01 Introduction To IEC 61850

POWERGRID
ABB Ltd. INPSS-SAS - 1

16-03-17
Surajkund,
07 Dec, 2007
Substation Automation Issues and Aspects
Rajiv Krishnan
ABB Limited, Bangalore
rajiv.krishnan@in.abb.com

16-03-17
Introduction
Introduction
A Global Standard for Substation Communication
Driving Factors and the Outcome
Structure, Contents
and Exclusions
User Benefits
Conclusions
Substation Automation Systems

The technological developments that led to the present availability of fast,
powerful microprocessors and communication systems give us the
possibility to build Substation Automation Systems (SAS).
The substation secondary equipment evolved from electro-mechanical
devices to microprocessor based numerical devices with built in
communication features.
This in turn provided the possibility of implementing SAS using several
intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) to perform the required functions
(protection, local and remote monitoring, control, etc.).

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Thus, the need arose for efficient communication among the IEDs using
appropriate protocols.
Data Exchange in a Substation Automation System

Monitored Information:

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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Single Bit indications (alarms, events)

Double Bit indications (on/off status of devices)
Step position indication (Transformer tap position)
Analog measurements (voltages, currents, power, etc.,)
Pulse counter data (kWH, kVARH, etc.,)
Protection Events,
Sequence of event records,
Disturbance records,
IED configuration data.
Data Exchange in a Substation Automation System

Control Information:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Close or trip commands

Set point (analog output) commands
Regulating step command
Time synchronization
Parameter setting commands

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Data Exchange in a SAS involves communication between the various

IEDs, using relevant protocols.
What is a Protocol?
Protocol:
Set of rules that determines the behavior of functional units in achieving and
performing communication.
Open Protocol:
A communication protocol whose stack is either standardized or publicly
available.

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Normally follows the ISO OSI Seven Layer Reference Model
Towards a Global Solution for...

...Substation Automation
Systems
Experience in:
International standards
De facto standards
Customer requirements
Proprietary solutions
System engineering

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Goals:
A solid background creates strong

innovations
Interoperability
Future-proof standard
A Breakthrough for Substation Automation
One world
One technology
One standard

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IEC 61850
Combining the best properties in a new

way...
IEC 61850
This standard applies to Substation Automation

Systems (SAS). It standardizes the communication
between Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) and
the related system requirements.

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From Scope of IEC 61850
The IEC 61850 deals with communication within a

substation only!
IEC 61850 extends and serves as a model to other areas.
A New Standard for Open Communications

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Connecting:
Where there has been life there has

been communication
Devices from different suppliers
Present and future installations
Engineering information from

different tools from different
manufacturers
New communication technologies

with existing applications
Different and changing SA

architectures
The New Standard of Interoperability

Enables:
Information exchange and cooperation between IEDs

from different manufacturers
Understanding of both structure and meaning of

information

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Higher degree of flexibility than ever before, but it still

matters which products you choose!
The New Standard for Intelligent Investment

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Savings from efficient IED engineering
IEDs are engineered using manufacturer specific IED

configuration tools
Configuration tools translate the IED capabilities to the

SCL (Substation Configuration description Language)
SCL enables information exchange between IED

configuration tools from different manufacturers
SCL secures backwards compatibility between different

versions of IEDs and IED configuration tools
The New Standard for Intelligent Investment

Savings from efficient system engineering

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Information exchange between IED and system engineering

configuration tools
IED capabilities from IED configuration tools to a system

configuration tool
Substation description for system related IED configuration, for

instance:
Communication addresses
Peer-to-peer communication paths
Engineering from the Human Machine Interface with direct

download to the IEDs without an intermediate cross-reference
of data
The Standard for Future-proof Communications

IEC 61850 separates applications from communication
technologies:
Applications are independent from the

communication technologies
Data and proven applications are safeguarded

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You benefit from the advantages of the evolving

communication technologies
Open to Changes in SA Architectures

The IEC 61850 supports optimization of SA architectures
through:

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Free allocation of functions
Centralized and/or
Distributed
Adapting the substation architecture in response to your specified

requirements
Availability
Budget
A Global Standard for IEC and ANSI ...

