La Psicología Del Bien y Del Mal
La Psicología Del Bien y Del Mal
La Psicología Del Bien y Del Mal
Por qué los niños, los adultos y los grupos ayudan y dañan a los demás
Ervin Staub es profesor de psicología en la Universidad de
Massachusetts en Amherst. Nació en Hungría y recibió su BA y su
Ph.D. (Universidad de Stanford, 1965) en Estados Unidos. Ha
enseñado en la Universidad de Harvard, la Universidad de
Stanford, la Universidad de Hawaii y la Escuela de Economía y
Ciencias Políticas de Londres. Es miembro de cuatro divisiones de la
Asociación Estadounidense de Psicología y fue presidente de la
Sociedad para el Estudio de la Paz, los Conflictos y la Violencia (y
también recibió el premio Lifetime Contribution to Peace
Psychology) y de la International Society for Political Psicología. El
profesor Staub aplica su trabajo a la promoción del cuidado, la
ayuda, la “presencia activa” y la prevención de la violencia a través
de apariciones en los medios, el trabajo con organizaciones y
escuelas, y trabajando en la curación y reconciliación en situaciones
de conflicto como Ruanda.
Otros libros de Ervin Staub:
Positive Social Behavior and Morality: Vol. 1. Influencias
personales y sociales
Comportamiento social positivo y moralidad: vol. 2.
Socialización y desarrollo
Personalidad: aspectos básicos e investigación actual (e ditor) El
desarrollo y mantenimiento del comportamiento prosocial: Perspectivas
internacionales sobre la moralidad positiva (c oeditor)
Las raíces del mal: Los orígenes del genocidio y otras violencias grupales
Valores sociales y morales: Individual and Societal Perspectives
(coeditor) Patriotism in the Lives of Individuals and Nations (coeditor)
ERVIN STAUB
Universidad de Massachusetts, Amherst
Cambridge, Nueva York, Melbourne, Madrid, Ciudad del Cabo, Singapur, São Paulo
Este libro está protegido por derechos de autor. Sujeto a las excepciones legales y a la
disposición de los acuerdos de licencia colectiva pertinentes, no se puede reproducir
ninguna parte sin el permiso por escrito de Cambridge University Press.
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Índice 5 61
Prefacio
Recibí mi Ph.D. en psicología en Stanford en 1965, comencé mi vida
laboral como profesor en Harvard y casi de inmediato comencé a
enfocarme en los temas de este libro: bondad y maldad. Durante muchos
años, he investigado, escrito extensamente y cada vez más aplicado al
mundo real la comprensión que se presenta en este libro sobre una
variedad de preguntas interrelacionadas: qué lleva a niños y adultos a ser
generosos y serviciales, y ¿Qué los lleva a responder a la necesidad
urgente de alguien en una emergencia en lugar de permanecer como
espectadores pasivos? ¿Por qué los niños y adolescentes se acosan,
acosan e intimidan unos a otros y qué podemos hacer al respecto? ¿Qué
influencias llevan a las personas, especialmente a los jóvenes, a volverse
agresivas y violentas, y qué socialización y experiencia en el hogar y la
escuela llevan a los niños y jóvenes a ser solidarios y serviciales? ¿Qué
lleva a grupos de personas a participar en acciones violentas,
especialmente en formas extremas de violencia como el genocidio y las
matanzas masivas? ¿Cómo pueden los grupos (e individuos) curarse del
trauma creado por la victimización pasada? ¿Cómo pueden reconciliarse
los miembros de los grupos de victimarios y víctimas, o los miembros de
grupos que se han hecho daño mutuamente? ¿Cuál es el papel de los
espectadores pasivos para permitir que se desarrolle la violencia y cómo
podemos utilizar el gran poder potencial de los "espectadores activos"
para prevenir la violencia o generar ayuda? ¿Y cómo se puede prevenir la
violencia y otros daños por parte de individuos y grupos y promover el
cuidado, la ayuda y la paz, y cómo se pueden crear culturas que las
generen? Desde el 11 de septiembre de 2001, también he aplicado mi
trabajo anterior a la comprensión de las raíces del terrorismo y su
prevención.
A medida que me involucré con estos problemas a lo largo de los
años, ingresé cada vez más al "mundo real". Di conferencias y realicé
talleres para padres y maestros sobre prácticas en el hogar y la escuela
que los ayudarían a criar niños solidarios y no violentos. En este libro
escribo sobre la socialización positiva (así como la negativa) en el hogar y
sobre las prácticas de las "escuelas solidarias". Creo que es posible
proporcionar a todos los niños experiencias
xi
xii Prefacio
influencias que he identificado desde las raíces del mal - por ejemplo, el
papel de la victimización pasado y heridas en la toma de violencia de los
grupos más probable. En The Roots of Evil también analizo cómo se puede
prevenir la violencia de los grupos. En los escritos de este libro, agrego a
esa exploración, abordando asuntos profundamente importantes como la
curación, la reconciliación e incluso el perdón, acciones específicas que
las “naciones espectadoras” pueden y deben tomar para prevenir la
violencia de grupos y la democratización como una vía para cambio de
cultura.
Escribí capítulos iniciales y finales de este libro e incluí algunos otros
artículos nuevos o recientes, no publicados anteriormente. El volumen
contiene artículos completos o capítulos de libros, y partes de otros. En
algunas selecciones, el material que informa los resultados de la
investigación se ha reescrito para que sea más fácil de leer y, por lo tanto,
accesible a un público más amplio. Al juntar estas selecciones, mi
objetivo ha sido describir y entretejer todos los elementos importantes en
la comprensión que he adquirido sobre el bien y el mal en el curso del
trabajo de mi vida, para representar lo que sé en este momento sobre el
bien y el mal.
Mi experiencia de vida y mi trabajo de toda la vida sobre el bien y el
mal, el altruismo y la agresión, y la ayuda y el daño, han estado
profundamente entrelazados. Como describe una de las selecciones, soy
lo que hoy en día se llama un niño sobreviviente del Holocausto. Yo era
un niño de 6 años en Budapest en el verano de 1944 cuando unos 450.000
de los 600.000 judíos húngaros fueron transportados a Auschwitz y
asesinados. Los miembros de mi familia nuclear y yo sobrevivimos
gracias a Raoul Wallenberg, un sueco que salvó heroicamente muchas
vidas en Hungría, y a María, una mujer húngara que trabajó para mi
familia e hizo todo lo posible por ayudarnos. Llamamos a Maria "Macs",
una abreviatura de la palabra húngara para gato. No sé cómo sucedió
eso. Pero Macs fue mi segunda madre, y siento que sus acciones
valientes y su naturaleza amorosa me enseñaron, a pesar de mis
experiencias durante el Holocausto y luego en Hungría bajo el
comunismo, a tener fe en los seres humanos y en la posibilidad de
preocuparnos por cada uno. otros, sobre el "otro" y sobre todos los
"otros".
Creo que mi comienzo a trabajar en lo que lleva a las personas a
ayudar a otros y lo que les impide ayudar a los necesitados, incluido mi
enfoque en el "espectador" pasivo y activo, y mi preocupación de toda la
vida por prevenir la violencia, la pasividad y promover la bondad, le
debemos mucho a las Mac. En una de mis visitas a ella en Hungría,
cuando tenía más de ochenta años, le dije a Macs que el trabajo que había
estado haciendo toda mi vida estaba inspirado en ella. Con su cabeza con
su hermoso cabello plateado fino temblando, como lo hacía
constantemente en esos días, sonrió y dijo, con naturalidad y sin orgullo:
"Lo sé". Este libro está dedicado a ella y a todos los demás que no han
sido ni seguirán siendo espectadores pasivos frente al sufrimiento y la
necesidad de los demás, que actúan en nombre de los demás y, por lo
tanto, hacen de este un mundo más solidario.
Agradecimientos
Este libro resume lo que he aprendido sobre el bien y el mal en el
transcurso de 35 años. Durante ese tiempo he realizado investigaciones
en entornos académicos e investigaciones en el mundo fuera de la
universidad sobre el cuidado, la ayuda, el altruismo y la reducción de la
agresión, y me he involucrado en esfuerzos para criar niños cariñosos,
prevenir la violencia por parte de individuos y grupos, y promover la
curación de los grupos victimizados y la reconciliación entre grupos.
Quiero expresar mi gratitud a las muchas personas que han contribuido
directamente a este libro, o han influido en mi pensamiento y trabajo a lo
largo de los años, y / o me han apoyado con su amistad, afecto o de
otras formas. Mencionaré algunos de ellos por su nombre.
Vachel Miller fue una colaboradora sobresaliente al ayudar a hacer
selecciones para el libro. Algunas de las selecciones incluyen hallazgos
de investigación, y también fue de gran ayuda al resumirlos en un
lenguaje accesible. Phil Laughlin, mi editor en Cambridge University
Press, fue de gran ayuda en todas las formas posibles, al igual que otros
en Cambridge, como Helen Wheeler, que supervisó la producción. Estoy
profundamente agradecido con los asociados, colegas y exalumnos que
me han permitido incluir o reproducir material de coautoría: Laurie
Anne Pearlman, Darren Spielman y Robert Schatz, así como Daniel
Goleman, cuyo artículo sobre mi trabajo en el New York Times (escrito
cuando era el escritor de ciencia del comportamiento para el Times) es el
único artículo de otra persona incluido en este volumen. Jen Borden
ayudó a organizar los materiales para el libro.
El difunto Perry London, la primera persona en estudiar a los
rescatadores heroicos, inspiró mis primeros trabajos sobre el altruismo.
Walter Mischel, mi asesor y amigo a lo largo de los años, Eleanor
Maccoby y Al Bandura, así como Perry London, fueron todos mis
maestros durante mis años de posgrado en Stanford. El fallecido Stanley
Milgram y Robert Rosenthal fueron colegas y amigos durante mis años
como joven profesor en Harvard. Seymour Epstein, a quien conocí
cuando era profesor invitado en Harvard y quien ha sido mi colega
durante muchos años en la Universidad de Massachusetts en Amherst,
xv
xvi Agradecimientos
que hacemos o no quieren llamar a tales individuos o grupos mal, hay
que reconocer su inclinación por el daño-haciendo. Debemos llegar a
comprender sus raíces y desarrollar el conocimiento requerido y la
voluntad de usar este conocimiento para prevenir comportamientos
destructivos.
Especialmente cuando se enfrentan a grandes males, como el
genocidio o actos aparentemente sin sentido de gran violencia
individual, existe una tendencia en la discusión pública a considerarlos
incomprensibles. Quizás no queremos entenderlos porque queremos
mantenerlos fuera del ámbito humano común del que formamos parte.
Pero las acciones destructivas son el resultado de ciertos procesos
psicológicos y sociales básicos y ordinarios y su evolución en formas
extremas. Comprender sus raíces nos permite prevenirlos y evitar que
individuos y grupos desarrollen las características que hacen probables
estos actos.
