
• Linear axes: 1.0 … 1,500 mm/s
Default: 250 mm/s
This parameter enables a servo gun, for example, to be cali-
brated in T1 with a higher velocity than 250 mm/s.
Note: The Cartesian velocities at the flange and at the TCP
are monitored independently of this parameter and cannot ex-
ceed 250 mm/s.
(>>> 7.5.7.2 "Parameter: Maximum velocity T1" Page 121)
Reduced velocity Limit value for safely reduced axis velocity
• Rotational axes: 0.5 … 5,000 °/s

Default: 5,000°/s
• Linear axes: 1.5 … 10,000 mm/s
Maximum velocity rotational Limit value for global maximum velocity for rotational axes
axis
• 0.5 … 5,000 °/s
Default: 1,000°/s
The axis-specific protected space is dependent on the global
maximum axis velocity. A defined minimum size for the axis-
specific protected space is derived from the global maximum
axis velocity; the size must not fall below this value. If this
minimum value is violated, a message is displayed.
Maximum velocity translation- Limit value for global maximum velocity for translational axes
al axis
• 0.5 … 30,000 mm/s
Default: 5,000 mm/s
The axis-specific protected space is dependent on the global
maximum axis velocity. A defined minimum size for the axis-
specific protected space is derived from the global maximum
axis velocity; the size must not fall below this value. If this
minimum value is violated, a message is displayed.
Icons
Icon Description


7.5.7.1 Parameter: Braking time

Description
If a safety stop 1 or 2 occurs, the safety controller monitors the braking

process. Among other things, it monitors whether the axis-specific velocity
remains below its monitoring ramp. If the velocity is too high, i.e. if the
ramp is violated, then the safety controller triggers a safety stop 0.
The ramp monitored in T1 mode cannot be changed and applies for the
braking process from the configured maximum T1 velocity of the respec-
tive axis down to standstill.
The monitoring ramp valid in the other operating modes can be adapted
using the Braking time parameter.
The parameter Braking time modifies the monitoring ramp. It does not
modify the actual time required by the kinematic system for braking.
The safety controller also monitors the braking ramp for axes which are
configured as couplable or grouped together in coupling groups. To be
able to alter the configured braking time for this monitoring function, the
coupling must be temporarily canceled.
The coupling of the axes can be canceled and set again in WorkVisual.
Information about this can be found in the WorkVisual documentation.
WARNING
Only increase the default time if it is necessary to do so. This might be
required, for example, in the case of very heavy machines and/or very
heavy loads, as these cannot stop within the default time.
The safety maintenance technician must check whether and to what ex-
tent the Braking time value needs to be modified in each specific appli-
cation. He must also check whether the modification makes additional
safety measures necessary, e.g. installation of a gate lock.
The monitoring ramp (for all modes apart from T1) is determined as fol-
lows:
• The ramp starts at 106% of the rated speed of the axis. This value re-
mains constant for the first 300 ms.
• Similarly, a constant value of 10.6% of the rated speed of the axis ap-
plies for the last 300 ms of the configured braking time.
• Over the intervening time, the permissible velocity is reduced linearly
from 106% to 10.6% of the rated speed of the axis.
• Allowance for the brake closing time for safety stop 1:
200 ms before the configured braking time elapses, the brake is com-
manded to close (SBC) and the drives enable signal (AF) is canceled.
• In the event of a safety stop 2, the standstill monitoring is activated af-
ter completion of the braking process, but no later than after the con-
figured braking time.

Fig. 7-16: Monitoring ramp for safety stop 1
1 Velocity profile during braking (example)

2 Monitoring ramp for braking time TBT
3 Brake closing time TBCT is taken into account within the moni-
toring ramp
n Percentage of the rated speed of the axis

t (s) Time (in seconds)
T0 The moment when safety stop 1 or 2 is initiated
TBT Braking time
Default value of Braking time parameter: 1.5 s
TBCT Brake closing time: 0.2 s
Signals:
FF Motion enable
AF Drives enable
SBC Safe Brake Control
STO Safe Torque Off
Limitations
Braking time can be configured separately for each axis. At the moment
of braking, however, the value used for all axes is always the highest val-
ue entered.
Recommendation: for greater transparency, enter the same value for all
axes.


Value increased
If the value Braking time is increased, this has the following conse-
quences:
The monitoring ramp becomes longer and flatter, i.e. monitoring is now
less strict. It is now less likely that the braking process will violate the
ramp.
Fig. 7-17: Example: Value is increased
1 Velocity profile during braking (example)

2 Monitoring (lower Braking time value)
3 Monitoring (higher Braking time value)
Value reduced
If the value “Braking time” is reduced, this has the following effect:
The monitoring ramp becomes shorter and steeper, i.e. monitoring is now
stricter. There is now a higher probability that a braking process will vio-
late the ramp.
7.5.7.2 Parameter: Maximum velocity T1
Description
The safety controller monitors whether the maximum velocity in T1 re-

mains below the configured values even for axes which are configured as
couplable or grouped together in coupling groups. To be able to alter the
configured values for these axes, the coupling must be temporarily can-
celed.
WARNING
Only alter the default value of Maximum velocity T1 if it is necessary
to do so. This can be the case, for example, when positioning welding
guns if these are to be moved at process velocity in T1 mode.
The safety maintenance technician must check whether and to what ex-
tent the value needs to be modified in each specific application. He
must also check whether the modification makes additional safety meas-
ures necessary, e.g. installation of a gate lock.

WARNING
Following modifications to the Maximum velocity T1 parameter, the
new value must be checked. The new value must also be checked if it
is smaller than the previous value.
(>>> 7.11.7 "Checking axis-specific velocity limits" Page 184)
7.5.8 Configuring safe operational stop for axis groups
Description
Safe operational stop can be configured for up to 6 axis groups (situa-

tions). A maximum of 8 axes or, in the case of kinematic systems with
master/slave axes, a maximum of 8 drives can be configured for each ax-
is group.
The safe operational stop for axis groups is activated via safety-oriented
inputs. If none of the safety interfaces specified in the product description
is used, the safe operational stop for axis groups is not available.
Forces acting on the robot in the production process may result in a vi-
olation of the safe operational stop, e.g. when loading a workpiece into
a gripper. To remedy this, the position tolerance for the affected axis
must be increased.
Preparation
The safety controller monitors whether the position tolerance is observed

in the event of a safe operational stop even for axes which are configured
as couplable or grouped together in coupling groups.
• To be able to alter the configured values for these axes, the coupling
must be temporarily canceled.
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure
1. Select the Axis monitoring tab and press Safe operational stop.
The Safe operational stop window opens.
2. Select axis from the list.
3. Enter the position tolerance for this axis.
The position tolerance configured here also applies to the global
safe operational stop, with which all axes are monitored.
The global safe operational stop is one of the standard safety func-
tions. The position tolerances can also be modified if safe
monitoring is deactivated.
4. Activate one or more axis groups in which the axis is to be monitored

by activating the corresponding check box (set the check mark).


5. Repeat steps 2 to 4 to define further monitoring functions.
Parameters
Fig. 7-18: Safe operational stop
Monitoring in axis groups 1-6 Safe operational stop for axis group 1 … 6
Check box active: Axis is monitored in axis group.
Check box not active: Axis is not monitored in axis group.
Default: No monitoring
Position tolerance Tolerance for standstill monitoring in the case of safe opera-
tional stop. The axis may still move within this tolerance when
a safe operational stop is active.
• Rotational axes: 0.001° … 1°

Default: 0.01°
• Linear axes: 0.003 - 3 mm
Default: 0.1 mm

Icons
Icon Description

7.5.9 Activating “Braking before restricted areas”
Description
The “Braking before restricted areas” function changes the way the robot
behaves at the limits of the monitoring spaces and of the cell area.
With the “Braking before restricted areas” function, the fictitious STOP 1 -
DRS end position based on the actual position is monitored in addition to
the actual position. If this end point violates a monitoring space, this indi-
cates an impending violation of this monitoring space by the robot.
In this case, a safety stop 1 DRS is triggered, bringing the robot to a
standstill at the precalculated end point. Due to the small safety margin in
the precalculation, the robot can generally be stopped before the monitor-
ing space.
A safety stop 1 DRS is a safely monitored drive ramp stop. This usually
deviates from the programmed path.
If the safety controller detects a violation of the monitored braking ramp,
a safety stop 0 is triggered. As the stopping distance of the robot devi-
ates significantly from the stopping distance of the drive ramp stop in
this instance, this case must be taken into consideration in the risk as-
sessment of the cell.
Possible reasons for an escalation of this nature are, for example:
• Power failure
• Controller fault
• Operation outside of the specification limits
• Hardware fault at the time the drive ramp stop is executed
Example
The figures show the behavior of the robot at the limits of a Cartesian and
axis-specific monitoring space when “Braking before restricted areas” is
activated.
Fig. 7-19: Braking before Cartesian space limit



Fig. 7-20: Braking before axis-specific space limit

Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
• The braking ramps of the axes have been verified by KUKA or by the
user / safety maintenance technician.
• If the braking ramps have been verified by the user / safety mainte-
nance technician: The function has been enabled in the machine data
of the kinematic system in WorkVisual.
WARNING
Whether a KUKA kinematic system supports BBRA is stored in the ma-
chine data. If this is the case, the set braking ramps of this kinematic
system have been checked by KUKA and verified as suitable for BBRA.
• For kinematic systems with a variable mounting position, the verifica-
tion applies exclusively to the “Floor” mounting position. The braking
ramps must be verified separately for the use of BBRA in other
mounting positions.
• For kinematic systems with a fixed mounting position, the verification
applies exclusively to the defined mounting position.
The verification refers to motions of the kinematic system without the in-
fluence of a ROBROOT kinematic system, e.g. a linear axis. If the robot
is expanded with a ROBROOT kinematic system, the values are only
valid if no simultaneous motions (robot kinematic system plus ROB-
ROOT kinematic system) are executed. Simultaneous motions may
cause the BBRA braking ramp monitoring to be violated.

Before KUKA kinematic systems are used with BBRA in normal opera-
tion, they should be verified by KUKA.
KUKA cannot verify the braking ramps of third-party kinematic systems,
e.g. linear axes. In order to enable these for BBRA nevertheless, the
user/safety maintenance technician can mark such a kinematic system
as verified in the machine data.
For verification purposes, it is necessary to check whether the axis is
able to execute the ramp indicated in the safety configuration in all an-
ticipated situations. This can also include superposed motions of KUKA
kinematic systems and third-party kinematic systems, for example.
(>>> 7.11.9 "Checking the values for the maximum braking ramp"
Page 187)
Further information about editing the machine data of a kinematic sys-

tem is contained in the WorkVisual documentation.
Procedure
1. Select the Braking before restricted areas tab.

2. Set the check mark next to the Activate braking before restricted
areas check box.


Parameters
Fig. 7-21: Braking before restricted areas
Drive ramp stop group Synchronously braking axes belong to a drive ramp stop
group (display only)
Braking ramp of drive unit Maximum possible braking ramp for an axis (display only)
Activate braking before re- Activating the “Braking before restricted areas” function
stricted areas
Check box active: Function is activated.
Check box not active: Function is not activated.
Default: Function is not activated.
Icons
Icon Description

Icon Description
7.5.10 Configuring the reference position and reference group
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
• Mastering type Reference switch is configured.
Procedure
1. Select the tool and base for Cartesian jogging.

2. Select the Reference position tab.
3. If external axes are configured, enter for each external axis the num-
ber of the reference group to which it is to be assigned.
4. Move all axes of reference group 1 to the corresponding reference po-
sition.
5. On the tab, select one of the axes of reference group 1.
6. Press Touch-up reference position for group to accept the refer-
ence position for the axes in reference group 1.
The coordinates of the Cartesian reference position are displayed in
the configuration window.
7. If present, move external axes in reference group 2 to the correspond-
ing reference position and save with Touch-up reference position for
group.
8. If present, move external axes in reference group 3 to the correspond-
ing reference position and save with Touch-up reference position for
group.


Parameters
Fig. 7-22: Reference position

Reference group Each axis that is to be subjected to safe monitoring must be
assigned to a reference group. There are 3 reference groups:
• Reference group 1
Robot axes and external axes on which a robot is instal-
led are always assigned to reference group 1.
Such external axes include KLs, for example, that serve
as a carrier kinematic system for the robot.
• Reference group 2, 3
Only external axes can be assigned to reference groups 2
and 3. There must be no robot installed on them.
Default: 1
Reference position Axis-specific coordinates of the reference position
To monitor the mastering, the axis angles of the robot axes
are defined for a specific Cartesian reference position. During
the mastering test, the robot moves to the Cartesian refer-
ence position and the actual position of the axes is compared
with the setpoint position.
• Rotational axes: -360° … +360°

Default: 45°
• Linear axes: -30,000 mm … +30,000 mm
Default: 1,000 mm
Current position Axis-specific actual position (display only)
• Red: reference position not allowed, as too near master-

ing position
• Green: reference position allowed
Mastering position The axis angles at the mastering position are defined in the
machine data (display only).
Cartesian reference position X, Y and Z coordinates of the Cartesian reference position
X, Y, Z relative to the WORLD coordinate system (display for refer-
ence group 1)
The coordinates of the Cartesian reference position refer to
the center point of the mounting flange.
• -30,000 mm … +30,000 mm
Default: 0 mm
Icons
Icon Description



7.5.11 Saving the safety configuration
WARNING
Serious injury and severe damage to the robot can be caused by an er-
ror during saving or a failed reinitialization. If an error message is dis-
played after saving, the safety configuration must be checked and
saved again.
Precondition

• Safety configuration is completed.
Procedure
1. Click on Save and answer the request for confirmation with Yes.
The safety configuration is saved on the hard drive and the activation
code of the safety configuration is saved to the RDC.
The robot controller is automatically reinitialized.
2. The activation code of the safety configuration is displayed on the
Common tab.
Note the activation code in the checklist for safety functions.
(>>> 11.1.3 "Checklist: Safety functions" Page 270)
7.6 Editing the local safety configuration in WorkVisual
Description
Instead of using the smartHMI, the safety configuration can be created

and edited entirely in WorkVisual. The tabs in WorkVisual are the same
as those on the smartHMI.
Precondition
• The safety option is installed in WorkVisual.

• The project that is to be edited has been loaded and opened.
• The safety option has been added to the project.
Procedure
1. Set the robot controller as the active controller.

2. Select the menu sequence Editors > Safety configuration (local) or
double-click on the Safety controller node in the Hardware view. The
Local safety configuration window is opened.
3. Select the Global parameters area on the Common tab and activate
the check box for Safe monitoring.
4. Edit the local safety configuration as required.
5. Save and close the local safety configuration.

7.7 Mastering test
Overview
A mastering test checks at a suitable reference position whether the

saved reference position of the motor of an axis corresponds to the actual
mechanical position of the axis.
The procedure used to perform the mastering test can be set in the safety
configuration:
• Mastering test via KUKA reference switch
A reference switch is used for the mastering test. The robot moves to
a taught reference position. The reference position is confirmed using
the reference switch.
• Mastering test via external system and with external mastering confir-
mation
An independent, user-specific referencing system such as a tracker,
navigation system or absolute encoder is used for external mastering
confirmation. The robot moves to a reference position saved in the
higher-level controller. The mastering test must be confirmed via a
safe input signal of the robot controller.
Safety risk due to mastering test that has not been performed/
confirmed
The safety integrity of safety functions based on safe axis positions is
limited if the mastering test is missing. The safety functions may behave
differently from how they were configured, creating additional hazards in
the system.
• It is advisable to perform the mastering test as quickly as possible
once this is requested by the robot controller.
• The system integrator must determine, by means of a risk assess-
ment, whether additional system-specific safety measures must be
taken if the mastering test is missing, e.g. a reference stop.
Request
The following events cause a mastering test to be requested:
• Robot controller is rebooted (internal request)

• Robot is remastered (internal request)
• I/O driver is reconfigured (internal request)
• Only relevant for mastering test via reference switch: Input $MASTER-
INGTEST_REQ_EXT is set externally, e.g. by a PLC (external request)
Monitoring time
The robot controller generates the following message for an internal mas-
tering test request: Mastering test required (internal). The robot can be
moved for another 2 hours (monitoring time) without a mastering test and
mastering confirmation.
Once the monitoring time has elapsed, the robot stops with a safety stop
1 and the robot controller displays the following acknowledgement mes-
sage: Ackn.: Mastering test time interval expired. Once the message has
been acknowledged, the robot can be moved for another 2 hours.


7.7.1 Mastering test via reference switch
Description
In the mastering test, a specific reference position is addressed, and the

reference switch is used to check whether the actual position of the robot
and specific external axes correspond to the reference position taught in
the safety configuration.
Infinitely rotating axes are taken into consideration in the mastering test
with modulo 360°, i.e. the reference position is always relative to the cir-
cle.
If the deviation between the current position and the reference position is
too great, the mastering test has failed. The robot stops with a safety stop
1 and can only be moved in T1 mode.
Axes checked
During a mastering test, the following axes are checked:

• Robot and external axes that influence the Cartesian position of the
robot flange
• External axes which are monitored in axis-specific monitoring spaces
NOTICE
Damage to property due to incorrect mastering of non-referenced
external axes
The incorrect mastering of external axes which are not checked by the
mastering test can result in damage to property.
• Correct mastering of the external axes which have not been
checked must be ensured by means other than the mastering test.
Reference group
Each axis that is to be subjected to safe monitoring must be assigned to

a reference group. There are 3 reference groups:
Robot axes and external axes on which a robot is installed are always
assigned to reference group 1.
Such external axes include KLs, for example, that serve as a carrier
kinematic system for the robot.
Only external axes can be assigned to reference groups 2 and 3.
There must be no robot installed on them.
All axes of a reference group are mastered together.
During the mastering test, all axes of a reference group must be in the
reference position in order to actuate the reference switch. If not all the
axes of a reference group are involved in actuating the reference
switch, the position of the axes cannot be checked.
Execution
The mastering test is carried out using the program “masref_main.src”. It

can be started in the following ways:

• Automatic
Integrate “masref_main.src” into the application program in such a way
that it is cyclically called as a subprogram. If a mastering test is re-
quested, the robot detects this and starts the mastering test.
• Manual
For this, start the program “masref_main.src” manually.

ence switch
Overview
Step Description
1 Select reference position.
(>>> 7.7.1.2 "Selecting a reference position" Page 135)
2 Install reference switch and actuating plate.
(>>> 7.7.1.3 "Installing the reference switch and actuating
plate" Page 137)
3 Connect reference switch.
(>>> 7.7.1.4 "Connecting the reference switch" Page 138)
4 Configure the input signal $MASTERINGT-
EST_REQ_EXT for the external mastering test request.
This signal is declared in the file $machine.dat in the di-
rectory KRC:\ROBOTER\KRC\STEU\MADA and must be
assigned to a suitable input. As standard, the signal is
routed to $IN[1026].
5 In the file “masref_user.dat” and in the safety configura-
tion, configure the reference groups to be checked.
(>>> 7.7.1.5 "Configuring the reference groups to be
checked in file" Page 139)
6 Teach positions for the mastering test in the program
“masref_user.src”.
The reference position must be taught in the program
“masref_user.src” and in the safety configuration.
(>>> 7.7.1.6 "Teaching positions for the mastering test"
Page 140)
7 Only if the reference switch is actuated by a ferromagnet-
ic part of the tool or following a tool change or replace-
ment:
Check the correctness of the reference position.
(>>> 7.7.1.7 "Checking the reference position (actuation
with tool)" Page 142)


Step Description
8 If the mastering test is to be executed automatically:
Integrate “masref_main.src” into the application program
in such a way that it is cyclically called as a subprogram.
9 If the mastering test is to be executed manually:
Start the program “masref_main.src” manually.
(>>> 7.7.1.8 "Performing a mastering test manually"
Page 143)
7.7.1.1 Programs for the mastering test
The following programs are used for the mastering test:

Program Directory Description
masref_main.src R1\System The program checks whether a mastering test is
required and must be executed as soon as possi-
ble after an internal request. If the program is not
executed within 2 hours, the robot stops and the
robot controller generates a message.
If a mastering test is required, the robot performs
it immediately.
The program calls the program “masref_user.src”
that is used to address the reference position.
masref_user.src R1\Program The program contains 3 subprograms for moving
to reference positions 1 to 3 and 3 subprograms
for the motion away from reference positions 1 to
3 after the mastering test has been performed.
If the motion away from the reference position is
not taught, the robot and external axes remain
stationary after the mastering test. The robot con-
troller generates an error message.
7.7.1.2 Selecting a reference position
Description
The reference position can be approached with the actuating plate or with
a ferromagnetic part of the tool as follows:

Fig. 7-23: Example position of reference switch actuating plate
1 Tool
2 Actuating plate
3 Reference switch
4 Mechanical mounting fixture for the reference switch
5 Actuated reference switch
Selection criteria
The reference run must be selected in accordance with the following crite-
ria:
• The position of the reference switch and actuating plate does not inter-
fere with the work sequence of the robot.
• The reference position is not a position in which the axes are in a sin-
gularity.
• In the reference position, both proximity switch surfaces of the refer-
ence switch are actuated by the switching surface (actuating plate or
tool).
• In the case of actuation with a tool, it must be ensured that the actua-
tion is only carried out at the intended reference position. For this, the
reference position must be checked using the procedure described
here:
(>>> 7.7.1.7 "Checking the reference position (actuation with tool)"
Page 142)
‒ Reason: In the event of a false positive mastering test, it is possi-
ble to exceed the configured safety-oriented space limits.
‒ The risk of a false positive mastering test is particularly high if the
reference switch is actuated by a large ferromagnetic part of a
tool.


• The reference switch must not be actuated continuously outside the
context of the mastering test.
The reference switch signal is monitored continuously. If the reference
switch is actuated for longer than 5 minutes, a fault message is gener-
ated.
• All axes of a reference group are in the reference position in order to
actuate the reference switch.
• In the reference position, the robot axes are at least ±5° (rotational ax-
es) or ±15 mm (linear axes) away from the mastering position.
• The position of the reference switch is within the motion range of the
robot.
7.7.1.3 Installing the reference switch and actuating plate
Precondition
• The robot controller is switched off and secured to prevent unauthor-

ized persons from switching it on again.
• The reference run has been selected in accordance with the required
criteria.
(>>> "Selection criteria" Page 136)
Procedure
1. Prepare a mechanical mounting fixture for mounting the reference

switch.
2. Attach the reference switch to the mounting fixture.
3. If the actuating plate is being used, fasten the actuating plate to the
robot flange or tool.
NOTICE
To ensure that the reference position remains stable, the reference
switch and actuating plate must be securely installed.

Example
Fig. 7-24: Example of an actuating plate on the tool
1 Robot
2 Actuating plate on tool
3 Tool
4 Reference switch on mounting fixture
7.7.1.4 Connecting the reference switch
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to incorrectly assigned cables
The robot controller is preconfigured for the specific industrial robot. The
manipulator and other components can receive incorrect data if they are
connected to a different robot controller. Death, severe injuries or dam-
age to property may result.
• Only connect the manipulator to the corresponding robot controller.
Only 1 reference switch can be connected directly to the robot control-

ler. If multiple reference groups are required, the reference switches can
be connected to the safety PLC and activated via the bus interface that
is in use. The safety PLC must evaluate the reference switches and set
the Mastering test input accordingly.

ence switch


Description
The reference switch is connected to the robot controller with the refer-
ence cable XG42 - XS Ref.
• XG42: Interface to robot controller
• XS Ref: Interface to reference switch
Bending radius
ence cable:
Precondition

• The power cable is de-energized.
• Observe the ESD guidelines.
• Reference switch is installed.
Procedure
1. Route the reference cable correctly.

2. Connect the reference cable.
7.7.1.5 Configuring the reference groups to be checked in file
Description
The reference groups to be checked must be configured in the file “mas-

ref_user.dat”. For this, the reference groups to be checked are entered in
an array. The order in which the reference groups are entered determines
the order in which they are subsequently called in the mastering test.
Configuration file
Directory C:\KRC\R1\Program
File masref_user.dat
Fold reference groups
Array MASREFg_GroupSequence[3]
Precondition
• User group Expert
Procedure
1. Open the file in the navigator.

2. Enter the numbers of the reference groups to be checked in the array.
(0 means that no reference group will be checked here.)
3. Save and close the file.
Example
Reference groups 1 and 2 are called and checked in sequence during the
mastering test. Reference group 3 is not required:

reference groups
...
DECL GLOBAL CONST INT MASREFg_GroupSequence[3] ; contains
reference groups to test
MASREFg_GroupSequence[1]=1
The order in which the reference groups are called is irrelevant for the
mastering test. It is equally permissible to call and check reference group
2 first and then reference group 1.
reference groups
...
DECL GLOBAL CONST INT MASREFg_GroupSequence[3] ; contains
reference groups to test
7.7.1.6 Teaching positions for the mastering test
Description
The following points must be taught for each reference group:

• Movement to the reference switch
• Reference position
The reference position must additionally be taught in the safety con-
figuration.
• Movement away from the reference switch
Precondition
• User rights of the following function groups:

‒ Critical KRL program changes
‒ Program selection and deselection
‒ Block selection
‒ General configuration
‒ Jogging with the jog keys
Or alternatively:
Jogging using the 6D mouse
‒ Teach local points
But at least the user group “Safety maintenance”
• The reference switch is installed and connected.
• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure
1. Open the program “masref_user.src”.