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is ready now!
What is IEC 61850?
IEC 61850 is a global standard for

Communication Networks and Systems in Substations
It specifies an expandable data model and services
It does not block future development of functions
It supports free allocation of functions to devices

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It specifies no protection or control functions

It is open for different system philosophies
What is IEC 61850?
It provides the Substation Configuration description

Language (SCL)

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It supports comprehensive consistent system definition

and engineering
It uses Ethernet and TCP/IP for communication
Provides the broad range of features of mainstream

communication
It is open for future new communication concepts
IEC 61850 Application Domain: Substation Automation

Station
level
Engineering/
Monitoring
Operator
workplace
Station bus
Bay
level
Control
Protection
Protection
& Control
Control
Protection
Process bus

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Process
level
Cu wires
Process Interface
Process Interface
Process Interface

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Market Requirements Have Been Driving
Cost reduction in design and operation
Safeguarding of investments
A global, open standard for a global market
The standard shall be future-proof, long term stability
Interoperability between IEDs from different vendors
Fit all types and sizes of substations
Whats in the IEC 61850 Documentation?

Information and
understanding
Part 1:
Introduction and Overview
Part 2:
Glossary
Part 3:
General Requirements
Part 4:
System and Project Management
Part 5:
Communication Requirements
Part 6:
Substation Configuration Language (SCL)
Part 7:
Communication model (Data model and Services)
Impact on tenders
and product mgmt.
Base req. for
the standard
Enables
interoperable
engineering

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The real stuff!

Part 8-1: Mapping for
MMS-TCP/IP-Ethernet
Part 9-1: Mapping for pointto-point connections
Part 8-x:
For future mappings
Part 9-2: Mapping for bus

connections
Part 10:
Realization of the
models on
the Ethernet
Specifies
conformance test
Conformance testing
Station bus
mappings
Process bus
mappings
What Is Not Included in the IEC 61850?

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Competition
remains
Product functions are not

standardized and not included
Operator functions and operator

interfaces are not standardized
and not included
Products from different vendors

are interoperable
but not necessarily
interchangeable

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IEC 61850 User Benefits
Information instead of data
Users subscribe to information
Portable engineering and configuration data
Re-use of engineering and standardized solutions
High speed Ethernet LAN communication
More intelligence in transducers and IEDs
Interoperability between IEDs from different vendors
Gives the opportunity to select Best value in use

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IEC 61850 - Conclusions
The communication standard for substations!
Embraced by vendors and users equally!
Provides features for improved substation operation!
Promises cost reductions from design to operation and maintenance!
Expands from substations to other areas!
Is ready now!

16-03-17
PGCIL, Corporate Centre

Gurgaon
04 Aug, 2006
Substation Automation
with IEC 61850
Rajiv Krishnan
ABB Limited, Bangalore
rajiv.krishnan@in.abb.com

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Contents
Details of the Standard
System Architecture and Engineering
POWERGRID SAS

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Data communication in Human terms

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Data communication in Human terms

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Logical Nodes
Functions or equipment used in power systems are represented in

Logical Nodes, LN
All information and functions in a substation is structured in atomic

units, the LNs
Each LN provides a list of well organized and named information

Complex functions use a set of LN required to represent the function
Services enable the exchange of the information in LNs between IEDs
Example: the LN for a Circuit Breaker has the generic name XCBR
New logical nodes can, if required, be created according rules defined

in the standard
Logical Node Groups

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Group Indicator
A
C
G
I
Logical Node Groups

Automatic Control
Supervisory control
Generic Function References
Interfacing and Archiving
LNs defined
4
5
3
4
System Logical Nodes
M
P
Metering and Measurement

Protection Functions
8
28
R
Sa)
Ta)
Xa)
Ya)
Za)
Protection Related Functions

Sensors, Monitoring
Instrument Transformer
Switchgear
Power Transformer and Related Functions
Further (power system) Equipment
10
4
2
2
4
15
LNs of this group exist in dedicated IEDs if a process bus is used. Without a process bus,
LNs of this group are the I/Os in the hardwired IED one level higher representing the
external device by its inputs and outputs
a)

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Functions, Logical Nodes, Physical Devices

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IEC 61850 Modeling Approach
IEC61850 Logical Nodes

Logical Node Concept
Separation
IEC61850
Configuration data
Input
data
Basic Function
(e.g. O/C protection)
Output
data

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Function still remain vendor specific