Comprenderse a sí mismo puede ser de gran valor. Al trabajar en
Ruanda después del genocidio, descubrimos que la curación tanto de los
sobrevivientes como de los miembros del grupo perpetrador que no eran
perpetradores fue mejorada al comprender las circunstancias, los
procesos sociales y la psicología de los individuos y grupos que crearon
el genocidio. Ver la violencia contra ellos como actos humanos
comprensibles y ver a los perpetradores no como encarnaciones de la
maldad pura, sino como seres humanos cuya evolución los llevó a sus
actos horribles ayudó a los sobrevivientes a sentirse más humanos
(véanse los capítulos 36 y 37).
La bondad es lo opuesto al mal. Se refiere a acciones que traen
beneficio a individuos o grupos enteros: cuanto mayor es el beneficio y
más esfuerzo y / o sacrificio requiere, mayor es la bondad. La bondad,
como el mal, puede presentarse de forma obvia, como un solo acto
heroico que salva la vida de alguien. Or it can take the form of persistent
efforts to save people, as in the case of people in the United States who
through the Underground Railroad helped slaves escape, or Hutus in
Rwanda who endangered themselves to save Tutsis. Heroic acts and
such persistent acts of goodness require great effort, courage, and at
times even the willingness to endanger one's life.
But goodness can also take the form of persistent engagement in help
ing people or creating positive social change that does not involve great
danger. It can consist of small, repeated acts that bring benefit to others,
like kindness by a neighbor or relative toward a child who is neglected
or badly treated at home, kindness that can help the child develop
normally and even flourish in spite of adversity.
Nations often act in selfish and destructive ways. But goodness by
groups, small and large, does exist, as I have already noted. In the case of
na tions, it sometimes comes from mixed motives, as in the case of the
Marshall Plan, which rebuilt Europe but also aimed at preventing the
spread of com munism. At other times, as in Somalia, seemingly
altruistic motives come to bad ends. The United States tried to help
people suffering from star vation, but due to circumstances and some
seemingly unwise decisions,5
Good and Evil: Themes and Overview 7
US soldiers were attacked and killed. The work of the Quakers in the
abolition of slavery and of the villagers in La Chambon, France, saving
thousands of Jews during the Holocaust, may also be regarded as group
efforts born of humane values and expressing unselfish caring or
altruism.
Like evil, goodness too is comprehensible. Like evil, goodness also
evolves, individuals and groups changing by their own actions, which
shape them to become more caring and helpful.
The material in this book presents a great deal of existing knowledge
about the influences that generate either goodness or evil in individuals,
nations, the whole world. My study of the roots of evil and goodness and
my active efforts to help prevent violence and promote caring that this
book presents have been motivated by my belief that evil can be
prevented, goodness can be created, generated, helped to evolve, that
bystanders can become “active.” This was true even in the early stages,
when I chose these topics and issues for my academic work out of deeply
set psychological forces in me (see the next selection), without
necessarily a conscious, well formed intention to make a difference in the
world. Over time, and at times in spite of despair over events in the
world, I have come to hold these beliefs more consciously, and act out of
them with greater self-awareness. With already existing knowledge, and
further knowledge we will gain over time, we can engage in creating a
more benevolent world.
by turning away, by closing their eyes to others' suffering. In one of my
studies (see Chapter 6, Section E) some passersby, after a single look at a
person who collapsed on the street, looked away and continued on their
way without ever looking again. But when the passivity is in the face of
harmful acts, it encourages the perpetrators and facilitates the evolution
of greater harm-doing. I will propose that in extreme cases – like
relatives or neighbors who know that a child is severely neglected or is
physically or sexually abused but do nothing, or nations that take no
action while a genocide is perpetrated in front of their eyes – passivity by
bystanders may be regarded as evil (see Chapter 26).
At times people turn away internally, psychologically, from those in
need. At other times bystanders see, know, but choose not to act and
even become complicit: they directly or indirectly encourage
perpetrators of violence. A country sells arms to and continues
commerce and other normal relations with a country that engages in
large-scale murder of people within its own population. A spouse or
other family member continues warm relations with a person who
physically, sexually, or psychologically abuses a child.
Bystanders also evolve. Some passive or complicit witnesses change
and join evildoers. For example, a group of psychoanalysts in Berlin in
the 1930s passively stood by as their Jewish colleagues were persecuted,
accepted a nephew of Hermann G¨oring, the second highest Nazi after
Hitler, as the head of their institute, and rewrote psychoanalytic theory
to fit Nazi ide ology. Some of them then participated in the euthanasia
movement, iden tifying mentally ill, physically handicapped and other
“inferior” Germans to be killed, and some later participated in the
extermination of the Jews.6
Caring values and empathy with other people give rise to motives to
help. But opposing perpetrators requires courage. In its early stages it
may require moral rather than physical courage. Moral courage is the
ability and willingness to act according to one's important values even in
the face of opposition, disapproval, and the danger of ostracism. I will
discuss moral courage in this book, although it has been little studied
either in children or adults. It is an essential characteristic, however, for
active bystanders, whether a child associating with or helping an
unpopular peer, or a person speaking out against some policy or practice
in a group.
of responsibility for others' welfare that lead a person to act in
destructive or caring ways. It looks at characteristics of persons that give
rise to help ing or harming others, the characteristics of cultures and
social/political systems, and the evolution of these characteristics.
It also looks at circumstances to which individuals or groups respond
that make either destructive or benevolent behavior likely. Certain
circum stances have great power, leading many people to behave the
same way. But even in the most extreme circumstances, who people are,
their per sonalities and values (and in the case of groups, their culture),
affects their reactions. Many people would not go into a burning house
to save a life, but some do. If someone points a gun at us in a dark alley
and demands our money, most of us hand it over. But some resist,
willing to die in the process.
A man named Mark Bingham once wrested a gun from a would-be
mug ger. The same man was on Flight 93 on September 11, 2001, which
crashed near Pittsburgh; presumably he was one of the passengers who
attacked the terrorists. He and the other passengers died, but saved the
lives of the people who would have been killed in the intended terrorist
attack. What happened on that flight seems a good example of the
combination of the power of the situation and individual characteristics.
Without a passenger learning on his cell phone about the terrorist attacks
on other targets, the passengers would probably have assumed that this
was a normal hijack ing, which they might survive without anyone
getting hurt. But once they understood the nature of their situation, it
still required some individuals to initiate action. The power of
individuals can powerfully show itself in such a situation. One or two
determined people can have great influence in mobilizing others.
The power of circumstance, of a specific situation, was clear in the
many studies of bystander behavior in emergencies initiated by two
social psy chologists, John Darley and Bibb Latan´e.7 They found that the
larger the number of people present when someone suddenly needs
help, due to an accident, an attack of illness, or some other reason, the
less the likelihood that any one person will initiate help. Research on
emergency helping is well represented in this volume, including
research in which I found that what one witness says to another, which
is an aspect of the circum stances that can influence action, greatly affects
whether the other person helps or not.
The power of circumstance was also shown in the studies of Stanley
Milgram on obedience to authority. A large percentage of people, the
actual percentage depending on exact circumstances, obeyed a person in
charge who put them in the role of “teacher” and told them to give
stronger and stronger electric shocks to a “learner” when this person
made mistakes on a task. When all that the teacher saw were signs on the
machine indicating that the shocks were increasing and in the end
extremely dangerous – when
10 Introduction and Core Concepts
the supposed recipient of the shocks was in another room and no
distress sounds were heard by the teacher – 69% of participants obeyed
the person in charge and proceeded to administer the strongest shocks.8
But circumstances affect people in different ways. In this situation,
31% of the participants refused to continue to administer shocks. One
study found that those who refused had a stronger feeling of moral
responsibility than those who continued.9 As in harming, so in helping
others, our values, feelings of competence, and other characteristics
strongly influence how we respond.
When the teachers heard distress sounds and loud complaints from
the other room by the supposed recipient of the shocks (who did not
actually receive the shocks), a smaller percentage of them obeyed. When
the learner sat next to the teacher, who had to put the learner's hand on
the shock machine, even fewer people obeyed.
The circumstances of a whole group of people, social conditions like
the state of the economy – inflation, depression, and unemployment – or
political turmoil, or threat or attack from the outside, powerfully affect
group processes and actions. However, the characteristics of cultures,
like a history of devaluation of a subgroup of society or overly strong
respect for authority, and the nature of social and political systems also
greatly affect how groups respond. Culture not only affects group
behavior, but shapes individual psychology. Up to early in the twentieth
century the popular view of children in Western countries such as
England, the United States, and Germany, as presented in books on
parenting, was that they are inherently willful (see again Chapter 4, on
Evil). These books suggested that to become good people children's will
must be broken, and broken early, using as much punishment as
necessary. But as we shall see in this book, research shows that harsh
treatment and cruelty to children enhance t he potential for both
individual and group violence.
humans are good by nature, that they care about others' welfare.
However, in reality their views confuse nature and nurture. Both
believed that this inherent goodness would be apparent under the right
circumstances – that is, given the right “nurture” or experience.
Rousseau's noble savage lost his goodness due to the bad institutions
society created, and Rogers's child could lose his or her goodness by not
receiving unconditional love. In other words, the right experiences are
required to bring the inherent goodness to the fore. Still others, like
David Hume, thought that relationships among people in groups can
give rise to positive actions as people pursued their enlightened
self-interest.
Sociobiologists think about human nature in the more modern terms
of shared genetic makeup. They believe that both altruism and
aggression have become part of the human genetic makeup. When others
are in great need, this activates altruism. Threat to life activates
aggression. When there is constant threat to life – for example, not
enough game in the forest to feed people in surrounding areas – a
culture may develop that promotes aggression in the service of survival.
EO Wilson11 has used this expla nation for the culture of the Mundurucu,
Brazilian headhunters who train children from an early age in fighting
and attacking.
However, there have been nontechnological societies living in great
scarcity that have been peaceful. A contrasting explanation would be
that cultures that promote aggression develop for various reasons, which
in clude scarcity and threat by other groups. These cultures then
re-create themselves and over time even tend to evolve toward greater
aggressive ness. Scarcity may contribute to, but does not make the
development of a culture of violence inevitable. In seeming opposition to
the sociobiological view, a group of scientists have signed the Seville
Statement, expressing their belief that human beings are not aggressive
by nature.
The assumption about human nature is an assumption about the
shared genetic makeup of all humans. This is what sociobiologists write
about. Evolutionary psychology, a recent development, is also concerned
with shared human genetic makeup. It focuses on psychological
mechanisms that have developed in humans because they help with
“inclusive fitness,” that is, they help us to survive so that we can
transmit our genes and lead us to protect our children so that they can
further transmit our genes.
