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STOC 2024: Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
ACM2024 Proceeding
Publisher:
  • Association for Computing Machinery
  • New York
  • NY
  • United States
Conference:
STOC '24: 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing Vancouver BC Canada June 24 - 28, 2024
ISBN:
979-8-4007-0383-6
Published:
11 June 2024
Sponsors:

Bibliometrics
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Abstract

The papers in this volume were presented at the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2024), sponsored by the ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory (SIGACT). The conference was held in Vancouver, Canada, June 24--28, 2024, with the papers being presented as live talks.

SESSION: 2D
research-article
Open Access
The Power of Two-Sided Recruitment in Two-Sided Markets

We consider the problem of maximizing the gains from trade (GFT) in two-sided markets. The seminal impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that even for bilateral trade, there is no individually rational (IR), Bayesian incentive ...

research-article
Open Access
Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding World

We study a game played between advertisers in an online ad platform. The platform sells ad impressions by first-price auction and provides autobidding algorithms that optimize bids on each advertiser's behalf, subject to advertiser constraints such as ...

research-article
Open Access
The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unknown Valuations

We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item’s value only if the auction is won. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to logarithmic factors, ...

research-article
Open Access
Bilateral Trade with Correlated Values

We study the bilateral trade problem where a seller owns a single indivisible item, and a potential buyer seeks to purchase it. Previous mechanisms for this problem only considered the case where the values of the buyer and the seller are drawn from ...

research-article
Open Access
No-Regret Learning in Bilateral Trade via Global Budget Balance

Bilateral trade models the problem of intermediating between two rational agents — a seller and a buyer — both characterized by a private valuation for an item they want to trade. We study the online learning version of the problem, in which at each time ...

Contributors
  • Simon Fraser University
  • Carnegie Mellon University

Index Terms

  1. Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

    Recommendations

    Acceptance Rates

    Overall Acceptance Rate 1,469 of 4,586 submissions, 32%
    YearSubmittedAcceptedRate
    STOC '153479327%
    STOC '143199129%
    STOC '1336010028%
    STOC '113048428%
    STOC '083258025%
    STOC '032708030%
    STOC '022879132%
    STOC '012308336%
    STOC '001828547%
    STOC '981697544%
    STOC '972117536%
    STOC '962017437%
    STOC '891965629%
    STOC '881925328%
    STOC '871655030%
    STOC '801254738%
    STOC '791113733%
    STOC '781203832%
    STOC '77873136%
    STOC '76833036%
    STOC '75873136%
    STOC '74953537%
    STOC '71502346%
    STOC '70702739%
    Overall4,5861,46932%