Data exchange is standardized in 61850
Application
(e.g. Protection)
Data Model
Service
(e.g. Report)
Service Rules
Communication
(e.g. Ethernet)
Mapping
Products from different vendors are

interoperable but NOT necessarily
Interchangeable
IEC 61850 Structure

Slow
Application
Domain
Applications
Objects
Services
Long term definitions

safeguarding investments
Abstract Interface
Substation
communication
Stack specific
Mapping
Mapping
Adaptation per
selected stack
Stack Interface
Communication
Domain
MMS
TCP/IP
Ethernet
Stack selection
following the
state-of-the art in
communications

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Fast
Speed of
change
ISO/OSI
seven layer stack
Solution in
IEC61850
Communication stack
Application
ACSI
GOOSE
Samples
Client / Server
Services

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MMS
TCP
IP
Ethernet II
Priority tagging 802.1p/802.1Q
Time
Synchronization
SNTP
UDP
IP
Communication concepts
Peer to peer communication;
time critical
Physical Device
ACSI Client
ACSI Server
reports
Client / Server communication

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Applications of "peer-to-peer"
communication
tripping of circuit breakers:
short information that needs to
be transmitted with a low
probability of loss within a few
milliseconds
transmission of sampled
values from instrumental
transformers: high amount of
data, to be transmitted within a
few milliseconds, loss of data
needs to be detected
Physical Device
req / rsp
Application
Data
Data
Data
Physical Device
req / rsp
ACSI Server
Data
GOOSE Message
Sampled Values
Data
Data
multicast
Application
Physical Device
Application

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XCBR1 Information depicted as a tree

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Example of an IED Composition
PTOC Time Overcurrent Protection, PDIS Distance Protection

PTRC Trip Conditionong, XCBR Circuit Breaker

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POWERGRID SAS
System architecture station bus ring

Control Center
Engineering
HMI
Router
Station Bus
100 Mbps Ethernet Ring with Switches
Bay
Controller
Relay
A
Relay
B
Bay
Controller
Relay
A
Relay
B

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Process Bus
Modern
Switchgear
Modern
CT / VT's
Modern
Switchgear
Modern
CT / VT's
Vertical Communication

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There are two classes of report control defined, each with a slightly different
behaviour.
Buffered Reports internal events issue immediate sending of reports or

buffer the events for transmission, such that values of data are not lost
due to transport flow control constraints or loss of connection.
Unbuffered Reports - internal events issue immediate sending of reports

on a best efforts basis. If no association exists, or if the transport data
flow is not fast enough to support it, events may be lost.
Distributed Function
A function which is performed in two or more logical nodes that are located
in different physical devices.
In case of the loss of one LN or one related communication link, the
function may be blocked completely or show a graceful degradation, if
applicable.
(IEC 61850-5)

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Some examples of Distributed functions:
Station-wide interlocking.
Distributed synchrocheck.
Breaker failure.
Load shedding.
Automatic switching sequences.
Horizontal (peer-to-peer) communication

Station
gateway
Station
computer
GOOSE
Control
Protection

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Process Interface
Control &
Protection
Process Interface
Control
Protection
Process Interface
GOOSE = Generic Object Oriented System-wide Events
IEC 61850 GOOSE Priority tagging

Ethernet-Switch
Overtake lane for IEC GOOSE
GOOSE

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Normal
Telegrams
Buffer for normal telegrams
IEC 61850 uses standard Ethernet
IEC 61850 can therefore take advantage from all the options of modern
Ethernet

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Application of GOOSE
System Availability and Reliability

Availability shall mean the ratio of uptime of the SAS to total time, as
defined in 3.2 of IEC 60870-4.
Uptime is the time that the SAS is able to perform its vital functions.
where secondary protection exists, failure of the primary protection

shall not be considered as contributing to downtime.
failure of an HMI shall not be considered downtime if an alternative

point of control exists.
Reliability requirements are as described in 3.1 of IEC 60870-4.