David Buss has proposed that anger is such a mechanism, its purpose
to prevent “strategic interference.” Many theorists of aggression have
viewed the interference with or blocking of goal-directed behavior as
creating frus tration, which in turn leads to aggression. While
frustration-aggression theory has assumed that frustration leads to
aggression, Buss does not as sume that strategic interference leads to
aggression. He proposes that it “motivates action designed to eliminate
the interference or to avoid subse quent interfering events,”12 leaving
open the possibility of varied types of actions that may accomplish this
goal. This is realistic, in line with much
12 Introduction and Core Concepts
research that shows that frustration may, but does not necessarily, lead
to aggression. It can also lead to a different approach to accomplish one's
goals.
In addition to the shared human genetic makeup, the heredity of
partic ular individuals is another important genetic influence. Are some
people more aggressive while others are less aggressive by nature? Are
some more altruistic while others are less so?
All that I have learned in the course of my studies of children and
adults, my work with teachers and parents, my study of genocide and
mass killing, my engagement with real-life situations like Rwanda,
trying to help prevent renewed violence after the genocide of 1994 by
promot ing healing and reconciliation, my work with police officers and
others, and my study of others' work tells me that human beings have
the po tential for both goodness and evil. Perhaps extreme conditions,
such as attack, or the intense need of a helpless person – for example a
young child's need in front of our eyes – do give rise to a natural
inclination re spectively for aggressive self-defense or help. But a young
child who is attacked may cry, run away, or hit back. The “natural”
inclination is not clear, and if it is there, it is only an inclination, not a
genetically determined action.
But the experiences that children, adults, and groups have do develop
characteristics that may lead them to be caring and helpful, or
untrusting, hostile, and aggressive. Given these characteristics,
circumstances give rise to psychological states and processes, like anger
or empathy, and feelings of effectiveness or helplessness, that in turn can
lead to helping or harming others. Over time an evolution to great
kindness or cruelty can take place.
Individuals, of course, differ in heredity. One approach to hereditary
origins is the search for particular genes associated with some behavior
or characteristic. Most human characteristics and behaviors have highly
complex origins and do not seem to be accountable by the nature of a
single gene. When such a gene is identified, as in the case of
manic-depressive or bipolar illness, over time the discovery has
repeatedly turned out to be in error.13
Another approach, used in behavior genetics, is to identify a heritabil
ity statistic that aims to show the extent to which particular behaviors are
due to genetic inheritance versus environment and experience.14 This is
done by comparing the degree to which relatives with greater and lesser
hereditary similarity (identical twins, fraternal twins, adopted children
and their adoptive versus birth parents) are more or less alike in
particular behaviors, like alcoholism or aggression. Using heritability
statistics is an appropriate strategy, but difficult to do correctly, since
alternatives to a ge netic explanation often exist. An obvious one is that
identical twins are not only more genetically similar but are also treated
more alike than fraternal twins. One way to properly establish hereditary
influence is to compare
Good and Evil: Themes and Overview 1 3
identical twins and fraternal twins who have been separated early in life
by adoption.
The most relevant heredity-based characteristic for goodness and evil
seems to be temperament. Children differ in how active they are, how
intense are their emotions, how comfortable they are with new places
and people, and how easily they can learn to regulate their feelings and
control their impulses. Some children, given their intensity and
impulsiveness (that is, speedy reactions to stimuli around them), need
more guidance to learn to be gentle in relation to others.
Certain temperamental characteristics of children can elicit reactions
from parents as well as other people that lead to problems in their de
velopment. Very intense, impulsive children may evoke impatient, harsh
reactions that shape them to become more intense and aggressive, rather
than temper their temperament. But this does not have to be so, and
many parents and adult caregivers offer children with more “difficult”
temperaments – a somewhat unfortunate term used by early tempera
ment researchers15 – the love and patient guidance they require for
optimal development.
Our shared human genetic makeup provides every child with the po
tential for caring and hostility, helping and aggression. But do all
children have these potentials to an equal degree? So far, while there is
some research showing differences in the heritability of aggression,16 and
to a lesser ex tent of helpful behavior, there is no evidence, at least in my
view, that either aggression or altruism is directly inherited, that
something other than differences in temperament are the sources of
heritability. The best explanations for differences in people's inclinations
to help or harm oth ers are their experiences in life, and this book will
focus on them. Until future research shows otherwise, the best
hypothesis is that to the extent heredity plays a role in inclinations
toward either kindness or cruelty, it does so through temperament, an
indirectly related characteristic, which exerts its influence to a large
extent through the reactions it creates to the child.
A shared genetic influence in humans is human needs, or what I have
called “basic human needs.” Like other human needs theorists,17 I
assume that all human beings share fundamental psychological needs.
There is substantial overlap in the needs different theorists focus on. I
have as sumed that basic needs include needs for security, a positive
identity, a feeling of effectiveness and control, positive connection to
other human beings, autonomy, and a “usable” comprehension of
reality. Basic needs are not directly linked to altruism or aggression; they
exert influence in combination with experience. Experiences that
constructively fulfill these needs make caring about other people more
likely. Experiences that per sistently frustrate them create vulnerability
and generate negative feelings and hostility toward people (see Chapter
5).
14 Introduction and Core Concepts
Repeatedly in this book I will suggest the usefulness of a basic needs
perspective in understanding goodness and evil in individuals and
groups. The influences that I will describe as contributing to harm-doing
and vi olence, or to their prevention and to caring and helpfulness, are
not de pendent on a basic needs perspective. But understanding the
reasons why these influences have the effects they do will be enriched by
considering how they fulfill or frustrate basic needs.
Humans also have an inclination to differentiate between “us” and
“them,” people they identify with, who are part of their group, and those
outside the group. Identification with groups is rooted in both thought
(perceiving oneself as a member of the group) and in feelings of connec
tion that are often intense. The group may be defined by ethnicity,
religion, nationality, race, family, political affinity, or in other ways. The
differentia tion between us and them is central to kindness and cruelty.
Seeing others as them has an important role in violence by groups
against others and seeing people as us contributes to empathy and
caring.18
The inclination to differentiate us and them is based, in part, on
aspects of our nature. One aspect is the infant's attachment to caretakers,
accompa nied by fear of strangers, which is a rudimentary form of the
differentiation between us and them. Another is that our mind works by
categorization, with those inside the group and those outside put into
different categories.
This differentiation probably also has to do with basic needs. Being
part of a group helps people feel secure. If one likes and respects one's
group, membership provides a positive identity and positive connection
to others in the group. The worldview propagated by the group is
absorbed by its members. It is a natural, even inevitable basis of
individuals' comprehen sion of reality.
become parents, tend to treat their children in the same way, especially
in societies in which there is substantial uniformity in behavior and stan
dards. In the United States, with great cultural variations, children who
are physically punished or abused by their parents are more likely to do
the same with their children. But many such children realize that the
treat ment they received was wrong and engage in valiant efforts not to
treat their children the same way.
special element of concern for the other person. They also believe and
feel that they themselves have a responsibility for others' welfare.
(However, some researchers see sympathy as including a feeling of
responsibility.)22 As selections in the book will show, we found in a
series of studies that peo ple with a greater prosocial value orientation
help more. This is true when someone is in physical distress, with
stomach pains, or in psychological distress, such as a woman having
been left by a boyfriend after a serious relationship. It is true with
self-reports of many different kinds of helping. We have also developed
a version of this test for adolescents and found that aggressive boys have
less of a prosocial value orientation than boys who are not aggressive.23
Other relevant characteristics, such as advanced moral reasoning, have
also been found to decrease aggression and increase helping.
Since people respond to circumstances, and since all of us have many
and varied values, beliefs, goals, and relationships, which join with cir
cumstances in complex ways, a generally kind and helpful person may at
times harm others. A normally cruel and aggressive person may at times
be kind. But different and opposing psychological states and processes
are likely to be active in leading to one or the other kind of action.
I have already mentioned another pair of opposites, us versus them.
We are more likely to help people we regard as us, see as similar to us,
part of our community or group. We more easily harm people we define
as them, different and separate.
include the need for connection, support, and the hope that an
ideological vision offers in difficult times. A readiness to obey authority
and/or a need to relinquish responsibility for their own lives, to give up
a burdensome individual identity for identity as a group member, can
lead people to join closely knit groups with authoritarian leaders.
With regard to violence by groups, the focus of this book is on mass
killing and genocide. However, understanding the roots of these forms
of group violence also enlightens us about other kinds of violence and
harm-doing by groups, ranging from discrimination, to persecution, to
terrorism. The preceding paragraph, which describes why people join
and follow ideological movements that lead to mass killing or
genocide,24 also accurately describes why people join terrorist groups.25
People may also be selected f or membership in an extreme group,
which in turn shapes them. For example, Greek torturers at the time of
the dic tatorship of the Colonels in the 1970s were selected from
members of the military police based on their anticommunist ideological
orientation and their obedience to authority.
Once they are members, the group socializes or resocializes people
through the ideas it propagates, through their relationship to others in
the group, and through the actions they engage in as members. They
may change toward goodness or toward readiness to destroy an
“enemy.” So cialization into the group may occur as a natural outcome
of group life, or may be deliberate, such as indoctrination against an
enemy. The Greek torturers underwent elaborate training. They
themselves were tortured, in part to further develop their obedience to
authority.26
Members of the reserve police battalions that were sent behind the
German front to kill Jews had at least three kinds of preparation. First,
the characteristics that led them to choose a police career prepared them.
The second preparation was the change and evolution that all Germans
underwent in the course of the increasing persecution of Jews in
Germany in the 1930s. The third one was the change and evolution that
police of ficers may undergo in the course of police work, which at times
involves the use of force.27 A fourth kind of preparation, described by
Richard Rhodes, was prior participation in violence and killing in the
service of the Nazi system.28
In the report by Christopher Browning about one of the police battal
ions, the first time they were ordered to gather and shoot groups of Jews,
the power of the group was evident. Even though they were told they
could excuse themselves if they felt they could not fulfill this task, and
even though many later reported inner struggle and some claimed they
avoided shooting the first time, they did not ask to be excused. It would
have dis tanced them from the group, might have diminished them in
the eyes of their fellow members, and in spite of the “permission” to
excuse them selves, might have led to later punishment. Over time,
shooting people
Good and Evil: Themes and Overview 1 9
became quite normal for them.29 (Note, however, that in another report,
Daniel Goldhagen30 claimed that the members of this police group were
cold-blooded killers from the start.)