2. Insert a HALT statement in the subprograms MASREFSTARTGX() and
MASREFBACKGX() of the current reference group.
3. Close the program “masref_user.src”.
4. Set the variable MASREF_GroupNumber to the value of the current
reference group, e.g. 1.


• Via the variable display, Module: /R1/masref_main
• Or directly in the file R1/System/masref_main.dat in the fold refer-
ence groups
5. Select the program “masref_main.src”.
6. Perform block selection to the subprogram RunTest_Group(MAS-
REF_GroupNumber).
7. Press the Start key. The subprogram MASREFSTARTGX() of the pro-
gram “masref_user.src” is called.
8. In the subprogram MASREFSTARTGX(), program a motion to a point
approx. 10 cm before the reference switch and teach the required
points.
9. Program a LIN motion to the reference switch so that it is actuated.
This position is the reference position.
The distance from the reference switch must not exceed 2 mm in
the reference position. If the distance is greater, the reference switch
will not be actuated.
10. Teach the reference position.

11. Do not move the robot.
12. Teach the reference position in the safety configuration.
(>>> 7.5.10 "Configuring the reference position and reference group"
Page 128)
13. Return to the subprogram MASREFSTARTGX() and perform a block
selection to the END line.
14. Press the Start key. The subprogram MASREFBACKGX() of the pro-
gram “masref_user.src” is called.
15. In the subprogram MASREFBACKGX(), program the motion away
from the reference position and teach the required points.
16. Deselect the program “masref_main.src” and save the changes.
17. For further reference groups (2, 3), repeat the sequence from step 1.
18. For automatic operation, delete all HALT statements from the program
“masref_user.src” once again.
19. Cyclically call the program “masref_main.src” at a suitable point and
enable execution of the mastering test after an internal request.
Program
1 GLOBAL DEF MASREFSTARTG1()

2 Teach path and reference position for group 1
3
4 END
5
8
9 END
10
13
14 END
15
16 GLOBAL DEF MASREFBACKG1()
17 Teach path back for group 1
18

19 END
20
23
24 END
25
28
29 END
Line Description
2 Program the motion to the reference position of reference
group 1 and teach the reference position.
17 Teach the motion away from the reference position of refer-
ence group 1.
ence group 2.
ence group 3.
7.7.1.7 Checking the reference position (actuation with tool)
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to false positive mastering test
In the case of improper actuation with a tool, e.g. if the reference switch
is actuated by a large ferromagnetic part of a tool, it is possible that the
actuation may occur at a position other than the intended reference po-
sition.
A false positive mastering test such as this makes it possible to exceed
the configured safety-oriented space limits. Death, severe injuries or
damage to property may result.
• It must be ensured that actuation is only carried out at the intended
reference position. The reference position must be checked in the
following cases:
‒ For start-up and recommissioning after the reference position
has been (re-)taught
‒ For recommissioning following a tool change or replacement
If the check with the new tool reveals that actuation no longer
occurs at the taught reference position, the following possible
solutions are available:
‒ Adapt the reference position to the new tool and reteach it.
‒ Remount the tool in such a way that actuation is carried out
at the taught reference position.
(>>> "Procedure" Page 143)
Precondition


‒ Critical KRL program changes
‒ Program selection and deselection
‒ Block selection
‒ General configuration
‒ Jogging with the jog keys
Or alternatively:
Jogging using the 6D mouse
• The reference position has been taught in the program “mas-
ref_user.src”.
• The reference position has been taught in the safety configuration.
• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure
1. Open the program “masref_user.src”.

2. In the subprogram MASREFSTARTGX() of the current reference
group, insert a HALT statement immediately before the END line.
3. Close the program “masref_user.src”.
4. Set the variable MASREF_GroupNumber to the value of the current
reference group, e.g. 1.
• Via the variable display, Module: /R1/masref_main
• Or directly in the file R1/System/masref_main.dat in the fold refer-
ence groups
5. Select the program “masref_main.src”.
6. Perform block selection to the subprogram RunTest_Group(MAS-
REF_GroupNumber).
7. Press the Start key. The subprogram MASREFSTARTGX() of the pro-
gram “masref_user.src” is called and the robot moves to the reference
position.
8. Jog each axis individually in the positive and negative directions using
the jog keys and observe when the reference switch is no longer actu-
ated.
9. Analyze the axis-specific tolerances determined in this way for the
mastering test relative to the application and select a different refer-
ence position if necessary.
10. For further reference groups (2, 3), repeat the sequence from step 1.
11. For automatic operation, delete all HALT statements from the program
“masref_user.src” once again.
7.7.1.8 Performing a mastering test manually
Precondition
• User rights: Function group Program selection and deselection

If the reference switch is connected to the robot controller via inter-
face XG42, the mastering test can be executed in Start-up mode.
• The reference groups to be checked have been configured in the file

“masref_user.dat”.
• The reference groups to be checked have been configured in the safe-
ty configuration.

• The reference position has been taught in the program “mas-

ref_user.src”.
• The reference position has been taught in the safety configuration.
• T1 or T2 mode
WARNING
The robot moves in T2 mode at the programmed velocity and can
cause personal injury or material damage. Make sure that the robot can-
not collide and that no persons are in the motion range of the robot.
Procedure
• Select the program “masref_main.src” and execute it through to the

end of the program.
7.7.2 System variables for mastering test
7.7.2.1 $MASTERINGTEST_ACTIVE
Description
Activation status of the mastering test

The variable specifies whether a mastering test is currently being per-
formed.
Writability
The system variable is write-protected.
Syntax
state = $MASTERINGTEST_ACTIVE
Explanation of the syntax
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
• TRUE: Mastering test is active.

• FALSE: No mastering test is active.
7.7.2.2 $MASTERINGTEST_GROUP
Description
Number of the reference group in reference position

The variable specifies the reference group that is currently in the refer-
ence position.
Each axis that is to be subjected to safe monitoring must be assigned to
a reference group. There are 3 reference groups:
Robot axes and external axes on which a robot is installed are always
assigned to reference group 1.
Such external axes include KLs, for example, that serve as a carrier
kinematic system for the robot.


Only external axes can be assigned to reference groups 2 and 3.
There must be no robot installed on them.
All axes of a reference group are mastered together.
Writability
Syntax
number = $MASTERINGTEST_GROUP
Element Description
Number Type: INT
• 0: No reference group in position

• 1 … 3: Reference group with this number in position
7.7.2.3 $MASTERINGTEST_REQ_INT
Description
Internal request for mastering test

The variable specifies whether the internal safety controller has requested
the mastering test.
The safety controller requests the mastering test after the following
events:
• The robot controller is rebooted.
• The robot is remastered.
• I/O driver is reconfigured.
Writability
Syntax
state = $MASTERINGTEST_REQ_INT
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
• TRUE: Mastering test is requested.

• FALSE: Mastering test is not requested.
7.7.2.4 $MASTERINGTEST_REQ_EXT
Description
External request for mastering test

The variable specifies whether the mastering test has been requested ex-
ternally, e.g. by a safety PLC.

The input signal for the external request is declared in the file …\STEU
\MADA\$machine.dat in the corresponding directory and must be assigned

to a suitable input. As standard, the signal is routed to $IN[1026].
Writability
Syntax
state = $MASTERINGTEST_REQ_EXT $IN[number]
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
• TRUE: Mastering test is requested.

• FALSE: Mastering test is not requested.
Number Type: INT
Number of the input $IN that is declared in the file $ma-
chine.dat for the external request
Default: 1026
7.7.2.5 $MASTERINGTEST_SWITCH_OK
Description
Check of the function of the reference switch

The variable specifies whether the reference switch functioned correctly
during the mastering test.
The state of the variable only changes if the following condition is met:
• If the mastering test is active and a dual-channel error has occurred at
the safety-oriented input signal JR
‒ Follow-up message: Error at mastering reference switch
In the case of a dual-channel error, the level at the reference switch
changes from HIGH to LOW and the variable is set to FALSE.
The state of the variable dose not change if the following condition is met:
• If the reference switch is actuated outside of the mastering test for at
least 5 minutes, the variable remains TRUE.
‒ Follow-up message: Level at mastering reference switch is unex-
pectedly "low"
• If the reference switch is disconnected, the variable remains TRUE.
‒ Follow-up message: Level at mastering reference switch is unex-
pectedly "low"
Writability
Syntax
state = $MASTERINGTEST_SWITCH_OK


Element Description
state Type: BOOL
• TRUE: Reference switch OK

• FALSE: Error at reference switch
7.7.3 Mastering test with external mastering confirmation
Description
If the mastering test is configured with external mastering confirmation, the

mastering cannot be verified using one of the reference positions saved in
the safety configuration. There is no KRL program to perform the master-
ing test.
The system integrator himself must check the mastering in the higher-level
controller as part of a safety function and must confirm the successful
mastering test via a safe input signal of the robot controller.
In the event that the higher-level controller recognizes a mastering error
or the mastering test fails, appropriate measures must be taken on the
robot controller, e.g. cancel the motion enable.
Signals
Safe input EJB (external mastering confirmation) is provided for external

mastering confirmation via the higher-level controller. The EJB signal is
available via the following interfaces:
• Ethernet safety interface
• Interface XG42 combined with safety interface XG13
In order to confirm mastering, a positive pulse must be created at input
EJB. The pulse must be at least 350 ms long and must not exceed 5 s. If
the EJB signal switches from “logic 0” to “logic 1” and switches back to
“logic 0” within the time frame, the mastering test is successfully con-
firmed.
The higher-level controller can determine whether mastering confirmation
is required via the safe output signals RR (robot referenced) and SO
(safety option active).
If safe output RR is “logic 0”, the mastering test must be confirmed. How-
ever, output RR is also “logic 0” in the following cases:
• The robot controller is switched off or is not yet fully booted (ready for
operation).
• The safety option is not active because safe monitoring is deactivated.
It is advisable to poll the safe output SO (safety option active). When us-
ing an Ethernet safety interface, it is also possible to poll the safe output
signal PSA (safety interface active). When safe output SO or PSA is “logic
1”, the state of safe output RR is also valid.

Fig. 7-25: Connection of higher-level controller (example)
1 Higher-level controller 3 Pulse generator

2 “Mastering OK” signal 4 Robot controller
Overview
The following steps are required in order to carry out external mastering
confirmation:
Step Description
1 Define the reference position and save it in the higher-level
controller.
2 When the mastering test is requested, address the refer-
ence position via the robot controller (via a user-created
KRL program).
3 Compare the setpoint position of the robot and external ax-
es with the reference position saved in the higher-level con-
troller to check whether the positions match.
4 If the position comparison is successful, confirm the master-
ing test via the higher-level controller. Send the confirmation
pulse at safe input EJB to the robot controller.
5 If the position comparison fails, the robot must no longer be
moved. Take appropriate measures on the robot controller
via the higher-level controller, e.g. cancel the motion ena-
ble.
7.7.3.1 Signal diagram: external mastering confirmation
Description
The signal diagram applies in the following case:

• The safe output signal RR is evaluated by the higher-level controller.
• The mastering test is requested by the robot controller. The RR signal
switches from “logic 1” to “logic 0”.
• The higher-level controller confirms the successful mastering test with
the pulse signal EJB.


• The RR signal switches from “logic 0” to “logic 1”. The message Mas-
tering test successfully carried out is displayed.
Fig. 7-26: Signal diagram: external mastering confirmation
1 Mastering test requested

2 External mastering confirmation starts
3 Successful mastering test is confirmed
Errors
The following situations can lead to incorrect mastering confirmation:

• The pulse at safe input EJB is created by the higher-level controller
even though no mastering confirmation is required. Safe output RR is
already “logic 1”.
• The duration of the pulse is longer than 5 seconds.
• Safe input EJB is already “logic 1” when the robot controller is started.
In these situations, safe output RR switches to “logic 0” and the message
Mastering test failed is displayed. A renewed pulse at safe input EJB will
result in successful mastering confirmation.
7.7.3.2 Safety acceptance: checking the external mastering confirmation
All steps of the function sequence implemented on the external system for
the mastering test must be checked by the safety maintenance technician
during safety acceptance as part of a positive test.
In addition to the positive test, the potential errors to be assumed for the
external system must be analyzed at the system level, and corresponding
error control tests must be carried out. In the event of an error, no correct
mastering may be confirmed, i.e. the EJB signal must not be set.
7.8 Brake test
7.8.1 Overview of the brake test
Description
Each robot axis has at least one holding brake integrated into the motor.
The brake test checks to see if the braking torque is sufficiently high, i.e.
whether it exceeds a certain minimum value. The minimum value for the
individual motor types is stored in the machine data and cannot be config-
ured. (The brake test does not calculate the absolute value of the braking
torque.)

It is advisable to carry out the brake test when the robot is at operating
temperature. This is the case after approx. 1 h in normal operation.
Operating modes
The brake test can be performed in all operating modes.
Activation + configuration
• The “brake test” functionality is automatically active if a safety option

is installed and safe monitoring is activated.
• If the brake test is not automatically active, the user has the option of
manually activating it (in WorkVisual or on the robot controller).
• The axes to be checked in the brake test can be configured (in Work-
Visual or on the robot controller).
• The cycle time can be configured (in WorkVisual or on the robot con-
troller).
If the brake test is not automatically active, the operator must carry out
a hazard assessment to determine whether it is necessary to activate
the brake test for the specific application.
If the brake test is active, the operator must perform a hazard assess-
ment to determine the following:
• Which axes need to be tested
• What cycle time needs to be defined
It is irrelevant whether the brake test is automatically active or it is acti-
vated manually. The hazard assessment is required in both cases.
Request
Events which request the execution of a brake test

If the brake test is active, the following events request the execution of a
brake test:
• Input $BRAKETEST_REQ_EX is set externally, e.g. by a PLC (exter-
nal request)
• Robot controller boots with a cold start (internal request)
• Brake test cycle time has elapsed (internal request)
The default cycle time is 46 h. It elapses when the drives have been
in servo-control for a total of 46 h.
• Status message from the automatic brake check:
Brake defective, {Axis} permanently under servo control
Response following a request
1. If a request is present, the robot controller generates the following
message: Brake test required.
The robot can be moved for another 2 hours. (This is referred to as
the monitoring time)
2. The brake test must be performed within the monitoring time. Once
the brake test has been performed successfully, the cycle time re-
starts.
3. If the brake test is not performed, the robot stops once the monitoring
time expires. The robot controller generates the following acknowl-
edgement message: Cyclical check for brake test request not made.
The message cannot be acknowledged externally (by the PLC), but
must be acknowledged on the smartPAD.

Once the message has been acknowledged, the robot can be moved

for another 2 hours.
At the time of the brake test, a simulation can be switched on, for ex-
ample via $SIMULATED_AXIS, $SIMULATED_COOP_ROBOTS or
$SERVO_SIM. The simulated axes are not included in the brake test.
Simulated axes must be removed from the simulation and tested before
the end of the cycle time. Otherwise, the robot stops and the robot con-
troller generates the following acknowledgement message: Cyclical
check for brake test request not made. Once the message has been ac-
knowledged, the robot can be moved for another 2 hours.
Active and requested axes
“Active axes” are those axes selected in the Active Configuration column
in the Brake test configuration window.
“Requested axes” are the active axes for which there is currently a brake
test request.
7.8.2 Sequence when testing a brake
The brake test checks the brakes to be tested one after the other.
1. From the start position of the brake test, the axis to be tested moves
in the direction in which the software limit switch is situated further
away, and then moves back. The gravitation and friction of the axis to
be tested are determined during this motion.
Rotational axes move a maximum of 5° in the direction of the software
limit switch; linear axes a maximum of 10 cm.
2. When the axis has returned to its start position, the brake closes and
the motor torque exerted against the closed brake is increased.
The results of the brake test are shown in the message window.
3. If a brake has been identified as being defective, the robot moves to
the parking position following confirmation.
If a brake has reached the wear limit, the robot controller indicates
this by means of a message. A worn brake will soon be identified as
defective. Until then, the robot can be moved without restrictions.
If an axis is equipped with additional brakes, the main brake is tested first.
7.8.3 Programs for the brake test
The programs are located in the directory C:\KRC\ROBOTER\KRC\R1\TP

\BrakeTest.

Program Description
BrakeTestReq.src Performing the brake test cyclically (via program):
• All requested axes can be tested in one cycle using the program.
For this purpose, the program is called without parameters.
• A selection of the requested axes can also be tested using the
program. The desired axes are transferred as parameters when
calling the program. This enables the brake test to be divided into
multiple shorter cycles.
Note: This allows, for example, small breaks in the application to
be utilized for testing individual axes.
(>>> 7.8.5.1 "Performing a brake test for requested axes (cyclically
via program)" Page 161)
BrakeTestReq.src can also be selected manually. All active axes are
tested.
(>>> 7.8.5.2 "Performing a brake test for active axes (manually)"
Page 163)
BrakeTestAxes.src With the program, axes for which there is no brake test request can
be tested. In particular, it also enables the testing of axes which can-
not be activated for the brake test and thus cannot be tested via
BrakeTestReq.src. Couplable axes fall into this category, for example.
(>>> 7.8.5.3 "Performing a brake test for further axes (e.g. couplable
axes)" Page 165)
BrakeTestPark.src The parking position of the robot must be taught in this program.
If, during the brake test, a brake has been identified as being defec-
tive, the robot is moved to the parking position following confirmation.
BrakeTestStart.src The start position of the brake test can be taught in this program. The
robot starts the brake test from this position.
If the start position is not taught, the robot performs the brake test at
the actual position.
BrakeTestBack.src The end position of the brake test can be taught in this program. The
robot moves to this position after the brake test.
If the end position is not taught, the robot remains at the actual posi-
tion after the brake test.
7.8.4 Overview of the brake test setup
Step Description
In WorkVisual or on the robot controller:
1 Activate the brake test; define the cycle time and axes
• On the robot controller:

(>>> 7.8.4.1 "Activating the brake test, defining the
cycle time and axes" Page 153)
• In WorkVisual: Information about activating the brake
test in WorkVisual is contained in the WorkVisual
documentation.
On the robot controller:
2 Configure input and output signals for the brake test.
(>>> 7.8.4.3 "Configuring input and output signals for the
brake test" Page 155)


Step Description
3 Teach positions for the brake test.
(>>> 7.8.4.5 "Teaching positions for the brake test"
Page 159)
4 Test the sequence.
(>>> 7.8.4.6 "Testing the sequence in the case of defec-
tive brakes" Page 160)
7.8.4.1 Activating the brake test, defining the cycle time and axes
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure
1. In the main menu, select Configuration > Brake test configuration.

The Brake test configuration window opens.
(>>> 7.8.4.2 "“Brake test configuration” window" Page 154)
2. If necessary, activate or deactivate the check box for Forcedin the
Current configuration column.
3. Also make the desired settings for the cycle time and axes in the Cur-
rent configuration column.
4. Press the Activate button.
The message Reconfiguration in progress ... is displayed. The mes-
sage disappears automatically when reconfiguration has been comple-
ted. The new settings for the brake test are now saved and valid.

7.8.4.2 “Brake test configuration” window

Fig. 7-27: “Brake test configuration” window
Element Description
Configurations are • LED lights up green: The settings in the Active Configuration
identical and Current configuration columns are identical.
• LED lights up red: The settings are not identical.
Checksum Checksum of the brake test configuration in the corresponding column
• Checksums in both columns are identical:

The settings in the columns are identical. Corresponds to the
green LED for Configurations are identical.
• Checksums not identical:
The settings are not identical. Corresponds to the red LED.
Current configura- The settings can be modified in this column. The most recent modifi-
tion cations are shown.


Element Description
Active Configuration This column displays the valid settings. A check mark next to an axis
means that the axis is selected for the brake test.
This column is used for display purposes only. Modifications are not
possible here.
Forced • Check box not active: Automatic response of the brake test
‒ A safety option is installed and safe monitoring is active. The
brake test is thus automatically active.
‒ Or:
No safety option is installed or safe monitoring is not active.
The brake test is thus automatically inactive.
• Check box active: Forced response
The brake test has been explicitly activated by the user (Here or
in WorkVisual). It is active, irrespective of safety options or safe
monitoring.
Note: The Forced check box WITHOUT a check mark does not indi-
cate whether the brake test is active or not!
The state of the brake test is indicated in the Safety configuration
window on the Common tab:
• Activated: The brake test is active for at least one axis.

• Deactivated: The brake test is not active for any axis.
Cycle time [h] The cycle time specifies the interval at which the brake test is to be
executed.
• 1 … 1000
Default: 46. Unit: hours
[Axis no.]:[Robot type] The robot axes and external axes for which the brake test is to be
executed can be selected here. By default, all axes are selected.
The following external axes cannot be selected:
1. External axes that are simulated

2. External axes that are configured as couplable
3. External axes with motors that are grouped together into a cou-
pling group
Activate Saves the settings of the Current configuration column. The system
then automatically performs a reconfiguration. Once reconfiguration is
completed, new settings are valid and are displayed in the Active
Configuration column.
Activate is only available if the 2 columns have different settings.
Reset to active con- Resets the Current configuration column to the settings from the
figuration Active Configuration column.
Only available if the 2 columns have different settings.
7.8.4.3 Configuring input and output signals for the brake test
Description
All signals for the brake test are declared in the file $machine.dat in the
directory KRC:\STEU\MADA.

WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to incorrectly used signals
These signals are not redundant in design and can supply incorrect in-
formation. If they are used for safety-relevant applications, this may re-
sult in death, severe injuries or considerable damage to property.
• Do not use these signals for safety-relevant applications.
Precondition
• User rights: Function group Critical KRL program changes
Procedure
1. Open the file $machine.dat in the directory KRC:\STEU\MADA in the

Navigator.
2. Assign inputs and outputs.
3. Save and close the file.
$machine.dat
Extract from the file $machine.dat (with default settings, without com-
ments):
...
SIGNAL $BRAKETEST_REQ_EX $IN[1026]
SIGNAL $BRAKETEST_MONTIME FALSE
...
SIGNAL $BRAKETEST_REQ_INT FALSE
SIGNAL $BRAKETEST_WORK FALSE
SIGNAL $BRAKES_OK FALSE
SIGNAL $BRAKETEST_WARN FALSE
...
Signals
There is 1 input signal. By default, it is routed to $IN[1026].

The output signals are preset to FALSE. There is no need to assign out-
put numbers to them.
Signal Description
$BRAKETEST_REQ_EX Input
• TRUE = brake test is being requested externally (e.g. by

PLC). The robot controller confirms the signal with
$BRAKETEST_REQ_INT = TRUE and generates message
27004.
• FALSE = brake test is not being requested externally.
$BRAKETEST_MONTIME Output
• TRUE = robot was stopped due to elapsed monitoring time.

Acknowledgement message 27002 is generated.
• FALSE = acknowledgement message 27002 is not active.
(Not generated, or has been acknowledged.)


Signal Description
$BRAKETEST_REQ_INT Output
• TRUE = message 27004 is active.

The signal is not set to FALSE again until a brake test is
carried out with a positive result, i.e. with message 27012.
• FALSE = brake test is not requested (either internally or ex-
ternally).
$BRAKETEST_WORK Output
• TRUE = brake test is currently being performed.

• FALSE = brake test is not being performed.
If no defective brakes have been detected, message 27012
is generated.
Edge TRUE → FALSE:
• Test was successfully completed. No brake is defective.