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No single point of failure should cause the substation to be inoperable. A

failure of any component should not result in an undetected loss of functions
nor multiple and cascading component failures.
If communication elements of the SAS are redundant, there shall be no single
failure mode that would disable both redundant elements.
(IEC 61850-3)
System Availability and Reliability

Redundancy
existence of more than one means for performing a required function in

an item (IEC 61850-2)

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Redundancy can be introduced to enhance the safety or availability of a

system, and at different levels of the system.
IED internal: IED specific data might have to be introduced for error
indications.
Communication system level: Might require additional SCSM specific

parameters, if the redundancy is in the stack mapping. If not, private P
parameters might be introduced, if necessary..
Application level: Each IED instance providing application redundancy

is explicitly modeled having its own name, and any explicitly provided
additional communication subnetworks are also modeled in the SCD
file.
System architecture
Fault tolerant ring configuration
(using STP / RSTP)
Proprietary protocols for faster recovery

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Duplicated communication, each IED

having two ports,connected to two
switches. Requires special handling at
protocol layer
Engineering Language
The Engineering language (SCL) is based on XML and it contains the
following subsections:
Substation subsection: describes the substation single line diagram,
and its binding to logical nodes as well as the placement of logical
nodes onto IEDs
Communication section: describes the communication connections
between IEDs in terms of connecting communication links

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IED section: describes the capabilities (configuration) of one or more

IEDs, and the binding to logical nodes on other IEDs
LNType section: defines which data objects are actually contained
within the logical node instances defined for the IEDs
SCL in the Engineering Process

IED
specific
tool
Device (IED)
Device
data
Device
Devicedata
data
Device
Devicedata
data
Device data
Stand-alone device
configuration*
System
configuration*

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System specification
*) Formal description according to

Substation Configuration Language
System
configuration
tool
System device
configuration*
System & device

configuration*
System
documentation
IED Engineering
ICD-File
IED Tool

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The .icd file describes the data model of the IED
logical devices, logical nodes
data sets
control blocks
Format: XML
Substation Engineering
ICD-File
ICD-File
ICD-File
ICD-File
SCD-File
Substation Configuration Tool

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The .scd file describes the complete substation configuration
single line diagram
communication network
IED configurations
binding information (e.g. trip matrix)
IED configuration
SCD-File
IED Engineering Tool

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ICD-File

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POWERGRID SAS
POWERGRID SAS
POWERGRID Specification Requirements (Line bays)

The following functions (Logical Nodes, or LN, as defined in IEC 61850)
are required for 400 kV and 220 kV line bays.
Distance protection (PDIS, 21), with quadrilateral characteristics and
suitable for series compensated lines.
Power swing block (RPSB, 78)
Fuse failure supervision (RFUF, 60)
Directional backup IDMT earth fault protection (PDEF, 67N)
Single shot auto reclose function (RREC, 79), with single phase and
three phase reclosing facility.

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Synchronizing and energizing check (RSYN, 25)

Breaker failure (local breaker back-up) protection (RBRF, 50BF)
Trip Circuit Supervision
Line over voltage protection (PTOV, 59)

The following functions (Logical Nodes, or LN, as defined in IEC 61850)
are required for 400 kV and 220 kV line bays. (continued)
Distributed bus bar protection (PBDF, 87B) bay unit
Fault locator (RFLO)
Disturbance Recording, bay level acquisition (RDRE), with 8 analog
and 16 digital
Sequential event recorder (RDRE) with time resolution of 1 ms
Breaker, isolator and earth switch control (CSWI)

16-03-17
Bay level and inter bay interlocks (CILO)

Measurement of voltages, currents, active and reactive power
(MMXU)
Events and alarms handling (CALH)
Local HMI (IHMI)

As per IEC 61850, the primary equipment are also represented as LNs, and
the ones used in this bay are:
Circuit breaker (XCBR)
Isolators (XSWI)
Earth switches (XSWI)
Current transformer (TCTR)

16-03-17
Voltage transformer (TVTR)

Since process bus (IEC 61850-9-2) is not used, these LNs are hardwired
inputs and outputs of the control and protection IEDs. XCBR and XSWI
represent the status inputs from, and command outputs to the breaker,
isolators and earth switches. TCTR and TVTR are the current and voltage
inputs respectively from the instrument transformers.
POWERGRID Line Bay Implementation

REL 670 / 7SA522
REB 500 (bay unit)
PDIS
RPSB
CSWI
RREC
PDEF
RFUF
CSWI
RSYN
PTOV
RFLO
CSWI
IHMI
CILO
MMXU
CALH
XCBR
CALH
XCBR
XSWI
TCTR
XSWI
XSWI
TVTR
XSWI
CALH
RDRE DR, SER
XCBR
TCTR
TVTR
REL 670 / 7SA522
REC 670
RPSB
CSWI
RSYN
PDEF
RFUF
CSWI
MMXU
PTOV
RFLO
CSWI
CALH
RREC
CILO
IHMI
RSYN
XCBR
RDRE DR, SER