The power of the group has also been shown among terrorists and sui
cide bombers. Terrorists often act for both “cause and comrades” (see
discussion of this in the Conclusion to the book). Palestinian suicide
bombers are often very young. While they are volunteers, once they
accept their mission, they are usually continually surrounded by other
group members, to limit their exposure to anything that might change
their minds.31
We don't know how frequent it is in the realm of helping and harm
doing that people act because they are entrapped in a group, disagreeing
with the group's actions but facing a combination of practical and psycho
logical circumstances that stop them from freeing themselves. In spite of
the difficulty and even danger of doing so, many recruits do leave
terrorist groups. Since groups are powerful socializers, this is more likely
to hap pen early, before the group resocializes them. However, as
circumstances change, differences in seemingly monolithic groups
emerge. Chinese Red Army soldiers, fierce fighters in Korea, began to
split into communists and anticommunists in POW camps and to fight
each other.32
In what Sam and Pearl Oliner have called “normocentric” rescue be
havior by some people during the Holocaust, helping was based not on
individual motivation, but on group membership. In Poland some
priests and leaders of partisan groups led their members to save Jewish
lives. Others, however, led their members to help the Germans kill
Jews.33 In Belgium, leaders in exile and church leaders at home
influenced the popu lation to help Jews. In European countries in
general, the more anti-Semitic the leadership the larger was the
percentage of Jews killed. However, when there was more anti-Semitic
leadership there had usually been a history of anti-Semitic institutions
and practices,34 which shaped the population and prepared them to
follow anti-Semitic leadership at the time of the Holocaust.
It can happen, of course, that an individual joins a group that turns
out to be, or becomes over time, greatly at odds with his or her beliefs,
values, and inclinations. Since such groups are difficult to leave, a per
son may stay, perhaps remaining internally opposed, perhaps changing.
Or the values of the individual lead him to oppose what the group does.
However, as a number of the selections in this book will show, members
of children's peer groups, ethnic groups, and nations are frequently pas
sive. Some of the selections examine what is required for people to
oppose their group when they realize that it is moving toward or
engages in evil acts.
A group, even a temporary one like a mob, can exert powerful influ
ence on people. Still, the psychological processes and motivations
leading
20 Introduction and Core Concepts
individuals and groups to help and harm others can be quite similar.
Both in individuals and groups self-interest (for example, wanting to
make a good impression, or to gain friends, or to bring about recipro cal
helping), empathy, a feeling of responsibility for others' welfare and
commitment to moral principles are important motives for helping. Both
individuals and groups harm others because they feel hostility, or want
to protect themselves from attack, whether real or imagined, or desire
revenge, or because they hope to gain something through aggressive
actions.
However, groups can activate, give direction to, enlarge as well as add
motivation. Ideology, a central motivator, is essentially a group
phenomenon. As members, people can participate in group action
automatically, guided by their embeddedness in the group. They may be
come “deindividuated,” momentarily losing their identity so that they
are guided not by their own but by the group's values and beliefs. They
may experience a “contagion” of emotions that spreads through the
group, for example, in case of mob violence, whether it is a lynching
mob, a riot in inner-city violence in the United States, or soccer
“hooligans.”35 They may be inspired by leaders, by group ideals, or may
obey authorities. They may be motivated by the desire for status in the
group, or to enhance their careers – a motivation among communist
functionaries as well as SS members.36
Notes
1. Staub, E. (in press). A brighter future: Raising caring, nonviolent, morally
courageous children. New York: Oxford University Press.
2. Staub, E., & Pearlman, L. (2001). Healing, reconciliation and forgiving after
genocide and other collective violence. In SJ Helmick, & RL Petersen (Eds.),
Forgiveness and reconciliation: Religion, public policy and conflict transformation.
Radnor, PA: Templeton Foundation Press.
3. Kurlantzick, J. (2001, August). Muhammed Yunus. Part of Real Heroes: 20 men
and women who risked it all to make a difference. US News and World Report,
p. 51.
4. Des Forges, A. (1999). Leave none to tell the story: Genocide in Rwanda. New York:
Human Rights Watch; Power, S. (2001, September) Bystanders to genocide.
The Atlantic Monthly Magazine.
5. See Staub, E. (1999). The origins and prevention of genocide, mass killing and
other collective violence. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 5, 303–
337.
24 Introduction and Core Concepts
6. Staub, E. (1989). Steps along the continuum of destruction: The evolution of
bystanders, German psychoanalysts, and lessons for today. Political
Psychology, 10, 39–53 (see also “The psychology of bystanders, perpetrators,
and heroic helpers,” Chap. 22, this book).
7. Latan´e, B., & Darley, J. (1970). The unresponsive bystander: Why doesn't he help?
New York: Appleton-Crofts.
8. Milgram, S. (1965). Some conditions of obedience and disobedience to author
ity. Human Relations, 18, 57–76; Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An
experimental view. New York: Harper and Row.
9. Kohlberg, L., & Candee, L. (1984). The relationship of moral judgment to
moral action. In WM Kurtines & JL Gewirtz (Eds.), Morality, moral behavior,
and moral development, pp. 52–73. New York: Wiley.
10. This is reviewed in chapter 1 (Positive behavior, morality, and human nature)
of Staub, E. (1978). Positive social behavior and morality. Vol.1. Personal and
social influences. N ew York: Academic Press.
11. Wilson, EO (1978). On human nature. New York: Bantam Books. 12. Buss, DM
(2000). The evolution of happiness. American Psychologist, 55, 15–23, 17.
13. Peele, S., & DeGrandpre, R. (1995). My genes made me do it. Psychology
Today, 28( 4) (July/August), 50–53, 62, 64, 66, 68.
14. Ibid.
15. Thomas, A., Chess, S., & Birch, H. (1970). The origin of personality. Scientific
American, 223 (2), 102–109.
16. Rutter, M., Giller, H., & Hagell, A. (1998). Antisocial behavior by young people.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
17. Maslow, AH (1987). Motivation and personality (3rd ed.). New York: Harper
and Row (original work published in 1954); Kelman, HC (1990). Applying a
human needs perspective to the practice of conflict resolution: The Israeli
Palestinian case. From J. Burton (Ed.), Conflict: Human needs theory. New
York: St. Martin's Press.
18. Staub, E. (1989). The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group vi olence.
Cambridge University Press, New York; Staub, E., & Bar-Tal, D. (in press).
Genocide, mass killing and intractable conflict: Roots, evolu tion,
prevention, and reconciliation. In D. Sears, L. Huddy, & R. Jervis, (Eds.),
Handbook of political psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
19. Sanday, PR (1981). The socio-cultural context of rape: A cross-cultural study.
Journal of Social Issues, 37 (4), 5–27.
20. Feshbach, ND, & Feshbach, S. (1969). The relationship between empathy and
aggression in two age groups. Developmental Psychology, 1, 102–107. 21. Batson,
CD (1990). How social an animal? The human capacity for caring.
American Psychologist, 45, 336–347; Eisenberg, N., & Fabes, RA (1998). Proso
cial development. In W. Damon (Ed.), Handbook of child psychology, fifth
edition, Vol. 3: N. Eisenberg (Ed.). Social, emotional, and personality
development. New York: Wiley.
22. For example, Nancy Eisenberg, Lecture in the Department of Psychology,
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, April 27, 2002.
Good and Evil: Themes and Overview 2 5
23. Spielman, D., & Staub, E. (2000). Reducing boys' aggression. Learning to
fulfill basic needs constructively. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 21, 2,
165–181 (see “Reducing boys' aggression,” Chap. 19, this book). 24. Staub, The
roots of evil.
25. McCauley, CR, & Segal, ME (1989). Terrorist individuals and terrorist groups:
The normal psychology of extreme behavior. In J. Groebel & JF Goldstein
(Eds.), Terrorism. Sevilla: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla.
26. Haritous-Fataurous, M. (in press). The psychological origins of institutionalized
torture. New York: Routledge.
27. Staub, E. (2001). Understanding and preventing police violence. In S. Epstein
& M. Amir (Eds.), Policing, security and democracy. Huntsville, TX: Office of
Criminal Justice Press. See article in Section 4, this book.
28. Rhodes, R. (2002). Masters of death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the invention of
the Holocaust. New York: Knopf.
29. Browning, CR (1992). Ordinary men: Reserve batallion 101 and the final solution in
Poland. New York: HarperCollins.
30. Goldhagen, D. (1996). Hitler's willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the
Holocaust. London: Little, Brown.
31. Post, G. (in press). The mind of the terrorist. Peace and Conflict: The Journal of
Peace Psychology.
32. McCauley & Segal, ibid.; McCauley, C. (in press). Making sense to terrorism
after 9/11. In Moser, R. (Ed.), Shocking violence II: Violent disaster, war and ter
rorism affecting our youth. Charles C. Thomas, publisher.
33. Oliner, S., & Oliner, P. (1988). The altruistic personality. New York: The Free
Press.
34. Fein, H. (1990). Genocide: A sociological perspective. Special issue of Current
Sociology, 38, 1–126.
35. Buford, B. (1992). Among the thugs: The experience, and the seduction, of crowd
violence. New York: Norton.
36. Steiner, JM (1980). The SS yesterday and today: A socio-psychological view.
In J. Dimsdale (Ed.), Survivors, victims and perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi
Holocaust. New York: Hemisphere Publishing Company.
2
Daniel Goleman
It was the summer of 1944, and 6-year-old Ervin Staub and his family,
like other Jews in Budapest, were being set apart from their neighbors by
laws imposed by the Nazis. Food was strictly rationed, and Ervin's
13-year-old cousin Eva, desperate to get a loaf of bread for her family,
was waiting in a long bakery line after the curfew for Jews and without
the yellow Star of David she was supposed to wear.
“Someone pointed her out as a Jew, and three young thugs tried to
take her away,” said Dr. Staub, now a psychologist at the University of
Massachusetts, who vividly recalls the incident. “But she ran into our
house to hide, and my aunt yelled at the thugs with such defiance that
she scared them away.”
That summer, members of the Staub family were given protective
identity papers by Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish ambassador who used
the documents to shelter tens of thousands of Jews from the Nazis.
Ervin's father had already been imprisoned in a Nazi labor camp, but
was emboldened to try an escape when a close family servant smuggled
the Swedish papers to him in the camp. He succeeded and hid in the
house undetected until the end of the war.
“What happened to me as a child in Hungary has left me with a
lifelong mission to get people to respond to those who need help,” said
Dr. Staub, who still speaks with a Hungarian accent, with luxuriantly
rolled R's and sibilant S's. At 18, Dr. Staub fled Hungary during the 1956
uprising against Communist rule, and lived for two years in Vienna.
Coming to the United States in 1959, he entered the University of
Minnesota and began his studies in psychology, completing his graduate
work at Stanford in 1965.
Reprinted from D. Goleman, Scientist at work: Ervin Staub. Studying the pivotal role of
bystanders. The New York Times, Science Times. June 22, 1993. C1, C6. Reprinted by
permission of The New York Times.
26
Studying the Pivotal Role of Bystanders 27
people heard a loud crash from the next room, followed by sobbing and
groans.