Message 27012 is generated.
• Or at least 1 defective brake was detected and the robot
has moved to the parking position.
• Or the program was canceled during execution of the brake
test.
$BRAKES_OK Output
• Edge FALSE → TRUE: Output was set to FALSE by the

previous brake test. The brake test was carried out again
and no defective brake was detected.
• Edge TRUE → FALSE: A brake has just been detected as
defective. Message 27007 is generated.
This signal does not take any couplable axes into account.
$BRAKETEST_WARN Output
• Edge FALSE → TRUE: At least 1 brake has been detected

as having reached the wear limit. Message 27001 is gener-
ated at the same time.
• Edge TRUE → FALSE: Output was set to TRUE by the
previous brake test. The brake test was carried out again
and no worn brake was detected.
This signal does not take any couplable axes into account.
Messages
No. Message
27000 Test of brakes {Axis bit mask} not executed because axes
are simulated
27001 Brake {Brake no.}{Axis no.} has reached the wear limit
27002 Cyclical check for brake test request not made
27003 Brake test for axes {Axis bit mask} required
27004 Brake test required
27007 Insufficient holding torque of brake {Brake no.}{Axis no.}
27009 Brake {Brake no.}{Axis no.} OK
27010 Unable to verify performance of brake {Brake}{Axis}
27012 Brake test successful

7.8.4.4 Signal diagram of the brake test – examples

Example 1
The signal diagram for the brake test applies in the following case:
• No brake has reached the wear limit.
• No brake is defective.
Fig. 7-28: Signal diagram: brakes OK
Item Description
1 The brake test is requested.
2 Automatic call of the program BrakeTestReq.src
Start of the brake test
3 The brake test is completed.
Example 2
The signal diagram for the brake test applies in the following case:
• Brake A2 is worn.
• Brake A4 is defective.
Fig. 7-29: Signal diagram: brakes not OK


Item Description
1 The brake test is requested.
$BRAKETEST_REQ_INT is not set to FALSE again until a
brake test is carried out with a positive result.
2 Automatic call of the program BrakeTestReq.src
Start of the brake test
3 Brake A2 is tested: brake is worn.
4 Brake A4 is tested: brake is defective.
5 The robot has been moved to the parking position or the pro-
gram has been canceled.
7.8.4.5 Teaching positions for the brake test
Description
Start position and end position

The start position and end position can be taught.
• If the start position is not taught, the robot performs the brake test at
the actual position.
• If the end position is not taught, the robot remains at the actual posi-
tion after the brake test.
Parking position
A suitable parking position must be taught.
If, during the brake test, a brake has been identified as being defective,
the robot is moved to the parking position following confirmation.
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to unfavorable parking position
A defective brake may cause the robot to sag, even if it is already in
the parking position.
• Select the parking position where no persons are endangered if the
robot sags.
The transport position, for example, can be selected as the parking
position. Further information about the transport position is contained
in the robot operating or assembly instructions.
Precondition

‒ Jogging with the jog keys or alternatively Jogging using the 6D
mouse
‒ Teach local points
• All output signals are assigned to outputs.
• T1 mode
Procedure
Start position:
1. Open the program BrakeTestStart.src in the directory R1\TP\BrakeTest.
2. Teach the motions to the start position of the brake test.

• The motions must be taught in such a way that the robot cannot
cause a collision on the way to the start position.
• In the start position, each robot axis to be tested must have a suf-
ficient motion range.
During the brake test, rotational axes move a maximum of 5° in
the direction in which the software limit switch is situated further
away; linear axes a maximum of 10 cm.
3. Save and close the program.
End position:
1. Open the program BrakeTestBack.src in the directory R1\TP\BrakeT-
est.
2. Teach the motions from the start position to the end position of the
brake test.
The start and end position may be identical.
Parking position:
1. Open the program BrakeTestPark.src in the directory R1\TP\BrakeTest.
2. Teach the motions from the end position to the parking position of the
robot.
Alternatively, the parking position can also be taught later when testing
the sequence.
(>>> 7.8.4.6 "Testing the sequence in the case of defective brakes"
Page 160)
7.8.4.6 Testing the sequence in the case of defective brakes
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to unfavorable parking position
A defective brake may cause the robot to sag, even if it is already in
the parking position.
• Select the parking position where no persons are endangered if the
robot sags.
The transport position, for example, can be selected as the parking
position. Further information about the transport position is contained
in the robot operating or assembly instructions.
Description
The robot controller simulates a defective brake.
Precondition

• In the start position, an adequate motion range is available for each
axis to be tested. (Or, if no start position has been taught, in the ac-
tual position.)
During the brake test, rotational axes move a maximum of 5° in the
direction in which the software limit switch is situated further away; lin-
ear axes a maximum of 10 cm.


Procedure
1. Select the program BrakeTestReq.src in the directory R1\TP\BrakeT-

est.
The following message is displayed: Start key required
2. Press the Start key.
The following message is displayed: Should the brake test be car-
ried out manually or should the movement to the parking position
be checked?
3. Select the answer Park pos..
4. The BCO run is performed. The message Programmed path reached
(BCO) is displayed.
The following message is displayed: CAUTION! Braking effect of the
holding brakes no longer sufficient to hold the robot safely. Triggering
safety functions or switching off the drives can cause the robot to sag.
Following confirmation, the parking position/wait position is addressed..
Confirm the message with Park pos..
• The robot moves to the parking position if the parking position has
already been taught.
• If the parking position has not yet been taught, the following mes-
sage is displayed:
Parking position is invalid. Move the robot to the correct posi-
tion and press the “Touch Up” softkey.
In this case, move the robot manually to the desired parking posi-
tion and teach the position.
7.8.5 Performing a brake test
7.8.5.1 Performing a brake test for requested axes (cyclically via program)
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to entering the danger zone premature-
ly
A defective brake may cause the robot to sag.
• Do not enter the danger zone until the robot has reached its parking
position.
NOTICE
Damage to property during motion to the parking position
If a brake is defective, the robot may sag when it is stopped.
• Avoid stops during the motion to the parking position, as sagging
could result in damage to property.
In particular, it must be taken into consideration that certain actions
trigger stops (e.g. E-STOP, opening safety gate, changing operating
mode), as do certain monitoring functions (e.g. monitoring spaces).
A defective brake can result in longer stopping distances.
• Approach the parking position at low velocity.

Description
With BrakeTestReq.src, the axes for which there is a brake test request
can be tested. The axes can either be tested in a single cycle or the test
can be divided into several shorter cycles.
This allows, for example, small breaks in the application to be utilized
for testing individual axes.
Precondition
To integrate the program:

Procedure
Test in a single cycle:

Integrate BrakeTestReq.src into a suitable program (e.g. into CELL.src or
into the application program) in such a way that it is called cyclically as a
subprogram. If a brake test is requested, BrakeTestReq.src detects the re-
quest and starts the brake test.
• Call BrakeTestReq.src without parameters:
BrakeTestReq()
Further information:
The axes are tested in a single cycle, from the lowest axis number to the
highest.
Alternative procedure
Test divided into several shorter cycles:

Integrate BrakeTestReq.src into a suitable program in such a way that it is
called cyclically as a subprogram. If a brake test is requested, BrakeTest-
Req.src detects the request and starts the brake test.
• When calling BrakeTestReq.src, transfer the axes to be tested as pa-
rameters.
Further information:
• One or more of the requested axes can be tested per cycle. The indi-
vidual cycles do not have to follow one another directly.
• The order of the cycles is irrelevant. A cycle to test A6, for example,
can be called first. If multiple axes are tested in one cycle, however,
the lowest axis will always be tested first.
• In total, all requested axes must be tested. This must occur within the
monitoring time.
Parameter
The axes to be tested can be transferred as an integer or as a bit mask.

Bit 0 corresponds to A1; bit 1 to A2; …; bit 6 to A7/E1; …; bit 11 to
A12/E6.
Example for A1 and A3, as an integer:
BrakeTestReq(5)
Example for A1 and A3, as a bit mask:
BrakeTestReq('b101')

No parameter or parameter “-1” means: all active axes.

Example
In this example, the lowest numbered axis from amongst the axes with a
currently requested brake test is tested. Such an example can be integra-
ted into the application cycle at a suitable point in order to test one axis
per cycle.
int axes_bit_mask, test_bit_mask, counter

...
1 axes_bit_mask = get_axesmask(#braketest_required)
2 test_bit_mask = 1
3 if axes_bit_mask > 0 then
4 for counter=1 to 12
5 if (axes_bit_mask B_AND test_bit_mask) > 0 THEN
6 counter = 13
7 else
8 test_bit_mask = test_bit_mask*2
9 endif
10 endfor
11 braketestreq(test_bit_mask)
12 endif
...
Line Description
1 Query for which axes the brake test is currently requested.
2 By way of preparation, set the lowest possible axis (in this
case, A1) as the axis to be tested.
3 to 12 If there is a request for at least one axis, the IF block is
executed. It contains a counting loop.
4 to 10 The counting loop is designed in such a way that, upon ex-
iting it, test_bit_mask always corresponds to the lowest
axis of all those to be tested.
6 Exit the counting loop.
11 Call the brake test for the axis to be tested
test_bit_mask.
7.8.5.2 Performing a brake test for active axes (manually)
WARNING
ly
position.

NOTICE
Description
This procedure can be used to test the active axes. The axes are tested
in a single cycle, from the lowest axis number to the highest.
This procedure can be used to process an existing brake test request.
Precondition

• In the start position, an adequate motion range is available for each
axis to be tested. (Or, if no start position has been taught, in the ac-
tual position.)
During the brake test, rotational axes move a maximum of 5° in the
direction in which the software limit switch is situated further away; lin-
ear axes a maximum of 10 cm.
Procedure
1. Select the program BrakeTestReq.src in the directory R1\TP\BrakeT-

est.
The following message is displayed: Start key required
The following message is displayed: Should the brake test be car-
ried out manually or should the movement to the parking position
be checked?
3. Select the answer BT man..
4. The BCO run is performed. The message Programmed path reached
(BCO) is displayed.
The following message is displayed: Brake test for axes {Axis bit
mask} required. The message lists the active axes.
The program now tests the brakes/axes successively, starting with the
lowest axis number.
6. Possible results:
• If a brake is OK, this is indicated by the following message: Brake
{Brake no.}{Axis no.} OK.
The message Brake test for axes {Axis bit mask} required then re-
appears. It now only lists the axes that have not yet been tested.
The program automatically tests the next axis.
If all brakes are OK, this is indicated after the brake test by the
following message: Brake test successful. (It is possible that one
or more brakes may have reached the wear limit. This is also indi-
cated by a message.)

Now deselect the program BrakeTestReq.src.

• If a brake is defective, this is indicated by the following message:
Insufficient holding torque of brake {Brake no.}{Axis no.}. The test
continues until all brakes have been tested.
Once all brakes have been tested, the following message is dis-
played: CAUTION! Braking effect of the holding brakes no longer
sufficient to hold the robot safely. Triggering safety functions or
switching off the drives can cause the robot to sag. Following con-
firmation, the parking position/wait position is addressed..
Now press Park pos. to move the robot to the parking position.
7.8.5.3 Performing a brake test for further axes (e.g. couplable axes)
WARNING
ly
position.
NOTICE
Description
With BrakeTestAxes.src, axes for which there is no brake test request can
be tested. In particular, it also enables the testing of axes which cannot
be activated for the brake test and thus cannot be tested via BrakeTest-
Req(). Couplable axes fall into this category, for example.
Precondition
To integrate the program:

Procedure
Integrate BrakeTestAxes.src into a suitable program in such a way that it

is called as a subprogram.
• When calling BrakeTestAxes.src, transfer the axes to be tested as pa-
rameters.
Parameters
The axes to be tested can be transferred as an integer or as a bit mask.

Bit 0 corresponds to A1; bit 1 to A2; …; bit 6 to A7/E1; …; bit 11 to
A12/E6.
Example for A7/E1, as an integer:

BrakeTestReq(64)
Example for A7/E1, as a bit mask:
BrakeTestReq('b1000000')
No parameter or parameter “-1” means: all active axes.
Additional info
In principle, it is also possible to use BrakeTestAxes(axes) to test one or

more axes for which there is a request. When calling the test, the axes
must be transferred as parameters in this case too.
An existing brake test request can be processed using BrakeTestAxes.src.
If BrakeTestAxes.src is called for an active axis, this triggers a request
for all active axes! As usual, the request must be processed within the
monitoring time. It is therefore not possible to test individual active axes
using BrakeTestAxes.src.
7.8.6 Automatic brake check
Description
The default cycle time of the brake test is 46 hours. In order to detect de-
fective brakes as early as possible, however, even before the end of the
cycle time, the robot controller performs an additional, automatic brake
check.
If the brake check indicates that a brake might be defective, a brake test
must be performed for verification.
Decoupled axes and force-controlled axes are excluded from the brake
check.
Sequence
1. If a brake has been applied, the robot controller automatically checks

whether the axis is still moving. Motions within a narrow, internally de-
fined tolerance range are allowed.
The tolerance range corresponds to half of the standstill window.
The standstill window is: $IN_POS_MA[axis] * $IN_STILL_MA.
Further information about these system variables can be found in
the documentation Configuration of Kinematic Systems.
2. If the tolerance range is exceeded, this indicates that the brake is de-
fective. In this case, the robot controller switches the axis back to ser-
vo control to prevent it from sagging. The axis is now in the “BrakeDe-
fect” state.
Furthermore, the status message Brake defective, {Axis} permanently
under servo control is displayed.
3. The further procedure depends on whether or not the brake test is ac-
tive for the corresponding axis:
• Brake test is active:
The robot controller sets $BRAKETEST_REQ_INT to TRUE and
generates the following message: Brake test required. A brake test
must be performed within the next 2 hours, otherwise the robot will
stop!
• Brake test is not active:

The robot stops and the acknowledgement message Stop due to

defective brake is displayed.
The message can be acknowledged and the robot movement can
be resumed. The axis remains permanently under servo control,
i.e. its brakes are no longer applied. (Except if the safety controller
resets the “Motion enable” input.)
In order to enable the brakes to close again, a brake test must be
performed manually!
4. Once a brake test has been performed and has indicated that the axis
is working correctly, the status message Brake defective, {Axis} perma-
nently under servo control disappears again.
BrakeDefect
If an axis is in the “BrakeDefect” state, the robot controller ignores brake

closing requests for this axis and for the axes on the same brake channel.
If an axis is in the “BrakeDefect” state, its brakes nevertheless close in
the following case: the safety controller resets the “Motion enable” input,
e.g. in the case of an EMERGENCY STOP or short-circuit braking.
7.8.7 System functions for the brake test
7.8.7.1 GET_AXESMASK: requesting information about the axes for the brake
test
Description
Various queries concerning the axes involved in the brake test can be car-
ried out.
Syntax
result = GET_AXESMASK(axes)

Element Description
result Variable for the return value, type: INT
Bit mask, i.e. specification of which axes are involved
axes Type: ENUM AXESMASK_INFO
• #BRAKETEST_CONFIGURED
Axes configured for the brake test
Corresponds to the axes in the Active Configuration
column in the Brake test configuration window.
• #BRAKETEST_ACTIVATED
‒ If the brake test is active, the return value is as
for #BRAKETEST_CONFIGURED.
‒ If the brake test is not active, the return value is
“0”.
• #BRAKETEST_REQUIRED
Axes for which the brake test is currently requested
• #BRAKETEST_UNTESTED
Axes for which the state of the brake is BT_UNTES-
TED. Axes not configured for the brake test are also
included.
• #BRAKETEST_BRAKES_OK
Axes found to be OK in the most recent brake test
Example
Query for which axis the brake test is currently requested:
int axes_bit_mask
...
axes_bit_mask = get_axesmask(#braketest_required)
7.8.7.2 GET_BRAKETEST_TIME: requesting time values for brake test
Description
Various time values related to the brake test can be polled.
Syntax
result = GET_BRAKETEST_TIME(time_type)


Element Description
result Variable for the return value, type: REAL
Time (unit: h)
time_type Times that can be polled
Type: ENUM BRAKETEST_TIME_INFO
• #BT_CONFIG_CYCLE_TIME
Cycle time for the brake test
Corresponds to the Cycle time [h] box in the Brake
test configuration window.
• #BT_REMAINING_CYCLE_TIME
Remaining cycle time
• #BT_REMAINING_MON_TIME
Remaining monitoring time
Total monitoring time: following the message Brake test required, the robot
can be moved for another 2 hours.
7.9 Override reduction
Override reduction is not a safety function.
Overview
Override reduction is a function that can be activated using system varia-

bles.
• Override reduction for velocity limits
Override reduction prevents velocity limits that are monitored by the
safety controller from being exceeded.
‒ Activation via $SR_VEL_RED
(>>> 7.9.1 "$SR_VEL_RED" Page 170)
‒ Reduction factor via $SR_OV_RED
(>>> 7.9.2 "$SR_OV_RED" Page 171)
‒ Example: (>>> 7.9.6 "Changing workspace: override reduction for
velocity limits (example without BBRA)" Page 176)
• Override reduction before space limits
The override reduction ensures short stopping distances if the robot is
stopped due to a space violation or a foreseeable space violation.
‒ Activation via $SR_WORKSPACE_RED
(>>> 7.9.3 "$SR_WORKSPACE_RED" Page 172)
‒ Only affects monitoring spaces for which the “Stop at boundaries”
function has been configured
‒ Active in T2, AUT and AUT EXT modes
‒ Generally inactive in T1 mode, i.e. it is also inactive if override re-
duction is activated via $SR_WORKSPACE_RED
‒ Dependent on the “Braking before restricted areas” function
(>>> 7.9.4 "Override reduction before space limits without BBRA"
Page 172)
(>>> 7.9.5 "Override reduction before space limits with BBRA"
Page 174)

Override reduction with/without spline
• If the motion is carried out without spline, then override reduction only
affects Cartesian velocity limits.
• If motion is carried out with spline, override reduction affects Cartesian
and axis-specific velocity limits.
Override reduction has an effect … With spline Without

spline
before space limits Cartesian
(in T2, AUT and Axis-specific
AUT EXT)
on space-specific ve- Cartesian space
locity
Axis-specific space
on velocity limits Cartesian velocity
• Maximum velocity (not space-

dependent)
• Reduced velocity
• Reduced velocity in T1
Axis velocity
• Maximum velocity (valid global-

ly for every axis)
• Reduced velocity
• Maximum velocity in T1
Spline is a motion type that is suitable for particularly complex, curved
paths. Such paths can also be generated using approximated LIN and
CIRC motions, but splines have advantages, however.
The advantages of spline include:
• The path always remains the same, irrespective of the override set-
ting, velocity or acceleration.
• Circles and tight radii are executed with great precision.
It is advisable to use spline for optimal override reduction, e.g. in the case
of frequent motion along the workspace limits.
Further information about motion programming with spline is contained
in the “Operating and Programming Instructions for System Integrators”.
7.9.1 $SR_VEL_RED
Description
Activation of the override reduction function for velocity limits

If override reduction is active, the velocity is automatically reduced so that
the lowest velocity limit currently monitored by the safety controller is not
exceeded.
The extent of the override reduction can be set using the variable
$SR_OV_RED.
Writability
The variable can be modified in $custom.dat in KRC:\STEU\Mada.

The variable can also be modified via the variable display or in the pro-

gram. Modifying the variable triggers an advance run stop.
Syntax
$SR_VEL_RED = state
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
• TRUE: Override reduction is activated.

• FALSE: Override reduction is deactivated.
Default: TRUE
7.9.2 $SR_OV_RED
Description
Reduction factor for the smallest monitored velocity limit as a percentage

If the override reduction for velocity limits is active ($SR_VEL_RED =
TRUE), the smallest currently monitored velocity limit is reduced to the set
percentage value using the variable $SR_OV_RED.
Writability

Syntax
$SR_OV_RED = reduction factor
Element Description
reduction Type: INT; unit: %
factor
• 10 … 95
Default: 75
Example
The override reduction is configured with a reduction factor of 95%:

• $SR_VEL_RED = TRUE
• $SR_OV_RED = 95
The lowest Cartesian velocity limit active on the safety controller is a re-
duced velocity of 1 000 mm/s. The override reduction function reduces the
Cartesian velocity at the safety-oriented TCP of the active tool to 950 mm/
s. The override reduction function is only triggered if it is foreseeable that
the limit of 950 mm/s will be exceeded without velocity reduction.

Fig. 7-30: Override reduction with $SR_VEL_RED
v3 Maximum Cartesian velocity; v3 = 1 200 mm/s

v2 Reduced Cartesian velocity; v2 = 1 000 mm/s
v1 Velocity v2 * reduction factor; v1 = 1 000 mm/s * 95% = 950 mm/s
t1 Override reduction is triggered: It is foreseeable that the limit v1
will be exceeded without the reduction in velocity.
t2 Override reduction is no longer triggered.
7.9.3 $SR_WORKSPACE_RED
Description
Activation of the override reduction function before space limits

Override reduction takes effect before limits of monitoring spaces for
which the function “Stop at boundaries” has been configured. When the
robot approaches the space limit with override reduction activated, the ve-
locity is continuously reduced. If the safety controller triggers a stop at the
space limit, the robot stops faster owing to the reduced velocity.
Writability

Syntax
$SR_WORKSPACE_RED = state
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
• TRUE: Override reduction is activated.

• FALSE: Override reduction is deactivated.
Default: TRUE
7.9.4 Override reduction before space limits without BBRA
Description
When the robot approaches the space limit with override reduction activa-
ted, the velocity is continuously reduced. When the robot moves over the

space limit and is stopped, the velocity has already been greatly reduced.

The stopping distance is short and the robot quickly comes to a standstill.
When the robot approaches the space limit with override reduction deacti-
vated, the velocity is not reduced. The robot is still moving at full velocity
when it is stopped at the space limit. The robot does not come to a stand-
still as quickly as with override reduction active, as the stopping distance
is greater due to the higher velocity.
Example
A Cartesian protected space is configured into which the robot may not
move. If the robot approaches the protected space, override reduction is
triggered and reduces the velocity. If the robot attempts to enter the pro-
tected space, a safety stop 0 is triggered at the space limit.
The following preconditions are met:
System variables:
• $SR_WORKSPACE_RED = TRUE
Safety configuration:

• The “Braking before restricted areas” function is deactivated.
• The “Stop at boundaries” function is active.
• At least one tool sphere on the active tool is monitored.
• The protected space is switched to active.
With spline (red line), override reduction reduces the Cartesian velocity at
the safety-oriented TCP of the active tool to a value that roughly corre-
sponds to a program override of 1% while it is still in the permissible
range. The robot enters the Cartesian protected space with this velocity
and is stopped with a safety stop 0.
Without spline (blue line), the Cartesian velocity is reduced while in the
permissible range, but the override reduction function is not usually trig-
gered early enough. The robot enters the Cartesian protected space at a
higher velocity than with spline. Here, once again, the robot stops with a
safety stop 0, but the braking reaction is more abrupt and the stopping
distance greater.
Fig. 7-31: Moving into a protected space
1 Permissible range 2 Cartesian protected space

7.9.5 Override reduction before space limits with BBRA
Description
When the robot approaches the space limit with override reduction activa-
ted, the velocity is continuously reduced to prevent the safety function
from being triggered. If necessary, the override is reduced to 0% if, for ex-
ample, the path being executed leads into a protected space.
If the robot is positioned before a temporarily activated space with 0%
override in T2 or AUT mode, it will resume its motion without any
further intervention as soon as the space is deactivated.
If the override cannot be reduced quickly enough to prevent safe space

monitoring from being triggered, then a path-maintaining EMERGENCY
STOP is executed.
When the robot approaches the space limit with override reduction deacti-
vated, the velocity is not reduced and the robot is stopped by the safety
controller with a safety stop 1 DRS. In this case, the robot does not nor-
mally come to a stop on the path. Instead, it deviates from this path be-
cause the safety stop 1 DRS is not path-maintaining.
Fig. 7-32: Overview: step-by-step prevention of space violation with BBRA


Example 1
move. In the example, the path leads into the protected space.
System variables:

• The “Braking before restricted areas” function is activated.
The override reduction function reduces the Cartesian velocity at the safe-
ty-oriented TCP of the active tool down to a standstill within the permissi-
ble range. This prevents the robot from reaching the Cartesian protected
space. If it is a temporary protected space and it is deactivated, the robot
resumes its motion without further intervention.
Fig. 7-33: Stop before space limit using override reduction
1 The robot is braked to a standstill on the path.

2 Protected space
3 Fictitious STOP 1 - DRS end positions monitored by the safety
controller do not violate the space because the velocity is suffi-
ciently reduced.
In the event that the override reduction does not reduce the velocity quick-
ly enough, the safety controller stops the robot with a safety stop 1 DRS
as soon as it detects that the end position of such a stop would violate
the space.
Fig. 7-34: Stop before space limit without override reduction

1 Robot is stopped by the safety controller using a safety

stop 1 DRS if there is an impending space violation.
2 Protected space
Example 2
move. In the example, the path runs very closely past the protected
space.
System variables:

• The “Braking before restricted areas” function is activated.
When the robot approaches a protected space boundary, its Cartesian ve-
locity at the safety-oriented TCP of the active tool is reduced to such an
extent that the fictitious STOP 1 - DRS end position remains outside the
protected space. This makes use of the fact that the braking distance of a
safety stop 1 DRS is shortened on account of the reduced velocity.
In some cases, it may not be possible to reduce the velocity quickly
enough to prevent the stop point from penetrating the protected space. In
this case, a path-maintaining EMERGENCY STOP is triggered to prevent
a safety function from being violated and the safety controller from execut-
ing a non-path-maintaining safety stop 1 DRS as a result.
(>>> Fig. 7-32)
7.9.6 Changing workspace: override reduction for velocity limits (example

without BBRA)
A change of workspace is carried out from one Cartesian workspace to

another Cartesian workspace with a lower space-specific velocity vmax.
System variables:
• $SR_VEL_RED = TRUE
• $SR_OV_RED = 80
Due to override reduction with $SR_OV_RED = 80, a maximum of 80
percent of the configured space-specific velocity vmax is reached in the
workspaces.