XCBR
TCTR
TVTR
PBDF
RBRF
400 kV Line bays

TCTR
REB 500 (bay unit)
PDIS
CALH
16-03-17
REC 670
PBDF
RBRF
220 kV Line bays
CALH
XCBR
XSWI
TCTR
XSWI
XSWI
TVTR
XSWI
TCTR
POWERGRID Specification Requirements (ICT bays)

The following Logical Nodes, as defined in IEC 61850, are required for
400 kV and 220 kV ICT bays.
Transformer differential protection (PTDF, 87T) triple pole type with
faulty phase identification, percentage bias restraint for through faults,
second harmonic restraint for transformer inrush and fifth harmonic
restraint for overexcitation.
Over fluxing protection (PVPH, 24) based on voltage to frequency
ratio.
Restricted earth fault protection (PNDF, 87N), single pole type.
Fuse failure supervision (RFUF, 60).

16-03-17
Directional backup IDMT over current protection (PDOC, 67).

Directional backup IDMT earth fault protection (PDEF, 67N).
Overload protection (PTOC, 51).

400 kV and 220 kV ICT bays (continued).
Breaker failure (local breaker back-up) protection (RBRF, 50BF).
Trip Circuit Supervision.
Distributed bus bar protection (PBDF, 87B) bay unit.
Disturbance Recording, bay level acquisition (RDRE), with 8 analog
and 16 digital.
Sequential event recorder (RDRE) with time resolution of 1 ms.
Breaker, isolator and earth switch control (CSWI).

16-03-17
Synchronizing and energizing check (RSYN, 25).

Bay level and inter bay interlocks (CILO).
Transformer tap changer control (ATCC, only manual mode).

400 kV and 220 kV ICT bays (continued).
Measurement of voltages, currents, frequency, active power, reactive
power, winding temperature and tap position (MMXU).
Events and alarms handling (CALH).

16-03-17
Local HMI (IHMI).

The primary equipment LNs used in this bay are:
Circuit breaker (XCBR)
Isolators (XSWI)
Earth switches (XSWI)
Power Transformer (YPTR)
Tap Changer (YLTC)
Current transformer (TCTR)
Voltage transformers (TVTR)

16-03-17
As in the case of line bays, these LNs are hardwired inputs and outputs of
the control and protection IEDs.
POWERGRID ICT Bay Implementation

RET 670(Main I)
PTDF
PTOC
PVPH
RET 670(Main II)

PNDF
PTOC
PDOC
PDEF
PDOC
PVPH
CALH
RFUF
CALH
RFUF
CALH
RFUF
XCBR
TCTR
XCBR
TCTR
XCBR
TCTR
YPTR
TVTR
YPTR
TVTR
YPTR
REC 670

16-03-17
REL 670
REB 500
(bay unit)
CSWI
RSYN
CSWI
CALH
CSWI
MMXU
CILO
IHMI
XCBR
PBDF
RBRF
CALH
XCBR
XSWI
TCTR
XSWI
XSWI
TVTR
XSWI
TCTR
400 kV ICT bays
POWERGRID ICT Bay Implementation