When the confederate said, “That probably has nothing to do with
us,” only about 25% of the volunteers investigated the source of the
groans in the next room (actually a tape recorder). But when the
confederate said, “That sounds pretty bad – I'll go get the experimenter
and maybe you should go check what's happening next door,” every one
of the volunteers went to see what was wrong.
“It showed me the power of bystanders to define the meaning of
events in a way that leads people to take responsibility,” said Dr. Staub.
That principle – in the form of the assumption that police brutality can
best be prevented by the intervention of onlooking fellow officers – is at
the core of the training program Dr. Staub has designed for the police in
California.
It proposes, for example, that chiefs and supervisors need to counter a
drift toward overuse of violence by officers in their departments by hold
ing them to strict accountability. The failure of supervisors to do or say
anything about excessive violence is taken as a tacit acceptance, which en
courages it. “That seems to have been the situation in the LA police force
before the Rodney King incident,” said Dr. Staub.
introduction
The connection between much of my work and my Holocaust experience
is quite obvious. My work was probably also affected by my
post-Holocaust experience of living under a communist system in
Hungary, escaping from Hungary without my family, living in Vienna,
then coming to the United States alone.
I did some early work on fear, control and lack of control, and the use
of information and control to reduce fear. At the time, in no way did I
connect this work to my own life experiences. I have spent most of my
career studying what leads people to help others, what leads them to
remain passive in the face of others' need, what leads them to harm
others. The latter included the study of the origins of genocide and other
collective violence. Underlying all my work has been an interest in
change: How can we develop caring in children? How can people
become more helpful? How can we reduce youth violence? How can we
eliminate violence by groups against innocent people? A thread through
all my work has been the study of the passivity and the potential power
of bystanders, of individuals and groups who witness suffering or harm
inflicted on others.
While the connection of this work to my Holocaust experience is quite
clear, for many years I ignored and disregarded this connection, almost
denied it. I survived the Holocaust and I was involved with my work,
and I emotionally separated these two domains.
The connection broke through at some points. I started this kind of re
search in the late 1960s. I remember reading Leon Uris's bookMila
Seventeen
31
32 Introduction and Core Concepts
after the war and would be under the protection of Sweden for the
duration of the war. He cajoled the Hungarian authorities into respecting
a certain number of these, constantly negotiating, threatening,
persuading govern ment officials. He as well as the underground created
many more of these documents. He repeatedly endangered his life. He
helped people in many ways: for example, pulling Jews off trains,
handing them protective passes, and then claiming that they were under
Swedish protection.
He bought apartment houses in Budapest, and people with protective
passes moved into them. We were among these people. I remember the
night when we left our apartment, pushing a cart with some belongings
on the way to the protected house. We were very scared that someone,
whether police, Arrow Cross, or hostile civilians, would stop us. At that
time and place Jews were fair game for anyone.
On our arrival we first slept on mattresses in the basement with many
other people. Later we graduated to the one-room apartment of an old
woman who was ill. The old woman was in bed most of the time. I don't
remember how we did this, but I believe eight of us stayed there.
I think that my lifelong concern with those who don't remain passive
but instead help others, my interest in “active bystanders,” was to an
important extent inspired by Macs, even more than by Raoul
Wallenberg. I regard her as my second mother, a woman who loved me,
my sister, and my cousins dearly. In these terrible times she did all she
could to help us. Sometime before we received the protective passes she
took me and my sister into hiding with a Christian family. I remember
walking with her on the street, holding on to her hand; arriving at the
house and then standing in front of the door of the apartment where the
family lived; entering the apartment and seeing a woman sitting on a
stool peeling potatoes. That is just about all I remember from the week or
two we spent there. When some people in the house where this family
lived seemed suspicious of the “child relatives visiting from the
countryside,” Macs moved us to another family. After we received the
protective passes, she brought us back home.
During our stay at the protected house, she prepared bread, which she
took in a baby carriage to be baked at a bakery. The bread and other food
she acquired fed many people in the house. Once she was stopped by
Arrow Cross men and accused of helping Jews. She had to stand for
hours with her hands held up, facing a wall. She firmly denied helping
Jews. They let her go, and she continued helping us.
She went to the separate labor camps where my father and uncle were
doing forced labor and brought them copies of the protective passes.
These were useless in their situation. But perhaps possession of a pass
gave my father courage. Whatever enabled him to do it, when his group
was taken to Germany, during an overnight stopover at some army
barracks in Budapest he escaped. He was the only one of the group to
survive. He came to our protected house and hid there until the Soviet
army arrived.
Studying Altruism and Genocide 35
During a number of raids on our house, miraculously, he was not
found. The protected houses were constantly raided, and many people
were taken away. Once during a raid my father was hiding under an
armchair that was pushed into the corner, with a blanket casually
thrown over it. The Arrow Cross raiders searched every closet, every
drawer, but did not find him. I was the one who saw them march down
the street toward the house, called out to inform the rest of my family,
and ran to the apartment door to check that they were actually entering
the house. I don't know whether hiding my father under the armchair
was a plan my mother had designed earlier or a strategy that she
thought up in that terribly dangerous moment.
Finally, in late January 1945 our part of the city was liberated by the
Soviet army. A number of my relatives did not survive. My uncle froze
to death in the forced labor camp. My father's sister and her two children
were killed in Auschwitz. But we were “luckier” than most people. The
fathers of most of the Jewish boys who survived died in forced labor
camps or in German death camps.
In 1956 I finished high school, a technical high school. Not being of
worker or peasant origin, and therefore considered politically unreliable,
I was afraid of not getting into a university and of having few options
after high school. Even though the engineering studies in my school did
not appeal to me, I followed the only university possibility that seemed
available. I succeeded in enrolling at a technical university in Miskolc,
another Hungarian city, to study engineering.
Soon after this, in October 1956, the Hungarian revolution began. I
had a variety of adventures during this time, of which I will mention one
that says something both about me and about the persistent
anti-Semitism in Hungary that probably reinforced some of the
psychological effects of the Holocaust. One day the police barracks in
Miskolc were raided and the police in them arrested. I was in front of the
police building when this hap pened. A revolutionary council, or
something like that, took over the city. My somewhat adventurous
nature landed me, the day after, inside City Hall. Outside people were
milling around, demanding that the now jailed police be handed over to
them. A number of people, communists, secret police, whatever, had
already been tied to cars and pulled around the city in revenge. There
were discussions inside the building that I participated in. It was decided
that a few students who were in the building would put on armbands to
indicate they were from the university, go outside, and try to calm
people.
Outside, people converged in small groups. Jews were one of the cen
tral points of their heated discussions. They believed that the new prime
minister, who turned out to be quite temporary, before Imre Nagy took
over, was Jewish. He was not, and I tried to assure them of that, acting as
an informed, neutral person. I could have been in serious trouble had
they found out I was Jewish.
When Miskolc calmed down, students with guns on their shoulder be
gan to direct traffic, and I decided it was time to go home. I made my
way to Budapest by train, by hitching rides on trucks and other vehicles,
and by walking. Life there was very exciting, with hope for a better
future. Then the Russian troops returned and after intense fighting put
the revolution down. Even before this, an exodus to the West began.
Mines and barbed wire that used to protect the border had been
removed in the course of the easing of communist repression that was a
precursor to revolt. Once the revolt started, the border was relatively
unguarded. While some people were caught and some were shot, almost
two hundred thousand people got through the borders surrounding
Hungary.
I was one of them, leaving with two friends. I immediately wanted to
go to the United States, but I did not get a visa. I lived in Vienna for two
and a half years. I first did nothing, then enrolled at the technical
university, then changed to the University of Vienna. Because I went to a
technical high school in Hungary, in order to transfer I was required to
take the final high
Studying Altruism and Genocide 37
school exams again. After one year at the university, in July 1959 I came
to the United States.
I went directly to Minnesota, arranged to study at the university, and
supported myself with varied jobs while doing so. I received my BA in
psychology in 1962 and went to graduate school at Stanford, where I
received a Ph.D. in 1965. I specialized in personality psychology my first
year, then also took clinical courses and did clinical practica. In the fall of
1965 I started my first job as assistant professor of clinical psychology in
the Department of Social Relations at Harvard University.
There were a couple of important influences on me during the
graduate school years. One of them was the rigorous research orientation
at Stanford, as represented at that time by my adviser, Walter Mischel;
Al Bandura; Eleanor Maccoby; and others. Another was the
cognitive-behavioral ori entation of Arnold Lazarus, who during a
one-year visiting professorship had a strong influence on a number of
students. A third was the friend ship I developed with Perry London,
who at that time was involved in the first study of rescuers of Jews in
Nazi Europe, a study he and his as sociates could not complete because
they could not receive funding. This says something about the mood of
the times. In psychology an attempt to understand behavior that took
place two decades earlier was not regarded as credible. The public's and
academics' attitude toward the Holocaust at the time was primarily to
ignore it.
research
Control, Information, and Fear
At Harvard I began a series of studies of the effects of lack of control on
fear and physiological responses and of the impact of control and
information in reducing fear. Enabling people to exercise control,
whether over a snake (Staub 1968) or in setting and administering shock
levels to themselves (Staub, Tursky, & Schwartz 1971), reduced fear and
physio logical responding. Providing people with information about
snakes or about the properties of shocks (Staub & Kellett 1972) also
reduced fear and physiological responding.
One may surmise that my interest in fear and control had to do in part
with the tremendous threat, powerlessness, and lack of control over our
lives that existed during my childhood. But perhaps my interest in
control also had to do with the fact that in spite of this, within the narrow
limits of still existing possibilities, my family did all it could to exercise
control. We managed to survive because of those efforts. My mother and
aunt standing in line with many people and somehow managing to get
those letters of protection, my father escaping, our hiding him, and many
other acts of control saved our lives.
38 Introduction and Core Concepts
children heard the distress sounds alone and when they heard the noises
in pairs (Staub 1970).
In this study, contrary to the findings of Latan´e and Darley that the
pres ence of other bystanders decreases helping, when another
bystander was present, that is, when kindergarten and first grade
children were in pairs, helping increased. This seemed to be because
young children did not hide their reactions from each other. There was
no pluralistic ignorance, every one looking unconcerned and thereby
leading others to interpret what was happening was not an emergency.
When young children heard the distress sounds, they reacted openly,
talked to each other about them, and moved together to help.
I hypothesized that the decrease in helping in sixth grade was the
result of children overlearning social rules that prohibited them from
interrupt ing work on their task or entering a strange room in a strange
place. In exploring this I found that when children received permission
to enter the adjoining room, for an irrelevant reason, they were much
more likely to help in response to the sounds of distress than children in
a no information (control) group, who helped as little as children who
were prohibited from entering the adjoining room (Staub 1971).