• The “Braking before restricted areas” function is deactivated.
• The workspace with the lower space-specific velocity vmax is switched
to active (permanently for preference).
• The space-specific velocity vmax is valid if the workspace is not viola-
ted.

With spline (red line), override reduction reduces the Cartesian velocity at

the safety-oriented TCP of the active tool in good time in the old work-
space and moves into the new workspace with the lower space-specific
velocity.
Without spline (blue line), the Cartesian velocity is reduced in the old
workspace, but the override reduction function is not usually triggered ear-
ly enough. The lower space-specific velocity of the new workspace has
not yet been reached at the space limit and the robot stops with a safety
stop 0.
Fig. 7-35: Changing to a workspace with a lower vmax
1 Cartesian workspace with vmax = 1,000 mm/s,

reduced to 800 mm/s
2 Cartesian workspace with vmax = 500 mm/s,
reduced to 400 mm/s
7.10 Safety acceptance overview
Description
The system must not be put into operation until the safety acceptance
procedure has been completed successfully. Using checklists, check and
document that all safety functions are configured correctly and work cor-
rectly.
Safety acceptance must be carried out in the following cases:
• Following initial start-up and recommissioning of the industrial robot
• After a change to the industrial robot
• After a change to the safety configuration
‒ The change log must be checked after every modification of the
(>>> 6.6 "Displaying the revision log" Page 84)
‒ It is also advisable to print out the data set containing the safety
parameters using WorkVisual.
• After a software update, e.g. of the System Software
Safety acceptance after a software update is only necessary if the ac-
tivation code of the safety configuration changes as a result of the up-
date.
Checklists
The safety acceptance procedure can be carried out and documented us-
ing the checklists in the appendix or using your own checklists.

• The items in the checklist must be completed fully and confirmed in

writing.
• The completed checklists, confirmed in writing, must be kept as docu-
mentary evidence.
Checklists in the appendix:
• Checklist for robot and system

(>>> 11.1.2 "Checklist: Robot and system" Page 269)
• Checklist for safety functions
• Checklist for safety-oriented tools
(>>> 11.1.4 "Checklist: Safety-oriented tools" Page 275)
• Checklist for cell area
(>>> 11.1.5 "Checklist: Cell area" Page 280)
• Checklist for Cartesian monitoring spaces
(>>> 11.1.6 "Checklist: Cartesian monitoring spaces" Page 282)
• Checklist for axis-specific monitoring spaces
(>>> 11.1.7 "Checklist: Axis-specific monitoring spaces" Page 284)
• Checklist for Cartesian velocity monitoring functions
(>>> 11.1.8 "Checklist: Cartesian velocity monitoring functions"
Page 288)
• Checklist for axis-specific velocity monitoring functions
(>>> 11.1.9 "Checklist: axis-specific velocity monitoring functions"
Page 290)
• Checklist for safe operational stop for axis groups
(>>> 11.1.10 "Checklist: Safe operational stop for axis groups"
Page 293)
• Checklist for “Braking before restricted areas” function
(>>> 11.1.11 "Checklist: Braking before restricted areas" Page 295)
7.11 Checking the safety functions for correct operation
7.11.1 Checking a safety-oriented tool
Description
The configuration of every safety-oriented tool must be checked as fol-

lows:
1. The specified geometry data of the safety-oriented tool must match
the geometry data entered in the safety configuration.
2. A Cartesian monitoring space must be violated once with each sphere
of the safety-oriented tool:
• If “Stop at boundaries” is configured, the safety controller stops the
robot as soon as a sphere of the safety-oriented tool violates the
boundary.
• If “Stop at boundaries” is not configured, an alarm space can be
used for the check.
Precondition
• At least 1 monitoring space is activated for the tool to be tested.

• Override reduction is deactivated:


‒ $SR_WORKSPACE_RED = FALSE
‒ $SR_VEL_RED = FALSE
• T1 mode
• Checklist:
‒ (>>> 11.1.4 "Checklist: Safety-oriented tools" Page 275)
Procedure
The following steps must be carried out for each sphere of a safety-orien-
ted tool.
SAFETY INSTRUCTION
1. Move the sphere that is to be checked up to the boundaries of a
monitoring space using the jog keys or the 6D mouse.
2. If the outer shell of a sphere makes contact with the boundary, ei-
ther the robot must stop or the corresponding safety-oriented output
must be set via an alarm space.
3. If the robot does not stop, or if no safety-oriented output is set,
check the configuration, correct if necessary, and check the sphere
again.
4. Check the active messages.
With the space violation, the following messages must be displayed:
• Monitoring space no. {Number of monitoring space} exceeded
• Ackn.: Stop because workspace exceeded
5. If no message or different messages are displayed, check the con-
figuration, correct if necessary, and check the sphere again.
7.11.2 Checking a cell area
Description
The cell area is a Cartesian monitoring space and, depending on the con-
figuration, consists of 5, 6 or more space surfaces. The space surfaces
can have any orientation.
To check the correct configuration of the cell area, at least 2 different
points on each space surface must be addressed by means of a test pro-
gram:
• If the check is successful, the safety controller stops the robot every
time there is contact with one of the space surfaces.
• Space surfaces that cannot be addressed due to circumstances in the
system are excluded from the check.
Fig. 7-36: Moving to space surfaces

Precondition
• Monitoring spaces that can be activated by means of safety-oriented

inputs have been deactivated.
• T1 mode
• Checklist:
‒ (>>> 11.1.5 "Checklist: Cell area" Page 280)
Procedure
SAFETY INSTRUCTION
1. Create a test program in which all points to be addressed for check-
ing the space surfaces are taught.
2. Execute the test program in T1 mode.
3. Every time there is contact with the space surface, the robot must
stop and the following message must be displayed:
• Cell area exceeded
4. If the robot does not stop, or if either no message or a different
message is displayed, check the configuration and the test program
and correct if necessary. Then execute the test program again.
7.11.3 Checking Cartesian monitoring spaces
Description
A Cartesian monitoring space consists of 6 space surfaces. The space

surfaces can have any orientation.
To check the correct configuration of a Cartesian monitoring space, at
least 3 different points on each space surface must be addressed by
means of a test program:
• If “Stop at boundaries” is configured, the safety controller stops the ro-
bot every time there is contact with one of the space surfaces.
• If “Stop at boundaries” is not configured, an alarm space can be used
for the check.
• Space surfaces that cannot be addressed due to circumstances in the
system are excluded from the check.
Fig. 7-37: Moving to space surfaces
When checking a Cartesian monitoring space on a KL, the linear unit

must also be moved. It must be ensured that the monitoring space
moves with the linear unit and does not remain stationary.

Checking the monitoring space also includes checking the following func-

tionalities (insofar as they are configured/activated):
(>>> 7.11.5 "Checking the space-specific velocity" Page 182)
• Stop if mastering test not yet done
Precondition
• The monitoring space to be checked is activated.

• T1 mode
• Checklist:
‒ (>>> 11.1.6 "Checklist: Cartesian monitoring spaces" Page 282)
Procedure
SAFETY INSTRUCTION
1. Create a test program in which all points to be addressed for check-
ing the space surfaces are taught.
3. Every time there is contact with the space surface, either the robot
must stop or the corresponding safety-oriented output must be set
via an alarm space.
check the configuration and the test program and correct if necessa-
ry. Then execute the test program again.
figuration and the test program and correct if necessary. Then exe-
cute the test program again.
7.11.4 Checking axis-specific monitoring spaces
Description
In order to check the correct configuration of the monitoring space, the

configured axis limits must be violated one after the other.
• If “Stop at boundaries” is configured, the safety controller stops the ro-
bot at the axis limits.
• If “Stop at boundaries” is not configured, an alarm space can be used
for the check.
Checking the monitoring space also includes checking the following func-
tionalities (insofar as they are configured/activated):
(>>> 7.11.5 "Checking the space-specific velocity" Page 182)

• Stop if mastering test not yet done
Precondition

• T1 mode
• Checklist:
‒ (>>> 11.1.7 "Checklist: Axis-specific monitoring spaces" Page 284)
Procedure
SAFETY INSTRUCTION
1. Jog each of the axes of the monitoring space that is to be moni-
tored to the upper and lower axis limit once using the jog keys or
6D mouse.
2. Every time there is contact with an axis limit, either the robot must
stop or the corresponding safety-oriented output must be set via an
alarm space.
check the configuration, correct if necessary, and check the axis lim-
its again.
figuration, correct if necessary, and check the axis limits again.
7.11.5 Checking the space-specific velocity
Description
For checking, the space-specific velocity limit configured for the monitoring
space is deliberately exceeded by means of a test program. The safety
controller then stops the robot.
Precondition
• The configured space-specific velocity limit is less than the maximum

Cartesian velocity.
• The monitoring space in which the space-specific velocity is monitored
is activated.
• T2 mode
• Checklist:
‒ (>>> 11.1.6 "Checklist: Cartesian monitoring spaces" Page 282)


‒ (>>> 11.1.7 "Checklist: Axis-specific monitoring spaces" Page 284)
Work safety
WARNING
Failure to observe the safety measures for setup work in T2 can re-
sult in fatal injury.
Additional safety requirements apply for setup work in operating mode
T2. Non-compliance can result in death, serious injury or damage to
property.
• Before executing the test program, ensure that the enabling devices
are operational.
• Before executing the test program, ensure that there are no persons
inside the safeguarded area.
• To execute the program, position yourself outside the danger zone
of the manipulator.
Procedure
SAFETY INSTRUCTION
1. Create a test program in which the space-specific velocity of the
monitoring space is deliberately exceeded, e.g. configured with
180 mm/s, moved at 200 mm/s.
The safety controller must stop the robot and the following message
must be displayed:
• Ackn.: Cartesian velocity in monitoring space no. {Number of
monitoring space} exceeded
and correct if necessary. Then check the velocity limit again.
7.11.6 Checking Cartesian velocity limits
Description
The following Cartesian velocity limits must be checked:

• Reduced Cartesian velocity in T1 mode
• Safely reduced Cartesian velocity
• Global maximum Cartesian velocity
For checking, the values for the maximum Cartesian velocities are deliber-
ately exceeded by means of a test program. The safety controller then
stops the robot.
When testing the Cartesian velocity on a KL, the linear unit must also
be moved.
Precondition
• Override reduction for velocity limits is deactivated:

• Checklist:
‒ (>>> 11.1.8 "Checklist: Cartesian velocity monitoring functions"
Page 288)

Work safety
WARNING
property.
are operational.
of the manipulator.
Procedure
SAFETY INSTRUCTION
1. Create a test program in which the velocity limits are deliberately ex-
ceeded with the safety-oriented TCP, e.g. configured with
1000 mm/s, moved at 1100 mm/s.
When creating the test program, ensure that the TCP used in the
program is identical to the safety-oriented TCP.
2. To check the reduced Cartesian velocity in T1, execute the test pro-
gram in operating mode T1.
must be displayed:
• Ackn.: Maximum Cartesian velocity in T1 mode exceeded
3. To check the reduced Cartesian velocity and the maximum
Cartesian velocity, execute the test program in operating mode T2.
must be displayed:
• If reduced Cartesian velocity exceeded: Ackn.: Safe reduced
Cartesian velocity exceeded
• If maximum Cartesian velocity exceeded: Ackn.: Maximum global
Cartesian velocity exceeded
and correct if necessary. Then check the velocity limits again.
7.11.7 Checking axis-specific velocity limits
Description
The following axis-specific velocity limits must be checked:

• Maximum axis velocity in T1 mode
• Safely reduced axis velocity
• Global maximum axis velocity
‒ It is only necessary to check the global maximum axis velocity if
an axis must not exceed a defined velocity.
For checking, the values for the maximum axis velocities are deliberately
exceeded by means of a test program. The safety controller then stops
the robot.


Precondition

• Checklist:
‒ (>>> 11.1.9 "Checklist: axis-specific velocity monitoring functions"
Page 290)
Work safety
WARNING
property.
are operational.
of the manipulator.
Procedure
Checking limits for rotational axes:

SAFETY INSTRUCTION
1. Create a test program in which the axis velocities are deliberately
exceeded, e.g. axis A1 configured with 190°/s, moved at 200°/s.
a. Calculate axis velocity $VEL_AXIS[x].
(>>> "Example calculation of $VEL_AXIS" Page 186)
b. Enter the axis velocity $VEL_AXIS[x] in the test program.
2. To check the maximum axis velocity in T1, execute the test program
in operating mode T1.
must be displayed:
• Ackn.: Maximum axis-specific velocity in T1 mode exceeded
3. To check the reduced axis velocity and the global maximum axis ve-
locity, execute the test program in operating mode T2.
must be displayed:
• If reduced axis acceleration exceeded: Ackn.: Safe reduced axis
velocity exceeded
• If maximum axis acceleration exceeded: Ackn.: Maximum global
axis velocity exceeded
Checking limits for linear axes:

SAFETY INSTRUCTION
1. Create a test program in which the axis velocities are deliberately
exceeded, e.g. linear axis configured with 1,000 mm/s, moved at
1,100 mm/s.
2. To check the maximum axis velocity in T1, execute the test program
in operating mode T1.
must be displayed:
• Ackn.: Maximum axis-specific velocity in T1 mode exceeded
3. To check the reduced axis velocity and the global maximum axis ve-
locity, execute the test program in operating mode T2.
must be displayed:
• If reduced axis acceleration exceeded: Ackn.: Safe reduced axis
velocity exceeded
• If maximum axis acceleration exceeded: Ackn.: Maximum global
axis velocity exceeded
Example calculation of $VEL_AXIS
Calculate the axis velocity $VEL_AXIS[x] as follows:

$VEL_AXIS[x] = (VTest / Vmax) * 100 = (200°/s / 360°/s) * 100 = 56
Element Description
x Number of the axis
Vtest Desired test velocity, in this example 200°/s
Unit: °/s
Vmax Maximum axis velocity according to the data sheet of the
robot
Unit: °/s
Enter the calculated axis velocity $VEL_AXIS[x] in the test program:
...
PTP {A1 -30}
HALT
$VEL_AXIS[1] = 56
PTP {A1 30}
...
7.11.8 Checking the safe operational stop for axis groups
Description
To check that the safe operational stop is functioning correctly, each axis
of an axis group must be moved once in order to violate the safe opera-
tional stop deliberately. The safety controller then stops the robot.
Precondition
• T1 mode
• Checklist:


‒ (>>> 11.1.10 "Checklist: Safe operational stop for axis groups"
Page 293)
Procedure
SAFETY INSTRUCTION
1. Activate safe operational stop for the axis group.
2. Jog the first axis in the axis group in the positive or negative direc-
tion using the jog keys or 6D mouse and with a jog override of 1%.
The safety controller must stop the robot and the following messag-
es must be displayed:
• External safe operational stop violated (axis group {Number of
axis group})
• Ackn.: Stop due to standstill monitoring violation
3. Deactivate safe operational stop for the axis group and reactivate it.
4. Repeat steps 2 to 3 to check further axes of the axis group.
7.11.9 Checking the values for the maximum braking ramp
Description
The “Braking before restricted areas” function is significantly dependent on

the profile of the braking ramp of safety stop 1 DRS. The braking ramp of
a drive ramp stop is linear and is defined by the maximum gradient that
can be maintained when the brakes are applied at full velocity.
Fig. 7-38: Braking ramp of a drive ramp stop
1 Monitoring of the braking ramp

2 Profile of the braking ramp
3 Gradient of the braking ramp
v1 Velocity when drive ramp stop is triggered
t1 End point of the braking ramp
If the value that is stored as the maximum braking ramp is too low, i.e.
the assumed braking ramp is too flat and the robot could, in theory, brake
more quickly, the robot will still execute the drive ramp stop as configured.

Fig. 7-39: Braking ramp flatter than required

2 Braking ramp as per configuration
3 Braking ramp that is theoretically possible
If, on the other hand, the value that is stored as the maximum braking
ramp is too high, i.e. the assumed braking ramp is too steep, the robot
will not be able to maintain this braking ramp in reality and the stop will
escalate to a safety stop 0.
Fig. 7-40: Braking ramp steeper than possible in reality

2 Braking ramp as per configuration
3 Braking ramp that is actually possible
4 Detection of the incorrect braking ramp, escalation to safety stop 0
Therefore, it is necessary to check that the braking ramp can be main-
tained in reality and that the braking ramp stored is not too steep.
Precondition
• “Braking before restricted areas” is activated.

• At least 1 monitoring space is activated for the axis to be tested.
• Override reduction for space monitoring is deactivated:
• T2 mode
• Checklist:
‒ (>>> 11.1.11 "Checklist: Braking before restricted areas" Page 295)


Work safety
WARNING
property.
are operational.
of the manipulator.
Procedure
The braking ramp must be checked for at least one axis per ramp stop
group at a monitoring space. It may be necessary to check further axes
(>>> 7.5.9 "Activating “Braking before restricted areas”" Page 124). For
this purpose, the monitoring space is deliberately exceeded using a test
program. The safety controller then stops the robot.
The following monitoring spaces can be used for checking purposes:
• An axis-specific monitoring space in which a limit is defined and active
for each axis to be checked
• A Cartesian monitoring space that is violated deliberately by the re-
spective single-axis motion
• The cell area that is violated deliberately by the respective single-axis
motion

SAFETY INSTRUCTION
1. Create a test program in which the monitoring space of the axis to
be tested is exceeded.
The safety controller stops the robot.
If a drive ramp stop is triggered by the safety controller due to an
impending space violation, the following message is displayed de-
pending on the type of space:
• Ackn: Safety stop before violation of monitoring space no. {Num-
ber of monitoring space}
• Ackn.: Safety stop before leaving cell area.
4. If it was not possible to maintain the braking ramp, the following
message is displayed:
• Ackn.: The braking ramp of the robot has been violated.
This message suggests that the stored braking ramp is too steep.
This may be because the machine data stored in the safety control-
ler are not up to date.
Remedy:
a. Import the up-to-date machine data into the safety configuration

and activate them.
b. Check the braking ramp again.
c. If it remains impossible to maintain the braking ramp, contact
KUKA.
7.12 Checking the values for the safe axis monitoring functions
Description
When the safety configuration is saved, random errors can occur in the
system, resulting in the safety configuration ultimately containing values
that differ from those programmed by the user. This is an exceptional oc-
currence, but cannot be ruled out entirely.
To rule out the possibility of such an error occurring for the parameters
Braking time and Position tolerance, the values of these parameters
must be verified in the diagnostic monitor. No other type of verification is
possible for these parameters.
WARNING
Danger to life and limb due to failure to check “Braking time” and
“Position tolerance”
If this check is not carried out, the safety configuration may contain in-
correct data. Death to persons, severe injuries or considerable damage
to property may result.
• Always check the values if the activation code on the Common tab
in the Safety configuration window has changed.
In other words, not only if the values themselves have been
changed, but if any changes have been made that affect the safety
configuration.


Precondition
• The values most recently saved for the parameters Braking time and
Position tolerance are known.
The most recently saved values can generally be found in a checklist,
sign-off sheet, or similar.
Procedure
SAFETY INSTRUCTION
The following procedure must be followed exactly!
1. In the main menu, select Diagnosis > Diagnostic monitor.

The Diagnostic monitor window opens.
2. Select the Safety controller (HnfHlp) area in the Module box.
Data are now displayed for this area.
3. Compare the values displayed for Braking time and Position toler-
ance with the most recently saved values.
4. Result:
• If the values match: OK.
Close the Diagnostic monitor window. No further action is neces-
sary.
• If the values do not match:
Enter and save the values again. If necessary, transfer the WorkVi-
sual project to the robot controller again.
Then carry out the check again. KUKA must be contacted if the
values still do not match.
7.13 Activating the safety configuration
Description
If the safety configuration on the robot controller has been updated (for
example, via a newly deployed WorkVisual project or the restoration of an
archive), the safety controller signals that the activation code of the safety
configuration is incorrect.
The safety maintenance technician must check the new safety configura-
tion and is responsible for ensuring that the correct safety configuration is
activated. The displayed activation code must match the expected activa-
tion code from the checklist for safety functions.
The administrator is also authorized to activate the safety configuration
following a prior check. They may only do so, however, if they have
been specially trained for the safety configuration.
The safety recovery technician requires the 8-digit activation code of the
safety configuration in order to activate it. The correct activation code
must be communicated by the safety maintenance technician or adminis-
trator.
Precondition
• User group “Safety recovery” or higher

Procedure

The safety configuration checks whether there are any relevant devia-
tions between the robot controller and the safety controller. The Trou-
bleshooting wizard window opens.
2. A description of the problem and a list of possible causes is displayed.
Select the cause from the list, e.g. restoration of an archive.
3. Press Activate to activate the updated safety configuration on the ro-
bot controller.
4. Only for the “Administrator” user group: Confirm the safety message
with OK.
5. Only for user group “Safety recovery”: Enter the activation code and
press Activate again.
7.14 Deactivating safe monitoring
WARNING
If safe monitoring is deactivated, the configured safety monitoring func-
tions are inactive.
Description
The following monitoring functions are part of the standard safety configu-
ration and always active. This means that these monitoring functions re-
main active when safe monitoring is deactivated:
• Monitoring of the braking time
• Monitoring of the maximum axis velocity in T1
• Monitoring of the axis positions during a global safe operational stop
(all axes)
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure
1. Open the safety configuration.

2. Press Global parameters.
3. Remove the check mark from Safe monitoring.
4. Click on Save and answer the request for confirmation with Yes.
The robot controller is automatically reinitialized.

Interfaces to the higher-level controller

8 Interfaces to the higher-level controller
The robot controller can communicate with the higher-level controller via
the safety-oriented I/Os of the following safety interfaces:
• Ethernet safety interfaces:
‒ EtherCAT/FSoE
‒ EtherNet/IP/CIP Safety
‒ PROFINET/PROFIsafe
Input and output bytes 2 … 7 are permanently assigned to the safety
monitoring functions of KUKA.SafeOperation.
Input and output bytes 0 … 1 are assigned to the standard safety
functions.
• Discrete safety interface for safety options:
‒ XG13 via IFBSafeExt
The safety-oriented I/Os of the discrete safety interface only offer a
reduced range of signals.
If interface XG13 via IFBSafeExt is used, the relay outputs of the IFB-
Safe and IFBSafeExt must be checked cyclically. The checking instruc-
tions and further information about the interface can be found in the as-
sembly instructions of the robot controller.
8.1 Safety functions via Ethernet safety interface (optional)
Description
The exchange of safety-relevant signals between the controller and the

system is carried out via the Ethernet safety interface (e.g. PROFINET/
PROFIsafe or EtherNet/IP/CIP Safety). The assignment of the input and
output states within the Ethernet safety interface protocol are listed below.
In addition, non-safety-oriented information from the safety controller is
sent to the non-safe section of the higher-level controller for the purpose
of diagnosis and control.
Reserved bits
Reserved safety-oriented inputs can be pre-assigned by a PLC with the

values 0 or 1. In both cases, the manipulator will move. If a safety func-
tion is assigned to a reserved input (e.g. in the case of a software update)
and if this input is preset with the value 0, then the manipulator either
does not move or comes unexpectedly to a standstill.
KUKA recommends pre-assignment of the reserved inputs with 1. If a
reserved input has a new safety function assigned to it, and the input is
not used by the customer’s PLC, the safety function is not activated.
This prevents the safety controller from unexpectedly stopping the ma-
nipulator.

Interfaces to the higher-level controller KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
Input byte 0
Bit Signal Description

0 RES Reserved 1
The value 1 must be assigned to the input.
1 NHE Input for external Emergency Stop
0 = external E-STOP is active
1 = external E-STOP is not active
2 BS Operator safety
0 = operator safety is not active, e.g. safety gate
open
1 = operator safety is active
3 QBS Acknowledgement of operator safety
Precondition for acknowledgement of operator safe-
ty is the signal “Operator safety active” set in the
BS bit.
Note: If the “BS” signal is acknowledged by the
system, this must be specified under Hardware op-
tions in the safety configuration. Information is con-
tained in the Operating and Programming Instruc-
tions for System Integrators.
0 = operator safety has not been acknowledged
Edge 0 ->1 = operator safety has been acknowl-
edged
4 SHS1 Safety STOP 1 (all axes)
• FF (motion enable) is set to 0.

• Voltage US2 is switched off.
• AF (drives enable) is set to 0 after configured
braking time (default: 1.5 s) minus the brake
closing time
Cancelation of this function does not require ac-
knowledgement.
This function is not permissible for the EMERGEN-
CY STOP function.
0 = safety stop is active
1 = safety stop is not active
5 SHS2 Safety STOP 2 (all axes)
• FF (motion enable) is set to 0.