REB 500 (bay unit)
REC 670
CSWI
RSYN
CSWI
CALH
CSWI
MMXU
CILO
IHMI

16-03-17
XSWI
RBRF
220 kV ICT bays
CALH
XCBR
XCBR
XSWI
PBDF
TCTR
TVTR
XSWI
XSWI
TCTR
IED Selection
AA1A1/ =LD0
REC 670 / IEC61850
Logical Device
CB_1
SW_1
52
CB
3=CSW
IN
I1
TL
CB
52=CILOC
1BCB
=XCBR1CB
25
SC
=RSYN1CB
402 - Dadri
SW_4
=Q2
=QB2
=QB1
SW_3
89
SW
3=CSW
IN
I2
TLSW
89=CILOSW
2 SW
=XSWI2 SW
SW_5
89
SW
3=CSW
IN
I4TLSW
89=CILOSW
4 SW
=XSWI4 SW
79 1->0
=RREC1
401-89B
401-89A
SW_2
89
SW
3=CSW
IN
I1
TLSW
89=CILOSW
1SW
=XSWI1SW
SW_6
89
SW
3=CSW
IN
I5
TLSW
89=CILOSW
5 SW
=XSWI5 SW
401-89AE
401-52
=QC1
=QA1
P2
Core 5
=BI1.5
1600 - 800 / 1, ,
CT
=TCTR1
VT
=TVTR1
HMI
=IHMI1
=LLN01
Core 4
=BI1.4
1600 - 800 / 1, ,
Core 3
=BI1.3
1600 - 800 / 1, ,
Core 2
=BI1.2
1600 - 800/ 1, , PS
401-CT Core 1
=BI1.1
1600 - 800/ 1, , PS
P1
AA1FP2/ =LD0
REL 670 / IEC61850
Logical Device
401- 89LE1
=QC2
401-89L
=QB9
M
21 Z1<
=PDIS1
21
Z<
=RFLO1
94 TRIP
=PTRC1
21 Z2<
=PDIS2
67N 3Io->
=PTOC1
52
CB
=XCBR1
21 Z3<
=PDIS3
95DR DR
=RDRE1
21
Z<
=PSCH1
VT
=TVTR1
21
Z<
=PSCH2
CT
=TCTR1
79 1->0
=RREC1
401- 89LE2
=QC9
401- CVT
=BU1
400KV/ 110V/ 110V/ 110V

16-03-17
89
SW
3=CSW
IN
I6
TLSW
89=CILOSW
6 SW
=XSWI6 SW
Line
=MMXU1
89
SW
3=CSW
IN
I3
TLSW
89=CILOSW
3 SW
=XSWI3 SW
401- WT
=L1
/
/
/
/
=LLN01
Line 1
1
=LPHD1
=LPHD1

16-03-17
System configuration

16-03-17
Data set configuration

16-03-17
Report control blocks

16-03-17
GOOSE control block
System architecture
IEC 60870-5-101
Laser Printer
Redundant HMI
DR WS
GPS
Receiver
DMP
Gateway
IEC 61850 Ring network
Ethernet Switch
Ethernet Switch
REC 670
REL 670 Main I
Ethernet Switch
Ethernet Switch
Ethernet Switch
REC 670
RET 670 Main I

REC 670
REC 670
REL 670
7SA522 Main II
REB 500 Main I
RET 670 Main II

16-03-17
REL 670
BBP Bay Units
Main I, Main II
Line x 2
REB 500 Main II

BBP Bay Units
Main I, Main II
Autotransformer x 2
BBP Bay Units

Main I, Main II
Bus Coupl. x 1
Auxiliaries
Busbar

16-03-17

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What are substation automation systems?

What are substation automation systems?

What factors led to the development of substation automation systems?

What factors led to the development of substation automation systems?

POWERGRID

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Substation Automation Issues and Aspects

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A Global Standard for Substation Communication

Driving Factors and the Outcome

Substation Automation Systems

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Data Exchange in a Substation Automation System

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Single Bit indications (alarms, events)

Data Exchange in a Substation Automation System

Close or trip commands

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Data Exchange in a SAS involves communication between the various

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Normally follows the ISO OSI Seven Layer Reference Model

Towards a Global Solution for...

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A solid background creates strong

A Breakthrough for Substation Automation

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Combining the best properties in a new

This standard applies to Substation Automation

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From Scope of IEC 61850

The IEC 61850 deals with communication within a

IEC 61850 extends and serves as a model to other areas.

A New Standard for Open Communications

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Where there has been life there has

Devices from different suppliers

Present and future installations

Engineering information from

New communication technologies

Different and changing SA

The New Standard of Interoperability

Information exchange and cooperation between IEDs

Understanding of both structure and meaning of

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Higher degree of flexibility than ever before, but it still

The New Standard for Intelligent Investment

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Savings from efficient IED engineering

IEDs are engineered using manufacturer specific IED

Configuration tools translate the IED capabilities to the

SCL enables information exchange between IED

SCL secures backwards compatibility between different

The New Standard for Intelligent Investment

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Information exchange between IED and system engineering

IED capabilities from IED configuration tools to a system

Substation description for system related IED configuration, for

Peer-to-peer communication paths

Engineering from the Human Machine Interface with direct