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Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply

Published: 27 March 2015 Publication History

Abstract

We consider the problem of designing revenue-maximizing online posted-price mechanisms when the seller has limited supply. A seller has k identical items for sale and is facing n potential buyers (“agents”) that are arriving sequentially. Each agent is interested in buying one item. Each agent’s value for an item is an independent sample from some fixed (but unknown) distribution with support [0,1]. The seller offers a take-it-or-leave-it price to each arriving agent (possibly different for different agents), and aims to maximize his expected revenue.
We focus on mechanisms that do not use any information about the distribution; such mechanisms are called detail-free (or prior-independent). They are desirable because knowing the distribution is unrealistic in many practical scenarios. We study how the revenue of such mechanisms compares to the revenue of the optimal offline mechanism that knows the distribution (“offline benchmark”).
We present a detail-free online posted-price mechanism whose revenue is at most O((k log n)2/3) less than the offline benchmark, for every distribution that is regular. In fact, this guarantee holds without any assumptions if the benchmark is relaxed to fixed-price mechanisms. Further, we prove a matching lower bound. The performance guarantee for the same mechanism can be improved to O(√k log n), with a distribution-dependent constant, if the ratio k/n is sufficiently small. We show that, in the worst case over all demand distributions, this is essentially the best rate that can be obtained with a distribution-specific constant.
On a technical level, we exploit the connection to multiarmed bandits (MAB). While dynamic pricing with unlimited supply can easily be seen as an MAB problem, the intuition behind MAB approaches breaks when applied to the setting with limited supply. Our high-level conceptual contribution is that even the limited supply setting can be fruitfully treated as a bandit problem.

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation  Volume 3, Issue 1
Special Issue on EC'12, Part 1
March 2015
143 pages
ISSN:2167-8375
EISSN:2167-8383
DOI:10.1145/2752509
Issue’s Table of Contents
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 27 March 2015
Accepted: 01 December 2013
Revised: 01 November 2013
Received: 01 February 2013
Published in TEAC Volume 3, Issue 1

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Author Tags

  1. dynamic pricing
  2. mechanism design
  3. multiarmed bandits
  4. posted price auctions
  5. regret
  6. revenue maximization

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  • (2024)A second-pricing based incentive-compatible mechanism for matching and pricing in ride-sharingExpert Systems with Applications10.1016/j.eswa.2024.123377248(123377)Online publication date: Aug-2024
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