Many adolescent smoking prevention programmes target social norms, typically evaluated with self-report, susceptible to social desirability bias. An alternative approach with little application in public health are experimental norms... more
Many adolescent smoking prevention programmes target social norms, typically evaluated with self-report, susceptible to social desirability bias. An alternative approach with little application in public health are experimental norms elicitation methods. Using the Mechanisms of Networks and Norms Influence on Smoking in Schools (MECHANISMS) study baseline data, from 12–13 year old school pupils (n = 1656) in Northern Ireland and Bogotá (Colombia), we compare two methods of measuring injunctive and descriptive smoking and vaping norms: (1) incentivized experiments, using monetary payments to elicit norms; (2) self-report scales. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) examined whether the methods measured the same construct. Paths from exposures (country, sex, personality) to social norms, and associations of norms with (self-reported and objectively measured) smoking behavior/intentions were inspected in another structural model. Second-order CFA showed that latent variables representing...
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We investigate in an economic experiment how people choose sides in disputes. In an eight-player side-taking game, two disputants at a time fight over an indivisible resource and other group members choose sides. The player with more... more
We investigate in an economic experiment how people choose sides in disputes. In an eight-player side-taking game, two disputants at a time fight over an indivisible resource and other group members choose sides. The player with more supporters wins the resource, which is worth real money. Conflicts occur spontaneously between any two individuals in the group. Players choose sides by ranking their loyalties to everyone else in the group, and they automatically support the disputant they ranked higher. We manipulate participants’ information about other players’ loyalties and also their ability to communicate with public chat messages. We find that participants spontaneously and quickly formed alliances, and more information about loyalties caused more alliance-building. Without communication, we observe little evidence of bandwagon or egalitarian strategies, but with communication, some groups invented rank rotation schemes to equalize payoffs while choosing the same side to avoid f...
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ABSTRACT In laboratory asset markets, subjects trade shares of a firm whose profits in a linked product market determine dividends. Treatments vary whether dividend information is revealed once per period or in real-time and whether the... more
ABSTRACT In laboratory asset markets, subjects trade shares of a firm whose profits in a linked product market determine dividends. Treatments vary whether dividend information is revealed once per period or in real-time and whether the firm is controlled by a profit-maximizing robot or human subject. The latter variation induces uncertainty about firm behavior, bridging the gap between laboratory and field markets. Our data replicate well-known features of laboratory asset markets (e.g. bubbles), suggesting these are robust to a market-based dividend process. Compared to a sample of previous experiments, both real-time information revelation and endogenous uncertainty impede the bubble-mitigating impact of experience.