Many other studies with children and adults followed. I want to
mention two series of studies, in my mind the most important of my
work in this area. Unfortunately, I was running out of steam; my interest
was turning to the study of the Holocaust, other genocides, and violence
by groups against other groups. As a result, while I described these
studies in several of my books and in chapters of edited volumes, I never
published them in journals. [However some are included in the
selections in this book. ES]
The first series of studies demonstrated that a particular personal
charac teristic, which I called prosocial value orientation, was strongly
associated with a variety of different kinds of helping. My students and I
first mea sured this using already existing measures (Staub 1974, 1978;
Feinberg 1978; Grodman 1979). These were factor analyzed and
provided a strong factor, with scores on these factors representing
individuals' prosocial value ori entation. Males who scored high on this
measure were more likely to enter another room in response to distress
sounds. Whether they entered or not, confronted with a person in
distress they were more likely to engage in varied efforts to provide help
(Staub 1974). Females who scored high on this test were more likely to
respond to another person's psychological dis tress, primarily by
suspending work on a task and attending to the person in need
(Feinberg 1978; Grodman 1979; Staub 1978).
At one point, I developed my own measure of prosocial value ori
entation. This measure was published as part of a larger questionnaire
developed for Psychology Today (Staub 1989b). An analysis of over two
thousand responses indicated strong relationship of prosocial value
orien tation to various forms of self-reported helping. It also showed,
together
40 Introduction and Core Concepts
with other information gathered in the questionnaire, that people have
dif ferent helping styles and domains of helping. Prosocially oriented
persons helped in many different ways. A politically liberal orientation
led people to work on positive social changes. Religiously oriented
helpers tended to be volunteers and made donations. Materialistically
oriented people (in terested in wealth and financial security) tended to be
unhelpful (Staub 1992, 1995a).
The second series of studies demonstrated learning by doing. It
showed that children learn to become helpful when they are guided to
engage in helping others. While the studies had complex results, overall
they showed that children who participated in making toys for poor,
hospitalized chil dren or taught something to younger children were
later more likely to be helpful (for a review of these studies, see Staub
1979, chap. 6; 1995a; 1995b). Providing children with information about
the beneficial conse quences of their initial helping tended to enhance the
effects of participa tion. So did more positive interaction between teacher
and helper in the teaching studies.
While doing all this research I was also working on a book on helping
behavior, which turned out to be two books (Staub 1978, 1979). I edited a
third book around the same time (Staub 1980). With all this done I
collapsed for a while, fortunately during a sabbatical.
reduce police violence by training police officers to be active,
constructive bystanders to each other who step in when confrontations
move toward violence. Another has been engagement with Facing
History and Our selves, a national and now international organization.
Central to its many activities has been to train teachers to use a
curriculum that the organi zation has developed. Using the history of the
Holocaust as its primary avenue, this curriculum teaches about human
cruelty and about the pos sibilities of caring, of people becoming
conscious of decisions they make and becoming concerned, active
bystanders. I have done workshops for Facing History, especially as part
of their teacher training institutes.
Also independently of Facing History I have done teacher training
and have worked on the creation of caring schools. My vision is that in
such schools a milieu is created in which all children feel part of a
community, where children are participants in ways that affirm them,
where they are guided to act in others' behalf and learn by doing. These
are schools that help children develop inclusive caring and the moral
courage not to be passive bystanders. As part of my concern with the
development of car ing I have been writing a book with the tentative title
A Brighter Future: Raising Caring and Nonviolent Children, that is both
scholarly and hopefully accessible to parents, teachers, and everyone else
who is concerned about children.
Another of my real world efforts was organizing and leading a con
ference on activating bystanders that took place in Stockholm in June
1997 (Beyond Lamentation: Options for Preventing Genocidal Violence).
A number of active efforts have emerged from this conference. One of
them is the creation of a human rights organization led by young people
(Staub & Schultz 1998). I have also engaged over the years with the
media, in the hope that they can influence public attitudes about caring
and violence.
Another effort has been an intervention research project that I and Dr.
Laurie Anne Pearlman have been conducting since 1998. The purpose of
this project, on healing, forgiveness, and reconciliation (supported by the
John Templeton Foundation), is to make renewed violence between
Hutus and Tutsis less likely, and to improve the lives of people deeply
affected by the horrors of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The project is
an intervention, with both psychoeducational and experiential elements.
We have worked with the staff of local nongovernmental organizations,
talking to them and discussing with them how genocide originates, what
the effects of such trauma are on survivors, and what might be avenues
to healing. They have also talked to each other, in small groups, about
what happened to them during the genocide, supporting each other as
they talk about very difficult experiences and feelings (Staub 2000).
The people we trained then worked with groups in the community.
We set up an elaborate and formal research project, with varied control
groups, to evaluate the effects of our training as it was transmitted to
people in
44 Introduction and Core Concepts
the community. Early results indicate that our training reduced trauma
symptoms over a period of time, made people aware of the complex
origins of violence, and led them to be more open to work with members
of the “other” group for positive goals, such as the welfare of children
and a better future. It also resulted in agreement with statements that
they would forgive the other group if the other group acknowledged
what they did and apologized. While healing, forgiveness, and
reconciliation seem daunting tasks after a horrible genocide, they are of
crucial importance.
where am i, at this time in my life?
I have had a very strong need to make a difference in the world, to
improve the world. But the world is not visibly improving. In the last
few years I have been less intensely upset as I read about, hear about, or
see on television violence in the world. I seem to have developed some
emotional distance, while still continuing to work hard on these issues.
Perhaps I have also experienced some vicarious traumatization
(Pearlman & Saakvitne 1995), through so much exposure in the course of
my work to violence, brutality, killings. And after a period of distress
about being less distressed, I am beginning to think that perhaps there is
some good in a degree of emotional numbing, in being less impacted
when I read about horrible things being done to people.
I have always worked extremely hard, not quite understanding the
source of my intense motivation. And the number of things I am
involved with seems to grow. What is my motivation in all this? What
needs drive me? How much of this hard work is a compulsion that
somehow derives from my Holocaust experience? In what part may it be
the desire to cre ate a better world; in what part a need to feel
worthwhile and important that is dependent on doing; on what part a
difficulty with just being? While working hard is satisfying, I also feel it
is too encompassing. I will certainly continue but very much hope that I
can learn to balance doing with being. I have long thought and talked
about this desire for balance. Perhaps, it will come, any day now.
References
Feinberg, HK 1978. Anatomy of a helping situation: Some personality and sit
uational determinants of helping in a conflict situation involving another's
psychological distress. Ph. D. diss., University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Grodman, SM 1979. The role of personality and situational variables in
responding to and helping an individual in psychological distress. Doctor.
diss., University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Latan´e, B., & JM Darley. 1970. The unresponsive bystander: Why doesn't he help?
New York: Appleton-Crofts.
Studying Altruism and Genocide 45
Pearlman, LA, & K. Saakvitne. 1995. Trauma and the therapist. New York: Norton.
Staub, E. 1968. The reduction of a specific fear by information combined with
exposure to the feared stimulus. Proceedings, seventy-sixth annual convention of the
American Psychological Association, 3: 535–37.
1970. A child in distress: The influence of age and number of witnesses on chil
dren's attempts to help. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 14: 130–40.
1971. Helping a person in distress: The influence of implicit and explicit
“rules” of conduct on children and adults. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 17:137–45.
1974. Helping a distressed person: Social, personality, and stimulus
determinants, In Advances in experimental social psychology, vol. 7, edited by L.
Berkowitz, 203– 342. New York: Academic Press.
1978. Positive social behavior and morality. Vol. 1, Social and personal influence.
New York: Academic Press.
1979. Positive social behavior and morality. Vol. 2, Socialization and development.
New York: Academic Press.
1980. Social and prosocial behavior: Personal and situational influences and
their interactions. In Personality: Basic aspects and current research, edited by E.
Staub. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
1989a. The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
1989b. What are your values and goals? Psychology Today, 46–49. 1992. Values
and helping. Manuscript, Department of Psychology, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst.
1993. The psychology of bystanders, perpetrators, and heroic helpers. Interna
tional Journal of Intercultural Relations 17: 315–41.
1995a. How people learn to care. In Care and community in modern society:
Passing on the tradition of service to future generations, edited by PG Schervish,
VA Hodgkinson, M. Gates, and associates. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Publishers.
1995b. The caring schools project: A program to develop caring, helping,
positive self-esteem and nonviolence. Manuscript, Department of
Psychology, Univer sity of Massachusetts, Amherst.
1996a. Cultural-societal roots of violence: The examples of genocidal violence
and of contemporary youth violence in the United States. American
Psychologist 51:117–32.
1996b. Preventing genocide: Activating bystanders, helping victims, and the
creation of caring. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 2:189–201. 1997.
Halting and preventing collective violence: The role of bystanders. Back
ground paper presented at symposium, Beyond Lamentation: Options to Pre
venting Genocidal Violence, Stockholm, Sweden, 13–16 June 1997. 1998.
Breaking the cycle of genocidal violence: Healing and reconciliation. In
Perspectives on loss, ed. by J. Harvey. Washington, DC: Taylor and Francis.
1999. Genocide, mass killing, and other group violence: Origins and
prevention. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 5:303–36.
2000. Genocide and mass killing: Origins, prevention, healing and
reconciliation. Political Psychology 21: 367–83.
Staub, E., & DS Kellett. 1972. Increasing pain tolerance by information about
aversive stimuli. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21: 198–203.
46 Introduction and Core Concepts
Staub, E., & T. Schultz. 1998. Youth movement targets violence prevention.
Psychol ogy International 9, no. 3:1–2.
Staub, E., & L. Sherk. 1970. Need for approval, children's sharing behavior, and
reciprocity in sharing. Child Development 41: 243–53.
Staub, E., B. Tursky, & G. Schwartz. 1971. Self-control and predictability: Their
effects on reactions to aversive stimulation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 18:157–63.
4
Is Evil a Useful Concept for
Psychologists and Others?
One focus of my work for many years has been the exploration of the
roots of violence, especially of genocide and mass killing, which I
referred to as evil ( Staub, 1989). How does a group, a culture, as well as a
person evolve so that they come to engage in “evil” actions or even
develop a ten dency for them? In recent years, I have also been greatly
concerned with the prevention of genocide (Staub, 1996, 1998). Genocide
and mass killing may seem obviously evil to most of us. However,
because the concept of evil is becoming increasingly used in the
social–psychological literature (Baumeister, 1997; Darley, 1992; Staub,
1989), it is important to ask whether it has useful meaning for
psychologists. How would the meaning of evil be differentiated from the
meaning of “violence”? Is evil the end point in the evolution of violence?
In genocide, a plan is formulated to destroy a group. Usually, a decision
is made to do this. Reactions to events and psychological and social
processes turn into a plan. However, a conscious intention of extreme
destructiveness does not seem a necessary aspect of evil. The real
motivation is often unconscious, and a group's or person's ha bitual,
spontaneous reactions to certain kinds of events can become highly
destructive.