• Voltage US2 is switched off.
knowledgement.
CY STOP function.
0 = safety stop is active
1 = safety stop is not active
6 RES -


7 RES -
Input byte 1

0 US2 Supply voltage US2 (signal for switching the second
supply voltage, US2, without battery backup)
If this output is not used, it should be set to 0.
0 = switch off US2
1 = switch on US2
Note: Whether and how input US2 is used must be
specified under Hardware options in the safety
configuration. Information is contained in the Oper-
ating and Programming Instructions for System Inte-
grators.
1 SBH Safe operational stop (all axes)
Prerequisite: All axes are stationary
knowledgement.
CY STOP function.
0 = safe operational stop is active.
1 = safe operational stop is not active.
2 RES Reserved 11
3 RES Reserved 12
4 RES Reserved 13
5 RES Reserved 14
6 RES Reserved 15
7 SPA System Powerdown Acknowledge
The system confirms that it has received the power-
down signal. A second after the “SP” (System Pow-
erdown) signal has been set by the controller, the
requested action is executed, without the need for
confirmation from the PLC, and the controller shuts
down.
0 = confirmation is not active
1 = confirmation is active

Output byte 0

0 NHL Local E-STOP (local E-STOP triggered)
0 = local E-STOP is active
1 = local E-STOP is not active
1 AF Drives enable (the internal safety controller of the
robot controller has enabled the drives so that they
can be switched on)
0 = drives enable is not active (the robot controller
must switch the drives off)
1 = drives enable is active (the robot controller may
switch the drives to servo-control)
2 FF Motion enable (the internal safety controller of the
robot controller has enabled robot motions)
0 = motion enable is not active (the robot controller
must stop the current motion)
1 = motion enable is active (the robot controller
may trigger a motion)
3 ZS The signal ZS (enabling) is set to 1 (active) if the
following conditions are met:
• One of the enabling switches on the smartPAD

is in the center position (enabling signal has
been issued).
• T1 or T2 mode
• External enabling signal has been issued (signal
ZSE1).
• Robot can be moved (no external
EMERGENCY STOP, safety stop, etc.).
4 PE The signal “Peri enabled” is set to 1 (active) if the
following conditions are met:
• Drives are switched on.

• Safety controller motion enable signal present.
• The message “Operator safety open” must not
be active.
5 AUT The manipulator is in AUT or AUT EXT mode.

0 = AUT or AUT EXT mode is not active
1 = AUT or AUT EXT mode is active
6 T1 The manipulator is in Manual Reduced Velocity
mode.
0 = T1 mode is not active
1 = T1 mode is active
7 T2 The manipulator is in Manual High Velocity mode.
0 = T2 mode is not active
1 = T2 mode is active


Output byte 1

0 NHE External E-STOP has been triggered.
0 = external E-STOP is active
1 = external E-STOP is not active
1 BSQ Operator safety acknowledged
0 = operator safety is not assured
1 = operator safety is assured (input BS = 1 and,
if configured, input QBS acknowledged)
2 SHS1EXT External safety STOP 1 (all axes)
0 = external safety STOP 1 is not active
1 = external safety STOP 1 is active (input SHS1
= 0, safe state reached)
0 = external safety STOP 2 is not active
1 = external safety STOP 2 is active (input SHS2
= 0, safe state reached)
4 RES Reserved 13
5 RES Reserved 14
6 PSA Safety interface active
Precondition: an Ethernet interface must be instal-
led on the controller, e.g. PROFINET or
EtherNet/IP.
0 = safety interface is not active
1 = safety interface is active
7 SP System Powerdown (controller will be shut down)
One second after the SP signal has been set, the
PSA output is reset by the robot controller, without
confirmation from the PLC, and the controller is
shut down.
0 = controller on safety interface is active.
1 = controller will be shut down
8.1.1 KUKA.SafeOperation via Ethernet safety interface
Description
The components of the industrial robot move within the limits that have
been configured and activated. The actual positions are continuously cal-
culated and monitored against the safety parameters that have been set.
The safety controller monitors the industrial robot by means of the safety
parameters that have been set. If a component of the industrial robot vio-
lates a monitoring limit or a safety parameter, the manipulator and
external axes (optional) are stopped. The Ethernet safety interface can be
used, for example, to signal a violation of safety monitoring functions.

Reserved bits
Reserved safety-oriented inputs can be pre-assigned by a PLC with the

values 0 or 1. In both cases, the manipulator will move. If a safety func-
tion is assigned to a reserved input (e.g. in the case of a software update)
and if this input is preset with the value 0, then the manipulator either
does not move or comes unexpectedly to a standstill.
KUKA recommends pre-assignment of the reserved inputs with 1. If a
reserved input has a new safety function assigned to it, and the input is
not used by the customer’s PLC, the safety function is not activated.
This prevents the safety controller from unexpectedly stopping the ma-
nipulator.
Input byte 2

0 JR Mastering test (input for reference switch)
0 = reference switch is active (actuated).
1 = reference switch is not active (not actu-
ated).
EJB External mastering confirmation (input for high
pulse from higher-level controller)
0 = external mastering confirmation is not ac-
tive (there is no pulse).
1 = external mastering confirmation is active
(there is a pulse).
The pulse must be at least 350 ms long and
must not exceed 5 s. If the EJB signal
switches from “logic 0” to “logic 1” and
switches back to “logic 0” within the time
frame, the mastering test is successfully con-
firmed.
1 VRED Reduced axis-specific and Cartesian velocity
(activation of reduced velocity monitoring)
0 = reduced velocity monitoring is active.
1 = reduced velocity monitoring is not active.
2 … 7 SBH1 ... 6 Safe operational stop for axis group 1 ... 6
Assignment: Bit 2 = axis group 1 … bit 7 =
axis group 6
Signal for safe operational stop. The function
does not trigger a stop, it only activates the
safe standstill monitoring. Cancelation of this
function does not require acknowledgement.
Input byte 3

0 … 7 RES Reserved 25 … 32
The value 1 must be assigned to the inputs.


Input byte 4

0 … 7 UER1 … 8 Monitoring spaces 1 … 8
Assignment: Bit 0 = monitoring space 1 … bit
7 = monitoring space 8
0 = monitoring space is active.
1 = monitoring space is not active.
Input byte 5

0 … 7 UER9 … 16 Monitoring spaces 9 … 16
Input byte 6

0 … 7 WZ1 … 8 Tool selection 1 … 8
Assignment: Bit 0 = tool 1 … bit 7 = tool 8
0 = tool is not active.
1 = tool is active.
Exactly one tool must be selected at all times.
Input byte 7

0 … 7 WZ9 … 16 Tool selection 9 … 16
Assignment: Bit 0 = tool 9 … bit 7 = tool 16
0 = tool is not active.
1 = tool is active.
Exactly one tool must be selected at all times.
Output byte 2

0 SO Activation status of the safety option
0 = safety option is not active.
1 = safety option is active
1 RR Robot referenced
Mastering test display
0 = mastering is not referenced.
1 = mastering test performed successfully.


2 JF Mastering error
The space monitoring is deactivated if at least
one axis is not mastered.
0 = mastering error. Space monitoring has
been deactivated.
1 = no error.
3 VRED Reduced axis-specific and Cartesian velocity
(activation status of reduced velocity monitor-
ing)
4 … 7 SBH1 ... 4 Activation status of safe operational stop for
axis group 1 ... 4
axis group 4
Output byte 3

0 … 1 SBH5 ... 6 Activation status of safe operational stop for
axis group 5 ... 6
axis group 6
2 SOS Safe Operation Stop
0 = a safety function has triggered a stop.
The output remains in the “0” state for at least
200 ms.
1 = none of the safety functions has triggered
a stop.
3 … 7 RES Reserved 28 … 32
Output byte 4

0 … 7 MR1 ... 8 Alarm space 1 … 8
Assignment: Bit 0 = alarm space 1 (associ-
ated monitoring space 1) … bit 7 = alarm
space 8 (associated monitoring space 8)
0 = monitoring space is violated.
1 = monitoring space is not violated.
Note: An inactive monitoring space is consid-
ered to be violated by default, i.e. in this case
the associated safety-oriented output MRx has
the state “0”.


Output byte 5

0 … 7 MR9 ... 16 Alarm space 9 … 16
Assignment: Bit 0 = alarm space 9 (associ-
ated monitoring space 9) … bit 7 = alarm
space 16 (associated monitoring space 16)
0 = monitoring space is violated.
1 = monitoring space is not violated.
Note: An inactive monitoring space is consid-
ered to be violated by default, i.e. in this case
the associated safety-oriented output MRx has
the state “0”.
Output byte 6

0 … 7 RES Reserved 49 ... 56
Output byte 7

0 … 7 RES Reserved 57 ... 64
8.1.2 Diagnostic signals via Ethernet interface
Description
Some signal states are extended to ensure that they can be detected reli-
ably. In the case of extended signal states, the minimum duration of the
extension is specified in square brackets. Values are specified in millisec-
onds, e.g. [200].
The diagnostic signals available via the Ethernet interface are not safe-
ty-oriented signals and may only be used for diagnostic purposes.
Output byte 0

0 DG Validity for non-safety-oriented signals and da-
ta on this interface
0 = data are not valid
1 = data are valid
1 IFS Internal error in safety controller
0 = no error
1 = error [200]
2 FF Motion enable
0 = motion enable not active [200]
1 = motion enable active


3 AF Drives enable
0 = drives enable not active [200]
1 = drives enable active
4 IBN Start-up mode
Start-up mode enables jogging of the manipu-
lator without a higher-level controller.
0 = Start-up mode is not active.
1 = Start-up mode is active.
5 US2 Peripheral voltage
0 = US2 switched off
1 = US2 switched on
6 … 7 RES Reserved
Output byte 1

0 SO Activation status of the safety option
0 = safety option is not active
1 JF Mastering error (optional)
0 = no error
1 = mastering error, space monitoring deacti-
vated.
2 VRED Reduced velocity (optional)
3 VKUE At least one Cartesian velocity limit exceeded
(optional)
0 = no error
1 = velocity exceeded [200]
4 VAUE At least one axis velocity limit exceeded (op-
tional)
0 = no error
1 = velocity exceeded [200]
5 ZBUE Cell area exceeded (optional)
0 = no error
1 = cell area exceeded [200]


Output byte 2

0 = safety stop is not active.
1 = safety stop is active.
1 ESV External stop request violated
Safe operational stop SBH, SBH1, SBH2 or
safety stop SHS1EXT, SHS2EXT violated
Braking ramp was not maintained or a moni-
tored axis has moved.
0 = no error
1 = violated
0 = safety stop is not active.
1 = safety stop is active.
3 SBH1 Safe operational stop (axis group 1) (optional)
4 SBH2 Safe operational stop (axis group 2) (optional)
5 WFK Tool error (no tool) (optional)
0 = no error
1 = no tool selected.
6 WFME Tool error (more than one tool) (optional)
0 = no error
1 = more than one tool selected.
7 RES Reserved
Output byte 3

0 JR Mastering test (optional)
0 = mastering test is not active
1 = mastering test is active
1 RSF Reference switch error (optional)
0 = reference switch OK
1 = reference switch defective [200]
2 JRA Mastering test request (optional)
0 = mastering test not requested
1 = mastering test requested


3 JRF Mastering test failed (optional)
0 = mastering test OK
1 = mastering test failed
4 RS Reference stop (optional)
Reference run is only possible in T1 mode.
0 = no error
1 = reference stop due to impermissible oper-
ating mode
5 RIA Referencing interval (optional)
0 = no reminder
1 = reminder interval expired [200]
Output byte 4

0 … 7 WZNR Tool number (8-bit word) (optional)
0 = error (see WFK and WFME)
1 = tool 1
2 = tool 2, etc.
Output byte 5

0 … 7 UER1 … 8 Monitoring spaces 1 … 8 (optional)
Output byte 6

0 … 7 UER9 … 16 Monitoring spaces 9 … 16 (optional)


Output byte 7

0 … 7 UERV1 … 8 Stop in the event of a violation of monitoring
spaces 1 … 8 (optional)
0 = monitoring space is not violated, or moni-
toring space is violated but “Stop at bounda-
ries” has not been configured.
1 = monitoring space is violated and robot
stops with a safety stop [200]. Precondition:
“Stop at boundaries” has been configured.
Output byte 8

0 … 7 UERV9 … 16 Stop in the event of a violation of monitoring
spaces 9 … 16 (optional)
0 = monitoring space is not violated, or moni-
toring space is violated but “Stop at bounda-
ries” has not been configured.
1 = monitoring space is violated and robot
stops with a safety stop [200]. Precondition:
“Stop at boundaries” has been configured.
8.2 KUKA.SafeOperation via interface XG13
Description
Interface XG13 on the IFBSafeExt consists of the following connectors:

• XG13.1
• XG13.2
The interface provides the following safety-oriented I/Os for KUKA.SafeOp-
eration.
If interface XG13 is used, tool 1 is always active. The tool cannot be
activated via a safety-oriented input. An automated, safely monitored
tool change is thus not possible.
Further information about interface XG13 is contained in the assembly

instructions of the robot controller.
Inputs
Some of the inputs have a dual function when KUKA.SafeOperation is

used. They can be used either for activating the safe operational stop
SBH3 … SBH6 or for the “activate via input” of the monitoring spaces
UER13 … UER16.
• If a monitoring space UER13 … UER16 is configured with “activate
via input”, the safe operational stop assigned to the input can no lon-
ger be used.

• Conversely, if a safe operational stop SBH3 … SBH6 is configured,

the monitoring space assigned to the input can no longer be config-
ured with “activate via input”.
• If axes are nevertheless selected in the corresponding safe operational
stop, or if a space is configured with “activate via input”, an error mes-
sage is displayed during compilation.
Connector Pin (channel) Signal Description

XG13.1 29/19 VRED Reduced axis-specific and Cartesian velocity (acti-
(TA_A/IN_A) vation of reduced velocity monitoring)
24/34 0 = reduced velocity monitoring is active.
(TA_B/IN_B)
30/20 UER12 Monitoring space 12
(TA_A/IN_A)
25/35
(TA_B/IN_B)
UER13 Monitoring space 13
31/21
(TA_A/IN_A) 1 = monitoring space is not active.
26/36 SBH3 Safe operational stop (axis group 3)
(TA_B/IN_B)
XG13.2 UER14 Monitoring space 14
25/19
(TA_B/IN_B)
26/20
(TA_B/IN_B)
27/21
(TA_B/IN_B)


XG13.1 32/22 SBH1 Safe operational stop (axis group 1)
(TA_A/IN_A)
27/37
(TA_B/IN_B)
(TA_A/IN_A)
28/38
(TA_B/IN_B)
The signal for the safe operational stop does not trigger a stop, it only
activates the safe standstill monitoring. Cancelation of this function does
not require acknowledgement.
Outputs
An inactive monitoring space is considered to be violated by default, i.e.

in this case the associated safety-oriented output MRx has the state “0”.

XG13.1 1/9 MR1 Alarm space 1 (associated monitoring space 1)
(TA_A/IN_A)
0 = space is violated.
5/13
1 = space is not violated.
(TA_B/IN_B)
2/10 MR2 Alarm space 2 (associated monitoring space 2)
(TA_A/IN_A)
6/14
(TA_B/IN_B)
(TA_A/IN_A)
7/15
(TA_B/IN_B)
XG13.2 1/9 MR4 Alarm space 4 (associated monitoring space 4)
(TA_A/IN_A)
5/13
(TA_B/IN_B)
(TA_A/IN_A)
6/14
(TA_B/IN_B)
(TA_A/IN_A)
7/15
(TA_B/IN_B)
4/12 SO Activation status of the safety option
(TA_A/IN_A)
0 = safety option is not active.
8/16
(TA_B/IN_B)


XG13.1 4/12 RR Robot Referenced
(TA_A/IN_A)
Mastering test display
8/16
0 = mastering is not referenced.
(TA_B/IN_B)
1 = mastering test performed successfully.
8.3 Mastering test via interface XG42
Interface XG42 provides a dual-channel input for the mastering test.

Signal Description
JR Mastering test (input for reference switch)
0 = reference switch is active (actuated).
1 = reference switch is not active (not actuated).
EJB External mastering confirmation (input for high pulse from
higher-level controller)
0 = external mastering confirmation is not active (there is
no pulse).
1 = external mastering confirmation is active (there is a
pulse).
The pulse must be at least 350 ms long and must not
exceed 5 s. If the EJB signal switches from “logic 0” to
“logic 1” and switches back to “logic 0” within the time
frame, the mastering test is successfully confirmed.

Diagnosis
9 Diagnosis
9.1 Displaying the diagnostic data with the diagnostic monitor
Description
The current status of the safety-oriented inputs/outputs can be displayed

in the diagnostic monitor.
Precondition
• User rights: Function group Diagnostic functions
Procedure

2. Select the Bus process data image[Name of bus/interface] module in
the Module box.
9.2 Displaying the diagnostic data for the safety interface
Description
For advanced diagnosis of the safety-oriented inputs/outputs, the diagnos-

tic data for the safety interface can be displayed.
Precondition
• The KUKA.DiagnosisSafety option package is installed.
Procedure
1. In the main menu, select Diagnosis > Safety interfaces.

2. Select the desired tab, e.g. PROFIsafe.
The diagnostic data are displayed.
Further information about advanced diagnosis can be found in the

KUKA.DiagnosisSafety documentation.
9.3 System variables for diagnosis of the safety monitoring functions
9.3.1 $SR_ACTIVETOOL
Description
Number of the active safety-oriented tool

The variable indicates the tool that is currently active on the safety con-
troller. Only 1 safety-oriented tool may be active at any one time.
Writability
Syntax
number = $SR_ACTIVETOOL

Diagnosis KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
Element Description
Number Type: INT
Number of the active safety-oriented tool
• 0: no tool or multiple tools are active.

• 1 … 16: tool 1 … 16 is active.
9.3.2 $SR_AXISSPEED_OK
Description
State of the monitoring of the reduced axis velocity

If the configured limit for reduced axis velocity is exceeded, the variable is
set to FALSE for 120 ms. It is then set back to TRUE.
Writability
Syntax
state = $SR_AXISSPEED_OK
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
TRUE = axis velocity is below the configured limit.
FALSE = axis velocity limit has been exceeded.
9.3.3 $SR_CARTSPEED_OK
Description
State of Cartesian velocity monitoring

If a Cartesian velocity limit is exceeded, the variable is set to FALSE for
120 ms. It is then set back to TRUE.
Writability
Syntax
state = $SR_CARTSPEED_OK
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
TRUE = Cartesian velocity is below the configured limit.
FALSE = Cartesian velocity limit has been exceeded.

Diagnosis
9.3.4 $SR_DRIVES_ENABLE
Description
Drive enable status from safety controller

The variable indicates whether the safety controller has enabled the drives
to start up. If the drive enable is not present, i.e. if the safety-oriented out-
put AF has a LOW level, then the variable is set to FALSE.
Writability
Syntax
state = $SR_DRIVES_ENABLE
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
• TRUE: Drives are enabled.

• FALSE: Drives are not enabled.
9.3.5 $SR_MOVE_ENABLE
Description
Motion enable status from safety controller

The variable indicates whether the safety controller has issued the motion
enable. If the motion enable is not present, i.e. if the safety-oriented out-
put FF has a LOW level, then the variable is set to FALSE.
Writability
Syntax
state = $SR_MOVE_ENABLE
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
• TRUE: motion enable present

• FALSE: no motion enable present
9.3.6 $SR_RANGE_ACTIVE
Description
Activation status of monitoring spaces 1 … 16

If the safety-oriented input UER1 … UER16 has a LOW level, i.e. if the
associated monitoring space has been activated via the input, the variable

is set to TRUE. If the monitoring space is configured as “always active”,

Diagnosis
the variable is always TRUE.
Writability
Syntax
state = $SR_RANGE_ACTIVE[number]
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
Activation status of the monitoring space
• TRUE = monitoring space is activated.

• FALSE = monitoring space is not activated.
Number Type: INT
Number of monitoring space
• 1 … 16
9.3.7 $SR_RANGE_OK
Description
Violation state of monitoring spaces 1 … 16

The variable depends on whether a stop has been configured for the
monitoring space in the event of a violation:
• If a stop has been configured and an active monitoring space is viola-
ted, the variable is set to FALSE.
• If no stop is configured, the variable is always TRUE.
Writability
Syntax
state = $SR_RANGE_OK[number]
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
Violation state of the monitoring space
• TRUE = monitoring space is not violated.

• FALSE = monitoring space has been violated and the
robot has been stopped.
Number Type: INT
Number of monitoring space
• 1 … 16

Diagnosis
9.3.8 $SR_SAFEMON_ACTIVE
Description
State of safe monitoring

The variable indicates whether safe monitoring is activated.
Writability
Syntax
state = $SR_SAFEMON_ACTIVE
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
• TRUE = safe monitoring is activated.

• FALSE = safe monitoring is deactivated.
9.3.9 $SR_SAFEOPSTOP_ACTIVE
Description
Activation status of the safe operational stop

The variable can be used to display the activation status of the following
safe operational stops.
• Global safe operational stop for all axes (can be activated via input
SBH)
• Safe operational stop for axis group 1 … 6 (can be activated via input
SBH1 … SBH6)
Writability
Syntax
state = $SR_SAFEOPSTOP_ACTIVE[number]
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
State of the safe operational stop
• TRUE = safe operational stop is activated.

• FALSE = safe operational stop is not activated.
Number Type: INT
Number of the safe operational stop
• 1: Global safe operational stop for all axes

• 2 … 7: Safe operational stop for axis group 1 ... 6

9.3.10 $SR_SAFEOPSTOP_OK
Description
Violation state of an externally activated safe operational stop

The variable indicates whether a safe operational stop that has been acti-
vated via an input (externally) is violated.
(>>> 9.3.9 "$SR_SAFEOPSTOP_ACTIVE" Page 213)
Writability
Syntax
state = $SR_SAFEOPSTOP_OK
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
• TRUE = safe operational stop has been violated.

• FALSE = no safe operational stop has been violated.
9.3.11 $SR_SAFEREDSPEED_ACTIVE
Description
State of the monitoring of the reduced velocity

If the safety-oriented input VRED has a LOW level, i.e. if monitoring of the
reduced velocity was activated via the input, then the variable is set to
TRUE.
Writability
Syntax
state = $SR_SAFEREDSPEED_ACTIVE
Element Description
state Type: BOOL
TRUE = monitoring of the reduced velocity is activated.
FALSE = monitoring of the reduced velocity is not activa-
ted.
9.4 Outputs for space monitoring
In the following error situations, outputs that signal a space violation like-
wise switch to the “violated” state (precondition: monitoring space is ac-
tive):

Diagnosis
• In the case of a Cartesian monitoring space, the Cartesian position is
invalid. The Cartesian position is invalid if one of the robot axes has
an invalid position. This applies in the following cases:
‒ An axis is unmastered.
‒ An encoder error has occurred.
‒ A communication error has occurred.
• In the case of an axis-specific monitoring space, the position of one of
the monitored axes is invalid. This applies in the following cases:
‒ An axis is unmastered.
‒ An encoder error has occurred.
‒ A communication error has occurred.
• In the case of a Cartesian monitoring space, no tool is selected or
several tools are selected simultaneously.
Signal states in error situations:
Output / variable Logic state
MRx (safety-oriented outputs) 0
UERVx 1
$SR_RANGE_OK[x] 0 (FALSE)


Messages
10 Messages
10.1 Information about the messages
The “Messages” chapter contains selected messages. It does not cover all
the messages displayed in the message window.
10.2 System messages from module: CrossMeld (KSS)
10.2.1 KSS15016
Message code KSS15016

Message text Ackn.: Stop due to standstill monitoring violation
Message type Acknowledgement message
Effect Ramp stop
Input of active commands (robot motions, program start) is blocked.
Possible cause(s) Cause: Safe operational stop violated (>>> Page 217)
Solution: Acknowledge message (>>> Page 217)
Cause: Safe operational stop violated
Description
At least one of the axes monitored for standstill has moved outside the
configured position tolerance.
Solution: Acknowledge message
Description
The program can be resumed once the message has been acknowledged.
Procedure
• An acknowledgeable message can be acknowledged with OK.

• All acknowledgeable messages can be acknowledged at once with All
OK.
10.2.2 KSS15017

Message text Ackn.: The braking ramp of the robot has been violated.

Messages KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
Effect Short-circuit braking
Possible cause(s) Cause: Braking ramp for STOP 1 or safe operational stop not main-
tained (>>> Page 218)
Cause: Braking ramp for STOP 1 or safe operational stop not maintained
Description
The robot controller has not triggered strong enough braking in the case
of a STOP 1 or a safe operational stop.
Description
Procedure

OK.
10.2.3 KSS15018

Message text Ackn.: Maximum Cartesian velocity in T1 mode exceeded
Effect Ramp stop
Possible cause(s) Cause: $SR_VEL_RED is FALSE (>>> Page 219)

Solution: Change value of the variable (>>> Page 219)
Cause: $SR_OV_RED set too high (>>> Page 219)

Solution: Change value of the variable (>>> Page 220)
Cause: Invalid drive configuration in WorkVisual (>>> Page 220)

Solution: Adapt the drive configuration in WorkVisual
(>>> Page 221)

Cause: $SR_VEL_RED is FALSE
Messages
Description
The variable $SR_VEL_RED is used to activate the override reduction for

monitored velocities. If override reduction is active, the velocity is automat-
ically reduced so that the lowest currently monitored velocity limit is not
exceeded.
This override reduction is deactivated if the variable is FALSE.
The procedure for checking the current value of the variable is as
follows:
Checking instructions
1. In the main menu, select Display > Variable > Single.

The Variable display – Single window opens.
2. Enter the name of the variable in the Name box and confirm with the
Enter key.
The current value of the variable is displayed in the Current value
box.
Further information on override reduction is contained in the assembly

and operating instructions of the safety option.
Solution: Change value of the variable
Description
Change the value of the variable using the variable display function.
Precondition
User rights:
• KSS: Function group General configuration

• VSS: User group “User” or higher
Procedure

2. Enter the variable name in the Name box and confirm with the Enter
key. The current value of the variable is displayed.
3. Enter the new value in the New value box.
4. Press the Set value button. The new value is displayed in the Cur-
rent value box.
Cause: $SR_OV_RED set too high
Description
The override reduction for monitored velocities is activated

($SR_VEL_RED = TRUE), but the value of the variable $SR_OV_RED is
set too high. The lower the value of $SR_OV_RED, the more a monitored
velocity limit is reduced by the override reduction.
The procedure for checking the current value of the variable is as
follows:


2. Enter the name of the variable in the Name box and confirm with the
Enter key.
The current value of the variable is displayed in the Current value
box.
Further information on override reduction is contained in the assembly

Solution: Change value of the variable
Description
Change the value of the variable using the variable display function.
Precondition
User rights:
• KSS: Function group General configuration

• VSS: User group “User” or higher
Procedure

2. Enter the variable name in the Name box and confirm with the Enter
key. The current value of the variable is displayed.
3. Enter the new value in the New value box.
4. Press the Set value button. The new value is displayed in the Cur-
rent value box.
Cause: Invalid drive configuration in WorkVisual
Description
The drive configuration in WorkVisual has been configured incorrectly. The

wrong initial project has been loaded and supplied, for example.
Fig. 10-1: Example for interchanged main and wrist axes

The procedure for checking whether the drive configuration is cor-
Messages
rect is as follows:
1. Check whether the motor connectors are correctly connected at the in-
terface panel.
2. Check whether the plug-in connectors on the KPP, KSP, etc., are cor-
rectly connected.
3. Check whether the drive bus configuration in WorkVisual matches the
hardware actually installed.
Solution: Adapt the drive configuration in WorkVisual
Description
Configure the drive configuration correctly in WorkVisual.
Procedure
1. Open and activate the current WorkVisual project.

2. Right-click on the Controller components node on the Hardware tab
in the Project structure window.
3. Select Drive configuration from the context menu. The “Drive config-
uration” window opens.
4. Compare the configured configuration with the components actually in-
stalled.
5. Delete the incorrect connections between the modules (KPP, KSP).
6. Recreate the connections manually or select the correct solution via
the WorkVisual project analysis in the bottom right-hand corner.
7. Then save the project and transfer it to the controller.
10.2.4 KSS15019

Message text Ackn.: Maximum axis-specific velocity in T1 mode exceeded
Effect Ramp stop
Possible cause(s) Cause: Jog override too high (>>> Page 222)
Solution: Reduce the jog override (>>> Page 222)
Cause: Program override too high (>>> Page 222)

Solution: Reduce the program override (>>> Page 222)
Cause: Maximum axis velocity in T1 incorrectly configured

(>>> Page 223)
Solution: Change the safety configuration (>>> Page 223)

Cause: Kernel system commands excessively high velocity during

force test (>>> Page 224)
Solution: Adapt Maximum velocity T1 in the safety configuration
(>>> Page 224)
Cause: Jog override too high
Description
Jog override was set to an overly high value while jogging in T1 mode.
For this reason, at least one axis was moving more quickly than is permit-
ted for T1 mode.
Solution: Reduce the jog override
Description
Reduce the jog override for jogging mode.
Procedure
1. Touch the status indicator Overrides. The Overrides window opens.
Fig. 10-2: Overrides status indicator
2. Set the desired jog override. It can be set using either the plus/minus
keys or by means of the slider.
• Plus/minus keys: The value can be set to 100%, 75%, 50%, 30%,
10%, 5%, 3%, 1%.
• Slider: The override can be adjusted in 1 % steps.
3. Touch the status indicator Overrides again. (Or touch the area outside
the window.)
The window closes and the selected override value is applied.
Alternatively, the override can be set using the plus/minus key on the low-
er right-hand side of the smartPAD.
Cause: Program override too high
Description
Program override was set to an overly high value during program control
in T1 mode. For this reason, at least one axis was moving more quickly
than is permitted for T1 mode.
Solution: Reduce the program override
Description
Reduce the program override for program control.

Messages
Procedure
1. Touch the status indicator Overrides. The Overrides window opens.
Fig. 10-3: Overrides status indicator
2. Set the desired program override. It can be set using either the plus/
minus keys or by means of the slider.
• Plus/minus keys: The override can be adjusted in predefined
steps.
• Slider: The override can be adjusted in 1% steps.
3. Touch the status indicator Overrides again. (Or touch the area outside
the window.)
The window closes and the selected override value is applied.
Alternatively, the override can be set using the plus/minus key on the low-
er right-hand side of the smartPAD.
Cause: Maximum axis velocity in T1 incorrectly configured
Description
At least one axis moved more quickly than the highest permissible velocity
in T1 mode.
In the safety configuration, an incorrect value for the maximum axis veloc-
ity in T1 has been entered for at least one axis, for example, a value that
is different to the one specified by the system integrator.
The procedure for checking what values are configured is as follows:

3. For each axis, check what value is configured for the parameter Maxi-
mum velocity T1.
Solution: Change the safety configuration
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure
1. In the main menu, select Configuration > Safety configuration. The

safety configuration is opened.
2. Select the appropriate tab and modify the configuration as required.


Further information on safety acceptance is contained in the assembly

Cause: Kernel system commands excessively high velocity during force test
Description
The velocity of all axes is limited as standard to 250 mm/s in T1.

For the force test in KUKA.ServoGun, the kernel system takes over the
velocity of the weld gun after a certain point in time. Under certain circum-
stances (depending on the required force and transmission ratio), this may
exceed 250 mm/s. For this reason, a higher value must also be config-
ured for the parameter Maximum velocity T1 for the external axis.

3. For each axis, check what value is configured for the parameter Maxi-
mum velocity T1.
Solution: Adapt Maximum velocity T1 in the safety configuration
Description
Adapt the parameter Maximum velocity T1 in the safety configuration. To

do so, cancel the axis coupling and restore it again after adapting the pa-
rameter.
Precondition
• The affected project is open.
Procedure
1. Select Editors > Drive configuration in the menu bar.

The Drive configuration window opens.
2. Right-click on the connecting line between the gun motor and the
RDC and select Disable axis coupling.
3. Select Editors > Safety configuration (local) in the menu bar.
4. Switch to the Axis monitoring tab.
5. Adapt the value for Maximum velocity T1.
6. Return to the Safety configuration (local) window.
7. Right-click on the connecting line between the gun motor and the
RDC again and select Enable axis coupling.



Messages
10.2.5 KSS15033

Message text More then one tool activated in the safety controller
Message type Status message
Effect Ramp stop

Follow-up message KSS15034 (>>> Page 225)
Possible cause(s) Cause: More then one tool activated in the safety controller
(>>> Page 225)
Solution: Only activate the required safety-oriented tool
(>>> Page 225)
Cause: More then one tool activated in the safety controller
Description
More than one tool is activated in the safety controller. Only 1 safety-ori-
ented tool may be active at any time
Solution: Only activate the required safety-oriented tool
Description
Only activate the required tool via the associated safety-oriented input on
the Ethernet safety interface.
Procedure
1. Reset the inputs for invalid tools.

2. Specify the input for the required tool.
10.2.6 KSS15034

Message text Ackn.: More than one tool activated in the safety controller
Effect Ramp stop

Original message KSS15033 (>>> Page 225)
Possible cause(s) Cause: Error cause of the original message has been eliminated.
(>>> Page 226)

Cause: Error cause of the original message has been eliminated.

Messages
Description
This follow-up message is displayed if the error cause of the original mes-
sage has been eliminated.
Description
Procedure

OK.
10.2.7 KSS15035

Message text No tool activated in safety controller
Effect Ramp stop

Possible cause(s) Cause: No tool activated in safety controller (>>> Page 226)
Solution: Activate safety-oriented tool (>>> Page 226)
Cause: No tool activated in safety controller
Description
No tool is activated in the safety controller.

Only 1 safety-oriented tool may be active at any time. If SafeRangeMoni-
toring is used, tool 1 must be active. Tool 1 can be activated via input
WZ1 of the Ethernet safety interface.
Solution: Activate safety-oriented tool
Description
Activate the required tool via the associated safety-oriented input on the
Ethernet safety interface.
Procedure
• Specify the input for the required tool.

Messages
10.2.8 KSS15036

Message text Ackn.: No tool activated in safety controller
Effect Ramp stop

(>>> Page 227)
Description
Description
Procedure

OK.
10.2.9 KSS15037

Message text Cell area exceeded
Effect No braking reaction
No interlock of motions or commands
Possible cause(s) Cause: Cell area exceeded (>>> Page 228)

Solution: Move the robot out of the violated space: (>>> Page 228)

Cause: Cell area exceeded

Messages
Description
The active safety-oriented tool has left the cell area. There is a space vio-
lation.
Solution: Move the robot out of the violated space:
Description
The robot must be moved out of the violated space in T1 mode. No other
operating mode can be set until the robot has left the violated space.
Precondition
Procedure

10.2.10 KSS15039

Message text Ackn.: Maximum global Cartesian velocity exceeded
Effect Ramp stop
Possible cause(s) Cause: Global maximum Cartesian velocity incorrectly configured

(>>> Page 228)
Cause: Global maximum Cartesian velocity exceeded by program-

ming (>>> Page 229)
Solution: Correct programming (>>> Page 229)
Cause: Global maximum Cartesian velocity incorrectly configured
Description
The maximum permissible Cartesian velocity has been exceeded.

In the safety configuration, an incorrect value for the global maximum Car-
Messages
tesian velocity has been entered, for example, a value that is different to
the one specified by the system integrator.
The procedure for checking which value is configured for the parameter
Cartesian maximum velocity is as follows:

The safety configuration opens with the Common tab.
2. Press Global parameters. The global parameters are displayed.
3. Search for the parameter and check the value.
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure



Cause: Global maximum Cartesian velocity exceeded by programming
Description
The programmed path or programming method causes the Cartesian ve-

locity to exceed the maximum global Cartesian velocity defined in the
• Check programming.
Solution: Correct programming
Procedure
• Correct programming
Further information is contained in the documentation for the rele-
vant software.

10.2.11 KSS15040

Message text Ackn.: Maximum global axis velocity exceeded
Effect Ramp stop
Possible cause(s) Cause: Global maximum axis velocity incorrectly configured

(>>> Page 230)
Cause: Global maximum axis velocity exceeded by programming

(>>> Page 231)
Cause: Global maximum axis velocity incorrectly configured
Description
At least one axis has exceeded the maximum permissible value for global
axis velocity.
In the safety configuration, an incorrect value for the maximum velocity for
rotational axes or linear axes has been entered, for example, a value that
is different to the one specified by the system integrator.

3. Check the values of the following parameters:
• Maximum velocity rotational axis
• Maximum velocity translational axis
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure


Messages

Cause: Global maximum axis velocity exceeded by programming
Description
The programmed path or programming method causes at least one axis

to exceed the maximum permissible global axis velocity defined in the
Procedure
vant software.
10.2.12 KSS15041

Message text Ackn.: Safe reduced Cartesian velocity exceeded
Effect Ramp stop
Possible cause(s) Cause: Safe reduced Cartesian velocity incorrectly configured

(>>> Page 231)
Cause: Safe reduced Cartesian velocity exceeded by programming

(>>> Page 232)
Cause: Safe reduced Cartesian velocity incorrectly configured
Description
The maximum permissible safe reduced Cartesian velocity has been ex-
ceeded.

In the safety configuration, an incorrect value for the safe reduced Carte-
Messages
sian velocity has been entered, e.g. a value that is different to the one
specified by the system integrator.
The procedure for checking which value is configured for the parameter
Reduced Cartesian velocity is as follows:

2. Press Global parameters. The global parameters are displayed.
3. Search for the parameter and check the value.
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure



Cause: Safe reduced Cartesian velocity exceeded by programming
Description
The programmed path or programming method causes the Cartesian ve-

locity to exceed the activated safe reduced Cartesian velocity defined in
the safety configuration.
Procedure
vant software.

Messages
10.2.13 KSS15042

Message text Ackn.: Safe reduced axis velocity exceeded
Effect Ramp stop
Possible cause(s) Cause: Safe reduced axis velocity incorrectly configured

(>>> Page 233)
Cause: Maximum value for safe reduced axis velocity exceeded by

programming (>>> Page 234)
Cause: Safe reduced axis velocity incorrectly configured
Description
At least one axis has exceeded the maximum permissible value for the
safe reduced axis velocity.
In the safety configuration, an incorrect value for the reduced axis velocity
has been entered for at least one axis, for example, a value that is differ-
ent to the one specified by the system integrator.

3. For each axis, check what value is configured for the parameter Re-
duced velocity.
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure




Cause: Maximum value for safe reduced axis velocity exceeded by programming
Description
The programmed path or programming method causes the maximum val-

ue for the safe reduced axis velocity defined in the safety configuration to
be exceeded by at least one axis.
If an override reduction is activated by $SR_VEL_RED=TRUE, but the ro-
bot moves without spline, the axis velocities are not reduced. The override
reduction then only has an effect on axis velocities if spline motions are
programmed.
Example
Axis 5 is moved into a singularity position. Axes 4 and 6 are therefore

considerably accelerated and the safe reduced axis velocity is exceeded.
Fig. 10-4: Wrist axis singularity
Procedure
vant software.
10.2.14 KSS15043

Message text External safe operational stop violated (axis group {Number of axis
group})

Messages

Possible cause(s) Cause: Value configured for position tolerance too low
(>>> Page 235)
Cause: Axis group incorrectly configured (>>> Page 236)

Cause: Value configured for position tolerance too low
Description
The value configured in the safety configuration for the position tolerance
of at least one axis in the axis group is too low. The values specified by
the system builder must be configured.

3. For each axis in the axis group, check whether the value entered for
Position tolerance matches the specified value.
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure




Cause: Axis group incorrectly configured

Messages
Description
The axis group is incorrectly configured in the safety configuration, i.e. the
group contains axes which are not to be monitored here. The axes speci-
fied by the system builder must be monitored.
The procedure for checking whether an axis is monitored in the cor-
rect axis group is as follows:

3. Select the axis that is to be checked from the list.
The check mark must be activated in the check box with the number
of the axis group in which the axis is to be monitored.
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure



10.2.15 KSS15044

Message text Ackn.: External safe operational stop violated (axis group {Number
of axis group})


Messages
(>>> Page 237)
Description
Description
Procedure

OK.
10.2.16 KSS15045

Message text Error at mastering reference switch
Possible cause(s) Cause: Reference cable incorrectly connected (>>> Page 237)
Solution: Connect cable correctly (>>> Page 238)
Cause: Reference position taught incorrectly (>>> Page 238)

Solution: Reteach and check the reference position (>>> Page 238)
Cause: Reference switch installed incorrectly or moved

(>>> Page 239)
Solution: Reinstall or realign reference switch (>>> Page 239)
Cause: Reference cable defective (>>> Page 239)

Solution: Exchanging the reference cable (>>> Page 240)
Cause: Reference cable incorrectly connected
Description
The reference cable connecting the reference switch to the robot controller
is not correctly connected.

The cabling is carried out as follows:

Messages
• XS Ref (interface to the reference switch)

• X42 (KR C4) or XG42 (KR C5) (interface to the robot controller)
The procedure for checking whether the cable is correctly connected
is as follows:
Precondition

• Check whether the connectors are correctly connected. Particular at-

tention must be paid to:
‒ Pins pushed in
‒ Loose plug-in connections
‒ Connector on correct slot
Solution: Connect cable correctly
Precondition

Procedure
• Connect cable correctly.
Cause: Reference position taught incorrectly
Description
The reference position to which the robot moves in the mastering test has
been taught incorrectly. This results in single-channel referencing.
1. Move to reference position.

2. Check whether both proximity switch surfaces of the reference switch
are actuated by the switching surface (actuating plate or tool).
Solution: Reteach and check the reference position
Description
The reference position must be taught in the subprogram that is executed

during the mastering test and in the safety configuration.
If the reference switch is actuated by the ferromagnetic part of a tool, the
correctness of the newly taught reference position must be checked.

Messages
The reference position must be taught and checked in accordance with
the procedure described in the operating and assembly instructions.
Description
The taught reference position has been addressed correctly. Single-chan-

nel mastering occurs because the reference switch has been installed in
an incorrect position or has been moved.

Solution: Reinstall or realign reference switch
Description
The reference switch must installed or aligned in such a way that both
proximity switch surfaces of the reference switch are actuated simultane-
ously when the robot is in the reference position.
Fig. 10-5: Installation position of reference switch on external axis
Cause: Reference cable defective
Description
The reference cable connecting the reference switch to the robot controller
is defective.
The cabling is carried out as follows:
• XS Ref (interface to the reference switch)

• X42 (KR C4) or XG42 (KR C5) (interface to the robot controller)
The procedure for checking whether the cable is defective is as fol-
lows:
Precondition

1. Check whether the connectors are correctly connected. Particular at-

• Pins pushed in
• Corrosion
• Scorched contacts
• Connector insert pushed back
• Socket pushed back
• Connector on correct slot
2. Check whether the cable is mechanically damaged. Causes of squash-
ed cables or wires can include the following:
• Cable straps too tight
• Clips too tight
• Trapped when closing a cover
• Bend radius too tight
3. Check whether the cable still conducts electricity. Particular attention
must be paid to:
• Cross-connection of individual wires
• Short-circuit of individual wires with the ground conductor
• Correct wiring in accordance with circuit diagram
Solution: Exchanging the reference cable
NOTICE
Bending radius
ence cable:
Precondition


Messages
Procedure
1. Disconnect the defective reference cable.

2. Connect the new reference cable correctly.
3. Connect the new reference cable.
10.2.17 KSS15046

Message text Error was at the mastering reference switch
Message type Notification message
Possible cause(s) Cause: Notification message following elimination of state of error

(>>> Page 241)
Solution: System information: no operator action required
(>>> Page 241)
Cause: Notification message following elimination of state of error
Description
This notification message is displayed once the state of error has been
eliminated and the associated status message has been revoked.
Description
This message provides system information to the operator and requires no

action.
10.2.18 KSS15047

Message text Mastering test required (internal)

10.2.19 KSS15048

Message text Ackn.: Mastering test time interval expired
Effect Ramp stop
Possible cause(s) Cause: Monitoring time elapsed (>>> Page 242)

Solution: Perform mastering test and acknowledge message
(>>> Page 242)
Cause: Monitoring time elapsed
Description
Following an internal mastering test request, the robot can be moved for
another 2 hours. This time has elapsed.
It is possible to acknowledge the message without performing a mastering
test beforehand. The robot can then be moved for another 2 hours without
referenced axes (not recommended).
The safety integrity of the safety functions based upon safe axis posi-
tions is limited until the mastering test has been performed and con-
firmed. The safety functions may behave differently from how they were
configured, creating additional hazards in the system.
Description
Following a successful mastering test, the message can be acknowledged.
Procedure
1. Perform mastering test.

2. Acknowledge the message with OK.
10.2.20 KSS15049

Message text Mastering test failed

Messages
Possible cause(s) Cause: Mastering test failed (>>> Page 243)
(>>> Page 243)
Cause: Mastering test failed (>>> Page 243)

Solution: Eliminate cause of error and carry out mastering test
(>>> Page 243)
Cause: Mastering test failed
Description
The mastering test has failed. The cause of the error is indicated in an
additional message.
Description
Following a successful mastering test, the message can be acknowledged.
Procedure
1. Perform mastering test.

Cause: Mastering test failed
Description
The mastering test has failed. The cause of the error is indicated in an
additional message.
Solution: Eliminate cause of error and carry out mastering test
Description
The error cause specified in the additional message must be eliminated

and the mastering test must then be performed again.
10.2.21 KSS15050

Message text Reference stop
Effect Ramp stop

Possible cause(s) Cause: Mastering test not yet performed successfully

(>>> Page 244)
Solution: Perform mastering test in T1 mode (>>> Page 244)
Cause: Mastering test not yet performed successfully
Description
The mastering test has not yet been performed successfully. The refer-
ence stop is triggered by an activated monitoring space for which the op-
tion Stop if mastering test not yet done is configured.
Solution: Perform mastering test in T1 mode
Description
The mastering test must be performed in T1 mode.
10.2.22 KSS15051

Message text Ackn.: Mastering test position not reached
Effect Ramp stop
Possible cause(s) Cause: Mastering test interrupted (>>> Page 244)

Solution: Acknowledge message and resume program
(>>> Page 244)
Cause: Mastering test interrupted
Description
The mastering test was interrupted before the reference position was
reached:
• Operating mode T1 or T2: The operator released the Start key.
• AUT EXT mode: The Start signal from the higher-level controller was
cancelled.
Solution: Acknowledge message and resume program
Description
Procedure

Messages
2. Operating mode T1 or T2: Press and hold down the Start key to re-
sume the program.
AUT EXT mode: Send the Start signal from the higher-level controller
to resume the program.
10.2.23 KSS15052

Message text Ackn.: Mastering reference switch not actuated
Effect Ramp stop
Possible cause(s) Cause: Reference switch fouled (>>> Page 245)

Solution: Clean the reference switch (>>> Page 245)
Cause: Reference switch moved (>>> Page 246)

Solution: Realign the reference switch (>>> Page 246)
Cause: Actuating plate bent (>>> Page 246)

Solution: Realign the actuating plate (>>> Page 246)
Cause: Referencing with incorrectly mastered robot (>>> Page 246)

Solution: Restore the mastering or remaster (>>> Page 246)
Cause: Reference switch defective (>>> Page 247)

Solution: Exchange the reference switch (>>> Page 247)
Cause: Reference switch fouled
Description
The reference switch was not actuated at the reference position because
the proximity switch surfaces of the reference switch are fouled.
Solution: Clean the reference switch
Procedure
• Clean the proximity switch surfaces of the reference switch.
NOTICE
Do not use aggressive cleaning agents.

Cause: Reference switch moved

Messages
Description
The taught reference position has been addressed correctly, but the refer-
ence switch not actuated. The reference switch or the device on which the
reference switch is installed has been moved.

Solution: Realign the reference switch
Description
The reference switch must aligned in such a way that both proximity
switch surfaces of the reference switch are actuated simultaneously when
the robot is in the reference position.
Cause: Actuating plate bent
Description
ence switch not actuated. The actuating plate fastened to the robot flange
or robot tool was bent.

are actuated by the actuating plate.
Solution: Realign the actuating plate
Description
The actuating plate must be aligned so that both proximity switch surfaces
of the reference switch are actuated simultaneously when the robot is in
the reference position.
Cause: Referencing with incorrectly mastered robot
Description
The reference switch was not actuated in the reference position. The ref-
erence position was not reached because the current mastering deviates
from the one used to teach the reference run.
Solution: Restore the mastering or remaster
Description
Restore the mastering with which the reference run was taught or remas-
ter the robot.

Cause: Reference switch defective
Messages
Description
ence switch is defective.
Solution: Exchange the reference switch
Description
The reference switch must be exchanged.
Precondition

Procedure
1. Unplug the reference cable.

2. Unscrew the reference switch.
3. Screw on the new reference switch.
4. Plug the reference cable into the new reference switch.
5. Perform a mastering test in order to check whether all reference
groups are referenced by the new switch.
10.2.24 KSS15053

Message text Ackn.: Mastering reference group no. {Number of the reference
group} not referenced
Effect Ramp stop
Possible cause(s) Cause: Reference group not taught (>>> Page 247)
Solution: Teach reference group (>>> Page 248)
Cause: Reference group not taught
Description
The reference group has not been taught.