Evil has been a religious concept. The word also has been used as a
secular term to describe, explain, or express aversion to certain actions
and the human beings or natural forces from which they originate. The
notion of a nonhuman force and origin often has been associated with
evil, such as the devil, Satan, or Mephistopheles. Some have seen the
forces of nature, when manifested in the destruction they sometimes
bring, as evil. From a psychological standpoint, the forces of nature are
surely neutral: They do, at times, cause harm but without conscious or
unconscious intention.
Reprinted from E. Staub (1999). The roots of evil: Social conditions, culture, personality,
and basic human needs. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 179–192. Included here
are pp. 179–181. Copyright 1991, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Reprinted with permission.
47
48 Introduction and Core Concepts
The word evil is emotionally expressive for people: It communicates
horror over some deed. People often romanticize evil. They want to see
the abhorrent acts or events to which the word refers as having mythic
proportions. Designating something as evil is sometimes used to suggest
that the actions are not comprehensible in an ordinary human
framework: They are outside the bounds of morality or even of human
agency. How ever, evil is the outcome of basic, ordinary psychological
processes and their evolution. Arendt's (1963) concept of the “banality of
evil” seems to recognize this. However, the notion of the banality of evil
also makes it seem as if its ordinariness diminishes the significance of
evil.
I originally used the term evil t o denote extreme human
destructiveness, as in cases of genocide and mass killing (Staub, 1989),
but evil may be defined by a number of elements. One of these is extreme
harm. The harm can be pain, suffering, loss of life, or the loss of personal
or human potential. Violent actions tend to arise from difficult,
threatening circumstances and the psychological reactions of people to
them. They are elicited by varied instigators, such as attack, threat, or
frustration. Not all people react to such conditions with violence, but
some do. Some individuals or groups engage in extremely harmful acts
that are not commensurate with any instigation or provocation ( Darley,
1992), another defining element of evil. Finally, some individuals,
groups, or societies evolve in a way that makes destructive acts by them
ay be another
likely. The repetition or persistence of greatly harmful acts m
defining element of evil. It is most appropriate to talk of evil when all
these defining elements are present: intensely harmful actions, which are
not commensurate with instigating conditions, and the persistence or
repetition of such actions. A series of actions also can be evil when any
one act causes limited harm, but with repetition, these acts cause great
harm.
An important question is what might be the nature of the actor,
whether a society or a person, that makes such acts probable. By “nature
of the actor,” whether a person or society, I do not refer to
psychopathology. The evil I focus on and explore arises out of ordinary
psychological processes and characteristics, although usually extreme
forms or degrees of them: seeing people as hostile, devaluing certain
groups of people, having an overly strong respect for authority, and
others.
When a person or group is attacked, they have a right to defend them
selves. If someone begins to shoot at me and I pull out a gun and kill the
person, my action is not evil. Whether self-defense is justified can get
complicated very fast, however. What if someone has threatened me,
and I then lie in wait for him and shoot him when he leaves his house? If
this person in a moment of anger has threatened to kill me, most of us
would not see this as sufficient provocation to justify killing him, unless
perhaps we know that this person has threatened other people in similar
ways and then actually killed them.
Is Evil a Useful Concept? 4 9
ways scaring them, as well as physically punishing them or depriving
them, were seen appropriate to break their will and teach them
obedience and respect (Miller, 1983).
In the case of genocide, it is usually clear to outside observers that it is
not justified by provocations even if it is a response to real violence by
the other group. However, frequently the victim group has done nothing
to justify violence against them, except in the perpetrators' minds. The
Jews engaged in no destructive actions against Germans. Many of the
intellectuals and educated people in Cambodia who were killed or
worked to death by the Khmer Rouge did no harm that would justify
such actions in the minds of most people. According to the Khmer Rouge
ideology, however, these intellectuals had participated in an unjust
system that favored them at the expense of others and were incapable of
participating in a system of total social equality. To fulfill a “higher”
ideal, to create total social equality, was the motivation to kill them or to
reduce them to slaves working in the “killing fields” (Staub, 1989).
There is the same absence of provocation in many cases of recurrent
violence against a spouse, or severe neglect, harsh verbal and physical
treatment, and persistent physical violence against children. Some
parents blame their children all the time: for having been noisy, thereby
causing the car accident in which the parents were involved; for needing
things that cost money, thereby depriving the family of other things; for
anything and everything (L. Huber, school psychologist, personal
communication, June 1997). Peck (1983) gave this as a primary example
of evil. Such par ents may completely lack awareness of what in
themselves leads to their blaming and scapegoating, seeing their actions
as justifiable reactions to the child.
Frequently, there are two levels of motivation in harmful behavior, in
cluding evil acts. One is to “harm” a person or a group, and another is to
fulfill some goal that the harmful act supposedly serves. Perpetrators
may present and often actually see their actions as in the service of
higher ideals and of beneficial outcomes, even to the victims themselves
(raising a good child), to society (creating social equality), or to all of
humanity (creating a better world).
My discussion of the concept of evil suggests that it could be a useful
con cept for psychologists. It could lead, for example, to more focused
explo ration of the characteristics of persons, cultures, and situations that
lead to harm doing that represents an overreaction to circumstances
(provocation), is extreme and/or recurrent. It also could lead to more
focused work on how cultures that promote such responses and persons
who respond in these ways develop. Time will tell whether evil will be a
comfortable concept for psychologists and whether it will become used.
Although the starting point for evil is usually the frustration of basic
human needs (see next selection), evil actions are made possible by some
Is Evil a Useful Concept? 5 1
or all of the following: lack or loss of concern with the welfare of other
people; a lack of empathy with people, both lack of empathic feelings
and lack of understanding how others feel; lack of self-awareness, the
ability to understand one's own motives; having a negative view of
others; a sense of entitlement, a focus on one's own rights; and
devaluation, fear of, and hostility toward some or all human beings.
How do the psychological tendencies that contribute to evil actions come
about? How do motivations to intensely harm others arise? How do
inhibitions decline? The material in this book will address these
questions.
References
Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil. New York:
Viking.
Baumeister, RF (1997). Evil: Inside human violence and cruelty. New York: Freeman.
Darley, JM (1992). Social organization for the production of evil. Psychological
Inquiry, 3, 199–217.
Greven, P. (1991). Spare the child: The religious roots of punishment and the impact of
physical abuse. New York: Knopf.
Miller, A. (1983). For your own good: Hidden cruelty in child-rearing and the roots of
violence. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
Peck, MS (1983). People of the lie: The hope of healing human evil. New York: Simon
& Schuster.
Staub, E. (1989). The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Staub, E. (1996). Cultural–societal roots of violence: The examples of genocidal
violence and of contemporary youth violence in the United States. American
Psychologist, 51, 117–132.
Staub, E. (1998). Breaking the cycle of genocidal violence: Healing and reconcil
iation. In J. Harvey (Ed.), Perspectives on loss: A sourcebook. Washington, DC:
Taylor & Francis.
5
52
Basic Human Needs 53
means, people will attempt to fulfill them by destructive means, that is,
in ways that harm themselves and/or other people. When basic needs
are constructively fulfilled in the course of a person's life, they become
trans formed and give rise to purposive motives, such as personal goals
(Staub, 1978). Such goals represent positive ends, or incentives, such as
achieve ment or helping, which may guide people's lives.
A number of personality theorists have embedded in their theories
central needs, motives, and beliefs that function as basic needs. These
include Freud and the pleasure principle (or sex and aggression); Adler
and the needs for overcoming inferiority or maintaining self-esteem,
maintaining one's conceptual system, and relating to others; Jung and
the need for transcendence and spirituality; Bowlby and object relations
theories and the need for relatedness; Rogers and the need to main tain
and enhance the self-concept; Kohut and the need for self-esteem
(Epstein, 1993). Epstein (1990; 1993) proposed that people develop self
theories that have the function of enhancing the pleasure-pain balance,
increasing self-esteem, organizing the data of experience and promoting
relations to others. Janoff-Bulman (1992) proposed that people strive to
maintain fundamental assumptions: that the world is benevolent, that
they themselves are good, worthwhile people, and that the world is an
orderly and just place.
Some theorists have made human needs central to their theory.
Maslow (1968, 1987) proposed a hierarchy of needs including
physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness and love needs, esteem
needs, and growth or being needs. Murray (1938) has offered a long list
of needs. Pearlman and her associates (McCann & Pearlman, 1990;
Pearlman & Saakvitne, 1995), based on their work with trauma victims,
have proposed five need areas that are affected by trauma: safety, trust
or dependency, in timacy, esteem, and control. Deci and Ryan's (1985)
self-determination theory posited three central needs: autonomy,
competence, and related ness. Stevens and Fiske (1995) noted that a large
number of theorists have suggested the existence of one or more of five
basic motives: to belong, to understand, to be effective, to find the world
benevolent, and to maintain self-esteem.
Psychologists and other social scientists, have also advanced the
concept of human needs as a way of understanding conflict, especially
seemingly intractable conflict (Burton, 1990; Lederer et al., 1980). For
example, Kelman (1990) has suggested that the failure to fulfill needs for
identity, security, recognition, participation, dignity, and justice, or
threat to such needs, sig nificantly contributes to the origins, escalation,
and perpetuation of conflict between groups. Christie (1997) has
suggested that the fulfillment of the needs for security, identity, material
well-being, and self-determination is central to peace building.
54 Introduction and Core Concepts
creates connection and may give people at least the illusion of
effectiveness and control. Elevating the group through the devaluation
of others, another common response, further fulfills these needs.
Scapegoating, which identifies some group as the cause of life
problems, is nearly universal in such times. It serves the need for a
positive identity by diminishing one's own and one's group's
responsibility for life problems, including the inability at times to
provide food and shelter for oneself and one's family. It serves the need
for comprehension of reality by providing an understanding of the
reasons for life problems. It serves the needs for security,
comprehension, as well as effectiveness and control by pointing to a way
for dealing with life problems (which is to “deal” with its cause, the
scapegoat). It is a means of creating connection, as members of the group
join in scapegoating and in taking action against the scapegoat.
Another avenue to need fulfillment is to adopt ideologies, visions of a
better society (like nationalism), or a better world (like communism and
aspects of Nazism). Ideologies and movements to fulfill them offer a new
comprehension of the world, connection to other followers, positive iden
tity, effectiveness, and hope. Unfortunately, such ideologies are usually
destructive, in that they identify some group as an enemy who must be
destroyed if the ideology is to be fulfilled.
These group psychological and social processes are functional; they
serve to fulfill the basic needs frustrated and activated by difficult life
conditions. Unfortunately, they also lead the group to turn against some
other group. Discrimination and limited violence against the victims
bring about changes in the group and its individual members that make
greater violence possible and probable. Without countervailing forces
that inhibit this evolution, especially opposition by witnesses or
bystanders, the pro gression of increasingly violent actions is likely to
end in mass killing or genocide.