The following points must be taught for the reference group:
• Motion to the reference switch


figuration.
• Motion away from the reference switch

The points are taught in the following file:
File
Directory C:\KRC\Roboter\KRC\R1\Program
File masref_user.src
The file contains 2 subprograms each for reference
groups 1 … 3.
MASREFSTARTG1() … MASREFSTARTG3()
The motion to the reference switch and the reference
position are taught here.
MASREFBACKG1() … MASREFBACKG3()
The motion away from the reference switch is taught
here.
1. Select the file in the Navigator and press Open. The file is displayed
in the editor.
2. Check whether the points required for addressing a reference group
have been taught.
Solution: Teach reference group
Description
The points required for addressing the reference group must be taught.
This activity must be carried out in accordance with the procedure de-
scribed in the assembly and operating instructions.
10.2.25 KSS15054

Message text Workspace monitoring functions deactivated (mastering error)
Possible cause(s) Cause: Axes unmastered (>>> Page 249)

Solution: Master unmastered axes (>>> Page 249)

Cause: Axes unmastered
Messages
Description
At least one axis is unmastered.
Solution: Master unmastered axes
Procedure
• Remaster all unmastered axes.
10.2.26 KSS15065

Message text Level at mastering reference switch was unexpectedly Low

(>>> Page 249)
(>>> Page 249)
Description
Description

action.
10.2.27 KSS15066

Message text Level at mastering reference switch is unexpectedly "low"

Possible cause(s) Cause: Reference switch fouled (>>> Page 250)

Solution: Clean the reference switch (>>> Page 250)
Cause: Mastering test input incorrectly configured (>>> Page 250)

Cause: Reference group not taught (>>> Page 251)

Solution: Teach reference group (>>> Page 252)

(>>> Page 252)
Solution: Reinstall or realign reference switch (>>> Page 252)
Cause: Reference switch defective (>>> Page 253)

Solution: Exchange the reference switch (>>> Page 253)
Cause: Reference switch fouled
Description
The reference switch was actuated for at least 5 minutes outside the mas-
tering test because the proximity switch surfaces of the reference switch
are fouled, e.g. with metal dust or weld spatter.
Solution: Clean the reference switch
Procedure
• Clean the proximity switch surfaces of the reference switch.
NOTICE
Do not use aggressive cleaning agents.
Cause: Mastering test input incorrectly configured
Description
The reference switch for the mastering test can be connected either di-
rectly to the robot controller or to a higher-level safety PLC that is linked
to the robot controller via an Ethernet safety interface.
The mastering test input must be configured accordingly in the safety con-
figuration.
The procedure for checking how the mastering test input is config-
ured is as follows:
1. Open the safety configuration: For this, select Configuration > Safety
configuration in the main menu.
2. On the Common tab, press Global parameters.
3. Check the parameter Mastering test input:

Messages
• at cabinet = reference switch is connected to the robot controller.
• via bus interface = reference switch is connected via Ethernet
safety interface.
Precondition

• T1 or T2 mode
Procedure



Cause: Reference group not taught
Description
The reference group has not been taught.

The following points must be taught for the reference group:
• Motion to the reference switch
figuration.
• Motion away from the reference switch

The points are taught in the following file:
File
Directory C:\KRC\Roboter\KRC\R1\Program
File masref_user.src
The file contains 2 subprograms each for reference
groups 1 … 3.
MASREFSTARTG1() … MASREFSTARTG3()
The motion to the reference switch and the reference
position are taught here.
MASREFBACKG1() … MASREFBACKG3()
The motion away from the reference switch is taught
here.

1. Select the file in the Navigator and press Open. The file is displayed
in the editor.
2. Check whether the points required for addressing a reference group
have been taught.
Solution: Teach reference group
Description
The points required for addressing the reference group must be taught.
This activity must be carried out in accordance with the procedure de-
scribed in the assembly and operating instructions.
Description
The reference switch was actuated outside of the mastering test for at
least 5 minutes. The reference switch is installed in the wrong position or
has been moved.

Solution: Reinstall or realign reference switch
Description
The reference switch must installed or aligned in such a way that both
proximity switch surfaces of the reference switch are actuated simultane-
ously when the robot is in the reference position.

Messages
Fig. 10-6: Installation position of reference switch on external axis
Cause: Reference switch defective
Description
The reference switch was actuated outside of the mastering test for at
least 5 minutes. The reference switch is defective.
Solution: Exchange the reference switch
Description
The reference switch must be exchanged.
Precondition

Procedure
1. Unplug the reference cable.

2. Unscrew the reference switch.
3. Screw on the new reference switch.
4. Plug the reference cable into the new reference switch.
5. Perform a mastering test in order to check whether all reference
groups are referenced by the new switch.

10.2.28 KSS15079

Message text Monitoring space no. {Number of monitoring space} violated
Possible cause(s) Cause: Monitoring space violated in T1 or T2 (>>> Page 254)

Cause: Monitoring space violated in T1 or T2
Description
The monitoring space has been violated in T1 or T2 mode. The active

safety-oriented tool, or at least one of the robot axes, is no longer situated
in the permissible range of the monitoring space.
The monitoring space is considered to have been violated if the monitor-
ing was only activated after the robot had moved over the space limit.
The permissible range depends on the type of monitoring space:
Space type Workspace Protected space
Cartesian space The active safety-oriented tool must The active safety-oriented tool must
move within the limits of the moni- move outside the limits of the moni-
toring space. toring space.
The space is violated if the safety- The space is violated if the safety-
oriented tool leaves the monitoring oriented tool enters the monitoring
space. space.
Axis space The axes must move within the lim- The axes must move outside the
its of the monitoring space. limits of the monitoring space.
The space is violated if the axes The space is violated if the axes
leave the monitoring space. enter the monitoring space.
Description
Precondition
Procedure


Messages
10.2.29 KSS15081

Message text Monitoring space no. {Number of monitoring space} exceeded
Possible cause(s) Cause: Monitoring space exceeded in T1 or T2 (>>> Page 255)

Cause: Monitoring space exceeded in T1 or T2
Description
The monitoring space has been exceeded in T1 or T2 mode. The active

safe tool, or at least one of the robot axes, is no longer situated in the
permissible range of the monitoring space.
If the space is exceeded in T1 mode, the acknowledgment message
Ackn.: Stop because workspace exceeded is also displayed.
The monitoring space is considered to have been exceeded if the monitor-
ing was already activated when the robot moved over the space limit.
The permissible range depends on the type of monitoring space:
Space type Workspace Protected space
Cartesian space The active safe tool must move The active safe tool must move out-
within the limits of the monitoring side the limits of the monitoring
space. space.
The space is exceeded if the safe The space is exceeded if the safe
tool leaves the monitoring space. tool enters the monitoring space.
Axis space The axes must move within the lim- The axes must move outside the
its of the monitoring space. limits of the monitoring space.
The space is exceeded if the axes The space is exceeded if the axes
leave the monitoring space. enter the monitoring space.
Description
Precondition

Procedure

10.2.30 KSS15083

Message text Ackn.: Cartesian velocity in monitoring space no. {Number of moni-
toring space} exceeded
Effect Ramp stop
10.2.31 KSS15107

Message text Error at the mastering confirmation input
Possible cause(s) Cause: Reference cable incorrectly connected (>>> Page 256)
Cause: Reference cable defective (>>> Page 257)

Solution: Exchanging the reference cable (>>> Page 258)
Description
The referencing system is connected to interface X42 (KR C4) or XG42

(KR C5) on the robot controller via the reference cable.
is as follows:
Precondition


Messages
• The higher-level controller and the connected referencing system are
switched off and secured against being switched on again.

‒ Pins pushed in
Precondition

Procedure
Cause: Reference cable defective
Description
The referencing system is connected to interface X42 (KR C4) or XG42

(KR C5) on the robot controller via the reference cable.
The procedure for checking whether the cable is defective is as fol-
lows:
Precondition

1. Check whether the connectors are correctly connected. Particular at-

• Pins pushed in
• Corrosion
• Scorched contacts
• Connector insert pushed back
• Socket pushed back
• Connector on correct slot

2. Check whether the cable is mechanically damaged. Causes of squash-

ed cables or wires can include the following:
• Cable straps too tight
• Clips too tight
• Trapped when closing a cover
• Bend radius too tight
3. Check whether the cable still conducts electricity. Particular attention
must be paid to:
• Cross-connection of individual wires
• Short-circuit of individual wires with the ground conductor
• Correct wiring in accordance with circuit diagram
Solution: Exchanging the reference cable
NOTICE
Bending radius
ence cable:
Precondition

Procedure
1. Disconnect the defective reference cable.

2. Connect the new reference cable correctly.
3. Connect the new reference cable.
10.2.32 KSS15108

Message text Error was at the mastering confirmation input

Messages
(>>> Page 259)
(>>> Page 259)
Description
Description

action.
10.2.33 KSS15109

Message text Level at mastering confirmation input is unexpectedly high
Possible cause(s) Cause: Input EJB is set to the wrong state (>>> Page 259)
Solution: Eliminate the error in the program of the higher-level con-
troller (>>> Page 260)
Cause: Reference cable wired incorrectly (>>> Page 260)

Solution: Wire the reference cable correctly (>>> Page 261)
Cause: Input EJB is set to the wrong state
Description
If a mastering test is requested, for example after rebooting the robot con-
troller, and input EJB goes into the state “logic 1”, no external mastering
confirmation is possible.
Input EJB is set to the wrong state. The error lies in the higher-level con-
troller program that is used to address input EJB. Input EJB must be in
the state “logic 0” in order to confirm mastering via a positive pulse signal.
The procedure for checking the level at input EJB is as follows:

2. In the Module box, select the device, i.e. the interface via which the
pulse signal for external mastering confirmation is provided. To do so,
select the entry Device (Device name). The diagnostic data for the de-
vice are displayed.
The device name displayed in the entry depends on the configura-
tion in WorkVisual. The default name of the device can be changed
in WorkVisual.
3. Search for the entry E: Mastering confirmation (EJB) in the diagnos-

tic data:
• confirmed: Input EJB is in the state “logic 1”
• not confirmed: Input EJB is in the state “logic 0”
Solution: Eliminate the error in the program of the higher-level controller
Description
The error must be eliminated in the higher-level controller program that is

used to address input EJB.
Information on the external mastering confirmation and the signals rele-
vant to the connection of the higher-level controller can be found in the
assembly and operating instructions of the safety option.
Procedure
• Eliminate the error in the program.
Cause: Reference cable wired incorrectly
Description
If a mastering test is requested, e.g. after rebooting the robot controller,

and input EJB goes into the state “logic 1”, no external mastering confir-
mation is possible.
Interface X42 (KR C4) or XG42 (KR C5), via which the pulse signal is
provided, is incorrectly wired. Input EJB must be in the state “logic 0” in
order to confirm mastering via a positive pulse signal.

vice are displayed.
in WorkVisual.

tic data:

Solution: Wire the reference cable correctly
Messages
Procedure
• Wire the reference cable to X42 (KR C4) or XG42 (KR C5) in accord-
ance with the circuit diagram.
10.2.34 KSS15110

Message text Level at mastering confirmation input was unexpectedly High

(>>> Page 261)
(>>> Page 261)
Description
Description

action.
10.2.35 KSS15111

Message text Pulse time monitoring of mastering confirmation violated
Possible cause(s) Cause: Pulse signal at input EJB too long (>>> Page 262)

Cause: Pulse signal at input EJB too long

Messages
Description
The higher-level controller confirmed a successful mastering test with a

positive pulse signal at input EJB. Because the pulse signal lasted longer
than 5 s at input EJB, the external mastering confirmation failed.
The pulse duration is incorrectly programmed in the higher-level controller
program that is used to address input EJB. The pulse must be at least
350 ms long and must not exceed 5 s. If the EJB signal switches from
“logic 0” to “logic 1” and switches back to “logic 0” within the time frame,
the mastering test is successfully confirmed.
Description

Procedure
10.2.36 KSS15112

Message text Pulse time monitoring of mastering confirmation violated

(>>> Page 262)
(>>> Page 263)
Description

Messages
Description

action.
10.2.37 KSS15113

Message text Mastering without reference request confirmed
Possible cause(s) Cause: Pulse signal at input EJB toggles continuously

(>>> Page 263)
Cause: Reference cable incorrectly connected (>>> Page 264)

Cause: Pulse signal at input EJB toggles continuously
Description

positive pulse signal at input EJB, even though no mastering test was re-
quested.
The error lies in the higher-level controller program that is used to
address input EJB. The pulse signal may be toggling continuously.

vice are displayed.
in WorkVisual.

tic data:


Messages
Description

Procedure
Description

positive pulse signal at input EJB, even though no mastering test was re-
quested.
The reference cable is not correctly connected to interface X42 (KR C4)
or XG42 (KR C5) of the robot controller, via which the pulse signal is pro-
vided. There may be a loose connection.
is as follows:
Precondition


‒ Pins pushed in
Precondition

Procedure

Messages
10.2.38 KSS15114

Message text Mastering confirmed without reference request

(>>> Page 265)
(>>> Page 265)
Description
Description

action.
10.2.39 KSS15127

Message text Ackn.: Stop because workspace exceeded
Effect Ramp stop
Possible cause(s) Cause: Monitoring space violated or exceeded in T1

(>>> Page 266)
Solution: Acknowledge the message and move the robot out of the
violated space (>>> Page 266)
Cause: Impending violation or exceeding of monitoring space in T1

mode (>>> Page 266)
Solution: Acknowledge message and move robot away from work-
space limit (>>> Page 266)

Cause: Monitoring space violated or exceeded in T1

Messages
Description
The active safety-oriented tool or an axis position has violated or excee-

ded a monitoring space in T1 mode. A status message additionally indi-
cates the affected space.
Solution: Acknowledge the message and move the robot out of the violated
space
Description
The robot must be moved out of the violated space in T1 mode. This is
only possible once the message has been acknowledged.
Precondition
Procedure

3. Move the robot in the desired direction:
Cause: Impending violation or exceeding of monitoring space in T1 mode
Description
The active safety-oriented tool or an axis position threatened to violate or

exceed a monitoring space in T1 mode. It was possible to stop the robot
before it reached the space limit because the “Braking before restricted
areas” function is active.
Solution: Acknowledge message and move robot away from workspace limit
Description
The robot must be moved away from the workspace limit in T1 mode.
This is only possible once the message has been acknowledged.
Precondition
Procedure


Messages
10.2.40 KSS15134

Message text Ackn: Safety stop before violation of monitoring space no. {Number
of monitoring space}
Effect Maximum braking; the drives are switched off at standstill.
Possible cause(s) Cause: Impending violation or exceeding of monitoring space in T2,

AUT or AUT EXT mode (>>> Page 267)
Solution: Acknowledge message and move robot away from work-
space limit (>>> Page 267)
Cause: Impending violation or exceeding of monitoring space in T2, AUT or AUT

EXT mode
Description
The active safety-oriented tool or an axis position threatened to violate or

exceed a monitoring space in T2, AUT or AUT EXT mode. The robot was
stopped for this reason.
Solution: Acknowledge message and move robot away from workspace limit
Description
The robot must be moved away from the workspace limit in T1 mode.
This is only possible once the message has been acknowledged.
Precondition
Procedure

10.2.41 KSS15135

Message text Ackn.: Safety stop before leaving cell area.

Effect Maximum braking; the drives are switched off at standstill.
Possible cause(s) Cause: Impending violation of cell area limits (>>> Page 268)
Solution: Acknowledge message and move robot away from area
limit (>>> Page 268)
Cause: Impending violation of cell area limits
Description
The active safety-oriented tool threatened to exceed the cell area limits.
The robot was stopped for this reason.
Solution: Acknowledge message and move robot away from area limit
Description
The robot must be moved away from the area limit in T1 mode. This is
only possible once the message has been acknowledged.
Precondition
Procedure


Appendix
11 Appendix
11.1 Checklists for safety acceptance
The checklists here serve merely as examples of checklists for safety

acceptance. It is permissible to carry out and document safety accept-
ance using user-specific checklists.
11.1.1 Precondition for safety acceptance based on the checklists
• Mechanical and electrical installation of the industrial robot have been

completed.
• Safety configuration is completed.
• The safety maintenance technician is trained. (Training course at
KUKA College)
The system integrator is responsible for the design of the cell.

The safety maintenance technician uses the values and configurations
supplied by the system integrator to configure the robot and tests
whether the safety functions work as specified. The safety maintenance
technician does not perform a safety assessment of the system.
11.1.2 Checklist: Robot and system
The inspection items of this checklist must be completed and confirmed

in writing by the system integrator.
Checklist
• Serial number of the robot: ____________________

• Serial number of the robot controller: ____________________
• Name of system integrator: ____________________
No. Inspection item OK

1 The industrial robot is in flawless mechanical condition and correctly instal-
led and fastened in accordance with the assembly or operating instructions
of the robot.
2 The permissible rated payload of the robot has not been exceeded.
3 There are no foreign bodies or defective or loose parts on the industrial
robot.
4 All safety equipment required for the system and robot is correctly installed
and operational.
5 The power supply ratings of the industrial robot correspond to the local
supply voltage and mains type, and the machine data correspond to these.
6 The connecting cables are correctly connected and the connectors are
locked.
7 The ground conductor and the equipotential bonding cable are sufficiently
rated and correctly connected.
8 The system meets all the relevant laws, regulations and norms valid for
the installation site.

Appendix KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6
Remarks / deviations
By signing, the signatory confirms the correct and complete performance of the safety accept-
ance test.
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
Place, date Signature
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________

___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
11.1.3 Checklist: Safety functions

in writing by the safety maintenance technician.
Checklist

• Safety configuration:
‒ Activation code: ____________________
‒ Last changed (date, time): ____________________
‒ Version: ____________________
• Mastering test type (reference switch / external confirmation):
____________________
• Name of safety maintenance technician: ____________________
No. Inspection item OK Not relevant

1 Safe monitoring is activated.
2 Robot is mastered.
3 If simulated axes are used:
The safe Cartesian monitoring has been activated or deacti-
vated according to the requirements and, if applicable, in ac-
cordance with a hazard assessment.
(>>> 7.5.2.1 "Switching safe Cartesian monitoring on/off"
Page 99)
4 Is the “Braking before restricted areas” function activated?
5 The machine data have been checked and are appropriate
for the robot used.
(>>> 3.12.4.1 "Checking machine data and safety configura-
tion" Page 59)
The machine data loaded must match the machine data on
the identification plate of the robot.

Appendix
6 The machine data of the external axes have been correctly
entered and checked.
Checking instructions:
• Move each external axis a defined distance by means of

a PTP_REL motion, e.g. 90°. Carry out a visual inspec-
tion and check whether this distance is covered.
• In the case of a KL, move the external axis a defined
distance by means of a PTP_REL motion, e.g. 500 mm.
Carry out a visual inspection and additionally monitor the
display of the Cartesian actual position to check whether
this distance is covered.
7 The local and external safety functions have been checked
and are functioning correctly.
(>>> 3.6.1 "Overview of the safety functions" Page 42)
(>>> 3.12.4 "Start-up and recommissioning: KSS/VSS"
Page 57)
8 The reference switch is firmly and stably mounted on the
mounting fixture.
plate" Page 137)
9 The actuating plate is firmly and stably mounted on the
robot flange or tool.
plate" Page 137)
10 The reference position has been taught in both the master-
ing test program and in the safety configuration.
11 The correctness of the reference position has been checked.
(>>> 7.7.1.7 "Checking the reference position (actuation with
tool)" Page 142)
12 Was the mastering test successful?
13 Was the brake test successful?
Note: These checks only need to be made if the brake test
is active. The checks only need to be made for the axes
that need to be tested by means of a brake test in accord-
ance with a hazard assessment.
Axis A1
Axis A2
Axis A3
Axis A4
Axis A5
Axis A6
External axes
14 Operator safety acknowledgement has been checked and is
functioning correctly.
(>>> 3.6.3 "“Operator safety” signal: KSS" Page 43)
(>>> 3.6.4 "“Operator safety” signal: VSS" Page 44)


15 Peripheral contactor (US2) has been checked and switches
at the right time.
Note: Further information about checking the peripheral con-
tactor is contained in the assembly instructions of the robot
controller.
16 Have the Cartesian and axis-specific velocities been config-
ured correctly and checked?
The corresponding checklists must be completed and con-
firmed in writing for the Cartesian and axis-specific velocity
monitoring functions.
(>>> 11.1.8 "Checklist: Cartesian velocity monitoring func-
tions" Page 288)
(>>> 11.1.9 "Checklist: axis-specific velocity monitoring func-
tions" Page 290)
17 Has the correct configuration of the safe operational stop
been checked by moving all axes?
Each axis in an axis group must be tested individually.
The corresponding checklist must be completed and con-
firmed in writing for every axis group.
(>>> 11.1.10 "Checklist: Safe operational stop for axis
groups" Page 293)
18 The values for the parameters Braking time and Position
tolerance have been checked in the diagnostic monitor and
correctly saved.
(>>> 7.12 "Checking the values for the safe axis monitoring
functions" Page 190)
19 Has the correct configuration of the cell area been checked
by moving to all reachable limits?
firmed in writing for the cell area.

Appendix
20 Has the correct configuration of the monitoring spaces used
been checked by moving to all reachable limits with a safe-
ty-oriented tool?
Each space surface of a Cartesian monitoring space must
be addressed at 3 different points.
The axis of an axis-specific monitoring space must be
moved to the upper and lower limits of the space.
firmed in writing for each monitoring space used.
(>>> 11.1.6 "Checklist: Cartesian monitoring spaces"
Page 282)
(>>> 11.1.7 "Checklist: Axis-specific monitoring spaces"
Page 284)
Monitoring space 1
Monitoring space 2
Monitoring space 3
Monitoring space 4
Monitoring space 5
Monitoring space 6
Monitoring space 7
Monitoring space 8
Monitoring space 9
Monitoring space 10
Monitoring space 11
Monitoring space 12
Monitoring space 13
Monitoring space 14
Monitoring space 15
Monitoring space 16
21 Have the values stored for the maximum braking ramp for
the “Braking before restricted areas” function been checked?
(>>> 11.1.11 "Checklist: Braking before restricted areas"
Page 295)


22 Have the safety-oriented tools used been configured correct-
ly and checked?
At least one monitoring space and one velocity must be
checked with each safety-oriented tool.
firmed in writing for each safety-oriented tool used.
(>>> 11.1.4 "Checklist: Safety-oriented tools" Page 275)
Tool 1
Tool 2
Tool 3
Tool 4
Tool 5
Tool 6
Tool 7
Tool 8
Tool 9
Tool 10
Tool 11
Tool 12
Tool 13
Tool 14
Tool 15
Tool 16
23 If an existing safety configuration has been changed:
A change log has been created and checked.
(>>> 6.6 "Displaying the revision log" Page 84)
: Must be checked by system integrator
ance test.
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________

Appendix
11.1.4 Checklist: Safety-oriented tools

A separate checklist must be completed for each safety-oriented tool.
Description
A monitoring space must be violated by each configured sphere to dem-

onstrate the correct functioning of the safety-oriented tool.
Precondition

Checklist
• Serial number of the robot: _________________

‒ Activation code: ____________________
‒ Version: ____________________
• Safety-oriented tool checked (name, number): _______________
• Monitoring space used in sphere test (name, number):
________________
Specified value:
• Value specified by cell planner, design engineer

Configured value:
• Value entered in the safety configuration

1 Safety-oriented TCP of the tool
The X, Y and Z coordinates of the safety-oriented TCP are
correctly configured and checked.
TCP X (specified value): __________ mm
TCP X (configured value): __________ mm
TCP Y (specified value): __________ mm
TCP Y (configured value): __________ mm
TCP Z (specified value): __________ mm
TCP Z (configured value): __________ mm


2 1. sphere on tool
The X, Y and Z coordinates of the sphere center point and
the sphere radius are correctly configured and checked.
X (specified value): __________ mm
X (configured value): __________ mm
Y (specified value): __________ mm
Y (configured value): __________ mm
Z (specified value): __________ mm
Z (configured value): __________ mm
Radius (specified value): __________ mm
Radius (configured value): __________ mm
3 2. sphere on tool
4 3. sphere on tool

Appendix
5 4. sphere on tool
6 5. sphere on tool
7 6. sphere on tool


8 7. sphere on tool
9 8. sphere on tool
10 9. sphere on tool

Appendix

ance test.
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
11.1.5 Checklist: Cell area

Description
The accessible surfaces resulting from the configuration must be violated

one after the other, each at 2 different points, to demonstrate the correct
configuration of the cell area.
Precondition
• The monitoring spaces that can be activated by means of safety-orien-

ted inputs have been deactivated.
Checklist
• Serial number of the robot: ________________

‒ Activation code: ____________________
‒ Version: ____________________
• Safety-oriented tool used in test: ________________

1 The limit in the Z direction has been configured correctly
and checked.
Z min: ____________mm
Z max: ____________mm
2 Corner 1 has been correctly configured and checked.
X coordinate: __________ mm
Y coordinate: __________ mm

Appendix
6 Corner 5 has been correctly configured.
ance test.
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________

11.1.6 Checklist: Cartesian monitoring spaces

A separate checklist must be completed for each monitoring space.
Description
The accessible surfaces resulting from the configuration must be violated

one after the other, each at 3 different points, to demonstrate the correct
configuration of the monitoring space.
Precondition

Checklist

‒ Activation code: ____________________
‒ Version: ____________________
• Monitoring space checked (name, number): __________
• Type of space (protected space|workspace): ____________________
• Stop at boundaries (TRUE|FALSE): __________
• Reference stop (TRUE|FALSE): __________
• Space-specific velocity __________mm/s
• Space-specific velocity valid if: __________
• Safety-oriented tool used in test: _________________
• Always active (TRUE|FALSE): __________
• Reference coordinate system: _____________

Appendix
1 The coordinates of the monitoring space have been cor-
rectly configured and checked.
Origin X: __________ mm
Origin Y: __________ mm
Origin Z: __________ mm
Origin A: __________ °
Origin B: __________ °
Origin C: __________ °
Distance to origin XMin: __________ mm
Distance to origin YMin: __________ mm
Distance to origin ZMin: __________ mm
Distance to origin XMax: __________ mm
Distance to origin YMax: __________ mm
Distance to origin ZMax: __________ mm
The following preconditions must be met to demonstrate the correct func-
tioning of the reference stop:
• Reference stop is active.
• Mastering test requested.
• Checked monitoring space is activated.