Certain cultural characteristics make genocide more likely (Staub,
1989; see also Staub, 1996). They can also been seen in basic needs terms.
For example, strong respect for authority means that people are
accustomed to guidance by and support from leaders and the group. As
a result, the loss of effective leadership, as evidenced by severe life
problems and social chaos, intensifies feelings of insecurity,
disconnection, threat to identity, and loss of comprehension of reality.
A basic needs perspective can also be useful in developing strategies
to prevent genocide and other collective violence. For example, in place
of a destructive ideology that focuses on enemies, an inclusive,
connecting vi sion can fulfill needs while enabling members of all groups
to join together in responding to life problems. This happened to a
degree in the United States during the Depression. It was made possible
by relatively moderate life problems, certain characteristics of the
culture, and the leadership that Roosevelt offered.
56 Introduction and Core Concepts
The road to intense group violence I sketched here is a common one.
Even when the starting point is different, or is a combination of difficult
life conditions with a history of antagonism between groups, or conflict
between dominant and subordinate groups, or self-interest (Fein, 1990;
Staub, 1989), many elements are common and much of the analysis
applies.
Security
The need to know or believe that we are and will continue to be free of
physical and psychological harm (of danger, attack, injury to our body or
self-concept and dignity) and that we are and will be able to satisfy our
essential biological needs (for food, etc.) and our need for shelter.
Humans and other organisms have a strong tendency to respond to
sig nals of potential harm. Sights, sounds, people, or places that have
been associated with harm create fear, stress, avoidance, or attack.
Attack and threat of attack, which frustrate the need for security (but can
also frus trate other needs), are the strongest, most reliable instigators of
aggression (Baron, 1977). Moreover, when humans and animals cannot
escape from places associated with previous pain and suffering, they
become with drawn and depressed and stop efforts to exercise control,
like dogs that have been exposed to unavoidable shocks (Seligman,
1975). Fear and stress associated with danger also reduce cue utilization.
In sum, insecurity leads to significant deterioration in the functioning of
organisms.
Positive Identity
The need to have a well-developed self and a positive conception of who
we are and who we want to be (self-esteem), which requires
self-awareness and acceptance of ourselves, including our limitations.
With increasing age, higher-level fulfillment of this need requires
integration of different parts of ourselves. Coherence and inner harmony
enable us, in turn, to lead increasingly purposeful lives.1 Esteem from
others has been regarded
1
This description is clearly of a family of needs, where “members” of the family may at
times conflict. For example, who we are and who we want to be can conflict with each
other. A positive view is not the same as an integrated view. However, as a mature
positive identity evolves, integration may come to enhance a positive view of the self, and
who we want to be may become a part of who we are. The description of positive identity
also includes processes required for continued growth, such as self-awareness.
58 Introduction and Core Concepts
by Maslow and other theorists as a basic need. Here it is seen as essen
tial to fulfill certain basic needs, especially positive identity and positive
connection.
There is probably no human need that has been posited by as many
theories as this one. As I have noted, this need has been regarded as a
central contributor to intractable conflict between groups (Burton, 1990;
Kelman, 1990). It seems embedded in most stages in Erikson's (1959)
developmental schema. Specifically the crises involving autonomy
versus shame, initiative versus guilt, industry versus inferiority, identity
versus role confusion, and ego integrity versus despair all seem to have
significant consequences for identity.
Research and theory in social (Baumeister, 1991) and personality
(Epstein, 1980) psychology suggest that both enhancement of one's self
esteem and maintaining the stability of one's self-concept are strong hu
man motives. From the present perspective, the latter probably also has
an important role in maintaining one's comprehension of reality.
Positive Connection
The need to have relationships in which we feel positively connected to
other individuals or groups, such as close family ties, intimate
friendships, love relationships, and relationships to communities.
Erikson's (1959) stage theory also stresses positive connection as
crucial for continued growth. Connection is implicit in both his first
developmental stage, which involves the crisis of trust versus mistrust,
and stage six, which involves intimacy versus isolation. Baumeister and
Leary (1995) gathered extensive empirical support for the existence of a
need to belong, “the need to form and maintain strong, stable,
interpersonal relationships” (p. 497).
The findings of the extensive research on attachment, quality of
attachment (Ainsworth, 1974; Ainsworth et al., 1979; Bowlby, 1969, 1980;
Bretherton, 1992), the positive consequences of secure attachment (Troy
& Sroufe, 1987; Waters et al., 1979) and the extreme consequences of lack
of attachment (Thompson & Grusec, 1970; Shaffer, 1995) suggest the
profound importance of positive connection. Research showing strong
positive as sociations between social support, that is, connections that
people have to other people and community, and health, well-being, and
even survival (Parks & Pilisuk, 1986) provides additional support.
Comprehension of Reality
The need to have an understanding of people and the world (what they
are like, how they operate) and of our own place in the world; to have
views or conceptions that make sense of the world. Our comprehension
of reality in turn shapes our relations to the world and can create
meaning in
Basic Human Needs 59
our lives. Since this is a basic need, any comprehension is better than
none. However, certain kind of comprehension of reality, for example,
seeing the world and people as hostile and dangerous, due to an earlier
history of need frustration, make the fulfillment of other basic needs
more difficult.
Not having some minimally coherent view of reality is a form of psy
chosis. Understanding or having a conception of how the world operates
is required to predict and control events. The need for meaning is central
in some theorizing (Frankl, 1959; Pearlman & Saakvitne, 1995). Meaning
may be seen as an integration of one's comprehension of reality and
identity and perhaps of other needs as well.
The need for consistency and the motivational power of inconsistency
have been strongly established in psychology. This can be subsumed
under the need for comprehension of reality: the need for various
elements of real ity (and identity) to fit together. Piaget's principle of
assimilation, absorbing new information into existing schemas, a
powerful principle of learning, appears to serve to maintain one's
existing comprehension of reality.
But human beings and other organisms also seek the unknown. The
attraction to and exploration of novelty may be means for developing
and exercising one's comprehension of reality and sense of efficacy (Deci,
1975; White, 1959). The way needs interrelate is also crucial. For
example, under conditions of security, in a benevolent environment,
greater novelty may be tolerated and preferred. When positive
connection is established, greater autonomy may be risked.
Independence or Autonomy
To make choices and decisions, to be one's own person, the ability to be
separate.
Young children already work hard to assert their will. The famous
terri ble twos are an expression of this need. So are the often intense and
hostile efforts of an adolescent in trying to become more independent
and au tonomous. Erikson (1959) has recognized the importance of
autonomy by specifying the second of his eight stages of development as
autonomy ver sus shame and doubt. While in well-functioning cultures
all basic needs must find at least moderate fulfillment, different cultures
emphasize and fulfill needs to different extents. Western cultures are
seen as emphasizing individualism and autonomy, Eastern cultures as
emphasizing connection and community (Triandis, 1994).
Increasingly as other basic needs are fulfilled, the need to move
beyond a focus on oneself emerges. People will experience
dissatisfaction and rest lessness, and continuing personal growth will be
truncated, without the fulfillment of this need (Coan, 1977). Religions,
Eastern and mystical tradi tions recount experiences of connection with
something universal, whether a universal self, God, other spiritual
entities, the universe or nature. There are many descriptions of “oceanic
feelings” in which the boundaries of the self are lost.
States and capacities for transcendence may serve the need for tran
scendence. For example, experiences of absorption or deep engagement,
what Csikszentmihalyi (1990) has called “flow,” may be regarded as
states of transcendence. These are times of self-forgetfulness. The focus is
away from the self. Altruistic acts, motivated by the desire to diminish
another's need, are inherently transcendent. Intense engagement
accompanied by self-forgetful joy seems to exist in infancy, and altruistic
acts may occur at an early age (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1979). Temporary
states of transcendence are likely to be growthful; paradoxically, going
beyond the self seems to serve the self. The growth of the self in turn
creates the possibility of more persistent forms of transcendence.
In the present view the need f or transcendence becomes powerful only
after other basic needs have been fulfilled. However, “pseudotranscen
dence” may result from unfulfilled basic needs that motivate people to
relinquish a burdensome self, often by giving themselves over to causes,
beliefs, and movements. In such cases transcendence and pseudotrancen
dence may look similar, but the underlying motivations differ.
Depending on the nature of the movement a person joins and subsequent
experiences in it, basic needs may get fulfilled and pseudotranscendence
may grow into genuine transcendence.
Long-Term Satisfaction
The need to feel and believe that things are good in our lives and that
our life is progressing in a desirable way, not necessarily at the moment,
but overall, in the long run.
People want to be contented, satisfied, and happy. Chronic
unhappiness affects all aspects of life. I use the term long-term
satisfaction rather than happiness to indicate stability even in the midst
of temporary distress, sorrow, or pain. Pain due to loss, illness,
separation, or the inability to fulfill important goals is inevitable in
human life. Even in the midst of temporary unhappiness, however,
people can have a basic, overall sense that their lives are progressing in a
positive, satisfying way.
The fulfillment of this need is primarily a by-product of the fulfillment
of other needs. Consistent with this view, self-esteem and internal locus
of control or a feeling of efficacy have been strong correlates of
happiness
Basic Human Needs 61
Need satisfaction is always temporary, but the effects of a history of
need satisfaction or frustration are enduring. Enduring psychological
processes also evolve that facilitate (eg, self-awareness) or frustrate (eg, a
negative worldview) further need satisfaction.
The fulfillment of basic needs provides the preconditions for, and goes
a long way toward creating, caring and altruism. Positive connections
lead to the valuing of people, which makes empathy and caring possible.
A feeling of security and a positive identity diminish a focus on oneself
and one's own needs and make openness to others' needs more likely.
Feelings of effectiveness and control help people fulfill their own goals;
this also makes openness to others more likely. Feeling effective makes it
probable that people will act on their empathy and caring. A realistic
understanding of the world, when it is at least moderately benevolent,
also makes it more likely that people will express caring and empathy in
action.
There are elements of socialization that contribute to the development
of caring, empathy, and helpfulness, beyond those intrinsically required
to fulfill basic needs. This is the case with aspects of guidance: pointing
out to children the consequences of their behavior on other people, the
modeling of helpful behavior, and leading children to engage in helpful
actions. Such practices, which are also need-fulfilling rather than
need-frustrating, specifically socialize children for caring, empathy, and
helping.
The fulfillment of basic needs creates strong connections to socializers.
This enables them to teach, through words and deeds, devaluation of
and hostility toward certain others. Thus, the practices and experiences
that develop caring also give power to the socializers to generate
hostility and aggression. However, while this can and does happen, it is
not the usual reality. Usually, it is neglect and mistreatment of children
that are associated with both individual violence as well as internal
violence in a group and warfare (Ross, 1993).