2 The correct functioning of the reference stop has been
checked.

tioning of the space-specific velocity:
• Space-specific velocity is active.

• The configured limit value of the space-specific velocity is less than
the limit value of the maximum Cartesian velocity.
• Robot exceeds the configured space-specific velocity.
• Override reduction for the velocity is deactivated: $SR_VEL_RED =
FALSE
Specified value:

Configured value:

3 The space-specific velocity has been correctly configured
and checked.
Specified value: __________ mm/s
Configured value: __________ mm/s

ance test.
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
11.1.7 Checklist: Axis-specific monitoring spaces

A separate checklist must be completed for each monitoring space.
Description
The configured limit values must successively be violated to demonstrate

the correct functioning of the monitoring space.
Precondition

Checklist

‒ Activation code: ____________________
‒ Version: ____________________
• Monitoring space checked (name, number): _________________
• Type of space (protected space|workspace): ____________________
• Stop at boundaries (TRUE|FALSE):_________________
• Reference stop (TRUE|FALSE): _________________
• Space-specific velocity _________________ mm/s

Appendix
• Space-specific velocity valid in: _________________
• Safe tool used in test: _________________
• Always active (TRUE|FALSE): _________________
Specified value:

Configured value:

Determined value:
• Value determined during the test
No. Axis name Inspection item OK Not relevant

1 1st axis of the monitoring space has been
Lower limit (specified value):
__________ ° or mm
Lower limit (configured value):
__________ ° or mm
Lower limit (determined value):
__________ ° or mm
Upper limit (specified value):
__________ ° or mm
Upper limit (configured value):
__________ ° or mm
Upper limit (determined value):
__________ ° or mm
2 2nd axis of the monitoring space has been
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm


3 3rd axis of the monitoring space has been
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
4 4th axis of the monitoring space has been
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm

Appendix
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
tioning of the reference stop:
• Reference stop is active.
• Mastering test requested.


9 The correct functioning of the reference stop has been
checked.

tioning of the space-specific velocity:
• Space-specific velocity is active.

• The configured limit value of the space-specific velocity is less than
the limit value of the maximum Cartesian velocity.
• Robot exceeds the configured space-specific velocity.
• Override reduction for the velocity is deactivated: $SR_VEL_RED =
FALSE

10 The space-specific velocity has been correctly configured
and checked.
ance test.
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________

___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
11.1.8 Checklist: Cartesian velocity monitoring functions

Description
The Cartesian velocity monitoring functions cannot be tested against a

discrete value. It is possible to carry out a test using an exaggerated val-
ue in order to check whether velocity monitoring is triggered.
Precondition

Appendix
Checklist

‒ Activation code: ____________________
‒ Version: ____________________
• Safety-oriented tool used in test: ____________________
Specified value:

Configured value:

1 The global maximum Cartesian velocity has been correctly
configured and checked.
2 The safely reduced Cartesian velocity has been correctly
3 The reduced Cartesian velocity for T1 has been correctly
ance test.
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________

11.1.9 Checklist: axis-specific velocity monitoring functions

The trace function (oscilloscope) can be used to determine the axis ve-
locities.
Precondition

Checklist

‒ Activation code: ____________________
‒ Version: ____________________
Specified value:

Configured value:

Test value:
• Value with which the test was carried out

1. Checking the global maximum axis velocity
It is only necessary to check the global maximum axis velocity if an axis
must not exceed a defined velocity.

The global maximum axis velocity has been correctly entered and
checked using at least one axis.
1 Specified value: ________ °/s or mm/s
Configured value: ________ °/s or mm/s
Test value: __________ °/s or mm/s
2. Checking the safely reduced axis velocity
The safely reduced axis velocity has been correctly configured and
checked for each axis.
2.1 Specified value: ________ °/s or mm/s

Appendix
Test value: _________ °/s or mm/s
Test value: ________ °/s or mm/s


3. Checking the maximum axis velocity for T1
The maximum axis velocity for T1 has been correctly configured
and checked for each axis.
Test value: _________ °/s or mm/s

Appendix
ance test.
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
11.1.10 Checklist: Safe operational stop for axis groups

A separate checklist must be completed for each axis group.

Precondition
Checklist

‒ Activation code: ____________________
‒ Version: ____________________
• Axis group number: ____________________
Specified value:

Configured value:

1 1st axis of the axis group has been
Position tolerance (specified value):
__________ ° or mm
Position tolerance (configured value):
__________ ° or mm
2 2nd axis of the axis group has been correct-
ly configured and checked.
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
3 3rd axis of the axis group has been correct-
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
4 4th axis of the axis group has been correct-
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm

Appendix
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
__________ ° or mm
ance test.
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________

___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
11.1.11 Checklist: Braking before restricted areas

Precondition
• “Braking before restricted areas” is activated.

• At least 1 monitoring space is activated for the axis to be tested:
‒ Axis-specific monitoring space
‒ Or Cartesian monitoring space
‒ Or cell area (always activated)

• Override reduction for space monitoring is deactivated:

Checklist

‒ Activation code: ____________________
‒ Version: ____________________
• Safety-oriented tool used in test: ____________________
• Monitoring space used in test: ____________________
• Values for axis group and braking ramp:
Axis Ramp stop group Braking ramp of drive
The braking ramp must be checked for at least one axis per ramp stop
group at a monitoring space. It may be necessary to check further axes
(>>> 7.5.9 "Activating “Braking before restricted areas”" Page 124).

1 The correct configuration of the monitoring space used for
testing has been checked.
(>>> 11.1.7 "Checklist: Axis-specific monitoring spaces"
Page 284)
(>>> 11.1.6 "Checklist: Cartesian monitoring spaces"
Page 282)
2 When the axis approaches the monitoring space limit, the
robot stops with a safety stop 1 and, depending on the
type of space, one of the following messages is displayed:
• Ackn: Safety stop before violation of monitoring space

no. {Number of monitoring space}
• Ackn.: Safety stop before leaving cell area.
3 The message Ackn.: The braking ramp of the robot has
been violated. is not displayed.

Appendix
ance test.
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
___________________________________________ ___________________________________________
11.2 Applied standards and regulations
The safety functions of KUKA.SafeOperation meet the requirements of

Category 3 and Performance Level d in accordance with EN ISO
13849-1:2015.


KUKA Service
12 KUKA Service
12.1 Requesting support
Introduction
This documentation provides information on operation and operator con-

trol, and provides assistance with troubleshooting. For further assistance,
please contact your local KUKA subsidiary.
Information
The following information is required for processing a support re-

quest:
• Description of the problem, including information about the duration
and frequency of the fault
• The greatest possible amount of information about the hardware and
software components of the overall system
The following list gives an indication of the information which is rele-
vant in many cases:
‒ Model and serial number of the kinematic system, e.g. the manip-
ulator
‒ Model and serial number of the controller
‒ Model and serial number of the energy supply system
‒ Designation and version of the system software
‒ Designations and versions of other software components or modifi-
cations
‒ System Software diagnosis package
Additionally for KUKA Sunrise: Existing projects including applica-
tions
For versions of KUKA System Software older than V8: Archive of
the software (Diagnosis package is not yet available here.)
‒ Application used
‒ External axes used
12.2 KUKA Customer Support
The contact details of the local subsidiaries can be found at:

www.kuka.com/customer-service-contacts

KUKA Service KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6

Index Axis angle, lower limit.................................. 114

Axis angle, upper limit..................................115
$BRAKES_OK.............................................. 157
Axis limitation, mechanical............................. 49
$BRAKETEST_MONTIME............................156
Axis monitoring functions, checking............ 190
$BRAKETEST_REQ_EX.............................. 156
Axis range.......................................................36
$BRAKETEST_REQ_INT............................. 157
Axis velocity, maximum..................32, 115, 118
$BRAKETEST_WARN..................................157
Axis velocity, maximum global..................... 184
$BRAKETEST_WORK................................. 157
Axis velocity, maximum in T1....32, 115, 118,
$MASTERINGTEST_ACTIVE...................... 144
184
$MASTERINGTEST_GROUP...................... 144
Axis velocity, reduced..............32, 33, 115, 118
$MASTERINGTEST_REQ_EXT...................145
Axis velocity, safely reduced........................184
$MASTERINGTEST_REQ_INT....................145
Axis, active................................................... 151
$MASTERINGTEST_SWITCH_OK.............. 146
Axis, requested.............................................151
$SR_ACTIVETOOL...................................... 209
$SR_AXISSPEED_OK................................. 210
$SR_CARTSPEED_OK................................210
$SR_DRIVES_ENABLE................................211 B
$SR_MOVE_ENABLE.................................. 211 BBRA.............................................................. 10
$SR_OV_RED.............................................. 171 Brake check, automatic....................... 150, 166
$SR_RANGE_ACTIVE................................. 211 Brake defect................................................... 54
$SR_RANGE_OK......................................... 212 Brake release device......................................49
$SR_SAFEMON_ACTIVE............................ 213 Brake test............................................... 15, 149
$SR_SAFEOPSTOP_ACTIVE......................213 Brake test, cycle time.................................. 150
$SR_SAFEOPSTOP_OK............................. 214 Brake test, manual....................................... 163
$SR_SAFEREDSPEED_ACTIVE.................214 Brake test, operating modes........................150
$SR_VEL_RED.............................................170 Brake test, programs....................................151
$SR_WORKSPACE_RED............................ 172 Brake test, signals............................... 155, 158
“Drives ready” interface..................................52 Brake test, state............................................. 83
”Drives ready” interface..................................51 Brake test, teaching positions......................159
”Drives ready” lamp........................................51 Brake, defective........................... 161, 163–165
BrakeTestAxes.src........................................ 152
BrakeTestBack.src................................152, 160
A BrakeTestPark.src................................ 152, 160
Accessories.....................................................35 BrakeTestReq.src..........................................152
Activating, monitoring space................ 108, 112 BrakeTestStart.src................................ 152, 159
Activating, reference stop.................... 109, 113 Braking before restricted areas..................... 28
Activating, safety configuration.................... 191 Braking before restricted areas, activating..124
Activation code, safety configuration............. 83 Braking distance............................................. 36
Actuating plate, hole pattern..........................73 Braking ramp of drive unit........................... 127
Actuating plate, installing............................. 137 Braking ramp, checking................................187
Administrator (user group)............................. 81 Braking time..................................................117
Alarm space....................................................11 Buttons, overview........................................... 82
Ambient temperature, reference switch.........69
ANSI/UL 1740.................................................51
Appendix....................................................... 269 C
Applied standards and regulations.............. 297 Cable lengths, reference switch module....... 16
Areas of application........................................14 Cartesian monitoring space, configuring..... 107
AUT (operating mode)....................................36 Cartesian monitoring spaces, checking.......180
AUT EXT (operating mode)........................... 36 Cartesian protected spaces........................... 23
Automatic (operating mode) Cartesian velocity limits, checking...............183
AUT............................................................36 Cartesian velocity, maximum................. 99, 183
AUT EXT................................................... 36 Cartesian velocity, reduced....................99, 183
Automatic External (operating mode)............ 53 Cartesian velocity, reduced in T1................ 183
Automatic mode..............................................64 Cartesian workspaces.................................... 22
Axis-specific monitoring space, configuring. 111 CE mark..........................................................36
Axis-specific monitoring spaces, checking.. 181 Cell area............................................ 12, 18, 20
Axis-specific protected spaces.......................26 Cell area, checking.......................................179
Axis-specific velocity limits, checking.......... 184 Cell area, configuring................................... 105
Axis-specific velocity monitoring functions, Checking the reference position.................. 142
configuring.................................................... 115 Checklists for safety acceptance................. 269
Axis-specific workspaces................................25 CIP Safety................................. 10, 15, 75, 193

Circuit diagram, reference switch.................. 72 Functions........................................................ 13

CK.............................................................10, 15
CK, monitoring................................................47
Cleaning work.................................................65 G
Configuration...................................................89 General safety measures............................... 54
Configuration, overview.................................. 91 GET_AXESMASK.........................................167
Connecting cables....................................17, 35 GET_BRAKETEST_TIME.............................168
Connector pin assignment, reference cable Global parameters, configuring...................... 97
XG42 - XS RefReference cable XG42 - XS
Ref, connector pin assignment...................... 71
Counterbalancing system............................... 65
Couplable external axes.................................15
H
Hardware components................................... 16
Hazardous substances................................... 66
Hole pattern, actuating plate..........................73
D Hole pattern, reference switch.......................70
Danger zone................................................... 37 Hysteresis, reference switch.......................... 69
Declaration of conformity............................... 35
Declaration of incorporation.....................35, 36
Decommissioning............................................66
Diagnosis...................................................... 209
I
IFBSafeExt...................................................... 11
Diagnosis package....................................... 299
Industrial robot................................................35
Diagnostic data, displaying.......................... 209
Installation.......................................................75
Diagnostic monitor (menu item)...................209
Installing
Diagnostic signals
via smartHMI............................................. 77
Ethernet interface.................................... 201
via WorkVisual...........................................75
Disclaimer....................................................... 35
Interface, XG13............................. 15, 193, 205
Discrete safety interface........................ 15, 193
Interface, XG42............................................ 208
Disposal.......................................................... 66
Interfaces...................................................... 193
Documentation, industrial robot....................... 9
Introduction....................................................... 9
Drive ramp stop group................................. 127
IT security....................................................... 56
DRS................................................................ 10
E J
Jog mode...........................................48, 52, 54
EC declaration of conformity......................... 35
EMC conformity, reference switch................. 69
EMC Directive.................................................36
EMERGENCY STOP device...... 44, 46, 52, 54 K
EMERGENCY STOP, external................ 46, 59 KL....................................................................11
EMERGENCY STOP, local............................ 59 Knowledge, required.........................................9
EN ISO 13849-1...........................................297 KR C............................................................... 11
Enabling device................................. 46, 52, 54 KSS.................................................................37
Enabling device, external............................... 47 KUKA Customer Support............................. 299
Enabling switches...........................................46 KUKA Service...............................................299
EtherCAT..........................................10, 15, 193 KUKA smartPAD.............................................37
Ethernet interface..................................... 10, 11 KUKA smartPAD-2......................................... 37
Diagnostic signals................................... 201
Ethernet safety interfaces......................15, 193
EtherNet/IP................................ 11, 15, 75, 193 L
EXT (operating mode)....................................53 Labeling.......................................................... 50
External axes..................................................35 Licenses..........................................................12
External axis................................................... 39 Limit value for safely reduced Cartesian
velocity in T1 mode........................................99
Linear unit.......................................................35
F Low Voltage Directive.....................................36
Faults.............................................................. 56
Fictitious STOP 1 - DRS end position.......... 11
FSoE................................................ 11, 15, 193 M
Function test................................................... 58 Machine data............................................59, 83
Functional description.....................................13

Machine data, displaying................................84 PROFINET.................................11, 15, 75, 193

Machinery Directive........................................ 36 PROFIsafe................................. 11, 15, 75, 193
Maintenance................................................... 64 Protected space................................. 11, 18, 23
Manipulator...............................................35, 37 Protection rating............................................. 69
Manual mode..................................................63 Protective equipment......................................48
Mastering confirmation, external.................. 147 Pulse duration, reference switch................... 69
Mastering position, reference position.........130 Pulse duty factor, reference switch......... 69, 70
Mastering test.........................................11, 132
Mastering test input........................................99
Mastering test via reference switch.............133 R
Mastering test, performing manually........... 143 Radius, tool sphere........................................ 93
Mastering test, programs............................. 135 Reaction distance........................................... 36
Mastering test, teaching positions............... 140 Recommissioning............................................57
Mastering type................................................ 99 Reference group............................ 11, 130, 133
Mechanical end stops.................................... 48 Reference group, configuring.......................128
Messages......................................................217 Reference groups, configuration.................. 139
Monitoring space............................................ 12 Reference position................................. 11, 133
Monitoring spaces.......................................... 18 Reference position, axis angle.................... 130
Monitoring time.............................. 11, 132, 150 Reference position, Cartesian......................130
Monitoring, physical safeguards.............. 43, 44 Reference position, configuring................... 128
Monitoring, velocity.........................................47 Reference position, selecting....................... 135
Reference stop......................................... 11, 30
Reference switch............................................ 11
O Reference switch module...............................16
Open source................................................... 12 Reference switch XS Ref, circuit diagram.... 72
Operating current, reference switch.............. 69 Reference switch, connecting...................... 138
Operating mode selection........................51, 52 Reference switch, installing..........................137
Operating voltage, reference switch.............. 69 Reference switch, technical data...................69
Operation........................................................ 81 Reference system................................ 106, 110
Operator safety............................42–44, 52, 54 Release device............................................... 49
Operators........................................................ 40 Repair............................................................. 64
Options............................................................35 Revision log, displaying..................................84
Outputs, reference switch.............................. 69 Robot controller.............................................. 35
Overload......................................................... 54
Override reduction........................................ 169
Overview, buttons........................................... 82 S
Overview, configuration.................................. 91 Safe monitoring.............................................. 99
Overview, safety acceptance....................... 177 Safe monitoring, activating.............................97
Overview, start-up...........................................91 Safe monitoring, deactivating.......................192
Safe operational stop...............................33, 37
Safe operational stop, axis group 1 to 6.... 123
P Safe operational stop, checking.................. 186
Panic position................................................. 46 Safe operational stop, configuring............... 122
Performance Level......................................... 43 Safe robot retraction.......................................87
Peripheral contactor....................................... 62 Safeguards, external...................................... 50
Permissible load current, reference switch... 69 SafeOperation via Ethernet safety
Permissible switching distance, reference interface........................................................ 197
switch..............................................................69 Safety..............................................................35
Permissible switching frequency, reference Safety-oriented TCP....................................... 31
switch..............................................................69 Safety-oriented tool........................................ 12
Personal protective equipment...................... 39 Safety-oriented tool, checking......................178
Personnel........................................................39 Safety-oriented tool, configuring.................. 101
Plant integrator............................................... 39 Safety-oriented tools.......................................31
Polygon, convex.................................11, 18, 21 Safety acceptance, overview....................... 177
Position tolerance......................................... 123 Safety acceptance, precondition.................. 269
Positioner........................................................ 35 Safety configuration, activating.................... 191
PPE.................................................................39 Safety configuration, displaying information.. 83
Pressure Equipment Directive........................65 Safety configuration, exporting...................... 87
Preventive maintenance work........................ 65 Safety configuration, importing.......................84
Product description.........................................13 Safety configuration, opening........................ 82

Safety configuration, saving......................... 131 Compatibility.............................................. 75

Safety controller..............................................43 Hardware................................................... 75
Safety functions........................................42, 52 Software.....................................................75
Safety functions, checking........................... 178 System variables, mastering test.................144
Safety functions, Ethernet safety interface..193 System variables, safety monitoring
Safety functions, overview............................. 42 functions....................................................... 209
Safety instructions......................................9, 89
Safety interfaces.............................................15
Safety maintenance (user group).................. 81 T
Safety measures.............................................54 T1 (operating mode)................................ 39, 53
Safety of machinery..................................... 297 T2 (operating mode)................................ 39, 53
Safety options.................................................38 Target group..................................................... 9
Safety recovery (user group)......................... 81 Teach pendant................................................ 35
Safety STOP 0............................................... 37 Technical data.................................................69
Safety STOP 1............................................... 37 Technical data, reference switch................... 69
Safety STOP 2............................................... 38 Terms used..................................................... 10
Safety stop 0.................................................. 37 Terms, safety.................................................. 36
Safety stop 1.................................................. 37 Time stamp, machine data............................ 83
Safety STOP 1 – Drive Ramp Stop.............. 38 Time stamp, safety configuration...................83
Safety STOP 1 DRS...................................... 38 Tool sphere, radius.........................................93
Safety stop 2.................................................. 38 Trademarks..................................................... 10
Safety zone.............................................. 37, 40 Training.......................................................9, 81
Safety, general................................................35 Transportation................................................. 56
Serial number, robot.......................................83 Turn-tilt table...................................................35
Service life................................................37, 69 Type of monitoring space.................... 108, 112
Signals, brake test............................... 155, 158
Simulation....................................................... 64
Single (menu item).............................. 219, 220
Single point of control.................................... 66
U
Uninstalling via smartHMI.............................. 78
smartPAD................................................. 38, 55
Uninstalling via WorkVisual............................76
smartPAD-2.....................................................38
Updating via smartHMI...................................77
Software..........................................................35
Updating via WorkVisual................................ 75
Software limit switches......................48, 52, 54
US2................................................................. 62
Space-specific velocity.......... 30, 108, 109, 113
User.......................................................... 37, 39
Space-specific velocity, checking.................182
User groups.................................................... 81
Space dimensions........................................ 110
User rights, displaying....................................82
Space type........................................... 108, 112
Sphere, radius................................................ 93
SPOC..............................................................66
Standstill monitoring...............................33, 123 V
Start-up.....................................................57, 89 Velocity monitoring......................................... 47
Start-up mode.......................................... 62, 90 Velocity monitoring functions..........................32
Start-up, overview...........................................91 Velocity, space-specific...................................30
STOP 0.................................................... 36, 38 Version, safety configuration.......................... 83
STOP 1.................................................... 36, 38 Version, safety option.....................................83
STOP 2.................................................... 36, 39 VSS.................................................................39
Stop at boundaries...............................108, 113
Stop category 0.............................................. 38
Stop category 1.............................................. 38 W
Stop category 2.............................................. 39 Warnings........................................................... 9
Stop category 1, Drive Ramp Stop............... 38 Workspace............................ 10, 18, 22, 36, 40
Stop reactions....................................19, 33, 41 WorkVisual...................................................... 15
STOP 1 - DRS............................................... 38
STOP 1, DRS end position............................11
Stopping distance.............................. 19, 36, 40 X
Storage........................................................... 66
XG13, interface..............................15, 193, 205
Support request............................................ 299
XG42, interface.............................................208
Switching function, reference switch............. 69
XML export..................................................... 87
System integrator.............................. 36, 39, 40
XML import..................................................... 84
System requirements

KST SafeOperation 36 en

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KST System Technology

Publication: Pub KST SafeOperation 3.6 (PDF) en

Book structure: KST SafeOperation 3.6 V3.1

Version: KST SafeOperation 3.6 V3

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3.6.7 External EMERGENCY STOP device.................................................................. 46

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6.3 Opening the safety configuration.......................................................................... 82

7 Start-up and configuration..................................................................... 89

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7.7.3 Mastering test with external mastering confirmation............................................ 147

8 Interfaces to the higher-level controller............................................... 193

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8.2 KUKA.SafeOperation via interface XG13............................................................. 205

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10.2.27 KSS15066.............................................................................................................. 249

12 KUKA Service........................................................................................... 299

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1.1 Target group

This documentation is aimed at users with the following knowledge and

• Advanced knowledge of the robot controller system

For optimal use of KUKA products, we recommend the training courses

1.2 Industrial robot documentation

The industrial robot documentation consists of the following parts:

• Documentation for the robot arm

1.3 Representation of warnings and notes

These warnings contain references to safety-relevant information or gen-

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This warning draws attention to procedures which serve to prevent or rem-

edy emergencies or malfunctions:

Procedures marked with this warning must be followed exactly.

These notices serve to make your work easier or contain references to

CIP Safety® is a trademark of ODVA.

EtherCAT® is a registered trademark and patented technolo-

1.5 Terms used

BBRA Braking before restricted areas

• With this function, the fictitious STOP 1 - DRS end position

CIP Safety Common Industrial Protocol Safety

DRS Drive Ramp Stop

EtherCAT Ethernet for Control Automation Technology

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FSoE FailSafe over EtherCAT

IFBSafeExt Interface Board Safe Extended

Mastering test A mastering test checks at a suitable reference position whether

KL KUKA linear unit

KR C KUKA Robot Control

Alarm space An alarm space signals a workspace violation by setting an output.

PROFINET Ethernet-based field bus (Ethernet interface)

PROFIsafe PROFINET-based safety interface for connecting a safety PLC to

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Safety-oriented tool A safety-oriented tool can be modeled using up to 12 configurable

Monitoring space A monitoring space can be defined as a Cartesian cuboid or by

Further information about open-source licenses can be requested from

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2.1 Product description

KUKA.SafeOperation 3.6 is a safety option that can be used to implement

• Safety-oriented monitoring of up to 16 user-defined, axis-specific or

2.2 Functional description